INEQUALITY AND EMPOWERMENT: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POST-WAR DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN EL SALVADOR, 1992-2000 by McElhinny, Vincent J.
  
 
INEQUALITY AND EMPOWERMENT: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF  
POST-WAR DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN EL SALVADOR, 1992-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
VINCENT J. MCELHINNY 
 
 
B.S.C.E. Carnegie-Mellon University, 1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment 
 
 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
2006 
  ii
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
 
by 
 
 
Vincent J. McElhinny 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
 
 
April 20, 2006 
 
 
and approved by 
 
 
Aníbal Perez-Linan, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science 
 
 
Scott Morgenstern, Professor, Dept. of Political Science 
 
 
Dissertation Co-Director: Barry Ames, Professor, Dept. of Political Science 
 
 
Dissertation Co-Director: John Markoff, Professor, Dept. of Sociology 
 
  iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Vincent J. McElhinny 
 
2006 
 iv
INEQUALITY AND EMPOWERMENT: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF  
POST-WAR DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN EL SALVADOR, 1992-2000. 
 
 
Vincent J. McElhinny, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006 
 
This dissertation is about decentralization and agrarian politics in post-war El Salvador (1992-1998).  
Decentralization of government has been prescribed widely in Latin America over the past two decades, 
justified on the premise that it encourages more accountable governance by empowering local actors.  
However, under conditions of high inequality and weak democracy, decentralization tends to reinforce 
already existing distributions of power and is frequently captured instead by powerful elites as a top-down 
strategy for preserving their interests.  Given this ambiguous mandate, a performance standard for 
empowered local actors is required.  I propose a novel conceptualization of empowerment as my 
dependent variable that is multidimensional and is examined at three levels of analysis (individual, meso-
organizational, macro-societal). I hypothesize that under conditions of high inequality and weak 
institutions, decentralization works (i.e. empowerment is achieved) when local actors acquire capital 
resources and through collective action they contest inequality to convert those resources into sustainable 
livelihood improvements and more favorable power relations.  Effective decentralization can therefore be 
contentious and may disempower local actors when collective action problems are insurmountable.  In El 
Salvador, two competing empowerment strategies may be distinguished.  Empowerment by invitation is a 
top-down, elite brokered process of political negotiation, premised upon a positive sum distribution of the 
benefits and a prior acceptance of the rules of the game.  Empowerment through conflict, on the other 
hand, implies a bottom-up, zero-sum contestation over political benefits, as well as the very rules and 
privileges that assure elites a cut of any subsequent benefit distribution.   To assess the performance of 
these competing empowerment strategies, I conduct a most similar case study comparison of three 
conflictive municipalities in the paracentral region of El Salvador that differ in one fundamental factor: 
their respective insurgent, hard-line counter-insurgent and moderate counter-insurgent political histories.  
Using survey analysis and process tracing, the evidence shows that where decentralization reinforced a 
process of diminishing inequality (Tecoluca) local actors were empowered to collect more local taxes, 
provide better services, achieve efficacious participation and attain more far reaching institutional 
coordination.  The persistence of high inequality in both counter-insurgent cases weakened mechanisms 
for participation, accountability and transparency that in turn made decentralization highly susceptible to 
bureaucratic resistance, corruption and the prioritization of elite interests – in other words, political 
capture.   
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I. CHAPTER ONE: DOES DECENTRALIZATION EMPOWER THE POOR?  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING POST-WAR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN EL 
SALVADOR 
 
 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralization of government has been prescribed widely in Latin America over the past two 
decades, justified on the premise that it necessarily encourages more accountable governance by 
empowering local actors.  From the classic work of Tiebout (1956), through the contemporary 
work of Ferejohn and Weingast (1997), decentralized systems are held to increase democratic 
legitimacy, while simultaneously improving the fiscal environment.1  It performs these feats by 
transferring from the central state to local institutions services that are efficiently carried out by 
actors who are more in tune with local preferences (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972).   
In Latin America, local institutions have demanded greater decentralization as a bottom-
up strategy to challenge inefficient, exclusive and corrupt central state agencies.  However, these 
Tocquevillian local interests have unintentionally coincided with similar top-down state reform 
goals championed by the multilateral development banks (IMF, World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, henceforth IFIs).  Not surprisingly, local institutions and their supporters 
have flourished.  Municipal governments, while previously only figurehead appointments, are 
now almost universally elected and are increasingly engaged in local development.2  Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civic associations and grassroots groups have also 
                                                 
1 Recent studies of targeting failures by centralized governments include Bardhan (2005), Shah (2004), Bird (2003), 
Grosh (1990, 1994), Ravallion (1999a, 1999b), Inter-American Development Bank (1994) and World Bank (1997, 
1994). Qian and Weingast (1997) debate Rose-Ackerman and Rodden (1997) regarding the reinforcing or corrosive 
effects of decentralization during market transitions in the case of China. 
2 Municipalities in El Salvador are like counties in the U.S. - an urban area that serves as the country seat surrounded 
by a rural area that is further divided into cantones (villages) and caseríos (hamlets). 
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proliferated across Latin America, resurrecting interest in the role of civil society in national 
development.3  In addition, social safety nets, which were initially deployed in response to 
development related emergencies as demand-driven (often externally financed) anti-poverty 
programs, have now assumed the status of permanent institutional interlocutors between 
communities and the state in almost every country.  Considering Latin America’s long centralist 
tradition, this remarkable shift toward decentralization has been described as a nothing less than 
a “quiet revolution” (World Bank 1997; Campbell 2003).  
  However, theories of political and fiscal decentralization were largely developed with 
reference to the advanced industrial democracies.  Their application as pro-poor rural 
development policies in developing countries departs from traditional assumptions of fiscal 
federalism in several ways.  Central governments in developing countries grant much less fiscal 
autonomy to local actors to compete through the supply of tax-expenditure packages.  In contrast 
to what the theory would predict, high information costs inhibit the poorest citizens from 
exercising exit strategies to take advantage of differential provision of welfare programs 
(Conning and Kevane 1999: 32).  More importantly, the proliferation of local actors competing 
over a relatively scarce provision of decentralized public goods has induced collective action 
problems that neutralize the benefits of localism (inter-jurisdictional coordination, realizing 
economies of scale, enforcement of contracts, monitoring of rule compliance, etc.).    
There is at least some evidence that these collective action problems are exacerbated 
when the state is weak, when mechanisms for local political competition are non-existent, where 
inequality is high and where democracy is unconsolidated.  In these settings, civil society has 
tended toward fragmentation rather than a coherent local system of checks and balances on local 
or national institutions. As a result, efficiency gains are usually small and decentralization is 
frequently captured instead by powerful elites as a top-down strategy for preserving their 
interests and political stability (Prud’homme 1995; Tanzi 1996, 2001).  Particularly under 
conditions of high inequality in the distribution of assets or income, decentralization is prone to 
capture by local elites (Bardhan and Mookerjee 1999, 2000).  This is the case in much of Latin 
America where decentralization strategies and unprecedented community level action have often 
strengthened local authoritarian enclaves and widened already high regional and household 
                                                 
3 Early research on this phenomenon includes Uphoff (1986), Chambers (1987), Cernea (1988), Esman and Uphoff 
(1984), Ostrom (1990), and Ostrom, et al. (1993).  
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inequality.4  Under such conditions, decentralization can have the perverse effect of 
disempowering local actors. 
 Nevertheless, decentralization will gather even greater momentum in the 21st century 
where, according to the World Bank, “two main forces will be shaping the world in which 
development policy will be defined and implemented: globalization (the continuing integration 
of the countries of the world) and localization (the desire for self-determination and devolution 
of power)” (1999: 31).  Given decentralization’s ambiguous mandate, is this trend toward greater 
localism and a smaller state in the interest of Latin America’s rural poor?  Why have local 
institutions become so important so quickly to development in Latin America?  Is 
decentralization being pulled down by local actors from below, or pushed down by elites from 
above?  How might we evaluate the pro-poor claims of decentralization – specifically in terms of 
empowerment?  In other words, what conditions make decentralization work?  These are the 
questions this dissertation sets out to answer. 
 I begin with the central hypothesis of this study.  Decentralization tends to strengthen 
the distribution of power that exists a priori at the local level.   Decentralization will tend to 
reinforce the interests of local elites in local contexts of high inequality, although this is less 
likely in contexts of relative greater equity.  In the first instance, decentralization tends to 
empower local elites almost exclusively.  In the less frequent instance of decentralization under 
conditions of improving local equity, decentralization tends to empower a wider cross-section of 
local society.  Both outcomes may involve a redistribution of state power, but only the latter is 
consistent with the conventional, if underspecified, use of local empowerment.5  The effectiveness 
of decentralization depends upon acting collectively to challenge local inequality. 
                                                 
4 Latin America is the most unequal region of the world.  In 1970, the richest 1 percent of the population earned 363 
times more than the poorest 1 percent.  By 1995, this gap had increased to 417 times (Londoño and Székely 1997; 
Székely and Hilgert 1999).  In general, the reforms of the 1990s failed to produce any decline in income inequality. 
(Székely 2001).  The World Bank (2003: 35-73) shows that the increase in Latin American inequality since World 
War II also evident in access to basic services, heath status, crime victimization, and political influence. 
5 The claim to empower is almost boilerplate language in both bottom-up and top-down reform proposals.  
Empowerment is now part of the core vernacular of peak development institutions, such as the World Bank.  First 
recognized by the Bank in chapters six and seven of the World Development Report 2000/2001 (2001) as one of the 
three pillars of poverty reduction, empowerment is now found in the documentation of over 1,800 World Bank-
aided projects, and it is the subject of debate and analytic work throughout the development community.  See Alsop 
and Heinsohn (2005) and Narayan (2002) for an overview of the World Bank’s work on measuring and 
mainstreaming empowerment, or http://www.worldbank.org/empowerment. 
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El Salvador represents a crucial case for answering the above questions and testing this 
hypothesis.  El Salvador experienced a twelve-year civil war, one of the leading causes of which 
was the unequal distribution of land, income and opportunity.  Throughout the war, the 
Salvadoran countryside was governed by two parallel states, two political-economic systems, 
and two competing conceptions of citizen empowerment.  Insurgent empowerment in zones 
under the control of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) 
coexisted with counter-insurgent empowerment in zones under the control of the Salvadoran 
government.  Of the various differences in local governance that separated government from 
insurgent FMLN rule, perhaps the most significant was the dramatic leveling of inequality that 
characterized the latter.  
Decentralized local rule has also emerged in insurgent communities with participatory 
experiences of decision making and a conspicuous capacity for contentious politics.  In contrast, 
local rule in zones of government control tend to have been associated with top-down 
experiments of decentralization, where an imposed consensus has relied on widespread 
acquiescence (Karl 1986).  Commitments to equality, participation and contentious advocacy 
strategies have contributed to the FMLN’s dramatic post-war electoral success.  While the 
insurgents have failed to win the Presidency, the former revolutionary party now represents the 
second political force in the country, and has controlled a plurality of seats in the national 
assembly and governs in as many as 75 of the country’s 262 municipalities, including the capital 
city of San Salvador.   
Sustained co-existence of alternative models of local development within various regions 
of the same country over the past two decades provides the basis for an important social 
experiment.  Sharply distinct political experiences involving decentralization have influenced 
competing notions of empowerment that in turn have deeply marked the institutionalization of 
local authority in NGOs, municipal governments and their articulation with social safety net 
programs.  Thus, the assigned roles, interests and performance of these local actors in 
decentralized postwar reconstruction will vary according to their respective underlying aggregate 
political experiences and their associated empowerment strategies.  Decentralization has 
empowered Salvadoran citizens differently depending upon the context of local political 
experience. 
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El Salvador is also an important case study of the globalization of local politics.   On one 
hand, under conservative governments El Salvador has advanced more quickly than almost any 
other Latin American country over the past decade in opening its economy to the free flow of 
international trade and investment.  This transnational dimension is deepened by the fact that 
nearly 20% of the Salvadoran population now lives abroad.  Remittances have a determining 
effect on local development policy, particularly in rural areas.6  At the same time, various 
transnational movements that mobilized for humanitarian and social justice concerns during the 
war have also engaged in innovative post-war advocacy campaigns to hold national and 
international economic actors more accountable in local development projects and national 
policymaking.  Again, wartime experiences have shaped both globalizing and localizing 
processes in post-war El Salvador. 
Because decentralized reconstruction programs were geographically targeted to benefit 
rural areas, I will focus more narrowly on rural development as a distinct domain of post-war 
empowerment.  Approximately 40% of the Salvadoran population still lives in rural areas, 
despite massive rural to urban migration over the past 30 years.  The rural economy has long 
subsidized urban development but enjoyed little of the spillover effects.  Urban poverty has 
declined considerably since 1991 while two thirds of the rural population remains below the 
poverty line. Most development indicators signal a clear urban bias to public and private 
investment over smaller and intermediate cities (World Bank 2001).  Third, in part as a corollary 
to the economic dependency of the primary cities on rural areas and peoples, recent democratic 
reforms also emerged in the periphery – a product of political challenges to authoritarian power 
mounted by rural peoples.  Still, these same political freedoms have yet to fully penetrate many 
rural clientelist enclaves (and arguably the behavior of the urban political elite).  For these 
reasons, any discussion of empowerment must account for political, economic and social change 
in the Salvadoran countryside, as well as its effect on urban and national development. 
This chapter views empowerment as the yardstick for answering the three questions 
identified at the outset.  Why have the institutional solutions to the decentralization’s collective 
action problems gravitated toward local government, NGOs and social safety nets?  How well 
                                                 
6 Formal and informal transnational institutions for the generation and transfer of remittances (and one might add 
criminal trafficking of illicit goods), the volume of which now well exceeds foreign direct investment and net export 
revenues in El Salvador, are analogous to the late medieval insurance institutions of long distance Mediterranean 
trade studied by Greif (1992). 
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have local actors (or the state) performed in their respective decentralized roles?  Under what 
conditions does decentralization work in post-war El Salvador?  In next section, I define key 
terms and outline the inequality induced collection action problem at the center of the 
decentralization debate.  In the final section, I elaborate a working definition of my dependent 
variable – empowerment, as the central evaluative measure of both approaches to 
decentralization.  Following Sen (1989, 1992, 1992), empowerment is conceptualized as a multi-
dimensional concept that will be measured in terms of resources, agency and achievements, and 
at three levels of analysis (community, meso-organizational, macro-societal).7       
 
 
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.  Defining Decentralization  
 
Decentralization is defined as the transfer from central to local decision makers some level of 
authority over taxes, expenditures and regulations.8 In practice, decentralization in Latin 
America has involved shifting some political, fiscal and/or administrative (resources and 
collection/allocation authority) to lower levels of government, but normally reserves most 
control over budgets or policy at the highest level.  Decentralization makes the most sense in 
policy areas where uniformity of provision is not required (exceptions include foreign policy, 
monetary and trade policy, public security) that have no inter-jurisdictional spillover effects 
(excepting constitutional amendment, income tax administration, educational curricula) and do 
not depend on economies of scale (state monopsony enterprises).  Public works represent one 
policy that fulfill these criteria and are frequently decentralized.  Certain tax measures represent 
                                                 
7 The field research for this dissertation, including a 913 person survey and related interviews, was conducted in El 
Salvador between 1998-1999 and in the U.S. in 1999.  I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Inter-American 
Foundation, the Aspen Institute's Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, and the Fulbright Institute for International 
Education for field research portion of this project, and an Andrew Mellon Fellowship for the analysis and writing 
stages of the work. 
8 Adapted from IDB (1994: 182). 
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another key area.  Following a framework proposed by the UNDP (1993: 67), decentralization 
can take three forms: 
 
• Deconcentration is limited to passing down only administrative discretion to 
local offices of central government ministries. Although it does result in some 
dispersal of power, few decisions can be taken without reference to the center. 
• Delegation involves passing some authority and decision-making powers to local 
officials, but central government retains the right to overturn local decisions and 
can, at any time, take these powers back. 
• Devolution represents the strongest form of decentralization.  Devolution 
involves granting decision-making powers to local authorities and allowing them 
to take full responsibility without reference back to central government.  This 
includes financial power over expenditures and taxes as well as the authority to 
design and execute local development projects and programs. 
 
 Within the development literature, decentralization implies that significant 
responsibilities are to be shifted from the state to local governments, non-governmental 
organizations, civic associations -- to civil society itself, which is assumed to hold a comparative 
information and accountability advantage in tailoring local services to client needs, deepening 
participation, and advocating for citizen interests (UNDP 1993; World Bank 2000: 107-124).  
From a public choice perspective, the inefficiencies and inequities attributed to centralization are 
best countered by forcing decentralized state institutions and levels of government to compete 
for citizen votes and taxes.9    In some cases, decentralization has been employed by neoliberal 
reformers as a politically more palatable means for privatization or structural adjustment.  
Support for local control can also be found in the post-structuralist critique of both markets and 
developmentalism, promoting instead a cultural politics of self-determination armed with local 
                                                 
9 See Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), Buchanan and Tollison (1981).  It is doubtful how applicable this model, 
based upon population mobility to access the best public tax-expenditure offers, is to developing countries such as 
El Salvador.  Given the significance of international migration and remittances, the most appropriate application 
would involve conceptualizing El Salvador as one local entity in a widely construed transnational labor market. 
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knowledge and aimed at regulating global property rights.10   Indeed, decentralization has been 
promoted in some cases to diffuse social and political tensions, using autonomy in the midst of 
ethnic or separatist conflict as a way of preserving power. 
In effect, all theoretical approaches to decentralization seek to empower citizens to hold 
the state and themselves more accountable for their own development. The metaphor of a 
virtuous circle is employed by (Tendler 2000: 15) to describe how the state and local networks of 
civil society organizations and local government become “locked in a two-way dynamic of 
pressures for accountability that results in improved government.” 11 
 The demonstrated heroic role of civil society organizations in democratic transitions has 
led the World Bank and other principal institutions to identify civil society as a crucial agent in 
consolidating democracy and improving economic performance.  Civil society is understood 
here in its conventional form, as the sphere of voluntary, collective action in the public 
sphere (Arato and Cohen 1992).   Not reducible to the exclusivity and privatism of the market 
and the family, nor the will to rule associated with political society, civil society tends to be 
viewed as a separate mediating sphere, often constituted by local voluntary associations, between 
economic and political society. 
 Local institutions and organizations are casually folded into civil society, but two 
distinctions are necessary.  Following definitions set out by North (1990), municipal 
governments are political institutions because they constitute the formal rules and the informal 
norms and values that structure governance (a large measure of horizontal interaction) at the 
local level.   NGOs are typically non-profit organizations comprised of groups of individuals 
bound by a common purpose to achieve their objectives.12  Municipal governments are formally 
                                                 
10 See Scott (1985), Escobar (1994), Sachs (1992), Alvarez et al. (1998), and Ferguson (1994). Bardhan refers to this 
perspective as “anarcho-communitarian” (2005: 106), lumping together the postmodernists, multiculturalists, 
environmentalists, and indigenists. 
11 The virtuous circle metaphor has also been employed by Putnam (1993) and Birdsall, et al. (1995). 
12 Not to conflate substantive differences between non-governmental organizations, unions, cooperatives and civic 
associations, in this chapter I will use NGOs to identify all four types of local actors.  In order to distinguish 
international NGOs (i.e. donors whose headquarters are located in Northern countries), I use the label - “INGOs”.  
Federations of unions and cooperatives that are organized primarily around economic or workplace concerns are 
referred to as gremios.  Gremios are akin to guilds, typically composed of members defined by occupational status, 
whose primary objective is the promotion and defense of the economic interests of the group.   Unions are included 
in my typology of local actors, even though they usually vanish from the screen of civil society in most Northern 
schemas.   
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charged with local rule and NGOs are not, although informal political competition blurs this 
formal difference.  Municipal governments are the primary expression of the state at the local 
level and possess the formal authority to make binding, non-voluntary decisions about rules (i.e. 
taxes and spending decisions) (James Thomson 1991).  NGOs are considered private, voluntary 
organizations.   
Yet, in matters of decentralized local development, the public-private divide between 
administrative and economic functions is less than clear.  For better or worse, non-governmental 
organizations are becoming institutionalized in El Salvador, although they operate within rules 
that are still quite fluid.   Discerning the functional differences among local actors requires a 
detailed treatment of interests, tactics, resources, internal and external structures.  
 Conceptually, civil society typically encompasses both NGOs and other associations, but 
not public institutions like municipal government.  I use the concept, mobilization network, to 
connote partnerships among local development actors that connect civil society organizations 
and institutions to the state and market.  While sensitive to the varied structural differences 
between NGOs, civic associations, and municipal governments, mobilization networks direct 
attention to the types of linkages (vertical and horizontal) that conduct the behavior of 
individuals and organizations within a locality.  The structure of mobilization networks 
represents part of the overall political opportunity structure for collective action – a qualifying 
condition for empowerment taken up in more detail in following chapter. 
 
 
2.  The Problem: Decentralization, Inequality, Institutional Capture & the Challenges of 
Collective Action 
 
While I will use evidence primarily from El Salvador, my theoretical argument is applicable to a 
more general set of post-conflict, developing country settings.13  Effective decentralization 
assumes that local actors will find it easier to act collectively to hold local institutions more 
accountable than remote, poorly informed, centralized, often times corrupt agencies.    However, 
                                                 
13 My argument will have particular relevance for political and economic transitions in post-conflict settings, of 
which there are over 50 countries experiencing ongoing or recently ended civil wars.  See, for example, the World 
Bank’s Fragile States: Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative. 
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local settings offer no panacea for improved governance or the absence of the ills of centralized 
rule.  Conditions of high inequality and weak democracy often produce a context of intense 
distributional conflict.  Fragmented local interests frustrate collective action and facilitate the 
political capture of decentralization by local elites.  Bardhan (2005:108-109) argues that the idea 
decentralization may need some protection from its own enthusiasts, whose preoccupation with 
efficiency in public provision can obscure the fact that “in many situations in developing 
countries the poor and minorities are oppressed by the local power groups and may look to the 
central state for protection and relief.” 14  Contrary to theories of fiscal federalism, under these 
conditions decentralization intended to punish unaccountable or corrupt centralist government 
can have the unintended result of leaving local actors less empowered than ever.  For these 
reasons, on which I elaborate below, I argue that inequality, asset inequality in particular, 
represents the major challenge to decentralization (and in turn, rural development) in developing 
countries. 
By collective action problems, I refer to the coordination, management and delivery of 
local public goods essential for rural development--roads, technical assistance services, power, 
telecommunications, irrigation, education, public health, sanitation, and security.15  These public 
goods are typically a pre-requisite for private investment.  In the provision of local public goods, 
collective action is necessary in the mobilization of money, labor and material resources, the 
design of rules governing resource use, the monitoring of rule compliance, and the enforcement 
of sanctions against rule breakers – all of which must be coordinated between jurisdictions of 
government. 
However, nested within this set of conventional tasks is a more intractable problem of 
dealing with the disproportionate opportunism of local elites that may capture the institutions set 
up to coordinate the provision of public goods (Rose-Ackerman 1997; Narayan, et al. 2000; 
Galasso and Ravallion 2000).  “The power wielded by the local elites is often in inverse 
                                                 
14 See also Tanzi (2001) and Von Braun and Grote (2000). 
15 These examples relax the definitional properties of a pure public good which emphasize jointness of supply and 
non-excludability.  Non-excludability means that the benefits of a good are available to a group, whether or not 
members of the group contribute to the provision of the good.  Under certain conditions, we might also add to this 
list, collective production, storage, commercialization, technology and credit acquisition.  Another category of 
public goods with significant economic implications for the poor are “common pool resources” such as forests, 
fisheries, grazing lands, and water resources.   
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proportion to the degree to which they are held accountable for their actions and decision 
making” (Narayan, 2000). In the policy context of rural development, Bardhan and Mookerjee 
define political capture as “anti-poor policy biases resulting from low levels of political 
awareness among poor voters, and lobbying by special interest groups that disproportionately 
represent the interests of the non-poor” (2000a: 5).16   
Evidence of political capture can be found in targeting failures involving scarce public 
resources, the withholding of private resources for development, regressive tax policy, lack of 
political competition, rule breaking in the cooperative use of common pool resources.  The 
effects of political capture are often associated with the undersupply of public goods (education, 
information, infrastructure, land, economic innovation) typically necessary for sustainable 
development.17 
The building of local roads that typically improve access to the properties of local elites 
often reflects both the power and asymmetric information of these elites in influencing the use of 
scarce public resources for private gain.  This is not to deny that local elites also typically own 
the farms and factories that would produce more and in turn potentially employ more people 
with better roads. However, political capture involves first and foremost a decision making 
process that reflects the power disparity between elite and peasant in a rural setting.  The rules 
regarding local resource use, like Przeworski’s definition of democracy, should provide for 
relatively unpredictable outcomes – such as investments in local roads that do not lead to the 
properties of local elites.   Outcomes that indicate political capture may also involve “anti-poor 
policy biases” in decisions not taken, such as transparent, accountable governance, enforced 
equitable and sustainable use of common natural resources or progressive tax reforms. 
Bardhan and Mookerjee conclude that the probability for insurmountable collective 
action problems and political capture is higher in areas of high inequality, precisely the areas 
targeted as beneficiaries of decentralized post-war reconstruction in El Salvador, but common to 
much of Latin America (Baland and Platteau forthcoming).  Latin America is without equal 
                                                 
16 Political capture might also be understood as an extreme case of “rent seeking” – or the politically rational pursuit 
by interest groups of economic privileges. 
17 Bardhan (2005: 113) cites the pro-decentralization arguments that attribute European industrial revolution to the 
fragmented rule, or “parcelized sovereignty” of post-feudal modernity and was the spark for a spiral of technological 
innovation and competition.  In capturing decentralization, elites can effectively derail the investments necessary for 
human capital and long-term economic progress. 
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when it comes to inequality, especially inequality in the distribution of land.18   According to 
Londoño and Székely (2000), who even when using a conservative consumption based estimate 
of inequality, find Latin America the most unequal region of the world.  Income inequality has 
not improved in the 1990s and in some countries, like El Salvador, it has worsened.  This 
persistence or deterioration of income distribution is largely due to within-country factors.  
Where the very rich have lost some ground in income share, gains by upper and middle-income 
shares have come at the expense of the poor.  Lower quintile Latin American incomes are in line 
with poor people worldwide, which suggest that inequality is due to excessive wealth 
concentration at the top.  Londoño and Székely argue that the worsening of inequality is not due 
to lack of growth (although perhaps to volatility), but rather to political incapacity to improve 
distribution.   
In contrast, China, India and other Asian cases provide evidence that decentralization is 
more effective in settings of relatively lower inequality.  The decollectivization of agriculture in 
China and land reform in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, which have both resulted 
in the highly egalitarian distribution of land, may have also substantially mitigated the risk of 
political capture by local elites (Mitra and Singh 1999).  China’s impressive rural 
industrialization led by local governments and Town-Village Enterprises is attributed to the lack 
of an excessively strong rural lobby (Oi 1999).  Research on conflict in the management of 
irrigation systems in particular seems to demonstrate the clear benefit of low land inequality for 
the success of decentralization (Bardhan 2005; Lam 1998; Wade 1981, 1997).  In each of these 
examples, decentralization has worked not because the state has withered away, but rather that 
the structure obstacles, such as land inequality, have been mitigated by a strong state beforehand. 
Solutions to local impunity, be they accommodative or contentious, represent an 
embedded set of collective action strategies upon which the more conventional questions of 
coordinating the provision of public goods depends.   Conventional coordination of public goods 
and challenging impunity are thus two faces of the same collective action problem in highly 
unequal societies. 
                                                 
18 World Bank (2003), Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998), IDB (1998), Székely and Hilgert (1999), Székely 
(2001a). 
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Inequality exacerbates collective action in a variety of ways.  At a macro-level, cross-
national and cross-sectional analyses have demonstrated how aggregate inequality intensifies 
distributional conflicts that also limit the capacity for collective action. 
 
• Inequality, particularly asset inequality, has been shown to reduce potential economic 
growth through inefficient use and underinvestment in natural and human resources, 
thus reducing the potential supply of incentives for collective action.19  
• Inequality also ensures that the growth that is attained does not translate into an equal 
share of benefits for the poorest – exacerbating further the problem of mobilizing the 
poor.  At such high levels of inequality, the linkage between growth and poverty has a 
low elasticity -- growth does not necessarily reduce poverty.  In fact, if Latin America 
had the same GDP but with the income distribution of any other region of the world, 
poverty would be cut by at least in half.20  Székely (2001a) has shown for Latin 
America that high income inequality may reduce the benefits of growth to the poor by 
one half to two thirds. Poverty is largely a distributive problem where gains due to 
growth are captured disproportionately by the rich. 
• Inequality increases mutual distrust, thus making consensus around policy shifts in the 
face of crises difficult or impossible and contributing to conflict.21  Latin America’s 
inability to implement meaningful fiscal reforms in the face of crumbling legitimacy of 
public institutions and the package of neoliberal reforms is but one example.   
 
At the micro-level, collective action problems may be aggravated by two classes of free 
rider problems – each of which is compounded by inequality.  The first is where collective action 
                                                 
19 This line of argumentation is associated with Kuznets (1955), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), Perotti (1996), Benabou (1996), Ravallion (1997), Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (1998), Squire and Zou 
(1998), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), and Deininger and Olinto (2000), but see Deininger and Squire (1998) and 
Barro (2000) for a summary of arguments finding no statistical relationship between inequality and growth without 
disaggregating for certain country clusters. 
20 Londono and Székely (2000).  Similar inequality-growth-poverty reduction arguments can be found in Adelman 
and Morris (1973), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Foster and Székely (2001). For research that suggests a one to one 
relationship between income generation and poverty reduction, regardless of inequality see Dollar and Kraay (2000). 
21 Bardhan (2005), Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000), Midlarsky (1999) Knack and Keefer (1997, 2000)  
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breaks down over how the costs of change will be shared.  The second is an asymmetrical 
bargaining problem – where collective action breaks down over how the benefits will be shared.  
In the former, as the group size increases, monitoring and enforcement costs are higher, and the 
probability of unsanctioned opportunism is raised, therefore lowering the ex ante incentives for 
participation.22  In the latter, some actors may not participate because they are not sure about the 
final distribution of the benefits (Ostrom, et al. 1993).  In other words, weaker actors may withhold 
their contribution under suspicion that the distribution of benefits will be captured by more 
powerful actors (Baland and Platteau 1996; Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 2002).  Conversely, 
powerful actors may veto a more efficient collective arrangement if the new arrangement 
threatens their current mechanisms for extracting rent or if absolute gains imply relative loss 
(Robinson 2003).  
Both classes of collective action problems are exacerbated by high intra-community 
inequality, weak institutions and distributional conflict – contributing to the distortion of 
decentralization through local institution capture.  The classic example of asymmetric bargaining 
obstacles to collective action involves the failure of land markets to resolve the highly inefficient 
state of asset concentration (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995; Griffin, Rahman Kahn and 
Ickowitz 2000; Deininger, 2003; Sauer and Barros, 2002; Carter and Salgado 2001).  Except in 
some plantation crops, economies of scale in agricultural production in many developing 
countries are insignificant (Netting 1993; Conroy, Murray and Rossett 1996).  
Land markets in Latin America have generally failed to redistribute land toward the more 
efficient small or middle strata farmers.  Tax laws and their lax enforcement motivate large 
landholders to hold land even while leaving it idle or underutilized despite land scarcity among 
poor farmers.  Large landowners have also vigorously resisted forceful land redistribution in 
order to preserve a profitable livelihood, speculative future opportunities, political access, and 
status (Baland and Robinson 2003).  Leasing in Latin America, another potentially more efficient 
alternative, is well below the developing country average due to fears that tenants may demand 
more secure occupancy rights (De Janvry 1998).  Market failures in credit routinely contribute to 
the inability of small farmers to purchase adequate land, underinvestment in existing small 
                                                 
22 Olson (1965). To be more precise, the marginal benefit in the distribution of a public good by a person’s 
contribution, does not outweigh the cost of contributing – and the benefits of the public good would most likely be 
available anyhow. 
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farming plots, and the higher probability of losing those plots to larger farmers in times of 
economic distress.  The unplanned collective action strategies influenced by land markets (and 
expropriative redistribution in many cases) have been thwarted by the asymmetrical bargaining 
power of landed interests (Browning 1971; White 1973). 
It is possible, as Olson suggests, that inequality could in fact resolve the free rider - 
collective action problems in the provision of rural public goods.  The tendency toward higher 
inequality increases the likelihood that a single, dominant actor can provide the public good 
unilaterally in exchange for some reciprocal benefit from individual users (e.g., sharecropping 
tenure arrangements).  This solution adequately describes the expansion of publicly subsidized 
commodity marketing programs and rural infrastructure (highways, feeder roads, irrigation and 
flood control infrastructure, storage facilities and ports) on El Salvador’s Pacific coast during the 
post-World War II expansion of cotton production.  High concentration of land ownership 
reduced the costs of collective action (lobbying the state) by a small group of landlords.  
However, the landed elites represented the primary source of opportunism (property rights 
violations) in the first place and assured that benefits would be captured.  Therefore, the skewed 
benefits with this provision of rural investment in the absence of asset redistribution produced 
the perverse outcome of reinforced inequality. 
Despite their obvious inefficiencies, the strength of vested interests allows dysfunctional 
local institutions to persist.  Various cases of decentralized public works and common pool 
resource management failures illustrate these factors at work.23   
There are many potential strategies for resolving both types of collective action problems 
– all of which I group together below under Agency.  Most solutions involving local institutions 
entail various combinations of selective incentives, coercion, entrepreneurial activism and social 
norms (Ostrom 1990).  Lichbach (1996: 18-24) has classified these strategies into four broad 
types – Market, Contract, Community and Hierarchy.24   
                                                 
23 One common example is the difficulty of holding large landowners accountable for water use by smaller irrigation 
system members (Wade 1987; Dayton-Johnson 1998). 
24 I prefer to use strategies instead of Lichbach’s choice of “solution”.    
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This typology of collective action shown in Figure 1.1 is divided along two dimensions.25    
The first dimension is ontological, or in other words whether one might believe that collective 
action may be spontaneous among individuals (Contract, Market) or is contingent upon pre-
existing institutions, social structures or social ties (Hierarchy, Community).  The second 
dimension is deliberative.  People involved in collective action may be dividing strategic 
approaches are planned versus unplanned.   Lichbach suggests that the Market CA strategies to 
achieving social order (insurgent or counter-insurgent) may be thought of as a baseline, while the 
three alternative sets of solutions may be viewed as the context in which the baseline model is 
placed. 
Market strategies represent uncoordinated choices within the given constraints of an 
invisible hand.  As illustrated in the case of land markets, Market CA strategies assume that 
among isolated individuals, there is little or no engagement in social planning (such as 
alternatives to or conditions on individual private property rights).  Market approaches tend to 
emphasize raising benefits and lowering the costs to CA, and hence, are most consistent with the 
core rationalist assumptions of uncoordinated voluntarist actions that flow from narrow self-
interested motivations.   Contract strategies represent planned choices to shape constraints over 
otherwise spontaneous actions.  Contract strategies assume individuals that find ways to bargain 
over the mutual agreements needed to solve their CA problems.  The forging of solidarity or 
pragmatic association among secondary (formal) groups is the basis for cooperation.  Lichbach 
identifies three types of contract strategies: establishment of self-governing institutions, 
contingent cooperation and mutual exchange – all of which rely upon a concerted change of the 
context in which individual strategies are pursued.   Community strategies assume that local 
norms and common values render planning unnecessary, and these norms and social ties 
facilitate cooperation.  Community approaches are unplanned, but contingent upon the existence 
or creation of a common belief system.  Informal primary groups and mechanistic patterns of 
solidarity are the basis for cooperation.  Hierarchy (force) assumes that pre-existing institutions 
make deliberate efforts to solve CA problems through some form of organization of the potential 
cooperators.  Hierarchy best describes the type of CA strategy that was most prevalent during the 
                                                 
25 Lichbach’s typology builds from the previous work of Taylor (1992) and is consistent with other similar 
classifications of the logical forms of collective action proposed by Hirschman (1970), Kriesi (1995), Tarrow 
(1994), and McAdam (1996). 
  17
war (under both government-military and FMLN command), as well as elite-peasant pre-war 
relations on most haciendas. 
 
 Ontology 
Deliberation Contingent Order 
Institutions, Structures, Social Ties 
Spontaneous Order 
Individuals 
Planned Hierarchy (force) 
• Imposing, monitoring and enforcing 
agreements (state repressive capacity) 
• Selective benefits/disincentives 
• Locating entrepreneurs (organizers) 
• Locating patrons (elite access & 
stability) 
• Reorganizing-decentralize 
• Increasing competition among allies 
Contract (bargaining) 
• Self-government 
• Contingent cooperation (Tit-for-Tat) 
• Mutual Exchange 
 
 
Unplanned Community  (political culture) 
• Tap other regardingness, altruism, 
solidarity, fairness 
• Build from self-actualizing political 
experience  
• Build Bandwagon – traditional 
organizing 
• Increase mutual expectations 
 
Market (baseline) 
• Increase benefits, lower costs 
• Increase resources 
• Improve probability of winning or 
making a difference 
• Improve productivity of tactics 
• Increase enemy competition 
• Increase risk taking 
• Use incomplete information 
• Restrict/promote exit 
• Reduce supply or change type of 
PG/public bad 
 
Figure 1.1  Agency: Solutions to the Collective Action Problem 
 
 
In the case of El Salvador, I will discuss the origins, the war-time shifts and the post-war 
implications of CA strategies that have been most influential in insurgent and counter-insurgent 
municipalities.  As Lichbach argues, both the FMLN and the government employed a repertoire 
of strategies to promote or prevent collective dissent. For example, hierarchical CA strategies of 
force may best describe the CA strategy that best explains the transition from an authoritarian, 
unfair labor regime that prevailed on most large rural farms in the pre-war period to the 
imposition of military rule in government controlled zones during the war.  In contrast, several 
currents of community CA strategies that built upon pre-existing communal solidarities 
(progressive Catholicism, rural unions, revolutionary organizing) were influential in explaining 
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the origins of the FMLN insurgency.  Insurgent organizing approaches then gravitated toward a 
combination of hierarchy and contract strategies during the war. 26   
Both insurgent and counter-insurgent CA strategies that prevailed before and during the 
war shifted again during peacetime. Government-military hierarchy has tended to shift toward 
both contract and market strategies. FMLN contract strategies have bifurcated into both 
community and hierarchy (see Figure 1.3 below).   
Lichbach emphasizes that no single type of strategy is a sufficient explanation for 
collective action (1996: Chapter 7).  Market CA strategies alone are acutely susceptible to failure 
under conditions of high inequality, as illustrated by the poor performance of land markets in 
Latin America.  Markets are logically incomplete because the origins of preferences and resource 
endowments cannot be explained.  Contract, community and hierarchy all represent contexts that 
attempt to partially fill this gap.  However each of these is, in turn, flawed as a unitary 
explanation for CA.  Norms can be those of the incumbent power and may be imposed, contract 
enforcement and monitoring is ultimately contingent on some prior structural arrangement 
among the actors, and the coercion of hierarchy is insufficient for the long-term maintenance of 
social stability.  
Contract presupposes some Hierarchy capable of enforcing compliance.  Hierarchy 
presupposes some prior unexplained collective action to form the organizations that coerce 
cooperative behavior.  The prior collective action may have rested on pre-existing Community 
norms.  Thus, any combination of all CA strategies are implicated and then may be involved to 
contest local inequality - a crucial condition for making decentralization work in post-war El 
Salvador.   
Democratic reforms in much of Latin America would suggest that greater political 
competition at the local level would provide a possible mechanism for challenging inequality.  
However, the troubling persistence of inequality in Latin America despite the advance of 
electoral democracy infers a more complex relationship.  If inequality is high enough, the rich 
                                                 
26 However, Hierarchy, Contract or Community CA strategies governing landlord-peasant relations were not 
mutually exclusive alternatives or variations on Market strategies.  Though represented only about 10% of the rural 
occupations and largely eliminated by export agriculture, various pre-war sharecropper contracts (i.e. colono) were 
widely preferred by many peasants over the market nature of rural labor relations today.   Similarly, Christian base 
Community CA strategies promoted by progressive Catholic priests and catechists were grafted onto hierarchical 
religious men’s orders, such as the Gentlemen of Christ the King. 
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will have sufficient political clout to capture locally elected office and block redistributive 
reforms/mechanisms or steer them from their intended target.27  
By contrast, the most effective land reforms in Latin America have involved often very 
undemocratic state expropriation of land, often triggered by collective violence against landlords 
or a repressive state (Riedinger et al. 2001; Griffin et al, 2000).  Democratic reforms themselves 
have also involved highly conflictive processes of bottom-up pressure to remove authoritarian 
rule at the national level.  Despite regular elections, local power in many rural areas of Latin 
America often still rests with unelected local elites.  The positive effect of democracy on holding 
local leaders accountable may be conditioned upon a prior or simultaneous reduction in asset 
inequality.  Both processes may be dependent upon the capacity for contentious, collective action 
in settings of high inequality – an assumption that would require a broadening of our most 
conventional conceptions of empowerment.   
 
                                                 
27 In his analysis of six developing countries, Blair (2000) has argued that there is little evidence that democratic 
local government can do much to reduce poverty in the short run.   
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C.  EMPOWERMENT 
 
As the dependent variable of this study, the final section of this chapter will elaborate a working 
definition of empowerment.  Empowerment implies the transfer of power to the powerless, 
which is consistent with the central presumption of decentralization – an unequal initial 
distribution of power resources.   Empowerment can be a private and individual process as well 
as a public and collective one.  Because the focus here on rural development emphasizes the 
capacity for local actors to resolve collective action problems in order to contest inequality, it is 
the latter component that I contend is most decisive.  
Considering the multiple paths to solving collective action problems and the contested 
notions of how power is transferred, no single empirical measure of empowerment will be 
satisfactory.   This encompassing quality suggests why empowerment is infrequently cited in the 
political science literature.28   Yet, upon identifying the constituent elements of empowerment 
(participation, efficacy, economic well-being, social ties, physical security, health, etc.), the links 
to several vital cross-disciplinary research programs becomes evident.29  Still, the inter-
connections between these various elements of empowerment remain relatively unexplored.30   
Drawing from the work of Amartya Sen (1992, 1999) I propose an empirical 
measurement of empowerment that requires the simultaneous attention to three dimensions - 
resources, agency and achievements, and three levels of analysis (individual-community, 
organizational, society).   After sketching the transition within the development literature toward 
a more capital resource-based evaluative approach to decentralization, I will address each 
dimension of the empowerment process.  I will then propose how each dimension will be 
measured within the community, across organizations and across society.   
 
                                                 
28 Recent attempts to measure empowerment in the past decade have focused on single dimensions, such as political 
representation, see Gilliam (1996) and Bobo and Gilliam (1990) 
29 I have in mind the recent theoretical work of Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997), Evans (1996), Putnam (1993), and 
Ostrom (1990), but specifically in the area of rural development, the asset or capital based proposals of the World 
Bank (2001) and Narayan (2002), see also Moser (1999), de Janvry, et al. (2000), Attanasio and Székely (2001), 
Chambers (1983, 1987, 1993, 1997) Bebbington (1999), Cruikshank (1999) and Scoones (1998). 
30 The interdisciplinary nature of this research builds on the important theoretical work of Sen (1999), but also draws 
on Bourdieu (1971); and recent work by Bebbington (1999), Kabeer (1999), and Scoones (1998) 
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1.  Empowerment by Invitation or through Conflict 
 
Empowerment has become the stated goal of a surprisingly wide range of interventions.31  So 
diverse, in fact, are these empowerment activities, that the term has been associated with many 
competing definitions and consequently little conceptual precision.32  Since its first use in 
association with rural development, the idea has acquired two very different meanings in Latin 
America in the area of rural development.33   The first meaning is associated with a model of 
social change that might be called empowerment through conflict.  This model is derived from 
the notion of power as a zero-sum resource, redistributed, as Tarrow argues, “when ordinary 
people join forces in contentious confrontation with elites, authorities and opponents” (1994:1).   
A more positive-sum notion of empowerment by invitation, is derived from what pluralists like 
Putnam (1993) describe as the rational pursuit of “self-interest properly understood” through 
more informal and consensual forms of local civic activity such as soccer leagues, bird clubs and 
choir societies, and in turn, through political participation.34  In the view of the former, 
decentralization is a bottom-up, potentially conflictive process where local institutions challenge 
the structures of inequality.  In the latter, decentralization involves a top-down but consensual 
process where local institutions seek to expand power even though relative distributional 
imbalances may remain unchanged.  I associate the former model with the insurgent methods of 
the FMLN, and the latter with the counter-insurgent methods of the Salvadoran government – 
although neither offers a perfect fit.  Neither approach is purely top-down nor bottom-up, 
                                                 
31 Some areas where empowerment has been identified as the dependent variable include: 1. Civic renewal & 
community action, 2.  Social work, 3.  Alternative rural development, 4.  Mental health, disability, and rehabilitative 
health care counseling, 5.  Faith and spirituality, 6.  Workplace employee management and organization, 7.  
Feminist/gender/subaltern politics, 8.  Consumer advocacy and, of course 9.  Reinventing government, deregulation 
and decentralization. 
32 The Heinz Corporation, a Pittsburgh based multinational recently marketed a new brand of “kid-friendly” green 
ketchup upon the premise that, “it’s empowered [children] in a way they have always desired but haven’t had an 
opportunity.  It’s a ketchup they can call their own.”  Pittsburgh City Paper, Vol. 10:29, July 19-26, 2000, pg. 4. 
33 In Spanish or Portuguese, the word empowerment has no direct translation. 
34  This typology and the phrase, empowerment by invitation, were both borrowed from Joel Handler (1996: 133).    
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consensual or conflictive, as the gaps between claims and practice in the municipal case studies 
will clearly illustrate.  Nevertheless, these two competing interpretations for how 
decentralization empowers people will frame my analysis of the goals, tactics and outcomes of 
decentralized development in El Salvador.   
As early as the 1960s an empowerment by invitation approach to rural development in 
Latin America was heavily influenced by pluralist notions of power.  This standard definition of 
power assumes that people will act on grievances by participating within relatively open decision 
making arenas.  Parsons (1971), for example, argued that empowerment is vocality, achieved 
through the ballot box or communications media, where critical resources are infinitely 
expansible.  Power is assumed to be widely dispersed, fluid and cumulative.  The emphasis is on 
absolute gains rather than shifts in relative distribution.  Therefore, observable inaction is not 
constrained by power or oppression, but explained by individual apathy, alienation, low political 
efficacy or the silent consent among unequals of their inequality (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1963).   
Collective action is framed by pluralist conceptions of power from a Market strategy 
perspective, bounded by the existing procedures and institutions for mediating political conflict.  
Power is exercised through conventional strategies of joining coalitions, participating in town 
meetings, voting to delegate authority to broader decision making institutions, based on the claim 
that these existing deliberative spaces are essentially open and fair.  Self-restraint is justified on 
the danger of institutional overload (Huntington, 1975: 112-115).  Therefore, collective action is 
framed by pluralists as limited by the required (and presumed natural) apathy of marginal 
groups, whose eventual inclusion involves the exchange of social mobility for self-restraint.35  
Inherent to this model is the assumption that regime stability entails a recruitment of civil society 
associations to absorb citizen energy at the local level, freeing public matters of governance to 
elites.   
Empowerment is conceived here as process of consensus that promises a positive-sum 
distribution of power resources.  It is assumed that both the interests of the powerful and the 
powerless converge around a particular goal, yet agree that the powerless cannot achieve the goal 
                                                 
35 This rationale for acceptable non-participation was labeled by Almond and Verba (1963) as a “parochial culture” 
Exclusion was therefore an individual choice, not an institutional or environmental pathology.  David Truman  
(1951: 51) said “We do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not exist Huntington’s 
limitation also applies to the types of “non-political” institutions (the family, the university, the military, business, 
private associations, government bureaucracies) where democratic procedures are not always appropriate (1968: 75).   
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by themselves.  The required technology must be transferred from the powerful to the powerless.  
The powerful provide inputs (guidance and material resources) to invite the participation of 
powerless in exchange for observing the conventional rules of conduct.  Non-participation is 
rooted in individual apathy or alienation, rather than blocked by structural barriers.   
Three historical stages of empowerment by invitation can be identified in the post-war 
period of U.S. – Latin America relations.  In each stage, the cold war competition between the 
localism promoted by U.S. pluralists and encompassing ideological projects of the Left 
encouraged the counter-insurgent recruitment of civil society by the Right.  The civic culture 
represented an alternative to communism’s dangerous political mobilization by its focus on local 
interests. The U.S. Alliance for Progress promoted rural development in Latin America based on 
a positive-sum notion of power as a direct response to the zero-sum model that emerged after the 
Cuban revolution.  Stabilizing consensus also motivated the Community Action Programs of the 
U.S. War on Poverty and the poverty elimination programs of the World Bank under McNamara 
(1970-1978).36  In the 1980s, low intensity warfare, the rise of structural adjustment reforms in 
Latin America and the deregulation reforms in the U.S. signaled a second stage of top-down 
stabilizing empowerment initiatives.  Civic action, refugee relief, social safety nets, 
decentralization of public service provision and flexible workplace management programs 
sought to tap the entrepreneurial spirit of self-reliance at the grassroots and the shop floor.37  
These programs also were intended to fight insurgent movements on the job and in the 
countryside as well as mollify resistance to privatizing the populist state and the global mobility 
of capital flows.  
In the 1990s, the advance of global capital market deregulation and state privatization has 
been accompanied by Empowerment Zones38 in the U.S., and decentralized local development 
                                                 
36 For U.S. War on Poverty, see Kramer (1969), Marris and Rein (1967), and for a timeline for rural development 
programs of the World Bank, see Kapur (1997). 
37 Representative literature in each of these areas includes Herrenkohl (1999), Argyris (1998), Champy (1995), 
Schultz (1994), Karsten, (1994), Frey (1993); Davidson and Malone (1992), Vogt and Murrell (1990) and Peters 
(1995) for New Management-workplace deregulation; for Civic Action Programs see Mondros and Wilson (1994), 
Hanna (1994), Craig and Mayo (1995), Temaner Jenkins and Bennett (1999), Weissberg (1999), McNulty (1999), 
Jenkins and Bennett (1999), Morissey (2000); Sen (1994) UNDP (1995), Kabeer (1999, 2001, 2002)  for Gender; 
and Tendler (1998), and Cornia (2001) for Social Safety Net Programs. 
38 Beginning in 1995, the Clinton administration granted $100 million plus tax incentives over 10 years to six urban 
areas identified as intransigent high poverty areas and designated as “Empowerment Zones” (Chicago, Atlanta, 
Detroit, Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia-Camden). In addition, 65 smaller “Enterprise Communities” were 
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programs in Latin America.   Under mounting international criticism, the IFIs launched 
unprecedented efforts to make poverty assessment more participatory, transparent and 
increasingly sensitive to non-economic factors.  While the new framework has softened the 
terminology and seeks to invite dissenting local actors to the decision making table, vital aspects 
of development policy (fiscal and monetary conditions of structural adjustment, social impact 
conditionality prior to structural adjustment loans, heavily tied and declining levels of official 
development assistance and restricted access for poor country goods in rich country markets) 
remain off the agenda.39  The mainstreaming of empowerment (by invitation) is complete now 
that the World Bank has adopted the term as one of the principal indicators of program 
effectiveness.  In recognition of the durability of inequality, empowerment by invitation now 
emphasizes the acquisition of human capital and access to productive assets by the powerless.  
However, this definition limits agency to conventional, individualist, self-help and market-based 
strategies that severely condition its use as a viable performance standard.40     
Structuralist or post-developmentalist conceptions of zero-sum power suggest an 
empowerment through conflict strategy that has also evolved in competition with its positive-
sum counterpart.  According to this challenge to the pluralist view, power is concentrated among 
elites who protect their privileged decision making authority though agenda setting measures 
(Alinsky, 1971; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Parenti 1970; Gaventa 1982).  High inequality 
suggests that any policy consensus around absolute gains serves to obscure an inherent conflict 
of interests framed by the relative gap that separates the powerful and the powerless.  
Assumptions of zero-sum power imply that a fundamental redistribution is necessary before, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
funded, 33 of which are rural.  EZ Program goals are poverty alleviation, empowerment, leveraging of private sector 
investment, reinventing government, although program evaluations have focused more on citizen participation, 
rather than actual job creation, investment or poverty reduction as indicators of success, see Craig and Mayo, 1995; 
Jenkins and Bennett, 1999; Morissey, 2000. 
39 In 1990, the World Bank launched a Learning Group on Participatory Development and promised high level 
commitment that led to new project procedures and has culminated in several new consultative mechanisms, 
including formal participatory poverty assessments (PRSPs & CDFs) ongoing in some 20 developing countries 
(World Bank, 1994, 1995, 2000).  Still, internal Bank social assessments (safeguard policies) are uneven, under 
funded and often have no weight of enforcement, which in turn have perpetuated the status quo of unaccountability. 
40 In a keynote speech, World Bank vice-president Nicolas Stern defined empowerment of the poor as (1) enhancing 
the capacity or poor people to influence the state institutions that affect their lives, by strengthening their 
participation in political processes and local decision making, (2) removing the barriers – political, legal and social – 
that work against particular groups and (3) building the assets of poor people to enable them to engage effectively in 
markets (Stern, 2001: 39). 
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pluralists suggest, critical power resources become “infinitely expansive.”  Conventional 
participatory mechanisms and institutions are implicated in the exclusion of the poor, less 
informed, and less well connected members of society.  Empowerment through conflict involves 
confrontational strategies to acquire power resources from the powerful, challenge legitimizing 
symbols and dismantle other barriers to inclusion that are set up and maintained by the powerful.  
Empowerment, according to Bourdieu (1977) involves breaking the established rules of 
politeness, or “habitus”.  “Changing habitus” by definition disempowers those who operate by 
the rules of an older habitus undergoing replacement.  While some weight is given to the 
powerless having accepted the legitimacy of the powerful as an explanation of non-participation, 
greater emphasis is placed on the fear of reprisal, cooptation, or the lack of awareness of how to 
work the system.   
While there is no direct translation of empowerment in Spanish or Portuguese, Freire’s 
notion of conscientização comes closest, loosely translated as consciousness raising (Freire 
1973).  Rowlands (1997: 145) points out that in later work, “Freire criticizes any notion of 
empowerment as an individual phenomenon, or even as a community or social activity; rather he 
insists on empowerment as ‘social class empowerment’: ‘The question of social class 
empowerment involves how the working class, through its own experiences, its own construction 
of culture, engages itself in getting political power’ (Freire and Shore 1987: 112).  The base 
community movement that emerged from 1967 Catholic bishop’s conference in Medellín 
adapted Freire’s methods to the collective interpretation of biblical scripture to analyze local 
problems and search for solutions.  Through both influences, empowerment has clearly carried a 
collective, emancipatory meaning that might be more closely associated with the contingent and 
institutional CA strategies of Community or Hierarchy in Lichbach’s typology. 
Three stages of empowerment through conflict may also be traced to initially distinct, but 
converging events in North and South America.  Unionization, civil rights, anti-war, welfare 
rights, and identity movements all represented variations of the empowerment through conflict 
model in the U.S. through the early 1970s (Piven and Cloward 1980).  In Latin America during 
this period, guerrilla insurgencies that followed the Cuban revolution were influenced both by 
the prospect for international Communism as well as by localized movements associated with 
Freire’s adult literacy methodology and the Liberation Theology work of the Catholic Church.   
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In the 1980s, social movements and NGOs in both the South and the North resisted the 
interventionist strategy of the U.S. in Central America and elsewhere, pushed for democratizing 
and other rights-based reforms and protested some of the most intolerable structural adjustment 
policies.  As noted above, NGOs and civil society organizations have collaborated at an 
international level to negotiate the labyrinthine structures of the multilateral banks and engage 
the adoption of significant reforms (debt relief, transparency, social and environmental impact 
assessments, and new mechanisms of civil society participation).  However, in response to a 
perceived disconnect between analysis, core policies and the increasing global economic 
insecurity in the 1990s, transnational advocacy movements have also stepped up confrontational 
pressure against unaccountable multinational corporations, multilateral banks and OECD leaders 
to resolve the growing gap between rich and poor.41  In all three periods, empowerment through 
conflict has combined conventional and contentious politics to challenge inequality. 
   
2.  Toward a General Understanding of Empowerment 
 
The mainstreaming of empowerment has not prevented contention over the term’s very meaning.  
While pluralists and structuralists contest the notion of power and the range of political actions 
that flow from it, there is a core relationship that is common to both that involves resources, 
agency and achievements.  In the last section of this chapter, I will propose a working definition 
of empowerment that is compatible with both the consensus and conflict models.   
Consider Robert Chambers definition of empowerment: 
 
Empowerment means that people, especially poorer people, are enabled to take more control over their 
lives, and secure a better livelihood with ownership and control of productive assets as one key element.  
Decentralization and empowerment enable local people to exploit the diverse complexities of their own 
conditions, and to adapt to rapid change. (Chambers 1993: 10) 
 
 
 For Chambers, empowerment is greater local control, achieved in part through the 
ownership and control of assets.  We might expand the specification of productive assets to 
                                                 
41 The evolution of the World Social Forum is the most recent expression of this global movement, see Keck and 
Sikkink (1998). 
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include various forms of capital (economic, human, social and political).  Together these power 
resources serve as the levers of control.  However, Chambers argues that ownership of these 
assets is insufficient. A farmer may have access to land and produce crops for sale, but fail to 
convert these goods into surplus revenue due to the unfair structure of the market.  Producers of 
basic grains contend with highly subsidized rich country export dumping that artificially drives 
down prices, legitimized by an imposed structure of global trading rules.   A student may acquire 
education but fail to convert that human capital into income if no commensurable jobs are 
available or if structural barriers prevent the labor market from working fairly.   Empowerment 
involves the exploitation of assets to convert them into valued resources that help secure a better 
livelihood under changing conditions.   
In a similar vein, Sen (1982, 1992, 1999) develops a comprehensive approach to 
measuring empowerment that distinguishes the possession of power resources (capital) from 
effective use (agency), the latter of which facilitates the reproduction or accumulation of capital, 
or in the opposite, leads to a deficit.   Consistent with Sen’s argument, Kabeer (1999) defines 
empowerment as the ability to make strategic life choices about what we value and want, what 
Sen refers to as ‘freedom’ (Sen 1992: 64).  Empowerment has three core dimensions – 
Resources, Agency and Achievements.  Resources are the pre-conditions to choice – the control 
levers of sustained capital acquisition or reproduction.  Agency is effective resource use, or “the 
ability to define one’s goals and act upon them” (Kabeer 1999: 439).  Agency describes how 
resources are then converted into achievements – defined by Sen as valued ways of being and 
doing that a person has managed to accomplish.  Through agency, resources are converted into 
achievements that we might associate with a dignified life – fulfillment of basic needs, a 
satisfying occupation, elemental political rights, physical security and the ability to cope with 
unforeseen shocks. 
Here, it is important to emphasize that human diversity mediates the path from resources 
to achievements and to underscore the distinction between achievements and freedom to achieve.  
What a person is observed to have achieved may not reflect what they aspire to achieve.  
Someone may choose a frugal lifestyle but have alternative options.  Others live in poverty 
against their own wishes but have few alternatives.  Differences in achievement may not reflect 
different resource stocks, but instead be due to principled differences in personal goals.  
Differential achievement may also be due to conversion rates that vary according to genetic 
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disparities, group-specific parameters (i.e. gender, age, etc.) or context (level of inequality).  
Returns to investment in human capital are in part a function of the innate capabilities of the 
student but also of the structural equity of employment opportunities.42  The diversity dilemma 
for assessing the impact of inequality of power resources on decentralized rural development is 
moderated somewhat by focusing on minimally acceptable achievements that would nonetheless 
have a tremendous effect on most poor countries.   
Ability to achieve (freedom), rather than achievement itself, is the most stringent test for 
assessing empowerment.  However, assessments of freedom have to be “constructed on the basis 
of presumptions” about the goals to which a person aspires as well as the range of actual choices 
(Sen 1992: 52).   Given the practical problems with informational availability, I will settle here 
for relating empowerment to observed and reported achievements.  Inferences about the extent of 
freedom will be contingent upon the information available in addition to observed achievements. 
The proposed empowerment model is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2  A General Model of Empowerment 
                                                 
42 Research by Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995) have shown that the payoffs to investment in basic education are less 
in countries with high income inequality than in others.  East Asian development has shown that education 
investments must be coupled with employment opportunities to complete the virtuous circle.  Arias, et al. (2002) 
show that race explains a significant variation in returns to education in Brazil, in part suggesting why this virtuous 
circle is incomplete there. 
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Most welfare analyses compare initial resource endowments with eventual achievements.  
However, Sen argues, “equalizing ownership of resources of holdings of primary goods need not 
equalize the substantive freedoms enjoyed by different persons, since there can be significant 
variations in the conversion of resources and primary goods into freedoms” (1992: 33, emphasis  
in original).  Two people with similar incomes may have very different means for converting that  
income into desired nutrition, status, political representation, leisure, or security from escapable 
death.   Resources and agency are therefore indivisible.  Together, they constitute what Sen 
(1985) refers to as capabilities: the potential that people have for preserving and expanding 
resources, and converting them into desired livelihoods, of achieving valued ways of ‘being and 
doing’.43  Achievements, then, refer to the particular ways of being and doing which are, in fact, 
realized by different individuals in specific contexts. 
 
a.  Resources    
 
Power resources can be sub-divided into four types of capital: economic, human, social and 
political (see Figure 1.4 below for detailed components at each level of analysis).  Economic 
capital refers to material wealth resources such as financial capital or technology.  This might 
include the income, credit/debt, savings, remittances and other household or farm assets, such as 
livestock, infrastructure, production equipment and technologies that are essential for the pursuit 
of any livelihood strategy.44  Economic capital is the basis of all other capital – the standard for 
conversion of any other power resources.  Of this subset of economic capital, land ownership and 
land distribution are two of the most significant. 
                                                 
43 This model simplifies Sen’s proposal by focusing on functionings (or well-being), rather than the extent of 
freedom to choose that a person enjoys beyond the observed choice itself (sense of well-being).   
44 Bebbington (1999) distinguishes a specific type of economic capital as natural capital – defined as the natural 
resource stocks (soil, water, air genetic resources, etc.) and environmental services (hydrological cycle, pollution 
sinks etc.) from which resource flows and services useful for livelihoods are derived. The differentiation is based on 
a concern for sustainability and capital’s function as an environmental resource for which values and prices are not 
clearly defined by present markets.  To the extent that this specific form of asset influences the meeting of basic 
needs (water scarcity, harmful contamination) rather than the level of demand for the amenity of living in a pleasing 
environment, it may add important analytical leverage to this type of framework.  However the lack of information 
necessary to distinguish economic from natural capital forces me to settle for the less disaggregated concept. 
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Although economic capital is a necessary resource for empowerment, it is not sufficient.  
Evidence of wealthy societies has shown that money cannot necessarily buy well-being if what is 
valued is family, friendship, cultural expression, work satisfaction or other forms of non-
commercial leisure (Easterlin 1974, 1995; Inglehart 1990; Lane 1993; Oswald 1997).  While the 
ranking of these values may differ cross-culturally, especially for developing countries, we may 
assume that empowered individuals, communities, organizations and societies acquire stocks of 
non-economic resources.  The most common of these is human capital.  By human capital I 
mean the education, skills, knowledge, good health and physical ability to labor, important for 
the successful pursuit of different livelihood strategies (Schultz 1963; Becker 1994).     
Another complement to economic resources is social capital, although there is much less 
agreement about its meaning.  Bourdieu (1986: 248) defines social capital as “the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to 
membership in a group.  Putnam elaborates on this group membership definition of social capital 
by referring to the “trust, norms, and networks that improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions” (1993: 167).  In later work, Putnam infers norms or reciprocity 
and trust from estimates of associational density (1995, 2000).  Woolcock (1998, 2000) further 
subdivides social capital as a network property into some combination of several types: 
communitarian bonding (horizontal ties within groups) bridging (horizontal ties across groups), 
and linking (vertical ties between state and society).   Examples of these types of networks might 
include labor sharing arrangements, micro-credit systems, producer or marketing cooperatives 
and federations, communal development associations, and migration networks.  They are both 
informal and formal, reside within a single village or extend across villages and to the state.  
Those networks that extend beyond the village and involve formal organizations require a second 
level of analysis of social capital.  To satisfy both the individual and relational properties of 
social capital, multiple measures will be compared (reported individual attributes, coordination 
of actors within mobilization networks). 
Finally, political capital is perhaps the least tangible and most difficult to define, but 
takes us closest to the heart of the dilemma of decentralization – the capture of local institutions.  
By political capital, I refer to both the psychological competence regarding influence in and 
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participatory voice in decision-making processes related to the distribution of public goods.45 
These public goods might include the space to make local budget rules or national laws, the 
distribution of tax costs and benefits, control over the delivery of a social welfare program, or the 
monopoly over the use of violence.  For some, such as Booth and Richard (1995, 1998) political 
capital consists of a combination of attitudinal support for a democratic system of governance 
(civic norms for democratic liberties) and conventional political participation.  Political capital is 
the core dimension of empowerment for Bobo and Williams (1990: 378) defined as the extent to 
which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making.  
Following Bourdieu, political capital is the capacity to speak authoritatively for or count on the 
support of a large category of people who can be mobilized collectively for exercising pressure 
over the distribution of benefits of public goods.46  Thus, political capital involves both 
capacities for conventional and contentious participation, as well as attitudes toward and formal 
mechanisms of representation.  As with social capital, multiple indicators of political capital will 
be explored at different levels of analysis. 
Political capital will be measured in two ways.  First, the ability to contact authorities 
(NGO, municipal council or mayor or some agency of the national government) to make a 
request or demand and as such represents political access.  Typical access involve requests that 
may range from individual transactions (document certification, personal reference or credit) to 
public requests (specific project proposal or to attend to some community problem).  
Government access may also revolve around indemnification under programs of the Peace 
Accords in areas of FMLN influence.  Second, political capital will be measured by the 
perceived availability of principled solidarity as a resource for solving political challenges that 
one’s community might face.  What I will refer to as collective efficacy addresses the extent to 
which a person believes that they could count on the support of their neighbors and whether they 
themselves would opt for joining a local protest to resolve political problems in the community.  
Such local problems might involve the excessive cost of electricity or the contamination of the 
                                                 
45 Friedman’s (1992) category of psychological capital overlaps with my definition of political capital in terms of its 
central focus on psychological competence. 
46 This definition is adapted from Peillon (1998: 217, 2001). 
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community by a nearby business.  In addition, collective efficacy will be measured by reported 
support for norms of equality associated with local economic development. 
In the domain of rural development in poor countries, economic capital is the principal 
reference for comparing the value of other forms of capital.  Conversion rates vary, however, 
between forms of capital and between different contexts of exchange.  Bourdieu (1986: 252) 
argues that economic capital is immediately and directly convertible into money (therefore most 
easily transmissible, and least easy to conceal) and may be institutionalized in the form of 
property rights.  Political capital may be the most difficult to convert into money because the 
value of its stock is the most unstable.   
Another key difference between economic and other forms of capital has to do with 
variable ceilings. While asset and income accumulation theoretically have no upper limit, other 
forms of capital have a ceiling.  There are diminishing returns to some forms of human capital 
investment, or in other words a point beyond which a person cannot be more nourished or 
healthy, or to a lesser extent, more skilled (Sen 1992: 5).  There is also a practical limit to the 
number of friends one might have, to the extent of participation in community affairs that might 
be desired, or increase to the stock of self-respect.   Unlike economic capital accumulation, these 
other forms of capital accumulation have a ceiling.  
However, in cases such as El Salvador, we are faced with fewer ceilings and more floors.   
What we care about with respect to the deprivation associated with the Salvadoran case is basic 
minimal capability, or the pre-requisite for adequate functioning (Sen 1992, chapter 1).  Poverty 
gap estimates and the like demonstrate that equality of basic capability is achievable even though 
income (or anything else) is unevenly distributed.  Therefore, we are not concerned with the 
distribution of maximum capability, nor ignoring the fact of biological and normative diversity 
by aiming for perfect equality.  Its efficient conversion rate and unlimited ceiling underscore the 
importance of economic capital over other forms.  However, economic capital may be of limited 
importance if valued ways of being and doing involve certain intangible goals. 
Another important issue is reversibility.  Capital stocks, as conceived here, may diminish 
through depreciation, consumption, or exchange.  Therefore, disempowerment involves the very 
real possibility of declining power resources.  During periods of rapid change, the greatest 
challenge to peasant farmers is to simply defend the assets they currently have.  However, the 
prior discussion of convertibility suggests that not all types of capital are equally reversible.  
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Political sympathies can switch, land can be sold and savings can be consumed in times of 
distress, trust can be violated and lost, patrons or friends can be alienated. Each represents 
potentially reversible processes leading to capital deficit.  On the other hand, education, 
knowledge, and skills are all more difficult to erode.  Similarly, a parent’s educational attainment 
cannot be transferred directly through inheritance, although some genetic and contextual 
advantages might make it seem so.47   
 Beyond these issues, a focus only on the composition of the capital stocks will not tell us 
what a particular person can do with them, in other words what they have achieved or have the 
ability to achieve with those resources.   Empowerment requires agency to explain the defense, 
reproduction or accumulation of capital, as well as the conversion of these power resources into 
achievement.    
 
b.  Agency  
 
Agency is the ability to define one’s goals and act on them.  As illustrated above in Figure 1.1 
agency involves strategies that encompass a range of individual and collective actions intended 
to contribute to the defense, reproduction and accumulation of capital, as well as the conversion 
of this capital into valued ways of being and doing.  I refer to the typology of strategies for 
solving the collective action dilemma outlined in Table 1.1 (see below) and elaborate specific 
ways that collective problems might solved in the context of post-war decentralized rural 
development in El Salvador. 
Agency, according to Chambers, means not only that people produce more, and more 
efficiently, but it also means they have the capacity to change the rules that govern or legitimize 
future use.48  Chambers says a great deal about various rural development activities as 
potentially empowering.  However, his argument seems to take as an article of faith that socially 
optimal arrangements will result even in a context of high inequality and predatory self-interest.  
For the powerless, effective use of resources may be instrumentally oriented toward surviving 
                                                 
47 This is of course different than one’s educational credentials, which are to a much greater extent, for sale. 
48 I refer to arguments outlined by Chambers in a series of Institute of Development Studies (IDS) discussion papers, 
and books (1983, 1987, 1997), but mainly his argument in (1987) “Sustainable Rural Livelihoods, Environment and 
Development: Putting Poor Rural People First”. 
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(welfare service provision), or structurally oriented toward effecting sustainable improvements in 
the quality of life (emancipatory).  While I agree with the spirit of Chamber’s proposal, my 
conception of agency places greater emphasis on collective action strategies that anticipate a 
much higher probability of resistance from local elites toward the emancipatory orientation, as 
well as foot-dragging by benevolent development practitioners.    
Thus, agency by the powerless must provide for collective action to some extent, which 
must endure in the face of resistance by the powerful and have the capacity to contest this 
resistance.     The typology shown earlier in Figure 1 provides a blueprint for the four possible 
strategic directions that agency might take.  For rationalists, interests are given and people are 
assumed to be able to recognize and rank their preferences, and to the best of their knowledge, 
subjectively estimate the costs and benefits of available courses of action (or inaction), choosing 
the one that maximizes their self-defined well-being.  The logic of collective action,” states 
Olson, “focuses on what does or does not take place after people have defined their interests in a 
particular way” (1990: 24).  Rationalists would therefore emphasize Market and Contract CA 
strategies in the Figure 1.1 typology that rely on stable individual preferences, require a 
minimum of planning and emphasize raising the costs or benefits of a particular choice of action.     
Culturalists disagree cautioning that preferences and utility functions are tractable, 
affective, and are concerned with long-term goals (reputation) rather than short-term tactics.  
Agency is politically constructed through local interaction with other agents and structures.49  
Therefore, empowerment can be conducted through Community CA strategies from below or 
Hierarchy CA strategies from above.  Through Community strategies from the bottom up, people 
become aware of their preferences through self-actualizing political experiences, which are 
reinforced by mechanisms of socialization to similar local norms and ties.50  Structuralists, on the 
other hand, argue that whether individual or collective actions are guided by the pursuit of 
evolving or fixed interests is dependent upon the institutional or organizational configuration of 
the field of action. Hierarchy suggests a Leviathan type strategy by large organizations or 
                                                 
49 Lichbach (1995: 330) notes that culturalists are divided as to whether culture works as a mechanism of efficiency 
or equity. 
50 Although some rationalists contend that well-being may be defined in non-materialist, other-regarding terms, such 
as leisure, altruism, etc., most rationalists follow Adam Smith in assuming wealth or power maximization as the 
predominant interest.  In contrast, following Marx, Freire’s concept of conscientization, assumes that interests 
change as a consequence of growing awareness of one’s class identity.   
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hegemonic actors that have the capacity to internalize the costs of CA.  Hierarchy CA strategies 
work through a combination of coercion and clientelism, setting the boundaries and cues for 
action that supersede the interests that might otherwise be motivated by rational calculation or 
parochial communal socialization. 
How do Market, Contract, Community and Hierarchy collective action strategies help us 
understand the link between decentralization and empowerment?  First, agency must be 
considered within the policy framework of decentralized rural development.  Second, we can 
begin with Lichbach’s assumption that the three alternatives to Market strategies are contexts for 
the latter baseline rational, self-interested, individualist strategy.   
Take as an example the question of participation in a municipal budget planning process 
that is common to local governance and a fundamental mechanism of transparency and 
accountability in local development finance in El Salvador – the cabildo abierto.  Participation in 
these periodic convocations of the public to discuss, ratify and control municipal income and 
spending priorities depends to some extent on the active participation of the public.  Participation 
in the cabildo is needed to legitimize of local rule.51  However, the function of the cabildo varies 
considerably with respect to historically rooted expectations and performance standards for local 
governance.  In settings of high inequality, the likelihood of political capture is both a reality and 
a disincentive for the powerless to participate.  Traditionally privileged interests view the cabildo 
both as a means to steer scarce public development resources in their favor as well as to stave off 
any redistributive effort that might challenge the actual basis of their power.   Elites therefore 
have an incentive to participate, if only indirectly through surrogate agents.  The challenge of 
collective action in this decentralized decision making process is to promote the optimal level of 
participation to balance costs with the principal benefit of avoiding political capture by local 
elites. 
 There are differing views on the optimal level of participation, which I will argue is 
contingent on accumulated political experiences and expectations in respective insurgent and 
counter-insurgent towns.  However, the collective action strategy framework gives us some clues 
as to how this agency challenge might be resolved.   
                                                 
51 Both because the holding of cabildos is a requirement to receive state transfers and because local governments 
believe, albeit to varying degrees, that public input is necessary to improve local governance, this legitimacy is 
conferred to local government via cabildos. 
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A Market strategy would focus on the costs and benefits (perceived and real) of 
individual participation.  For example, travel compensation or subsidized transportation, gifts, or 
a meal, entertainment might all be offered to lower the costs or increase the benefits of 
participating in the cabildo.  A Contract strategy would focus on negotiations designed to alter 
the constraint or benefit structure for participation.  The key focus of such negotiations might 
involve representation on the municipal council or resource allocation rule making committee, 
influence over the distribution of municipal resources, how to increase turnout, or the creation of 
formal organizations within the ambit of municipal decision making that provide greater voice to 
non-exclusive constituencies.  Still, as with the Market strategy, the Contract strategy toward 
participation emphasizes influence over the rationality of individual participation. 
A Hierarchy strategy would focus on selective benefits and sanctions as incentives for 
participation of a targeted population.  The selective benefit/sanction strategy might be oriented 
in two ways.  A clientelist orientation often used by political bosses might provide some bonus 
(per diem) or threat (verifiable by attendance lists) to people dependent upon the patron to ensure 
participation that was ultimately reinforcing of the power relations between the patron and client.  
Alternatively, the patron might provide the same incentives to coerce participation of groups that 
are not necessarily dependent and whose participation coincides with a view of the common 
good.  For example, a benevolent despot might enable the voice of excluded groups through 
lowered costs of participation in a way that might be oriented toward strengthening community 
norms and dispositions at the eventual expense of the despot’s power.   
Finally, a Community strategy might draw from and strengthen existing norms of 
reciprocity and past experiences of collective action that encourage participation in the cabildo to 
ensure representation.  A Community strategy does not require incentives from outside or a 
priori bargaining, but relies instead on informal organizing that is flexible yet appropriate to each 
new instance of representation.  While costs and benefits matter to the effectiveness of 
Community collective action strategies, they are not decisive.   
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The cabildo example is but one of many instances of how the challenge of collective 
action impinges on the effectiveness of decentralized development in settings of high inequality.  
Other examples of local decision making requiring some level of cooperation that are prone to 
political capture might face the reverse threat of exit by vested local elites.  The management of 
scarce common pool resources such as water, forests, grazing pasture, or an irrigation district are 
not unlike public budgets, in that large users must agree to comply with a mutually agreed set of 
rules for the resource to be sustainable.  While powerful elites have often absorbed the costs of 
cooperation to prevent free riding by the poor, they also just as frequently enjoy exit options that 
make these rules non-binding in the absence of ineffective monitoring and enforcement capacity 
by non-elites.  As such, the challenge of collective action to ensure the sustainable and fair use of 
common pool resources may involve the restriction of elite exit options.  How the respective 
actors choose to act to resolve this collective action problem can also be understood within the 
proposed agency framework. 
Formal organization as a Contract collective action strategy explicitly designed to 
improve resource mobilization and distribution helps explain the rise of Salvadoran NGOs and 
the decline of gremios in an environment of state repression.  Planning and organization in the 
rise of increasingly bureaucratic NGOs tends to come at the expense of ideology, radical norms, 
or the flexibility of more informal gremios and grassroots CA strategies.  Contract strategies may 
undermine Community strategies.  Similarly, coercion or selective benefits/sanctions can only 
temporarily solve CA problems, before voluntarism is overwhelmed by opportunism.  Hierarchy 
can also destroy Community strategies.52   
Ultimately, multiple CA strategies are employed simultaneously, although it is possible 
to identify dominant strategies at different moments (Figure 1.3).  For both insurgent and 
counter-insurgent movements during and after the war in El Salvador, the government and 
FMLN both relied to differing degrees on a Hierarchy CA strategy to mobilize support and 
diminish resistance during the civil war.  However, I will show that the starting point for hard-
line counter-insurgents was a very similar repertoire of Hierarchy CA strategies.  For insurgents, 
their starting point before the war came from a Community strategy preference, then gravitated 
                                                 
52 See Tayor (1982).  Selective incentives foreclose community strategies by undermining altruism, reciprocity and 
voluntarism.   Exclusive reliance on selective incentives or disincentives can have a similarly corrosive effect on the 
ability to legitimate bargaining positions contemplated in a Contract strategy. 
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to a balance between Contract and Hierarchy strategies during the war (culminating in the 
agreement between the five rebel factions that created the FMLN).  However, reliance on 
sustained Hierarchy strategies by the FMLN during the war was neither as exclusive nor as 
intense as the government and military.   Here I depart from other analyses, both from critics and 
neutral observers of the FMLN that painted the war mobilization strategy somewhat narrowly as 
coercion or co-optation.  Rather, the FMLN experimented with a wide variation of mobilization 
tools that ranged from instilling solidaristic values to imposing strict entry and exit restrictions 
on all forms of collaboration.    
 In the post-war period, hard-line counter-insurgents have been forced to diversify their 
CA strategies as a consequence of the dismantling of much of the repressive state apparatus and 
greater political competition.  The FMLN has also employed a shifting balance of all four CA 
strategies, contrary to the more dire predictions about the insurgent pathological tendencies 
toward greed, opportunism, corruption and coercion.53  If we were to believe the arguments of 
the Salvadoran elite and its U.S. benefactors, before, during and after the civil war, FMLN rule 
would be intolerant, authoritarian, secretive, and unrestrained in the violation of property rights 
and human rights. The predominant strategies of FMLN governance at the local level have been, 
in fact, more pragmatic - to perfect local governance through Contract and Community CA 
strategies, despite the noted tension and interconnectedness between them.   
Lichbach (1998: 271) argues that Market and Hierarchy strategies are mostly likely to 
generate or perpetuate inequality.  It follows that if the FMLN has effectively relied less on these 
strategies, that inequality has also been diminished in zones of insurgent influence, both in 
absolute terms and as an obstacle to collective action.  Conversely, we should suspect from this 
argument that inequality should not only persist in areas of counter-insurgent influence by the 
military or government during the war, that the preferred CA strategies adapted to war 
mobilization should have reinforced inequality.  Both tendencies can be demonstrated and have 
left their mark on post-war development processes. 
Agency will be measured by comparing collective action strategies in the case study 
municipalities, with attention to the formation of mobilization networks, the prevalence and 
                                                 
53 Lichbach (1998, Chapter 8) provides an extensive list of scenarios in which rebel solutions to the CA problem 
create unintended and perverse consequences that undermine future collection action. 
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impact of NGOs, patrons, or informal grassroots organizations, and the significance, scope and 
style of political advocacy.  
 
c.  Achievements (Mediating Attitudes & Sustainable Livelihoods)   
 
To assess empowerment, we must evaluate what has been achieved.  This task confronts two 
problems: a level of analysis problem and a temporal sequence (simultaneity) problem.  First, 
empowerment is conceived as a three level process (individuals aggregated at the level of the 
community, local actors linked or unlinked at the meso-organizational level, and rural 
development properties at the macro-societal level).  Empowerment hinges on solving collective 
action problems to contest inequality at each level.  While the individual-community level 
represents the most basic locus of change, collective action at each level is necessary to achieve 
sustainable rural development.  Decentralization can then be conceived of as a series of nested 
collective action problems (within the community; within the mobilization network; and within 
society).54   
 The temporal sequence problem involves identifying a starting point in the recursive 
process that leads from resources to achievements. Are people empowered as the outcome of a 
process, or did already empowered people determine the outcome of a process?  In other words, 
capital stocks are simultaneously inputs and outputs of the empowerment process.   
Empowerment begins with an initial stock of capital, but generally sustains or increases capital 
stocks as a consequence as well as producing other achievements.55  However, any cross-section 
analysis of an empowerment process is unable to accurately distinguish between beginning 
capital resources or achievement capital resources.  The short time period of observation for 
most of the rural development interventions in this study prohibits any clear solution to this 
methodological problem, except to attempt careful inferences when available data on resource 
and achievement indicators permit. 
                                                 
54 The proposed framework to evaluate empowerment at the World Bank takes a similar approach.  See Alsop and 
Heinsohn (2005). 
55 There are conditions of trade-off, where an increase in one form of capital may necessarily diminish the stock of 
another form.  An increase in economic capital from having a successful career may come at the expense of time 
available to participate in the life of one’s community or family. 
  41
In light of the formidable data requirements suggested by this framework, some 
simplification is required.  Within the core relationships of the proposed empowerment model, I 
will limit my focus to the following individual level resource and achievement indicators listed 
Figure 1.4 (and detailed in Tables A.1-A.4 in the Appendix).  For economic capital, several 
indicators will be measured including family income, land ownership, access and distribution, 
remittance benefits, and household and agricultural asset index. The primary indicators for 
human capital will be years of schooling attained and civic knowledge (capacity to correctly 
identify key local political figures). Social capital indicators will include social ties, reported 
communal associational density, the observed presence of organizational networks, and a 
surrogate for exit options (distance to local market or paved road).  Political capital indicators 
will be measured by access to the local government, access to national government, access to 
local NGO, as well as several indicators of collective efficacy (aspects of perceived capacity to 
count on neighbors in collective action solutions to political problems). 
Achievement indicators at both the individual level or aggregated at the level of the 
community are mediated by certain attitudinal underpinnings.  These attitudes include personal 
and political efficacy, inter-personal trust, optimism toward the future, and positive aspirations 
for personal or communal development. 
Achievements include fulfillment of basic needs, social or political action, resource 
mobilization and local problem solving-advocacy skills.  Key indicators for these achievement 
areas (detailed in Appendix Table A-4) will be measured predominantly and the individual level 
aggregated by community or type of political experience.  Access to minimum health, clean 
water, shelter and electricity are all considered basic for survival.  I add to these social and 
political actions, which combine actual voice in social or political decisions, the evidence of 
participation in various aspects of community life and local politics, and the level of actual 
voting or protest participation within the municipality (with special attention to women’s 
participation).  Local problem solving and advocacy skills will compare the attitudes of capacity 
with reported preferences and actual attempts to solve identified local problems, with attention to 
level of coordination, contentious versus accommodative orientations, and the encompassing or 
hierarchy features of an advocacy coalition (horizontal and vertical ties). Finally, resource 
mobilization at the household and municipal level will be examined.  At the individual level 
indicators will include agricultural income improvements, productivity, diversification, land 
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security, dependence on remittances and access to credit.  The complexity of empowerment as I 
have suggested so far makes clear that any attempt to measure this concept will fall far short of a 
precise instrument, but hopefully generate insights that allow the framework to be more than a 
heuristic tool.  I am interested in comparing the differences in empowerment between individuals 
who belong to communities, are intervened upon or represented by organizations and are 
constrained or provided opportunities by the rules and norms of a society.  There are 
undoubtedly other empowerment indicators that are unrepresented in this configuration.  Security 
is an obvious element of empowerment in El Salvador, inferring a basic protection against 
violent abuse, violation of property rights.  Resilience is another, pointing to the elements of a 
limited insurance policy for coping with periodic crises – credit, adequate health, and the ability 
to produce in a way that conserves the long term viability of one’s natural assets.  Both of these 
elements of an empowerment model are beyond the quantitative limits of this study, but will be 
addressed in other ways. 
At the meso-organizational level, empowerment is concerned mostly with the capacity 
for horizontal and vertical collective action (coordination as opposed to competition and 
isolation) of local development actors.  The principal domain for assessing organizational 
coordination will be local governance and resource mobilization in particular. Change in the 
availability, diversity and control over local development resources will be assessed at the 
municipal level as several measures of resource mobilization.  Other meso-level measures 
include institutional performance, coordination, accountability, transparency and representation. 
These will be measured through a combination of survey and qualitative evidence.  Together 
they constitute a framework for measuring meso or institutional level achievements. 
Additional organization level achievements include the quality of services provided, the 
perceived representativity of the relations with the target population, the transparency with which 
the work is conducted, and the range of mechanisms through which the organization can be held 
accountable.  At the societal level, measurement will be the most speculative in terms of its 
direct link to micro and meso-level processes, and will coincide to a large degree with discussion 
of the shifts in the political opportunity structure.  Equity will be measured by the distribution of 
critical resources, including income, land, education, and political rights.  Accountability will 
focus on the quality, responsiveness and effectiveness of key institutions.   Political stability will 
focus on protection of society from arbitrary action by state agents or international forces.   
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Resources Agency Mediating Attitudes Achievements 
Economic capital 
Income 
Land 
Land inequality 
Remittances 
Dependency ratio 
Farm Assets 
HH Assets 
 
Human capital 
Education 
Civic Knowledge 
 
Social capital 
Social Ties 
Associational density 
Exit Options 
Networks 
-Horiz. Bonding ties 
-Horiz. Bridging ties 
-Vertical ties 
 
Political capital 
Access to local govt. 
Access to natl. govt. 
Access to NGOs 
Collective Efficacy 
Market (unplanned, spontaneous, 
individual) 
privatization, deregulation, liberalization of 
state authority 
change costs/benefits 
invest in public relations 
entry/exit - migration 
 
Contract – (planned, spontaneous, 
individual) 
delegation of authority 
improve bargaining capacity through formal 
organizations (NGOs) & networks  
negotiate land taxes 
channel remittances 
 
Hierarchy- (planned, contingent, 
institutional) 
power/resource centralization or 
deconcentration 
party hegemony/discipline 
patron-client selective incentives or 
disincentives 
 
Community-(unplanned, contingent, 
social) 
devolution of authority & resources 
invest in process (trust, reciprocity) 
tap solidarity 
strengthen informal organizations  
subjective confidence 
trust 
life satisfaction 
optimism toward future 
development aspirations 
political efficacy 
system support 
preferences for change 
religious non-fatalism 
critical consciousness 
 
Meeting Basic Needs 
access to water 
access to adequate housing 
access to electricity 
access to health care 
project beneficiary 
 
Social & Political Action 
voice in communal decisions 
satisfaction with local decision making 
local demand effectiveness 
taking part in the life of the community 
taking part in local politics 
taking part in local projects 
taking part in women’s organization 
women’s influence 
cabildo participation 
voting/abstention 
protesting 
 
Local Problem Solving & Advocacy 
Problem solving skills 
Collective advocacy 
 
Resource Mobilization 
Improve Ag Incomes  
Improved Ag production  
Ag diversification 
Ag intensification 
Land use 
Land security 
Access to credit 
 
Figure 1.4  Individual – Community Level Empowerment Indicators 
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D.  SUMMARY AND RESTATEMENT OF WORKING HYPOTHESES 
 
Decentralization of government has been prescribed widely in Latin America over the past two 
decades, justified on the premise that it necessarily encourages more accountable governance by 
empowering local actors.  However, under conditions of high inequality and weak democracy, 
decentralization is frequently captured instead by powerful elites as a top-down strategy for 
preserving their interests and power.  Given this ambiguous mandate, a performance standard for 
empowered local actors is required.  Several broad hypotheses guide the subsequent analysis of 
why civil society organizations, local governments and social safety nets have appeared as 
important development actors in the postwar period, what form local development action has 
taken, and the evaluation criteria for performance of local actors in El Salvador.   
 
Hypothesis 1) Decentralization, defined as the devolution of resources and authority to local 
actors and increased participation in local politics, tends to reinforce already existing 
distributions of power when democratic institutions are weak and local inequality is high. 
 
Hypothesis 2) Under such conditions, decentralization works (i.e. empowerment is achieved) 
when local actors acquire capital resources and use them effectively to overcome collective 
action problems and contest prevailing inequality. 56   
 
Hypothesis 2a) Counter-insurgent empowerment by invitation approaches to decentralization 
will tend toward Market and Hierarchy CA strategies that stabilize local inequality. 
 
Hypothesis 2b) Insurgent empowerment through conflict approaches to decentralization will tend 
toward Community and Contract CA strategies that challenge local inequality. 
 
                                                 
56 This hypothesis assumes that some local actors are able to coordinate their interests, which are to defend an unfair 
or predatory advantage over the rest.   
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Hypothesis 3) Effective use of resources (agency) to contest prevailing inequality will require the 
capacity for both contentious and conventional collective action. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4) Decentralization may disempower local actors to the extent that on their own (i.e., 
in the absence of state safeguards) they are unable to overcome collective action problems to 
seriously contest prevailing inequality through conventional or contentious means. 
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II. CHAPTER TWO:  POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND TWO COMPETING PATHS TO 
EMPOWERMENT IN EL SALVADOR 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In Chapter one, I proposed a core set of relationships between resources, agency and 
achievements to explain empowerment as the central measure of effective decentralization.  I 
also suggested two competing interpretations that frame this core set of relationships, 
empowerment by invitation and empowerment through conflict.  According to these two views, 
empowerment can be a top-down or bottom up process, pushed down by elites or pulled down by 
popular mobilization, through consensus or conflict.   
The Resources-Agency-Achievements framework for evaluating empowerment involves 
individual choices. Why agency takes individual or collective, accommodative or contentious 
forms requires analysis of the larger structure of political opportunity, including competing 
efforts to shape the meaning of empowerment.   In other words, to explain how empowerment 
comes to be seen as a win-win or win-lose process requires an analysis of the social forces 
competing to have one or the other interpretation prevail.   
In this chapter, I introduce the structure of political opportunity, including mobilization 
networks, to show how decentralized local development during the post-war transition in El 
Salvador has generated both empowerment models.  The structure of political opportunity sets 
conditions on the range of agency choices that may derive from any resource set, as well as the 
institutional form and focus of strategies to expand or restrict choice and in turn, the resulting 
achievements of rural development. 
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 The Salvadoran post-war transition clearly illustrates the impact of competing 
conceptions of empowerment on the outcomes of local governance and rural development 
interventions between 1992 and 1998.  During a twelve-year civil war, competing conceptions of 
empowerment facilitated insurgent and counter-insurgent collective action through reliance on a 
combination of selective benefits, local norms, coercion and voluntarism in support of either the 
government of El Salvador (GOES) or the insurgent Farabundo Martí Nacional Liberation Party 
(FMLN).   
The collective action repertoire associated with areas historically under the long 
dominant influence of right-wing political parties, such as the National Republican Alliance- 
ARENA, Partido Conciliación Nacional – PCN, and the center-right Christian Democrats, have 
emphasized stabilizing strategies of accommodation to prevailing local inequality of opportunity.  
I refer to this approach as the consensus path to empowerment, or empowerment by invitation.57   
Supporters of the FMLN, on the other hand, have pursued decentralization strategies that have 
challenged post-war inequality.  I associate this combination of conventional and contentious 
tactics with a dissensus path to empowerment, or empowerment through conflict.  Empowerment 
by invitation is a top-down, elite brokered process of political negotiation, premised upon a 
positive sum distribution of the benefits and a prior acceptance of the rules.  Empowerment 
through conflict, on the other hand, implies a bottom-up, zero-sum contestation over political 
benefits, as well as very rules and privileges that assure elites a cut of any subsequent benefit 
distribution.   
Understanding how these strategies have been formulated and mediate decentralized 
institutional performance in rural development is rooted in analysis of the local political context.  
In the case of El Salvador, a rural insurgency pried open the political opportunity for 
decentralized rural development by reconfiguring the correlation of political forces at the 
national and local level.  Given this opening, the respective legacies of insurgent FMLN and 
counter-insurgent GOES rule have directly shaped the conflict or consensus approach to 
                                                 
57 The National Conciliation Party (PCN) ruled between 1960-1979 as the formal expression of the military.  At the 
expense of oversimplification, the roots and interests of the PCN have been and continue to be almost 
indistinguishable from those of the presently governing ARENA party (1989-2004).  The Christian Democrats 
began as a progressive political force during the mid 1960s, but upon assuming power in 1980 as part of the civilian-
military junta, and after formally winning the executive office in 1984, the Christian Democrats rapidly lost both 
credibility and power. 
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empowering rural producers and citizens in respective localities of insurgent or counter-insurgent 
rule.  The post-war empowerment strategies and performance of local development institutions 
can be traced back to their respective wartime political experiences. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I outline the more and less durable elements of political 
opportunity and show how they might be incorporated into the general model of empowerment.  
In the second section, I point to the elements of political opportunity in the institutional 
configurations of both insurgent and counter-insurgent experiences that have shaped the 
development choices in post-war El Salvador.  In the third section, I combine the elements of 
political opportunity with the core relationships of empowerment to complete the comparative 
institutional framework for analysis of the Salvadoran case in the chapters that follow.   In the 
final section, I detail my methodology for assessing the factors that make decentralization work 
in El Salvador, which combines survey analysis, key informant interviews and participant 
observation. 
 
 
 
B.  THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR DECENTRALIZATION IN 
POST-WAR EL SALVADOR 
 
Collective action represents the central challenge to making decentralization work in settings of 
high inequality and weak democracy.  Institutional strategies for solving collective action 
problems at the local level have gravitated toward strengthening municipal government, 
mechanisms for NGO coordination, and extending social safety net programs of the central 
government.  However, the collective action strategies associated with these three local 
institutions have served as powerful forces for equity and democratization in some contexts but 
have strengthened the hand of predatory local and national elites in others.  Explaining how both 
empowering and disempowering types of decentralization outcomes are possible and the 
conditions under which the former will be more likely, we must consider how competing notions 
of empowerment narrow or expand the range of available strategic choices.  This competition 
over the meaning of empowerment turns our attention to the elements of the political opportunity 
structure: a) configurations of elites or institutional rules, b) the network mobilization capacity of 
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political entrepreneurs.  Taken together, these elements of political opportunity constitute an 
important qualification of the empowerment model presented in Chapter one, and help us 
understand how competing notions of empowerment set the agenda for available resources, 
strategies and achievements in rural development.    
Tarrow defines political opportunity in structural terms, as “consistent - but not 
necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide 
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure” (1994: 85).  Similarly, Gamson (1996) defines political opportunities as dynamic and 
composed of any number of institutional or cultural elements that range from more to less 
enduring.  Following Tarrow and Gamson, I distinguish between the more and less durable 
elements of political opportunity. 
Figure 2.1 lists the most enduring elements of political opportunity (left column).58 The 
first is the availability or access to elite allies, which are a function of the level of 
decentralization of the state and the party system.  Dissident elites signal the vulnerability of the 
state or dominant group to collective action and increase the probability that such action will 
succeed.   The more centralized a state or party system, the fewer points of access.  However, the 
more centralized a state or party system, the more clear and unitary the target for collective 
action it presents.  Decentralized states and party systems are more porous, but are more 
effective in preventing particularistic demands from flowing into encompassing movements.  For 
example, Salvadoran right, embodied by ARENA, is a highly centralized party, capable of 
exercising discipline and providing little autonomy to lower level politicians.  Arena has 
demonstrated an impressive capacity for preserving unity behind a small commission of 
appointed party leaders (COENA), despite periodic internal crises triggered by the electoral 
challenges by the FMLN.   
Another enduring element of political opportunity is the electoral stability of alliances 
between political elites, (including international elites) and between elites and non-elites.  The 
balance of power between the FMLN and the GOES was clearly influenced by political swings 
in the U.S. and Europe, particularly the collapse of the Soviet bloc.  The secular decline of 
                                                 
58 These five durable elements of political opportunity are evident priorities in the work of Gamson in McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald (1996), especially Figure 12.1 on pg. 281.  See also Eisinger (1973), Tilly (1978), Kitschelt, 
(1986), Gamson (1990), Brockett (1991), and Kriesi (1996). 
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communist, socialist and social democratic political constituencies in the North, beginning in the 
late-1980s and the dramatic events of the early 1990s set certain limits to both insurgent and 
counter-insurgent strategies during the war.  The assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the 
political shift to the right under the Reagan administration in the U.S. to the center under 
Salvadoran Christian Democrat Napoleon Duarte in 1984, and the electoral defeat of the leftist 
Nicaraguan FSLN in 1990, all signaled key political realignments that reshaped the political 
opportunity for conflictive or consensual empowerment strategies within El Salvador.   
A third enduring element of political opportunity is the state’s capacity/propensity for 
repression.  The Salvadoran military has been one of the most brutal in Latin American history.   
Episodes of state repression have conditioned empowerment strategies long after their time. 
However, the state’s repressive capacity is neither monolithic nor constant over time.  In El 
Salvador, explosions of state violence have coincided with the permissive leadership of “iron-
fisted” presidential rule that has followed attempted liberal reforms.59  Repressive capacity has 
also clearly turned on military aid appropriation votes in the U.S. Congress.  Similarly, FMLN 
capacity to resist state violence has experienced several important shifts in leadership and 
resource endowments that substantially influenced their own political-military strategies as well 
as those of the government.   
The final two elements of political opportunity are the attitudinal and behavioral referents 
of the political culture, and the related openness or closure of media organizations.  Norms of 
legitimacy that the popular vote endowed to President Duarte in 1984 and the emergent respect 
for human rights represent two important dimensions of an enduring Salvadoran political culture 
that set limits to wartime strategies on the right and the left.  These collective beliefs were 
therefore the target of insurgent and counter-insurgent propaganda.  The institutional openness of 
the media merits act as the regulating valve of ideas and information that permit a democratic 
political culture to evolve.  During the war Salvadoran media censored most non-governmental 
views, which the FMLN succeeded at times in circumventing only through sensational tactics.  
Post-war media has permitted greater access to non-elite views, but as a minority voice that is 
                                                 
59 Salvadoran presidents or de facto leaders associated with the worst violation of human rights include Hernandez-
Martinez, (1932-39) who followed the liberal reforms of Melendez (1928-32); Romero, (1977-79) after 
developmentalist reforms of Molina; D’Aubisson, 1979-82 as the driving political force behind the civil-military 
juntas, and perhaps Cristiani, (1989-1993) who followed Duarte. See Comisión de la Verdad (1993), Burns (1984), 
Vejar (1980), Williams and Walter (1998), Castellanos (2001) 
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disproportionately smaller than its representative audience.  Nearly every major news source 
remains under the control of conservative private sector ownership with little accountability to 
the public.  The media continue to distill or marginalize dissenting views.    
 
Enduring Elements of Political 
Opportunity 
Less Enduring Elements:  Mobilization 
Networks 
 
• Elite access: level of centralization  
• Stability of elite alignments 
• State Repression Capacity/ Propensity 
• Political Culture 
• Institutional Openness of media 
• Centralization:  Top-down, Bottom-up 
• Extension: Peripheral, Metropolitan, 
Transnational Links  
• Cross-Class: Between-Group Ties 
(Encompassing) or Within-Group Ties 
(Particularistic) 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Elements of Political Opportunity 
 
These enduring elements of political opportunity are stable enough to structure strategic 
choices over a defined period of time.  However, enduring elements of political opportunity 
alone, fail to explain why repression may harden resistance in one place, but suppress it in 
another (Brockett 1991; Booth and Richard 1998) or why widened institutional access has 
elicited both citizen apathy (Michels 1962; Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 1979) and 
“democratic overload” (Tocqueville 1955; Huntington 1968; Tarrow 1989; Diamond 1994); or 
why some dissident elites spark transformative collective action, while other calls to action fall 
on deaf ears (Tilly 1978; Tutino 1986; Wickham-Crowley 1993).  This gap between structural 
opportunity and collective action is bridged by the less enduring mobilization networks.   
Mobilization networks constitute the less stable elements of political opportunity.  
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996: 3-4) define mobilization networks as “those collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective 
action.”  They may include both meso-level and grassroots level actors, work and neighborhood 
associations, churches and schools, and informal friendship and family networks.  In Figure 2.1 
(right column), I highlight three important features of mobilization networks that help explain 
their effectiveness.  First, networks may be top-down (elite dominated) and bottom-up (mass 
participation).  Second, mobilization networks are increasingly transnational, extending from 
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local groups to international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral aid agencies, donor NGOs, or 
diaspora populations.  Third, a network can emphasize the mobilization of between-group ties 
(cross-class, encompassing) and/or within-group ties (particularistic) concerns.    
During the war, the broader social movement associated with the FMLN represented the 
quintessential mobilization network.  Fundraisers and political diplomats facilitated coordination 
with the FMLN central command, but the social movement actors on the whole, relied on a wide 
range of decentralized and bottom-up collective action.  Mobilization was transnational in scope, 
but closely tuned to Congressional appropriation votes on U.S. military aid or crucial turning 
points at the local level in the conflict.  The FMLN solidarity movement was cross-class, linking 
peasant villages, unions, parishes, student’s groups and eventually transnational migrant 
communities that represented the revolutionary base of the insurgency with an extensive network 
of paired counterparts in the U.S., Canada and Europe.  The constant flow of Salvadorans to the 
North and Northerners to the South exposed U.S. and European influence in the civil war and 
catalyzed participation in a wide variety of opposition actions within solid middle-class U.S. 
communities (Clements 1985, Golden and McConnell 1986).  So effective was this movement 
that insurgent tactics became the blueprint for counter-insurgent strategists that lost little time in 
cultivating conservative support in the U.S., although from the top-down and with a less 
encompassing reach in terms of class.  These competing mobilization networks were adapted as 
the principal vehicles of insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies during the 
post-war period.  
 
 
C.  INSURGENT & COUNTER-INSURGENT DECENTRALIZATION IN EL SALVADOR 
 
In El Salvador, the emergence of decentralization policy and many local actors, particularly 
NGOs, social safety nets and municipal government, were in response to a specific historical 
political opportunity.  In El Salvador, these origins can be found embedded in the logic of the 
country’s civil war (1980-1992).60   In this section, I provide a brief overview of three key 
                                                 
60 Municipal government was established under Spanish colonial rule, but was a relatively powerless institution, 
eliminated in 1932 and gradually relegitimized prior to the 1983 constitution always in service of the local 
landowning elite.   
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turning points in the run-up to the twelve year civil war, suggesting how these shifts in political 
opportunity shaped the emergence of local institutions in the post-war period. 
I then suggest how insurgent and counter-insurgent responses to changing political 
opportunity in the context of civil war influenced two competing approaches to empowerment.  
The FMLN employed an empowerment through conflict approach, emphasizing an inherent 
conflict of interest between elite and non-elite groups over a zero-sum distribution of power 
resources.  The Government of El Salvador pursued an empowerment by invitation approach, 
based on an imposed consensus over the acceptable rules of political expression that preserved 
the inalienable property rights and political privileges of the elite.  Both insurgent and counter-
insurgent strategies to solving collective action problems during the civil war provide insights 
into the available strategies for resolving collective action problems in the post-war period.   
Most agree that inequality, especially land inequality, was a root cause of the Salvadoran 
conflict (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Paige 1996; Midlarsky 1999).  In 1971, 86% of El Salvador’s 
270,000 farmers had access to less than five hectares of land.  At the same time, some of the 
wealthiest landowning families, such as the Dueñas, owned 22,764 hectares, the Guirolas 
(28,403 ha) the Sols (15,830 ha.) the Daglios (11,711 ha.), and some 47 other family holdings 
exceeded 1000 hectares (Colindres 1977).   In 1971, the Gini coefficient for land distribution in 
El Salvador was 0.82, one of the highest indices of land inequality in the world (Muller and 
Seligson 1987).   Those with access to the best and most extensive farmland also controlled 
commodity and credit markets, the sale of imported inputs, agro-processing and export contracts.  
Landed interests had long captured the vital organs of the state, and had converted the National 
Guard into a semi-private security mechanism for disciplining rural labor.  The struggle for land 
against an increasingly repressive landed elite was a central dimension to the civil war. 
 
1. The Center Collapses 
 
The first turning point occurred in March 1980.  Increasing pressure for reforms by students and 
radical Catholics, two fraudulent presidential elections, deteriorating conditions for urban and 
rural workers, escalating repression and the Sandinista overthrow of Somoza in neighboring 
Nicaragua, all pushed El Salvador to the brink of collapse by 1979.  Rural insurgency from 
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below and political pressure from above by the United States induced the Salvadoran oligarchy 
to announce a major set of land reform programs and begin the forced expropriation of farms in 
March of 1980.  Land reform was explicitly designed to reduce landlessness and steal support 
from the insurgency, but the imposition of the reform greatly diminished its initial impact.  
Hunger for land persisted and filled the ranks of the growing insurgency. 
The flawed implementation of land reform and increasing state repression contributed to 
the failure of a series of civil-military provisional governments to contain the deepening conflict 
between hardliners on the right and the five leftist guerrilla factions that ultimately negotiated the 
creation of a single rebel umbrella organization.  The indiscriminate killing of civilians by the 
Salvadoran armed forces and the assassination of Catholic Archbishop Oscar Romero on March 
24, 1980 increasingly tilted sympathies toward the FMLN and closed off any escape from civil 
war.  The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 ushered in a conservative shift in U.S. 
politics that would coincide with the beginning and end of formal civil war in El Salvador.61  As 
a consequence of the events leading up to March 1980, the center in Salvadoran politics 
collapsed, the reforms were narrowed and became non-negotiable and reformist voices were 
silenced. 
 
2. Military Stalemate and Strategic Decentralization 
 
The second turning point came between January and March, 1984.  Insurgent forces overcame 
countless defeats against the overwhelming military superiority of the Salvadoran armed forces 
to push the U.S. financed regime to the breaking point of folding in late 1983.  Through steadily 
increasing contentious collective actions, the FMLN developed the political capacity and military 
strength to overrun the most well defended garrisons in the country, destroy major infrastructure 
linking the eastern and western halves of the country, and maintain control of large parts of the 
countryside.  Within FMLN controlled zones of the country, rebel forces established popular 
local governments that decentralized many governance responsibilities.  U.S. advisors warned 
                                                 
61 A formal state of war was declared in January 1981 and would last until Peace Accords were signed in January 
1992.    
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the newly re-elected Reagan administration in early 1984 that the FMLN was on the verge of 
winning the war.   
The U.S. responded with a change in military and political tactics that resulted in a 
decentralization of the war on both sides.  A massive shipment of helicopter gun ships and 
fighter planes to the Salvadoran Armed Forces (FAES) in 1983 enabled a capacity for air strikes 
and rapid troop deployment that essentially neutralized the FMLN’s ability to concentrate 
battalion size forces.  The FMLN responded by deconcentrating its forces into smaller, self-
reliant commando units that would increase the spatial dispersion of attacks but still allow 
concentration for large scale attacks.  Force deconcentration also coincided with the massive 
displacement of the civilian base into refugee camps and the disruption of FMLN experiments in 
popular self-government within control zones. 
The March 1984 presidential election of the center-right government of Napoleon Duarte 
also dealt a decisive blow to the FMLN strategy of promoting popular insurrection and fended 
off complete political control by the extreme right under Roberto D’Aubuisson.  Despite 
irregularities that severely challenged the legitimacy of the result, Duarte’s victory reflected the 
majority preference for peaceful social change that severely conditioned the political-military 
strategies of the FMLN.62  In response, the FMLN adjusted its strategy to demand the 
enforcement of civil liberties and political rights for the civilian population located in and 
returning to conflictive zones under insurgent control, restoring a limit to the repressive capacity 
of the FAES.  The repopulation of FMLN control zones would ensure material support for the 
decentralized military units and lay the groundwork for formalizing entitlement to occupied land.  
A shakeup within the FAES high command also led to a shift from large military deployments to 
a decentralized civilian engagement plan modeled after U.S. civic action programs that were 
deployed in Vietnam to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population.  Civic action also 
channeled resources directly through the military and through local mayors in an effort to 
recover some institutional legitimacy lost in the conflictive zones.  This combination of elite 
realignments and augmented FMLN military capacity forced a greater reliance on local actors in 
both insurgent and counter-insurgent organizational strategies that enabled the constituency for 
post-war decentralization. 
                                                 
62 The murder-suicide of two top FMLN leaders April 1983 also contributed to a shift in strategic focus within 
central command away from a Vietnamese policy of prolonged popular war and toward negotiation. 
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3. The 1989 FMLN Offensive 
 
The final turning point of the war came in November 1989.   Regional peace talks had been 
deadlocked, stalled by the outgoing Reagan administration.  No new commitments to the 
regionally crafted Esquipulas peace plan seemed forthcoming from the Bush government nor 
from the recently elected ARENA president, Alfredo Cristiani.  With negotiations at a standstill 
and following several high profile civilian massacres, the FMLN shocked the Salvadoran 
government and U.S. military advisors once again with an unprecedented attack on the capital 
city, San Salvador.   The attack failed to spark an insurrection despite severe government 
retaliation against the civilian population.  However, like the Tet Offensive of 1968, the battle 
succeeded in proving to the U.S. that the war could not be won militarily.  The murder of the 
Jesuit priests and other gross violations of human rights also engendered new opposition to the 
impunity of the Salvadoran regime.  U.S. military aid was soon conditioned on a negotiated 
compromise and peace talks began in earnest.63   
What the FMLN gained in strategic parity, they lost in terms of the broader political 
realignment.  The FMLN suffered an estimated 4,000 casualties in the ten day offensive, perhaps 
a quarter of its total combatant force.  Any notion of mobilizing fresh recruits to extend the war 
was severely limited by the collapse of supportive Eastern European regimes, as well as the 
electoral loss by the Sandinistas in February, 1990.  The events of 1989 signaled the best 
possible opportunity for a negotiated peace, which both sides seized on Jan. 22, 1992.  In the 
winner-take-all political culture of El Salvador in which negotiation is rare, the political 
significance of the Peace Accords cannot be understated (Crosby, et al. 1996: 12).  
These three turning points suggest how various elements of political opportunity 
combined to condition insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies during the war.   
Rapid concentration and polarization of forces on the left and right collapsed the political center 
in March 1980 and closed off strategies of populist state-led reforms and civil dissent.  
Escalation to an air war in 1984 forced both sides to decentralize their tactics, which re-opened 
the door to conventional politics.  Mutual recognition of a military stalemate in 1989 during a 
                                                 
63 The acquisition of surface to air missiles by the FMLN in 1989 and the initially devastating effect they had on the 
ability to conduct an air war also shifted the balance of power at this time toward the FMLN. 
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moment of tremendous political uncertainty permitted an end to militarism, shifted competitive 
tactics back to the terrain of post-war electoral politics in which local actors would play an 
unprecedented role.   
Decentralization was a product of civil war, conditioned by the structure of political 
opportunity in El Salvador.  Wartime decentralization involved two very different empowerment 
strategies to solve collective action problems.  Strategies of empowerment through conflict in 
FMLN zones of influence and empowerment by invitation in GOES zones have shaped 
respective post-war development practices and outcomes.  In the next section, I trace the rise of 
local government, NGOs and social safety nets as elements of insurgent and counter-insurgent 
empowerment strategies.     
 
4.  Insurgent Empowerment through Conflict 
 
For many Salvadorans, empowerment has involved experiences of choosing to confront local 
inequality.  In November 1974, unarmed peasants challenged the authority of two companies of 
National Guardsmen in the village of La Cayetana, a small village of tenant farm worker 
families beholden to the Angulo family.  The Angulos owned the southwest slope of 
Chinchontepec volcano in San Vicente and had dominated regional politics.  Peasant families 
had organized to demand access to subsistence plots that their families had farmed as 
sharecroppers for generations but which recently had been converted to commercial cotton.  The 
audacity to openly confront the landowner, Coralía Angulo and the Guard ended badly, costing 
the lives of 14 men and the torture of 14 others in one of the conflict’s first massacres.  The 
unrest might have stopped here.  Instead, La Cayetana galvanized a peasant worker movement, 
La Unión de Trabajadores del Campo (UTC) that would become one of the backbone popular 
organizations of the FMLN.  Peasant combatants and supporters of the nascent insurgency 
participated in or witnessed for the first time a decisive challenge to the almost mystical 
authority of the Salvadoran security forces.  The insurgency that coordinated rural mobilization 
networks such as the UTC constituted a shock to a systemic pattern of patron client relations that 
had preserved elite power in the Salvadoran countryside for nearly 150 years.  
The FMLN successfully established zones of popular control covering close to a third of 
the national territory by 1983.  Figure 2.2 shows FMLN control and expansion zones by the late 
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1980s.  Rebel held territory was governed under a stylized federalism of militarily defensible 
popular local governments (los poderes populares locales).  In these zones, unprecedented 
experiments in participatory, collective self-rule were attempted.64  Where landowners fled, the 
FMLN sanctioned free access to land by thousands of formerly landlessness peasants and 
thereby challenged a notion of exclusionary property rights that had prevailed in El Salvador 
(Wood 2000).  These experiences of insurgent rule not only challenged asset inequality, but 
eroded the symbolic legitimacy upon which the asymmetric power of the Salvadoran elite rested.   
 
 
Figure 2.2  Map of FMLN Control and Conflictive Zones in El Salvador During the Civil War. 
Map reprinted with permission of Georgia State University, Dept. of Cartography, originally 
printed in Montgomery (1995) 
 
 
Given the non-contiguous spatial distribution of FMLN controlled zones, decentralized 
collective action was necessary for survival.  How was the FMLN able to resolve collective 
action problems to first concentrate, and then decentralize as many as 15,000 revolutionary 
                                                 
64 I refer here to those zones where individuals chose to stay and thus become identified with the FMLN. The 
experience of popular local government was reconstructed through various interviews, and documented analyses 
including Medina Nuñez (1990: 85-152), Binford and Argueta, no date, mimeo; Binford (1997, 1999), Montgomery 
(1995), Pearce (1986), Montoya (1994), Thompson (1995).   
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forces as well as tens of thousands of logistic civilian supporters for over a decade?  By 
responding to local grievances, appealing to norms of social justice, imposing entry and exit 
constraints and offering limited selective benefits, the FMLN established a variety of 
revolutionary institutions such as los poderes populares locales, transnational refugee and 
solidarity networks, and an array of specialized grassroots organizations.  From these nascent 
movement networks, the first local NGOs were created.65  All functioned under or at least in 
concert with the FMLN military command structure as catalysts for a socialist state at the 
national level and a transitional project of popular economic development at the local level.66 
 The collective capacity of local actors, engaged in struggle with the Salvadoran state over 
greater political and economic self-determination, was under constant construction.  This 
localized insurgent experience involved participation in literacy and primary health care 
brigades; cooperative production, processing and transport of food, clothing, medicines and other 
war related supplies; coalitions that planned and conducted human rights advocacy campaigns; 
surveillance and messenger squads that gathered and reported intelligence; unions and solidarity 
organizations that engaged in purposeful, non-violent confrontations with local and national 
authorities; diplomatic envoys that raised funds and cultivated political support in the exterior; 
and of course, the community militia and combatant units that engaged in direct military actions.   
A sensationalist media, loyal to the military and oligarchy, closed off the public arena 
from informed debate the about most salient issues and actively collaborated with the 
government’s efforts to delegitimize the FMLN.  The FMLN resorted to clandestine radio, 
leafleting, graffiti, a vast network of political operators and other popular communication devices 
to disseminate an alternative message that justified the disruptive tactics as a last resort while 
conditions for a democratic peace were absent.   The achievements and goals of the revolution 
were broadcast each evening by mobile radio transmitters and translated into popular culture 
                                                 
65 Local NGOs existed for years in El Salvador, but most were urban based charity or professional associations. 
66 This is not to ignore that many other institutions chose to distance their work from the FMLN, or chose centrist or 
counter-insurgent alliances during the war.  FMLN aligned NGOs sought structural change, by which I mean a 
fundamental challenge to private property rights through state-led expropriation by force, redistributive fiscal 
reforms, a large state role in planning and ownership of economic production combined with democratic civil 
liberties.  Of course, few actors espoused well-articulated transformative or socialist models, but most shared 
common ideals.  See Montoya (1994) for the best articulation of the popular local economy model, and González 
(1991), Foley and Edwards (1996) for the distribution of local actors allied and against the insurgent project. 
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through cumbias (traditional dances) performed by guerrilla musician groups conjuntos (Almeida 
and Urbizagástegui 1999; Henríquez Consalvi 1994).   
Some have attributed active support for the FMLN more to coercion or fear than by 
revolutionary beliefs.67  As failed peasant insurgencies have shown, coerced recruitment has 
been the recipe for failure.  Unlike the government’s mandatory conscription policy, recruitment 
by the FMLN was largely voluntary.68  Some twenty to thirty thousand peasant supporters were 
killed (mostly civilians at the hands of government forces) before the FMLN consolidated 
protection of its zones of control by about 1984.  Many migrated to the cities and abroad either 
voluntarily or in flight from state sponsored terror campaigns.69  Those less politically militant 
peasants, cooperativistas, landowners, merchants or others who chose to stay in zones of 
insurgent control or expansion engaged in a complex negotiation with the FMLN over war taxes 
and other forms of passive collaboration.  Active service in combat, which in the case of some 
lasted for nearly twenty years, was an austere and high-risk existence. For most, the typical 
economic payoff for revolutionary service among the survivors was a small plot of land and 
some marginal resources for a post-war subsistence occupation.  In contrast to rational 
explanations of insurgent participation as an exchange for actual or expected share of the war 
booty, the eventual material rewards could scarcely compensate for the personal investment.70 
Facing a tremendous disadvantage in material resources and lacking physical refuge in a 
largely deforested countryside, the FMLN’s ability to offer selective incentives was relatively 
negligible.  Instead, the FMLN earned the committed support of a peasant minority and achieved 
the strategic passivity of many potential pro-government informants through a variety of non-
material incentives.  The insurgent appeal emphasized a demonstrably high probability that a 
                                                 
67 For this view, see Danner (1994) and Stoll (1993) for a similar account of failed insurgency in Guatemala.  For a 
more textured view of the Salvadoran case, see Binford (1996). 
68 Voluntarism must be understood within the context of repression that the Salvadoran state and death squads had 
enforced in the countryside for nearly a century during which choice was never free.  The FMLN exploited the loss 
of single members of extended kin networks to recruit entire families in the early years of the war.  Also, a short-
lived attempt at forced recruitment in 1985 failed miserably.  The government employed forced conscription tactics 
throughout the war.   
69 Conflictive zones experienced a tremendous depopulation.  Nearly 1 in 3 Salvadorans were forcefully displaced or 
voluntarily migrated. 
70 See Grossman (1991, 1999) and Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 2000) for this “greed” explanation of recent civil 
conflicts. 
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corrupt, repressive regime could be beaten and that concessions from the rich could be won, all 
of which relied on disciplined class solidarity.71  Perhaps more importantly, solidarity was 
facilitated by relatively egalitarian distribution of available resources within their ranks and a 
reputation for honesty when bargaining with passive collaborators.  The FMLN solved the 
collective action problem of insurgency less by imposing constraints on the free riders, but rather 
by establishing a credible reputation for ensuring that any post-war payoff would be equitably 
distributed.   
Political-military support for the FMLN endured for over a decade in control zones 
because certain decision-making was carefully decentralized.  The definition of local needs and 
the decisions over how to allocate resources in zones of FMLN control permitted an 
unprecedented exposure to principles of equity, accountability and participation.  The five 
different political tendencies within the FMLN established a unified command, however political 
military strategies and relations to the civilian base differed between the two dominant 
organizations, the FPL and the ERP.  A decidedly decentralized strategy was initiated in 1984 in 
response to greater GOES reliance on air transport and bombing.  Different forms of base-party 
autonomy emerged in the various zones under FMLN control.  However, all models shared 
certain fundamental principles that would ground an alternative development model upon 
winning the war.  These principles included collective property rights and work, social and 
distributive equality, participatory planning and organization, transparency and accountability of 
leaders.  These principles and experiences shaped post-war expectations and practices.  This 
achievement was dramatic in relation to Salvadoran standards of clientelism and repression, 
although not meant to romanticize the limited freedoms and grave, but isolated abuses associated 
with FMLN governance during the war.72   
While mobilization was directed from the top-down, often steered by commanders who 
often came from the urban middle class, a reciprocal relation with peasants and workers broke 
with the clientelist and repressive cycle of past relations.73  Violent disruption of unchecked elite 
                                                 
71  With respect to the non-combatant civilian population, passivity may or may not indicate neutrality. The nature of 
the conflict made such distinctions nearly impossible to determine.  
72 Based on personal interviews.  Also see Lungo (1996), Murray 1995), Montgomery (1995), Medina Nuñez 
(1990), Binford (1999). 
73 With several notorious exceptions described in Gibb (2000). 
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power in much of the Salvadoran countryside by the insurgent FMLN was an external shock to 
the structure of political opportunity that reduced the asymmetric power and unaccountability of 
the rich, shifted the balance of distributional conflict toward the interests of the poor and induced 
the grudging adoption of redistributive policies (Wood 2000; Binford 1997).   
 In the post-war period, FMLN local development experiences have continued to 
emphasize bottom-up, and at times, conflictive challenges to the political and economic elite.  
One concrete aspect of FMLN rule in local government or through the presence of NGOs has 
been the mobilization of the poor to demand greater redistribution of land and productive 
resources.  Insurgent focus is on class conflict between rich and poor and on both absolute and 
relative gains for the poor as necessary conditions for empowerment.74  Examples include 
campaigns to fulfill the commitments of the Peace Accords, write off an accumulated agrarian 
debt, challenges to the privatization of water and dozens of localized protests around increased 
state investment in rural infrastructure and provisions for environmental protection.  Collective 
actions have forced expropriative redistribution of assets, which have lowered inequality and 
reduced the asymmetric bargaining power of local elites.  It is not surprising that FMLN 
municipalities defy national indicators of income and land inequality that persist at levels that 
remain extremely high. 
Scholars of revolution have attributed a variety of pathologies to insurgent rule and the 
FMLN strategies to the CA problem have no doubt generated certain disempowering effects 
(Skocpol 1979; Lichbach 1995:261-275; Grossman 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1998).  Some 
critics of the FMLN argue that the politics of disruption created as many new obstacles to 
collective action as they removed.   Stimulating civil strife lowered economic growth, fostered 
intolerance, facilitated criminal activity, and weaken the legitimacy of political institutions – all 
of which tend to negatively impact the poor.  The post–war effects of insurgent strategies are 
evident in the inequality of privilege between leadership and base, corruption, the routinization 
of protest, and participation in criminal violence.   
Perhaps the more complex contribution of FMLN strategies of empowerment through 
conflict derive from the difficulties of reconciling a highly centralized organizational structure 
                                                 
74 The relative-absolute gains distinction is particularly important for evaluating the impact of empowerment 
strategies in light of the accumulated evidence that development interventions frequently empower the already 
powerful rich and middle classes prior to or instead of empowering the poor.  
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and the incentive for decentralized decision-making autonomy.  During the war, these 
“pathologies” of insurgent CA contributed to destructive competition between the five principal 
insurgent groups, an alleged culture of “asistencialismo”75 that undermined local self-reliance, 
and the failure to monitor abuses of leaders at the local level.   The possibility of winning the war 
temporarily unified disparate social forces during the war – a unity which has since unraveled.  
Internecine power struggles among party elites are largely to blame for the FMLN’s failure to 
win the Presidency since 1994.  Despite unilateral efforts by the FMLN to institute 
decentralizing mechanisms of party-decision making power such as national and local 
convention nomination of candidates, a quota for women candidates, term limits, and primary 
elections, the wartime opposition coalition has fragmented into competing ideological or 
personalist factions.  Some attribute this to the centralism of party leadership, others to the 
natural pluralist tendency with which any democratizing society must cope.  Nevertheless, the 
costs of post-war party procedural decentralization seem to have outweighed the benefits so far 
for the FMLN at the national level, as greater voice for delegates and constituent groups has 
contributed to factional disputes that have splintered party interests.  Appeals to class struggle 
that served to mobilize collective action during the war must now accommodate pluralist and 
subaltern (women, war wounded, environmentalist, children, migrant) demands to reform a 
coalition that is capable of winning national elections. 
Despite the legacy of verticalist command, the categorical framing of the FMLN and their 
supporters as enemies of democracy stands in stark contrast to pragmatic, often innovative 
participatory experiments in local governance that have emerged in many FMLN communities.   
In the early post-war period, community participation in local decisions was limited to the 
revival of the cabildo abierto, or town meeting, as the primary inter-election mechanism for 
mayors to elicit citizen views on municipal resource allocation decisions.  Initial evaluations of 
the municipal town meeting approach to administering local reconstruction funding showed that 
local governance was not seen as very participatory, and tended toward ritualistic validation of 
local authority.76  Some mayors and NGOs, including many FMLN, have transformed the 
                                                 
75  Asistencialismo is a term created by the donor community to describe the alleged habit of foreign aid dependence 
among communities whose livelihoods are destroyed by conflict or natural disasters. 
76The cabildo abierto was established as a mechanism of Spanish colonial rule, dusted off by USAID and made the 
centerpiece of its local development program, Municipalities in Action, following the 1986 amendment of the 
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cabildo abierto into a participatory budgeting mechanism that has deepened citizen involvement 
in the allocation of local resources.  Municipal planning processes have also emphasized building 
horizontal ties with other mayors and grassroots organizations and vertical linkages with the state 
and international donors in the coordination of local development efforts.  FMLN mayors, 
backed by a plurality of deputies in the National Assembly, led the push to raise the level of 
municipal transfers to 6% of national budget in 1998.  
However, municipal transfers are far from sufficient for rural development.  Local rule in 
areas influenced by the FMLN typically has expanded the scope of local politics beyond issues 
of local service provision.  Decentralized service provision is viewed as leverage for solving 
broader obstacles to rural economic development (investment, credit, infrastructure, non-farm 
employment).  FMLN mayors have been particularly successful in raising local revenues, 
striking novel private-public partnerships, and leveraging international investment.  Yet, these 
strengths have generally failed to make up for the tendency to divert state investment and 
services toward communities and producers supportive of the government and the diminished 
state support of agriculture.  FMLN communities have attempted to fill this gap with NGO-led 
rural development projects, which are highly organized and notably more participatory, but 
clearly inadequate to make up for the state’s neglect of the rural economy.77  Even with 
substantial donor backing, as in major integrated rural development programs in several 
departments, these projects have produced only modest economic improvements when 
unsuccessful in negotiating state collaboration.   An increase in environmental disasters has only 
exacerbated the failure to stabilize rural livelihoods. 
 
5.  Counter-insurgent Empowerment by Invitation 
 
In parts of the countryside under government rule during and after the war, Salvadoran peasants 
experienced a very different strategy of empowerment.   While life was also conflictive, 
                                                                                                                                                             
municipal statutes.  See Seligson and Córdova (1995), Goodin, et al. (1996) and Chechi (1994) for survey evidence 
of the performance and evaluation of the cabildo abierto fora. 
77 The principal development NGOs emerged from the five political factions that came to constitute the FMLN: 
CORDES (FPL), (PRTC), FUNSALPRODESE (PC), REDES (RN) and sixth F-16, now FUNDESA. Another, 
FUNPROCOOP, was created by the Catholic Church in 1970.  
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empowerment involved a fundamental tradeoff: accommodation of local inequality in exchange 
for protection from the conflict.   If a community actively resisted the FMLN and provided 
support to the Salvadoran military, victimization by state sponsored violence was considerably 
less.  In exchange for loyalty, the Government of El Salvador promised protection from FMLN 
attacks, resources for reconstruction and development and recognition as patriotic defenders of 
the nation.  In effect, this exchange constituted empowerment by invitation – a coerced contract 
between peasant clients and the patron state to withhold support for the insurgents.  This counter-
insurgent empowerment strategy shaped the post-war bargain around an imposed consensus for 
reconstruction.  Participation would be confined to non-threatening activities that effectively 
disregarded local inequality and was rewarded with projects.   
The legacy of counter-insurgent empowerment can also be traced to crucial events.  In 
the communities of Jiboa Valley, located less than 180 degrees around the Chinchontepec 
volcano from La Cayetana, a similar stand off occurred in 1979 between peasants and local 
elites.  A dispute over deteriorating wages and working conditions during the coffee harvest led 
to a strike organized by local peasant leaders to withhold labor from the largest fincas, several of 
which were owned by the family of Alfredo Cristiani.  After patiently absorbing the economic 
losses of the strike, the National Guard selectively killed 20 peasants considered to be lead 
organizers.   Like La Cayetana, the unrest could have stopped there, and it did.   The massacre of 
coffee strikers effectively silenced any future dissent in the Jiboa Valley for next decade.  
Despite repeated attempts, no locally rooted support for the FMLN was organized on the 
northern slopes and valley of the volcano.  Instead, the peasants of the region accepted the 
invitation of the Salvadoran armed forces to fight against the FMLN, defend the coffee harvests 
and enjoy the state’s protection.  Most peasants remained in fear of state repression and 
undoubtedly understood that their actions preserved the unequal privilege of a few coffee 
families that continue to dominate the Jiboa Valley today. 
 The government responded to the FMLN insurgency in places like the Jiboa Valley with 
a rapid build up of counter-insurgent troop strength.  Peasants were conscripted to serve in a 
military that expanded to as many as 63,000 active troops.  Others were organized into civil 
defense units.  The most loyal to the government were active in clandestine intelligence 
gathering and death squads.  While service was voluntary, coercion often played the decisive 
role.  Many families with any resources relocated to the urban centers and evacuated their 
   
 66
children to the U.S.  The poor migrated to shantytowns that rose up around the major cities.  
Others who remained in the conflictive zones suffered the economic sabotage of the insurgents.  
Collective action problems were solved by the government and military by absorbing the costs of 
sanctioning free riders.  The threat of repression ensured that enough peasants contributed their 
service to the civil defense brigades.   
 The provisional government led by the Christian Democrats expected to gain the 
sympathies of some of the 80,000 families who received land through the agrarian reform.  An 
alliance was established with the centrist Unión Comunal de Salvadoreños (UCS), whose 
support by several U.S. government agencies beginning in the 1960s made them an obvious 
choice for administering the land reform program.  But initial support languished as the 
cooperatives were left unattended or abused by corrupt state supervisors.  UCS leaders were 
assassinated by hostile landowners aligned with the hard-line right and indiscriminate violence 
suppressed reform oriented agrarian activism.  Organized solidarity in government zones of 
control was tempered by the military’s distrust of most peasants as potential insurgents, and the 
overarching goal of preserving clientelist structures of wealth and power (Stout et al. 1990; 
Schwarz 1991; Sollis 1993b).   
Counter-insurgent civic action programs sought to recapture and consolidate political 
control by restoring municipal authority and with it, the legitimacy of the state.  The cornerstone 
of this program was the re-establishment of municipal authority by constitutional reform in 1983, 
and the channeling of civic action projects of services and infrastructure in conflictive zones 
through local mayors.  Here too, decision-making was centralized within the political military 
command structure of the Salvadoran military, but civic-military actions increasingly 
emphasized the deconcentration of basic service provision to help stabilize strategic conflictive 
rural areas.  Civic action programs included a typical menu of services: employment in 
construction projects, provision of housing materials, health checkups by military doctors, 
patriotic music or theater performed by local artists, and political speeches by the local Armed 
Forces commander or Catholic priest.  In both cases of military service and civic action 
programs, participants were induced to act collectively with a heavy dose of selective incentives 
(wages, projects, building materials, medicines, children’s toys) combined with an imposed 
constraint (conscription, authoritarian control on mobility, surveillance of private activities).  The 
timing and location of government sponsored civic action programs left little doubt as to the 
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primary objective - to stabilize the FMLN influenced areas of the countryside by containing local 
support and capacity for insurgent resistance. 
 This top-down, stabilizing approach to decentralization provided the design for post-war 
reconstruction programs.  The main government pacification programs were fused in 1992 to 
create the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN), in which ARENA and Christian 
Democrat leaders insisted that the municipal government play a central, but subservient, 
executing role. Greater responsibility for public service provision was delegated to local 
government, but the purse strings remained tightly controlled by a central government, now 
leaner as a consequence of privatization but still highly politicized (Rodriquez 1999; Orellana 
1997; Castañeda and Fernandez 1995; Morales Ehrlich 1995; Nickson 1995).  While the 
principal goals of the SRN were to integrate some 50,000 ex-combatants on both sides into 
Salvadoran society and address the reconstruction needs of the 150 most devastated 
municipalities, the allocation of projects reflected a clear bias against FMLN communities 
(Murray et al. 1995).  Unaccountable GOES influence over reconstruction programs forced 
several European donors, including the EU, to channel its post-war assistance around the SRN 
and directly to conflictive regions.   
Demands for broader inclusion by FMLN NGOs and these same European donors led to 
several mid-term reforms in the reconstruction program.  In 1996, the bureaucratic remnants of 
the Secretariat for National Reconstruction, along with the USAID sponsored Municipalities in 
Action program were folded into an already existing social safety net program, el Fondo de 
Inversion Social (FIS), that had been created to finance small, emergency infrastructure needs in 
poor communities.  The new institution, FISDL, has become the favored governmental channel 
for local development projects.78  Financial and technical infusions by several international 
donors were needed to shore up the technocratic autonomy of the FISDL, with the goal of 
transforming what was a patchwork of social safety net programs into a showcase for 
decentralized and participatory local development.  At the same time, the achievement of the 
primary of goal of political stability permitted the government to vacillate on decentralizing line 
ministry functions and local control over fiscal resources, despite enthusiastic post-war 
commitments. 
                                                 
78 The letters DL stand for desarrollo local that were appended to the institutional name in 1997. 
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ARENA post-war decentralized local development efforts have increasingly focused on 
the FISDL, which was fashioned as an honest broker between NGOs, local government and the 
poorest communities.  Despite new packaging, the FISDL continues to be viewed by many as a 
top-down effort by the ruling party to retain control over local development as FMLN victories 
at the municipal level made political capture more difficult.  Any political autonomy enjoyed by 
the FISDL has depended on external financing, which could end in the coming years.  In direct 
competition with COMURES (the Salvadoran Municipal Corporation) a national lobbying 
organization for municipal advocacy and another state technical assistance agency for 
municipalities (El Instituto de Desarollo Municipal, ISDEM) the FISDL has steadily traded off 
stronger alliances with community organizations and NGOs, for closer ties to government in the 
interest of preserving its own budget.79 As a consequence, FISDL funded municipal projects 
(largely the choice of a fixed menu of social infrastructure) have increasingly become 
disconnected from questions of economic development, particularly in rural areas.    
In the empowerment by invitation model, inequality is addressed indirectly through 
market competition and individual initiative.  Competition and self-interest empower citizens as 
consumers to choose from a widened selection of commodities, occupations, places of residence, 
and political representation.  Land transfer, for example, is delegated to a market of voluntary 
buyers and sellers.  As a result of noted institutional weaknesses that prevent these markets from 
working well, asset inequality remains very high in government zones of control.  In turn, local 
elites are more likely to capture the benefits of decentralization.  However, modest absolute gains 
in well-being are sufficient for empowerment.   
The state provision of productive resources and services in rural areas flows 
disproportionately to the dominant private sector gremios (e.g. members of the principal business 
associations, CAMAGRO, ANEP, ABANSA, ASI).  The majority of smallholder agriculture is 
assisted through various externally funded, state sanctioned, NGO administered social insurance 
programs (CARE-Fundacampo, IFAD-Prodap, ProChalate, IDB-PAES, UNDP-Prodernor) that 
tend to prioritize individual strategies over cooperative organization or political advocacy.  These 
government approved development NGOs often prioritize upward vertical accountability to the 
                                                 
79 A more recent reorganization of FISDL in 1999 was intended to decentralize the agencies work, by relocating 
staff to regional offices.  There is little information available that these measures have changed the institution’s 
centralist approach taken previously. 
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external donors over downward accountability to the beneficiary population.  Some of these 
initiatives also tend to operate as islands unto themselves, rarely encouraging local partners to be 
active participants in larger coalitions.  As I show in subsequent chapters, this empowerment by 
invitation approach to decentralized rural development has facilitated the state’s withdrawal from 
the rural economy unless the provision of state services are monopolized by powerful local elites 
or demanded by contentious, organized producer groups.  Government control zones may be 
characterized more by the former than the latter.  Thus, while the top-down model of 
decentralization has contributed to the proliferation of local development actors, it has also 
contributed to their depoliticization and demobilization. 
The decisive strength of the ARENA’s top-down empowerment by invitation strategy has 
been stability.  Surprisingly, while this approach to decentralization has accompanied the neglect 
of the rural economy, ARENA maintains a strong rural electoral base through the distribution of 
selective benefits.   Perhaps as a reflection of a transition in economic power within the ruling 
elite away from the old agrarian elite (particularly with the decline of coffee) and toward the 
service and manufacturing sector leaders, ARENA has also weathered significant internal 
upheaval in the leadership of its party.  Still, the FMLN has failed to adequately exploit this 
opportunity of elite realignment to upset ARENA in any of the three post-war Presidential 
elections.  Finally, the ARENA mobilization network has been more effective in establishing a 
relationship with the ever more influential Salvadoran community in the U.S., placating the 
political demands of this crucial source of remittance flows that have dramatically softened the 
party’s economic austerity reforms and kept the economy afloat.  
 
6.  Summary 
 
Political experiences associated with the government or FMLN control left their imprint on how 
the state, local government and civil society have responded to political opportunities opened or 
closed by post-war decentralization.  A contest that began in the 1970s to win over the "hearts 
and minds" of the rural population foreshadowed the rise of  NGOs and municipal government as 
the two dominant and competing forms of social and political organization in postwar 
reconstruction.   NGOs and municipal authorities were initially associated with insurgent and 
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counter-insurgent projects, respectively.  Donors took sides by funding either municipal 
government (in the case of several bi-lateral donors, mainly USAID) or NGOs working in 
conflictive zones (in the case of many European aid agencies).80  Communities in zones of 
wartime FMLN control supported NGOs and reserved hostility for many mayors.  This pattern of 
institutional preferences was reversed in zones of government control.  NGOs allied with the 
FMLN have prioritized contentious collective actions to demand expropriative redistribution of 
assets.  Municipalities have emphasized conventional modes of participation to gradually 
improve lives through expansion of public services.   
 The national reconstruction program and an array of decentralized anti-poverty programs 
provided an optimal postwar setting for NGOs and local governments to coordinate local 
development, but a lack of clarity about appropriate roles and relations between them, and a 
climate charged by past rivalries, has hindered this goal.  As such, decentralization efforts to 
strengthen local institutions proceeded along two separate tracks, one offering incentives to 
municipal governments and the other offering incentives to NGOs (Cernea 1989; Blair, Booth, 
Seligson, Córdova 1995).  These tracks correspond to the counter-insurgent positive-sum and 
insurgent zero-sum notions of power and consensus-conflict approaches to empowerment, 
respectively. 
Wartime tendencies toward institutional competition remain an obstacle to 
decentralization when coordination is more necessary than ever.  The majority of Salvadoran 
municipalities have fewer than 20,000 residents and despite the benefits of being more in tune 
with citizen needs, they may be administratively unviable. Efforts to foster inter-municipal and 
inter-governmental coordination through COMURES have produced mixed results.  The 
"project" orientation of international aid has also contributed to fragmentation of civil society 
and duplication of work, where production, education, health and environmental projects are 
conducted in cross-purposes with each other and the line ministries.81    
                                                 
80 This political favoritism began to fade after 1989.  See Mujal-Leon (1989).  A political genealogy of NGOs is 
offered by Gonzalez (1991), Foley and Edwards (1996), and MacDonald (1995).  Some of the larger, international 
NGOs (CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, Plan International, Catholic Relief Services) also accepted U.S. 
funding during the war.  Most donors were reluctant to fund both NGOs and local government directly. 
81 By the late 1990s six different municipal strengthening programs were operating with little coordination or 
sharing of results, perhaps explaining the relatively modest, if any, improvement in the state’s responsiveness and 
accountability to local needs.  One good example is the health sector.  A coalition of health NGOs was formed with 
purpose of organizing in preparation for opportunities for decentralized care provision.  The coalition has had little 
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Local organizations are left to resolve these obstacles to coordination and convert past 
political experiences and the autonomy and resources of decentralization into the mutual 
empowerment of citizen and state - a task for which these local actors on their own may be 
underqualified.  Electoral gains by the opposition FMLN have diminished the suspicion between 
Salvadoran NGOs and municipal governments.  By 2003 FMLN mayors governed many major 
cities and some 75 municipalities in all.  The political right and center have also rushed to form 
their own NGOs.  Some ideologically opposed mayors have even banded together with other 
civil society organizations at the local level to demand faster decentralization of inefficient, 
politicized central ministries.  As NGOs and municipalities discover a common local 
development agenda, the Salvadoran government has shifted its support to the FISDL as the 
trusted interlocutor with local actors.   
The emergence of local institutions in post-war El Salvador as solutions to collective 
action problems illustrate two rival models of decentralized empowerment.  Neither, of course, is 
purely top-down nor bottom-up.  Political experiences associated with FMLN rule are laden with 
an internal tension between the centralism of political command and local pluralism, cooperative 
norms, and voluntarism of bottom-up politics.  As such, the FMLN combines a variety of 
collective action strategies that emanate from the Contract bargaining strategy set, but with 
significant capacity to tap Community solidarity, as well as exercise Market incentives and 
disincentives for participation.  Despite its emergence and many positive innovations as a 
representative political party, the FMLN at times relies on Hierarchy CA strategies that rest upon 
the vertical command structure of the war but run counter to the other mentioned strategies in the 
post-war period. 
   The top-down consensual empowerment model also relies on spontaneously self-
coordinating, voluntarist collective actions to resolve the most intractable economic problems of 
rural development.  ARENA tends to continue to operate from a Hierarchy CA strategy basis that 
has served it well in the party’s twenty five year history.  The demobilization and reform of the 
state security forces have limited the Right’s ability to repress dissent, and have therefore forced 
ARENA to diversify its repertoire of CA strategies in the post-war period.  The loss of majority 
                                                                                                                                                             
success in holding the government minister accountable to promises of decentralizing service provision resources.  
An experimental effort to decentralize health services in several municipalities was reversed and re-centralized in 
1997. 
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control in the National Assembly has required greater negotiation (Contract), both among the 
minor players of its own coalition as well as with opposition parties.  ARENA has also had to 
invest more in Market incentives (a dogmatically loyal press and increasing although still anemic 
provision of public goods) to preserve its electoral plurality.  Community strategies have even 
received a modicum of ARENA interest, although the goal is to recover the work ethic, respect 
for property rights and social order that were perceived to exist in the rural sector before the war.   
Both models have influenced conventional and contentious modes of post-war 
participation.  The legacies of insurgent and counter-insurgent rule in rural areas present an 
opportunity to compare the impact of past political experiences (contentious, bottom-up, 
insurgent versus stabilizing, top-down, and counter-insurgent) on how empowerment strategies 
are conceptualized, coordinated and deployed by local actors in the design and performance of 
post-war institutions.   
 
 
D.  METHODOLOGY - COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
There is little agreement on the optimal analytical framework to assess empowerment, and 
attempts to consolidate such an approach are very much in their early stages.  The experimental 
nature of this study therefore requires multiple methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative to 
assess the relationship outlined above between power resources, agency and achievements, within a 
changing opportunity structure.  Below, I describe these methodologies. 
 
1.  1998 Regional Survey Design & Case Study Municipality Overviews 
 
The paracentral economy of El Salvador was transformed by the combined penetration of cotton 
and coffee in a way that was quite unlike most of the other conflictive zones of El Salvador, 
setting in motion a conflict between renter and sharecropping peasants and landowners that 
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approximated Paige’s (1975) classic notion of agrarian revolt.82  The expansion of export crops 
triggered a cycle of displacement of tenant farmers, widespread peasant resistance, the escalation 
of state repression against peasant protesters, the polarization of reformist and reactionary elites, 
finally generating the moral indignation and fear that drove many peasants to join in rebellion 
against the state.  The FMLN and Salvadoran Armed Forces fought for control of the zone 
between 1979 to 1992, splitting the region into large areas of control and influence (as indicated 
above in Figure 2.1). The intensity of the civil war in the paracentral zone can be summarized by 
the fact that San Vicente was the only department in El Salvador to report a negative annual 
population growth rate (-0.33%) between 1971-92 (DIGESTYC, 1997).    
The paracentral zone was chosen for this study because of the homogeneity of many 
socio-economic and geographic factors that fueled the agrarian discontent and are held in 
common among the surveyed communities. More importantly, however, this region is perhaps 
unique in terms of the close proximity of insurgent and counter-insurgent communities within 
the same geographical area over the course of the conflict.  During the war, the zone represented 
two of five political-military theaters organized by the FMLN.  The legacy of insurgent influence 
is illustrated by the expansion of post-war FMLN governance at the municipal level in the region 
- a reflection of their deep-rooted support among the regional peasant population.  Local political 
competition varies throughout the region, with FMLN electoral support centered in San Vicente, 
but with growing support in Usulután and persistently low support in La Paz. 
The socio-economic features of the paracentral zone, including high quality land and 
access to economic infrastructure and national markets, permit an authentic debate over 
economic development rather than manageable subsistence.  In other words, the stakes of 
challenging property rights were and are higher in the paracentral zone than in most other 
regions.  It represents the only region where prized productive assets were contested and won by 
the FMLN.  By studying a zone of economic significance, I am arguing that empowerment has a 
great deal to do with the acquisition of economic capital, a factor that weakens any empowering 
outcome in insurgent strongholds in Northern regions.   
                                                 
82 Paige argues that peasant revolution is based on rural class structure.  Of all types of peasants, sharecroppers or 
wage working peasants are the most likely revolutionaries, but only when faced with an owner dependent upon 
agriculture as the primary source of income. 
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Between August and October 1998, I conducted a regional survey of 912 households 
designed to explore the variation in tangible and intangible empowerment indicators at the 
community level.  The survey and sample as designed to compare the impact of insurgent and 
counter-insurgent historical socialization experiences associated with the Salvadoran civil war on 
various individual and institutional level performance indicators of decentralized development in 
the post-war period.  Three representative case study municipalities were selected and 
oversampled in equal proportions in order to maximize variation across the municipality as a 
social context.   
My paracentral survey is also structured as a clustered sample approximating the 
stratified population distribution of the paracentral region of the El Salvador based on the 1992 
census with some adjustments for the known population increases in the case study 
municipalities.  The sample was designed to resemble the national and defined regional 
population distribution within three strata of city sizes, ex-conflictive and rural areas, but surveys 
were clustered within randomly chosen municipalities (with the exception of the case study 
municipalities).  A regional sample was chosen to permit inferences about the impact of 
contextual insurgent and counter-insurgent experiences across communities within the entire 
region. An additional 482 respondents were surveyed in 11 other municipalities, selected 
randomly within population strata covering the departments of San Vicente, La Paz, and 
Usulután - generating a total sample of 912.83   Within municipalities, primary sampling units 
consisted of randomly chosen urban neighborhoods and rural caseríos, within which surveyors 
would fan out to ensure a reasonable distribution.  Within households, the respondent was 
selected according to a quota criteria for gender and age.84  Of the sample, 48.7% were women, 
the average age was 37.5 years, 69.8% were located in official ex-conflictive municipalities, 
66.7% were in rural designations, 48% were landowners or renters, and 22% were ex-combatants 
from both sides.  (See Appendix for Tables B.1 survey sample design, Table B.2 list of 
municipalities surveyed and Appendix C for survey instrument and coding) 
                                                 
83 By secondary municipalities, I refer to non-case study towns where surveys were conducted, but less extensive 
research was possible.  A complete explanation of survey design can be provided on request.  See Sample Design 
description in Table B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix. 
84 For many ex-conflictive communities, there were no updated local census maps to work from. 
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A total sample of 912 drawn from a regional population of about 480,000 people, 
suggests that the confidence interval will be +/-3.2%.85  This means that if the sample were 
drawn repeated times, 95 percent of the time, the value derived from my sample would be no 
more than plus or minus 3.2% away from the true value for any given question for the 
paracentral region population.  Figure 2.3 identifies the location of the three oversampled case 
studies, Tecoluca (155 interviews, insurgent case), the Jiboa Valley (155 interviews, hard-line 
counter-insurgent case) and San Ildefonso (119 interviews, moderate counter-insurgent case) 
within the broader sampling area of the paracentral region (the departments of San Vicente, the  
western half of Usulután and eastern half of La Paz located east of the Jiboa River).86  For 
comparisons between municipal cases, the confidence increases to between +/- 8-9%.  For these 
comparisons, some care will be taken to report whether differences are in fact statistically 
significant by showing the confidence interval “error bar” graphically or reported the ρ statistic. 
To explore the historically rooted, contextual effects of political experience, I adopt a 
most similar systems design to compare how differences among decentralization strategies have 
shaped participation in post-war reconstruction in otherwise similar rural municipalities.  I have 
selected case studies where variation in key independent variables - socio-economic variables, 
development potential, and geographic parameters are low enough so as not to explain much of 
the variance in the dependent variable – empowerment.  The three case study municipalities – 
Tecoluca, Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso, each representative of insurgent FMLN, counter-
insurgent National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and moderate counter-insurgent Christian 
Democrat (PDC) party loyalties and political contexts, are similar in almost every way, except 
for differences in insurgent and counter-insurgent political experiences during the war.   
                                                 
85 A population census was conducted in 1992, but was quickly considered obsolete given the massive migration 
internally and externally that occurred in the early 1990s.  Sample design is based loosely on the 1992 municipal 
population estimates.  It is known that cluster samples help reduce survey costs, but increases the confidence interval 
of the sample by some degree.  Determining how much clustering increases the confidence interval depends on the 
uniformity of a given characteristic shared by residents within and between the clusters.  Thus, the design effect of 
clustering varies with each survey question, and therefore makes it difficult to estimate the loss of precision.  Some 
recent analyses of exit polling have suggested that clustering may lead to a 50% increase in sampling error over 
simple random sampling.   
86 The paracentral regional boundaries do not coincide with the national definition of what is considered the 
paracentral region, but are informed rather by the historical boundaries of the conflict spanning an area that extends 
from the Rio Jiboa to central Usulután and is bordered by Cabanas to the north and transected by the Lempa River.  
In addition to being targeted by the first concerted counter-insurgency programs of the war, the communities in this 
region share many economic and political attributes.  
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Isolating political experience in the survey analysis will be enabled by reclassifying the 
survey respondents according to a proposed indicator of political experience (a scale variable 
that is constructed from a combination of five independent survey and non-survey indicators).  
This political experience index will allow somewhat more analytical leverage on the testing of 
the significance of this factor across the entire sample.   
 
 
Figure 2.3  Map of El Salvador Paracentral Region, Survey Sample and Case Study 
Municipalities (all maps are by author unless noted otherwise) 
 
 
Thus, the principal quantitative analytical procedures employed (OLS Regression, 3 & 4 
category ANOVA comparisons) are intended to isolate the significance of political experience as 
an explanatory factor in the measurable levels of empowerment.  Beyond bivariate comparisons 
of my empowerment indicators between municipalities and categories of political experience, 
two principal methods will be used to assess the significance of past political experiences on 
variation in empowerment achievements.  I will test the strength of political experiences in 
explaining several modes of efficacious participation in community and political actions across 
Paracentral Zone 
    Municipalities 
Survey Sample  
    Municipalities 
Case Study  
   Municipalities 
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the entire survey by regressing participation variables on the contextual variable - political 
experience, while controlling for several widely accepted indicators of democratic attitudes: a) 
inter-personal trust, b) support for various political institutions, c) political efficacy, as well as 
several unconventional indicators of social capital, d) collective efficacy, and e) contentious 
efficacy skills, in addition to standard socio-economic variables.   
Secondly, I will compile all of the indicators for empowerment achievements into a 
single empowerment index to provide a comprehensive comparison of empowerment resources, 
intervening attitudes, and achievements in the three case study municipalities and between 
categories of municipal experience.  This way of exploring subnational data at the individual 
level or aggregate community level in terms of empowerment indicators hopes to avoid the 
known limitations of ecological inference that overstate the utility of national averages.87   
The survey included both closed and open ended questions (see survey instrument in 
Appendix C), and the answers to the open-ended questions were recoded according to the 
specified instruction.  Survey questions were tested and all surveys were supervised in the field 
by the primary investigator (over 300 surveys were conducted by the primary investigator 
himself) and each survey was revised before data entry.  After data entry, the database was 
cleaned to minimize coding error on the subsequent analysis. 
My survey was interrupted by two unforeseen events.  The first was dengue fever, 
contracted midway through the survey and resulting in three weeks of convalescence (and 
preliminary data analysis).  The second was Hurricane Mitch, which hit El Salvador on October 
31, 1998, the day our survey team of ten was attempting to complete the final visit to Jucuapa, 
Usulután, but were turned back by mudslides and the closing of the only highway over the 15 de 
Septiembre dam.  After a two week delay, we completed our survey.88 
In the course of conducting the survey, the team visited 98 communities.  I personally 
conducted surveys and extended interviews with key informants during one or more visits to 72 
                                                 
87 Gary King’s book, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem, suggests that national level measurement of 
key variables tends to obscure within-country variation, thereby producing inaccurate empirical conclusions using 
aggregate (i.e., “ecological”) data to infer discrete individual-level relationships of interest when individual-level 
data are not available. (1995:I).   
88 The survey team was composed of 10 of San Vicente’s most promising agronomists who were in the final year of 
studies at the San Vicente branch of the National University.  My thanks go to them for their stellar performance in 
the completion of this survey, their professionalism toward for the participants, and the many insights they shared 
with me about regional culture and politics. 
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of the 98 communities that participated. Some visits were for no more than a few hours.  In 
others, I lived for months at a time.  My observations about the three case study communities rest 
on a reasonably solid foundation of evidence built through extended visits, numerous interviews, 
participant observation and document analysis during a primary field work period that began in 
January 1998 and ended in April 1999.89 
 
2.  Complementary Survey Data  
 
The reported responses of the 1998 paracentral regional survey will be compared to the 
responses to equivalent questions in a 1991 urban survey of San Salvador, and two national 
surveys (1995 & 1999) conducted by the University of Pittsburgh.  Some comparisons will be 
made with national socio-economic indicators derived from the official multipurpose household 
economy survey (EHPM) from various years, but particularly 1998.  The EHPM is conducted 
annually by DIGESTYC, the statistical arm of the Ministry of Economy.  The survey began in 
the 1970s, but has improved throughout the 1990s. The sample size increased from several 
thousand households in 1991 and questionable representation of the rural sector to about 16,000 
households now that are more representative samples at the department level (with a +/- 10% 
confidence interval).  Where comparable questions and sample design permit, some comparisons 
over time will be made of certain empowerment variables.90  A descriptive profile of all four 
survey samples is given it Appendix Table B.3. 
Survey data will permit only a cross-sectional analysis of communities, organizations and 
society at one moment in time.  As such, survey data alone are not enough to answer key 
questions about empowerment involving backward and forward inferences regarding trends in 
how resources and agency have combined to facilitate empowerment.  To make such inferences, 
I will look to the available relevant secondary literature, as well as more qualitative research into 
community and institutional histories, key informant interviews, biographies, and participant 
                                                 
89 Follow-up research visits to El Salvador since 1999 have permitted additional data collection and validation. 
90 For a complete description of the 1991, 1995 and 1999 surveys, see Seligson, Córdova Macías, and Cruz (2000) 
El Salvador Democracy Audit.  I wish to acknowledge the generous support of Mitchell Seligson who provided 
access to these original Salvadoran datasets. 
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observation of the key decision making processes within the case study communities, and 
participation related to rural development projects.   
 Because empowerment is not only an instrumental effect, but also has intrinsic qualities, I 
have collected additional information from interviews and participant observation that is both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature.  A semi-structured survey of development institutional 
representatives and participant observation in a variety of local and national development processes 
were designed to assess the level of coordination or competition between these actors.  In addition to 
this information derived from broad historical interviews, these institutional surveys were designed to 
assess the intrinsic nature of empowerment in the case study municipalities.   
 
3.  Institutional Survey 
 
In addition to the formal survey and comparative analysis of national-regional household surveys, I 
interviewed over 100 organizations (representatives of the Salvadoran government, IFIs, INGOs, 
NGOs, gremios, community organizations or CSOs) that were stakeholders of some type in the 
paracentral region.  The interviews included questions about development philosophy, financial data, 
organizational history and structure, decision making processes, active projects in the region, the 
level of horizontal and vertical coordination with other organizations, and advocacy strategy.  The 
uneven quality of the information obtained (i.e. the non-transparency with regard to providing 
financial data), does not allow a statistical analysis of this relatively small sample of development 
practitioners.  Yet, these interviews did provide invaluable source of background information about 
local development finance, collective action strategies, and performance).  A list of the institutions 
interviewed conducted is attached in Appendix C. 
 One way of describing the organizational field will be a power map of development actors 
present in each case study municipality.  These institutional mappings will be one means of 
addressing organizational density, diversity and linkages, as well as provide an indication of the 
various sources of development finance. 
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4.  Participatory Observation 
 
During the 16 month field work season, and in follow up visits to the country, I participated as a 
research observer in a wide variety of local development processes.  The most relevant of these 
included municipal planning meetings and cabildo abiertos; NGO assemblies, project visits and 
planning meetings; political party campaign events, primaries and conventions; protest marches; 
events and meetings convened by donors or the government; regular meetings of San Vicente 
Departmental Assembly of Mayors, the Jiboa Valley Microregion, and the Tecoluca Municipal 
Development Council.   
 
5.  Historical Interviews   
 
The lack of comparable longitudinal survey data precludes rigorous analysis of change over time.  
For that reason, historical evidence to reconstruct key aspects of insurgent and counter-insurgent 
political experience was gathered through a survey of the relevant secondary literature and key 
informant interviews.  These historical interviews provide the foundation for the pre-war and wartime 
analyses presented in Chapters 5 & 6.  It is worth noting that the validation of key historical events in 
government zones of influence and access to former soldiers or officers in the paracentral zone were 
considerably difficult and limited by the number of sources from this part of the investigation.  
 
 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Salvadoran case illustrates how institutional solutions to the decentralization’s collective 
action problems have gravitated toward local government, NGOs and social safety nets.  These 
local actors have served as powerful forces for asset redistribution and democratization in some 
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areas and have strengthened the hand of predatory local and national elites in others.  My 
comparative overview of insurgent FMLN and counter-insurgent GOES zones of control and 
influence suggests that the capacity of local collective action to confront entrenched inequality is 
more likely in the former than in the latter.  In FMLN zones of influence, I expect the specific 
developmental roles assigned to local actors to emphasize contestation and transformation of 
local and national inequalities, a prioritization of horizontal (between-group) and vertical 
coordination (upward and downward accountability) in local economic development initiatives.  
In government zones of influence, where social inequality is viewed as a given and moreover, 
has not been ameliorated through prior local development actions of contestation, I expect 
accommodative empowerment strategies will tend to prioritize uncoordinated local action.   
This portrayal of the Salvadoran case suggests a qualification of the empowerment model 
presented in Chapter one.   The political opportunity represented by FMLN, ARENA, or 
Christian Democrat influence in reconfiguring elite power and organizational mobilization 
networks to resist or stabilize inequality has narrowed or expanded the strategic choices available 
to rural populations in the post-war period.   
 This comparative institutional framework will prove useful to the extent that it helps 
answer the three questions identified at the outset: Under what conditions does decentralization 
work in postwar El Salvador, why has the local institutional solution to decentralized collective 
action gravitated toward local government and NGOs, and finally, how well have local actors (or 
the state) performed in their respective decentralized roles.   
 To answer these questions, some have looked to Tocqueville, emphasizing the 
significance of a vibrant culture of civic association marked by habits of restraint and 
moderation, capable of keeping a both weak state and the “unreflecting passions of the 
multitude” in check, and thereby locating the wellsprings of U.S. political and economic 
prosperity.91   Tarrow has argued the reverse that cyclical patterns of civic and uncivic political 
mobilization and quiescence are determined less by custom or habit, than by opportunities for 
action produced by state consolidation.  Decentralization is conceived as a bottom-up 
empowerment process in the view of the latter, a top-down empowerment process in the former. 
 A comparative institutional analysis of decentralized development in postwar El Salvador 
captures and compares both empowerment strategies by applying the tools of social movement 
                                                 
91 from Tocqueville, Democracy, p. 272 
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theory to encompass the structure, strategy and symbology of contentious and convention 
political action. 
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III. CHAPTER THREE:  A “QUIET REVOLUTION”? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DECENTRALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
Decentralization of power and of spending, coupled with democratization, has dramatically 
transformed the local political landscape in Latin America, in what some have called a “quiet 
revolution.”  A new model of governing is emerging in the region.         (World Bank 1997: 166) 
 
Three local institutional innovations have flourished as a consequence of this decentralizing turn 
in development policy.  Mayors were elected directly in only three Latin American countries in 
1980.  Now, 18 Latin American countries elect their mayors, and six other countries appoint 
mayors indirectly through elected municipal councils.92  The share of government spending by 
state and local governments has also increased substantially from about 15 to 20% in the last 
decade, although still far short of the industrialized country sub-national expenditure average of 
35% (World Bank 1997). Secondly, NGOs, civic associations and grassroots groups have 
proliferated across Latin America, resurrecting interest in the role of civil society in national 
development.93  Finally, social safety nets, which were initially deployed as emergency demand-
                                                 
92 Sub-national elections are now held in 71 out of 75 multiparty democracies worldwide for which data are 
available. Freedom House (1998).   
93 Since the late 1980s, the number of NGOs operating in parts of Latin America, Africa and Asia has almost 
doubled, with estimates as high as 50,000.  In Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent (CIS) 
countries, NGOs may have increased three or fourfold from a very low base level in 1989.  In some OECD 
countries, operating expenditures in the voluntary or NGO sector now account for almost 4% of GDP (World Bank 
1997: 113). Northern aid channeled through NGOs has also jumped dramatically, from $1 billion in 1970 to $7.2 
billion in 1990, perhaps twice this amount if loans are included.   Yet the impact of NGOs or local governments is 
not necessarily reflected by their spending power.  Total aid channeled through NGOs still only represents 3.3% of 
all Official Development Aid and 0.02-0.05% of total OECD GNP (UNDP 1998).  Total non-governmental aid 
expenditure (est. $10 billion 1996) represents just a fraction of net private capital flows to low and middle income 
countries ($285.5 billion), total bilateral and multilateral developmental finance ($88.9 billion) or total charity 
spending in the U.S. ($700 billion (New York Times Oct. 18, 1999).  Total sub-national government expenditures in 
the developing world also represent only a modest portion of total government expenditures - between $86.4 - $144 
billion (15-25%)  (UNDP 1998; World Bank 1999).  Sub-national government spending in developing countries 
equals $15-30 per capita, compared with $1,345 per capita sub-national expenditures in OECD countries. 
   
 84
driven (often externally financed) anti-poverty programs, have now assumed the status of 
permanent institutional interlocutors between communities and the state in almost every country.  
Considering Latin America’s long centralist tradition, this remarkable shift toward 
decentralization has been described as a nothing less than a “quiet revolution.”    
In the view of many scholars, decentralization has assumed the status of political 
panacea.  Decentralized systems are held to increase democratic legitimacy by transferring 
resources and responsibilities to local actors, while simultaneously improving the fiscal 
environment.  Decentralization in Latin America is also guided by Tocqueville’s admiring 
perception of the rich and harmonious U.S. associational life, which the ancien regime in France 
lacked as a buffer between society and an invasive, centralizing and corrupt state.   
Yet, applying Tocqueville to the present often comes at the risk of oversimplification and 
mis-specification.  Tocquevillian localism has come to embody a development prescription of a 
weak state and an active but accommodative society.  Tocqueville found in U.S. local 
governments and associations a protection not only against state despotism, but also from the 
“tyranny of the majority,” whose radical egalitarian and democratic provocations had paved the 
way for despotism in France.  While in America, “the general equality of condition among the 
people,” may have appeared far more favorable than in Western Europe, other accounts demur.94 
Moreover, organized, disruptive opposition prodded by the changing opportunity structure of 
state consolidation may have done as much, if not more, than the orderly New England town 
meetings, to level 19th century differences and advance democracy.  “Praising the weak 
American state whose presence could barely be seen at the grassroots, and ascribing 
associational development to that absence, Tocqueville overlooked in America how a 
contentious - and often ugly - mass politics in rough dialectic with the state was shaping how 
people acted collectively” (Tarrow 1994:65).  Decentralized access to the state did not excise 
state power nor did it quell "un-civic" local action. 
 In Latin America, despite their prominent billing and the facilitative premises of 
decentralization, the capacity of civil society associations and local governments as catalysts in 
transitions from authoritarian rule has clearly not been matched when it comes to effecting more 
                                                 
94 Tocqueville’s traveling companion, Beaumont, suggested that his friend was not very good at numbers.  Zinn 
1980: 213, and Chapter ten).  On Tocqueville, American democracy and inequality see Wilentz (1988), and Pessen 
(1973). 
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accountable, equitable, better performing post-authoritarian governance.  The “paradox of 
decentralization,” as one practitioner has put it, is that decentralization demands “more 
centralization and more sophisticated political skills at the national level” (Rudolf Hommes, ex-
minister of state in Colombia, 1998, cited in Tendler 1997: 142).95  The local development model 
formulated for El Salvador and dominant in most Latin American countries, avoids this paradox 
by pre-supposing but not adequately specifying a new and improved division of labor between 
civil society, the state, and the market.   
Given decentralization’s mixed record in Latin America, the principal question to be 
addressed in this chapter is why local actors and institutions, municipal governments, civil 
society organizations and social safety nets, have emerged as key development actors in policy 
areas where the state has presumably failed?  Are these reforms pushed down by stability-minded 
elites from above, or pulled down by subordinate, excluded challengers from below?  The 
political and economic transitions literature has clearly privileged the former, treating mass 
protest and social movements as brief or exogenous factors to political and economic reform 
processes controlled by competing elite factions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Higley and 
Gunther 1992; Huntington 1991; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995).  However, a renewed interest in civil society’s role in democratization has 
begun to systematically explore the link between popular politics from below and regime 
change.96   
Utilizing a comparative institutional approach, I contend that neither a top-down or 
bottom-up perspective is sufficient by itself in explaining the emergence of decentralization or 
the performance of local institutions.  NGOs, municipal governments, and social safety nets 
could simply not have thrived the way they have over the past two decades without a broad 
societal base of support and some vested interest within the state.  Instead, I argue that it is the 
interaction of elite and non-elite strategies of empowerment that has produced this unique 
                                                 
95 This view is consistent with Kahler’s (1990) “orthodox paradox” that neoliberal orthodoxy implied the 
imposition of radical policy changes that simultaneously restricted and invoked the state as a implementer of these 
changes. 
96 Among those works that have assigned a more central role to non-elite actors are Moore (1966), Karl (1990), 
Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), Putnam (1993), Fox and Brown (1998) Smith, Chatfield and 
Pagnucco (1997), and Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
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consensus for decentralized development.97  In this chapter, I trace the political and economic 
transition in Latin America where decentralization has become a central tenet.  Consistent with 
the theoretical model for assessing empowerment, top-down, and elite led, stabilizing approaches 
to decentralization tend to be associated with an empowerment by invitation strategy, and 
bottom-up, contentious, mass challenges to decentralization tend to be associated with an 
empowerment through conflict approach.  The revival of municipal government and social safety 
nets have emerged from the former, while the latter has historical links to NGOs.  
This chapter will proceed in two parts.  In the first section, I discuss the current support 
for decentralization as a legacy of the collapse in support for the developmentalist state in Latin 
America.  From above, decentralization became part of the neoliberal agenda to restructure the 
state and fend off the most radical redistributive demands.  From below, decentralization has 
been seized as a way of expediting the demise of authoritarian rule but increasingly to resist 
neoliberal reforms.  In the second section, I review the empirical evidence of political and fiscal 
decentralization and the emergence of municipal governance, NGOs and social safety nets in 
Latin America.  This section also reviews some of the theoretical arguments (fiscal federalism 
and participatory development) upon which the emergence of local development institutions is 
grounded.  I call attention to the gap between theoretical expectations and the limited evidence 
on local institutional performance.  A goal of this chapter is to place the Salvadoran case within a 
regional framework of decentralized local development.  
 
A. THE DECLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENTALIST STATE (1930-1982) 
 
Centralist rule in Latin America is not simply an artifact of the military and authoritarian regimes 
of the 1960s and 1970s.  It is a vestige of the region’s colonial heritage (Veliz 1990).  In fact, an 
urban centralist tradition has long co-existed with a fairly decentralized and privatized peripheral 
authoritarianism under semi-feudal local elites.  However, with the resources and demands 
associated with the export expansion of the mid 19th century, institutions such as a standing 
army, security forces, central banks, public education and tax systems, and to a lesser extent 
                                                 
97 Recent scholarship that has applied this hybrid approach include Bates (1989), Roseberry, Gudmundson, and 
Samper (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996), Markoff (1996), Evans (1997), Collier (1999) and Wood (2000). 
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transportation and communication systems, provided the state with political autonomy and 
centralized power vis a vis contending elite factions.    
Latin America’s centralist political economic legacy has endured, but events of the past 
15 years provide evidence that a transition might be underway.  The support for decentralization 
is due in part to a shift in the political opportunity structure for development, characterized by 
the global expansion of democracy and the ascendance of neoliberal structural adjustment over 
socialism as the dominant development model.  However, the origins of this decentralizing 
current can be traced to the collapse of the Latin American developmentalist state following the 
oil shocks of the 1970s and the debt crises of the 1980s.  Democracy and neoliberalism both 
represent expressions of “society against the state” critiques of developmentalism and socialism.  
Each process has contributed to the rise of NGOs, municipal government and social safety nets 
as organizational responses by IFIs, government and social movements in competition over the 
meaning and outcome of development.  
 The current support for decentralization is very much a legacy of Latin American 
developmentalism.  The Latin American experience of centralist rule corresponded to a fifty-year 
interval of state-led development policy of primary or secondary stage import substitution 
industrialization.98  Inward-looking and populist, this period of national capitalism emerged in 
response to the global economic shocks of the 1930s’ economic crises and the unpredictable 
cycles of access to U.S. and other Northern markets during international wars.  This policy mix 
of incentives and constraints triggered a shift from predatory oligarchic rule to nationalist and 
developmentalist experiments.  By nationalist, I refer to the export pessimism and political 
cynicism toward the “free market” advice of the U.S. that inspired expropriations of foreign 
                                                 
98 ISI was an inward-looking development policy that was stimulated first by the catastrophic loss of markets and 
external credit after the Great Depression and then deepened by the ideas of CEPAL structuralists such as Raul 
Prebisch.  Prebisch (1950) argued that secular terms of trade favored elastic, capital-intensive goods of the North 
over inelastic, labor-intensive, primary goods of the South.  While there was considerable variation across the 
region, the early internal variant of ISI (1920-1955) promoted domestic industrialization through protectionist 
measures that included an overvalued exchange rate, wage and price controls, credit subsidies, import tariffs on 
consumer goods. Secondary ISI (1955-1980) focused more on the export promotion of strategic sectors, but as 
Bulmer-Thomas argues, Latin America largely missed the boat by turning inward during the dramatic post-war 
expansion of international trade.  Between 1946 and 1975, Latin America’s share of total world exports fell from 
13.5% to 4.4%.  It was also during this period that the region achieved its highest sustained rate of economic growth 
(1994: 270). 
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owned industries.99  Developmentalism became associated with rapid, large-scale, vertically 
integrated industrialization, financed through debt (due to low national savings) and a calculated 
indifference to questions of internal redistribution and Third World solidarity (Sikkink 1991).    
State-led development was organized around two broad mobilization networks that drew 
energy and leadership from competition between traditional and modernizing elites, permitting 
an unprecedented degree of cross-class and cross-regional alliance.100   Following Gibson’s 
analysis of populist electoral politics in Mexico and Argentina, I focus here on the changing 
nature of state support from rural (peripheral) and urban (metropolitan) electoral coalitions.  
Gibson argues that during the height of populism, the labor dominated metropolitan coalition 
functioned as the “policy” coalition, supporting and garnering most of the benefits from ISI 
development strategies.  The “seedier side of populism,” is constituted by the peripheral 
coalition, which hinged ISI’s electoral stability to the preservation of traditional agrarian 
relations between lord and peasant.  To use Barrington Moore’s phrasing, the politics of this 
“reactionary alliance” between rural and urban elite-mass mobilization networks and the state are 
crucial to understanding the role of local actors in the shift from centralist to decentralized 
development.  As long as the populist coalition was stable, little authentic space for alternative 
bottom-up demand making was possible. 
From a macro-economic standpoint, the results of developmentalism were impressive.  
Between 1945 and 1973, Latin American GDP grew at an unprecedented 5.3% annually, and per 
capita output climbed at nearly 3% (Thorp 1998: 160).  As the workforce became more urban 
and real wages generally rose for certain city dwellers, Latin America seemed to be fulfilling the 
expectations of modernization theorists.  In the idiom of the principal development discourse of 
the time, the region had reached its “turning point” (Lewis 1954), or “takeoff stage” (Rostow 
                                                 
99 Mexican oil under Cardenas, 1938; Argentine railways under Peron in 1948; United Fruit plantations in 
Guatemala under Arbenz in 1952; Bolivia tin under Paz Estensoros in the 1952, followed by Gulf Oil in 1969; oil in 
Ecuador in 1976; iron-ore and oil and in Venezuela in 1975; Chilean copper under Allende in 1972; Costa Rican oil 
refining in 1969; 
100 This discussion is limited to sketching broad contours of change in Latin America, which must unfortunately 
oversimplify complex and contradictory variation in the specific forms and timing of state formation, elite 
competition and pacts, and popular mobilization.   
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1960) or had begun to reap the “advantages of backwardness” according to Gerschenkron 
(1962).101      
Latin American elites legitimized the unequal and often undemocratic partnership 
between ruler and ruled by promising an inevitable payoff of prosperity.  This social contract 
was sufficient for overcoming collective action problems.  Indeed, expectations were raised that 
motivated unprecedented political challenges to the distribution of the benefits of growth and to 
the democratic limits set by populist authoritarian ruling coalitions.  The first challenges, mostly 
led by labor unions, were contentious but demands were often particularistic. 
Disequilibria in Latin America’s national capitalist model were apparent by the late-
1950s, threatening the social contract and adding fuel to the fire of local opportunism.  The 
central contradiction to ISI can be traced to agriculture’s subsidization of industry.  Under cheap 
food policies designed to benefit urban economic activity, rural livelihoods had either stagnated 
or deteriorated for the peasantry between 1930 and 1960 (Griffin 1974).  Disincentives to 
increase agricultural output set limits to ISI, ultimately increasing food imports which further 
exacerbated the problem of distorted rural markets (Bates 1981). The 1959 Cuban revolution 
validated elite fears of region-wide peasant rebellions.102   In direct response, the U.S. Alliance 
for Progress rapidly inaugurated land reforms throughout Latin America, followed in rapid 
succession by “Green revolution” productivity enhancing seeds and inputs, integrated rural 
development projects and finally, programs targeting the basic needs of small farmers.  Most 
reforms failed to reach any but the upper strata of peasants, which were strategically segmented 
and converted into a conservative firewall that politically divided the peasantry and ensured the 
continued production of cheap food for urban diets.103   However, the threat of expropriation and 
the incentives of near exclusive access to credit, technology and resources, did induce the 
modernization of some traditional estates into more competitive commercial farms.   
                                                 
101 See Lipset (1959) for the classic view of modernization theory.  Estimates of population shift suggest that Latin 
America was 67% rural in 1940, but had dropped to 40% by 1969 and 26% by 1997. Wilkie (1990) and World Bank 
(2000). 
102 In addition to direct transfers of surplus revenues, a cheap food policy to offset urban wage demands, maintained 
through over-valued exchange rate and cheap U.S. food imports, condemned 50 to 70 million Latin American 
smallholders to a subsistence living (less than $75 per capita annually) (de Janvry 1981: 85). 
103 For an analysis of the political and economic motives for agrarian reformism in the 1960s, see de Janvry (1981). 
This counter-insurgent motive was also inherent to reforms that occurred before the Cuban revolution but in the 
midst of local peasant insurgencies, Mexico (1917), Guatemala (1952), Bolivia (1954) and Venezuela (1959). 
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The agrarian reforms had the dual effect of strengthening capitalist farming while 
diffusing the political tension among the rest of the peasantry in Latin America, but left the 
underlying social structure of agrarian inequality largely unchanged.  Moreover, while the intent 
of land redistribution may have been inspired by a decentralizing impulse to break up inefficient, 
semi-feudal systems of production and weaken political opposition, through the creation of a 
complex of rural institutions the state became the prime beneficiary (Grindle 1986).  In short, 
agrarian reforms centralized state authority in the countryside, thereby ensuring a balance of 
power between metropolitan and peripheral elites.  
This combined success and failure of land reform in dealing with the region’s rural unrest 
accelerated rural to urban migration at rates impossible for industrial growth to absorb.  
Insufficient consumer demand for capital goods and low growth in tax revenues, which peaked at 
only 17.2% of GDP in 1970, created a growing fiscal imbalance.104  Low export growth and 
increasing imports (including food and luxury items) created balance of payments problems, 
forcing Latin American countries to seek the first IMF stabilization loans.105  Loan conditions 
required recipients to consider, for the first time in the post-war period, recessionary policies 
(high interest rates, devaluation, and cuts in public spending).  Inability to finance the second 
stage of ISI (deepening) with national savings contributed to a greater reliance on foreign direct 
investment and debt. 
 The 1973 Nairobi speech by then World Bank president McNamara publicly admitted 
that the benefits of the growth-oriented development strategies of the 1950s and 1960s were 
failing to reach the poorest.  At the center of the crisis of developmentalism was a tension 
between growth and distribution.  Despite massive investments in state-led industrial 
transformation, the benefits were captured by a small politically powerful coalition of agrarian 
and commercial elites who restricted education and other social “entitlements”, especially in 
rural areas.  The footing for a modernizing middle class was effectively removed.  Despite a 
declared nationalist agenda, Latin America’s elites came to identify more with their peers in the 
                                                 
104 IMF, various years for all of Latin America. The one exception, Venezuela, used oil rents to boost central 
government revenue to 34.6 % of GDP in 1975, which was approximately three times higher than the percentage in 
Mexico and Brazil (IDB, 1983: 356). 
105 Thorp associates the first IMF stabilization package with Chile in 1947, just two year’s after the Fund’s creation, 
and another for Mexico 1954.  Such packages were extended to many other Latin American countries during the 
1960s. 
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North than their fellow citizens. The economic result was a dual internal market of luxury and 
subsistence consumption that proved insufficient to finance local industrialization.  The 
unequivocal results of Latin American ISI included a falling global share of exports, the 
increasing dependence on foreign capital, and a growing gap between developed economies and 
their own.  Divisions emerged between industrialists looking for export markets and agrarian 
elites demanding trade and monetary protections. 
Inequality also deepened political disequilibria, as state strategies of co-optation under 
conditions of declining real wages exhausted the patience of urban consumers and peasants.  
Unleashed by episodic clientelist mobilization strategies but lacking effective democratic 
mechanisms, class interests threatened independent action against a now divided elite.  This 
unstable combination of political and economic vulnerability reduced national sovereignty, 
entrenched inequality, sharpened elite divisions and mass dissent proved explosive.  A 
generation of bureaucratic-authoritarian rulers called upon themselves to contain the fallout by 
overthrowing unstable elected regimes and cracking down on dissent (Huntington 1968; 
O’Donnell 1973). 
Military rule underscored the weakness of democratic institutions associated with the 
developmental state by the ease with which it suppressed civil society and restricted (and thereby 
safeguarded) the political perquisites of feuding elites.  Latin American dictatorships had 
effectively carried out a de-municipalization of political authority (Nickson 1995).  New central 
government agencies were created that stripped local governments of many powers.  Most local 
officials were appointed.   In 1960, of the twenty major countries of Latin America, only four 
were multi-party democracies and none elected their mayors.106  Centralized parties and military 
governments negotiated their exit and strategically devolved power to lower tier elites in order to 
simultaneously co-opt and fragment the bases of political opposition, and thus preserve stability.  
Democratic institutions, including competitive national elections, existed prior to the 
authoritarian period in Latin America. However local democratic governance is a fairly new 
phenomenon. 
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes intensified political and economic centralization by 
deepening the state’s role in planning and production activities.  Despite establishing effective 
                                                 
106 The date underscores the fact that local democracy was virtually absent before bureaucratic-authoritarian rule. 
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social control and unprecedented political autonomy for the state, authoritarian regimes failed to 
resolve the economic disequilibria of ISI.  This final chapter in Latin American 
developmentalism began with accelerated growth due to the availability of cheap credit provided 
by surplus petro-dollars and brief spikes in commodity prices.  This gave the temporary illusion 
of prosperity, initiated apparent improvements in welfare and equity and suspended fiscal 
concerns regarding deepening balance of payment problems and the slowing of global economic 
growth.  A frenetic lending boom in the early 1970s fueled higher public expenditures (wage 
increases) and fed inflationary growth throughout Latin America.107  However, these resource 
windfalls all too frequently were diverted from productive investment into speculative 
investment (tourism, real estate versus manufacturing or industry), luxury consumption and 
capital flight.108  Rates of gross fixed capital investment, the Achilles heel of Latin American 
development, increased substantially during this period as a proportion of GDP. However, 
investment remained well below developed country and East Asian rates of 30% and higher and 
was highly subsidized by the public sector.   
 Precipitated by the warning signs of fiscal imbalances apparent for nearly a decade but 
ignored by lax IFI supervision, the 1982 debt crisis brought the state-led period of high growth to 
a crashing, unceremonious halt.109  Latin American debt exploded from $100 per capita in 1970 
to $745 in 1980, while per capita GDP and wages declined.  The debt crisis severely 
                                                 
107  Real growth in GDP between1960-70 was 5.0% and between 1970-1980 was 4.9% (World Bank 1990a).  One 
sign Latin America’s debt-led growth period was not overly competitive or sustainable was the drop in  
manufacturing as a share of GDP from its peak in 1973 at 26% to 22.5% in 1995. Thorp (1997: 160). 
108 The Mexican case is most instructive as a public-private sector failure to “fix” loan and oil revenues in 
productive investment.  While 50% of manufacturing assets were controlled by foreign firms in 1972, the oil boom 
was associated with the shift in private investment from industry to higher profits in real estate.  The public share of 
fixed investment filled the gap, increasing from 25% in 1950 to 66% in 1978.  E.V.K. Fitzgerald clearly shows that 
investment supply was never a resource scarcity problem, but one of distribution (1977). 
109 A 1981 IMF evaluation on the eve of the crisis reflected the level of negligence among the IFIs to the pending 
financial disaster as well as the IFIs and private banks’ willingness to lend even after export earnings and interest 
rates had turned unfavorable to Latin American debtors.  “The overall debt situation during the 1970s adapted itself 
to the sizable strains introduced in the international payments system...Though some countries experienced 
difficulties, a generalized debt management problem was avoided, and in the aggregate the outlook for the 
immediate future does not give cause for alarm” (Nowzad 1982: 13).  Mexico defaulted in 1982.  The World Bank 
also had issued economic forecasts in 1980 that were overly optimistic, which encouraged greater borrowing. The 
debt crisis is perhaps better understood as a single stage in a series of cascading crises that began with rising oil 
prices, rising interest rates, debt, and declining terms of trade for nearly all Latin American exports, including oil.  
See Williamson (1993) for discussion of the Washington Consensus on Structural Adjustment policies. 
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delegitimized the inward-oriented developmental state model in Latin America and ruptured the 
urban – rural elite balance of power on which it was grounded in two significant ways.110  While 
previous coalitions had partnered with foreign capital for major joint investments, debt 
stabilization forced Latin America to cede tremendous policy making autonomy to international 
actors.  Most countries suffered a loss of a decade of growth, hyperinflation, increased 
unemployment and poverty, greater income inequality and a drop in the average real wage.111  
Renewed lending and eventual resumption of foreign direct investment were made conditional 
by the IFIs on the implementation of structural adjustment reforms – most of which centered on a 
dramatic reduction in the state’s role in the economy and a shift in the cost of the reforms to the 
lower classes.  These included the privatization of state owned production enterprises and social 
expenditures, trade liberalization through the reduction of tariffs, the elimination of subsidies to 
private enterprises and consumer goods, wage controls, price deregulation, a restrictive money 
policy, tax reform and often the devaluation of the local currency (Williamson 1990).  A central 
condition of renewed lending, imposed by the IMF and international creditors, has been the 
downsizing of what neoliberal reformers diagnosed as an inefficient, bloated or overextended 
public sector.112  However, it is important to correct a popular misperception about the Latin 
American state.  Over the past four decades, governments in Latin America have been and 
continue to be small by comparison to industrialized economies or the economies of other 
regions, significant growth occurred in the 1970s prior to the debt crisis.   
                                                 
110 For Argentina and Chile in the early 1980s, and followed later in the decade by Peru, Argentina for a second 
time, Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua, hyperinflation may have done more symbolic damage to the image of the 
developmental state than debt. 
111 For Latin America as a region, between 1980 and 1990, real wages fell by 13%, real minimum wages declined by 
31%, poverty increased from 35% to 41% and social spending fell by 6% (Thorp 1998: 221). 
112 See Krueger (1993, 1995), Buchanan and Tollison (1981), Krueger and Bates, (1994).  The literature on reform 
of the state within the so-called Washington Consensus package of reforms, shares a common thread of 
empowerment through decentralization with two other contemporaneous bodies of literature.  The New Public 
Management movement to “reinvent government” seeks to improve performance by prescribing greater autonomy 
and discretion to lower tier agencies and employees (Osborne and Gaelber 1992).  The “Quality Circle” literature on 
industrial workplace reforms seeks to transform all workers into thinking contributors to firm decision making 
processes (Applebaum and Batt 1994).  As noted in the previous chapter, both streams of professional advice 
reinforce the stabilizing-consensual tendency of empowerment by delinking participation from agenda-setting 
power.  Both have been criticized for their thinly disguised motive of undermining the bargaining capacity of public 
and private sector unions.  These claims of depolitization and demobilization of labor are pertinent to my critique of 
consensual empowerment approaches in Latin American decentralized development.  
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 After the first structural adjustment reforms, Latin American average central government 
expenditures averaged 22.6% of GDP between 1990-1994, about third less than the 35.9% spent 
by OECD countries, and substantially less than the 26-27% spent by East Asian and all 
developing countries during the same time period (World Bank 1997; CEPAL 1998).  This gap 
increased further as second and third generation reforms continued to pare away the Latin 
American state.  Thus, one clear consequence of structural adjustment reforms is a decline in 
Latin American government spending from a pre-debt crisis peak to levels consistent with the 
early 1970s, while OECD states have doubled in size and East and South Asian government 
spending have increased by almost the same magnitude.  By even modest Latin American 
standards, El Salvador has maintained anemic spending levels at no more than 12% of GDP, 
underscoring one element of its character as a weak state.   
 Privatization of state owned enterprises and steep cuts in social spending effectively 
eroded social protections that an already small public sector was incapable of providing to 
vulnerable sectors of the population (Nelson 1990; Mesa-Lago 1994).  Recessionary policies and 
economic mismanagement during initial stabilization period (1982-1989) contributed to 
hyperinflation, sharply increased unemployment and contributed to shortages of goods and 
services.  Austerity riots and other outbreaks of political violence forced or accelerated the 
emergency passage of supplemental social and political stabilization measures.113  The 
intensification of armed insurgencies in El Salvador, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, and to a lesser 
extent, in Southern Mexico, also influenced the introduction of such reforms.  Many local NGOs 
were formed during this same period as informal service providers and political advocates of 
austerity’s victims.   
 At the heart of the crises sparked by the riots of late 1980's was the perception among 
Northern states and the IFIs that unstable political conditions would issue a return to populist 
state policies of the past or worse, provoke greater insurgent violence.  The architects of 
structural adjustment viewed economic growth and its purported macro-economic underpinnings 
of low inflation, increased exports, a decline in the state’s role in the economy and an increase in 
                                                 
113 Walton and Seddon (1994) make the clearest argument for emergency social programs in response to violence, 
listing significant violent events in Peru (1976), Jamaica (1979), Argentina (1982) Venezuela (1989), Bolivia 
(1983), Brazil (1983), Mexico (1986) and the Dominican Republic (1984).  For a different interpretation of the link 
between these events and the timing or purpose of decentralization reforms, see Jolly and Stewart (1987), Jolly and 
Graham (1994), World Bank (1990) 
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private domestic investment as the highest priorities for recovering economies.  All other social 
indicators were expected to follow suit.  During the early 1990s, modest advances in lowering 
poverty and inequality achieved during the 1970s were quickly reversed.  It was soon apparent 
the neither inequality nor poverty would improve despite restored growth in Latin America. 
 While the austerity riots returned poverty alleviation to the top of the IFI agenda in 1990, 
decentralization was introduced less as a means for lowering poverty than as a shield to protect 
the fragile adjustment reform processes.  In order to mitigate the costs of adjustment and 
preserve political stability in countries undergoing reform, special "safety net" programs (Social 
Investment Funds, Emergency Social Funds, Social Action Programs, etc.) were introduced to 
assist people adversely affected by the unavoidable effects of adjustment.114   It was at this 
moment that the first fiscal and political decentralization measures were also introduced.   
 Most scholarship on democratic transitions has focused on the crafting of pacts by 
civilian elites as the principal author of the political and economic reforms of the 1980s.  Some 
argue that mass movements were mobilized only as a consequence of elite strategies, and 
therefore attribute to contentious politics from below only a supporting role in the 
democratization narrative.  “The transition to democracy in Latin America has never been 
revolutionary,” the World Bank concludes, “instead, most Latin American cases were transitions 
from above, in which traditional elites remained in control and successfully used some 
combination of compromise and force to retain at least some of their power” (Burki, Perry and 
Dillinger 1999: 32).   Democratization from above is framed as an orderly affair, safely 
conducted by elites, who therefore continue to merit special privileges as stewards of post-
transition institution building. 
Nevertheless, the institutionalization of competitive elections both nationally and locally 
had the very real effect of opening political structures to wider participation and expanding 
citizens’ demand-making capacity as well as the field of political elites who must compete more 
frequently for local support.  Democratization upset elite alliances, restored certain legitimacy to 
some political institutions, and enfranchised new political actors.  Democratization also 
                                                 
114 There are differences among social safety net programs, yet most share the following features: they are national, 
multi-sectoral, target vulnerable populations, and are seen as short-term and complementary rather than substitutive 
of state provided services, they tend to be designed to act in a more efficient, flexible, and faster way than most line 
ministry programs.  The main difference involves the level of direct government coordination (supply-based vs. 
demand-based projects) and reliance on decentralized agencies and organizations for administration. 
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improved safeguards for the legal political activity of minority or opposition groups, offering 
increased potential leverage in holding political leaders accountable.  Political opposition 
movements to the dominant parties have frequently staged challenges from municipal office, and 
many of the NGOs now present in Latin America first emerged to contest authoritarian 
regimes.115  From this local foothold, opposition parties and civil society have struggled to 
expand the meaning of democracy beyond the pluralist, procedural and electoral focus. 
The democratic opening has generally favored urban opposition movements over the 
more isolated rural contests where personalist and authoritarian enclaves have been able to resist 
the pressure of transparent electoral processes.  Resource poor opposition movements typically 
have been less effective competing in the countryside with local elites backed by the ruling party.  
Massive rural to urban migration and increasing rural poverty and unemployment during the 
1980s reduced the electoral weight of the rural sector and diminished the capacity of rural elites 
to deliver these votes.  Democratization therefore shifted political attention to the cities, where 
the swollen ranks of politically uncommitted migrants proved to be a decisive constituency for 
any successful electoral coalition.   
Consequently, the ascent of neoliberal reform, according to Gibson, involved, “replacing 
the mobilizational power of labor with the financial power of business as the foundation of the 
metropolitan coalition’s electoral organization” (1997: 360).  This shift from labor to business, in 
turn, forced ruling elites to circumvent sectoral and traditional party leaders, and buttress both 
the urban and rural electoral bases.  Both constituencies were hit hard by painful adjustment 
reforms, displacing many from clientelist organizations.  Preserving the status quo legitimacy of 
traditional elite rule in Latin America required institutional innovations in order to appeal to the 
newly unorganized segments of the working class and peasantry as well as the previously 
unorganized informal service sector.   This double achievement of shrinking the state and 
stabilizing the metropolitan-peripheral coalition is precisely where neoliberal reformers and 
traditional (agrarian-based) party elites joined forces to promote decentralization to local actors. 
Despite the declining electoral weight of rural voting districts, Gibson may understate the 
political importance of decentralized distributive programs designed to strengthen the patronage 
                                                 
115 In addition to the Christian Democrat opposition to the military regime in El Salvador, other examples of 
municipal level political opposition include the PT in Brazil and PRD and PAN in Mexico.  Opposition parties have 
also reaped the benefits of local electoral support when those elections have boosted the proportional windfall for 
opposition candidates in coincidental national representative elections. 
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system and regulate the peripheral coalition.   The politics of decentralization programs and 
SSNs can be understood as functioning to preserve or contest the distribution of rural votes as a 
form of political insulation for neoliberal governments in Latin America as they reformulated 
their metropolitan coalition.    
Neoliberal reforms destabilized the urban-based “metropolitan” coalitions - producing 
what the World Bank referred to as the “conjunctural poor”.  Structural adjustment displaced key 
constituencies in the urban coalition (organized labor, civil servants, industry oriented to the 
domestic market).  However, others (internationally competitive business and labor, national 
business oligopolies) were rewarded through privatization, investment and autonomy.  Finally 
and perhaps most importantly, distributive programs, such as revenue sharing transfers to local 
governments and SSNs, were increasingly directed toward both the informal, unorganized poor, 
but to the traditional, patron-client and rural based “peripheral” coalitions - or the “structural 
poor” as well.  In the countryside, decentralized SSNs, municipal reforms and NGOs served to 
redirect and contain rural demand making within co-optative and individualist modes of 
participation. 
At the same time, these programs provided desperately needed food and resources to a 
civil society unable to maintain a constant capacity for mobilization or protest that it had 
invested in bringing down the region’s military regimes.  Whether through co-optation or self-
interest, these ameliorative programs found deep support across an increasingly uprooted, 
informally employed and politically uncommitted population.  
 The tension between growth and distribution generated by the demise of 
developmentalism was no more visible than in Central America.  Due to the small size of their 
internal markets, Central America was limited to a much shorter, less intense process of 
developmentalism.  Despite brief populist interludes in the early post-World War II period, 
intransigent agrarian elites and U.S. Cold War politics condemned El Salvador, and much of 
Central America to a development model of “reactionary despotism,” preserving extreme 
inequality and suppressing or co-opting all working class activity (Baloyra 1983).  A balance 
between the state and agrarian interests in Costa Rica and Honduras, led to more democratic 
regimes, with greater tolerance of labor – the former through extension of welfare and the latter 
through redistribution of land. 
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Central American states came late to the policies of ISI, and pursued a hybrid model 
emphasizing the intensification and diversification of the export of primary products.  The 
approach paid off early on (1944-1954) due to favorable prices in coffee and cotton, but the 
decline in terms of trade brought the first fiscal crisis in the late 1950s.  External investment 
through the Alliance for Progress and growing intra-regional trade stimulated by the formation of 
a common market fed a new wave of high economic growth.  However, export-led growth also 
came with increasing inflation, causing real wages to fall during the 1970s.116   
El Salvador, like its neighbors, was unable to avoid the foreign exchange bottleneck.  It 
imported more capital goods than it sold in terms of intermediate consumer products to a 
stagnant domestic market and thin regional market.  A weak attempt at ISI was made in El 
Salvador by the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s.  A mild land reform was announced 
with the combined goals of accommodating an increasingly assertive and numerically menacing 
peasantry and to modernize agriculture.117  Surplus foreign exchange generated by agro-exports 
was to be redirected toward investment in urban industrialization and rural agro-processing.  Yet, 
even this modest effort failed to consolidate a manufacturing base and in turn catalyze a 
modernizing industrial elite from the unified ranks of landed agro-export class in El Salvador.118  
The agrarian oligarchy blocked the primary goal of inducing a late, but rapid industrialization.  
El Salvador’s inability to absorb surplus labor forced migration to neighboring Honduras.119  
Perceptions of scarcity in both countries sparked a war in 1969 prior during which Honduras 
expelled as many as 100,000 Salvadoran migrant workers.  The Central American Common 
Market and El Salvador’s export-led industrialization hopes collapsed soon afterward.   
                                                 
116 Bulmer-Thomas notes that this wage decline was reversed only in Costa Rica and Honduras, the two Central 
American countries with the strongest trade unions. (1987: 219). 
117 Underutilization of land was a principal concern, as El Salvador had already achieved one of the highest yields in 
the world for coffee and cotton by the 1950s (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987: 154) 
118 See Bulmer-Thomas (1987: 150-229). CEPAL (1978) estimates that manufacturing share in the Salvadoran GDP 
grew from 12.9 % in 1950 to 17.6% in 1970, but then dropped slightly to 17.5% of GDP in 1979.  Gains in 
employment were even less impressive.  Mena (1979) notes that of the 42 major industrial ventures launched prior 
to 1960, 25 were held by groups of coffee growers.  This diversification nevertheless failed to divide the coffee 
oligarchy between modern and traditional factions.   
119 Despite over 8% growth in manufacturing output during the 1960s, the proportion of industrial workers in the 
total labor force actually declined from 13.1% in 1960 to 11.1% in 1970 (CEPAL 1980: 18).  
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 National capitalist policies of ISI were not reformed but instead were adapted to Central 
America’s dramatic structure of land and income inequality.  In El Salvador, agriculture 
employed over 50% of the economically active population in 1970.  Yet, land distribution was 
one of the most unequal in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.82.120   Due to a weak internal 
market, the expansion of export quotas to the U.S., and the strength of entrenched local elites, 
national capitalism emerged heavily reliant upon primary products.  The profitability of tropical 
commodities in Central America, such as coffee, sugar, bananas, cotton and beef, crowded out 
investment in traditional industrialization efforts such as those underway in the larger economies 
of Latin America.  With the possible exception of Costa Rica, the Central American model 
developed the traits of a weak, but centralized state (under the tutelage of successive military 
governments), a well organized and increasingly diversified agro-export based elite, extreme 
inequality in land distribution, and increasing dependence on U.S. support and markets.   
 The crisis in this model came not from debt, (again, with the possible exception of Costa 
Rica) but from political turmoil stemming from protests of entrenched inequality.  The 
distributional dynamics of the Central American agro-export model that Durham (1979) has 
shown to explain the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador, eventually led to full scale 
peasant rebellion and civil war in three of the five countries.  More so than in the rest of Latin 
America, decentralized institutions emerged in Central America as instruments of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent political strategies, only to later assume development responsibilities. 
The significance of the Salvadoran case lies in the relatively equal penetration of bottom-
up conceptions of decentralization in as much as third of the country. The FMLN mobilized rural 
actors for over two decades, ultimately eroding the rural material base of landlord hegemony 
within the reactionary ruling alliance and setting in motion a process of economic, political and 
social transformation at the local level.  Traditional agrarian relations were disrupted by 
contentious strategies for the redistribution of land and power.   Decentralization of governance 
in zones under insurgent control devolved unprecedented authority to poor community leaders.  
International organizations backed both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces in a 
variety of ways: facilitating the coordination of confrontational protests, providing sanctuary for 
refugees and channeling substantial material resources to civilian populations and belligerent 
                                                 
120 Estimated from DIGESTYC Censo Agropecuario (1974). 
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forces on either side.  Transnational solidarity movements played a significant role in advocating 
local self-rule in liberated territory as a means of strengthening the human rights of civilian non-
combatants but also to contest state authority in areas of insurgent control.121   
As the main supporter of the counter-insurgent effort, USAID coordinated “democracy 
aid” to the Salvadoran Christian Democrats and then to ARENA to compensate for constant 
economic crises and offset the threat of insurgent influence. Democracy building in El Salvador 
was a top-down process. Decentralization began through military civic action programs, which 
required the revival of municipal authority.  Through a selective recruitment of individuals and 
groups to participate in training scholarships, local institution building programs and through 
provision of indirect electoral support for acceptable opposition parties, “democracy aid” sought 
to commit any new ruling elite to minimalist and gradualist democratic goals (Carothers 1999; 
Robinson 2000). One recent study of U.S. democracy aid finds that it has been “inevitably 
political,” having promoted “an artificially narrow conception of civil society – focused on 
Western-style advocacy NGOs – at the expense of other organizational forms” (Ottaway and 
Carothers 2000).  The capacity of the FMLN to effectively challenge counter-insurgent 
democratization transformed the coercive capacity of traditional (agrarian) elites to control the 
ruling coalition and therefore placed the entire electoral formula in jeopardy forcing its 
reformulation. 
 In sum, a fifty year experiment in Latin American developmentalism was on the brink of 
collapse by the early 1980s.  To understand why this critical moment in Latin American 
development produced decentralization as a model for success in areas where the developmental 
state had failed, it is important to underscore what the model had achieved and what it had not.  
Its principal achievement of relatively autonomous high growth with political stability proved 
insufficient to alter the region’s reliance on volatile global primary goods markets or its highly 
skewed distributional outcomes.  A modernizing industrial class failed to break the bonds of 
dependence on local landlords or foreign investors.  In El Salvador, the short-lived and 
ultimately failed effort to effectively industrialize closed the only possible alternative to massive 
land redistribution for preventing armed revolution.  In sum, developmentalism represented a 
                                                 
121 These networks have also orchestrated international campaigns in favor of human rights, labor rights, gender and 
ethnic freedoms.   
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weak welfare model that failed to deepen the responsibility held by either the state or society for 
the region’s poor or to close the gap between the North and South.   
Unable to fix deep fiscal imbalances, the reactionary ruling alliance of agrarian and 
modernizing elites, the state and foreign investors now faced two threats. From above, IFI and 
creditor demands for fundamental restructuring of the state and the integration of the national 
economy into a globalizing capitalist system signified a steep erosion of local autonomy.  From 
below, increasingly violent demands for political and economic equity threatened the entire 
franchise of elite-led development.  In both, we find the wellsprings of the mass movements and 
elite pacts for democracy that brought the demise of authoritarian regimes and opened the door 
for decentralization programs through the course of the 1980s.  In the former, we find the 
makings of a new pact between agrarian and modernizing elites that acceded to decentralization 
as a means of safeguarding the crumbling political power of a single ruling coalition.   In the 
latter, we find the structuralist and post-developmentalist mobilization networks that have seized 
decentralizing reforms as a way of resisting neoliberalism and globalization.  These top-down 
and bottom-up movements have structured the support for decentralization.  
 
 
 
 
B.  LATIN AMERICAN DECENTRALIZATION: MUNICIPALITIES, NGOS AND SOCIAL 
SAFETY NETS122 
 
 
This section examines the trends in political and fiscal decentralization and the three principal 
institutional innovations: municipal government, NGOs and social safety nets.  Given the 
theoretical benefits of fiscal federalism and participatory development upon which the 
emergence of local development institutions is grounded, a central question to be explored here 
is whether local institutional performance has met expectations.   
 
                                                 
122 Cases of decentralization in Latin America can be sub-divided between countries with federal (Argentina, 
Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil) and two-tier political structures.  This chapter focuses on the latter political structure.  
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1.  Municipalism  
 
Evidence of a local transition in Latin America is illustrated by the political and fiscal 
decentralization reforms in Latin America summarized in Tables E.1 and E.2 in Appendix.  
Table E.1 synthesizes the political dimension of decentralization reforms, placing El Salvador in 
a regional perspective.  Direct elections for mayor now occur in nearly all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, as competitive elections were re-established in the early 1980s.  Latin 
American countries differ in their respective political structures.  Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela 
and Mexico are federal systems, with three functioning tiers of government and elected state 
governors.  For unitary systems, which include El Salvador, Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica and other 
smaller countries, intermediate states or departments have a much less independent role.  
Regional or provincial governors are appointed by the executive.   In at least seven countries 
(including El Salvador) the executive reserves the legal right to override decisions made by local 
government, also setting a substantive limit to the autonomy of municipal government.   Thus 
despite political decentralization, the executive retains significant decision-making power over 
local government in both the political and administrative realms of decentralized authority.123  
Part of this authority derives from local spending in the form of SSNs (last three columns of 
Table E.1) 
 The fiscal autonomy of municipal government is addressed in Table E.2.   In general, the 
level of total revenue collection and total government expenditure that happens at the local (state 
and municipal) level has increased since the 1980s.  For Central America, the share of total 
government revenue varies between 2.9% in Costa Rica and 9.4% Nicaragua.  The local share of 
total government expenditures in Central America ranges from 3.4% in Costa Rica to 12.3% in 
Honduras.  On both accounts, Central American municipalities continue to play a very modest 
role in total finance administration, but that expenditure responsibilities have tended to outpace 
revenue increases. 
                                                 
123 Local duties where Latin American central governments continue to have some authority include hiring and 
firing of local employees, contracting out services, and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary dismissal of local 
government. 
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 In almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries, the revenue base of local 
governments has increased in the last decade.  The resource base is typically a mix of fixed or 
formulaic transfers from the central government, locally generated revenues from taxes and user 
fees, and the capacity to incur debt.  There is considerable variation in the national budget 
assigned to local government, with Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia sharing more than 20% of total 
government expenditures with the municipalities, and Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Paraguay 
sharing less than 3%.   
 Locally generated revenues are generally limited to those most appropriately 
administered by sub-national governments, including vehicle or business license tax, user fees 
for various services, and in a few cases, a property tax.124  All local governments in Latin 
America, with the possible of exception of the largest cities, are dependent on revenue sharing 
contracts with the central government.  The World Bank refers to this level of dependency as 
vertical imbalance-- or the degree to which sub-national governments rely on central 
government revenues to support their expenditures.  Vertical imbalance is measured by 
intergovernmental transfers as a share of sub-national expenditures.125  Here too, there is 
considerable variation.  Dependence on inter-governmental transfers is highest in federal 
systems, but also several small unitary governments (El Salvador, Honduras and Bolivia).  
However, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic all 
report less than 10% dependence on state transfers.  In small countries, local taxes are of greater 
significance to the local revenue base, which usually means that local revenues are quite low.126 
 It is worth noting that local control over tax rates, tax bases, local services, territorial 
planning, procurement, borrowing and establishing conditions for inter-governmental transfers in 
most developing countries is the exception rather than the norm.  Shah and Thompson (2004) 
                                                 
124 Income taxes (personal and corporate), import duties, and value added (or sales) taxes are typically administered 
by the central government - the only level of government, in theory, capable of uniform and universal coverage.  
Such revenues are then redistributed to lower levels of government through transfers.  See Musgrave (1983) and 
Shah (1994) 
125 See World Bank Decentralization and Sub-national Economic Governance program.  
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm, accessed November, 2005.   This 
measure for vertical imbalance does not distinguish what proportion of transfers is conditional versus general 
purpose, and the GFS data do not provide this information. 
126 Shah (2004: 9) estimates that sub-national own revenues as a percent of GDP represent only 5.5% of GDP in a 
sample of developing countries. 
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point out that in Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru, despite increased 
transfers of resources and authority, the central government retains a varying capacity to 
intervene in the administration of property taxes.  In part due to the meddling of corruptible 
central government agents in the administration of property taxes, the overall collection as a ratio 
of GDP and total tax revenue remains surprisingly low.127  By comparison, transfers represent a 
significantly higher and growing share.128 
 Another stream of local finance that reflects centralized state control but a 
deconcentration of resources and a delegation of responsibilities are the social safety net 
programs.  The size of many of these SSN programs often exceeds that resources transferred to 
local governments directly from the state. 
What are some of the arguments upon which municipalities have become relegitimized?  
By enfranchising local government, decentralization is expected to increase inter-party political 
competition, intra-party competition, and finally, competition between separate levels of 
government.  In theory, all three types of competition are supposed to make political institutions 
perform more efficiently and effectively (Ferejohn and Weingast 1997).  Decentralization is also 
associated with the town meeting virtues of localized democracy inherited from Tocqueville, 
which suggests that “smaller is better.” (Dahl and Tufte 1973).  In addition to the improvement 
in representation suggested by heightened party competition, decentralization strengthens 
democratic local governance by improving civic competence, enhancing the accountability and 
responsiveness to local interests, and constituting a means for checking centralized power 
(Diamond 1999: 119-122). Putnam’s (1993) research on Italian regions makes one of the 
strongest claims that through the construction of horizontal ties among citizens (one conception 
of social capital) and increased access to legislators (political capital) decentralization closes the 
virtuous circle that links associational activism with economic development.   
 In the area of fiscal politics, decentralization is frequently supported on the theoretical 
grounds of solving the “aggregation problem” - that is, when states deliver uniform public 
services that fail to meet diverse local needs.  Theories of fiscal federalism argue that delegation 
                                                 
127 Bahl (2001) estimates that property tax revenues represent 0.42% of GDP and about 2% of total tax revenue in 
developing countries. 
128 Shah (2004).  In 1997, transfers represented 42% of total sub-national revenues (includes states of federal 
systems, and would be higher for only municipal governments. 
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of decision-making power to sub-national levels of government can increase the efficiency of 
governance by allowing matching public service delivery with local preferences (Stein 1997). 
“Local consumers, confronted with the costs of alternative levels of service, will reveal their 
preferences by voting for rival political candidates or moving to other jurisdictions.” (Burki, 
Perry and Dillinger 1999: 21).  
 The effect of decentralization on the size of government is the subject of at least two 
competing theories.  Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that, as an unregulated monopoly, the 
state is not subject to competitive pressures and therefore tends to grow in order to expand rent 
seeking opportunities or solve efficiency problems.  Decentralization increases popular control 
over politically motivated incentives to expand the public sector, thereby reducing the overall 
size of government expenditures.  Oates (1985) contends that decentralization leads to a closer fit 
between local preferences and government response, thereby generating greater willingness to 
entrust local government with more tax resources.  Decentralization, according to this view, 
results in larger government.  Both arguments are predicated on an active civic capacity, 
competitive local political structures, and the freedom of mobility as effective sanctions against 
poor local governance - all assumptions that are questionable for parts of Latin America.  While 
recent research on Latin America has provided support for both arguments, it should be clear 
they share a common dependence on local politics to effectively transmit individual preferences 
(Oates 1972). 
 In practice, the efficiency payoffs of decentralization have been slow in coming in Latin 
America, although it might be argued that it is too soon to tell Remmer (1993). Centralized 
political party systems have often controlled both the revenue source and the expenditure menu 
of decentralization programs, allowing substantial political manipulation of the allocation 
process.  Moreover, many decentralization reforms (especially social safety net programs) have 
actually increased the autonomy of the executive by providing a discretionary budget 
independent of traditional party hierarchy (Dresser 1991).  This executive discretion has not 
always favored the consolidation of democratic gains.  Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999) 
argue that decentralization has advanced farther in countries where the party structure is more 
decentralized and disciplined, which therefore enhances the bargaining capacity of locally 
elected party leaders.  Conversely, research by Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1997) find that fiscal 
policy is heavily influenced by electoral cycles in Latin America, and that fragmented party 
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systems common to Latin American politics tend to exacerbate the very fiscal soundness on 
which local resources depend. 
 Perhaps anticipating these political obstacles, proponents of fiscal federalism have 
emphasized several conditions for decentralization success.  First, to enjoy the benefits of 
decentralization, municipalities must approach economies of scale.  Many municipalities are 
simply too small to handle the required administrative responsibilities and a rational 
consolidation is needed.  The average Salvadoran municipal population is about 23,000, which is 
typical for Latin America but larger than municipalities in many European countries.129  
However the mean municipal population obscures the skewed distribution of municipalities, 
where a few large cities (such as San Salvador with a population of 1,000,000) dwarf the vast 
majority of towns (over two thirds) have less than 10,000 people.  Some Salvadoran municipal 
governments represent fewer than 1,000 people. 
 A second related concern is the steep learning curve for most mayors in countries where 
political decentralization has only recently been introduced.  The deficit in human capital and 
budgeting skills clearly impact effective administration of local resources. Unspoken is the 
attribution of weakness of mayors as an effective lobby to these same deficits. 
 Third, studies of decentralization have emphasized the importance of the autonomy that 
local government potentially acquires in attempting to balance new responsibilities with 
resources.  Clearly, the principal bargaining point between local, national and international actors 
is over the size and composition of local revenues and spending rules.  The property tax is widely 
considered to represent the most appropriate local instrument to strengthen municipal fiscal 
autonomy, but as Bird (1992) and others have noted, poor cadastral lists and weak collection 
enforcement capacity inhibit effective tax collection.  Central government transfers are limited 
by Latin America’s general reliance on indirect expenditure based taxes which are substantially 
more volatile than direct income based taxes, and have produced one of the world’s lowest tax 
bases.130  Furthermore, excessive municipal budget dependence on central government transfers 
                                                 
129 European municipal size varies from extremely large municipalities in Britain and Ireland (average size, 
respectively, 120,000 and 103,000) and rather small municipalities in France, Spain and Italy (average size, 
respectively, 1,600, 4,800, and 7,200).  Scandinavian municipalities are in the middle, with Denmark (18,000), 
Norway (9,000), Finland (10,900), and Sweden (30,200).  Mouritzen (1999) cited in Larson (2002). 
130 Volatility is defined as greater than average fluctuations (the degree of standard deviation) from year to year in 
the fiscal balance.  For example, Gavin and Hausmann (1998: 41) argue that the typical change in the fiscal balance 
as a percent of GDP in Latin America has been about 2-3 times that of industrialized economies.  Moreover, fiscal 
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can discourage local revenue generation and does not necessarily encourage citizen vigilance of 
local government efficiency because locals don’t see transferred indirect taxes as “their money” 
(Peterson 1997: 9). 
 Fourth, solving the aggregation problem introduces a coordination problem of pooling the 
efforts of a wider array of governmental and non-governmental actors.  Unless clear functional 
responsibilities are established between separate levels of government, duplication and 
incentives to “free ride” threaten to undermine the potential efficiency gains of 
decentralization.131  Indeed, as some NGOs have amassed considerable budgets and social safety 
net programs have been transformed into line ministries in charge of local development, their 
status as brokers between communities and the state or international funding sources has led to 
coordination problems, and conflict with local governments, private sector interests and party 
elites over control of local patronage networks. 
 Although the theory of decentralization is rooted in the bottom-up behaviors of voters 
that organize or move to find the optimal mix of taxes and services, the evaluation criteria for 
decentralization that has dominated the discussion to this point reflects a top-down blueprint 
drawn up by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and national elites.  The overriding 
concerns of the IFIs are growth, fiscal discipline, resource allocation efficiency of service 
delivery, and the largely endogenous political obstacles to achieving both.  Decentralization is 
guided by an empowerment by invitation approach that enlists citizen participation only to the 
extent that the prioritized reform agenda is advanced. However, national elites are often less 
interested in the Tiebout objectives of improving the efficiency, equity or downward 
accountability of local governance, than in short run political and bureaucratic advantages that 
might be won through the redistribution of state assets (Shah 2004: 21).  It is no surprise then 
that decentralization has advanced in Latin America where the mutual interests for a stable 
transition between state managers, local capital and IFI program officials have converged.   
 By contrast, the evidence that decentralization reforms have resulted in Latin America 
from popular bottom up demands for more efficient state governance is sketchy as best.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
volatility has been compounded by its procyclical character (spending more in good times, less in bad times), both 
of which produce a “stop and go” pattern of public spending. 
131 A growing IFI concern with the “sustainability” of projects has focused on the lack of state or local commitment 
to the maintenance and operations costs that dramatically shorten a project’s lifespan.  
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know that fifteen years of decentralization reforms, which now constitute nearly a third of the 
World Bank’s lending portfolio, have done little to alter the world’s highest levels of inequality 
and embedded poverty.132  Notably absent from the IFI criteria for decentralization performance 
are the mechanisms that disable political capture by ensuring the capacity to overcome collective 
action problems and contest prevailing inequality. 
 
 2.  Social Safety Nets 
 
While mayors and city councils have been the direct beneficiary of decentralization reforms, a 
second quasi-local development institution that has emerged from the top-down is the ubiquitous 
social safety net program (also referred to as social investment funds).  Between 1980 and 2000, 
the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, together, have spent a total of more 
than $2.6 billion on social safety net programs in Latin America and Africa.  European donors 
have invested another $1.3 billion (Jorgensen 2000).  At their inception, social safety net 
programs were designed to fill recession-induced holes in the social welfare system that emerged 
as a direct result of structural adjustment reforms.  These programs provided assistance to the 
new poor, while the old poor, which included most of the rural sector, were viewed as a long-
term consequence of inherent distortions in the reformed institutions.133   Economic growth was 
expected to resolve the second type of poverty.134  As one World Bank study at the time 
optimistically suggested, "Not only can the adverse impact on the poor be reduced at little cost to 
                                                 
132 Ferranti, et al. (2003) compile an impressive description of the state of inequality in Latin America that is equally 
notable for the absence of meaningful corrective policy proposals or a rigorous assessment of how past Bank 
policies have facilitated this outcome.  The socialization of beneficiaries in the virtues and skills of democratic 
governance that are typically recommended by paternalistic IFI civic renewal schemes has rarely been sufficient to 
alter the structural barriers to development erected by exclusionary and corrupt elites.  Thus, it is not without ample 
evidence that IFIs continue to ignore how deeply rooted enclaves of inequality are highly resistant to any reform.   
133 That is, the old, structural poor existed prior to the debt crisis and subsequent adjustment policies.   While safety 
net programs employed different targeting criteria, most attempted, more or less successfully, to initially address the 
needs of the "new poor" but eventually to reach the very poorest of the entire population. 
134 Allocative efficiency is seen as the organizing principle of structural adjustment reforms - meaning the reduction 
of price distortions and economic rents caused by ineffective state intervention.  Rapid and sustained growth is 
supposed to follow.  However the success of the East Asian countries in achieving this goal by "getting prices 
wrong" (Amsden 1994) has challenged this extreme faith in the market logic. See World Bank (1993) for market 
interpretation of East Asian success and Wade (1996) for critique. 
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the adjustment program, but opportunities can be created during the adjustment process for 
stronger poverty reduction in the future." (Ribe, et al. 1990: 1) 
 Funded largely by external lending institutions, these social investment programs targeted 
the poorest, but were intended as short-term, transitional measures to provide emergency 
employment and cushion the temporary decline in income, employment and services that 
resulted from the reform process.  Social safety net programs originated from the realization that 
structural adjustment would be slower and more difficult than initially expected.  Lifting a slogan 
from a report highly critical of structural adjustment, SSN programs came to be characterized as 
disguising adjustment with “a human face" 135  
The persistence of poverty expanded the primary focus of SSNs to attack the problem of 
the “old” structural poverty in rural areas.  SSNs have since come to be viewed as a permanent 
alternative form of delivering social services and small scale public works projects to rural and 
high poverty areas.  This policy solution prided itself for the avoidance of institutional 
corruption, relatively better trained staff and overcoming the political resistance to 
decentralization characteristic of line ministry personnel.  Social safety net programs surmounted 
these factors by designing privatized and targeted anti-poverty programs to reach the poorest and 
to secure minimal autonomy from established political institutions.  Aiming at correcting the 
argued inefficiencies of centralization and overzealous planning for which the state was blamed, 
SSNs were intended to coordinate delivery of relief services through local government, and to a 
lesser extent, NGOs and community level grassroots organizations. 
SSNs are touted as “demand-driven” to the extent that grant funds are provided for 
communities to choose among a pre-established menu of projects. They are decentralized to the 
extent that project design, construction and maintenance involve or are the full responsibility of 
local governments, NGOs, private firms and community groups - the latter of which are often 
required to make a matching donation of labor or resources.  SSNs are organized, at least at the 
outset, as semi-autonomous agencies operating parallel to line ministries and often directly 
accountable to the country’s executive and the institution’s international donors.  Finally, SSN 
staff are considered to be superior to and are often compensated higher than peers in the public 
sector workforce in terms of experience and professionalism - in part due to the incentives and 
                                                 
135 Ribe, et al. (1990), accommodating the slogan used by Cornia, et al. (1987). 
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sanctions imposed by international donors.  For these reasons, SSNs are widely held to represent 
improvements over the centralized “supply-driven” (read populist) programs of central 
governments (Tendler 1999: 8). 
 Eighteen social safety net programs are operating in Latin America, half of which are 
funded by both the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.  SSNs in Latin America 
have focused on creating employment, developing infrastructure, delivering social services 
rapidly, at lower cost and more effectively than central governments, and strengthening local 
institutions in areas identified by poverty maps as the most poor.   One IDB review of SSNs 
concluded: 
 
 
Latin American governments, as presently constituted, have few agencies through which to channel 
resources.  Most government benefits go to better off communities.  Social investment funds can be 
thought of as an attempt to correct this bias albeit mainly with foreign resources.  They represent a Latin 
American social invention that has been replicated worldwide:  a government institution whose 
fundamental objective is poverty reduction and which complements other government programs and 
policies to help the poor.  They are a response to a permanent problem and as such have come to represent 
an important part of the attempt to improve equity in Latin American societies.  Given the seriousness of 
the poverty problem, there is ample justification to transform the funds from temporary to permanent 
instruments of government. (Goodman, Morley, Siri, and Zuckerman 1997: 64, italics added)  
 
 However, another study summarizing the findings of IFI internal analyses of 
internationally funded SSN programs is decidedly less optimistic regarding their impact.  
Tendler concludes that program performance was well below expectations and often inferior in 
many areas to prior supply-driven government programs.  The evidence in terms of employment 
and wages, poverty reduction, reaching the poorest, rapid disbursement, flexibility, lower service 
costs - all stated objectives of the SSNs, does not support the overwhelmingly positive portrayals 
of SSNs as successful policy innovations.  This evidence is often the same at that used to justify 
the extension of consolidation of SSNs as a model for permanently serving a country’s poorest 
people.  Despite the difficulties of comparing SSNs with non demand-driven programs, the 
Banks’ own data suggests that the programs studied were clearly not superior and poor or non-
existent monitoring and evaluation made it impossible to determine whether SSNs actually made 
a difference in improving the availability or quality of basic services in poor and rural 
communities (IDB 1997: 68).   In the words of another analyst, the evaluated programs could not 
be proven to be “effective safety nets in any significant scale.” (Lustig 1995: 2-4) 
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 Tendler points out the irony that the very recommendations to fix the SSN programs 
(greater expenditure on planning and regional presence) move them in the direction of supply-
driven centralized agencies that SSNs were designed to replace.  In this sense, the semi-
privatized nature of SSNs may be understood as the opposite of decentralization.  In practice, 
“they are run by central-government agencies, either newly created or newly empowered by their 
association with international donors and with strong support from the country’s president.  In 
the majority of cases, moreover, they do not devolve power and responsibilities to local 
governments; when they do, this usually does not happen as part of a larger [decentralizing] 
reform, ... sometimes even works at cross purposes to such reforms” (1999: 10).   
SSN spending has been associated with electoral patterns, often responding to the 
political threat of emerging opposition parties or social movements.136  Tendler argues that SSNs 
may be more accurately described as a deconcentration of supply-driven service provision to 
more trusted interlocutors between the local population and national leaders.  Given the lack of 
results, the IFIs are now rethinking their promotion of SSNs, but have had little success in 
dismantling what have now become entrenched and permanent bureaucracies.137  We are left 
with the question of how the making of SSNs permanent will not detract from the larger task of 
reforming existing line ministries. 
 
3.  Civil society and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)  
 
A third local institution has emerged from below to challenge the exclusionary nature of elite 
crafted alternatives to the developmental state.  The recent proliferation of NGOs in Latin 
America can be traced to the same social terrain that gave rise to structural adjustment, social 
safety nets and decentralization (Stewart 1995; Graham 1992, 1994).  The repression directed 
                                                 
136 Perhaps the two most well documented cases of SSNs serving as political patronage are that of PRONOSAL in 
Mexico and FONCODES in Peru (Cornelius, 1994; Schady, 2000; Graham and Kane, 1998).  These studies 
generally show spikes in SSN spending prior to elections, exclusion of politically relevant opposition communities, 
although these cause-effect linkages have been shown to be mediated by the structure of local politics (Ames, 1995). 
137 The most recent version of the SSN approach are cash transfer programs.  In search of a new panacea, 
replications of the Oportunidades Program in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil are being rapidly spun off with 
ready IFI funding in other Latin American countries.   
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against public universities as hotbeds of student protest in the 1970s, followed by downsizing of 
public employment during the 1980s, displaced many middle class, highly educated 
professionals, often those associated with political opposition to the ruling party (Levy 1995).  
NGOs have served as a refuge for this class of Latin American intellectuals and development 
practitioners who formed research, advocacy and service organizations that were often openly 
critical of structural adjustment and lobbied for the rights of the politically excluded.  
 In reaction to their role as a catalyst for greater transparency, participation and 
accountability in democratic institutions, NGOs have traditionally been viewed by national 
governments in Latin America with what ranges from indifference to hostility.  Largely 
associated with leftist opposition movements, service provider NGOs were integrated into social 
safety net programs and as partners in decentralization programs only with great initial 
reluctance.  Perceived as opponents of structural adjustment, relations between NGOs and 
governing elites have been fraught with mutual suspicion. 
 However, these monolithic classifications obscure substantial variability among NGOs as 
the unitary expression of civil society in Latin America.  A more useful typology recognizes both 
horizontal and vertical diversity among NGOs and other civil society organizations.  First, NGOs 
are simply one type of civil society organization, co-existing with unions, civic groups, 
cooperatives, charity agencies, the private sector, informal associations and networks.138  These 
organizations are typically non-profits, humanitarian oriented, and differ in terms of governance 
structure (representation, board of directors, etc.).  While many if not most NGOs find their 
origins as social movement actors, there exists a significant ideological diversity among the 
NGOs.  Some of the most influential NGOs are professional and commercial trade associations 
as guilds historically linked to groups on the political right (e.g. the FUSADES family of NGOs 
in El Salvador).  On a second vertical axis, some local NGOs are based in host countries, while 
larger international donor INGOs operate through networks that encompass horizontal and 
vertical linkages between international headquarters and branch offices in Northern countries and 
                                                 
138 For this reason, some prefer the label “civil society organization” or CSO, which captures any formal or informal 
group in a particular country.  Fisher (1998) uses the terms, Grassroots Organization (GRO) and Grassroots Support 
Organization (GRSO) to differentiate between local, member based groups and regional, service organizations.  My 
use of NGOs is consistent with Fisher’s GRSO, while I use gremio or CSO (civil society organization), 
interchangeably to refer to local, member-based organizations. The U.S. vernacular is private voluntary 
organizations (PVO), which for this research, often coincides with international donor agencies, or INGOs. 
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satellite offices in the South (CARE, World Vision, Oxfam).  Third, at all levels, political 
diversity among NGOs is increasing.  This study looks at the entire local institutional field of 
development actors, but focuses in most detail on Salvadoran NGOs.   
 This rise of NGOs has renewed interest in the benefits of an assertive, autonomous civil 
society as a basic condition for transforming structural inequality (Cernea 1988; Keane 1988, 
1990; Carroll 1992; Arato and Cohen 1992). For much of the 1990s, the virtues of NGOs were 
widely acclaimed.  NGOs have been credited with providing more cost effective, innovative, and 
customized services to the poorest social sectors, in stark contrast to the overburdened, over-
bureaucratized and clientelist state sectors (Fowler 1990; Korten 1991).  By the same token, 
NGOs are endowed with useful political capacities.  NGOs are described as "supercitizens", 
serving as the inspiration for broad-based civic action (Reilly 1995).  It is this civic-ness that 
Putnam (1993), among others have identified as social capital, or the bedrock of democratic 
norms, trust and horizontal networks that underwrite governmental accountability.  NGOs 
advocate directly on behalf of beneficiaries but also empower communities and their grassroots 
organizations to exercise influence on policy decision making processes independent of other 
political actors, including the NGOs themselves (Sen 1982; Elliott 1987; Diaz-Albertini 1990; 
UNDP 1993). 
 Has the proliferation of NGOs increased non-elite bargaining capacity?  Despite their 
noted virtues, empirical research has failed to demonstrate the superior effectiveness of NGO 
performance on the basis of having mitigated the wider socio-economic trends toward growing 
inequality that persist in Latin America.  Tendler (1987) questions the "articles of faith" about 
NGO capacity, debating the claim that NGO provision of services to the poor is cheaper than 
public provision.  Edwards and Hulme (1992) argue that NGOs have had little impact on 
democratizing reforms.   Indeed, some studies have strongly suggested that NGOs perform a 
stabilizing role that exacerbates the very problems they have set out to transform (Tendler 1981; 
Hancock 1989; Smith 1990; Korten 1991; Ferguson 1994; Arellano-López and Petras 1994; 
Carothers 1999: chapter 8).  
Both critics and supporters of the NGO boom have now cautioned against viewing local 
actors as substitutes for the state in many areas of social policy.  Despite the rise of NGOs and 
their best efforts to provide the poor with greater voice in government policy decision making, 
there is growing concern that the capacities of NGOs may be overstated.  As one critical 
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observer of NGO experiences in Central America has argued, "the cards largely remain stacked 
against the poor, and NGOs seem to be able to do little to reshuffle the deck."139  Others have 
gone farther to suggest that NGOs are no more virtuous than any other private interest embodied 
in civil society, and can just as likely degenerate into predation or venality as become a force for 
democratic development (Keane 1990; Foley 1996; Levi 1996).  
 Nevertheless, the association between NGOs and democracy in Latin America is a 
significant one, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.  Comparing the total number of NGOs found 
in a country with its Freedom House Democracy Rating for 1995, there is a noticeable decline in 
the number of NGOs with improvements in a country’s democracy rating (Rsq. = 0.25; Number 
of NGOs is significant p<0.05).  However, when the number of NGOs is divided by the 
country’s total population, the linear pattern is no longer significant.  
 
NGOs and Democracy in Latin America
Source: Fisher 1998
Freedom House Democracy Rating 1995 (0=Low, 7=High)
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Figure 3.1  NGOs and Democracy in Latin America 
                                                 
139 (MacDonald 1995).  NGOs dedicated to development have grown tremendously both in OECD countries (by 
nearly 100% in the last 15 years) and in the developing world. Despite moderate improvements in certain human 
development indicators, the rise of NGO-led development has not halted the growing income gap between North 
and South, nor the absolute level of global poverty. 
R BlzJam Pan
Sta Luc 
Dom
   
 115
 
 
One might conclude that NGOs emerged in the most difficult, contentious stages of 
democratic reform and as institutions have achieved a certain level of democratic legitimacy, 
fewer NGOs are needed.  In this view, NGOs might be viewed as a transitional actor, 
strengthening the link between state and civil society as democratic practices take root.  
However, the persistence of NGOs suggests two alternative hypothesis.  One equally plausible 
explanation is that NGOs were never instrumental to the democratization of leading Latin 
American countries such as Costa Rica, Uruguay and prior to recent events, Venezuela.  This is 
not to say these transitions were exclusively an elite affair.  Rather, this second view suggests 
that the role of NGOs as catalysts of democratic development in Latin America is less than clear. 
A third hypothesis is that democracy itself might be the cause of NGO formation rather than the 
reverse.   
 Political pressure from below rather than empirically validated contributions have led the 
international lending community to recognize the importance of NGOs as promoters of 
grassroots participation.  Using increasingly sophisticated strategies for publicizing the 
deficiencies and abuses of power in economic and political transitions, NGOs were successful 
for exposing injustices and supporting the poor peoples’ campaigns for meaningful alternatives.  
The amplified voice of NGOs for greater participation, transparency, and accountability was 
facilitated by the discredited retreat of the Latin American state.  Funding to NGOs spiked and 
despite their transitional origins, many were consolidated into permanent organizations. 
 In recognition of the power, ambition and capacity that NGOs had achieved, many have 
been recruited as partners with local government to provide a variety of local services through 
decentralization and social safety net programs.  The privatization and deconcentration of health, 
education and agricultural extension services have relied on contracting NGOs to provide bare 
bones services to the more remote rural villages.  Most of those contracted have accepted these 
service provider roles without questioning the comparative quality of the service, nor the 
restrictions placed on participating that typically prohibit increased consumer and citizen 
participation in the formulation of these policy reforms.  Mass participation is limited to selective 
and non-binding consultation with segments of civil society through mechanisms that insert 
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international creditors and donors as critical interlocutors between society and national 
governments.  Decentralization is shrouded in the mythical pre-condition of economic and 
political competition that steers citizens toward conventional, accommodative, and atomized 
self-help oriented modes of participation. In effect, decentralization can demobilize contentious, 
encompassing, rights oriented forms of association. Publicizing this empowerment by invitation 
strategy, the World Bank proudly announced that NGOs were partners on 40% of all Bank 
projects, although a subsequent study found this estimate highly overstated.140   
 In light of the questionable mandate outlined above, the reliance on NGOs in the design 
and implementation of decentralized development programs deserves greater attention.  The 
principal advantage of NGOs is that they represent an alternative path for channeling needed 
resources to the most vulnerable sectors of developing country populations.  An argued 
limitation is the lack of organizational and technical capacity that inhibits most NGOs from 
scaling up beyond community level projects or providing highly technical services such as 
micro-finance (IDB 1997: 38). Many NGOs have only recently formed, possess limited 
resources, and are only slowly developing the technical expertise that is required to satisfy donor 
contract requirements.  As with municipal officials, the architects of decentralization have only 
begun to address this limitation by strengthening NGOs and grassroots organizations along with 
local government. 
 Still, the capacity of the NGO sector should not be overstated.  From the standpoint of 
NGO skeptics, it is by no means clear that scaling up micro-credit or food for work programs are 
preferential to state or private sector credit or investment.  Such NGO programs may in fact act 
in cross purposes with scaling up state capacity or provided the appropriate incentives to the 
private sector.  In their annual report linking human development with decentralized institutions, 
the UNDP concluded, “NGOs are unlikely to ever play more than a complementary role…their 
importance lies in making the point that poverty can be tackled, rather than tackling it to any 
large extent.” (1993: 98-99)   As such, perhaps one of the most important NGO roles, although 
more controversial among many donors and governments, is to act as an alternative channel for 
the transmission of grassroots interests and claims upward.   David Korten (1987) argues that 
                                                 
140 Paul Nelson (1995).  InterAction, the American Council for Voluntary Action - the largest U.S. based NGO 
member organization, reports that two thirds of PVO members rely on USAID funding for some part of their 
operating budget.   
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advocacy towards policy change is a key feature of maturing "third-generation stage" NGOs, or 
those organizations that have moved beyond relief or poverty program implementation functions 
to addressing structural change.141   The prevailing distrust of NGOs by governments in Latin 
America suggests reluctance in accepting this reciprocal conception of the NGO role as political 
advocate in decentralization and SSN programs, independent of political party control.  
Frequently, the invitation to participate in government or IFI funded programs comes with the 
implicit or explicit condition of political self-censorship - a noted compromise that many have 
criticized as abandoning the historic mission of advocacy for which NGOs were created (Foley 
and Edwards 1996). 
 Perhaps the most striking example of this tradeoff has been the truncated political form of 
association promoted by NGOs and their respective donors.   Ties with labor unions, 
cooperatives, and other forms of workplace gremios (guilds), organized around some form of 
collective bargaining rights, are typically less common in the project portfolios of development 
NGOs.142  The strengthening of labor unions is remarkably absent in the IFI schema of 
empowering local actors.143  As possibly the historically most political form of civil society 
advocacy in Latin America, unions have nearly disappeared from the development research 
agenda, despite their unquestionably central role in effective development.  Public (and private) 
sector unions are viewed as centralized, parochial and corrupt opponents of reform, whose 
defense of benefits and protections have slowed privatization and fiscal reforms. Unions are 
therefore considered a fundamental justification for decentralizing key public services.144  
                                                 
141 By advocacy, I am referring to purposeful actions designed to bring about favorable change in people’s lives.   
Advocacy activities can include information dissemination, training, lobbying, research, group formation, 
networking, dialogue, monitoring and protest.  Advocacy outcomes can included media attention or public 
awareness of an issue, collective identity or shared control over some resource, resource mobilization, the opening 
of public space or policy change. 
142 Gremios are organized primarily around economic or workplace concerns.  Gremios are akin to guilds, typically 
composed of members defined by occupational status, whose primary objective is the promotion and defense of the 
economic interests of the group.    
143 Tendler (1997: 170, fn.21) points out that the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report, the only issue 
dedicated to the role of workers in reform, addresses labor unions in just one of its 18 chapters.  This chapter weighs 
much more heavily on the special problems presented by labor rather than the contributions unions have and can 
make to development.   
144 This overwhelming bias against unions ignores a growing historical literature that redeems the role of the 
working class in transitions to democratic development in Latin America (Reuschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 
1992; Middlebrook, 1995; R. Collier, 1999).   
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Downsizing has been the near universal recipe for reforming public sector and promoting 
investment, with almost no attention to how relations between workers, management, and 
consumers might be most effectively re-organized.  Between 1985 and 1995, trade union density 
decreased in almost every Latin American country for which data are available.145  As NGOs 
have proliferated alongside local government and social safety nets as the accepted forms of 
decentralized collective action, unionization and other contentious forms of mobilization 
(cooperatives, South-South encompassing coalitions) have been crowded out. 
Despite claims by the IDB that the worst fears of privatization had not been realized, the 
Bank’s own data show that by the late 1990s unemployment had reached record highs 
throughout Latin America and the informal sector sectors have exploded.146  NGOs were 
eventually accepted by the IFIs as a more palatable mode of civil society organization, often 
delivering newly privatized services (health, education) not lucrative enough for private 
investors.  In this sense, the rise of NGOs may have come at the direct expense of traditional 
forms of labor organization in terms of collective rights and workplace protections.  Safely 
colonizing local demand making within the parochial bounds of NGO programs has undoubtedly 
provided greater policymaking leeway neoliberal reformers. 
NGOs have also become catalysts for transnationalizing many advocacy campaigns.  
Keck and Sikkink (1998: 10) and Smith, et al. (1997) argue that INGOs engaged in transnational 
advocacy networks have increased steadily in many issue areas.  NGOs and INGOs are well 
positioned to establish powerful North – South and South-South linkages to raise awareness and 
resources to hold national and international institutions more accountable.147  However, the 
                                                 
145 Trade union density is defined as union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural labor force.  The most 
severe declines occurred in Argentina (-47.9%), Mexico (-42.7%), Venezuela (-42.5%), Costa Rica (-42.6%), 
Uruguay (-41.4%), Guatemala (-37.3%) and Colombia (-37.3%) - the latter two cases involving notable campaigns 
of anti-unionist terror.  Trade union density in Chile rose during the same period by 37%, and fell in the U.S. by 
15.2%.  Data were not available for Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras.  
World Labour Report, 1997-98. 
146 The IDB 2003 Report on Economic and Social Progress, which consulted closely with organized labor in the 
U.S. and Latin America and focuses on exclusively labor issues, does recognize the significance of unions but 
devotes most attention to promoting greater flexibility of labor markets and perseverance in neoliberal reforms as 
the solution to unemployment. 
147 Some of the more prominent transnational movements focus on human rights, environment, IFI reform, free trade 
and debt.   
   
 119
overall influence of transnational advocacy networks is ambiguous.148  Some transnational 
networks assume the very hierarchical power relations and modest goals of the institutional 
targets that Southern partners are resisting.  A great many humanitarian INGOs have employed 
transnational organizing in ways that are entirely consistent with and may even reinforce global 
poverty and inequality (Hancock 1989).  One of the most significant and least understood 
transnational network involves international migration and remittances.  Well established and 
sophisticated networks of coyotes, labor recruiters, predatory employers, churches, families and 
financial transfer systems as well as complicit policy makers on both ends of the circuit 
collaborate informally to perpetuate the lucrative enterprise of illegal migration that despite the 
toll in human suffering now accounts for over $53 billion in Latin American investment (IDB 
2006).   
 Finally, the role of NGOs can be better understood by examining the types of linkages 
that NGOs establish horizontally, (among other NGOs and other local institutions), and vertically 
(with the state or donor institutions above and constituents below).  Critics of Putnam have 
argued that social capital cannot be explained merely by the density of local associational 
membership, but must evaluate the linkages between local and national groups, as well the 
political goals and range of coordination activities that these associational linkages entail 
(Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000; Crowley and Skocpol 2000; Foley and Edwards 1997, 1999).  
Dense horizontal linkages among intermediary organizations have been emphasized as the basis 
for both political and economic effectiveness (Esman and Uphoff 1984; Fisher 1993; Bratton 
1990).  State or donor vertical links with NGOs have received much less attention (Edwards and 
Hulme 1996, 1997).  In practice, the efflorescence of NGOs without coordination leads to 
inefficiency, duplication and competition for target populations and scarce resources.   Large 
numbers of NGOs ought to indicate a most viable civil society. Yet, as one study by Oxfam 
America concludes, the NGO sector in Latin America is fragmented, often highly politicized, 
and in many respects, given their numbers, spectacularly unable to advance a progressive social 
agenda (Renshaw 1994). 
 
                                                 
148 See Nelson (1995, 2000), Fox and Brown (1998) and Mallaby (2004) for three quite different views of how 
effective transnational NGO movements have been in reforming unsavory IFI policies. 
   
 120
 
C.  CONCLUSION 
 
Decentralization is presented here as the reaction to the political opportunity triggered by the 
collapse of the Latin American developmentalist state in the early 1980s.  This crisis set in 
motion a combination of political, social and economic realignments.  The emergence of 
municipal government, SSNs and NGOs can be viewed as the product of strategic negotiation 
between stability oriented elite reformers from above and challenge oriented contentious 
movements from below. 
Wracked by an unprecedented loss of legitimacy, hemmed in by the diffusion effect of 
global processes of democratization, and the hegemonic ascent of neoliberal structural 
adjustment, and strident demands for equity and participation by increasingly transnational social 
movements, Latin American elites had little choice but to decentralize state functions as a way of 
preserving their teetering economic and political systems.  Given these constraints, ruling elites 
pushed down decentralization reforms from above to stabilize the peripheral electoral coalition 
as realignment occurred within the urban coalition.   
Decentralization has emerged from the remarkable convergence of interests the ascending 
neoliberal faction and the descending traditional, agrarian faction of Latin American political 
leaders.  Handpicked local actors have been invited to help implement decentralization programs 
that range from counter-insurgent civic action programs to anti-poverty complements of 
structural adjustment.  Responding to the crisis of the developmentalist state, this reactionary 
alliance introduced social safety nets and revived local government with the objective of 
resisting contentious challenges from below.   
Decentralization was also adopted as a de facto governance practice by insurgent and 
social movements as well as a political means for expediting the demise of corrupt, authoritarian 
governments.  The emergence of NGOs is clearly associated with social movement opposition to 
authoritarian rule in Latin America that opened political space for decentralization.  However, 
the effectiveness of NGOs in directly challenging top-down decentralization is much less clear 
due to their frequent acceptance of the established rules for political participation.   
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 The dramatic local turn in development policy has also highlighted   significant gaps 
between the theory and expected performance of local institutions.  Local development actors 
have rushed in to fill the void left by a state weakened from structural adjustment reform.  
Several conditions for successful decentralization have been noted.  Decentralization is expected 
to work where local governments are of adequate size, have acquired administrative skills and 
autonomy over local revenue generation, and rest upon a well-defined division of labor that 
provides the capacity to coordinate both horizontally (across NGOs, local governments) and 
vertically (upward with the line ministries of the state and downward with communities).  These 
expectations for decentralization are often frustrated in the prevailing context of inequality and 
bureaucratic self-interest that decentralization was also intended to protect.  Absent the necessary 
mechanisms against political capture, the emergence of NGOs, social safety nets and local 
government has effectively stabilized political support for neoliberal reforms.    
 These political and economic realignments associated with decentralization have 
increased the political space for local actors, but have they empowered local actors?  It is toward 
answering this question that I trace in the next two chapters the origins and performance of 
NGOs, local government and social safety nets in the opportunity structure and action choices 
that contributed to civil war in El Salvador? 
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IV. CHAPTER FOUR:  DECENTRALIZATION FROM BELOW I – THE PRE-WAR 
INSURGENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENT EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES, 1961-1980 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Local institutional performance today has a great deal to do with choices people made in the 
recent past.  In this chapter, I begin to trace the conflictive and consensual origins of the local 
institutions that emerged in post-war El Salvador and their effectiveness in tackling the many 
challenges of reconstruction.  These local actors emerged as key post-war interlocutors between 
communities and the state and international donors.   As argued in the previous chapter, the 
apparent consensus behind a push to decentralize post-war development was shaped by a 
decade’s long clash of challenging (insurgent) and stabilizing (counter-insurgent) forces.   
Decentralization before the war consisted of de facto rule by local landlords whose influence 
grew with the export boom that began in the 1950s and endured through several crises until the 
civil war began in 1980.  This period of agrarian modernization not only altered the rural 
landscape, but generated social tensions that ultimately transformed local politics and 
institutions.  This chapter unpacks the process of agrarian modernization and the related 
economic, social and political reactions it caused in my case study region of analysis. 
Choices made during this period set communities on one of three possible paths – 
revolution, reform or reactionary counter-insurgent defense of agrarian inequality. History is, 
therefore, subject to the competing interpretive frames.  Where the iron grip of the landholding 
elite and reactionary clergy mobilized local communities to resist the ideology of revolution 
espoused by the FMLN, local politics remains very much as it was three to four decades ago – 
safely regulated by the self-serving veto power of a small network of wealthy terratenientes.   As 
in my counter-insurgent case study of the Jiboa Valley, history is articulated by the powerful few 
who view the revolutionary period as one of social decay.  Restricted post-war local pluralism is 
  123
tolerated as an acceptable trade-off of the defeat of radical political challenges by leftist 
insurgent organizations.  The resurgence of leftist politics of the past is viewed as a threat to the 
fragile democratic opportunities now available.  Having chosen, voluntarily or not, to stabilize 
the dominant agrarian regime, local inhabitants of these regions are resigned to the consequences 
in a deepened climate of intimidation.   
The survival, even dominance of the insurgent FMLN and the radical Christian Base 
Community experience on which it was built has had the opposite effect of leveling local 
inequalities and in turn, opening up the political opportunity structure to new contenders.  Within 
leftist municipalities such as Tecoluca – my case study of insurgent influence, a framing of 
Salvadoran history views the civil war as a period of social transformation. The constructed 
political consensus for decentralization was dependent upon the dramatic effectiveness of 
insurgent movements to open democratic space and reduce the privilege of unaccountable elites.  
Rather than suppressing political and social conflict as a technical problem to be managed by 
rational elites, this insurgent framing validates conflictive processes as a source of democratic 
values and aspirations where institutions are weak or non-existent.  Having effectively 
challenged a formidable adversary, insurgent communities demonstrate a vibrant and self-
confident local political culture that continues to invent new ways of creatively confronting 
political and economic authoritarianism.   
Where communities attempted to carve out a neutral political position during the war – 
often coinciding with a preference for the moderate reform agenda of the Christian Democrats, 
local politics represents a mixed bag.  In municipalities such as San Ildefonso, having failed to 
consolidate the trust of either dominant political force nor transformed local property rights, the 
reform path communities are constrained by the contradictory currents of contentious political 
mobilization and reactionary authoritarianism. 
In order to explore the impact of these experiences on how post-war local development 
unfolded, I examine how otherwise similar neighboring communities chose these different paths 
and crafted different local responses to political opportunity during the conflictive period (1961-
1980) that predates the onset of full civil war.  The goal of this chapter is to establish the 
existence of insurgent (challenging) and counter-insurgent (stabilizing) sub-cultures 
(accumulated political experiences of empowerment and disempowerment) as a basis for 
evaluating their respective impact on post-war decentralized development.  By focusing on one 
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region of the country, I will show how effective challenges to local inequality involved solutions 
to collective action problems that had long conspired to impoverish the rural peasantry.  Where 
authority was uprooted and redistributed downward, and trained on changing the local structure 
of inequality, people found myriad ways to organize, coordinate, and defeat pre-war power 
structures.  Where pre-war authority went unchallenged, collective action strategies have proven 
more compatible with inequality.  These experiences were carried forward in the respective 
design of wartime and post-war institutions. 
Exploring the interpretations of these choices reveals a contested notion of the meaning 
of history.  For some, the war and the sequence of events leading to it, represent a sacred, 
empowering and decisive break with a formidable structure of injustice.  For many who felt they 
defended their communities against communist aggression, the meaning of history remains 
somewhat less articulate, silenced to a greater degree by a fear that continues to restrict freedom 
of expression.  For others, the war was profoundly destructive and disempowering, leaving 
human loss and a bitter nostalgia for a somewhat sanitized pre-war existence.  For the latter 
group, perhaps the majority, recent history remains a clash of ideals and brutal realities in which 
they were not the protagonists, but rather the accidental victims.    
Regardless of one’s orientation, political experiences associated with the war left a deep 
imprint on the post-war institutional terrain.  So in this chapter, I lay the foundation for 
understanding political empowerment in post-war El Salvador by examining the choices made by 
people in three fairly representative communities (Tecoluca, Jiboa Valley, San Ildefonso) 
focusing on the pre-war years leading up to the outbreak of civil war.  Sharing many common 
features, but differing in terms of competing political experiences, these three representative case 
studies of insurgent, hard-line counter-insurgent and moderate counter-insurgent municipalities 
are all located within the same conflictive region of El Salvador.  The political experiences that 
distinguish these municipalities have generated competing empowerment strategies that in turn 
have shaped the types of local institutions charged with carrying out postwar reconstruction.  In 
later chapters, I trace these historical paths to the reconstruction and development experiences of 
those same communities in the post-war period. 149 
                                                 
149 I draw here upon an immense body of literature on the Salvadoran conflict, but mostly the excellent analyses of 
the origins of the war in the regions of Aguilares and Guazapa, Carlos Cabarrús (1983) Tenancingo, Cuscatlan, 
William Durham (1979) and Elizabeth Wood (2003); Chalatenango, Jenny Pearce (1986), Morazán, Leigh Binford 
(1996, 1997), Sonsonate and San Vicente, Tom Gibb (2000) and San Vicente, Serena Fogaroli and Sara Stowell 
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More importantly, my goal is to explore how historical patterns of mobilization help us 
understand the present.  By arguing that collective action is necessary for decentralization to 
avoid the pitfalls of political capture, the types of mobilization or individual strategic actions 
chosen to survive the terribly violent years leading up to the 1992 truce (and beyond), will be of 
specific interest.  All sides were mobilized, but what was the lasting effect of these experiences 
on how people deal with obstacles to the collective action problem in the post-war context? This 
question is central to my historical analysis. 
The chapter will be organized in five sections.  First, I sketch a comparative overview of 
the three municipal case studies.  Second, I map out the main trends in the Salvadoran agrarian 
structure in which the civil war was rooted.  Third, I discuss how expanded elite access triggered 
by religious and political divisions serve as a central variable defining the political opportunity 
structure.  In the fourth section, repression is addressed as a final element of political 
opportunity.  I outline for each case study community a key act of repression that clearly 
illustrates the circumstances under which strategic quite different action choices were made.  I 
conclude by outlining the three empowerment strategies that emerge from pre-war political 
opportunity structure. 
  
 
 
 
B.  THREE PATHS TO WAR – AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
My map of the physical, social and economic landscape of San Vicente and much of the entire 
paracentral region (defined here as consisting of the department of San Vicente, the department 
of La Paz west of the Jiboa River and eastern Usulután, are dominated by extremes (see Figure 
4.1).  The topography contrasts a fertile coastal basin surrounded on three sides by towering 
volcanoes (Chinchontepec, Tecapa, and Usulután) on the western and eastern borders, the rocky 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1997); as well as several general works, Tommie Sue Montgomery (1995); Enrique Baloyra (1982); James 
Dunkerley (1983, 1988) Charles Brockett (1988); Robert Williams (1986). 
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foothills of Cabañas to the North, the Pacific Ocean to the South, and sliced in half by the 
country’s main river, the Lempa.    
San Vicente, the smallest of the three paracentral departments, is the setting from which 
the case study municipalities were chosen because of the close proximity of insurgent and 
counter-insurgent communities within the same geographical area and the nature of agrarian 
inequality that fueled discontent.  Inequality emerged as a long standing feature of the region’s 
export oriented development process, which began with anil, (or indigo) a blue dye produced 
during the colonial period.  Land and income concentration deepened considerably in the late 
19th century, when the El Salvador’s volcanic slopes were transformed into some of the most 
productive coffee fincas in the world at the expense of indigenous communal property rights.  
While coffee is grown on the higher slopes of the paracentral region’s volcanic peaks, it 
represents only a minor share of the country’s coffee sector.  The advance of other cash crops 
(cotton, sugar and cattle) displaced the region’s indigenous and campesino farmers to the 
margins of a rural economy dominated by large export oriented farms.   Where export crops 
thrived, the peasant subsistence livelihood from colonato and other forms of sharecropping, 
renting or wage labor were most severely disrupted. This rupture in landlord – peasant relations 
was one of the primary triggers for rebellion.  
During the civil war, the zone supported two of five political-military theaters defined by 
the FMLN, parts of which were occupied by insurgent combatants and a reservoir of mass 
organizations for much of the conflict.  Local support for the FMLN as well as continued 
allegiance to the right wing ARENA and PCN are both deeply rooted in the regional peasant 
population, as reflected in trends of post-war governance that is relatively divided between these 
three parties at the municipal level.   
The socio-economic traits of the paracentral zone feature high quality agricultural land 
with enormous economic potential, significant productive infrastructure and access to both 
national and export markets.  Land remains at the center of all economic activity in this region.   
In the course of the war, some of the most prized productive assets were expropriated and 
redistributed by the FMLN to poor people. A sample of the main historical characteristics of 
each case study municipality is summarized in Table 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1  Map of Paracentral Region of El Salvador 
 
 
1.  The insurgent case study municipality of Tecoluca  
 
Tecoluca is the largest municipality in San Vicente, extending from the tip of the Chinchontepec 
volcano to the Pacific Ocean.  The Littoral highway and series of feeder roads that divide the flat 
coastal lowlands are a testament to the importance of pre-war cotton and cattle haciendas that 
once dominated the sprawling landscape.    Trucks hauling sugar cane have now replaced cotton, 
and compete daily with a slew of other passenger and commercial vehicles that transport goods 
and people back and forth to the markets, maquiladora (clothing assembly) factories and 
extended families that live in San Salvador.  A more complex patchwork of rural communities, 
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cooperatives, old and new urban settlements and large farms now occupy what once were 
sprawling estates.   
The Lempa River snakes along the Tecoluca’s eastern border.   The country’s second 
major bridge, el Puente de Oro (bridge of gold), as well as boat traffic along the riverbanks, 
connects Tecoluca with its sister communities of Jiquilisco on the Usulután side.   The river 
provides great potential for irrigated agriculture, but the lack of adequate infrastructure 
investment has failed to realize this potential.  Moreover, periodic flooding in the lower Lempa 
valley is a persistent vulnerability to the inhabitants in the lowland half of the municipality.  The 
urban center (cabecera) sits in the shadow of the volcano to the north and foothills to the east.  
Destroyed on various occasions by war and most recently by earthquakes, the town center 
remains a vestige of what it once was.  The urban houses strike a contrast between the relative 
wealth of their former occupants, the regional landowners who have long since fled, with the still 
evident bullet marks that their current caretaker occupants have little incentive to repair.150  
Tecoluca represents a great case study of FMLN-insurgent political experience. The 
combined influence of intransigent landed elites with recourse to military and paramilitary 
security forces, a relatively swift increase in landlessness and rural insecurity, and the sustained 
presence of religious and student organizers, contributed to formation of an impressive network 
of Christian base communities and the region’s  first rural union - the Unión de Trabajadores del 
Campo (UTC).    
Religious organizing by two parish priests and the dozens of catechists trained at nearby 
vocational centers posed some of the earliest organizational challenges to the local alliance 
between landlords, the military and conservative church hierarchy in Tecoluca.  Soon after the 
arrival of David Rodríguez in 1969, who was then accompanied by Rafael Barahona several 
years later, the role of the church in local politics was transformed. Local landowners 
immediately identified the threat to their interests posed by the influence of the progressive 
church in raising the confidence and establishing solidarity within and between the poorest 
communities in Tecoluca.  Despite the early warning signs, religious organizing was somehow 
provided nearly five years to sink deep roots in the collective consciousness of the Tecolucan 
population.  Like a number of parishes throughout El Salvador where progressive priests, young 
                                                 
150 Interview, Pincho Mendez, former mayor of Tecoluca, April 4, 1998, estimated that 70% of the houses in the 
cabecera are not occupied by the owners. 
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and old, were opening the door to the political conversion for hundreds of catechists and lay 
leaders, this period in Tecoluca represented a formidable social foundation. 
Peasant mobilization was met early on with repression, which only intensified local 
organizing.  By the late 1970s, peasants seized haciendas, churches and public offices, 
sabotaging harvests and productive property, as well as swelling the ranks of clandestine military 
groups that carried out small attacks against security forces.  Landowners responded in kind by 
unleashing the National Guard and regional military brigades to annihilate entire communities 
suspected of insurgent activity.  The Fuerzas Populares de la Liberación Popular Farabundo 
Martí (FPL) recruited heavily in this zone and battled government forces here throughout the 
war.151    
Efforts to introduce agrarian reform cooperatives in Tecoluca in the early 1980s failed. 
Most of the intervened farms, as well as much of the municipality, was abandoned during the 
early years of the war.  Many of these same abandoned reform properties were seized by the 
repopulation movements coordinated by the FPL beginning in 1986. Over half of Tecoluca’s 
arable land was redistributed to ex-combatants and civilian beneficiaries of the post-war Land 
Transfer Program.  In all, two thirds of all arable land was redistributed by some program related 
to agrarian reform.  Widely recognized as an insurgent municipality, Tecoluca suffered 
tremendous human and physical damage, but insurgents retained control over some of the most 
prized economic and political assets in the region.    
Politically, the FMLN has governed Tecoluca for four consecutive terms since 1994, the 
first elections in which they have participated as a legal party.  Despite targeted repression of 
local leaders, the FMLN has sustained widespread support in Tecoluca.  Most local institutions 
now employ FMLN ex-combatants.  However, political sympathies are by no means 
homogenous.  Large clusters of ARENA supporters, including some demobilized ex-combatants 
of the armed forces, reside in several densely populated cantónes within Tecoluca.  These 
pockets of opposition to the FMLN are located close to sites that once served as military 
garrisons during the war.  The Christian Democrats and smaller centrist parties have no base in 
Tecoluca.  The political leadership in Tecoluca comes from the rural poor and middle classes, 
                                                 
151 The FPL was the largest of five revolutionary organizations that joined in 1980 to form the FMLN. 
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many of whom were experienced officers with the FMLN and have received post-war vocational 
training or education scholarships.   
Most traditional elite families abandoned the zone for San Salvador or the U.S. during the 
war and do not participate directly in local politics.  For most of the 1990s, Tecoluca experienced 
large flows of migrants seeking land or reuniting with family.  In recent years, the creation of 
small rural housing developments have attracted new migrants to the region, particularly those 
who work in the maquila factories about an hour’s bus ride  away.  At the same time, sustained 
economic recession has triggered a belated out-migration of the municipality’s youth, unwilling 
to work in agriculture.  Of the many social and economic reconstruction projects initiated in 
post-war period, a network of communities in the lower Lempa region supported by an NGO – 
CORDES has carved out a respectable portfolio of small cooperative ventures that include a 
variety of fruit and vegetable production, a cashew processing and export business, a dairy 
factory and an organic sugar cane mill.  Despite the noted shift in property ownership, the local 
economy is dominated by sugar cane, cattle and basic grains production and receives relatively 
significant investment through NGO and bilateral aid programs.  
 
2.  The hard-line counter-insurgent case study municipal of the Jiboa Valley 
 
The pro-Government, hard-line counter-insurgency case combines the four small San Vicente 
municipalities of Guadalupe, Nuevo Tepétitan, Verapáz, and San Cayetano, all belonging to 
a contiguous strip of the Chinchontepec volcano that slopes down to one of country’s most 
scenic valleys.  Each of the four towns numbers between 5,000-7,000 residents.  The four are 
treated as one municipal case study that I refer to here as the Jiboa Valley.  The mayors of the 
respective municipal governments are attempting to form an integrated micro-region that would 
rationalize costs and share assets in recognition that any single municipality on its own is too 
small to be administratively viable.   The Jiboa Valley is bordered on its northern perimeter by 
the Pan-American Highway, and extends eastward to the outskirts of departmental capital of San 
Vicente.  A view of the valley from the highway above reveals one of the most picturesque 
patchworks of small and medium size farms in the country.  Dominated by sugar cane and corn 
farms, this image gives the perception that smallholders are more common in this area.  While 
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less clearly demarcated under forest cover, coffee is cultivated in both large and small plots at 
higher altitudes.  Trapiches, or family operated sugar mills, are common and a private coffee 
beneficio is also located in Nuevo Tepetitán.  The Acahuapa River offers natural irrigation in the 
valley, but access to water is a major problem in the communities located higher on the volcano.   
 One major difference with Tecoluca is that the presence of major landowners is felt in the 
Jiboa Valley.  None personify this presence more than Alfredo Cristiani, former ARENA 
President and one of country’s wealthiest citizens.  Cristiani owns various prime coffee fincas, a 
processing mill, a flower export facility and a number of other assets in this region.  On any 
weekend, Cristiani’s helicopter can be seen retreating to his rural estate (one of several), replete 
with Swiss chalet constructed of all imported materials, private pool, water tanks, electrical 
power station and private road, all nestled among several hundred hectares of meticulously 
pruned and well guarded coffee trees. On Sundays, the permanent labor force invites local soccer 
teams from the outside the estate to play on what is likely the only soccer field of its kind, a level 
surface carved from the steep slopes and lined by majestic ceiba, cedar, conacaste and pine trees.   
The interests that control the volcano and much that it looks down upon include family 
representatives of ARENA stalwarts and coffee barons (Cristiani-Burkhard, García-Prieto, 
Guirola, Llort, Borgonovo, Molina, Alfaro, Bonilla, Dominguez) as well as regional landed 
elites, such as (Angulo, Miranda, Henríquez, Iglesias, Espinoza and Escafini).  This may explain 
why the first U.S. designed counter-insurgency program was launched to stabilize government 
control of the Chinchontepec volcano.  The agrarian reform touched few farms in the Jiboa 
Valley, with only 9% of overall land being redistributed (only 200 ha. in the form of Phase I 
cooperatives).   
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Table 4.1   Key Historical Attributes of the Case Study Municipalities 
 
 
 Tecoluca San Ildefonso Jiboa Valley San Vicente El Salvador 
Political 
Experience 
Hard-line 
Insurgency 
Disputed 
Zone 
Hard-line Count
Insurgency 
Department National 
Demography      
Population 1998 est. 26,000 11,000 23,000 156,336 6,100,000  (1.9%)
Pop. 1992 16,746 8074 18,841 143,000 (-0.33%) 5,118,599 (1.73%
Pop. 1971 25,413 9013 15,640 153,398 3,554,648 (3.48%
Pop. 1961 18,837 6440 12,060 112,920 2,510,984 (2.82%
Pop. 1951 14,362 4,947 10,323 88,972 1,855,917 (1.6%)
Pop. 1930    77,534 1,436,900 
Pop. 1913 7,400 2,544 9,608  1,225.835 
Pop. 1893 2,520  
(1500 indig.)
1,393 5,248 40,500 703,500    (1.7%)
% Rural 1998 71% 75% 60% 58%    52.7% 
Population Density 1998 106 80 267 132 291 
Population Density 1950 50 35 130 74 88 
Political Orientation (1) FMLN PDC ARENA ARENA     ARENA 
1971 Agrarian Structure       
Total Land Area (ha) 28500 13600 7300 118100 20,935,000 
Arable Land for Ag Use 18474 10892 5265 74143 1,451,985 
Cultivated Land152 11533 3170 3845 42,740 932,716 
    - Temp Crop Land153 7821 1294 2427 27064 488,436 
    - Coffee Farm Area  279 14 1077 1811 147,039 
    - Cotton Farm Area 2994 0 0 3645 14,328 
    - Sugar Cane Farm Area 76 2 847 2073 23251 
    - Pasture Area154  7053 7679 651 29,739 507,970 
    - Basic Grains Farm Area 3907 1216 1190 17726 277,058 
Total No. Farms 1896 939 1337 13081 270,868 
    - Coffee Farms  23 1 270 540 40,779 
    - Cotton Farms 45 0 0 51 18,571 
    - Sugar Cane Farms 17 2 487 1484 11012 
    - Cattle Farms155 318 150 152 2041 34,736 
    - Basic Grains Farms156 1,500 800 600   
                                                 
152 Total equals sum of temporary crop land, permanent crop land, prepared pasture, and forest. 
153 By the definition given in El Salvador’s Agricultural Census, temporary crop land includes annual crops such as 
corn, beans, rice, wheat, cotton, sugar cane, other and idle land that was previously used for annual crop cultivation. 
154 Includes both prepared and unprepared pasture. 
155 Farms with 5 or more cattle.  Includes farms that devote a smaller part of the farm for basic grains production. 
156 I refer here to farms that grow corn, sorghum, rice, or beans, either independently or in combination, as the 
primary economic activity.  Totals are estimated since the 1971 Agricultural Census does not permit the precise 
disaggregation of this activity. 
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Table 4.1 (continued) Key Historical Attributes of the Case Study Municipalities 
 
 
Total Land Gini    0.81 0.81 
Coffee Gini N/A N/A 0.80 0.80 0.85 
Total Perm. Farm Workers 3794 1782 2536 23371 494,023 
Tractors 444 6 187 954 15,731 
Production Cooperatives 1 0 1 3 28 
Farms w/ Credit 118 13 77 905 17510 
Total Credit157 $739,661 $25,744 $17,740 $1.16 mn $53.5 mn 
Land Reform      (2)      
Land Grade       I-III 62% 5% 35%  18% 
                         IV-VI 27% 10% 25%  28.3% 
                         VII-X 11% 85% 40%  51.5% 
 
Sources: DIGESTYC - Censo Agropecuario (1974), Barón Castro (1978) UNDP El Salvador 
Human Development Report, various years; De Grajeda, et al. (1997); PRISMA (1997); Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional (1994); Ministerio de Economía-DIGESTYC (1998); and Seligson (2000a); 
El Salvador Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), various years. 
 
 
Due to its proximity and commercial importance, the Jiboa Valley communities have 
traditionally had close economic, social and political ties to San Vicente and Cojutepeque, 
offering some indication of basis for the region’s conservative interests.  The four towns 
collectively share a very different history and common political experience than Tecoluca during 
the war, despite their location less than 180 degrees around the Chinchontepec volcano.  The 
Jiboa Valley remained largely under government control during the entire war.   
Support for progressive religious or political organizing never took root here despite early 
attempts to build base communities and recruit local catechists.   The pro-landowner influence of 
Bishop Aparicio de Quintanilla in San Vicente and Juan Arnoldo Platero, parish priest of 
Guadalupe, stemmed the efforts of more progressive priests to establish CEBs in the region.  
With a small organizational foundation from which to recruit, revolutionary organizations failed 
to establish the network of militants that were trained to provide security for fledgling political 
movements.  
                                                 
157 Nationally, credit was provided by Banks (67%), ABC (10%), Federación de Cajas de Credito Rural (7%), 
informal intermediaries (10%), other (6%).  Within San Vicente, the Banks provided 75%, ABC (12.7%), 
Federación de Cajas Rurales (5%), Other (4%). 
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 As in much of the region, but perhaps with greater effect, death squads operated freely in 
the Jiboa Valley during this period and the early years of the war. Many peasants served in the 
civil defense corps, others acquired experience and connections in the Organización Democrática 
Nacionalista (ORDEN), a rural paramilitary intelligence organization.  Most families had sons in 
the military. A minority had family members that served in the FMLN, but suffered severe and 
unreciprocated reprisals.   
Peasant organizing began in the early 1970s, but failed to penetrate the entire region.  A 
political turning point occurred when a strike by coffee pickers on several of Cristiani’s fincas 
was violently suppressed in March of 1980.   Twenty residents of the cantón of San Pedro Aguas 
Calientes were killed by the military and buried in the local church.  This massacre had a chilling 
effect that effectively stopped local organizing.  A spiral of revenge killings marked the early 
years of the war in the Jiboa Valley, and left the victim’s families with a deep reservoir of 
personal betrayal, distrust and resentment that has overwhelmed any clear political analysis of 
the conflict. 
Several factors may have contributed to the lack of an endogenous insurgent movement 
in the Jiboa Valley.  The absence of cotton and a higher density of smallholding peasants 
throughout the valley and on the slopes of the volcano may have mitigated the rapid change in 
land tenure that occurred in other regions.  In defense of their small parcels, Jiboa peasants may 
have enjoyed greater security than most.  Faced with the uncertainty of rebellion, there existed a 
shared commitment to the status quo conditions and greater risk aversion toward collaboration or 
active participation with the FMLN. Jiboa Valley communities were more receptive to the 
counter-insurgent influence of local coffee growers and reactionary Catholic clergy.158  
The political leadership in local institutions derives from ex-civil defense recruits and the 
commercial middle class.  A significant number of residents that have permanently relocated to 
San Salvador and visit only on the weekends, remain active in local politics.  However, all local 
decisions of any significance are subject to the discretion of landholding elites or their appointed 
representatives.  Local development projects have relied almost exclusively on government 
agencies, rather than the accompaniment of NGOs.   Projects tend to focus on the provision of 
                                                 
158 This section is based on interviews with Jiboa residents, nearly all of whom asked to remain anonymous.  FMLN 
leaders who were generally less concerned about anonymity also emphasized the strategic constraints of defending 
and holding of valley terrain between the Pan-American highway and the volcano as well as the lack of sources of 
water on the Northern slopes of the volcano.  Interview Pablo Parado Andino, June, 1998.  
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basic services rather than production or employment, which is left to individual initiative or the 
initiative of existing coffee and sugar cooperative associations.  While the coffee association 
tends to be dominated by the largest growers, the sugar association, based in Verapáz, has less 
disparity among members and tends to reflect the median sugar producer interest vis a vis 
contract negotiations with the closest mill (Jiboa). 
The Christian Democrat party once held a modest but loyal following in the zone, but that 
base has since diminished, blending into support for either ARENA or the small but growing 
base of new support for the FMLN, which is now the second political force locally.  Symbolic of 
this political realignment is Nuevo Tepetitán, where the mayor elected in 1997 and several 
council members were FMLN ex-combatants.  Still, ARENA and PCN enjoy strict party control 
in the majority of the Jiboa Valley, despite periodic defections between the two.  Continuing a 
patron-client tradition, ARENA party elites actively reward party loyalty and punish disloyalty 
regarding decision making about the development needs of a particular community or the 
fulfillment of public duties by elected officials.  As a result, inclinations toward local pluralism 
are more circumscribed by the imprint of authoritarian rule than other case study regions.   
 
3.  The moderate counter-insurgent case study municipality of San Ildefonso 
 
San Ildefonso sits in the northeast corner of San Vicente, above the Pan-American highway.  The 
municipal border with Cabañas department to the north is divided by the Titihuapa River and to 
the east, San Ildefonso faces the reservoir of the 15th of September hydroelectric dam.   A 10 
kilometer road, the only all weather road within the municipality, connects the town center with 
the main highway, just prior to the other principal east-west bridge, Puente Cuscatlán, which 
crosses into Usulután.   With a number of small valley basins that are tucked between the rolling 
foothills of northern San Vicente, the soil is generally rockier and of lower quality.  Small cattle 
and dairy ranches dominate the landscape.   The city of San Vicente is the closest commercial 
center, a day’s travel for some in the more remote communities.  Local market days are once a 
week.  The center of daily activity remains the rural villages. 
San Ildefonso represents a mixed political experience case study as a municipality 
influenced by the establishment of land reform cooperatives and the ideology of the Christian 
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Democrats before the war and for most of the 1980s.  During the war, the political sympathies of 
San Ildefonso sought a more neutral course between the two fires of hard-line insurgency and 
hard-line counter-insurgency.  Santa Clara and San Esteban Catarina to the east and the 
communities of northern San Miguel to the west were zones controlled by the FMLN, where 
demobilization camps were ultimately located.  To the north, Villa Dolores and much of 
Cabañas was known for its support of the military.  Caught in between, the highland regions of 
western San Ildefonso were militarily contested by both sides during the war.  The majority of 
peasants living in San Ildefonso remained strategically loyal to both sides. Many served in the 
civil defenses, others served as militia for the FMLN. Families in the more remote villages 
provided food and logistical assistance to both the FAES and the FMLN when requested.   
Like Tecoluca, San Ildefonso farmland was dominated by large properties that were 
concentrated in the hands of four major families.159  Sorghum, rice, and cattle farms provided 
wage labor and access to small plots of marginal land for most peasants.  Peasants that worked 
mostly as colonos were treated poorly, even brutally by ruthless cattle ranchers such as Manuel 
Aguilúz.  Residents in the community of Los Almendros spoke of a massacre of 12 peasants by 
the Treasury Police that allegedly occurred in the late 1960s on a farm owned by air force 
officer, Miguel Hernandez Gavídia.160 However, many recollected memories of “patronos 
buenos” and a risk aversion among many former colonos to assume management responsibility 
for the large farms that employed them.  Few communities organized during the 1970s and the 
work of visiting liberation theology priests did not take root in the San Ildefonso region, although 
the influence of Father Alirio Napoleón Macías in San Esteben Catarina was more instrumental 
in motivating rebellion.161  Sporadic and isolated incidents of repression and violence during the 
war were not a factor in altering sympathies of most that chose to stay.  Neither revolutionary nor 
deep loyalties to the military distinguished San Ildefonso. 
 The 1980 land reform transferred some of the largest properties and the PTT transferred 
another 15% of the municipality’s land to local peasants.  In total, 30% of all land was 
                                                 
159 According to local sources, the four principal landowning families were the Marín, Melendez, Amaya and Torres.    
160 The massacre was reported to have occurred on a second property of Hernandez located near the Lempa River.  
Hernandez was also the brother of PCN president at the time, Fidel Sanchez Hernandez. 
161 This section based on interviews with San Ildefonso residents who requested anonymity. 
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transferred to landless peasants representing about one of every five producers.  The land quality 
is generally inferior to that found in Tecoluca and parts of the Jiboa Valley, yet the unrealized 
potential is tied to low pre-war investment by smaller scale cash strapped owners.  The oldest, 
most productive farms were located in the land bordering the Lempa river.162  Cotton and melons 
were cultivated in the Lempa valley region and sugar cane was attempted in the early 1970s by 
one large highland landowner with unsatisfactory results.163  The municipality lost much of its 
highest quality productive land used for export crops prior to the war, perhaps as much as 10% of 
arable land, which disappeared when the farms adjacent to the Lempa river were expropriated by 
the state in the 1970’s to provide space for the 10,000 hectare reservoir that powered the 15th of 
September hydroelectric dam. The eastern half of the municipality that borders the dam was 
more heavily defended by the army and therefore was less conflictive.  Many peasant families in 
the lowland communities adjacent to the dam confide that the loss of these lands as a source of 
seasonal employment had a greater impact on their livelihoods than the war itself. 
 A mixed agrarian structure of reform cooperatives, a handful of remaining medium sized 
farms, and many smallholding ranchers displaced few peasant farmers and thus offered little 
incentive for FMLN to recruit and secure control over a large part of the zone. The more remote, 
highland communities of the municipality were very conflictive, with many people temporarily 
abandoning the zone between 1982-84.  FMLN tactical errors in their early policy toward the 
cooperatives contributed to the alimentation of many peasants in San Ildefonso to the 
revolutionary movement.  Cooperative leaders in at least two communities were executed on 
charges that they were government informants. More skillful FMLN command improved 
relations later in the war in many of these western highland communities, but suspicion of the 
FMLN still limits overt partisan political activism.  Post-war FMLN support comes from these 
more conflictive communities. 
 Distrust of the FMLN and the concrete benefits of the agrarian reform created the 
strongest political base for the Christian Democrats among the three case study municipalities.  
                                                 
162 The hacienda of Abel Paras, with cattle and sugar cane, was one of the original families of San Ildefonso, at the 
turn of the century. 
163 Cotton was reportedly planted on Hacienda Lempa by Manuel Antonio Marín (or Teleflor Ortíz) and a trapiche 
was installed for the local milling of sugar cane on the farm of Ebelio and Francisco Noboa.  (Interviews, Ebelio 
Noboa, Lolo Melendez, May 1998) 
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Local elite families (Aguilúz, Noboa, Lazo, Melendez) were networked to the PDC during the 
Presidency of Duarte, and although most have crossed over to the PCN or ARENA, still exercise 
considerable influence on municipal decision making.  Orlando Arevalo, populist peasant leader 
and Duarte protégé during the agrarian reform era, lived most of his youth in San Ildefonso.  
Now an iconoclast deputy with the PCN after being expelled from ARENA, Arevalo can 
mobilize thousands of San Foncho  and Vicentino farmers.   
A PDC mayor governed during most of the war. However, both ARENA and the FMLN 
now claim about 50% of the local vote since the collapse of the PDC after 1989.  The first 
ARENA mayor was elected in 1997 and despite the best efforts by ARENA leaders to undermine 
her administration, won re-election in 2000 on a PCN ticket.  Political organization throughout 
San Ildefonso has reflected the identity crisis of its municipal leadership. Competition for 
municipal funds and local office between lowland, highland and urban communities can be 
understood by sub-municipal geographic political motivations. NGOs, some closely aligned with 
the FMLN, have worked in the highland communities of PTT beneficiaries, while government 
agencies finance local development projects in the former PDC base among lowland 
communities.  ARENA hardliners come from middle class of landowners, professionals and 
merchants that dominate the urban center, and have held most of the political posts.   
Like Tecoluca, San Ildefonso experienced population declines in the 1980s due to the 
violence.  Like the Jiboa Valley, many families sent their children to the U.S. and remittances 
now play a significant role in the local economy.  Lacking any clear regional development plan, 
individualist strategies prevail. Expectations for modest improvement in status quo livelihoods 
are center around dairy and basic grain production and the paving of the principal road that leads 
to neighboring Cabañas.  
 
 
C.  LAND OWNERSHIP AND LOCAL AUTHORITY IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD 
 
The achievements and aspirations of these communities in the post-war period can be 
traced back to their different political experiences.  Several factors stand out in any explanation 
of why some challenged the widespread poverty and injustice, others acted alongside the military 
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and government to resist these challenges, and a third group did their best to escape the conflict 
by staying neutral.  These factors include: a) the pre-war agrarian structure and its impact on 
socio-economic relations between the landed elite and the peasantry; b) the presence of political 
leadership, including local and international elites, but particularly the influence of the Catholic 
church; and finally c) the impact of repression on local organizing.  These three factors help us 
understand the competing empowerment strategies deployed by the FMLN and the military-
government during the 1980s and how people in these communities responded to them.   
 
1. The Pre-War Agrarian Structure and the Export Boom 
 
Questions of local politics or development are inextricably linked to the structure of 
agrarian production.  The rise and inevitable fall of export prices have historically been an 
important trigger for social unrest.  Indigo, the first Salvadoran export crop,164 and the 
indigenous forced labor that it required were the ingredients of the first major agrarian revolt in 
January 1833 (Domínguez Sosa 1962, 1995; Cevallos 1920: 48-54; Calderón 195; Guerra 1962: 
58; White 1973: 72-74).  Accumulated grievances combined to spur Anastacio Aquino to lead a 
largely indigenous army of about 2,000 Nonualcos on a brief campaign that resulted in the 
sacking of the provincial capital of San Vicente.165  Independence and the ensuing regional wars 
eliminated what few protections that indigenous people had under Spanish rule.  Finance of 
regional wars forced a restoration of tribute on indigenous communities.  Communal resources 
continued to be confiscated and indigenous conscripts were forced to defend state property from 
frequent ladino tax revolts.  Labor abuses were common in the production of indigo, such as the 
operation in which Aquino and his brother labored in Santiago Nonualco (about 5 km to the west 
of Tecoluca).   
Several events in early 1833 sparked the revolt.  Aquino’s brother had been put in stocks 
by the hacendado as a punishment.  At the same time, a company of about 100 Nonualco 
                                                 
164 The exception may be cacao trade prior to the Conquest. 
165 San Vicente was designated by the short-lived Central American federation as the capital of El Salvador in 1834 
until 1840. 
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conscripts were nearly annihilated while trying to put down a ladino insurrection in San Miguel.  
In response, Aquino organized a rebellion.  Recruiting both indigenous and poor ladino 
insurgents, Aquino led a month-long pogrom that left several cities in ruins.  Wealthy ladino 
estates were targeted and goods confiscated from the rich were redistributed to the poor.  The 
attacks were designed to articulate a demand for social justice rather than simply ethnic revenge.  
Aquino’s forces mercilessly sacked and briefly occupied the city of San Vicente.  The principal 
Catholic church, where the wealthy had stashed their fortunes, was not spared.   
History reports that Aquino was killed by government forces, his severed head displayed 
in several towns to mollify elite anger and warn other potential indigenous insurgents.  Local 
myth, however, claims that Aquino rests in a hammock strung between the twin peaks of 
Chinchontepec.   
This account of rebellion endures in the minds of both the landowning class and the 
FMLN ex-combatants to this day.  When Aquino and his soldiers were forced to retreat up the 
slopes of the volcano in 1833, one of his cannons was left behind in Nuevo Tepetitán.  The 
cannon is now proudly displayed in the local elementary school.  During the war, the Salvadoran 
armed forces fired the cannon in the public square, aimed toward the FMLN occupied volcano, 
in order to motivate the local civil patrols.   Today, the Tepetitán council is seeking funds to 
build a monument to Aquino in the square, with the cannon pointed toward San Vicente, the 
direction from which government troops and National Guard have always entered.  Beyond 
Tepetitán, the symbolism of Aquino’s resistance is visible both in the prominence it holds in the 
local educational curricula and popular culture of FMLN governed towns, as in its absence in 
those Nonualco towns from which the movement originated but are now governed by PCN or 
ARENA mayors. 
 Nearly a century after Aquino, a similar confluence of factors surrounding the collapse of 
coffee and the social relations between landowners and the largely indigenous peasantry also 
resulted in an agrarian revolt.   A 50% drop in global coffee prices, transferred in large part to the 
poor and middle class through wage cuts and job loss, exposed the concentration of land and 
wealth generated by rapidly rising exports (Lindo Fuentes 1990; Perez-Brignoli 1995).  Many 
landless laborers and smallholder coffee growers were least able to endure the price shock.  In 
1932, an attempted insurgent uprising influenced by leaders such as Farabundo Martí of the 
Salvadoran Communist Party was attempted in a dozen municipalities in the Western third of the 
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country.  The revolt was quickly and ferociously put down with the massive slaughter of an 
estimated 30,000 people (Anderson 1971).  While this second event spared the paracentral 
region, it too has seared the collective memory of peasant and elite alike.  
So too did the pressures brought by the next phase of agrarian capitalism that began in the 
1950s set in motion a train of events that would lead again to conflict.166  Land and income 
inequality are widely held as one of the root causes of the civil war.  The volatility of the global 
markets for these crops upon which the Salvadoran landed elite became increasingly dependent, 
helps explain their intransigence in the face of redistributive demands by a disenfranchised 
peasantry.  The rapid increase in export crops has significantly influenced trends in land tenure 
and agrarian opportunity.  There is general agreement that land concentration and landlessness 
both increased in the 20th century, reaching levels that undoubtedly motivated agrarian 
insurgency.  There is greater dispute over the exact level of landlessness or inequality or how 
they may have varied between sub-regions (Seligson 1995; Diskin, Paige and Seligson 1996: 
111-158).  Such a task is complicated by the inconsistency and uneven tenure data.  Beginning in 
this section, I analyze these long-term shifts in the Salvadoran agrarian structure, both for the 
paracentral region and the entire country, based on an original analysis of census and survey data 
that extend from 1950 to 2000.167   
El Salvador is a small country, only 2,100,000 hectares, about the size of Massachusetts. 
One third is not in production, leaving about 1,500,000 hectares in cultivation.  Land used for 
agricultural activities has declined since 1950, signaling that El Salvador had reached its 
agricultural frontier.  Much of this land in use is in fact not suitable for crop production and as 
much as a third (500,000 ha) is left as pasture.168  The agrarian structure has been dominated by 
                                                 
166 Various episodes of peasant uprisings occurred between 1833 and the 1970s, with most famous but clearly not 
the only instance being 1932.  See Lauria-Santiago (1999), Gould and Lauria-Santiago (2004) 
167 This section and others in subsequent chapters that discuss land tenure and employment data are based on 
McElhinny and Seligson (2000).  As noted, estimates of the shift in land inequality and employment are based on 
the 1950, 1961 and 1971 Agrarian Census and Population Census data from those and later years.  No agrarian 
census has been conducted since 1971.  To fill gaps and to bridge earlier census data with current trends, I also use 
estimates of land use, distribution and employment derived from the 1991 and 1998 household surveys.   A detailed 
description of the methodology is found in Appendix D Finally, a 1988 USAID survey of land use is also 
incorporated. 
168 Altitude is also a limiting factor.  The best coffee can be grown at 1,200 – 2,000 meters under shade, cotton can 
be grown profitably only below 500 meters, and sugar at 500-1000 meters.  Cattle pasture is not limited by altitude. 
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the expansion of export crops.  Farmland dedicated to coffee, cotton and sugar has increased 
from 140,000 ha. (15% of cultivated land) in 1950 to 360,000 (38%) by 1978 – over 50% of this 
land cultivated in farms 200 ha. or larger.169   
The general storyline for the Salvadoran countryside is that the export crop boom and 
bust cycles transformed the agrarian structure and peasant landlord relations by transferring land 
dedicated to basic grains production into export crops, and replacing colonato labor contracts 
with cash rents and wages.  Colonato is defined as resident salaried labor that is often provided a 
parcel of land to work on the margins of a larger hacienda, a house, food and some services, in 
return for labor on the larger property and in some cases, on other farms.  This form of tenure 
was allegedly rescinded by the 1965 minimum wage law.170    In short, cotton, cattle and sugar 
pushed many sharecropping peasants literally to the margin of the rural economy, as tractors, 
fences and export minded owners’ modernized agricultural production and reduced demand for 
peasant labor.  Landlessness and land poverty increased dramatically.  At the same time, the 
1971 agricultural census showed that almost 70% of land in farms larger than 500 hectares was 
being underutilized as pasture or not cultivated at all.  Export intensification also accelerated 
deforestation trends, although the Pacific coast had already undergone considerable deforestation 
by peasant subsistence production.    
By 1950, direct tenancy (cash rent) and indirect tenancy (colonato) together accounted 
for 38% of all farm land tenure and the remaining 62% of farms were owned.  By 1961, colonato 
increased to 25%, raising indirect tenancy to 44%, and most likely reached 50% if mixed tenure 
farms are included.171   However, the advance of cotton accompanied an increase in cash rents 
                                                 
169 By late 1970s, coffee occupied 200,000 ha. cotton 110,000, sugar 50,000 ha, and cattle pasture 500,000.  The rest 
was devoted to basic grains. 
170 While the number of colonos has clearly decreased from their peak of 55,769 (25% of all farmed properties) in 
1961, it hasn’t disappeared, the legal restriction notwithstanding.  The term “censo” is used to describe what is in 
fact a complex variety of sharecropping contracts that usually involved some form of fixed or proportional share of 
harvest crop as payment for use of land.  See Adams (1957: 433-436) for a description of the geographic variation in 
sharecropping contract terminology that still frustrates accurate agrarian surveys. 
171 This increase in colonato is likely associated with the cotton expansion, beginning with the invitation of peasants 
to clear forested land in preparation of eventual cotton planting.  Mechanization rapidly lowered the number of 
colonos necessary to produce cotton.   
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(30-39%)172 from 1961 to 1971 and the effective elimination of colonato contracts, reducing it to 
only 6%.173  
 
a.  Inequality   
 
Between 1951-1971, total land dedicated to agricultural production declined by about 80,000 ha. 
while the number of farms increased by nearly 100,000. Thus, the average farm size declined as 
land for food production was converted by large farms into cotton, cattle and sugar, squeezing 
many farmers with access to land into increasingly smaller and less fertile parcels.  Between 
1950-1971, the average farm size declined from 8.8 ha to 5.4 ha.  The main cause was 
subdivision among poor and medium sizes farms that created many new small farms.174  Some 
large farms were also broken up into medium size properties.  By 1971, the average rented farm 
was only 2 ha, and the average colono farmed only half a hectare.  At the same time, there were 
15 farms over 2,500 ha. each.  Although the Gini coefficient for national land inequality dropped 
slightly from 0.83 in 1961 to 0.81 in 1971, these are extremely high levels of inequality.175    
These trends were particularly acute in the paracentral region, disproportionately exposed 
to the expansion of export agriculture.  Between 1961-1971, land dedicated to coffee, cotton and 
sugar increased from 26% to 36% of all cultivated land.  San Vicente experienced a rise in 
inequality over this decade, from 0.80 to 0.81, values which are near the median for El 
Salvador.176   
                                                 
172 The 1971 Agricultural Census does not precisely categorize a segment of farms that combine production by 
owner and rented plots, thus making it impossible to state the exact level that renting reached.   
173 Cotton expansion was accompanied by changes in laws extending the minimum wage of permanent rural workers 
(1965) and rent ceilings, which also expedited this switch from sharecropping to cash transactions.   
174 A cultural factor that exacerbates land inequality in El Salvador is that poor families tend to subdivide small 
properties among all dependent children or at least among the males.  Wealthier landowners tend to pass on the 
entire property through inheritance to only the eldest son, or find that children more likely to take non-agricultural 
jobs are less interested in land.  
175 The 1971 census failed to include 129,534 ha  (8.2%) of the farms, many of which were large properties, which 
may have led to an underestimation of land inequality.   
176 Regional land inequality varied from low gini values of 0.678 in Cabanas and other northern departments to high 
gini values of 0.878 in the coffee growing department of Sonsonate.   
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b.  Landlessness   
 
The overall changes in agricultural occupations are summarized in Table 4.2, based on a 
methodology that is described in Appendix D, based on Seligson (1995) and McElhinny and 
Seligson (2000).177  However, I make several changes to this methodology.  Following the 
government definition, I include as part of the economically active agricultural population all 
men and women above the age of 10.178  The landed population is defined as those producers 
having access through ownership, rent, colonato or other forms of tenure to land greater than 2 
hectares.179  Land poverty includes those producers deriving the majority of their income from 
farms less than 2 ha.  Permanent and temporary wage laborers are combined under agrarian 
labor, although the latter typically outnumber the former by 2:1 ratio.  Unpaid family labor is 
known for 1971, and estimated by the same 12% ratio for other years.180  Finally, total 
agricultural employment and unemployment are taken from the population census.   
 Later survey analyses of the agrarian population show that household economies include 
mixed income streams, combining farm income with wage income and non-farm income.  As 
such, there is some overlap between the land poor and agrarian labor when the land and 
                                                 
177 Principal sources are the Agricultural Census and Population Census for each year. 
178 Seligson argues that 16 years of age rather than 11 should be the cut-off for the active adult working age 
population in agriculture, suggesting that most youth have no short-term expectation of owning their own farm 
unless through family inheritance or a wife’s dowry.  For the 70% of all farms less than 2 hectares, neither of 
Seligson’s proposed options are likely to alter patterns of landlessness.   Diskin (1996: 117) argues that either way, it 
is irrelevant.  At the time of the survey, if they are economically active adults – they can only be classified as 
landless.  We might dispute whether children between 11 and 15 can be considered adults.  Undoubtedly, child labor 
is a fact of rural life, in just the same way that 11 year olds were conscripted by both sides during the war.  Age 
should be a factor in determining a dignified livelihood, but sadly is not. The definitional difference that sets age 11 
as a lower bound for defining an economically active population in agriculture equates to 53,858 additional persons 
in my estimate of the for 1971, a 10% increase over Seligson’s estimate that are regrouped mostly in the unpaid 
family labor category. 
179 Estimates of subsistence minimum land parcels are contingent on the quality of the land, which varies 
significantly in El Salvador.  Seligson uses 1 mz, which is too low.  Others argue that as much as 9-10 ha is the 
minimum needed to support an average family White, (1971: 133), Menjivar (1962).  Phase III of the land reform 
which transferred tenant properties to their occupants, set a limit at 7 ha.  During the Peace Negotiations, the FMLN 
proposed between 4 and 12 ha., depending on location.  Wood (1993:37).  See Diskin (1996:118, fn 9) for 
comparison of different land poverty estimates. 
180 The population census for 1971 does not distinguish unpaid  family labor. 
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population census data are compared and an adjustment is made to estimate the total land 
poor.181  Agrarian wage labor is calculated by subtracting all other occupational categories from 
the total employed agricultural workforce.   
Table 4.2 shows that the extension of export crops is closely associated with land 
inequality and landlessness.  In the twenty year period from 1951-1971, the total number of 
farms increased by over half, while the number of subsistence farms (here defined as 2 hectares 
or less), rose even faster (80%).  The landed farmer percentage of the agrarian labor force 
declined from 18.2% to 11.7%. Even among the subsistence farms, only about two thirds 
enjoyed secure tenure (ownership).   Almost one in four farms are subsistence farms (land 
poverty), whose increase in absolute terms explains the persistence of land inequality, despite the 
parcelization of some large farms.  It also reflects the limits to land acquisition among poor 
families and the custom of subdividing small farms among all children.   
Landlessness is a contested concept.182  Most, but not all, unemployed, unpaid or wage 
earning laborers want some land to farm although it is impossible to estimate a precise 
percentage. If landlessness is defined at a minimum as unpaid family labor plus temporary (day) 
wage laborers (two thirds of agrarian wage labor), then it was 41.5% of the total agricultural 
labor force in 1961 and decreased slightly to 40.2% in 1971. If the unemployed and/or the 
permanent wage labor force are included as Diskin (1996:115) argues they should, landlessness 
easily tops 60% of all agricultural workers and reaches 66% by 1971.   In either case, it is likely 
that landlessness increased as further cotton production reached new heights in the 1970s. 
 The controversy surrounding the measurement of landlessness is often wrapped up in the 
attribution of some threshold with revolutionary potential (Prosterman 1976; Diskin, Paige, and 
Seligson 1996).   Peasant revolution is based on rural class structure.  Of all types of peasants, 
sharecroppers or wage working peasants are the most likely revolutionaries, but only when faced 
with an owner dependent upon agriculture as the primary source of income.  Paige argues that it 
                                                 
181 These surveys indicate that 20% of agrarian laborers, that is those employed in wage labor, also have their own 
small farm up to 2 hectares.  To avoid double counting, 20% of the total farms smaller than 2 hectares are deducted 
to produce an estimate for land poor. 
182 Estimates of landlessness vary considerably for the 1970s, due in some part to disputes over the optimal metric.   
Simon and Stephens (1982) claimed 65% of the rural population was landless, while Seligson argues that only 
38.1%  of a smaller base population (the economically active population in agriculture) is landless based on 1971 
agrarian census figures.  Durham (1979:50) estimates landlessness using the latter metric at 21.8%. See Seligson 
(1995:43-74) for a discussion of estimating landlessness. 
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is not landlessness per se that predicts revolution, but the social organization of agrarian 
production (particularly sharecropping) pitted against land owners dependent on farm income 
that matters most.   
 
Table 4.2   Agrarian Occupation Structure (1950-1971) 
 
 
 1951 1961 1971 
 No. Pct No. %  Pct 
Total Farms 174,204  226,896  270,868  
Farms <= 2 ha 105,054 60% 155,555 69% 188,527 70% 
       
Landed population (>= 2 
ha) 
69,150 18.2% 71,341 14.6% 79,341 11.7% 
Land Poor 84,043 22.1% 124,444 25.4% 150,822 22.2% 
Agrarian labor 
(Permanent and 
Temporary) 
162,037 42.7% 210,573 43.1% 286,440 42.3% 
Unpaid Family Labor 45,575 12.0% 57,831 11.8% 81,355 12.0% 
Total Employed 
Agrarian Labor Force 
360,805 95% 464,189 94.9% 597,957 88.2% 
Unemployed 18,990 5.0% 24,909 5.1% 80,000 11.8% 
Total Agrarian Labor 
Force 
379,795  489,098  677,958  
 
 
Indeed, it might be argued that including family or temporary labor as landless might actually 
misrepresent the problem if these laborers are adding wages to a landowner’s family income.  
We might wonder whether the inclusion of unpaid family labor as landless might overstate the 
true extent of the problem if most poor farms inevitably rely on family off-farm labor wages that 
would in turn not exist if they became eligible for ownership otherwise.   
Paige is correct to say that any single measurement of landlessness is an insufficient 
revolutionary indicator.  On the other hand, income diversification strategies of Salvadoran 
families were necessary to cope in a rural economy in which 80% of the population was poor and 
underemployed, but by no means adequate to achieve dignified or even stable livelihoods.  
Absent this alternative path to economic security, most agrarian laborers as well as a 
  147
considerable number that may have migrated to urban areas, probably still looked toward 
eventual land ownership as the only possible path out of poverty. 
 Table 4.2 paints a rather dire picture of agrarian inequality in 1971.  Nearly three quarters 
of all farms were too small to provide a subsistence living, and between 200,000 and 350,000 
additional agricultural workers were landless.  If the average reform property of 3 hectares was 
made available to every estimated landless farmer in 1971 and in addition a supplement of 1 
hectare was made available to the 130,000 land-poor farms with less than 1 hectare, a total of 
1,180,000 hectares would need to be transferred.  This represents 75% of the total farmed land in 
1971.  In the years leading to war, this level of redistribution was not beyond the realm of 
imagination. 
 
c.  Coffee   
 
These trends continued into the 1970s and were even more pronounced in the paracentral 
region.183  However, not all export crops had the same effect on rural landscape.  Since its 
introduction in the mid-19th century, coffee has been the dominant export crop for El Salvador, 
constituting as much as 85% of all exports (revenue).  Land cultivated in coffee has grown 
steadily in the 20th century, increasing 40% alone between 1971-1978.  Coffee prices declined 
beginning in the late 1950s, but rose dramatically in the 1970s, peaking at $210 per quintal (over 
four times the average export price in the preceding thirty year period).   
The average coffee finca in El Salvador was about 4 ha. in 1971, although the most 
commercially profitable fincas were much larger, in the range of 50-300 hectares.184  Usulután 
has about 13% of the country’s coffee area, as well as some of the larger properties.  The average 
finca is 10 ha., there are several hundred estates in the 200-300 ha. range.  On the other hand, the 
majority (90%) of the coffee farms in San Vicente and La Paz are owned and operated by 
smallholders (ave. 3 ha.).   
Indeed, towns such as Guadalupe were considered to be more politically conservative due 
to attitudes associated with the higher relative presence of smallholders.  In the pre-war Jiboa 
                                                 
183 Calculations for San Vicente, La Paz and Usulután produce similar estimates for landlessness in 1961, 1971. 
184 1961 and 1971 Agricultural Census, DIGESTYC (1967, 1977).   
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Valley, 20% of the farms were coffee fincas and another 36% were sugar cane farms.  However, 
in the case of coffee, the average finca in Guadalupe was 0.5 ha, compared to at least 7 larger 
fincas of 50 hectares or more.  The distribution of land in coffee production within Guadalupe 
was highly unequal (Gini coefficient of 0.80).  Following a national pattern of highly 
concentrated production, coffee offers the perception of smallholding, but is often more unevenly 
distributed than farmland in general.185    
Moreover, profitability of small and large coffee fincas differs significantly.  The larger 
fincas tend to be higher quality land between 1,200-1,800 meters in altitude.  Coffee yields vary 
between 5 to 35 quintales oro (dried beans in units of 100 lb sack) per hectare based on 
geography and level of technification.  Some of the largest coffee producers in the region saw 
annual profits as high as $3-4 million.  The Cristiani-Burkard family, for example, produced 
16,375 quintales in 1980-81, for a net profit of $750,000.  In addition, Cristiani operated the 
Acahuapa beneficio in Tepetitán and exported, adding another $2,000,000 to his earnings (Arias 
1988: 196, Chapter 2).  Smallholders with 2 hectares of coffee (50% of all coffee producers in 
the region) were likely to produce 40 quintales and reap net earnings of about $2,000 to 
$3,000.186  While the disparity between the coffee elite and the smallholder is striking, even half 
a hectare of coffee could generate a livelihood that was preferable to other rural incomes, at least 
when prices were high.  
 
d.  Sugar cane  
 
Sugar cane is notably less skewed in terms of its distribution and is traditionally more of a small 
farmer activity than the other cash crops.  In part, this was due to the survival of traditional sugar 
production techniques suitable for local markets. The average sugar cane farm in the Jiboa 
Valley was 1.7 ha in 1971, compared to a national average of 2.1 ha.  Many small and medium 
                                                 
185 Only 10 of 540 fincas in San Vicente (ave. 30 ha/finca) reported receiving technical assistance (others ave. 3 
ha/finca).  For the entire region (148 of 5220 fincas, 2.8%, ave. finca 46 ha) reported receiving technical assistance. 
186 Based on a yield of 20 qq per hectare and production costs of $50-$70 per hectare, and a sale price of $110-125 
per quintal, slightly lower than the average sale price in 1980 of $150, which most smallholders would be unlikely to 
obtain when they had to sell to processors like Cristiani. 
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size sugar cane growers owned, operated and rented out their trapiches.187  Sugar, perhaps more 
than coffee, reflected a smallholder base in the Jiboa Valley.   However, like coffee, profits from 
sugar production favored large growers whose net earnings per hectare were nearly twice that of 
small farmers ($1600 compared to $600-$700 per hectare).  Annual wages in the sugar sector 
averaged below $500. 
Sugar cane production increased rapidly in the 1970s in San Vicente after the 
construction of the Jiboa Sugar Mill.188  Land dedicated to sugar cane production increased in the 
paracentral region from 3,700 to 13,300 hectares between 1971-1975.189  Large farms designed 
to supply the modern sugar mills for export markets began to crowd out the small producer, as 
average sugar cane farm size jumped to 4 ha in the region by 1975. 
 
e.  Cotton   
 
Displacement of smallholding and tenant families as well the sharecropping colono accelerated 
in the 1950s with the boom in cotton production, which transformed much of the coastal plains 
(Browning 1971; Arias Penate 1988; Williams 1979; Durham 1979).  Public health measures to 
defend against malaria, production technology advances and the building of the Pacific highway 
and feeder road system (1955-1963) all facilitated the expansion of cotton production in the 
paracentral coastal plains.  During these years, 80% of El Salvador’s highway budget was spent 
on paving the Pacific highway.190  Cotton consumed more credit than any other crop, much of it 
heavily subsidized by the state.  COPAL, the elite dominated Cotton Cooperative, flush with 
                                                 
187 A trapiche is a rustic ox or motor-driven mill that converts cane sugar into dulce de panela – a course brown 
sugar cake that is preferred in local markets and by some candy makers.  There are an estimated 75 trapiches in the 
Jiboa Valley.  The larger sugar mills are owned and operated by families representing the large growers, grouped 
within the Cooperativa Azucarera Salvadoreña. 
188 El Salvador’s principal export market is the U.S. with each of the Central American countries sharing a sugar 
quota. 
189 DIGESTYC (1977) 
190 Prodded by the World Bank, IDB and U.S. Alliance for Progress funding, the export boom went hand in hand 
with a significant increase in road improvements.  Between 1953 and 1978, Central America quintupled its length of 
paved roads (1,200 to 6,000 miles), tripled secondary improved roads (5,000 miles to 16,000 miles) and quadrupled 
feeder roads (7,000 to 29,000 miles).  Williams (1979) 
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profits, captured disproportionate public investment even well after cotton prices and production 
peaked in the mid-1960s.  
Cotton production and prices fluctuated wildly from 1959-1979. Production more than 
doubled in the 1960s, and land dedicated to cotton reached a peak of 110,000 hectares in 1965, 
dropped to 40,000 in 1967, then reached 102,000 hectares in 1979, before steadily declining due 
to the war.  Price volatility, rising production costs (including interest on loans) as rates spiked in 
the 1970s and lower yields all were factors in these shifts.   While cotton prices reached record 
highs of $60 per quintal in 1977, inflation, and spiraling interest rates reduced profitability for 
many growers.  The instability of the global market for cotton induced tremendous anxiety 
among the cotton growing elite, intensifying the most reactionary opposition to reform within 
this sector as social demands grew. 
Cotton only accounted for 7% of all arable land nationally.  In the 1970s, 88% of all 
cotton production was concentrated principally in 25 municipalities along the Pacific Coast.  
Large growers consumed all available coastal land, converting traditional food cultivation for 
local consumption into export production.  In San Vicente, production and cotton farm area 
increased fourfold between 1961-1971, with almost all additional production occurring on farms 
in Tecoluca. 
While there were some small cotton farms, many went bankrupt when cotton prices 
tanked.  Larger growers extracted protection from the government through loan deferral and 
trade protections.  About 85% of cotton in San Vicente was planted on haciendas of 100 ha or 
larger.191   Some of the largest farms in the paracentral region, between 500 and 1000 hectares, 
generated annual profits in the range of $50,000 - $100,000 per farm.192  Such profits equaled 
100 to 200 times the average cotton laborer salary.193  The Gini coefficient for land distribution 
in the San Vicente cotton sector was 0.86.   Small cotton farms were more frequent in Usulután, 
with only 65% grown on farms greater than 100 ha.  Colono contracts plummeted between 81-
                                                 
191 In 1961, Salvadoran farms under 50 hectares represented 82% of growers, but just 17% of cotton land.  Farms 
with 200 or more hectares cultivated 60% of all cotton. 
192 Salvador Arias (1988: 240), estimating for the 1977-78 production season.  There is evidence of harvests valued 
in the millions of dollars on the largest single farms (3,000-4,000 ha) when prices were high.   
193 Op cit, estimated at 4.25 ¢ per day for general labor and ¢6.5 per day for harvest labor, totaling about $500 per 
year. 
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94% in the paracentral region during this period.  Cash rent contracts, on the other hand, 
increased by 33% (73% in San Vicente) even as the cost of renting increased as well.    
As much as 56% of all cotton in the country was cultivated on rented property.  Renting 
in the cotton sector, along with credit, went mostly to medium and large farms, many of whom 
were non-agricultural professionals that lived in El Salvador but wanted to invest in the cotton 
boom.  The volatility of cotton profits, linked to credit availability and land rental rates, favored 
the largest growers with the best lands and thinned the ranks of many small and medium 
producers in periods of low profits.  These swings reinforced a concentration of wealth within 
the cotton elite, allowing a diversification into banking, inputs, marketing, ginning, and textiles, 
as well as investments in other export crops (Colindres 1977; Sevilla 1985).  
The switch from sharecropping to cash rents effectively marginalized many poor families 
that became surplus labor for cotton production that required less labor than basic grains. Cotton 
also displaced corn directly.  Jiquilisco was the largest corn producing municipality in 1950.  By 
1971, it was the largest cotton producer. The long standing guarantee of peasant subsistence 
through sharecropping contracts that provided access to marginal land and certain productive 
resources was severely reduced by the expansion of agro-export crops (Williams 1986; 
Browning 1971). 
 
f.  Beef   
 
The expansion of cotton and cattle are closely connected.  The export price of cotton had been 
declining between 1954 and 1969 and profits reached a plateau in 1958, even as land dedicated 
to cotton continued to increase.  As prices shot up in the 1970s, cotton experienced another boom 
in planting after a drop in acreage in the late 1960s.194   However, the volatility of cotton prices 
and yields and the increase in U.S. beef quota to El Salvador in 1971 spurred diversification by 
already cleared cotton farmland into cattle.195 Central America’s share of the U.S. beef quota 
rose from 5% in the early 1960s to 15% by 1979.  Cattle ranching was less subtle a threat to 
                                                 
194 Williams (1979), Arias (1988: 106). The 1971 Agrarian Census does not reflect the second expansion of cotton in 
the 1970s.  Cotton profits were reduced by steadily rising costs for petroleum based inputs and lower yields. 
195 It’s worth noting that cotton profits were investing in an expansion of coffee as well, which grew by 50,000 
hectares in 1970s. 
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subsistence crop producers.  Cattle, even on improved pasture, required less labor than other 
rural activities and enclosed even the marginal lands to which domestic use agriculture had been 
confined by cotton.  In Tecoluca, 40% of all farmland was designated as pasture, compared to 
17% for cotton. The majority of these ranchers were 100 hectares or more.  According to Picho 
Mendez, former ARENA mayor and cattle rancher of Tecoluca, the town boasted one of the 
country’s major cattle auctions – an indication of growing importance of this activity.196  
Although the lowest of all Central American countries, Salvadoran beef exports jumped from 
zero to $14 million by 1979. 
Beef production profits were also concentrated among a few large landowners.  Beef 
profits were combined with foreign investment and development program assistance to diversify 
their stake beyond grazing into fattening, slaughtering and export packing enterprises.  The beef 
boom produced even fewer rural jobs than cotton or coffee and thus intensified landlessness.197 
 
g.  Food crops    
 
Several authors have illustrated the historic competition for land between coffee, cotton and corn 
in El Salvador.  Daugherty (1969: 138; Wilson 1970: 122-127), document how coffee displaced 
peasant production of food crops on the volcanic slopes, driving producers into the valleys and 
toward the relatively less fertile northern frontier departments.198  This shift contributed to 
temporary food shortages, price volatility and imports – all of which exacerbated social stability 
prior to the final straw of coffee’s collapse, which in turn ignited again the tinder of peasant 
protest but brought down the full weight of state repression.  A series of popular uprisings 
associated with growing landlessness culminated in 1932 matanza.199 
                                                 
196 According to Mendez, who owned more than 500 cattle in the 1970s, Tecoluca hosted the regional auction on 
Thursdays of each week. 
197 One estimate is that cotton cultivation requires six times more labor per acre per year (30 man-days) than cattle 
ranching (5 man-days), sugar offers seven times more (38 man-days), and coffee offers thirteen times more (68 man-
days). SIECA, (1973). 
198 See also Adams (1957), White (1973) and Browning (1971:293-362) 
199 Torres (1962:9) documents at least five violent peasant protests between 1872 and 1898. 
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  The disappearance of indigenous communal land, traditionally dedicated to milpa 
production and relatively equally distributed, contributed both to the steady loss of land planted 
for grains production as well as a rapid increase in land concentration (Browning 1971: 16).  In a 
prophetic categorization that undoubtedly influenced Roy Prosterman’s design of the 1980 
counter-insurgent land reform, Durham shows how three phases of land concentration consumed 
all but a small fraction of Salvadoran farmland over four centuries.   The first major land grab 
was the colonial appropriation through land grants of up to a third of the country.   Phase I land 
concentration extracted 355,000 hectares in the form of some 440 haciendas that were 
established in this period by incorporating or adjoining indigenous land.200  After the outright 
elimination of indigenous ejido or common property, the third and final stage of land 
concentration occurred between 1940 and 1979, with expansion of cotton, sugar and cattle.   
A second phase of land concentration was inaugurated by the land redistribution laws of 
1881 and 1882 that allowed already wealthy landowners to acquire increasing amounts of land, 
but particularly in the coffee highlands.  This second massive land grab, magnified by the boom 
in coffee profits prior to 1930, produced an aristocracy of wealth that Adams refers to as “the 
cosmopolitan upper class.”201  It is worth noting that Tecoluca, Verapáz and San Vicente were 
three of the first of among 43 Salvadoran municipalities to pass municipal resolutions between 
1879 and 1880 that reinforced national legislation toward the privatization of ejidal land and 
incentives for the expansion of coffee production.202  A census determined that indigenous 
communities asserted access rights to as much as a quarter of national territory.   In San Vicente, 
7,000 ha were claimed as ejidal land and 27,070 ha. in Usulután.  Although underestimated, both 
                                                 
200 Gutierrez y Ulloa (1807) estimates that the five largest estates near the end of the colonial period ranged between 
1,400 hectares and 6,000 hectares.   
201 On coffee see Adams (1957:462-463) and rural class see Wilson (1970: 59, 132). 
202 Browning (1971:309-313).  The author notes that in 1874, a San Vicentian coffee producer, Esteben Castro, 
submitted to the national government a report on the problems restricting the expansion of coffee, including a weak 
regulatory climate, labor scarcity, and the low productivity of ejidal lands.  The report urged the government to 
require half of all ejidal land to be planted in export crops and the official work day should be regulated to ensure a 
cheap and steady labor supply.   Castro’s report influenced a governmental decree that established nurseries for 
coffee trees throughout San Vicente in June of 1874 (fn. 20, pg. 300).    
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claims represented 17% and 27% of total cultivated land as defined by the 1950 agrarian 
census.203 
 Up to three years were provided in principal for indigenous occupants of ejidal land to 
convert to coffee, after which such lands could be expropriated.  These municipal acts were not 
implemented immediately in Tecoluca and Verapáz, eliciting a significant fine by the national 
government for “general lack of civic spirit and love of progress.” 204  However, one year later 
the impact of the legislation was unmistakable, Tecoluca counted 50,000 coffee saplings, 
Verapáz, 60,000, and Guadalupe, 30,000, Tepetitán, 20,000.205  Particularly among the wealthier 
ladino population in the city of San Vicente and municipal functionaries, the 1879 legislation 
hastened illegal encroachment on ejidal lands before the three year limit had expired. Peasants, 
indigenous and mestizo alike, had to pay to obtain a legal title to the land they worked.  By 1881, 
the government simply abolished indigenous claims to communal land, and a year later abolished 
ejidal land.  In 1907, an Agrarian Law was passed to regulate displaced indigenous rural labor, 
replete with a agrarian judges and a rural police force to enforce labor obligations and prosecute 
a variety of designated survival practices considered harmful to elite owned natural resource 
base.206   
Although the best coffee and valley land was claimed quickly, the redistribution of 
communal land by municipal governments lasted over eighty years.   In San Pedro Nonualco, 
which borders Guadalupe to the west, Marroquin shows that as late as 1962, 58% of the 
indigenous villagers had access to 68% of the land within the municipal boundaries (Marroquin 
1962).  If this evidence is any indication of the state of pre-war land distribution in the 
                                                 
203 Browning (1971) illustrates the location of communal lands declared in the 1879 census (see Map 19), suggesting 
the incompleteness of the data.  No data was reported for La Paz in the 1979 census, although a large percentage of 
the department would likely have been claimed.  The 1950 data on departmental land cultivation is used as the 
closest temporal reference on land use, although the population in the late 19th century was only one half of that in 
1950. 
204 “Informe de la Gobernación del Departamento de San Vicente,” D.O. Aug. 2, 1879, cited in Browning (1971: 
310).   The report noted that all municipalities except Santa Clara had established nurseries and one local coffee 
producer had sold 29,000 trees to neighboring growers. 
205 “Informe de la Gobernación del Departamento de San Vicente,” D.O. Feb. 21, 1880, cited in Browning, pg. 312). 
206  Browning (1971: 355-359).  The expansion of shade grown coffee production gave local institutions a new 
found appreciation for conservation, particularly after thousands of former indigenous occupants were now reduced 
to clearing marginal land, hunting or rummaging firewood to survive.  The rural police, which began in Santa Ana, 
would become the National Guard in 1912. 
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Nonualcos region of La Paz, and perhaps extending into the Jiboa Valley, it suggests that shifts 
toward land concentration were not as swift in all places.   
Comparing data for all three phases of land concentration, Durham (1979) shows that the 
above described processes of land concentration and export agriculture were more responsible 
than population growth for the increasing land scarcity and persistent shortfall in the food 
supply.207  The gap between food production and population growth suggests that by the late 
1950s, El Salvador was not producing enough food to feed its population.  Durham notes that El 
Salvador was the only known country that sorghum, which is typically used for animal feed, 
became an important human food.  Consequently, by the mid-1960s, El Salvador’s population 
experienced the most rapid rate of growth (3.5%), export crops accounted for 42% of cultivated 
land and the country was importing almost a third of the required corn supply.  When cotton 
prices slumped and yields declined in between 1965-1967, corn imports soon declined as land 
was shifted back to grains (Durham 1979: 32). 
The expansion of export crops displaced smallholder cultivation of basic grains, but 
population growth required greater production of food grains.  Between 1961 and 1980, the 
production of white corn (maize), rice and beans all increased considerably (between 20-40% per 
year).  Most of these gains were due to productivity increases, induced by the introduction of 
hybrid seeds, fertilizers and pesticides.  Yields increased dramatically by over 12% per year in 
the 1960s for each crop, then fell flat as production increases became a function of area (see 
Table 4.3).  This apparent “de-technification” was due to a combination of factors, including the 
inflationary disincentives against intensification in the late 1970s, political uncertainty curtailing 
all investment and soil exhaustion. Prices for basic grains dropped faster than the commensurate 
reduction in input costs, driving already break-even subsistence production into crisis.  The 
stagnation of basic grains productivity would continue during the war, leaving food production 
barely able to keep up with population growth by the end of the war (Hugo, Worman and Ramos 
1992).  
White estimates that corn and coffee production in 1969 each absorbed about the same 
amount of labor, although the value of the respective production of each crop at local market 
prices reveals that the national corn crop was worth less than a fifth of the coffee harvest (White 
                                                 
207 Durham (1979: 21-62) presents the most well documented alternative to the widely popular Malthusian 
attributions of food insecurity in El Salvador. 
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1971: 142).  Even when other basic grains are included (rice, beans and sorghum), the total value 
of these crops barely exceed the wages of paid in coffee.  Nevertheless, food security is rooted in 
grain production and these crops tend to absorb more work and receive more attention from the 
rural population. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3   Summary of Basic Grain Production area, output, yields and imports (1961-1990) 
 
 
 Years Area 
ha 
Production 
1000 mt 
Yield 
Qq/ha
Imports 
1000 mt 
White Corn 1961-65 172,877 187 24 33 
 1971-75 206,929 339 35.7 40 
 1981-85 250,022 465 41.4 60 
 1986-90 273,717 543 42.9 57 
      
Rice 1961-65 10,782 24 48.6 1.8 
 1971-75 11,571 39.5 74.3 2.5 
 1981-85 13,247 47.5 78.6 9.4 
 1986-90 13,266 51.9 85.7 12.3 
      
Beans 1961-65 25,895 13.8 11.4 15.2 
 1971-75 44,058 32.9 17 3.3 
 1981-85 54,845 41.3 17 0.8 
 1986-90 63,717 43.6 14.3 2.9 
      
Sorghum 1961-65 97,749 94.2 21.1 2.0 
 1971-75 125,720 145.6 25.6 0.3 
 1981-85 115,314 129.3 24.7 0.1 
 1986-90 121,677 117.6 21.4 0.8 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock – Directorate 
General of Agricultural Statistics (MAG-DGEA), cited in Hugo, 
Worman and Ramos (1992); FAO (2005) database for food 
imports 
 
 
h. Regional integration and migration   
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Landlessness turned farmers into squatters on public lands and migration increased sharply to the 
towns, San Salvador and to Honduras - a traditional safety valve for shrinking rural opportunity.  
Soyapango, which was a small suburb on the eastern edge of San Salvador, saw its population 
jump from 20,000 in 1961 to over 260,000 in 1992 as poor rural migrants settled in shantytowns.   
However, even during the apogee of the Central American Common Market, urban job creation 
could not absorb the flow of rural migrants.208 Many rural migrants joined the informal urban 
economy. By 1969, 150,000 Salvadorans had migrated to Honduras, squeezed by the extensive 
growth of export agriculture and subsistence crop land scarcity.  Tensions between the two 
countries resulted in a brief but bloody war that forced the repatriation of some 100,000 
Salvadorans.209  The war with Honduras ended CACM trade for El Salvador, but more 
importantly, closed a safety valve for mounting rural social pressure.  
Despite nominal increases in the minimum wage and concessions to labor unions, wages 
deteriorated significantly in the 1970s.  By the early 1980s, agricultural salaries represented only 
65% of their 1970 purchasing power.  In urban areas, real wages for industry and commerce 
were had fallen to 1970 levels (CEPAL 1982). 
 
i.  Power and Powerlessness in the Pre-war Countryside   
 
Local economic opportunity was controlled by landed elites.  There occurred shifts within this 
group, although a few families have traditionally dominated. Pre-war land distribution in 
Tecoluca was highly concentrated among twenty landowning families.  The pre-war land reform 
ownership structure reads like a who’s who of El Salvador agrarian oligarchy with diversified 
holdings in multiple sectors, industry and finance.210  Much of the land in the paracentral region 
was once the property of the family of José Simeon Cañas, one of the founders of the Salvadoran 
                                                 
208 One estimate of the total number of new manufacturing jobs created annually at 20,000 per year in the 1960s, but 
this employment was disproportionately absorbed into the micro-enterprise sector.  Traditional industrial sector 
employment remained virtually stagnant in the 1960s, but increased by 32,000 to 152,000 in 1975.  Moreover, as 
industrial employment growth rate slowed in the 1970s, real wages also declined. Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Jung 
(1980). 
209 Some settled on land donated by large landowners in the Usulután side of the lower Lempa valley.   
210 Colindres  (1977), ISTA Farm Lists, FMLN PTT Lists; Grajeda, Cummings, Moreno and Almendárez (1997) 
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republic, born in Zacatecoluca.  Before some of largest properties were subdivided in the 1940s 
and 1950, the Angulo family was reportedly the sole owner of a triangular wedge that 
encompassed the Southern half of the volcano and adjacent coastal plains, stretching to the 
sea.211   
Expansion of cotton, cattle and sugar, backed by state subsidized credit, both directly and 
through infrastructure.212  The coastal highway began in 1958, and flood control and drainage 
improvements on most estates were all heavily state subsidized.  Don Eliseo from the village of 
Socorro in Tecoluca worked as a laborer clearing land for cotton in the 1950s and recalled that 
the urgency to plant had devastating consequences for the forest that remained in the coast.  The 
Hacienda Nancuchiname, which consists of an enormous forested property along the Lempa 
River in Jiquilisco was owned at the time by the Regalado Dueñas family – one of the so-called 
“fourteen families” that ruled in El Salvador. Virgen forest was converted overnight to cotton.  
Earth moving equipment felled trees 3-4 feet in diameter and simply buried the trunks in the rush 
to plant.213  The introduction of cotton gradually absorbed all available land, displacing most 
small farmers and contaminating homes near the cotton fields with air delivered fumigants.   
Some landowners owned properties throughout the region.  The Tecoluca Angulo estate 
was eventually broken up to providing land for their children (Julia, Luís Roberto, Coralía, 
Vicki) and selling other parcels.  Their holdings were so extensive that they included cattle, near 
the hacienda household center (Hacienda Tehuacan Opico), indigo, sugar cane, coffee 
(Haciendas Peña, Barrios, La Paz) and cotton (Paz Opico).   
There was also a considerable presence of active and ex-military officers, other well-
placed government officials and their families that owned and operated large farms in the region.  
The family of Salvadoran President Molina reportedly owned some 8,000 ha in 1913. Farms 
owned by the Molina family totaling 1,000 ha in Tecoluca were expropriated in the agrarian 
reform in 1980.  Other notable military owners in the area included Colonel Aníbal Portillo 
(former PCN member of the 1961 junta) and Col. Vides Casanova, who headed the feared 
                                                 
211 The Hacienda Nancuchiname, a massive forest along the Lempa River in Jiquilisco, was also originally a 
property of the Angulo’s before they sold it to the Dueñas family.   
212 During the 1950s, the road system nearly quadrupled – with nearly a quarter of all roads being paved. (SIECA, 
1967 cited in Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).  In the eight most important cotton municipalities, 70,000 ha of cotton 
cropland were brought into production between 1950-1971. 
213 Interview, Don Eliseo, Socorro, Tecoluca, July, 1998. 
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National Guard for most of the 1980s.214  Other notable military figures present in the region 
included Fidel Torres, ex-Minister of Defense and owner of Los Naranjos in Tecoluca; Air Force 
Major Miguel Hernandez Gavidia, brother of PCN ex-President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, and 
owner of Los Almendros in San Ildefonso; and Col. Napoleon Alvarado (department commander 
during the war) was a local landowners in San Antonio Jiboa, Verapáz.   
In addition to military landowners, the export boom attracted a new breed of farm 
operator to the paracentral region.  Urban professionals acquired or rented land from large 
landowners that began to break up their estates in the 1950s, to cultivate export crops or cattle.  
Absentee farmers would work in the capital and supervise rural operations on the weekends.  
Some went bankrupt during bust periods of low prices, but their presence in the region, like the 
possible expansion of military owned farms, intensified the decline of peasant security.  As non-
local farmers with a relatively lower sense of obligation to the colono population or 
communities, these new agrarian bosses accelerated the demise of pre-existing patron-client 
relations. 
Adams argues that the introduction of new non-local agrarian elites and the conversion of 
a segment of the existing landed elite into an absentee and diversified “cosmopolitan upper 
class” effectively squeezed the provincial landed class to whom the lower and middle classes 
turned in times of need.  Among the cosmopolitan elites, particularly when the subject is 
indigenous, Adams argues that the prevailing relations of rural El Salvador in the 1950s could be 
described by attitudes of almost hostile superiority.  In areas where no distinct cosmopolitan 
class emerges, the patron – client relation tends to be described by a discourse of equality.  “The 
acomodados (provincial elites) and humildes (colonos and sharecroppers) are really one, that 
there are few differences between them, that it is just a matter of some being better off, even 
though intermarriage is almost unheard of” (Adams 1957: 465).  According to Adams these two 
relationships (cosmopolitan and provincial elites) signified different phases of agrarian capitalist 
expansion.  The former is the future, the latter is the past.  “Where there is a cosmopolitan upper 
group present, the feeling of equality is usually weak if existent at all.”  These combined 
processes of agrarian modernization eroded a fragile social contract. 
                                                 
214 Hacienda Miramar in Guajoyo, Tecoluca, one of several properties in the area that was redistributed to 
demobilized FAES beneficiaries of the PTT.   
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j. Political capture   
 
Economic power enabled the largest landowners to capture most of the incentives for agrarian 
development and diversification.  State investment in extending the Pacific highway system and 
improving drainage systems in the coastal farms were public subsidies that clearly favored large 
growers.  Access to cheap national credit and technical assistance was almost exclusively limited 
to a handful of the largest producers. Even programs such as the U.S. Alliance for Progress were 
diverted to reinforce rather than reform the unequal agrarian structure.  White points out that the 
majority of the pre-1967 beneficiaries of the USAID Program for Land Improvement farmed 
more than 75 hectares, although this limit was set as maximum for eligibility (White 1973: 171).  
The primary interests controlling the USAID financed beef export packing plants in El Salvador 
were members of the traditional landed oligarchy (Colindres 1977;  Williams 1986:104).   
As noted, tremendous fortunes were made during periods of high world prices and 
profitability.  However, profits were not shared with labor in good times and costs were typically 
shifted downward in bad times.  The largest, more diversified growers were better insured 
against the downturns. Many smaller and medium producers of export crops experienced 
considerable economic instability.  It was only in the late 1970s that political pressure 
accumulated for a sharing of this wealth, primarily through wage increases that often failed to 
keep pace with inflation.  The hard-line interests within the Salvadoran landed elite chafed at 
even these relatively modest concessions. 
At the same time, the prevailing tax structure was generous to the landowning elite by 
exempting many exports and eluding any significant property tax.   Overall tax revenue in El 
Salvador has been low by developing country standards and property tax yields have been almost 
negligible (3.5% of GDP in 1965, and 8.4% in 1970).  Cotton and coffee revenue, some 80-90% 
of all export revenue were exempt.  A fiscal crisis triggered by lowered regional import duties 
associated with the liberalization of trade within the CACM prompted tax reforms which 
effectively gravitated toward the most regressive option, the creation of an official indirect sales 
tax.215  The political veto capacity of the agrarian elite effectively nullified the type of fiscal 
                                                 
215 El Salvador employed a stamp tax on all official transactions which generated most of the country’s tax revenue. 
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redistribution from export earnings that was necessary for sustained industrial development 
down the road.   
Although conditions varied, the colono or sharecropping contract conveyed some mutual 
obligations (landlord charity in exchange for peasant humility).  Sharecropping or colonato 
typically required a donation of a quarter to half the crop (2 to 4 fanegas or 600 to 1,200 pounds 
of corn per manzana), or 15-20 days labor per month for the owner, in return for access to land 
on the hacienda.216   Fair or not, the deal permitted some wiggle room for the peasant by having 
debt indexed to actual, or reported, harvest and committed the owner to offer some insurance 
against the producer bearing the full cost of failed harvests.  For many colonos, this subsistence 
contract was tolerable and preferable to the cash rent contract that has now become the norm.  
Land rents increased steadily and finding land also became more difficult.    
Permanent, relatively skilled laborers, were the minority, but often enjoyed more 
favorable working conditions.  These jobs, including those 35,000 in agroindustry (coffee 
beneficios, cotton gins, sugar mills and fruit processing).  Wages for permanent laborers were 
often as much as double day laborer wages, but experienced real declines in purchasing power in 
after the mid 1970s.  Day laborers and cash rent tenants enjoyed few, if any, of these protections.  
Reported minimum wages for a day laborer in the early 1970s ranged from 1 to 2.5 colones per 
day ($0.40-$1.0).217  Legally mandated wage increases of up to 5-6 ¢ per day by the late 1970s 
were often ignored by landowners and failed to keep pace with inflation for day laborers. The 
costs of living and land rental outpaced wages.  Purchasing power for day laborers was estimated 
in 1982 to be 65% of 1970 levels (CEPAL 1982).   
Harvest wages were comparatively better and represented a windfall income that could be 
double or triple the income earned during the rest of the year.  For picking an arroba (25 lb 
basket) of coffee, the official wage was 0.50 colones ($0.20) in 1966, but 2.85 colones by 1980.  
For a ton of sugar cane, the official wage was 1.25 colones in 1966, and 5.75 colones in 1980. 
For a quintal of cotton, the official wage was 2.5 colones in 1966 and 10.5 colones in 1980.  
Laborers were often cheated, sometimes paid by volume instead of weight as well as at wages 
that violated the official minimum.  On average in the mid-1970s, a worker could pick between 
                                                 
216 One manzana, a standard measure for land, equals 0.7 ha. 
217 Wages for women were officially indexed at less than 100% of male wages. 
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10 and 20 colones of coffee and 5 and 10 colones of cotton or sugar per day over a harvest 
season that lasted 90-120 days, translating into harvest incomes as high as high as 1000 colones, 
or nearly two thirds of a yearly salary (Montes 1986; Arias Peñate 1988).    
Growing insecurity of access to land, widespread robbery at the coffee or cotton scales, 
refusal to pay legal minimum wages, withholding wages for months to drive up debts at local 
stores, and the non-fulfillment of other aspects of the rural labor contract regarding meals and 
medical treatment, cast an unsparing light on the extent of peasant powerlessness.  Added to that 
were the frequent personal abuses and punishing physical treatment. On some estates, even as 
late as the 1970s, peasant dependency on the landlord resembled the classic mechanisms of 
indentured servitude.  Some haciendas paid workers in company script (fichas), only 
reimbursable company stores.   
Legendary accounts of inhuman cruelty were widespread and are vividly recounted 
today.  Manuel Aguilúz, a cattle rancher with several properties and perhaps as much as 500 
hectares in San Ildefonso, was identified by former laborers as one of the worst. 218  Punishment 
for mild offenses or mistakes approached torture.  Testimony was common of landowners that 
were known to order guards to count the fruit on trees to monitor theft by workers, to forbid 
foraging among fallen fruit and to shoot anyone taking firewood or water from their property.  
One account of Ramón Urquilla owner of the Hacienda Llano Verde de San Ildefonso, recalled:  
 
The children were paid 25 cents for a day of work and Urquilla would sometimes pay them, and 
sometimes not.  The adults earned 1 colon.  To earn a bit more, the children would train their dogs to hunt 
iguana and garrobo, which brought them more in a minute than they earned in a week on the hacienda.  In 
order to force them to work for him, the owner entertain himself by killing the dogs with his 22 caliber 
rifle.   On one occasion, a man that lived as a colono on Llano Verde carried to sell in the market some 
jocote fruit from trees that he had planted.  On the road he encountered the landowner and upon seeing 
what the man was carrying, said to him, ‘I didn’t know that you are now the owner?  Please get off my 
land as soon as you can.’  And despite much begging, the man was forced to leave his house. (Regional 
Peasant Organization of Northern San Vicente 1997: 6) 
 
The power of local landlords and local attitudes of powerlessness also translated into a 
type of supernatural mysticism that was invoked to explain the motivation and capacity of 
particularly feared hacendado’s to sustain acts of injustice and accumulate wealth.  Former 
                                                 
218 Aguilúz reportedly owned several properties in northern San Vicente, part of Limon, Izcatal, San Juan Romero, 
San Lazaro. 
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colonos insisted that certain cruel landowners maintained their authority and accumulated their 
tremendous wealth on the basis of a pact that was struck with the devil.  Jose Santos Prudencio, 
owner of several large cattle ranches near San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca and employed as many as 
2,000 people, was one such “pactado”.  Santos was an uncompassionate and strict boss, paying 
low salaries and enforcing deductions for various errors on the job.  At the same time, Santos’ 
cows produced 20 bottles of milk per day, far above the regional average.219   
  Although accounts differed, most agreed that every year, 4 or 5 workers would 
disappear without a trace while working for “Chepe Diablo.”  A worker who may have crossed 
Santos was often given the task of “aguando el buey”, taking the prized bull to a watering stream 
at the most remote corner of the farm.  The bull would always return, but the worker would not.  
Those convinced that Chepe Diablo was pactado explained these recurrent disappearances in 
terms of Santos fulfilling his end of the bargain by supplying souls to the devil.  Others merely 
attributed the disappearances to killings that precluded having to pay back wages.  In either case, 
pre-war peasant culture’s mystification of Chepe Diablo’s power, like that of other untouchable 
landowners, both condemned it within the local religious framework as well as elevated the 
prospect of sanction beyond the reach of human intervention.  These stories reveal a sense of 
worker impotence in the face of expanding agrarian capitalism and a crumbling social contract 
between peasant and landowner. As Gould argues describing similar circumstances in Pacific 
coast haciendas of Chinandega in neighboring Nicaragua, “such myths attempted to make sense 
of the exploitative nature of wage labor and the loss of land, to a Nicaraguan audience that was 
undergoing the transition from a peasant-based to a wage labor based economy” (Gould 1990: 
28-32).  
Good patronos – On the other hand, some former landowners were considered to be 
kinder or more equitable than others.  Landowners that did not abandon their property attributed 
their survival to better relations with their workers and flexibility in negotiating with insurgents.  
Echoing the testimony other landowners, Ebelio Noboa, co-owner of the 210 hectare El Castaño 
sugar cane and cattle hacienda in San Ildefonso stated that he avoided losing his property or life 
to either side because his colonos regarded him as a good patrono.  Noboa added that this 
perceived goodwill among those dependent upon him was mixed as well with reluctance by 
                                                 
219 According to MAG Bajo Lempa Irrigation District Study, average milk production was 4 bottles per cow per day. 
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former colonos to assume the risks of managing the farm themselves.220  Typically, these claims 
by more moderate landowners were sprinkled with retrospective admissions that the FMLN had  
been justified in its initial demands for better wages and better treatment of workers.  Many 
landowners paid war taxes to the FMLN, voluntarily or otherwise.  However, this enlightenment 
ceased when property rights were questioned.  Picho Mendez, of Tecoluca, claimed that the 
FMLN, “overstepped their authority by setting their sights on property, suggesting that they had 
the power to govern the country.”221 The prevailing views among most current and former  
 
Figure 4.2  The remains of El Castaño, the most admired hacienda in San Ildefonso before the 
war 
 
 
                                                 
220 Interview, April 18, 1998, casco San Ildefonso.  Colonos for the Noboas lived in the adjacent caserío of El Zaiti, 
and did not benefit from any land reform program.  Organizers in the region affirm Noboa’s perception of the risk 
aversion within the community, but contest his benevolence.  Other factors may have added to the level of fear in 
making overt demands.  Five community members were killed while serving as FMLN militia in an ambush by 
FAES forces in Usulután while attempting to accompany the return of PRTC commander, Camilo Turcios.    
221 Interview, Picho Mendez, Tecoluca, Abril 4, 1998. 
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patronos in the region contrasts their own superior farm management experience with the 
inadequate capacity or interest of the workforce to take control, and a burning resentment of any 
rationale for land expropriation.   
The hegemony of the landed class was insulated by and in turn helped reproduce attitudes 
of fatalism, resignation, and submissiveness among most peasants.  Many former laborers who 
described pre-war social relations referred to him or herself as “uno de pobre,” an attribution that 
self-evidently explains or justifies the extent of suffering that they had experienced.  Peasants 
viewed landowners as “endiosado” (god-like), and were obligated by custom to bow their heads 
in recognition of this authority when passing a landowner or their family on the road.222  The 
discourse of traditional Catholicism was often invoked to reinforce the inherent status inequality 
between lord and peasant.  A recounted local landowner’s discourse to his peasant’s reveals this 
ideology: 
 
A rich landowner, upon realizing that several of his peónes had joined a peasant movement, called all of 
his workers, more than a hundred including women and children, and organized a procession with the 
saint of his devotion, and he marched out in front, rosary in hand, reciting the Our Father and Hail Mary, 
until arriving at the patio of the hacienda.  There he asked, in the name of Christ, that the workers all 
kneel and he proceeded to preach a long sermon whose central theme was the following:  The land where 
you all live, I inherited from my father, and you….?  What have you inherited?  Nothing!  Therefore I am 
not guilty of being rich, nor you of being poor.  All of this was preconceived by God.  He knows what he 
is doing.  If to me he gave land and denied land to you, all who are against that are against God.  This 
rebelliousness is a mortal sin.  Accept the decision of God in order to not fall to his ire and to lose your 
soul.  You will have to accept the poverty of land in order to gain eternal life in heaven.  The poor live in 
the grace of God.  In this way you are happier than I, in that you are closer to heaven.  So, why do you 
deviate from this path, and refuse to pay the increased tax?   Wasn’t that our agreement? I hardly invented 
these obligations or did they similarly not exist when Adam and Eve were expelled from paradise?  Hear 
what I say and follow my advice: he that has joined this movement should leave it.  The same devil that 
tempted Christ tempts the Christian. The devil wants to lead the poor astray from the path that will carry 
him to salvation.223 
 
 
The increase in landlessness and land poverty combined with falling real wages for most 
were symptomatic of the incredible strain that the export boom transferred to the prevailing 
                                                 
222 Failure to do so, Williams claims, was grounds for eviction. (1986: 71). 
223 Napoleon Alvarado (n.d.: 111-112), Licenciado Thesis, UCA citing Francisco Juliao, in an exchange that 
occurred on Hacienda Tres Ceibas, Sonsonate in the 1970s. 
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clientelist rural social contract.  Cotton, cattle and sugar expansion essentially ended this semi-
feudal convention.  Cotton production and cattle ranching reduced the permanent labor force and 
led to evictions.  While this displacement was necessary to expand and modernize production, 
especially when price shifts squeezed profits, it also removed the glue that preserved a period of 
social stability in the Salvadoran countryside. Peasant humility and respect for the landowners 
was transformed into strident calls for agrarian reform.  Williams observes, “problems that had 
once been worked out in a personalistic give-and-take between landlord and peasant were pushed 
into the domain of the state” (1986: 158).    
 
k. Thwarted Land reform   
 
Questioning the local order typically had dire consequences.  The capture of the state by the most 
extreme and violent landed interests insured a harsh reaction.  The National Guard served as the 
private security for landowner power.  Large grower families controlled many of the meaningful 
economic gremios and had direct influence in the operations of the state.  Late as it was in 
coming, when discussion of an agrarian reform heated up in the early 1970s, landowners, 
particularly the cotton growers, organized the eastern cotton growers front (FARO) to block any 
reform measure.   
The target of the landed elite was a proposal to convert several hundred thousand hectares 
of underutilized land in Pacific Coast into several irrigation districts, expropriate the land, invest 
in productive infrastructure and transfer this property to the local workforce. One such district 
comprising 68,000 hectares of coastal land covering La Paz, San Vicente and Usulután was 
targeted for expropriation by the military government in 1975 to be transferred to landless and 
land poor peasants as a world class irrigation district.224  Had the project not been blocked by the 
                                                 
224 MAG (1978).  A diagnostic study that was conducted in the early 1970s sketches the pre-war socio-economic 
profile of the 48 communities of the coastal plains.  Of the 11,363 surveyed families that populated the zone, over 
83% had migrated recently to the region (42% between 1960 and 1975).  Land distribution was highly unequal.  
Two thirds of these families (some 7,500) were landless, but worked as colonos or wage laborers for larger farms.  
Over 60% of the land was controlled by 125 owners, with farms greater than or equal to 100 hectares.  The average 
salary per family across all rural occupations was over $1,000 but dropped to $650-750 for seasonal landless wage 
workers.  Illiteracy was estimated at 54%, primary enrollment at 43%, only 3 of the 48 villages had clinics, and over 
50% had no potable water source.  Production of cotton and pasture for cattle occupied 69% of the land area.  Credit 
was available to fewer than 600 producers (about 5% of all families).  In terms of industry, the region contained four 
rice mills, one cotton ginning facility, and plans were underway by 1975 for the construction of the Jiboa sugar mill.  
The area was prone to flooding, with events recorded in four of the six years between 1969-1974.   
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region’s landed interests, it may have served as a safety valve by releasing the accumulating 
pressure of peasant grievances.  It’s rejection in 1976 contributed to the polarization of peasants 
and landowners, and popular support for land takeovers, rural strikes, sabotage of harvests, and 
eventually to civil war. 
 
D.  ELITE ACCESS 
 
Agrarian modernization reshuffled the composition within the economic elite of El Salvador.  
However, despite small divisions between forward looking industrialists and a backward looking 
landed oligarchy and the emergence of new economic and political entrepreneurs, these changes 
largely preserved the agenda setting power of latifundistas at the national level.  At the same 
time, two other political shifts occurred that were equally significant for understanding the 
opportunity structure in the years leading up to the war.  Parallel to the hardening of the military-
landowner-government triumvirate, divisions between reactionary and radical factions of the 
Catholic church and the emergence of the Christian Democrats as an opposition political party 
created a cadre of marginal dissident elites that had a pronounced effect on peasant sympathies.  
These reform movements were met by intensified mobilization of peasants loyal or beholden to 
government authority within increasingly violent organizations such as ORDEN and various 
paramilitary groups.   
Alliances between rural civil society organizations and elites in the insurgent, counter-
insurgent and reform mobilization networks began to identify with three competing forms of 
political expression.  The organizational trajectories of rural movements that clustered within 
tendencies on the right, center and left are outlined in Figure 4.3. 
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1970s                            1980s                        1990s  
 
Political Right 
PCN (1961) ?        ? ARENA (1980)?  
CIVIL PATROLS ? ORDEN     ? UGB 
     ? 
ANEP ?           FARO(1975) 
      FUSADES  ?FORTAS?FUND. GUADALUPE?  MICROREG JIBOA 
 
Government 
MIN INTERIOR ?   DIDECO?      CONARA ?  MEA ? ADESCOS 
                                                       ISTA (1975)/FINATA 
 
Political Center 
PDC/AIFLD ? 
      UPD 
                     UCS (1967)        UNOC  
                                        ?ACOPAI (1978)?   ANC  ? CNC      
          ADC   ANTA 
        FEDECOOPADES 
        FESACORA        
        COACES 
        CONFRAS 
 
Political Left       
POPULAR CHURCH? CEB(1971)?  CONFRES/CONIP (1981) 
FUNPROCOOP   
FARN? RN 
               FECCAS (1969)   ?    FAPU (1975)           
                                 ?FTC   CRIPDES 
FPL(1970) ?FAPL?   UTC (1975)             ? BPR ? UNTS   CORDES 
 ERP (1971)?                 LP-28 
                                               PRTC (1975)?MLP    ACC     ORC ASDI 
PCS? UDN  ?     FAL     
***************************************FMLN (1981) 
Figure 4.3  Historical Organigram  – Three Paths to Rural Empowerment in El Salvador 
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1.  Political party competition  
 
The PCN and the PDC both emerged as new political parties in the early 1960s – the first as a 
continuation of military rule and the second as a moderate centrist opposition.  The PCN 
closely represented the interests of the landed elite and the military, taking power after a coup 
in 1961 and ruling through fraud and intimidation until another coup in 1979.  The Christian 
Democrats appealed to a growing urban middle and working class, but whose programs 
reflected a relatively milder patron-client relationship, particularly in rural areas.  The Christian 
Democrats party won the municipal election of San Salvador in 1964 and retained it through 
1972, representing a centrist alternative to growing trade unionism and more militant political 
movements inspired by the Cuban revolution.   The PDC won almost a third of the 
municipalities in the 1968 elections, increasing support in paracentral departments like La Paz 
and the city of San Vicente.225 
In some rural municipalities, PDC mayors provided the first local encouragement for 
bottom-up community organizing efforts focusing on basic services.  Nicolás García 
remembers that a PDC mayor from San Vicente, Felipe Quintanilla, was the first to encourage 
residents of his village in León de Piedra to organize for rural electricity, water and improved 
education services in the 1969-1970 period. 226  The PCN won all but 5 municipalities in the 
1970 elections, eliminating this brief impulse in some municipalities for local organizing. 
At the legislative level, the PDC also made significant inroads in the 1960s, winning as 
many as 19 of the 52 available seats in 1968, compared to 27 for the PCN.227  This trend was 
unceremoniously halted in the early 1970s, as the PCN re-exerted its authority through a 
mixture of rural paternalism and electoral fraud. 
                                                 
225 The PDC won 80 municipalities in 1968, including San Salvador. 
226 León de Piedra bordered Tecoluca, but belonged to the municipality of San Vicente.  Interview, Nicolás 
García, mayor of Tecoluca between 1994 and 2000, in April 1999. 
227 El Salvador has unicameral legislature that adopted a mixed proportional representation system in 1963, where 
initially 9 seats are allocated to the capital department of San Salvador, and the rest are distributed according to 
population in the other 13 departments.  The total number of seats increased to 60 in the 1970s, and currently 
stands at 82.  Legislative and Municipal Elections were held biannually (now every three years) and every five 
years for President.  A simple majority is needed to pass most legislation, but a two-thirds majority for ratifying 
foreign loans. On most, if not all questions of significance to the economic elite, the executive has until recently 
exercised almost dictatorial control of the assembly. 
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The PDC, along with a number of Catholic priests organized the Christian Federation of 
Salvadoran Peasants (FECCAS) in 1965.  For the first several years, FECCAS reflected the 
moderate reformist influences within the PDC, and in turn remained a weak and ineffective 
peasant organization.  In 1974, radical influences pushed FECCAS to adopt more aggressive 
demands for agrarian reform and a more combative political style.   
The ideology of the PDC revolved around a moral centrism that was at the same time, 
strictly anti-communist, reform oriented, and vague on strategy for achieving social justice.228  
Salvadoran Christian Democracy was, according to Stephen Webre, an ideology well-suited to 
the professional middle class that founded it.  “While it adopted a moral orientation toward the 
question of social justice, it did not question the concept of class advantage itself.  It retained 
private property as the foundation of economic life and assumed individual inequalities in its 
distribution, condemning such inequalities only when they were so gross as to threaten social 
order and development.” (100) As such, Webre views PDC thinking as traditional and 
backward looking. 
The moderate, reformist approach was compatible with the U.S. Alliance for Progress, 
which found common cause with the PDC in El Salvador.  With backing from U.S. AID and 
the Catholic church, the PDC promoted the development of cooperatives and peasant 
associations.  By 1967, 154 state-directed cooperatives had been established, although most 
were savings and loans associations, or benefited urban and wealthy rural growers (Pearce 
1986: 93).  Under the impetus of San Salvador Archbishop Luis Chávez y González, 
smallholder agricultural cooperatives were organized.  By 1971, about 7,500 peasant producers 
were organized cooperative members, many coordinated by the Foundation for the Promotion 
of Cooperatives (FUNPROCOOP), founded in 1967.   
The U.S. American Institute for Free Labor Development was contracted in the early 
1960s to train and organize peasant leaders as part of the Alliance for Progress.  By 1968, 
AIFLD began promoting the organization of peasant unions, the first of which were established 
in La Paz and Usulután.  The first cooperative “communal union” was formed in the cantón of 
Platanares, in costal lowland section of Zacatecoluca, La Paz.  With a $3,000 loan from USAID 
and support of CARITAS, 32 laborers on a cotton plantation rented 31 hectares.  Some 4,000 
                                                 
228 For example, the 1967 PDC platform for the Presidential election emphasized legalization of rural unionization, 
assessing income tax to coffee production, meals for rural workers and other alternatives to full agrarian reform.   
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members of these communal unions were joined to form the Salvadoran Campesino Union 
(UCS).  While rural unionization was illegal and landowners were adamantly opposed to any 
form of peasant organizing, the PCN government tolerated the experiment as a relatively 
harmless means for containing rural unrest.   
 By most accounts, the UCS represented an accommodative force in rural politics that 
avoided direct conflict with the authorities by virtue of its dependence on U.S. funding and the 
links between some of its leaders with the paramilitary right (Segundo Montes 1986: 271-284; 
Bonner 1984: 187-203).  Personal and organizational power struggles, mismanagement and 
corruption did not halt the rise of the UCS.  Flush with external finance, UCS membership 
grew rapidly in the 1970s, with bases in half the country.229  By 1980, the UCS had established 
some 53 pre-cooperative organizations, mostly in the western departments of Sonsonate and 
Ahuachapán (Montes 1980: 277-279).  As AIFLD has hoped, the UCS was poised to champion 
the U.S. designed and PDC led agrarian reform.   
One analyst commenting on the UCS impact in Chalatenango, underscored the 
organization’s clientelist foundation.  “The organization’s history – it’s dependence on external 
funding, the weight of its bureaucratized central office and the careful selection and limited 
training of peasant leaders around certain objectives chosen for them by outsiders – had left 
(the UCS) prey to the manipulation of those able to offer sufficient material incentives.” 
(Pearce 1986: 97)  By most accounts, the UCS represented a rural firewall against more radical 
organizing and a stabilizing force for the status quo (Montgomery 1995: 106; Wheaton and 
Forché 1980), 
The PDC experience was short-lived. The PCN used fraud and violent intimidation by 
the National Guard to block PDC electoral gains.   PDC control at the municipal was 
dramatically reduced after massive fraud in the 1970 elections.  Napoleon Duarte, the PDC 
presidential candidate won the 1972 elections over PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Molina.  
Ballot box rigging permitted the installation of Molina.  A failed uprising by junior military 
officers in favor of Duarte was crushed.  Duarte was arrested, beaten and forced into exile 
along with many other urban opposition politicians.  For revolutionary organizations such as 
                                                 
229 By one estimate, UCS membership reached 210,000 by 1980.  
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the ERP and FPL, the 1972 elections marked the closure of the electoral road to reform, 
initiating the first insurgent military operations in the country.   
The PDC continued to compete in elections until 1977, despite blatant fraud.  Among 
the intellectuals of this group, pressure was maintained for agrarian reform, broad reforms in 
the national economy, electoral system and public services – all of which proved relatively 
fruitless.  For the PDC reformers who remained in El Salvador, just as with those of the minor 
third parties, the disappearing space for electoral opposition during the 1970s pushed most 
toward more uncompromising resistance led by popular movement organizations.    
PCN legitimacy was facilitated on the one hand through coercion and the prohibition of 
organized opposition, and on the other by the nationalist sentiments stirred up by the 1969 war 
with Honduras.  The opening for acceptable political opposition and moderation toward labor 
during the 1960s provided the illusion of democratic progress.  PCN governance continued a 
Salvadoran tradition of highly centralized administration, politically driven by the joint 
decision making bond between the military and the landed elite.  PCN mayors discharged their 
functions in rural towns at the bottom of this hierarchy by providing surveillance on the rural 
work force to landowners, supervising small infrastructure projects and other public services.  
The municipal government is also responsible for collecting taxes, all of which is transferred to 
the national government, after which a small portion is returned.230  Politically appointed 
departmental governors exercised close supervision over mayors.  In sum, the PCN preserved a 
top-down system of local rule that first and foremost acted to enforce rural order.  
Under President Rivera and the direct authority of General José Alberto Chele 
Medrano, but with training from U.S. military trainers, the PCN formed ORDEN in the early 
1960s as a paramilitary counter-revolutionary organization (Nairn 1984).  ORDEN reportedly 
maintained overlapping membership with the UCS (Cabarrus 1983: 43).  ORDEN functioned 
as a clientelist organization – offering the rural poor some chance of social mobility and 
economic security.  Benefits included the right to carry a gun and an identification card – both 
of which constituted life insurance as death squad violence escalated.  ORDEN members also 
received preferred consideration as tenants when land to rent became scarce and for job 
                                                 
230 Some of the local taxes include rental of market posts, commercial enterprises, public functions, 
slaughterhouse, cemetery, sanitation, water, sewerage, lighting and, at least in theory, land.  Richard N. Adams 
(1957: 471-472) points out that municipal governments have declined in relative significance from the period in 
the late 19th century when they were the owners of large extensions of ejidal land.   
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opportunities as permanent laborers on farms or in public works projects.  Having greater 
probability of ameliorating the effects of rural unemployment in the 1970s, ORDEN members 
represented many of those who became owners of Phase III land reform.  In return, ORDEN 
members provided intelligence about organizing in rural communities and some collaborated in 
violence or intimidation against targeted individuals. 
By the early 1970s, ORDEN was estimated to have 10,000 armed and organized 
militants, but also counted on a reserve force of as many as 100,000 occasional collaborators 
that also served in the patrullas cantonales.231   The organization of ORDEN was a purely 
localist variety, with little exchange or linkage between village level chapters or among the 
broad membership.  The idea was not to breed any sense of group empowerment, but rather, 
through a combination of selective benefits, extortion, and complicit participation in criminal 
violence, to ensure the political inoculation of a large segment of the rural population against 
the ideas of liberation theology or revolutionary challenge to the ruling elite. 
Although more will be said in the sections that follow, the emergence of several 
competing revolutionary organizations also exposed rural populations to the urban based 
political leadership of these groups.  In many cases, students from San Salvador were the first 
contacts with nascent rural insurgent groups.  Although their numbers were few, the impact of 
revolutionary recruitment in regions such as the paracentral zone was significant.  The FPL 
(1970) and ERP (1972) emerged as the first military organizations on the left, initiated by 
dissidents within the electorally focused Communist and Christian Democrat parties, 
respectively.  All of the five revolutionary organizations emerged in part as a measure to 
protect nascent popular organizing.  The mere existence of organized armed resistance, 
announced initially through graffiti, printed propaganda, and interventions with select 
caporales of the area fincas and haciendas, caught the attention of few outside the local zones 
of recruitment.232  A wave of high profile kidnappings and sensational attacks on political 
                                                 
231 The civil patrols consisted of ex-soldiers as reservists that lead weekly duties to assist the National Guard in 
maintaining order.   
232 El Rebelde, was the name of the local FPL publication and other broad political and economic analyses were 
being published under revolutionary organizational attribution.  “El Gran Impulso Neocolonial” dated June, 1973 
offers detailed critique of the Molina Five Year Plan, whose authorship the FPL places with the IDB, and outlines 
a recruitment strategy for a prolonged popular war.   
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targets, including the feared National Guard, stiffened the resistance of popular organizations 
and provoked the brutal retaliation of the security forces against the civilian population. 
Insurgent organizing increased coordination between regions of the country as well as 
between countries.  Some insurgent leaders returned to El Salvador with experience in the 
Sandinista insurgency.  The FMLN also benefited from the participation, solidarity and 
coordination with combatants and supporters from various countries.  This internationalization 
of the emerging conflict had both positive and negative implications for organizing, but 
undoubtedly transformed the parochial lifestyle of the rural community.  While the FPL 
ultimately became the dominant revolutionary organization in the region, other FMLN factions 
(National Resistance (RN), the Revolutionary Central American Workers Party (PRTC), an the 
Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) all had small bases as well.  The politics of the 
revolutionary left was virulently competitive, which threw up many obstacles to coordination 
and more effective resistance, before, during and after the war.   Problems associated with 
competition for hegemony within the revolutionary movement eventually forced the leadership 
of the respective organizations to hammer out a cooperation agreement that, in effect, had 
already been put into practice by commanders in the respective conflictive zones.  This process 
of shaping a complex, national revolutionary political military organization, albeit with myriad 
deficiencies, created an organizational entity and sense of belonging that had never existed in 
El Salvador.  This foundation of loyalty and principle, unique to the country’s history, set the 
stage for the formation of the FMLN as the most significant opposition political party in the 
post-war period. 
 
2.  Religious Polarization 
 
A deep divide in the Catholic Church emerged in the 1960s that had a profound impact on 
political mobilization and socio-economic change in San Vicente and the paracentral region.  
This section examines both in turn. 
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a.  The Popular Church   
 
In the early 1960s, a renovation movement was motivated by the Second Vatican Council 
(1963-1965), which initiated reforms in the practice of Catholicism, among those the 
establishment of the equality of laity, priests, and bishops.  Initially this movement helped 
initiate pastoral cursillos de Christiandad (Short Courses in Christianity) in the early 1960s, but 
like early experiments with agricultural cooperatives these reflection groups largely served a 
middle and upper class and urban audience, or were limited to the San Salvador archdiocese 
(Alas, 2000).   
This reform process shifted gears with the Medellín Bishops Conference in 1968, which 
translated Vatican II for Latin America, and called on Latin American Catholic clergy and laity 
to adopt in the practice of their faith, “a preferential option for the poor.”  At its core, the “new 
evangelization” involved a decentralization of the church’s authority and decision making that 
was considered essential for integrating the disenfranchised majority.  The “popular church” 
gave new respect and attention to rural pastoral agents.  The notion of sin ceased being 
exclusively a failure of individual morality, and began to focus on the failing of unjust societal 
structures. In turn, the Apostolate of Catholic Social Action encouraged solutions to societal 
problems that obligated the popular church to emphasize community building that was oriented 
by the poor themselves.   
Cleary argues that this shift to bottom-up evangelization strategies cannot be overstated 
given the prior verticalist structures of the traditionalist church where most religious activity 
was channeled through brotherhoods or sodalities and cult worship.  The author notes: 
 
The main issue [before the Church] is political—not the worrisome problem of politicization, but 
internal politics: the emergence of the laity, empowering lay persons for positions of leadership. The 
greatest achievement of the Latin American church has been largely ignored: the church is empowering 
lay persons to a degree and extent unknown in most other parts of the world.  The perform functions 
previously reserved to priests and they are creating new ministries within the church (Cleary 1985:125-
126).  
 
The focus of the emerging Liberation Theology movement was accelerated and 
intensified with the influx of new priests during this period, many with seminary training and 
exposure to new ideas in other Latin American countries (San Miguelito, Panama; Ecuador, 
  176
Cuernavaca, Mexico) and Europe.233  The establishment of the Central American University by 
the Jesuits in 1965 introduced a significant new impetus for major reforms and quickly 
associated the Jesuits with many of the most contentious local struggles.234 
The progressive wing of the church responded by training peasant catechists and 
delegates of the word as community leaders and facilitating the analysis of prevailing 
conditions of social injustice within a network of bible study circles.235  Activist priests 
organized Christian Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base – CEBs) to 
encourage the laity to act with more independence of the church hierarchy.   
In El Salvador, a country almost entirely Catholic at the time, this space for Liberation 
Theology to prosper existed because there were simply too few priests.  To offset the demand, 
foreign born priests were invited to El Salvador and a greater dependence on catechists was 
encouraged.  One mission team from Cleveland, Ohio was invited by Bishop Lawrence 
Graziano to join the diocese of San Miguel.236 A team arrived in La Union in March, 1965 and 
after about a year invited some 25 communities in their parish to select 3-5 individuals who 
                                                 
233 Andrew Stein, in a meticulous study of the attitudes of church leaders in Nicaragua, illustrates the significance 
of this influx on the receptivity and enthusiasm to implement the perceived mandate of Vatican II and Medellín.  
This commitment was most visible in the two generations of priests ordained between 1966-1979 and 1980-1989.  
Consequently, it was significantly lower in prior and subsequent generations.  See Stein (1995) Chapter 3: Pastoral 
Work, Views of Church Authority, and the Role of The Laity: Is the “Preferential Option for the Poor” actually 
being implemented?” 
234 See Charles J. Bierne, S.J. “Murder in the University: Jesuit Education and Social Change in El Salvador. 
Unpublished Manuscript, Feb. 15, 1994, (chapter 5).  Within the Jesuit community, Bierne distinguishes between 
the “gradualists” and the “liberationists.” During its first decade, the UCA was oriented for the most part by the 
gradualist tendency.  However, the combination of greater economic stability, ironically provided by two loans 
negotiated under President Molina’s approval with the IDB ($2 million and $10 million), with growing repression 
of liberationists, steadily tilted the UCA’s work toward the views of Ignacio Ellacuría and the goals and methods 
of the latter ideology. 
235 According to Berryman (1984:108) some 10 urban and 27 rural base communities were established, with over 
300 catechists, 15,000 lay peasants trained at the peasant vocational schools. 
236 Based on an interview with Dennis St. Marie, and “Mission to Latin America: A Progress Report,” prepared by 
the Staff of the Cleveland Latin American Mission,  July 28, 1969; and John D. King and Timothy W. Gareau, 
“An Historical Overview of the Mission of the Diocese of Cleveland in El Salvador,” St. Mary Seminary, 
Cleveland, Ohio, March 25, 1987.  Between 1965 and 1999, the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland and Youngstown 
sent 65 missionaries to staff operations in Chirilagua, San Miguel and La Libertad.  Included were Sisters Maura 
Clark and Ita Ford, and layworkers, Dorothy Kazel, Jean Donovan, who were killed by the Salvadoran National 
Guard in La Paz, on Dec. 3, 1981.  Other priests from the Cleveland team were expelled in the 1970s. 
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would volunteer to undergo rigorous liturgical training over the next two years.237  The 
principal motivation early on was to ease the burden of providing the sacraments and religious 
education for some 650,000 faithful in a parish with fewer that than 20 priests.   
The Cleveland mission was instrumental in establishing the first rural training center for 
catechists in the diocese, the Queen of Peace – El Castaño Center, in Chirilagua, San Miguel, 
in 1968.  The initial success of El Castaño led to the formation of six other centers (Los 
Naranjos, Jiquilisco; Centro San Lucas, San Miguel; Escuela Agricola Monseñor Luís Chávez 
y González, Suchitoto; CEPROR, Santa Tecla, Domos Maria, Mejicanos, and La Divina 
Providencia, Santa Ana).  Peasant catechist training centers were established to train lay 
leaders to deepen the role of the church in community struggles and redistribute the ecclesiastic 
load on the Salvadoran priests in the region.  Participants were carefully selected by the 
communities and clergy based on their potential to return to their communities and extend the 
reach of the church.  In addition to liturgical training, early training at the centers emphasized 
leadership skills, vocational education, health and family planning.  
Fr. Denis St. Marie, member of the first Cleveland mission team and co-founder of El 
Castaño, considers these peasant training centers the finest pastoral work that he or perhaps any 
part of the Catholic church had achieved in Latin America during the period.  Catechists were 
provided some incentives to attend relatively long and intensive training sessions.238  At least in 
the early years, the centers also benefited from U.S. food aid for work programs, administered 
by Caritas and Catholic Relief Services, instruction by government agronomists, teachers and 
public health specialists, as well as the Red Cross.239 These alliances were conditional on the 
early paternalist style of pastoral outreach reflected in the primary focus on evangelization.  
                                                 
237 In 1967, 100 Salvadoran men began religious training and 65 finished this initial course in 1968.  The initial 
team included Clevelanders Fr. Thomas Sebian, Fr. William Gibbons, Sister Martha Fox, Sister Alice Brickman, 
Fr. Michael Scheid, Sister Ann Schaefer, Sister Marie Baltrinic, Fr. Norbert Hannibal, Sister Francisca Theil, 
Sister Janet Kearns, Fr. Patrick McGuckin, and Rosemary Smith. 
238 Initial participants at El Castaño were provided a day’s wage (about $1) for lost income.  Training 
commitments in the first year were to attend the school one week of every four over the course of a year.  
Interview, Dennis St. Marie, 1999; Binford has noted that later on, the centers paid for the transportation costs as 
well as food and housing, but did not provide monetary subsidies.   
239 Operational costs for El Castaño were estimated in 1969 at $1000 per month, covered by private donations.  
Mission, pg. 10. 
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Initial efforts to work within the prevailing order were so successful, that conservative bishops 
encouraged parish priests to ensure catechist participation.240   
Peasant leaders from the paracentral region were selected to attend the Los Naranjos, El 
Castaño, and San Lucas based on their piety and leadership potential.  Binford suggests that 
many of the catechists that originated from Northern Morazán did not come from the poorest 
families.  In San Vicente, the ranks of catechists were recruited from both landless and landed 
peasant households.   
The curriculum at the centers eventually became more political.  David Rodríguez led 
discussions on the “national reality” of the country, based on a popular education text entitled, 
“Conozcando Nuestro Realidad” (Understanding Our Reality).  By introducing a social and 
historical critique of the Salvadoran reality, with particular emphasis on the rural economy, 
participants were exposed not only to the magnitude of inequality and injustice that prevailed 
around their own communities, but to remedies that have been employed in similar contexts by 
others.   
This combination of skill enhancement and political instruction contributed to what 
many participants described as an experience of conversion or awakening, as well as becoming 
the source of greatest agitation among the church hierarchy.  Fr. St. Marie insisted that pastoral 
training at the centers did not encourage political reform, nor openly endorse the movements 
seeking more far reaching change in the country.  Still, the centers became associated, correctly 
or not, with training insurgents.  Disagreeing with the politicization of the Center’s training, 
then bishop of the diocese of Santiago de Maria, Oscar Romero, closed Los Naranjos in 1975 
for a year.  El Castaño was eventually targeted by the Romero government (no family relation 
with the Archbishop) as a subversive organization, raided by the military and finally closed in 
1980. 
A review by the Cleveland Diocese of their mission experience felt compelled to clarify 
the matter.   
 
                                                 
240 Early references to promotion of local artisans, food for work infrastructure projects, literacy and hygiene 
efforts, well-minded as they might have been, replicate some of the miscalculated development thinking that 
prevails today which dooms the chances of survival for such depoliticized development efforts.   
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With persistent accusations that the Church of El Salvador has been involved in Communist activity, a 
sensitive yet legitimate question may be addressed as to the actual involvement of the mission in 
communist activity.  According to team members, such involvement was “minimal” and involved 
infiltration of communist activists into local base communities and groups, and not any activity on the 
part of the missionaries themselves.  The team has said that they were, at times, “duped” by not 
detecting and expelling soon enough those who were infiltrating and exploiting local religious 
communities for political purposes.  (King and Gareau 1987: 15).   
 
Increasingly put on the defensive in the face of allegations by reactionary clergy and the 
government, the experience of the Cleveland mission, as accounted for by their own testimony, 
is reticent regarding the links between the training centers and political partisanship.241 Other 
CEB parishes were less circumspect. For many, the religious conversion that occurred in the 
CEB movements led to the politicization of this process in a way that was inevitable, organic 
and stimulated by a widely held demand for the church to accompany poor communities in 
their own liberation (Cabarrus 1983; CONFRES 1978; Richard and Melendez 1982; Lernoux 
1982; Wright 1990; Peterson 1997).  Many priests, nuns and bishops themselves were not 
immune to the conversion process nor to the consequences of this decision, no more clearly 
illustrated than the transformation of archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero.242 
In San Vicente, the strength of the CEB movement may be attributed to the critical mass 
of Liberation Theology priests in the region.  Thirteen of the reputed “group of 30” radical 
priests in the Salvadoran Catholic clergy were based in San Vicente.243 Conservative elements 
of the San Vicente and adjacent dioceses (San Miguel, La Paz) sided with the landowning class 
and the military in their hostility toward an escalating insurgency.  Of the country’s seven 
                                                 
241 King and Gareau go as far as to suggest that the church was equally victimized by the both the FMLN and the 
military, grossly exaggerating what is now known to be a pattern of terror for which the latter is almost entirely 
responsible. 
242 The story of Romero’s conversion from politically conservative at the time of his installation in November 
1977 to the profound commitment he held for the individuals and organizations that led the social movement 
challenge to the oligarchy and military governments is told poignantly in numerous books, including Lopez Vigil 
(1995). 
243 While the number of “liberationist” clergy and religious women exceeded this estimate, the “group of 30” 
designation was coined by Bishop Freddy Delgado (1983), representative voice of the reactionary church and ally 
of the death squad organizations led by Roberto D’Aubuisson in the 1970s that directly targeted these priests.  See 
“La Iglesia Popular Nacio en El Salvador: Memorias de 1972 – 1982.” Mimeo.   The names of San Vicente 
diocesan priests at the time David Rodríguez, Benigno Rodríguez, Rafael Barahona, Alirio Napoleón Macías, 
Cosme Spezzoto, Trinidad de Jesus Nieto, Porfirio Martínez, Vicente Sibrian, Rafael Palacios, Miguel Alipio 
Flores, Hernan Rodríguez and Francisco Mejía.   
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bishops, five opposed the liberationist pastoral approach and of these San Vicente’s bishop, 
Pedro Arnoldo Aparicio y Quintanilla, became the most conservative and reactionary.  Aparicio 
was the founder and principal organizer of the Caballeros de Cristo Rey (Knights of Christ the 
King), which combined militant allegiance to the traditional church with anti-communism.  
While Bishop Aparicio encouraged the education and early enthusiasm of the young priests to 
implement Vatican II, this space closed quickly by the mid-1970s.  Eventually, pushed in the 
opposite direction by the same social forces that led to the radicalization of then Archbishop 
Oscar Romero, Aparicio would come to personify the extreme anti-communist voice within the 
church.  The San Vicente diocese was perhaps the most divided between hard-line anti-
communist supporters of the oligarchy and liberation theologians. 
David Rodríguez epitomized the class of church leaders that Bishop Aparicio would 
come to condemn and the government would target for expulsion, torture or  assassination.  
Born to a middle class farm family in Apastepeque, San Vicente, Rodríguez was raised in a 
typically rural religious household.  His father was a devout leader of the Caballeros de Cristo 
Rey, and he along with a brother and sister received formal pastoral training.  After extended 
studies in canon law in Spain and Mexico, Rodríguez was ordained and began his service as 
young priest in 1967.  Benigno Rodríguez, David’s brother, would also be ordained and serve 
as a priest in several towns in San Vicente and Cabañas.  David Rodríguez was assigned to the 
parish of Tecoluca in May 1969, continuing the progressive pastoral work of Rafael 
Palacios.244  Soon after his arrival, Dr. Rafael Antonio Carballo, owner of several large estates, 
invited Rodríguez to give a mass for the January 15th Esquipulas celebration.245 Carballo was 
one of Tecoluca’s wealthiest patronos.  One source estimated that prior to the war, the family 
headed by Carballo, then the Minister of Justice for the Molina government, owned well over 
5,000 hectares in central sector of Tecoluca.246 
Impressed by the young priest, Carballo invited Rodríguez to give a monthly mass on 
the hacienda, and would pay $200 for each one.  All religious services were regulated by the 
                                                 
244 Palacios was killed on June 20, 1979 in Santa Tecla – one of 3 diocesan priests that were assassinated.  He was 
related to Rebeca Palacios (Lorena Peña), one of the first female FPL and top FMLN commanders. 
245 In addition to the Hacienda Santa Teresa, Carballo owned several other large haciendas, including El Casino 
and La Burrera that extended from the central region to the coast. 
246 Interview, Pablo Parada Andino, Tecoluca,  
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bishop, which served as a sort of tax base for the church.  In 1970, a visit to the community cost 
$25, a baptism $2, a marriage $10, a prayer for a deceased relative $5, although if the prayer 
was sung it cost $25.   Masses for village patron feasts were also expensive, the priest often 
charged between $100 and $250, which was either collected by the community or paid by the 
landowner.  The church also rented lands to various villages where local male religious leaders, 
Knights of Christ the King, would organize men to grow corn and beans for the church.  This 
priest would visit the communities, not so much to talk with the people, but to monitor 
production, encouraging poor farmers to give the best part of their harvest as a donation to the 
church, and shaming those who hadn’t fulfilled his expectations. 247 
After three visits, Rodríguez was approached by peasants from Cantón El Regadío, at 
the margins of the land now fenced off for cattle and cotton by Carballo.  They asked the priest 
to intervene on their behalf with the owner.  Carballo had cut off the community’s access to 
water and the road.  The recently installed fencing had forced them to detour for several miles 
when walking to work and had monopolized the use of the stream which had dried up in their 
community.  When Rodríguez conveyed the appeal to Carballo, the owner responded in a 
condescending but threatening tone, ‘you’re a young priest, don’t be stupid getting mixed up in 
these things’.  David refused to continue giving masses on the hacienda, but continued saying 
mass for the workers without charge.  This first confrontation rippled throughout the parish and 
emboldened peasant and landowner alike by the perception that the moral standing of the 
church on political questions relevant to the parish was shifting.  Similar confrontations with 
several other notorious landlords in the parish served as early signals to him of expectations of 
subservience that the landed elite held for the church in maintaining rural order. 
Like other priests in the region, Rodríguez began introducing changes to the 
relationship between the church and peasant.  This began with ending the practice of fixed 
charges for services, offering many services for free, or allowing people to pay what they 
could.  The typical hierarchical relationship between priest and peasant was also transformed.  
Greater authority was delegated to local catechists in the first Plan Parroquial in 1971, which 
decentralized many of the tasks and decisions surrounding evangelization to the laity.   
As an extension of the Plan Parroquial, hundreds of local peasant men and women 
were selected by their communities to attend cursillos at the rural training centers.  Los 
                                                 
247 Interview, David Rodríguez, San Salvador, 1998 
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Naranjos, one of the peasant training schools located in neighboring Jiquilisco, was widely 
recognized as having had a deep impact on the collective consciousness of the rural Christian 
community, a fact made more ironic by the initially rather conservative pedagogical intentions 
of these centers.248 Binford provides a vivid description of the methodology used at the centers 
to unsettle and shape latent sensibilities and develop leadership qualities in the participants 
(Binford 2004).  Linking biblical themes to everyday life was central to this leadership training, 
resulting in priests, catechists and many of the faithful taking more active roles in solving 
community problems.  Catechists would return to the base communities and lead the bible 
circles in discussing national issues and analyzing local problems, looking for solutions in 
scripture, and reflecting on how one should act as a Christian when faced with these problems.  
A space was opened for people to learn to speak publicly and be heard for the first time.  
Poverty, landlessness and injustice became problems to be solved, rather than the intractable 
will of God.   
The CEB experience also instilled the practice of coordination.  Tecoluca’s parish 
council was divided up into 10 sub-regions, and each catechist on the council had intimate ties 
to the bible study circles within each community in their respective sub-region.  Bible study 
circles met every Sunday.  Some 30-40 catechists in the parish met the first Saturday of every 
month.  Tecoluca trained as many as 400 delegates of the word, who in turn conducted much of 
the pastoral organizing work.  Every 15 days, community leaders from various biblical circles 
met.  Larger meetings of the parish were convened through announcements conveyed by word 
of mouth. In the early 1970s, Tecoluca was viewed as one the most organized parishes in the 
country.249  Lacking telephones, a postal system, and in many places, roads, the word of mouth 
messenger communication network of parish leaders throughout the region facilitated meetings 
with uncanny effectiveness.250 
 Moreover, local catechists often participated in exchanges with their peers and priests in 
other regions of the country or began participating in larger protests in San Vicente or San 
                                                 
248 Interview, Dennis St. Marie, Cleveland, July 21, 1999. 
249 Other documented parish organizing efforts included Aguilares (Cabarrus), Suchitoto and Guazapa (Alas).  
250 Interview, Miriam Abrego, San Carlos Lempa, 1998 
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Salvador.  These regional encounters not only instilled a deeper sense of solidarity between 
local experiences being waged by leaders of the popular church, but they permitted a level of 
coordination and awareness that worked against parochial tendencies within rural communities 
and the verticalist tendencies within the traditional church that would endure during the war.  
These links with other parishes outside the region were crucial for sharing information and 
monitoring government and landowner responses to local organizing efforts, particularly in 
relation to addressing security threats and developing effective community self-defense 
measures.  Describing these linkages between El Castaño and Northern Morazán, Binford 
describes how peasant catechists became the “organic intellectuals” of the revolutionary 
movement.  Invited into a space that awakened a sense of their own capacity to change the 
present conditions of poverty and landlessness, these catechists carried this message to every 
corner of their rural communities.    
The training provided at the centros de formación campesino challenged the ideology 
and icons of traditional Catholicism espoused by bishop Aparicio, who regularly ended his 
masses with appeals for the salvation of lost Communist souls in China and the Soviet Union.  
For Aparicio and like-minded priests such as Father Platero in Guadalupe, collective solutions 
were acceptable as long as they were limited to self-help projects and did not transgress the 
lines of rural authority.  Aparicio encouraged vigilance against communist infiltration by 
arming the ranks of Caballeros de Cristo Rey with clubs.   
Of course, many of the first initiatives did begin with self-help projects.  Youth groups 
were organized to make collections toward construction and equipping of small chapels in the 
villages.  However, the completion of the chapel was only the first stage of achievement, after 
which the bond of mutual support was then steered toward applying experience to resolving 
more complex local and national problems and tracing the region’s history. Many recalled the 
significance of music and theater in this period, beginning with church’s assistance. One 
combatant recalled these beginnings:  
 
I was born in San Francisco Angulo and I had barely gotten to sixth grade with the help of my professor.  
We were eleven in my family, nine brothers and two sisters.  My father lived by working as a day 
laborer and from the time I was seven until I was fourteen, I worked with him during the harvest picking 
cotton.  My father loved music and we formed our own group.  We were invited to play at the patron 
feasts to raise money.  In 1968, David Rodríguez was young and dynamic priest and he taught me to 
play the guitar.  He helped raise funds with raffles to buy instruments and organize our musical group.   
(Carlos Espinoza, FMLN ex-combatant, Las Pampas, Tecoluca, Dec. 18, 1998) 
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Local musical talents were slowly oriented from ecclesiastic songs to more cantos de 
liberación, eventually playing a fundamental role in raising consciousness among the semi-
literate and even more central functions in the celebrations of achievements to follow.  This 
popular culture of resistance, like much of the CEB legacy and unlike most development 
assistance in El Salvador up to that date, was built on a quite conservative, and at times 
paternalistic foundation of self-help initiatives that were then permitted to explore beyond these 
limits.251 
Religion and politics were inextricably linked in the parish of Tecoluca.  For example, 
one aspect of pastoral training was voter education.  Parishioners were prepared to participate 
in the 1972 elections, but the fraud and violence that enabled Col. Arnoldo Arturo Molina to 
become president, also imposed a PCN mayor, Atilio Cañas, despite the widespread belief that 
the Christian Democratic candidate had clearly won.   
In 1973, President Molina announced that he would visit Tecoluca as part of his 
Gobierno Móvil program to inaugurate a public works project and requested that church leaders 
be present to deliver welcoming remarks at the ceremony.  David Rodríguez discussed the 
invitation with the catechists and within many local communities.  Angry with the 1972 
electoral fraud, the majority decided that Rodríguez would not support the visit by withholding 
his presence from the event.  Bishop Aparicio reacted by transferring Rodríguez to the parish of 
Olocuiltla, about 30 km to the west of Tecoluca.  After further reflection, the parish of 
Tecoluca decided to protest the Bishop’s decision and as many as 10,000 parishioners marched 
to the Cathedral in San Vicente - the first overt demonstration of its kind in the region.  A 
second larger march occupied the San Vicente cathedral and confronted the bishop.252 
Rodríguez eventually reached an informal agreement with his replacement, Rafael Barahona, to 
remain in the parish, divide it half, and share the pastoral duties.  These protests and their 
perceived success built local self-confidence in parish’s capacity for collective action, but had 
national repercussions that called the attention of authorities to Tecoluca. 
                                                 
251 Interview Alicia Clímaco, San Carlos Lempa, Dec. 7, 1998.  See also Foran (1993, 1997) for the concept of 
political culture of resistance and Almeida et. al (1999) for specific analysis of FMLN popular music in framing 
the conflict.   
252 Interviews, David Rodriguez, June, 1998, Nicolás García, April 16, 1999 and Pablo Anaya, May 1998. 
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As objective conditions for peasants deteriorated, the influence of young, activist 
Catholic priests in parishes like Tecoluca, awakened an indignation and moral self-confidence 
to challenge existing problems.  A fundamental element to the success of the CEB movement 
was the space and leadership to permit collective decision making.  The church promoted the 
early formation of agricultural and savings and loan cooperatives.  Under the guidance of 
Rodríguez and Barahona, TECOOP, the savings and loan cooperative, was founded by 20 
Caballeros de Cristo Rey in 1970.  Membership reportedly reached 900 before the repression 
forced it to close.  Other similar initiatives were blocked by the changing reaction to local 
religious movements. 
 
b. The Reactionary Church   
 
Many communities were unreceptive to the CEB influence, but were equally devout and 
activist Christians.  Liberation theology was countered by reactionary clergy and suspicious 
catechists. Communities were divided and many CEBs were neighbors with both traditional 
religious communities and reactionary paramilitary strongholds.  It is worth remembering that 
progressive Catholicism represented a minority position within the church.  Perhaps 30-45 
prelates out of a total clergy that numbered 437 by 1978 openly sympathized with the 
methodology of Liberation Theology.253   The landed elite maintained close ties to powerful 
bishops and the papal nuncio who spearheaded the opposition to the liberationist priests and 
practices.  
Juan Platero, a Jesuit, who served over 50 years as priest, was beloved in his parish of 
Guadalupe.  His influence in the Jiboa Valley in favor of the prevailing rural order may have 
been equal to that of any of the progressive clergy in the region. Some attribute Platero’s 
conservative views to the fact that his brother was a paymaster on the nearby fincas of Alfredo 
Cristiani.   He prophesized the violence that would engulf the region and counseled 
parishioners to trust in God’s plan for them, not to question it, and therefore, not to get mixed 
up in politics.  Civil patrollers in the cabecera of Guadalupe and in San Emigdio, one of the 
                                                 
253 Delgado estimates that 20% of the clergy was committed to the Popular church.  Another indicator of overall 
support might be the letter to the Pope in 1978 signed by some 300 priests, nuns and laity requesting clarification 
by Rome on their support for Liberation Theology and its practice in El Salvador. 
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town’s principal cantónes, recalled how Platero’s homilies would provide spiritual 
reinforcement for wavering obligations to serve in defense of the town.254   
References to the peasant training centers and CEBs were notably absent from 
interviews with peasants in the Jiboa Valley.  One catechist that was trained by Platero from 
Agua Agria, a cantón of Guadalupe, knew little of the peasant training schools.   
 
We grew sugar cane in the valley and I remember the organizing pitch (terapias) of ‘agitators’ in the 
San Pedro Agua Calientes.  They asked me about the price that I received for my harvest and explained 
how the poor were being cheated.  But I worked as a driver for Cristiani and as a civil defense volunteer.  
I saw the violence, the bodies.  As attacks by the FMLN intensified, I decided to join the Armed Forces 
so that if I was killed, at least my family would receive a pension. (Interview, Agua Agria, Guadalupe, 
Aug. 3, 1998)  
 
Maintaining such close commercial ties with San Vicente, the influence of bishop 
Aparicio throughout the valley was also widely acknowledged.  In San Cayetano, accounts 
suggested that loyalty to Aparicio effectively silenced the local clergy.255  The church was 
viewed as indifferent to the escalating violence when events unraveled and institutional support 
could have shifted the balance.   
The impact of Aparicio in the Jiboa Valley cannot be overstated.  He was appointed 
bishop of the San Vicente diocese in 1948, and served until his retirement in 1983.  In his 
public pastoral statements and from the pulpit, Aparicio spoke passionately and eloquently in 
opposition to the “intolerable social injustice” and the imperative of implementing Vatican II.  
Yet, his pronouncements were intentionally vague regarding the correct interpretation of the 
mandate of Medellín and the appropriate CEB methodology.  He was Machiavellian in his 
castigation of priests who had deviated from their pastoral mission into politics, while at the 
same time railing in general terms about the lack of adequate social or economic development 
to address growing unrest.256  
During the 1970s, reacting to growing local pressure from liberationist parishes, 
Aparicio increasingly hardened his public position.  In public, a concerned and sympathetic 
                                                 
254 Interviews, catechists, El Chile, San Juan Nonualco; Guadalupe, July, 1998 
255 Interview, Napoleon Orantes, San Cayetano Istepeque, Dec. 1998. 
256 “Denunciation of the Grave Social Situation that El Salvador is Enduring,” by Aparicio on June 29, 1971 – the 
25th anniversary of his appointment as bishop. 
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script regarding rural injustice was maintained, while in private Aparicio, who Tecolucans 
referred to as tamagás (a lethal snake that inhabits the mangrove region), scolded the victims of 
massacres for overstepping their place and withheld support to parish priests targeted by death 
squads or security forces. Despite increasing pleas for protection after death threats, Aparicio 
ignored them. 
The voice of the traditional church served as an effective moral shield against the 
growing international clamor against human rights violations in El Salvador.  In Puebla (1979) 
at the hemispheric meeting of Catholic clergy, Aparicio disputed claims that the church was 
being persecuted. Another example is the citation of Aparicio’s public condemnation of priests 
that have misinterpreted the meaning of liberation theology that were prominently cited in  
government rebuttals to highly critical reports submitted to the OAS in the late 1970s. 
“The priests and nuns who operate educational centers and parochial communities must 
refrain form any direct or indirect collaboration with the [peasant organizations] FECCAS and 
the UTC and with any other similar organization whose activities are conducted in the strictly 
political field (the taking of power) and because, moreover, they are leftist organizations.” 257  
For Aparicio and the reactionary church, communism (leftism) had ceased being an 
“illusionary pretext for intimidating peasants” and had become a sin.  According to Aparicio, 
renegade priests had succumbed to the temptation to reduce “salvation to material well-being 
and church activity to a political endeavor.” This, in the view of the reactionary bishops, 
absolved the church of any legitimate obligation to protect them or those foolish enough to 
follow them.  
Benigno Rodríguez and other progressive priests did have some impact in starting 
several CEB communities in the Jiboa Valley, particularly San Pedro Aguas Calientes, a 
cantón of Verapáz. However, progressive Catholic mobilization did not take root.  Benjamin 
Molina, who owns four sugar cane mills and was a former Caballero de Cristo Rey recalled 
being invited by Benigno Rodríguez along with other local lay leaders to a 10 day workshop in 
                                                 
257 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Sidney Mazzini Villacorta, Ambassador for El 
Salvador to the OAS, Feb. 26, 1979. (http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ElSalvador78eng/observations.htm), 
acquired 2/25/05, citing statement given in San Salvador, August 28, 1978. by Pedro Arnoldo Aparicio y 
Quintanilla, Bishop of San Vicente, president of the Bishop’s Conference, Benjamin Barrera y Reyes, Bishop of 
Santa Ana, José Eduardo Alvarez, Bishop of San Miguel, Chaplain General; Marco René Revelo, Auxiliary 
Bishop of San Salvador; Freddy Delgado A., Secretary General of the CEDES. 
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Zacatecoluca in the late 1970s.  He remembers that the majority of the catechists invited from 
Jiboa Valley communities were uncomfortable or alienated by the discussion led by David and 
Benigno Rodríguez, Cosme Spezzoto, Marcial Serrano and Alirio Napoleon Macias.  These 
discussions, according to Mejía, began with biblical lectures but deviated into discussions about 
“subversion.”  He disagreed at the time but maintained his silence.  Nevertheless, he attributes 
his lack of enthusiasm for the “radical theology” to being labeled as an informant and eventual 
kidnapping by the FMLN.258   
In San Pedro Aguas Calientes, a small number of catechists were connected with 
Chencho Alas in Suchitoto and Benigno and David Rodríguez, as well as urban contacts in the 
revolutionary movement.  However, Ramiro Valladares, the priest who succeeded Rodríguez in 
Verapáz and extended family of FMLN commander, Marta Valladares (also known as Nidia 
Diaz), was sympathetic to the opposition but reluctant to actively promote CEB organizing.259  
Beginning in the mid 1970s, catechists in Aguas Calientes began working clandestinely 
to organize base communities and build support for challenging unfair working conditions on 
the fincas. Yet, the families in and around Aguas Calientes were divided with regard to the 
progressive and conservative currents within the church.  The divisions coincided to some 
degree with smallholding and landless households.  According to one account, most of the civil 
patrol chiefs in the community were landowners, some of whom actively collaborated with the 
National Guard to identify opposition leaders.  Communal and political organizing centered on 
the landless laborer and renter population.260   
The indiscriminate repression by the National Guard that drove all families from Aguas 
Calientes in 1980 left most with memories of bitter resentment and distrust.  The legacy of the 
efforts to introduce Christian base communities, as perceived in many communities of the Jiboa 
Valley, was one of unnecessary and tragic disruption of a relatively peaceful co-existence with 
                                                 
258 Interview, 7/17/1998, Verapáz.  Molina employed 30 peones when his milling operations were at full capacity.  
His son was executed by the FMLN as a suspected informant.  He was kidnapped by FMLN combatants who were 
also his former employees 
259 Fr. Valladares was later captured and tortured by the military. 
260 Interview, Sofia Marroquin de Hernandez, Human Rights Center – Madeline Legadec, a former catechist and 
organizer in Aguas Calientes.  Some the families of San Pedro Aguas Calientes with members on both sides of the 
struggle included the Mira, Dimas, Campos, Sanchez, Hernandez, and Portillo.  Similar accounts of families with 
combatants on both sides were noted in the cabecera of Verapáz. 
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the large landowners.  Many are angry that the entire community had to be punished for the 
mistakes of a few – underscoring the conformism and resignation that characterized the 
traditional Catholicism’ relation to the rural poor.   
 The impact of the CEB movement was also considerably less in San Ildefonso.  
Opposition communities were aware of the base community work, but liberation theology 
failed to penetrate the rural communities of San Ildefonso.  References to CEB organizing or 
catechist training simply did not take prominence in the local reconstruction of history.  On the 
other hand, residents of the cabecera reported hostility to the occasional homilies of 
progressive priests.  Parishioners cited their defiance of the “terapias” of Benigno Rodríguez 
by staging walkouts of his sermons.  Traditional patron feasts organized during the war were 
perceived by the organizers as acts of protest against the influence of FMLN.261 
 
Life here before the war was quiet, peaceful.  We didn’t have problems.  Because of the actions of a few 
the entire cantón was falsely tied to the subversives.  I was arrested and threatened and my brother was 
killed, only because of his involvement.  We all fled in 1980.  I went to Cojutepeque, then to Guatemala. 
In 1983, I was one of the first of two families to repopulate the village after the mayor gave permission.  
In 1985, others followed.  (Jesus Mira, San Pedro Aguas Calientes, July 1998). 
 
 Figure 4.4 summarizes the key opportunity structure attributes discussed to this point.  
Agrarian inequality is high in each case, although the greater presence of export crops in 
Tecoluca and the Jiboa Valley reflect a more hard-line cosmopolitan elite, compared to the 
provincial elite that is dominant in San Ildefonso.  It follows that the rupture in peasant-
landlord relations has been most abrupt in Tecoluca, least so in San Ildefonso and cushioned in 
the Jiboa Valley only by the larger relative presence of smallholders.  Rural demand making 
has escalated in Tecoluca, is resigned to the status quo in the Jiboa Valley and moderated by 
the hopes of land reform in San Ildefonso. 
 The landholding elite in all three cases exercise ties to allies in the major political 
parties and the military.  The provincial elites in San Ildefonso have stronger relative influence 
with the Christian Democrats, (as illustrated by the rising status of peasant leaders such as 
Orlando Arevalo).  Hard-liners in both Tecoluca and the Jiboa Valley count on significant 
influence in the PCN and the paramilitary  
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 Tecoluca Jiboa Valley San Ildefonso 
Pre-war 
Agrarian 
Structure 
• Cotton, Cattle and corn 
• Rupture of colonato and 
high landlessness 
• Odious cosmopolitan 
Elites and high 
inequality 
• Escalating demands for 
agrarian transformation 
 
 
• Coffee, sugar and corn 
• Buffer effect on 
growing insecurity by 
smallholding peasant 
class 
• Odious, but feared 
cosmopolitan elites and 
high inequality 
• Resignation toward 
status quo agrarian 
relations 
• Limited export crops 
Cattle 
• Loss of prime land to 
hydroelectric reservoir 
resolved in part through 
elite brokered 
compromise 
• Provincial elites, both 
odious and respected, 
with moderate 
inequality  
• Preferences divided 
between restored 
patron-client social 
contract and modest 
agrarian reform 
 
Composition 
and Clout of 
Landed Elites  
• Stronghold of agrarian 
hardliners 
• Ties to PCN Executive 
• Ties to active Military 
• PDC reformers in 1969 
• Angulo family as an 
example of landowner 
concession in the face 
of organized resistance 
• Stronghold of agrarian 
hardliners 
• Ties to ARENA and 
paramilitary leaders 
• Cristiani example of 
intransigent landowner 
hegemony 
 
 
• Weak ties to PCN and 
strong ties PDC party 
• Non-violent peasant 
social mobility 
• Noboa & Aguilúz, 
examples of good and 
bad bosses led to 
peasant ambivalence. 
 
Access to Social 
Movement or 
Revolutionary  
Elites 
 
• FPL concentration zone 
• UTC – BPR focal point 
 
• Few PRTC /RN ties 
 
• PRTC expansion zone 
Access to 
Religious Elites 
• Enduring and 
widespread influence 
Progressive Church 
clergy 
• Ties to National CEB 
network leaders 
• Extensive exchange 
with Los Naranjos and 
El Castaño schools 
• Parish Plan Unity 
• Oppositional access to 
Reactionary church 
leadership 
• Blanket influence of 
Reactionary Church 
leadership (Aparicio) 
and local clergy  
 
• Targeted & temporary 
influence of Progressive 
church clergy 
• Truncated and late 
exposure to Progressive 
Church clergy from 
neighboring parishes. 
 
• Pastoral organizing 
resisted by provincial 
elites 
 
Figure 4.4  Summary of Key Case Study Opportunity Structure Attributes 
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movement that would become ARENA.  Social movement organizational presence is deepest 
in Tecoluca, with ties and cooperation extended to the national leadership of all relevant 
organizations.  While not nearly as pervasive, paramilitary influence is dominant over 
fragmented revolutionary organizing efforts in the Jiboa Valley.  San Ildefonso represents an 
expansion zone for both sides. 
 Finally, Tecoluca enjoyed strong ties to the progressive Catholic church until 1977 
when the leadership of this movement was decapitated.  Nevertheless, Tecoluca’s internal unity 
and a broad array of linkages to national religious networks were consolidated through the 
implementation of the1970 Parish Plan under the guidance of David Rodríguez, Rafael 
Barahona and a constant rotation of catechists trained in Los Naranjos and El Castaño,  The 
Jiboa Valley is much closer politically to the reactionary church leadership under Bishop 
Aparicio, which has contained the germ of Christian Base Community organizing.  In San 
Ildefonso, the influence of liberation theology arrived late or indirectly, never really contesting 
the predominant conservative influence of the local laity. 
 
 
 
E.  THE INEVITABLE BECOMES INTOLERABLE – REPRESSION AND TURNING 
POINTS IN PRE-WAR POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 
 
When the few brief spaces for political organizing have opened in El Salvador, opposition 
organizations on the left have mobilized rapidly only to have that space clamped shut.  The 
political space opened from above by dissident political and religious elites in the early 1960s 
was also closed by the mid 1970s.  The precise turning point varies for the case study 
municipalities, but as for most of the country, it hinges on specific events.  For most, these 
events involve a violent act intended to suffocate popular organizing efforts.   For each case 
study community, the three catalysts (agrarian inequality, elite access and repression) 
converged in a crucial political moment that was decisive in terms of the choice of historical 
paths.   
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1.  Case One - La Cayetana:   
 
For Tecoluca and many in surrounding communities, this event occurred on Nov. 29, 1974 in 
La Cayetana, a hamlet which formally belongs to the cantón León de Piedra, San Vicente.  On 
that day, six men were massacred and 18 others were imprisoned and tortured by the National 
Guard and Police after a confrontation between residents of the village of La Cayetana and 
local landowner, Coralía Angulo, over the right to farm the Angulo’s land.  Nine of those taken 
from the community were later killed.  The dispute began in 1973 when Angulo rented her land 
to a cotton grower instead of to local colonos.  The massacre is recognized as a turning point in 
revolutionary organizing in Tecoluca and had major impacts in other parts of El Salvador.  
La Cayetana was a community situated on land owned by the Angulo family.  The 
Angulos were at one time, owners of the entire Southern half of the volcano and adjacent 
coastal plains that extended into La Paz and stretched to the sea.  Pablo Anaya, former colono 
and resident of La Cayetana at the time, claimed that the Angulos had accumulated all of this 
land until the 1930-40’s, before sub-dividing the estate and distributing parts of it to their 
children (Julia, Roberto, Coralía, Vicki, etc.) and selling parts to others.  Moreover, in 
Usulután, the Hacienda Nancuchiname was originally a property of the Angulo’s before they 
sold it to the Dueñas family.  Through these land transactions, the Angulos were networked 
with the largest landowning families in the region. Their holdings were so extensive that they 
included cattle, near the hacienda household center (Hacienda Tehuacan Opico), indigo, sugar 
cane, coffee (Haciendas Peña, Barrios, La Paz) and cotton (Paz Opico), in addition to basic 
grains that were grown in part by the colono labor force.  
 
a. Life in pre-war La Cayetana.   
 
Pablo Anaya was born in 1940 and his parents lived in the community and worked as colonos 
for the Angulos for as long as he can remember.  La Cayetana consisted of about 80 families, 
perhaps as many as 500 people.  The house of Pablo’s family was located just below a plateau 
extension of the Angulo family land called Hacienda Paz Opico.  As colonos, Pablo’s family 
did not own their own land, but were allocated a small spot for the house, and provided a small 
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garden plot to grow corn and beans, and raise a few animals.  In return, his parents had to give 
half of the harvest to the Angulos, and in addition to provide labor for planting and harvesting 
crops on the hacienda.  His father worked for some time in the processing of indigo, an 
unpleasant job.  Wages were 1.25 colones a day ($0.25), even though the legal minimum wage 
was 2.25 colones ($0.45).  The food during the work day consisted of a tortilla in the morning, 
two more at lunch and some beans.  The beans were typically cooked on Monday, but were 
served all week long, and so they often accumulated roaches, or rats.   
By contrast, the Angulos were conspicuously wealthy by area standards, with a trapiche 
to process sugar and añil, near the Hacienda Tehuacan Opico and a swimming pool.  The 
economic power of the Angulos had translated into political domination of the region for most 
of the 20th century.  General Nicolás Angulo, owner of the 1,800 hectare Hacienda Ramirez, 
was appointed to a number of high ranking posts in the government of President Fernando 
Figueroa (1907-1911), including Secretary of State.262  Luis Raúl Angulo (1912), Felipe 
Angulo (1915) and Gonzalo Angulo (1931), all doctors, were congressional deputies from San 
Vicente and awarded prestigious recognition as physicians by their peers in the Assembly.   
Ernesto Angulo Sr., a cousin living in Santa Tecla, was one of Roberto D’Aubuisson 
closest confidants, founder of the ARENA party and eventual congressional deputy.263 Ernesto 
Angulo Milla, the son, would become ARENA deputy in the 1990s.  Luís Roberto Angulo 
Samayoa would become President of the National Assembly for the ARENA party in 1991, in 
the same period when David Rodríguez served as Congressional Deputy for the FMLN 
representing the Department of La Paz.  Blanca Avalos de Angulo, wife of Roberto, was 
appointed as governor of San Vicente under ARENA in 1998.  Other family members received 
similarly privileged public positions. 
The colonos for the Angulo family in La Cayetana supplemented their meager 
livelihoods by working during the coffee and sugar cane harvests between October and April.  
                                                 
262 In 1930, President Pio Romero Bosque, San Vicente landowner of almost 14,000 hectares and neighbor of the 
Angulos, approved a resolution to erect bronze busts of General Nicolás Angulo and Indalecio Miranda, in the 
plaza San José of San Salvador, to the right and left of one of the founders of the Salvadoran republic, José Matías 
Delgado. 
263 After divorcing his first wife, Yolanda Munguia, the daughter of a wealth landowning family from Usulután, 
D’Aubuisson would remarry Marta Luz Angulo in 1985,    The  Munguia ceded 150 mz of coffee land to PTT in 
Chinameca, 230 mz in Jiquilisco, 350 mz in Jucuaran, 200 mz in Tecapan,  
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In the coffee fincas there were no scales, so the workers were often robbed of the weight of 
their harvest when they delivered the picked coffee fruit.264 The salaries were not fixed, the 
contracts were verbal, and the situation steadily deteriorated because workers from northern 
departments arrived willing to work for even lower wages.  The owner did not have to provide 
meals legally, it was more of a tradition.  Tortillas were often made with sorghum instead of 
corn.  Also, the colonos often lost earnings through deductions.  Everyone was given a row of 
trees to work but if you broke even one branch, your entire days wage was discounted.  
Sleeping facilities were not provided, neither were bathrooms, nor doctors.  However the 
National Guard was always present, especially on payday.  David Rodríguez remembers little 
solidarity among the workers in the early 1970s, but distrust between local and migrant 
workers.  
By the early 1970s, most living on the volcano were landless laborers.265  The economic 
conditions for the majority of people could easily be described as extreme poverty.  Still, the 
community of colonos had a strong social tradition.  The local school had been a demand of the 
community that the Angulos had conceded.  The one room building had been built with 
donated adobe bricks and roof tiles and with donated community labor.  It served not only as an 
elementary classroom offering a rudimentary education for children up to third grade, but also a 
ceremonial gathering place or small church, where local parties and holidays were celebrated.  
Geographically the school marked the center of the village. 
León de Piedra was a neighboring village about ten minutes walk from La Cayetana, 
but also on land belonging to the Angulos.266  Nicolás García, ex-combatant, two term mayor 
of Tecoluca and now Congressional Deputy for the FMLN, was then studying in high school.  
He was bright and committed to the community as leader of a youth group.  His teacher was 
Blanca Avalos de Angulo.  He remembers her as strident and conservative in her political 
views and a poor instructor, with bad handwriting.  She organized students to stone a caravan 
supporting the national teachers strike in 1968. 
                                                 
264 The canasta was measured by means of long measuring rod that estimated the height of the picked beans in the 
basket and converted it to a unit wage of 0.50¢ per arroba.   
265 Interview, Gregorio Osorio, originally from caserío El Cumbo, April 1, 1998 San Carlos Lempa. 
266 León de Piedra (Stone Lion) is named after a large rock with a carved figure of crouching lion, which marks 
the ruins of a prehistorical Pipil community, replete with unrestored pyramids and ball court. 
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Nicolás García was 16 in 1974, one of 11 brothers and sisters. He characterized life in 
León de Piedra as notable for its attitude of solidarity and political opposition to the ruling 
PCN.  If someone needed something, everyone helped.  Many families in León de Piedra were 
smallholders, having purchased lots of 2-5 hectares after the Angulos sub-divided and sold a 
small part of their estate.  Therefore the villagers of León de Piedra were a little better off than 
those in La Cayetana, but still had to pick coffee and cut sugar cane to make ends meet.  He 
remembers that the village León de Piedra was always an opposition village politically, 
initially identified with the Christian Democrats.  The first community board of directors in 
1969-70 were successful in getting electricity and water services from the municipality.  With 
the exception of one family, all were organized in the community.  These initial achievements 
contributed to an appreciation for local organization.   
 
b. Cotton.    
 
In the 1950s, the Angulos began growing cotton, like many of the haciendas on the coast.  As 
cotton began to consume more of the nearby land traditionally used to grow household crops, 
two changes in the life of the colonos were almost immediate.  The first was environmental.  
The contamination from the fumigation planes became a major concern within the community.  
Many of the trees surrounding the cotton fields, even some of the oldest and largest ceiba trees, 
were cleared indiscriminately in order to make room for the planes to sweep in very low to 
fumigate the cotton plants.  The prevailing winds coming down off of the volcano, swept the 
chemicals into La Cayetana, poisoning food and drinking water.  Pablo Anaya recalls, “The 
airplanes passed very low fumigating over the houses, which had thatch roofs and the plans 
poisoned us.  The people who had small animals, watched them die.” 267  Anaya emphasized 
this problem of contamination, and recalled stories of women giving birth to severely deformed 
children. 
The second problem had to do with lost access to land.  Pablo Anaya estimated that of 
the colonos in La Cayetana, as few as a quarter had access to about a manzana of land to work.  
The other 75% were landless and dependent upon the Angulo’s for work.  In 1973, Coralía 
                                                 
267 Interview, Pablo Anaya, Nueva Tehuacan, Tecoluca, April 1998. 
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Angulo, on whose part of the Angulo estate the colonos from La Cayetana were dependent, 
decided to rent some of her land (the Hacienda Santa Teresa) to the wife of a Colonel Melendez 
from Usulután to plant cotton.  As a result, the land that even a small number of families used 
to grow household crops was converted to cotton.  The little autonomy that existed for these 
families suddenly disappeared.   
 
c. Organization.   
 
The process of organization in the La Cayetana, and within the zone was around the most basic 
problems -- the treatment of workers by landowners, lack of basic services in the communities 
and an increasing lack of access to land.  The organizing was guided by access to religious and 
political elite leadership.  However, the impetus for organization was largely internal. 
David Rodríguez said a mass regularly in the La Cayetana, and in later coordination 
with Rafael Barahona worked patiently over several years with catechists to train delegates of 
the word, connect the community with other CEBs in Tecoluca and send a number of local 
peasant leaders, both men and women, to Los Naranjos or El Castaño.268  People from La 
Cayetana had been involved in the opposition to Molina’s post-election visit and subsequent 
protest marches following Aparicio’s attempts to pull Rodríguez from the parish.  Experience 
with the bible circles, the peasant training centers and episodes of collective political action 
helped establish a solid foundation of community organization. 
It is unclear when political organizers first entered the zone.269  La Asociación de 
Trabajadores Agrícolas y Campesinos de El Salvador (ATACES), a peasant organization 
associated with the Salvadoran Communist Party, first attempted to recruit community leaders, 
but did not have much success.   Chencho Alas, working with FECCAS in Suchitoto, also 
invited community leaders to join FAPU, a base organization of the RN that had recently 
                                                 
268 Interview Nicolás García, whose father, Antonio was one of the two first sent from León de Piedra and was 
also a Caballero de Cristo Rey. 
269 Just as liberationist priests helped facilitate initial encounters between peasant organizations and insurgent 
leaders in places like Morazán (see Binford) and Aguilares (see Cabarrus and Alas), David Rodriguez likely 
facilitated the encounters between UTC and FAPU or the FPL.   
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formed.270  Over time, leaders from FECCAS and the peasant leaders from La Cayetana 
developed strong ties.  However, it was the Fuerzas de Liberación Popular that established the 
first solid relations with peasant activists in La Cayetana.  
From the beginning, the FPL strategy was to build mass organizations from which the 
military structure would draw its support.  Organizing was initiated by five or six political 
leaders from the capital, including the founder of the FPL, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, that 
clandestinely recruited local leaders as the first cadre as early at 1972.271  FPL organizers 
would stay in the zone for about a week, and establish contact with certain local leaders.   
This process of FPL formation of local cells proceeded parallel to the base community 
formation led by Padre David.  Victor and Macario Hernandez, Fernando Panameño, Pablo 
Anaya all from La Cayetana were both FPL recruits and catechists.  They attended cursillos at 
Los Naranjos and El Castaño where they talked about “Faith y Compromise”, and studied the 
Jesuit publication Peace and Justice.  They then returned to their communities to assist in the 
delivering of the sacraments and leading bible study.  On a more clandestine level, they also 
helped disseminate “El Rebelde” for the FPL. 
Certain catechists and others were recruited by the FPL to form the first cells.  The cells 
operated in absolute secrecy, even to other catechists.   This network of leaders worked to 
convene meetings in the zone and later to organize participation in marches in San Salvador.  
Community meetings would be facilitated by the local leaders (playing a dual role as 
catechist/FPL recruit), but there would always be a FPL cell in contact with these leaders, 
supporting and critiquing their performance, instilling and forming the discipline needed to 
maintain different levels of security.  The other communal leaders never knew that the support 
people from outside the community were actually the FPL central command.   
Cell members often had to dedicate 2-3 days of the week to this activity of organizing 
different community leaders.  As was the case when catechists left the community to attend 
cursillos, when cell members’ own agricultural work had to be neglected , others pitched in and 
worked cooperatively to provide food and lodging for them and their families.  
                                                 
270 Chencho Alas, Fabian Amaya, and Bernardo Boulan were the priests working closely with FECCAS and RN. 
271 Interview with Pablo Anaya, referring to Cayetano Carpio (“Marcial”) - for whom Pablo served as security for 
four years).  Other early FPL leaders in the region included Andres Torres, Milton Mendez, Dante Bettaglia, 
Felipe Pena, and Rene Franco.  Some were students from San Salvador. 
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Growing out of the efforts of religious organizing, the Union of Farmworkers (UTC) 
was formed by FPL leaders.272  UTC organizing in San Vicente began in 1972 and then spread 
out to other departments.273  Despite the illegality of rural unions, UTC organizers collected a 1 
colon donation (about $0.40 or a third of day’s wage) from a peasant’s monthly salary to go 
toward organizer expenses, but also benefited from community donations.  The initial demands 
of the UTC were modest by comparison of what they would become later - better food, scales 
to ensure fair weights, higher wages, greater respect for workers by farm managers and the 
removal of the National Guard from the haciendas.  The UTC slogan was, “11 colones, tortillas 
and beans.” 274  
UTC commissions visited hacienda foremen and managers and some owners to make 
appeals for support for the UTC.  The owners never responded favorably to appeals for small 
donations.  However the more tolerant farm managers permitted UTC commissions to hold 
meetings with the workers.  The more intransigent caporales were strong-armed during visits at 
night by armed and masked FPL combatants.  Some concessions were won this way, including 
an increase in the unit rate for coffee harvest from 50 cents to 1.50¢ per arroba, and the 
inclusion of rice with meals.275   
There was little repression at this stage (1972-74), the National Guard was not as visible 
on the haciendas, and the UTC was permitted some open space for organizing.  This space 
proved crucial for consolidating local organization.  After several years, all of the communities 
on the south and eastern slopes of the Chinchontepec volcano were organized with the UTC.  
Organizing colonos, landless laborers and smallholders alike to demand better working 
conditions from the large landowners, UTC members eventually numbered in the thousands.    
                                                 
272 Interview Nicolás García.  Early national leaders of the UTC from San Vicente included Francisco Alfaro 
(León de Piedra), Chele Méndez (Paz Opico), Fernando Panameño, Adrián González (Cantón San Diego).  García 
also includes leaders from other departments, Apolinario Serrano, Facundo Guardado, Juan Chacon, and Justo 
Mejia, also identified as leaders of FECCAS.  Clear attribution between peasant organizations or FPL is 
impossible given the double identities and frequent organizational merging that existed during this period. 
273 It is not clear that the UTC openly identified itself as such before 1974.  Some have located the official 
formation of the UTC as occurring after the Nov 1974 massacre in a meeting held in a cave named after Anastasio 
Aquino, in the Cerro Tacuazín (David Rodriguez Interview, Stefan Ueltzen, 1994: 252). 
274 Informants recalled different versions of the UTC slogan, although most were variations on this general theme. 
275 Nicolás García, interview, April 1999 
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Early FPL recruits were also some of the same catechists that David Rodríguez had 
trained.  Victor Hernandez was one of the first catechists that the FPL recruited.  Victor died in 
an accidental shootout in July 1974 with the manager of the Finca El Cuatro during an FPL 
clandestine action to communicate the demands of the UTC.  To help cover up the 
circumstances surrounding the conspicuous death of two well-known members of the area, 
David Rodríguez was informed for the first time regarding the extent of FPL activity in the 
zone and the identity of several combatants.  Not long after, Rodríguez was also recruited to 
join the FPL. 
 
d.  Confrontation with Coralía Angulo   
 
The colonos of La Cayetana endured almost two years of having no access to their old 
farmland.  They also had to compete for what work there was planting, tending and harvesting 
the cotton with peasants brought in from outside the area by the tenant.  The deforestation 
washed more land than ever down over their houses when the rains came.  Robbery at the 
scales increased health problems were making the peasants of La Cayetana increasingly 
desperate.   
The first open community meeting to plan a strategy was held in April 1973.  Residents 
of La Cayetana decided to confront Coralía Angulo and demand access to their old lands.  
Initially, the community tried to negotiate with the owner.  The UTC helped the community 
collect money and offer to buy the land, or at least rent it (estimated at 125 colones per 
manzana per rental season).  Coralia Angulo replied that the land was not for sale, and she 
would honor the existing contract to rent it to Ana Margoth de Mendez (wife of Col. 
Melendez).  “So, you had better find some elsewhere to farm or you’ll starve to death.”  Pablo 
Anaya, a member of the negotiating delegation responded, “Of starvation, we are not going to 
die.” 276 
When the workers from other provinces arrived in April 1974 to prepare the land and 
plant cotton, the peasants from La Cayetana confronted them and explained that no cotton 
would be planted this year.  Instead, corn and beans would be planted.  A partial takeover of 
                                                 
276 Interview, Pablo Anaya 
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Hacienda Santa Teresa began one night in May 1974. In an act of reappropriation, community 
members of La Cayetana decided to clear six manzanas (10 acres) of cotton during the night 
and planted corn in defiance of Angulo’s refusal to rent. The taken land bordered the 
community and represented only a small part of the overall Angulo estate.  The experience of 
clearing the land, planting and tending for the corn and beans was not only the first direct 
confrontation with the landowner, but also the first cooperative experience of production. 
Between May and October 1974, despite threats of eviction from the Angulos, no direct 
confrontation happened, although events began to escalate.  Periodic sabotage of crops, burning 
of sugar cane and cotton bushes occurred during the night on land of the most intransigent 
owners in the zone, including the Angulos.  In October, during the beginning of the coffee 
harvest on the volcano, the UTC organized simultaneous strikes in four different coffees fincas, 
including the Angulo’s Hacienda Paz Opico.  During the strike, a guard from the Paz Opico 
finca shot and wounded one of the strikers, a woman.  It was known that this same guard had 
raped a young female worker earlier that year.  Armed members of the UTC executed the 
guard, the first open and violent killing of a person associated with the landowners.277  The 
strikes continued, disrupting the coffee harvest.  Peasants from other organizations in the 
country, including FECCAS, arrived to the zone to show solidarity with the strikes.  Coffee 
trees were cut down, and there were threats that the strikers would burn down the Angulo’s 
house if the demands of the strikers were not met.   
When the peasants of La Cayetana began to harvest the corn and beans they had planted 
after the coffee strikes and sabotage had died down, the National Guard was called upon to visit 
the community and arrest the troublemakers.  Five Guardsmen (judiciales) first entered the 
village on November 26, with a list of names of alleged community leaders, including brothers 
Victor Hernandez, the President of the Cooperative who had died earlier, and Leonso 
Hernandez.278   They found Leonso Hernandez thrashing beans in front of his house and 
arrested him when copies of “El Rebelde” were discovered in a small hole behind his house.  
                                                 
277 Pablo Anaya recalls that an armed FPL/UTC peasant returned fire, wounding the guard, who tried to flee.  The 
women present then finished off the man with stones and clubs.  Interview, 1998. 
278 Pablo Anaya says 3 NG entered the community before Nov. 26, and attempted to arrest Epifanio Clímaco.  The 
bell was sounded, the community gathered, and one ex - reservist, Alejandro Mendez, jumped one of the Guard 
and wrestled away his rifle.  The NG released Clímaco, and retreated after reaching an agreement that the rifle 
would be returned on condition that no one would be harmed.   
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Informants within the community had provided the Guard with names and data on key 
members of the resistance in La Cayetana.   
The community met on various occasions to consider their actions and the potential 
reactions of the authorities, anticipating an inevitable confrontation.279  However, they believed 
they would not be targets of violence.  They were convinced that only by unifying the entire 
community, could they defend themselves. Perhaps even more so, their primary concern was 
the fear that their recently harvested corn would be taken by the National Guard, and they 
might starve.  Alicia Clímaco summarized the view of most.  “We were sure that if we didn’t 
do something, our children would become no better than slaves of the Angulo family, like 
cattle with their own brand.” 280 
The community was therefore prepared for that day.  The bell over the school was 
sounded as soon as Leonso was captured, calling everyone to gather there.  Soon some 300 
people from the community, armed with machetes, slingshots and sticks, quickly formed a 
menacing circle around the jeep of the National Guard, with Leonso sitting in the back seat - 
his hands bound behind his back.   
Appeals for the release of the prisoner failed.  When Leonso feigned thirst, the Guard 
loosened his handcuffs to allow him to take a quick drink before departing.281  With his hands 
briefly free, the crowd closed on the jeep rescuing Leonso.  Rocks were moved to block the 
road.  After a three hour stand-off, under threat of mob violence, the Guard was forced to 
retreat on foot from the community, although threatening to return.  The peasants of La 
Cayetana, having won the freedom of a community leader, were filled with confidence and 
indignation.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
279 Interview Alicia Clímaco and Mercedes Hernández, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca 
280 Interview, Alicia Clímaco, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca 1998 
281 Interview, David Rodriguez, 
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e.  The events of the Massacre Nov. 29, 1974   
 
Residents of La Cayetana met again in anticipation that when the Guard returned, violence was 
increasingly likely.  Among the self-defense measures that were planned, the men would 
escape by fleeing toward the adjacent villages higher up on the volcano upon notice of the 
Guard’s arrival to avoid capture.  The women and children would remain. 
When the Guard returned that Friday afternoon of November 29, 1974, Pablo Anaya 
remained at a distance of about 70 meters from where the machine gun was set up at the edge 
of the soccer field.  The Guard contingent now numbered in the hundreds and included Police, 
soldiers from the Fifth Brigade and judiciales.  The security forces arrived firing guns into the 
air and combing the community for the men.  The presence of the Red Cross underscored the 
gravity of the situation.  Anaya was one of a very few FPL cadre that had access to a pistol, but 
confronting the National Guard with arms would have been senseless.  The Guard had arrived 
this time not simply looking for local leaders, but to deliver a massive psychological blow that 
would strike fear into the community. 
As the security forces deployed their troops around the community, some peasants were 
unaware of the plans to desert the community or chose to stay and confront the Guard.  Perhaps 
they still refused to believe that as in all prior encounters with authority that year, their 
determination and cleverness would win out.  The Guard quickly arrested 14 men, blindfolded 
them and put them in one of the trucks.  Then, 18 others were stripped, forced face down on the 
ground in front of the school.  The soldiers beat these peasants with rifle butts, and walked over 
the backs of their heads, demanding the names and whereabouts of the community leaders.    
When hearing the gunfire as the Guard arrived in the La Cayetana, Benedicto Morataya 
was walking back to León de Piedra from picking coffee all day at Finca La Paz, with other 
men and women from their village.282  They decided to investigate the problem, and a 
delegation of about 30 people from León de Piedra made their way toward La Cayetana.  They 
arrived at about 5 pm, in the midst of the persecution of La Cayetana peasants, and attempted 
to intervene peacefully to persuade the Guard commander to release the prisoners they had 
taken, and to stop the torture of the others.  As Benedicto Morataya and five other men 
                                                 
282 Finca La Paz was also the property of Coralia Angulo. 
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approached the Guard commander, they were ordered to stop.  Benedicto and the others 
continued to approach and the order was given to fire.  The six men were machine gunned 
down.  A monument now stands to mark the time and place.  It reads, Martyrs of the Struggle 
for Land, Diego de Jesus Hernandez Gonzalez, Jesus Morataya Belloso , José Benedicto 
Morataya Galvez, Jose Hernan H. Belloso, José Jorge García, Miguel Rodríguez Belloso, Nov. 
29, 1974, La Cayetana, Tecoluca – Christian Communities. 
The local press reported, 
 
 
The block of PCN deputies rejected a motion to investigate the  deaths of six peasants that occurred on 
Nov. 29 in San Vicente.283 The motion was made by Christian Democrat deputy for San Vicente, Dr. 
Julio Samayoa, but immediately after being read yesterday in the plenary session of the National 
Assembly, was endorsed by all of the PDC deputies.  Between three and four pm in the afternoon, on the 
29th of November, 1974, contingents of the National Guard and the National Police, the latter dressed 
in civilian clothes, heavily armed and aboard various official and private trucks, arrived in the hamlet 
of La Cayetana, in the village of León de Piedra, jurisdiction of the municipality of San Vicente, 
shooting off their firearms and sewing terror among the peasants, that at this time were returning to 
their homes after finishing their day’s labor in the fields. 
 
A 51 mm caliber mortar cannon was placed on the soccer field, aimed at the community, and a Red 
Cross ambulance of the Armed Forces was stationed strategically on the road, and everything indicated 
they were preparing a military operation of large proportion against the enemy.  It was apparent that 
the military were ready both technically and professionally for a confrontation.  Upon hearing the shots 
and the encirclement of their houses, many of the peasants ran in terror toward the higher reaches of 
the San Vicente volcano looking for somewhere to hide, being pursued until reaching a place called El 
Potrerillo (the small pasture).  A large number of peasants were captured and forced up into the trucks, 
while the others, that were not as lucky, upon returning from hauling coffee in their carts, and becoming 
aware of the danger that they had run into, ran to hide in nearby huts, where it is said, they were 
machine gunned down, dying instantly.  Some of the dead were cut to pieces with machete blows and 
their remains were placed in baskets that were brought along for just such a purpose.  Then the baskets 
were lifted into one of the trucks which departed in an unknown direction. 
 
After nearly three hours of terror, the Guard contingent forced nearly thirty other 
peasants onto the trucks and began leaving.  At the entrance to the village, half of those taken 
prisoner were pushed out of the truck, after having acid sprayed in their eyes to assure they 
would not see which direction the National Guard troops escaped.  Fourteen other peasants 
from the La Cayetana remained in the truck and were ultimately held and tortured by the Guard 
for over a week, until growing public pressure secured their release of several.   
                                                 
283 Call To Investigate the Deaths of Six Peasants in San Vicente is Rejected.  Diario de Hoy, Wed. Dec. 3, 1974 
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An official investigation into the La Cayetana massacre failed to assign responsibility.  
The Ministry of Defense issued the following press release:  
 
Yesterday at 5:00 pm, in the hamlet of La Cayetana, San Vicente, when National Guard and National 
Police patrols conducted a sweep in pursuit of local criminals, they were ambushed by a group of 
unidentified individuals, who attacked the patrols with firearms.  The attack was repelled by the security 
forces leaving a balance of four dead attackers and one wounded agent of the National Guard from the 
encounter.  The rest of the criminals are being sought, and an investigation of the event is underway. 
  
The event sent shockwaves throughout the country.  President Molina arrived 
personally in the village several days later to attempt to calm the waters.  The handful of 
Christian Democrat deputies in the Congress, led by fellow Vicentino, Dr. Julio Samayoa 
called for an official investigation.  The PCN majority blocked the motion.284  Investigators 
from the Justice Ministry arrived, took testimony.  No charges were filed. 
The pseudo-investigation failed to calm the waters.  Solidarity strikes occurred on the 
cotton and sugar cane plantations in the coastal sector of Tecoluca.  Thirty days after the 
massacre, FAPU organized a protest in Tecoluca, and then a march to La Cayetana.  As one of 
the march leaders, Nicolás García recalled that his uncle, Rubén Sanchez, fired upon the 
protesters with two pistols when his bakery was painted with graffiti. After injuring two 
marchers, Sanchez was wounded by armed militants within the crowd, and it advanced toward 
the main plaza.   
Bishop Aparicio verbally denounced the massacre in his sermons, but in private was 
critical of the community leaders.  When visited by a delegation from La Cayetana to request 
solidarity and a formal denunciation from the Bishop, he responded, “what you people need is 
an even harder jolt (palizo), so that you finally learn.” 285  Formal support for an investigation 
There are several remarkable aspects to this event.  The first is that the overwhelming 
force called in by the Angulos was evidence of a shift in the repressive capacity that the 
government was willing to exercise in defense of the property rights in the region.  The first 
massacre in the region signaled that a threshold had been passed.  Another similar massacre 
                                                 
284 At the time, the PDC had 7 deputies, MNR – 2, and UDN – 2.  The PCN controlled the other 49. 
285 Interview, Pablo Anaya and Alicia Clímaco.   
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occurred six months later, in Tres Calles, about 10 km to the east of La Cayetana.286  These 
massacres signaled for many that, “there were no alternatives left to preparation for armed 
struggle,” and they assumed legendary status in the discourse of resistance. 
Secondly, as brutal as the event was, it failed to break the determination of the victims.  
This may be attributed to several factors, including the prior level of organization and 
communal solidarity had been built and tested over the previous 3-4 years.  While not all were 
in agreement with the actions taken, solidarity bridged landless and landowners, urban and 
rural, and joined political organizations across party lines.  It is essential to remember that the 
six men who were shot were not from La Cayetana, but from landowning families that acted 
out of a sense of communal obligation to their landless neighbors.  Immediate solidarity from 
outside the community reinforced commitments that had been patiently forged.  Amazingly, 
this massive blow did not break the community, it only hardened the resolve to fight back.   
Third, the events leading up to the massacre clearly suggest an escalation in attempts to 
shift the balance of power in the region by an organized peasantry.  The confrontation with 
Coralía Angulo was one of many that were occurring as a test of the strength of the UTC.  It’s 
likely that these confrontations did not begin with David Rodríguez refusing to convey 
religious legitimacy to local landlords, nor ended with La Cayetana in terms of the day to day 
tests of local power that gathered steam in the early 1970s.   
 David Stoll has argued that these types of provocations by unwelcomed revolutionary 
organizations have unnecessarily placed the necks of an indefensible civilian population on the 
chopping block.  The expected violence by the landowning elites would either swell the ranks 
with new recruits and fortify revolutionary commitments or destroy the organization.  La 
Cayetana seems to fit a larger narrative that Stoll offers to explain the disastrous results of 
similar provocative acts in Guatemala’s Ixil Triangle in this same period.287  
 
                                                 
286 On June 21, 1975, the National Guard killed Jose Alberto Astorga and three sons, Santos Morales and two sons, 
7 men and children in all in the community of Tres Calles, San Agustín, Usulután. 
287 Stoll (1993). Danner (1992) makes similar inferences about the motivations and consequences of the 1980 
Mozote massacre in Morazán.  Both suggest that guerrilla forces coerced an uncommitted peasantry by implanting 
itself and staging isolated attacks, knowing that the military would use excessive force and force displaced 
peasants to join the insurgency. 
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Figure 4.5  Pablo Anaya, FMLN ex-combatant and survivor, standing in 1998 beside 
monument erected to the “Martyrs of the Struggle for Land, Nov. 29, 1974, La Cayetana, 
Tecoluca – Christian Communities” 
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Yet, other details of the story indicate that UTC’s mettle had already been tested.  Many 
residents had already participated in successful collective actions, assessed the risks as a 
community and were acting with relative autonomy from any single political or religious 
influence that was prevalent in the region.  At decisive moments, decisions were taken by 
community members alone and if local FPL organizers such as Leonso Hernandez were 
considered an outside provocateur, his neighbors would not likely have risked their lives 
attempted to save his. 
As such, the community and the UTC were able to survive, and in fact, matured into 
one of the most effective insurgent forces within the FMLN.  This autonomy had its price.  The 
first major offensive by the National Guard in November 1976 targeted the communities of 
León de Piedra and La Cayetana, effectively forcing most young men to join the FPL and 
family members to seek refuge in newly formed communities of resistance higher up on the 
volcano.  Popular militia now operated openly on the volcano and the structure of the FPL 
began to take shape.  A wave of land and building takeovers followed, led by the popular 
organizations.  The first clandestine recuperation of military caliber arms came next, 
complementing the assortment of rustic hunting and household guns that were both 
requisitioned and donated.  Soon after, the sparse but more heavily armed insurgents organized 
the first attacks against local National Guard posts.  The train of revolution began moving down 
the tracks.  There would be no turning back. 
David Rodríguez identified the massacre of La Cayetana as a turning point.  The 
political demands that were a product of the organizing of the progressive church had been 
taking an ever deeper root.   “The Parish Plan had awakened a hunger, but it did not provide 
food.  By late 1974 the Parish Plan had reached its limit, the aspirations of the peasantry had 
grown beyond the influence of the church.”  In early 1975, Rodríguez formally joined the FPL 
as a political-military organizer. 
Pablo Anaya, reflecting back after 25 years, remained convinced that the massacre at La 
Cayetana was a decisive moment in the history of events that ultimately led to armed 
resistance.  It was intended to squelch an emerging peasant movement.  Instead, it became a 
code word for heroic resistance and motivated more intensified organizing in San Vicente and 
in other zones to act as well. 
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Nicolás García, whose older brother Jorge was killed at La Cayetana, was one of six 
brothers who joined the FPL.  He pointed to La Cayetana as an inevitable destiny for a 
community in which solidarity was so entrenched.  The UTC and FPL organizing of claims 
making and self-defense capacities were tempered by early confrontations with local authority, 
explaining in part their survival and consequent influence on wartime and postwar local 
organization and empowerment strategies.  
Not all were in favor nor fully aware of the risks taken by the local militant organizing 
of the UTC.  Community meetings leading up to the violent stand-off with the National Guard 
did not include 100% of the families, as some have indicated.  Others from León de Piedra and 
reactions to post-massacre protests have suggested that some families were divided and did not 
fully endorse the growing combativeness toward local landowners or the National Guard.  In 
both villages there were known informers and active collaboration with death squads.288  It is 
also evident that the participants in the organizing held different expectations of the likely 
consequences of their actions.  Some acknowledged that they were embarking on a high risk 
revolutionary path fully aware of the potential costs, but others did not recall this prior 
commitment.   
While no peasant village could be expected to have fully anticipated and established 
consensus around the course of action chosen, the evidence of prior layers of political and 
religious organizing over a period of as much as five years, the gradual unfolding of the 
confrontation with the Angulos during which community meetings were held to map out a 
strategy, and the unplanned arrival of landowning peasants from León de Piedra in response to 
the perceived distress of their neighbors – all speak to the depth of local organizing prior to the 
arrival of the National Guard.  Contrary to Stoll, during this period, the Angulos or local 
dissenting families would have enjoyed considerable autonomy in derailing the process through 
earlier interventions.  Indeed, some evidence suggests that local organizing crossed numerous 
such thresholds before the massacre itself, triggered in part by local officials and peasants 
sympathetic to the landowners.  The gathering capacity of peasant organizing can not be 
reduced to the provocative leadership of key outsiders, such as David Rodríguez or urban FPL 
                                                 
288 Interviews with Pablo Anaya, Gregorio Osorio and Nicolás García. 
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commanders (although these influences were undoubtedly significant), or it would have been 
much more quickly extinguished- as Stoll accurately characterizes in the Ixil case.   
There are perhaps several key factors that explain why La Cayetana avoided the fate of 
Stoll’s Ixil victims.  These factors include the sharpened land scarcity and disruption of patron-
client relations caused by cotton production, the respective organizational capacities of the 
insurgent/military forces or the reactionary/progressive church, and finally, the nemesis of 
scientific research - inexplicable luck.  Both accounts of effective and failed revolutionary 
organizing rely on limited and selective evidence, which ultimately favors the plausibility of 
both but challenges the generalizability of either.289  In fact, La Cayetana’s discordance with 
Stoll’s argument must confront the noted parallels in the other cases below. 
As the conflict engulfed the Chinchontepec volcano, the Angulos were forced to 
abandon their property – one of many highly visible cracks that formed in the edifice of 
landowner control over peasant lives.  Over the course of the war, the hacienda would be 
destroyed in attacks on the National Guard post and occupied for long periods as an FMLN 
concentration point.  The remains of the once majestic Hacienda Paz Opico and Tehuacan 
Opico, along with the chapel in La Cayetana, now sit hidden under vegetation. 
 
2.  Case Two - San Pedro Aguas Calientes:   
 
The tragic history of El Salvador is that La Cayetana represented only the first in many similar 
gross acts of violence that would occur over the next two decades.  However, these crucial 
moments involved different choices by those involved and likewise, different outcomes.  A 
similar turning point for Jiboa Valley communities, although not as well documented, is that of 
San Pedro Aguas Calientes, in Verapáz, where a peasant movement that shared many of the 
features of La Cayetana was derailed by another brutal massacre by the National Guard on 
March 23, 1980. 
                                                 
289 In the same way that Stoll’s narrative is based largely on interviews with those Guatemalans that fled from the 
EGP, my account of La Cayetana rests largely although not exclusively on testimony of those who remained with 
the FPL.  For logistical reasons, Stoll is unable to contrast the views of his informants with the 12,000 who chose, 
voluntarily or not, to remain in the Communities of Populations in Resistance, or EGP combatants themselves.  
See Wood (2003: 234, fn 7) for other methodological concerns related to Stoll’s analysis. 
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The five year period (1975-1980) between La Cayetana and San Pedro Aguas Calientes 
was one of polarization that steadily closed all political space for civil opposition.  Insurgent 
and paramilitary violence escalated with kidnappings, sporadic bombings of security and 
economic infrastructure, and expanded recruitment by insurgents and a steady shift from 
selective targets to indiscriminate attacks by security forces on the right.   
FECCAS and the UTC merged to form the Peasant Workers Front (FTC), and soon 
after, steered the formation of the principal mass resistance organization, the Revolutionary 
Popular Bloque (BPR).  The FTC strengthened solidarity and collaboration between peasant 
communities in the paracentral region and those in region to the north of San Salvador.  The 
centrist UCS, despite crises in funding and relations with their U.S. government sponsors, 
continued to incorporate cooperatives and grow.290  ORDEN and the death squads, in turn, 
became less restrained in the use of violence to intimidate peasants participating in opposition 
activities. 
The Molina government proposed a modest agrarian reform in 1976, supported by a 
coalition of academics and peasant groups, while the BPR advanced proposals to reform the 
Agrarian law governing wages and working conditions.  Landowners and the industrial elite 
quickly closed ranks to block any meaningful reforms.  San Vicente hard-liners were key 
participants in the landowner opposition to proposed reforms. 
Through blatant fraud, the PCN eliminated all legislative and municipal opposition and 
installed Col. Humberto Romero, former Minister of Defense under Molina, as president in 
1977.  As President, Romero unleashed death squad and security force leaders to carry out a 
systematic assault on the popular church.  Between 1977 and 1981, sixty priests were expelled 
from El Salvador.  Eleven priests, three nuns, Archbishop Romero and many more lay workers 
and catechists were killed.  In the San Vicente diocese, two priests were executed (Fr. Alirio 
Napoleon Macías of San Esteben Catarina and Fr. Cosme Spezzoto, of Santiago Nonualco), 
several others tortured (included Fr. Barahona of Tecoluca and Fr. Valladares of Verapáz), and 
several more forced into exile (Fr. Benigno Rodríguez).  The popular church was slowly forced 
underground.  
                                                 
290 AIFLD was expelled from El Salvador in August 1973 and the U.S. government funded Inter-American 
Foundation took over as the principal funder of UCS. 
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Between 1977-1979, factory and farm strikes proliferated, in addition to office and land 
takeovers, kidnappings and executions.  Coordinated occupations of key farms in the 
paracentral region were carried out by the FTC during Holy Week, 1977.291 Violent evictions 
followed, but the confrontations with landowners and security forces steeled the confidence of 
a growing rural insurgency.   
Both nationally and internationally, the political context careened toward civil war.  The 
Sandinistas toppled Somoza in July, 1979.  An ambivalent Carter administration in the U.S. 
began to urge Col. Romero to resign, who in turn rejected conditioned U.S. military aid and 
circumvented other sanctions on internationally financed projects.292  In October, 1979, a 
reformist junta deposed President Romero and announced a series of sweeping economic and 
political reforms, including agrarian reform.   
By one account, political murders increase from a yearly average of 14 between 1972-
1977, to 299 between 1977-1978 to 1,030 in 1979.  This was only a prelude to 1980, when 
between 16,500 and 19,500 Salvadorans were killed, 75% of which were civilians.293  The first 
junta dissolved, followed by a second.  Each attempt to form a government shifted decisively to 
the right. In early March, 1980, a third attempt was made to form a provisional government, 
personified by PDC leaders such as Napoleon Duarte but led by military leader, Jaime Abdul 
Gutierrez, considered by some as a moderate.  A massive land reform was announced on March 
6 to be implemented under force of military arms.  Two UCS leaders were tapped to head the 
land reform agency, ISTA, and the UCS was positioned by U.S. advisors to champion the 
program.   
 
 
 
                                                 
291 These included Hacienda Guajoyo, Porvenir, La Mora in Tecoluca and Hacienda Platanares, Zacatecoluca.   
292 In March, 1977 President Romero declared a state of siege and the human rights deteriorated quickly.  In July, 
1977, President Carter blocked approval of the $90 million IDB loan for the 15 of September dam.  The loan was 
then approved in October, 1977, representing a crucial concession to support one of the most repressive regimes in 
the hemisphere. 
293 Baloyra (1983: 190).  Pre-1977 estimates are clearly inaccurate.   
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a. Life in pre-war Jiboa Valley   
 
In the context of spiraling violence and ungovernability, we find the Jiboa Valley wedged 
between deepening revolutionary conflict in Tecoluca and Aguilares-Suchitoto-Cinquera, yet 
relatively acquiescent.  In part, this may have been due to the absence of cotton production in 
the region and disproportionate number of smallholders in the sugar sector.  While the 
expansion of coffee and sugar production continued unabated, concentrating the region’s 
productive assets, the impact in terms of landlessness and unemployment may have been 
relatively lower. 
Another reason may involve the type of landowner that dominated the Jiboa Valley.  
The Cristiani family’s influence in the Jiboa Valley exceeded that of the Angulos to the south.   
The Angulos, despite accumulating tremendous wealth from their agricultural assets and the 
political appointments that came with it, failed to penetrate the highest echelons of El 
Salvador’s political economic elite.   The Cristiani Burkard – Llach syndicate, on the other 
hand, diversified coffee, cotton and sugar holdings in the 1970s to catapult themselves into one 
of the country’s richest families.  Strategically employing his later influence within ARENA as 
former President, Alfredo Cristiani has focused on building his business empire. Through 
extended family representation, family holdings now include a diverse portfolio that has clearly 
benefited from close ties to government officials.294 
Cristiani family members hold major ownership shares of Central America’s largest 
bank, the country’s most lucrative private pension company, an insurance company, various 
investment firms, computer equipment & farm inputs import and distribution companies, two 
coffee exporting companies, a major drug store chain, a sporting goods store chain, a plastics 
fabrication and a cemetery.295   
                                                 
294 Cristiani has been associated with a number of scandals that have strongly suggested that preferential contracts 
and corruption between his businesses and government programs (BFA, MAG, ISSS, BCR) are common, although 
never prosecuted.  Perhaps the most significant and spectacular of these was the recapitalization and privatization 
of the national banking sector as President, only to become the lead investor in Banco Cuscatlan.   
295 Paniagua Serrano and Chávez Henríquez (2000: 66-79); See also special edition of Estudios Centroamericanos, 
El Bloque Empresarial Hegemónico Salvadoreño,” Jul-Aug. 2002, Vol. 645-646.  Eduardo Colindres (1977), 
Sevilla (1985), Albiac (1999). 
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Cristiani was 33 in 1980 and conservative, but not involved in politics.  Roberto 
D’Aubuisson, the founder of ARENA, had become the principal architect of the counter-
insurgency strategy of the landed elite and the suspected leader of the White Hand death squad 
(Pyes and Beckland 1983; Nairn 1984).  D’Aubuisson was familiar with the Jiboa Valley, 
through motivational visits to civil defense forces in villages such as San Emigdio, and the 
orchestrated resettlement of client refugee groups in FMLN controlled areas nearby.  
By contrast, Cristiani was not considered one of the true believers in the extreme right 
political leadership.  However, increasingly targeted by insurgents in San Vicente, the pre-war 
experience pushed Cristiani toward reliance on protection by the extreme right.  This 
partnership between Cristiani and D’Aubuisson, like that entered into by other members of the 
coffee oligarchy in the region, became a protection racket, which was a critical factor in 
pacifying the Jiboa Valley.  A hard line would be drawn against the FMLN in the Jiboa Valley.  
In 1988, D’Aubuisson handpicked Cristiani as the ARENA Presidential candidate.296   
 
b. Organization   
 
The weak foundation of CEB organizing in the Jiboa Valley did not allow nascent organized 
opposition to establish more than a few pockets of support, disconnected and fledgling.  About 
twenty families based in San Pedro Aguas Calientes represented the most ambitious effort to 
build a peasant opposition movement that targeted the local coffee elite.   Yet, even within this 
community, progressive catechists were a minority.  The absence of an established network of 
catechists and layworkers in the Jiboa Valley was due to the pervasive suspicion of local 
organizing that actively opposed the influence of liberation theology priests and fenced in the 
few, small CEB initiatives that did take root.  Most catechists were resigned to the unjust 
conditions of the coffee economy.  Organizing began later when events like La Cayetana had 
increased the obstacles to collective action strategies.  This insecurity and the constant 
surveillance by the local civil patrols made overt organizing nearly impossible.  
The space unoccupied by progressive religious organizing was filled by ORDEN and a 
reinforced civil patrol network.  Under threat by the municipal and departmental commanders, 
                                                 
296 Interview published in Diario de Hoy, 2005 
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volunteers from every cantón were pressed into civil defense duties.  Reluctance to serve was 
generally expressed in retrospect, however the fear of reprisal by the military or paramilitary 
forces was overwhelming.   
Despite the climate of intimidation that prevailed, some space for opposition was 
opened.  In 1974-75, there was an attempt by workers at the Beneficio Acahuapa in San 
Cayetano Istepeque to unionize.  According to one source that collaborated with the effort for 
FENASTRAS, a provisional union was achieved for a time before individual union leaders 
were persecuted and fled.297  Opposition mayors were elected or appointed in Verapáz and San 
Cayetano by the late 1970s.  On Jan 15, 1980, Isabel Mejía Flores, a sixty year old mayor of 
San Cayetano Istepeque for the UDN, along with his son, José Napoleon Mejía and Elio 
Sanchez, catechist and secretary of the municipal council were arrested and tortured by the 
National Guard.  The opposition mayor was later killed by death squads, but his son joined the 
insurgency.    
After several years of clandestine organizing, in 1978, the political organizers based in 
San Pedro Aguas Calientes decided the time had come to challenge the local coffee elite.  
Several leaders, Rufino Sanchez, Pedro Mira, and Juan Hernandez were delegated to represent 
the workers in negotiations with Alfredo Cristiani over improved benefits for seasonal coffee 
pickers.  The principal demands were adherence to the labor law permitting payment for the 
seventh workday (Séptimo), wage increases, fair weights at the scales and better food.  In an 
attempt to co-opt the peasant negotiators, they were offered preferred work assignments and 
higher individual salaries.  When they refused, Cristiani circulated pamphlets to all area fincas 
that effectively blacklisted the men from future employment.  The most compliant families 
were then selected by local landowners to fill the relatively lucrative harvest positions, using 
this discretion to marginalize workers from opposition communities. 
 During the following harvest in November 1979, the coffee pickers of the Jiboa Valley 
organized takeovers of the principal fincas owned by Cristiani (Las Margaritas, El Carmen). 
Organizers used their control of the fincas to assign work more equitably and reiterated 
previous wage demands.  After several weeks, Cristiani appeared to concede.  Bi-monthly pay, 
                                                 
297 Interview, former FENASTRAS organizer, Granzaso, Tecoluca Aug. 1998. 
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which included the Séptimo benefit, was dropped to the occupied fincas by helicopter.  The 
takeover endured for the entire harvest.   
The victory was short-lived.  Waiting until the harvest had ended but watching as the 
military prepared to intervene and redistribute farms across the country, Cristiani had the 
National Guard exact retribution against the community of San Pedro Aguas Calientes.  The 
local civil patrol chiefs, mostly landowners themselves, identified beforehand which families 
were involved with the coffee strike. In turn, families collaborating with the Guard were given 
warning that an attack was imminent and began to vacate.  The families allied with the coffee 
strike began sleeping away from the community, only returning to prepare meals.   
In February 1980, Mario Dimas was killed by unknown assailants and Juan Hernandez 
and Pedro Mira were arrested.  At dawn on March 23, 1980 the National Guard moved in and 
massacred twenty people.  The corpses were buried in the community chapel.  Some 200 
families deserted the cantón taking refuge in the cabecera of Verapáz.   Having been identified 
as the principal leaders of peasant organizing and a likely FMLN encampment, the community 
of San Pedro Aguas Calientes was annihilated.298  Opposition organizing never recovered on 
this side of the Chinchontepec volcano.  The day following the massacre at Aguas Calientes, a 
death squad sniper assassinated Archbishop Oscar Romero while saying mass in a small chapel 
in San Salvador. 
Much more needs to be investigated about this second case, but there are apparent 
similarities and major differences between this turning point and the one at La Cayetana.  First, 
pre-existing ties of reciprocity may have also existed between Aguas Calientes and neighboring 
villages, although few inter-community collective actions were recounted in historical 
testimony.  There existed little collective sense of injustice, outrage or alienation over 
experiences such as the massacre.  Rather, individualist and apolitical critiques of the war 
centered on the arbitrary and personalized nature of the violence that tended to assign equal 
                                                 
298 Survivors of the San Pedro Aguas Calientes massacre dispute claims regarding the level of FMLN sympathy 
among the 200 families then living in the village.  Several informants argued that violence against the community 
was perpetrated on the basis of personal grievances rather than solid information.  Another source suggested that 
the killings in Aguas Calientes were revenge for an FMLN assassination at the INCAFE coffee storage facility in 
neighboring Molineros.  The INCAFE victim had personal ties with a local Sergeant who retaliated by killing the 
suspects in custody in Aguas Calientes.  It is not clear how widely it is now acknowledged that some degree of 
clandestine military organizing, including storing of arms, was ongoing in the village.  Interviews, Verapáz, 
Molineros, Agua Agria and San Pedro Aguas Calientes, July 1998 
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blame on both the FMLN and government security forces.  Residents in Molineros described 
how youth from Aguas Calientes would visit for soccer matches, only to attempt to recruit the 
opposing team for political activities.  What was dangerous about this recruitment was not the 
potential conversion to communism, but the certain retribution that the family would suffer as a 
result.299  Some families within Aguas Calientes remain resentful that an entire cantón was 
falsely identified as an insurgent hotspot.  Equal responsibility is attributed to the victims and 
the security forces.   
Second, while political and religious opposition allies were available to organizers in 
San Pedro Aguas Calientes, the solidarity was insufficient to prepare for and guide the 
community through this crisis.  No marches were organized in protest, no delegations were 
made to signal outside support, and few if any active insurgent cells were capable of 
capitalizing on the disruption to peasant lives.  Silence prevailed.  The PRTC, which had only 
formed in 1976 and was much smaller than the FPL, coordinated with community leaders but 
never seemed to have a major presence in the Jiboa Valley or northern slopes of the volcano at 
that time.  Key actors in the popular church played a role, both from the San Vicente and San 
Salvador dioceses, but were more effectively opposed by reactionary clergy in Guadalupe and 
San Vicente.  Catechists, some of whom became active in the early 1970s, were nevertheless 
divided.  Without widespread endorsement of a liberation theology type Parish Plan, the level 
of parish organization and unity achieved in Tecoluca was never possible.   
 Third, Cristiani’s use of overwhelming force was effective in taking any steam the 
burgeoning peasant movement might have had.   The National Guard reportedly forbid any of 
the victim’s families to bury their dead collectively to crush any resurgence of communal 
solidarity.  Despite frequent shows of force by FMLN combatants during the war, early 
reprisals against families with members that had joined the insurgency had a chilling effect on 
local communal actions. Unlike Tecoluca, no apparent measures were taken or organizational 
capacity achieved for effective self-defense of those family members that were suspected of 
insurgent collaboration but chose to remain in their homes.   
 As a result, just as La Cayetana has served as code for resistance and transformation in 
the collective memory of FMLN communities, San Pedro Aguas Calientes came to represent 
                                                 
299 Interview  Molineros and Agua Agria. 
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the equally symbolic decay of peasant respect for rural authority and defeat of such impulses in 
government controlled zones like the Jiboa Valley.  Still, the latter massacre never assumed the 
same pride of place in the heroic narratives of communist resistance recorded in post-war 
civilian testimony in the surrounding area.   Rather, the massacre in San Pedro Aguas Calientes 
is described with candor as an example of the punishment a peasant must always expect when 
one transgresses the rural order.  
 In San Pedro Aguas Calientes we find a situation much closer to Stoll’s analysis of 
Guatemala.  The provocation of a strike against the most powerful local coffee baron without 
the prior establishment of a solid basis for community support and self-defense was probably a 
leap of faith with which the majority disagreed.  Much stronger reservations now voiced by the 
survivors of the 1980 massacre raise many of the concerns that Stoll explores in his challenge 
to the solidarity perspective of such events.   Perhaps most persuasive is the imprint that the 
violence has left on the collective psyche manifested in the blame assigned to the victims as 
well as the National Guard.   
 
3. Case Three -  San Francisco de la Cruz, “El Pulguero” & Las Canoas:   
 
The final illustration shows how a combination of events proved decisive in defining the 
political opportunity structure of action in San Ildefonso.  The receptivity to agrarian reform 
and FMLN violence toward cooperative leaders in 1980 in several highland communities 
represents the closest thing to a turning point of the kind described above.  It resulted in 
strategic choices that are most associated not with the active insurgent or counter-insurgent 
options noted above, but a moderate reform alternative that staked its hopes on the Christian 
Democrat political project.  This turning point event differs from both of the prior two in that it 
describes the history of insurgent violence and, for the most part, the avoidance of conflict.   
While San Ildefonso experienced its share of political violence in the years leading up to the 
war, no single event was as significant as the perceived opening provided by the agrarian 
reform process and the fumbled initial FMLN policies toward cooperative leaders.  Reactions 
to the implementation of agrarian reform and early attacks on at least two cooperatives 
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represent the crucial turning point for the strategic choices that shaped expectations and 
institutions in San Ildefonso for years to come.   
 
a. Life in pre-war San Ildefonso   
 
In the years leading up to the war, rural economic relations had not reached the level of 
confrontation in other areas, although conflict bordered the municipality on all sides.  While 
economic conditions were equally catastrophic for the rural poor, the elite in San Ildefonso 
were provincial, not “cosmopolitan”.   That is, while some export crops were cultivated, these 
growers started late and most continued to live within the municipality.  Moreover, most were 
dependent upon the local labor force and thus a lingering mutual respect endured longer in San 
Ildefonso.300 Thus conditions never came to transform the pre-war rural landscape and social 
relations as completely as in the other municipal regions.   
Gerardo Rodríguez and Fermín Cortéz, were the current leaders (in 1998) of the 
communal organization and cooperative, respectively, of the highland community of San 
Francisco de la Cruz (“El Pulguero”) of the cantón, Guachipilín.  The Lazo family owned 9 or 
10 properties in the region, and produced sugar cane and rice in San Francisco de la Cruz.   As 
former colonos, both referred to treatment of workers by the Lazo family, with mix of 
resentment and empathy.  Colonos working for the Lazo Amaya family that owned several 
farms in neighboring Las Canoas also described a tolerable working relationship.  Neither were 
tinderboxes of protest.   
Abusive conditions existed for colonos and laborers working on a good number of large 
farms in San Ildefonso, and several owners were notoriously cruel.301  However, there were 
also owners that had reputations for generosity, and in sum, little justification for insurrection 
existed.  From both the perspective of the landowner and the peasant, both parties were trying 
to manage a deteriorating social contract, when outside factors polarized the situation.  Instead, 
most conflicts were at the individual level.   
                                                 
300 Interviews, Miguel Cornejo, Los Almendros; Santiago Meléndez, San Ildefonso. 
301 Manuel Aguilúz paid 1 colon per temporary laborers when the minimum wage was 2.25 colones, and was 
reportedly fined by Ministry of Labor for wage violations.  Interview, Pablo Torres, Sihuatepeque, San Ildefonso. 
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b. Organization   
 
As both peasant grievances and landowner indifference or hostility mounted, goodwill and 
patience among the workers toward the patrono were exhausted by the late 1970s.  However, 
there were few cases of organized land takeovers or organized attempts to negotiate better 
conditions with landowners prior to the war.302  At the same time, municipalities to the west in 
the Cerros de San Pedro region of San Vicente, insurgents had established deep support in most 
of the rural communities and were recruiting in the highland communities of San Ildefonso.  
Although not immune to this influence, events early in the conflict weakened the support that 
the FMLN would ever have there.   
In neither region was the popular church nor the displacement caused by export crop 
expansion as dramatic as in Tecoluca or the Jiboa Valley.  The influence of Padre Macias in 
San Esteben Catarina before his death in 1979, as well as that of the Rodríguez brothers, was 
minimal.  The collaboration between the reactionary laity within the church, the municipal 
council and the military provided little space for pastoral agents to even begin working.303 
While the popular church did not have much impact on awakening peasant indignation, 
many were exposed to the emerging resistance organized by political and religious organizers 
during the cotton harvests in neighboring Usulután, where many migrated in the off-season.  As 
in the Jiboa Valley, pockets of PRTC recruits were recruited and trained clandestinely where 
working conditions were the most inhumane.  However, these efforts were disconnected with 
neighboring communities.304   
The construction of the 15 de Septiembre dam that began in 1977 indirectly influenced 
the political linkages that would come to dominate San Ildefonso.  The dam’s reservoir flooded 
3,500 hectares of the region’s most productive farmland and in turn eliminated employment on  
                                                 
302 One reported takeover was the Hacienda San Pablo Cañas of Manuel Aguilúz.  
303 Interview, “Chaca”, former commander in Northern San Vicente, April, 1998. 
304 Cells were established among colonos on the Hacienda Los Almendros, Interview, Miguel Cornejo, July, 1998. 
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some export oriented farms, closed transit routes for many peasants that migrated for the 
harvests, and displaced thousands along the banks of the Lempa River.  The decision to sell  
was taken by local landowners after little or no consultation with the local colono and laborer 
population.  Some of the 250-500 families displaced by the reservoir reported little advance 
warning before the water was at their doorstep.305  For those who remained, the quality of life 
has deteriorated steadily, independent of the war.   
 
 
Figure 4.6  The 15 of September Hydroelectric Dam spanning the Lempa River bordering San 
Ildefonso (left) and the province of Usulután (right) (Photo by CEL). 
 
 
                                                 
305 The IDB (1985) reports that between 1982 and 1984, 250 families were relocated with assistance from the state 
power agency, (CEL) to housing built in the cantón of Condadillo, Estanzuelas, Usulután, overlooking the dam. 
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While some families were relocated, most were colonos and they were not compensated 
but had to negotiate the sale of the land they would occupy.306  Others had to absorb personal 
losses of displacement or adapt to the new environment.  In other settings, dams had been a 
source for peasant mobilization.  The construction of El Salvador’s first major hydroelectric 
dam, El Cerron Grande, beginning in 1969, was the spark for peasant organizing.  The dam 
which was completed in 1976, flooded 14,000 hectares of farmland in the upper Lempa basin 
of Chalatenango and Cuscatlán.  To accommodate the reservoir, large landowners sold off their 
land at an inflated price, but offered no resources to relocate the peasants who would be 
displaced.  Local peasants inhabiting the proposed reservoir area were opposed to the 
project.307  While the peasant organizations were unable to block the dam’s construction, the 
organizing effort was instrumental as a confidence and consciousness raising experience. 
San Ildefonso did not experience a violent confrontation when families were displaced 
by the 15 de Septiembre dam.  Perceived inequality was mitigated by two factors.  A 
combination of a lack of what Adam’s referred to as a cosmopolitan upper class and the 
perception of “good patronos” among the provincial landed elite may have softened incentives 
to challenge local authority.308  More importantly, the perceived escape through land reform for 
some families engineered by Orlando Arevalo and CEL acted as an even more significant 
safety valve for social tensions. 
The hydroelectric project was financed by the IDB and others when the political 
stability of the government was the most uncertain – providing an important infusion of capital 
at a time when the provisional governments of the early 1980s were descending into crisis.  
IDB records show that the Bank disbursement of $125 million in 1982-83 was second only to 
                                                 
306 Carlos Soriano, ex-mayor of San Ildefonso, stated that CEL donated some of the land on the Usulután side of 
the bridge, although the displaced members of the new community, Vista Hermosa, were obliged to pay for the 
land and housing through a project financing facility.  Interview, 5/24/05 and IDB (1985: 25). 
307 Alas (2003) Accompanied by local priests, Chencho and Higinio Alas, protests forced the project’s temporary 
postponement. A small number of the 25,000 who would be displaced were resettled.  However, the dam was 
built.  As the water filled the reservoir in December 1976, a crisis was touched off when 250 peasants gathered at 
the hacienda Colima in Aguilares to confront the Francisco and Eduardo Orellana, the principal landowners that 
benefited from the project.  During the protest, Eduardo Orellana was accidentally shot.  The circumstances of the 
shooting provoked an “eye for an eye” campaign of retribution by right wing death squads.   
308 Although the earlier massacre may have had an effect. 
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USAID in terms of external finance that stabilized an economy that was spiraling downward.309  
The costs of building a dam in the middle of a highly conflictive zone exceeded initial projects 
by nearly 50% or $90 million – dwarfing the resources available for development within San 
Ildefonso.  These expenses were attributed to vaguely accounted cost overruns by the principal 
construction contractor related to the extraordinary security provisions and inflationary spike in 
material expenses.   The counter-insurgent cost overruns, including an airstrip in San Ildefonso 
to avoid any travel of project management by car were accepted by the IDB without question - 
undoubtedly influenced by the April, 1980 encounter between two Bank specialists and 
“elementos subversives” on the Pan American highway in transit to the project site.310   
As disruptive as the dam may have been for some, it provided the obvious benefits for 
others that derive from major public works projects.  One construction supervisor affiliated 
with the PDC found regular employment through small infrastructure projects associated with 
the dam construction.  Another local landowner reportedly sold a parcel for an inflated price 
where the landing strip was built, and then married a construction executive and moved to Italy.  
Local restaurants and stores benefited from the local purchases of construction personnel, 
although few locals were placed in the skilled trades employed to build the dam.  Combined 
with the modest relocation package offered by the state, these local benefits cushioned the 
potentially explosive effect the dam might have had.   
Orlando Arevalo personified the personality of non-violent peasant social mobility that 
could be replicated through loyalty to the Christian Democrats.311  Arevalo’s family worked as 
colonos for Alfredo Marin on Hacienda Candelaria Lempa.  As the oldest of seventeen 
children, nine of whom died during infancy, Arevalo worked as a boy picking cotton and as a 
general laborer for Marin.  At age twelve, he was hospitalized for a year after injuring his left 
                                                 
309 IDB (1985: 3). http://www.iadb.org/projects/Project.cfm?project=ES0022&Language=English, accessed March 
15, 2005.  The IDB provided over $500 million in project financing to the Salvadoran government between 1970 
and 1983, some $372 million of which came after 1977 when human rights violations by state security forces were 
highest. 
310 IDB (1985: 29).  The government request for an additional $70 million from the IDB, on top of the original $90 
million loan approved in 1977, came shortly after the incident. 
311 The history of Orlando Arevalo was a subject that came up in many interviews.  This section is based on 
interviews with Arevalo individuals in the communities of Divisadero, Mariadiga, Cumiste, Ahogadas, as well as 
on published interviews, eg. La Prensa Gráfica, Jan 10, 2000, 
http://archive.laprensa.com.sv/20001001/enfoques/enf7.asp, accessed March 15, 2005. 
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arm in a fall from a tree.  Marin took an interest in Arevalo and facilitated his elementary 
education.  At a young age, Arevalo assumed the position of mandador on another of Marin’s 
properties, Hacienda La Peleada.312  When the reservoir was flooded and threatened to 
submerge the community of Lindero, Antonio Marin helped Arevalo and the other displaced 
families negotiate land that the government had acquired in the pre-land reform period and 
intended to sell (Hacienda Miralempa) – which now belongs to the municipality of San 
Vicente, but borders San Ildefonso. 313 
Charismatic and connected to the local Christian Democrat party elite, Arevalo 
ascended the political ladder at a remarkable pace.  At Miralempa, Arevalo organized the 
displaced families into a cooperative and joined the Asociación Cooperativa de Products 
Agropecuarios Integrados (ACOPAI).  Arevalo soon became president of ACOPAI, a small 
cooperative association that split from the UCS in 1978 over ideological and strategic 
differences.314  Newly elected President Duarte picked Arevalo to head the National Financial 
Institute for Agricultural Lands (FINATA), created to administer the Land to the Tiller program 
(Phase III) of the agrarian reform (1985-1989).315  Arevalo was deposed as president of 
ACOPAI after a falling out over Duarte’s economic policies toward unions and agriculture in 
1986, and he established a parallel coalition which ultimately became the National Peasant 
Confederation (CNC).   
In the 1991 elections, Arevalo was offered a spot on ARENA’s national list of deputies, 
and accepted.  Revealing a political skill that is been characteristic of his survival, Arevalo has 
been switching parties regularly since 1991.  All the while, he has managed to remain the 
                                                 
312 Also referred to by some as La Galera. 
313 Arevalo claims that ACOPAI promoter, Marciano Ulloa, was involved with the relocation and cooperative 
formation in 1979.  Lolo Melendez, Jr, former ACOPAI promoter and resident of Miralempa, estimates that 78 
families were originally in Lindero, of a total 300 that were relocated from all three departments that would be 
flooded.  Beneficiaries were offered 1 mz of land to be financed.  Interview, 6/1/98 
314 ACOPAI is one of the smaller cooperative associations established around the time of the agrarian reform.  At 
its peak, ACOPAI represented about 25 coops, with a maximum of 5,000 members.  Forché and Wheaton (1981) 
argue ACOPAI resulted from a power struggle orchestrated by the AIFLD in 1978 that was led by Jorge Camacho, 
an embattled AIFLD client, when UCS traditional leaders, Rodolfo Viera and Tito Castro, were under scrutiny on 
corruption charges.  At the same time, the UCS as beginning to distance itself from U.S. tutelage. 
315 Land to the Tiller transferred small rental properties less than 7 ha to independent farmers that farmed them.  A 
full treatment of the land reform will be addressed in next chapter. 
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leader of a significant centrist peasant confederation, a most impressive feat in the treacherous 
terrain of agrarian politics.  The CNC is the most visible legacy of the UCS, after many 
divisions and reformulations, a center-right peasant organization.  Yet for agrarian issues of 
common concern, Arevalo’s political influence has derived from his capacity to mobilize tens 
of thousands of poor rural dwellers upon command.   
The trajectory of Arevalo, and families associated with ACOPAI and the Christian 
Democrats heightened local faith in the promise of the agrarian reform as a solution to rural 
conflict.  Many more informants attributed the source of change between pre-war and post-war 
conditions to the agrarian reform than to the Peace Accords negotiated by the FMLN.  Duarte, 
Arevalo and other PDC leaders retain tremendous respect among peasant farmers in San 
Ildefonso.   
 
c. The events of March to September, 1980   
 
ISTA, the UCS and ACOPAI were known in the region as word spread about the prospect of 
land reform in late 1979.  Several nearby ISTA cooperatives had experienced half a decade of 
operation by 1980.316  However, most of the colonos in the seven largest farms that were 
intervened by ISTA and FINATA after March 1980 were unorganized.317  In effect, the land 
was simply turned over to them.  Under the paternalist and often corrupt direction of ISTA 
staff, cooperatives were established and payments were collected, although few if any 
understood where the money went.  The cooperatives would quickly fall into debt.   
The property of Francisco Lazos and his sons Alvaro and Gilberto, was registered by 
FINATA as a Phase III land reform property.  The cooperative was serviced by ACOPAI.  Not 
long after its first harvest, a platoon of 30 PRTC combatants arrived in San Francisco de la 
Cruz on September 24, 1980, in search of suspected ORDEN collaborators.318  One youth 
thought to be an informant was detained.  The community was armed and resisted any attempts 
                                                 
316 San Jose Los Almendros in Santa Clara; Villa Dolores; San Juan del Merino all began operating as coops with 
church assistance in the mid-1970s. 
317 In likely reciprocity to a “good patrono,” only 10 hectares of land from the Marin family was intervened by 
FINATA. 
318 Interview Fermin Cortéz, Cooperative President, San Francisco de la Cruz, May 22, 1998. 
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by the PRTC commander to question or arrest community members.  The tense standoff 
resulted in an exchange of gunfire that left two PRTC combatants dead.  In response, the PRTC 
commander ordered the execution of four members of the cooperative, including the 
cooperative leader.   
Various informants from the community and the FMLN have attributed the events in 
San Francisco de la Cruz to a mistaken tactical approach to the agrarian reform cooperatives 
and the lack of experience of the commander involved.319  Early resistance was based on 
FMLN preference for expropriation without compensation of former owners.  Cooperative 
leaders were also threatened by the landed elites and the military, which established protection 
rackets for the new cooperatives or assassinated cooperative leaders as well.   
While some argued that improved leadership by the FMLN later in the war effectively 
repaired relations with the community, there is significant evidence to the contrary.320  The 
events pushed the cooperatives toward a commitment of neutrality in the conflict that found its 
deepest expression in the discourse of the PDC.  
San Ildefonso, in the words of many, was a passive observer to the capricious and 
violent actions of two larger forces.  The conflict was introduced from the outside, not from 
within.  The preferred strategy was conflict avoidance, which translated during the war into 
passive collaboration with both insurgents and the military.  The Christian Democrat reformist 
legacy left the deepest impression in the years leading up to the war, and no significant 
relationships were established with the FMLN or ARENA.   
In San Ildefonso, we have the most clear cut example of Stoll’s paradigmatic 
uncommitted community that strives to avoid the high risk identification with either the 
insurgents or the military.  Untrusting of both, the majority viewed themselves as trapped 
between two fires while desperately allegiant to a non-violent reform alternative.  However, as 
Stoll only acknowledges to a limited extent, not all fled to the perceived security of government 
                                                 
319 Others suggested that the killings were ordered for personal rather than political reasons. 
320 At some later point in the war (1984), the FMLN also reportedly executed seven suspected informers in the 
community of Las Canoas.  Interview Carlos Soriano, Las Lajas and Genaro Henríquez, San Ildefonso, May, 
1998.  A leader for the cooperative at San Jose Los Almendros, in neighboring Apastepeque, which began in 1976, 
reported pressure as early as 1978-1979 from FMLN militants for cooperative members to incorporate. One coop 
leader was killed in 1981, and another in 1986.  Interview, Lucio Adalberto Mendez, Cooperative President, Oct. 
13, 1998,  
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controlled refuge.  A small number did flee to the hills to join the insurgents or maintained a 
clandestine association for some part of the war.  Nevertheless, particularly in the highland 
communities where the conflict was most intense, almost everyone fled at some point – and as 
we share see later, more people in San Ildefonso fled to other countries than the hard-line 
insurgent or counter-insurgent cases.  So, in San Ildefonso we have a second variant on Stoll’s 
narrative that provides both supporting and detracting evidence of the motivations for 
revolution, reform or counter-insurgent resistance. 
The combination of FMLN sponsored executions of cooperative leaders and the deeply 
engrained influence of Christian Democrat personalities and institutions begins to explain the 
dominant political choices.  To most in San Ildefonso, Napoleon Duarte and the PDC 
represented the preferred alternative to extreme violence on the right and armed insurrection on 
the left.  As one local CNC promoter put it, “the PDC represented the moderate line, to fight 
with ideas and look for solutions without weapons, but rather through negotiation.”321 This 
vague moral centrism and the prospect of selective benefits was entirely compatible with the 
appeal of the PDC in San Ildefonso. While significant gains are attributed to the PDC project, 
they stand in stark contrast to the prevailing poverty.  Still, the perception remains that the 
centrist road was the only one worth choosing – so much so that when massive repression 
began in the early 1980s, the vast majority of the population fled to the cities, not to the hills as 
combatants.  
At a local level, the political legacy of Orlando Arevalo was evident in terms of the 
reflexive and entrepreneurial form of political organizing that became the norm in San 
Ildefonso.  Arevalo aptly demonstrated his skills as a leader as he emerged as one of the 
country’s most visible peasant leaders by 1980.  He rose through the ranks in the agrarian 
bureaucracy, defying explicit party affiliation but always adhering to a centrist philosophy.  
When the ARENA party controlled FINATA and ISTA offices and D’Aubuisson looked to 
ACOPAI to recruit a peasant candidate for the 1982 Constituent Assembly, Arevalo accepted 
but was too young to run.322  When the Christian Democrats collapsed in the late 1980s, 
Arevalo had already agreed to terms with Cristiani and easily switched parties to serve several 
                                                 
321 Interview Lolo Melendez, San Ildefonso,  May 20, 1998 
322 Interview with Arevalo in La Prensa Gráfica, op cit. 2001 
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terms as an ARENA deputy.  When political demands for his peasant base went unheard, 
Arevalo switched again to his current seat with PCN.   
Views toward Arevalo vary.  He is seen both as a pragmatic compromiser and a populist 
wholly lacking in principle.   Most agree that he has retained credibility as a peasant leader as a 
result of years of channeling small projects to communities that support him, and at least 
initially, the PDC.  For most in San Ildefonso, party identification was less important than the 
prospect for survival and gradualist incremental change.  Transformative public goods were not 
of interest.  However, the assiduous clientelist relationships with which Arevalo has kept 
himself afloat politically, reveals how local tolerance for populist and opportunist politics of 
that espoused by the Christian Democrats in the pre-war period informed the political action 
choices made by San Fonchanos over the long run.  
Among the FMLN, the legacy of Duarte and agrarian reform failed in the sense that it 
delivered land, which is but one aspect of structural rural poverty, without altering the 
fundamental consciousness of the beneficiary population.  Under the paternalist and corrupt 
tutelage of ISTA, the potential impact on the beneficiary population was lessened in not having 
organized to conquer land inequality.  Those who did join the insurgency tend to attribute the 
lack of greater participation among the local population to the absence of base community 
organizing and the fear of both sides caused by mistaken policies toward cooperative 
communities.  Reflecting its own contradictions, the FMLN was unable to provide an 
alternative strategy and the requisite actions to justify following it.  Like the majority of 
Salvadorans on the eve of civil war, the PDC chimbolitos (or little fish symbolized by the 
party’s icon) of San Ildefonso chose the middle path of least resistance. 
To summarize, Figure 4.7 compares the key differences and similarities of these 
catalytic turning points in the paths toward insurgent or counter-insurgent empowerment.  The 
events turned on variation between the case study contexts that can be subdivided into three 
areas (local organization, the nature of state repression, and local analysis of the violence), all 
of which contribute to collective choices toward an insurgent, counter-insurgent or neutral 
collective action choices. 
 The communities of La Cayetana and León de Piedra benefited from strong reciprocal 
ties and an accumulated prior experience of effective collective actions, compared to the rather 
atomized community relations in the other two cases that seemed to be dominated more by the 
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vertical ties each community had to a particular landlord.  Tecoluca and Jiboa Valley 
communities enjoyed strong ties to the progressive and reactionary church leaders and 
institutions, respectively – compared to relatively less religious influence in San Ildefonso 
either way.   Religious influence strengthened the hand of peasants in La Cayetana and 
weakened the potential support within San Pedro Aguas Calientes.  By contrast, the deep 
support for the reactionary church closed space for CEB expansion and restricted the influence 
progressive Catholic clergy to a handful of communities and scattered families. 
 The influence of revolutionary organizations was limited to the FPL in La Cayetana and 
most of Tecoluca, but fragmented among three different factions in the Jiboa Valley.  The 
PRTC was the decisive influence in the highland region of San Ildefonso, whose impact was 
not discernable until the onset of civil war.   In somewhat of a mirror image, there existed a 
more palpable impact of the paramilitary organizations in the Jiboa Valley, particularly in the 
absence of any competing military counter-balance.  Paramilitary organizing was present in 
Tecoluca although much more defensive as the FPL steadily armed itself.  Paramilitary 
influence prior to the war was less visible in pre-war San Ildefonso, perhaps due to the lower 
level of conflict between landlords and peasants.  
 Finally, the clearest difference in pre-war local organizing in the three cases revolved 
around collective action toward land claims.  In Tecoluca, beginning with La Cayetana, if not 
earlier, peasants organized to overtly take land from the most powerful and feared landlords 
and paid the price.   Most peasants throughout the Jiboa Valley were not as willing as those 
killed in San Pedro Aguas Calientes to take land.  An accurate read of the local opportunity 
structure or not, this reluctance to openly challenge agrarian elites would mark future action 
choices.  Many landless peasants in San Ildefonso also did not take land, but instead were 
satisfied to receive land from ISTA. 
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 Tecoluca Jiboa Valley San Ildefonso 
 La Cayetana,  
(Nov. 29, 1974) 
San Pedro Aguas 
Calientes, (March 23, 
1980) 
San Francisco de la Cruz, 
(Sept, 24, 1980) 
Local 
Organization 
• Strong inter-community 
reciprocity ties 
• Successful prior CA 
experiences 
• Enduring, expansive network 
of CEBs and catechists 
• FPL revolutionary influence 
unchallenged by other 
factions 
• Paramilitary organizing 
challenged early by local 
insurgents 
• Land was taken by force, 
ISTA reforms were limited 
• Weak inter-community 
reciprocity ties 
• Few successful CA 
experiences 
• Intermittent and 
circumscribed CEB/catechist 
influence 
• Fragmented revolutionary 
organizing between PRTC, 
PC, and FPL 
• Paramilitary organizing 
unchallenged and hegemonic 
• Land was neither taken nor 
given to any large degree 
• Moderate inter-community 
reciprocity ties 
• Few successful CA 
experiences 
• No evident CEB/catechist 
influence 
• PRTC influence began late 
and harmed local trust 
• Land was given by ISTA, not 
taken by peasants 
 
 
State 
Repression 
• Overwhelming, indiscriminate 
force by state security agents 
• Early in the cycle of state 
violence 
• Collective insurgent self-
defense measures available 
 
 
 
• Overwhelming, 
indiscriminate force by state 
security agents 
• Later in the cycle of state 
violence 
• No collective, self-defense 
capacity 
• Organized counter-insurgent 
self-defense measures most 
decisive 
• Modest, targeted violence by 
the National Guard as well as 
the FMLN against 
cooperative leaders 
• Later in the cycle of state 
violence, early in the cycle of 
insurgent violence 
• Collective neutral self-
defense measures available 
Analysis of 
Violence 
• Event became code for 
resistance and transformation 
• Amplified by legislative 
investigation 
• Blame assigned to landowners 
and state security forces 
• Reinforced collective 
conception of agrarian 
injustice and solutions 
• Highly politicized analysis of 
the war  
 
 
 
• Symbolic of the decay of 
peasant respect for rural 
authority and the defeat of 
rebellious impulses 
• Obscured in the public by 
larger events and the historic 
record 
• Equal blame assigned to the 
FMLN, state security forces 
and in some instances, the 
victims themselves 
• Individualist and apolitical 
critiques of agrarian injustice  
• Arbitrary & personalized 
nature of the violence 
• Reflected the capricious and 
violent actions of two larger 
forces 
• Relegated to the semi-public 
record of insurgent oral 
history, yet to be written or 
redressed. 
• Conflict was introduced from 
the outside, blame is placed 
with FMLN 
• Reinforced passive 
observer/collaborator 
strategy  
 
Preferred 
Empowerment 
Strategy 
• Confrontational zero-sum 
path of armed revolution 
 
 
• Mix of coerced and voluntary 
counter-insurgent resistance   
• Centrist path of conflict 
avoidance, translated during 
the war into passive 
collaboration with both 
insurgents and the military 
 
Figure 4.7  Summary of Key Differences and Similarities Between Momentous Turning Points 
in Case Study Paths to Insurgent or Counter-Insurgent Empowerment 
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Two key differences distinguish the impact of repression.  In Tecoluca and the Jiboa 
Valley, the private landowners called in state security forces to send a strategic signal to all 
local peasants that organized resistance would be met with overwhelming force.  It was early 
enough in the cycle of state violence that the growing political maturity in Tecoluca had not 
been worn down by escalating state retaliation.  The fact that neighboring communities failed 
to rally in defense of San Pedro Aguas Calientes is at least in part due to the five year interim 
experience of observed deterioration in the human rights climate that changed the prevailing 
risk analysis.  A capacity for local self-defense can mitigate the effect of violence and the 
temporal difference should have worked in the reverse direction, favoring San Pedro Aguas 
Calientes.  Yet, the Jiboa Valley experience reflects a much weaker self-defense capacity 
despite the advantage of five additional years to prepare. 
 The San Ildefonso case is different from both in that the community of San Francisco de 
la Cruz was attacked by PRTC.  Moreover, the goal of the attack involved a locally popular 
reform.  Rather than an overwhelming demonstration of force, the rebels were limited to only a 
modest threat that was barely superior to a significant local self-defense capacity.  This relative 
parity in terms of military superiority is in part responsible for the stand off and resulting shoot 
out.  This balance of power between the communities of San Ildefonso and the PRTC forced 
both sides to consider more accommodative co-existence strategies as an alternative to their 
primary preferences. 
 Not surprisingly, subjective analyses of the violence varied in each case.  The massacre 
in La Cayetana became a codeword for revolutionary heroism and entered the FMLN pantheon 
of cultural referents for pre-war social injustice.  The amplification of the story of La Cayetana 
and placement of responsibility squarely with the local landlords and National Guard was 
facilitated in part by the high profile legislative investigation of the crime, albeit without any 
legal consequence for the Angulo family or the local Guard.  Five years hence, the massacre in 
San Pedro Aguas Calientes was obscured by the open floodgate of killing that was underway in 
1980.  The assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero the following day ensured that the 
victims of the Jiboa Valley death squads would pass into anonymity as the level of killing 
reached an astonishing 75 homicides per day.  Although survivors know and have reported 
details of the event to human rights organizations, this massacre that occurred within full view 
of Cristiani’s residence is barely known to the public.  Lesser known still are the details of the 
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exchange between young PRTC commanders and defiant cooperative leaders in San Francisco 
de la Cruz, Las Canoas and elsewhere that ended the lives of civilian peasant farmers in San 
Ildefonso.  In the Jiboa Valley, the absence of a public record has allowed the event to 
symbolize the inevitable consequence when respect is lost for traditional rural authority.  In San 
Ildefonso, the local knowledge of the killing of cooperative leaders merely underscores the 
prevailing suspicion most held toward violent solutions to agrarian problems where the 
majority in this region preferred passive collaboration with both sides to avoid identification 
with either.   
 In each case, the violence reinforced a local conception of the agrarian injustice and the 
possible menu of solutions that underwrote the competing empowerment strategies that guided 
them through the war and have subsequently shaped post-war institutions.  In Tecoluca, La 
Cayetana provided proof that through unified and contentious resistance, peasants can break 
the straightjacket of structural inequality.  Empowerment through conflict would therefore 
involve a zero-sum exchange of power that would in turn require armed self-defense.  In the 
Jiboa Valley, San Pedro Aguas Calientes meant many different things to different people, 
ultimately revealing a composite of highly personalized and largely apolitical understandings of 
the violence.  This vacuum of permissiveness enabled a hard-line counter-insurgent 
empowerment strategy to invite peasants to trade loyalty for survival while leaving the highly 
skewed local power relations essentially intact.  In San Ildefonso, the violence hardened the 
population’s aversion toward both of these war empowerment strategies and therefore pushed 
them into the majority position of negotiating neutrality through limited, passive collaboration 
with either side. 
 Together, these three cases of repression illustrate a significant variability in the factors 
associated with political violence that challenges the generalizability of Stoll’s claims about 
rebellion, repression and insurgent influence.  In other words, my analysis of how peasant 
insurgency unfolded in the paracentral region should raise suspicion about any national level 
explanation that homogenizes sub-national distinctions.  If anything, rural guerilla movements 
are not best understood simply as a response to government or insurgent repression, as 
Wickham-Crowley has argued, although that was certainly present in each case (Wickham-
Crowley 1992: 41).  Instead, they turn on other factors that vary between the cases, including 
the types of marginal elites to which local people have access and the intensity of agrarian 
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dislocation.  Tecoluca, the Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso were all victimized by state or 
insurgent violence and reacted differently.  These differences are sharpened more profound as 
the war unfolds.  Despite noted limitations in the evidence supporting each case, this variability 
may be rooted in the very real difference between otherwise similar country cases of peasant 
rebellion or questions regarding the type of evidence brought to bear in comparative inquiry. 
 
F.  CONCLUSION 
 
These episodes of pre-war collective action provide a glimpse of how such strategies are crucial 
for understanding how development policies such as decentralization avoid the pitfalls of 
political capture under conditions of severe inequality and weak democratic institutions. This 
chapter has explored how historical patterns of mobilization or demobilization of peasant unrest 
begin to help us understand the present context for decentralized development. Peasants were 
mobilized by both insurgent and counter-insurgent political forces, but what was the lasting 
effect of these experiences on empowerment strategies during the war, and in turn how people 
deal with obstacles to the collective action problem in the post-war context.   
The chapter has outlined historical sketches of the three municipal case studies, with 
particular emphasis on three central variables in the political opportunity for local 
empowerment (agrarian structure, elite access and state repression).  I have argued that these 
factors define to a large degree the political opportunity structure within which strategic action 
choices were made in the years leading up to full scale civil war.  In turn, the types of local 
mobilization or individual strategic actions chosen to survive the increasingly violent years 
leading up to the war begin to distinguish the various competing empowerment strategies that 
emerge from this pre-war political opportunity structure. 
Severe, enduring agrarian inequality was deepened by the modernization and export 
orientation of production.  Agrarian inequality was responsible for the marginalization of a 
peasant labor force that had only years earlier been subsisting as colonos in relatively stable 
relations with area landowners.  The export boom modernized the rural economy, and 
consumed all available land – intensifying landlessness and insecurity.  Growing economic 
anxiety and intransigence within the landed elite blocked all meaningful political and economic 
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reform initiatives.  These shifts reshaped long-standing peasant-landlord relations and 
disempowered the rural poor in the pre-war period.    
Two main catalysts explain how the poor reacted.  Access to political and religious 
elites and experiences of specific and diffuse violence altered the political opportunity structure 
and shaped how solutions were found to collective action problems through trust, coordination, 
and political mobilization.  The progressive Catholic Church and revolutionary organizations 
provided elite leadership for channeling rural and urban grievances toward conflictive 
mobilization tactics.  The indifference by the global community, particularly the U.S., in the 
1970s to growing repression only polarized the strategies of the extreme right and left.  Brief 
interruptions in the pragmatic U.S. and IFI alliance with increasingly intolerant PCN military 
regimes failed to mollify either side or open any space for electoral alternatives to civil war. 
In all three case study municipalities, crucial events illustrate how these factors 
converged to shape the choices taken by people confronting a formidable decision.  
Challenging, stabilizing or accommodating strategies were available.  However, the 
circumstances help explain why different choices were made in each municipality.   
In Tecoluca, where four to five years of building Christian base communities and a 
parallel effort to recruit and train insurgent cadre preceded the first shock of massive 
repression, as illustrated in episode of La Cayetana, the movement to challenge the rural order 
was strengthened.  In the Jiboa Valley, where the impact of the popular church was isolated and 
reactionary political forces found a strong following, an episode of massive repression was 
capable of annihilating any base of resistance to the prevailing coffee oligarchy.  In San 
Ildefonso, a combination of weak religious influence and insurgent violence toward a widely 
supported cooperative movement closed off potential participation in an active challenge to 
local inequality or a counter-insurgency.  Instead, an allegiance to the personalities and 
accommodative policies of the Christian Democrats, and in particular, the promise of agrarian 
reform, was reinforced.   
The emergence of religious and political leaders in opposition to the oligarchy and the 
military created space for rural organizations to effectively challenge local inequality.  The 
CEB movement is notable for several reasons.   First, it transformed attitudes of fatalism and 
deference that the church had long cultivated among the faithful.   People were given an 
instrument to articulate opposition to injustice that subjected all authority to careful critique.  
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Second, it achieved an impressive level of coordination while at the same time shifting 
authority into the hands of the laity.  Where progressive Catholicism took hold, individual 
attitudes toward social change were altered, and communal experiments unbeholden to any 
institution began to challenge rural injustice.  This skill formation process was adaptable to the 
changing context of the Salvadoran countryside and soon outpaced even the limits set by the 
priests leading the process.  Out of this process came organizations such as the UTC and 
FECCAS that represented the most profound challenge to the rural status quo.   When elite 
intransigence and revolutionary demands eclipsed any tenable strategy for pacific reform, CEB 
communities invested in measures for collective self-defense and many catechists and lay 
leaders made the natural transition to some form of active collaboration with organizations 
engaged in armed struggle.  This destination was not pre-determined, but the process of 
empowerment through conflict on which it was based never foreclosed such an option.  
Reactionary clergy and state security forces also mobilized peasants, although the 
orientation could not have been more different.  Counter-insurgent organizing placed a 
premium on the secret surveillance of one’s neighbors and coerced service in the defense of the 
elite dominated rural order.  ORDEN militants often participated in local terrorist acts against 
civilian opposition organizations.  The direction of ORDEN remained ensconced in a 
paramilitary command structure that was clientelist and anti-democratic in nature.  Within a 
climate of fear and intimidation, this type of rural mobilization served to stabilize a highly 
unequal pre-war landlord-peasant social contract. 
The PDC and USAID attempted to orient a segment of the peasant sector into the 
neutral center.  The UCS and its progeny, ACOPAI, adhered for long periods to the Christian 
Democrat fallacy of neutrality in the years leading to civil war, although chafing at the U.S. 
hold in the late 1970s.  In the end, however, these peasant organizations became the champions 
of a modest agrarian reform carried out by a chastened and conservative Christian Democratic 
leadership that was increasingly dependent and doomed to capitulate to an extremist U.S. 
counter-insurgent policy.   
Experiences in La Cayetana, San Pedro Aguas Calientes and various parts of San 
Ildefonso reveal the roots of these emerging empowerment strategies.  Each case suggests how 
choices within specific political opportunity structures have acted as the historical switchman 
that dispatched entire communities on different development paths, driven by different 
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empowerment strategies that would shape local institutions and development outcomes twenty 
years hence.  
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V. CHAPTER FIVE:  DECENTRALIZATION FROM BELOW II – EMPOWERMENT 
STRATEGIES FORGED IN THE FURNACE OF CIVIL WAR, 1980-1992 
 
 
 
 
By 1979, the structures of what political and social stability remained in El Salvador were 
crumbling.  A tyrannical regime under the command of President and Colonel Carlos Humberto 
Romero was under increasing pressure from the U.S. to soften its attacks on the left and from 
the right to intensify its crackdown on all political opposition.  Choices made during the 1970s, 
a decade of increasingly restrictive conditions in Tecoluca, the Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso, 
set each of these communities in motion on decidedly different tracks as the space for non-
violent politics collapsed.  The context for politics was radically and permanently altered by the 
civil war that engulfed the country for the next twelve years.  During this period, the process of 
empowerment and disempowerment that had been initiated by the pre-war clash of social 
forces was reinforced.  When the political war ended in 1992, the experiences that 
distinguished those individuals and communities that chose revolution, reform or reactionary 
counter-insurgent defense of the status quo would be so profoundly rooted that they would 
shape the expectations and behaviors of a generation of Salvadorans that came of age in these 
years.  For better or worse, these political wartime experiences are the decisive attributes of 
local development in most conflictive rural communities today. 
In this chapter, I trace how the three factors of the political opportunity structure of pre-
war El Salvador (agrarian structure, elite access and repression) help us understand the 
competing empowerment strategies deployed by the FMLN and the military-government 
during the 1980s and how people in the case study communities responded to them.   
Agrarian injustice, political intolerance and the impunity of the elite directed security 
forces precipitated a civil war in El Salvador, during which decentralized mobilization 
strategies were necessitated by the sheer scope, duration and intensity of the conflict.  During 
the civil war, the Salvadoran countryside was governed by two parallel states, two political-
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economic systems, and in turn, two competing conceptions of citizen empowerment.  A twenty 
year insurgency brought with it a transforming process that rendered the pre-war authority 
structure, and associated agrarian land structure on which it rested, null and void.  Landlords 
and many rural officials were expelled from the countryside. Large segments of the progressive 
church and political opposition to military rule were driven underground.  One in every four 
Salvadorans was uprooted.  Hundreds of thousands journeyed to other countries, expanding the 
theater of the conflict as politics followed them.  The political-military machinery of the 
government and the FMLN experienced qualitative leaps in their respective capacities and 
contested the influence of the rural Salvadoran population.  This influence and capacity 
extended through transnational solidarity networks, inserting Salvadoran reality indelibly into 
the international consciousness. 
 However much the war extended Salvadoran politics beyond national borders, the 
fulcrum of the war remained local and largely rural. As U.S. advisor, Colonel Waghelstein put 
it, “the only territory you want to hold is the six inches between a campesino’s ears.”323  Over 
the course of the civil war, competing insurgent and counter-insurgent strategies experimented 
with new institutions and governance rules at the local level to win peasant sympathies.  Within 
zones of military control, the authoritarian character of government rule was unabashedly top-
down, ruthless, and opposed to any civic participation that served no counter-insurgent 
function.   The conscription of soldiers and coerced service of civil patrols, the revival of 
municipal government and state managed agrarian reform cooperatives served as the three 
fundamental pillars of the government counter-insurgency focus on local populations as a 
buffer against FMLN recruitment. 
Within zones of FMLN control, command was also vertical but notably different in the 
self-imposed limits set on this power.  FMLN authority derived from an underlying respect for 
human dignity, the delegation of governance authority to local populations and the goal of 
equity in property redistribution.  The asymmetric nature of the conflict forced insurgent 
commanders to delegate responsibilities and decision making power to the thousands of 
community organizers, and the masses of peasants, women, elderly, and children that supported 
                                                 
323 Speech by Col. John Waghelstein, “Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in the Post Vietnam Period,” Jan. 17, 1985, 
American Enterprise Institute, cited in Schwarz (1991: 22), see also Waghelstein (1985), Manwaring and Prisk 
(1988, 1990) and Bacevitch (1998).   
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them.  While many of these new leaders transitioned from pre-war roles as catechists, students, 
and peasant union leaders, their experiences during the war required new skills and often the 
ascription of multiple identities.  As militia, popular local governments, independent 
cooperatives, repopulation movements, and eventually NGOs, insurgent populations invented 
new local institutions to survive and resist the government efforts to re-establish pre-war 
agrarian relations.  As such, the collective experiences in FMLN controlled zones involved 
significant increases in the confidence of opposition communities. At the same time, they were 
punctuated by deep fissures of distrust and suspicion that were a legacy of clandestine 
organizing, betrayal and the suffering of gross acts of violence. 
Sustained co-existence of these alternative models of local development within various 
regions of the same country provides the perfect setting for assessing how sharply distinct 
political experiences have influenced competing notions of empowerment that in turn have 
deeply marked the institutionalization of local authority in NGOs, municipal governments and 
grassroots organizations (CSOs) in the post-war period.   
In effect, decentralization occurred in both insurgent and counter-insurgent controlled 
and contested zones as de facto governance strategies where the war had destroyed prevailing 
structures of rule.  Municipal government was revived and NGOs were invented as political 
necessities in a climate of violence and struggle for the sympathies of the Salvadoran 
population.  Decentralized rule was essential because the heightened stakes of winning or 
sustaining the allegiance of rural “hearts and minds” led to the authentic or apparent 
empowerment of local populations to set their own terms for participation.  
Both types of local institutions, to differing degrees, were instruments for political 
capture by competing parties to the conflict.  Before the war, the few NGOs did not get 
involved in politics and mayors discharged a narrow political mandate set by local landowning 
elites in the ruling party.  Preserving the stability of agrarian inequality was the paramount 
goal.  The onset of political democratization as well as the rather slow, methodical process of 
discovery that had been possible within Christian base communities and rural peasant unions, 
were strangled early by military repression, which then escalated to a full-blown and bloody 
contest over national power and property rights.  The civil war brought both change and 
continuity.  Some communities had leadership and capacity forged over a decade of training 
and collective action, others were swept into the chaos with little preparation or understanding 
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at all.   In either context, local institutions were endowed with unprecedented responsibilities 
and authority.  Tempered by this conflict, competing visions and capacities for local 
development and democracy were both forged in the furnace of civil war. 
This analysis of the Salvadoran civil war departs somewhat from the view held by some 
that the nature of experiences of FMLN combatants were overwhelmingly authoritarian and 
non-democratic.324  While this was undoubtedly true for the experiences of some, the relatively 
little evidence that we have about the diversity of self-governing experiences under FMLN rule 
in conflictive zones tells a considerably different story.  The insurgent collective action strategy 
during the war was much more dependent upon the voluntarism of its supporters and 
combatants than a hierarchical imposition of conduct.  The post-war experience of FMLN rule 
has tended to be surprisingly innovative and democratic at the local level, although regressing 
at times toward a central command mode of decision making at the national level – aspects of 
empowerment that cannot be explained without recognition of accumulated capacity for 
democratic self-rule during the war. 
 This chapter will proceed in four sections.  First, I examine the question of who rebelled 
and who did not, what each choice meant, and in turn contributed to the correlation of political 
force at the outset of the civil war.  In the next three sections, I describe what the experiences of 
joining the rebels, the counter-resistance or staying neutral had on local governance.  I describe 
in three stages, the evolution of insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies and 
their respective influence on the emergence and orientation of local institutions.   During the 
“high intensity conflict” period (1980-1984), the FMLN experimented with Poderes Populares 
Locales (PPLs), while the civilian-military regime attempted to stabilize rural unrest by 
implementing an agrarian reform.  In the “low-intensity conflict” stage of the war (1984-1989), 
I explain how empowerment strategies then shifted as a result of the electoral success of the 
Christian Democrats and the ebb in international support. The combination of a formidable air 
war with a U.S. designed civilian pacification scheme (CONARA/Municipalities in Action), 
forced the FMLN to break up its battalions into smaller, more coordinated but independent 
mobile units, and renew the focus on political organizing and refugee land repopulations.  
Finally, I conclude by depicting how the invention of NGOs, while not new to El Salvador, was 
                                                 
324 See Schwarz (1991) for a summary of these views.   
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at the center of insurgent and counter-insurgent preparations for peace in the years between 
1990-1992, setting the stage for a new chapter of political struggle in the post-war period.  
 
A.  WHO REBELLED AND WHY? 
 
1.  Correlation of force at the outset of the war 
 
By the late 1970s, the social movements in opposition to the military regime overflowed the 
channels of the progressive church that had guided its path for the first half of the decade.  As 
the persecution of priests and laity intensified, the direction of the opposition assumed a 
decidedly military form.  Although some factions of the left continued to pursue an electoral 
strategy, the escalation of violence under the regime of General Romero (1977-1979) forced 
many popular organizations to opt for the route of military conflict.  Preparation began with 
training to provide defense for the confluence of strikes, land and government office takeovers, 
and sabotage of property and protest marches from growing state repression.  At the same time, 
the convergence between military and popular protest infused these “civic” actions with greater 
organization and aggressiveness.   
The strategy of the Romero government was to disarticulate the popular organizations 
that had gathered strength under the wavering reforms of the Molina government.  Before 1977, 
guerrilla attacks numbered fewer than 50, killing several dozen members of the security forces 
(Gibb (2000: 49).  Huge mass organizations shielded the smaller revolutionary groups that 
would become the FMLN, which by 1978-1979, were capable of only pinpoint attacks, 
removing National Guard posts, and expelling government informants from rural villages. At a 
national level, kidnappings and assassination of the business elite rattled the establishment and 
funded logistical preparations for an eventual insurgent military offensive.325 
                                                 
325 Montgomery estimates that $65 million was accumulated in ransom from a string of about 25 high profile 
kidnappings (1995: 117) 
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Five revolutionary organizations formed in the 1970s, distinguished by strategic and 
tactical goals that had little bearing on their appeal to rural populations.  Each of the five 
competed for recruits and recognition, which was reflected in the growth and fracturing of civil 
society into parallel networks of mass organizations, unions, student, peasant, mothers and 
women’s groups.  FECCAS and the UTC, the two principal peasant organizations deeply 
rooted in the base community movements of San Vicente and the region to the north of San 
Salvador, merged to form the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR) in 1975.   The actions of 
the Bloque Popular Revolucionario were closely aligned with the Forces for Popular Liberation 
(FPL).  Together with other mass organizations, public protests were coordinated by the 
political-military leadership of the five revolutionary organizations, each jousting for 
superiority but all clearly lacking the means to mount any serious threat to Romero 
government.   
In Tecoluca, the emergence of the FPL was inseparable from the ascent of the Union de 
Trabajadores de Campo.  Within the UTC, leaders were elected, assemblies voted, and the 
voice of the individual campesino was heard.  Here, initial experiences with collective decision 
making on policy proposals and political actions extended the base community process further 
and honed the skills of local peasant leaders in the practice of democratic procedures.   
The first FPL combatant died in Tecoluca during an accidental shootout with a local 
farm foreman in July, 1974 as militias were forming throughout the volcano communities.  As 
political space closed, scores joined clandestine FPL cells.  On May 7, 1977, an ambush by five 
FPL combatants of a National Guard truck near the village of Santa Lucía, overlooking 
Zacatecoluca recovered the very first G-3 military rifles in the zone.326   During this period, 
militants from other regions started arriving for training in a dozen encampments on the 
Chinchontepec volcano.  
A series of coordinated land takeovers by the UTC were organized with meticulous and 
unprecedented coordination between civilian and military groups.  The land actions were both a 
                                                 
326 Interviews with FPL combatants now living in Tecoluca that participated in the assault, Pablo Anaya, Nueva 
Tehuacan, Tecoluca; Carlos Urbina, La Florida, “Trini,” Las Pampas, Tecoluca (1998).  The presentation of these 
arms, like other significant advances in the insurgency, was celebrated in a midnight gathering of several thousand 
people.  Urbina noted that the next attack was much less successful.  An attempted ambush of a convoy of 
National Guard near KM-51 of the Panamerican highway (above Verapáz) was surrounded by two nearby Guard 
contingents.  Two of the three recently capture G-3 rifles were lost, in addition to a machine gun and three of the 
eighteen insurgents.   
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political gesture as well as a test of the movement’s self-defense tactics, which in this instance 
prevented massacres by the National Guard.327  Armed FPL militants not only accompanied the 
collective actions of the UTC and Bloque, but began executing notorious death squad members.  
In early 1977, the FPL killed Tecoluca PCN mayor, Atilio Cañas.  These events signaled a 
growing confidence and capacity among opposition communities in Tecoluca.  
Counter-revolutionary tactics were also stepped up, although a division emerged 
between the soft and hard-line right.  The Carter administration was generally reluctant to 
intervene more directly in El Salvador.  This changed after the Sandinistas took power in 
Nicaragua in July 1979.   The U.S. government temporarily blocked the IDB loan to fund the 
15 of September hydroelectric dam for six months as the human rights situation deteriorated 
under Romero in 1977.  Avoidance of another Nicaragua with U.S. elections on the horizon led 
to greater U.S. involvement.  These hopes remained tied to the hopes of the Christian 
Democrats despite the isolation of most of its national leadership that had been forced into 
exile.  Within the centrist camp of popular organizations, the moderate UCS now claimed 
120,000 members but was experiencing an internal crisis associated with the alleged corruption 
of its leaders and the temporary loss of external funding from the Inter-American Foundation in 
1977.328   
Pushed to the center as the eventual champion of the U.S. inspired land reform, the 
shakeup within the UCS was mitigated by the return to El Salvador of the American Institute 
for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) after the 1979 coup.  However, the U.S. had 
contradictory interests during this period that included negotiations with supposedly moderate 
military officers to fend off the extreme right and a more scaled back program of land reform 
than the first provisional government had envisioned.  These contradictions were exacerbated 
                                                 
327 El Porvenir, owned by the Nunez family, was reported as the first toma, followed by La Sabana, San Bartolo, 
San Carlos in the south of Tecluca, and El Flor and Pichiche in neighboring Zacatecoluca.  The cotton harvest was 
burned in Zamorran in 1978.  Interview, Jose Audelio Diaz, Tecoluca 
328 John Strasma, “Union Comunal Salvadorena: Summary of Findings and Recommendations,” San Salvador, 
Aug. 10, 1977 and correspondence to AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy, cited in Wheaton and Forché (1981)  The 
notes by Strasma indicate concerns about misappropriation of funds within the UCS between 1974-1977 under 
Tito Castro, and suggests that the Inter-American Foundation was aware of the problem but failed to intervene.  
These issues were apparently put on the backburner to facilitate the higher priority of “smoothing the path for the 
entrance of AIFLD.” 
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by the radicalization of elements within the UCS, although many remained loyal to AIFLD 
leadership with hopes of acquiring land. 
The hard-line anti-Communist right pushed the government to respond to rebel 
provocations and surging social unrest with more indiscriminate violence.  After quashing 
earlier attempted land reforms, the paramilitary forces of the right targeted progressive clergy 
and unleashed a campaign of intimidation and terror in conflictive areas.  In Tecoluca, Fr. 
Rafael Barahona was captured and tortured by the security forces and Fr. David Rodríguez was 
forced into clandestinity on charges that he was involved in the murder of Atilio Cañas.  Two 
other priests, Fr. Cosme Spezzoto of San Juan Nonualco and Fr. Alirio Macías of San Estében 
Catarina in the northern half of San Vicente were killed by death squads.   
Rodríguez eventually resurfaced joining his brother Benigno in the town of Villa 
Dolores, just to the north of San Ildefonso in 1979.  There the Rodríguez brothers resumed their 
pastoral efforts to reorient conservative peasant attitudes toward social justice, but found that 
the events leading to war were moving much faster than the local population was prepared to 
engage.  Unlike Tecoluca, and much more like the Jiboa Valley, the level of consciousness 
about liberation theology was thin when war erupted.  The lack of any foundation of collective 
struggle in the area around Villa Dolores and prevailing suspicions of leftist reform proposals 
among the urban elites as experienced during interrupted sermons in San Ildefonso, left these 
municipalities susceptible to the terror campaigns of the National Guard.  Over the coming 
years, most would come to feel they had become as several people described, “objects that 
were batted back and forth between opposing sides to a struggle to which they were never a 
party.” 329 
During the two and half years of escalating violence under President Romero, the 
security forces, ORDEN and the paramilitary right transitioned from isolated episodes of 
brutality to extended sweeping operations of intimidation and massacres.  As the PCN lost its 
footing as the de facto party of the military, a new political movement emerged from the 
frustrations of the extreme right to stabilize its monopoly on the national franchise.  The 
National Republican Alliance (ARENA) was created by Major Roberto d’Aubuisson, the 
former head of ANSESAL (the state intelligence agency and reputed death squad command 
center), d’Aubuisson had been stripped of his military career along with some of the most 
                                                 
329 Interviews with farmers in the villages of Las Ahogadas and Cumiste, San Ildefonso (October, 1998) 
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notorious human rights abusers by the first provisional junta in October 1979.  Reorganizing 
the rural rank and file of ORDEN (which had also been dissolved by the first junta) into the 
Frente Democrático Nacionalista and appealing to the deep pockets of the most intransigent 
elite defenders of the pre-war status quo, d’Aubuisson came to personify the deeply engrained 
intolerance for change that so came to characterize the bloody class war he and his allies 
carried out against the poor in El Salvador.330 
One of the closest allies of d’Aubuisson was Ernesto Angulo, extended family of the 
patriarch of Tecoluca, Nicolás Angulo.  Like many other landed elites facing the loss of land 
and prestige, the Angulo family pledged their allegiance to d’Aubuisson’s dirty war strategy 
from the outset.  d’Aubuisson’s origins were modest by comparison. He appealed to Angulo in 
similar economic desperation when his twenty year career in the Salvadoran military was 
unceremoniously ended by the reformist military officers under pressure from the U.S..  
Angulo and d’Aubuisson saw in each other the solution to their respective problem.  Like other 
elites, the Angulos needed a private army to restore landowner property, prestige and provide 
protection.  d’Aubuisson, who would eventually marry into the Angulo family after the divorce 
of his first wife, needed the landowner resources to fund and restore legitimacy to his dirty war 
against the left.  ARENA emerged from this marriage of convenience as the vehicle that would 
do both. 
Leading up the outbreak of war, a variation in mobilization strategies can be traced 
along three distinct trajectories that were reinforced during the next decade.  On the left, 
disillusionment with the limitations of electoral strategies inspired by the Christian Democrats 
was steered by the progressive church to more profound demand-making that was intended to 
improve livelihoods for all of the rural poor.  Confronted by state repression, those associated 
experiences of with popular democracy and collective struggle of the Catholic left chose 
alliances with the revolutionary groups, first in the mass organizations and then to varying 
                                                 
330 Declassified State Department documents indicate that D’Aubuisson received support from extreme anti-
communist groups in Argentina, Venezuela and “six enormously wealthy former landowners who lost estates in 
Phase I of the agrarian reform,” and whom had assets that were estimated to be in the range of $200-500 million.  
Cited in Byrne (2000: 58) based on U.S. Declassified Documents I, Department of State, ER 4b vol.  
“Millionaires’ Murder Inc.?” telegram #00096, from U.S. Embassy, San Salvador to Secretary of State, 6 Jan. 
1981.  See also former CIA official’s dossier on established links between D’Aubuisson and death squad activity 
in El Salvador.  http://www.serendipity.li/cia/death_squads.htm, accessed April 2005. 
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degrees as combatants.  At the center, the Christian Democrats ultimately allied with U.S. 
reformers to fend off challenges from the extreme right and left, although they ended up allying 
with the former.  Bankrolled by the U.S., the PDC exercised influence over the UCS, and 
reinforced their pursuit of incremental political change and land reform. These goals became 
transformed into increasingly selective and inadequate benefits to only a fraction of the rural 
population.   
On the right, the elite – military – government triumvirate that had served as a rural 
protection racket for the landed oligarchy was reinvented as a modern political movement 
(ARENA) with a strong rural base (ORDEN) and no apprehensions about defending the 
prevailing property rights.  ORDEN’s reformulation into the rural base of ARENA was 
exclusive with regard to counter-revolutionary obligations and loyalties in return for highly 
selective benefits in the form of employment, access to land, security and general social 
mobility. 
In October, 1979, three months after the Sandinistas took power in neighboring 
Nicaragua, the U.S. urged Romero to step down.  Soon after, a reformist faction of junior 
military officers staged a peaceful coup that ousted Romero and about 100 other military 
officials.   The provisional government initially included members of the political left, but 
endured less than three months.  Declarations of land reform and other reforms were criticized 
as excessive by the extreme right and insufficient by the revolutionary left.  As the U.S. 
attempted to hold together a second, then a third provisional government, opposition protests 
reached a high water mark when on January 22, 1980, an estimated 200,000 people 
demonstrated for change, representing nearly 8% of total adult population.331    
The signature moment in the descent into war was the murder of Archbishop Oscar 
Arnulfo Romero on March 25, 1980 by a gunman hired by extreme right paramilitaries.  The 
crescendo of outrage that followed the assassination and massacre of fifty more observers at 
Romero’s funeral a week later represented perhaps the only moment during the ensuing twelve 
year civil war in which a popular insurrection was possible.  Yet, strategic divisions between 
the five revolutionary organizations and the severe lack of arms allowed the moment to pass.  
                                                 
331 El Salvador has seen its share of large protest marches.  Consider that an estimated 80,000 marched in San 
Salvador on May Day in 1930 during the coffee crisis that preceded the 1932 rebellion, or about 10% of the 
country’s adult population at the time.  Anderson (1981). 
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Instead, the announced land reform began and the third provisional government under the 
symbolic civilian leadership of Napoleon Duarte was provided valuable time to consolidate his 
fragile hold on power.  As the left struggled to unify for war, the right unleashed the bloodiest 
sustained violence of the twelve year conflict.  In May of 1980 alone, the murder rate reached 
50 per day.   By the end of the year, 13,000 Salvadorans, mostly civilians, had been killed. 
On January 10, 1981, just days before the inauguration of President Reagan, the newly 
formed FMLN initiated its “final offensive,” attempting to trigger a popular insurrection to 
overthrow the fledgling provisional government.  Attacks were launched in 39 different areas 
of the country by some 6,000 rebel combatants.  In the paracentral zone, the offensive included 
strikes by insurgent squads ranging from 5 to 40 people over several days against the military 
and National Guard posts and military garrisons in Tecoluca, Zacatecoluca, San Vicente, San 
Esteban Catarina, San Nicolás Lempa, San Marcos Lempa, the Littoral highway, Villa Dolores 
and Chirilagua.   
The military correlation of fighting force at this moment generally favored the 
government.  Unable to spark a massive popular uprising during the 1981 offensive followed 
by the spike in U.S. military aid, the force correlation would not improve.  As shown in Table 
5.1, in 1981 better armed government combatants (regulars, police and National Guard) 
outnumbered FMLN combatants by about 10 to 1.332  While less than a third of all FMLN 
combatants were armed, many with rustic hunting rifles or pistols, the offensive lasted about a 
week and proved to be an important test of strength for both sides.333  FMLN losses for January 
1981 offensive were estimated between 500-1000 (6-11.5% of total forces) and for the FAES, 
                                                 
332 In the 1932 attacks, according to Brockett (1992) and Anderson (1971), 500 peasants stormed the towns of 
Juayua, Nahuizalco, Sonsonate; up to 1400 attacked Ahuachapán, 1800 attacked Tacuba.  As the counterattack 
mounted, some 5,000 rebels regrouped at Tacuba and a like number at Sonzacate.   
333 Various estimates have been given of FMLN strength at the moment of the Jan. 1981 offensive.  Nicolás García 
estimates 6,000 armed combatants and another 6,000 minimally trained and prepared to use arms.  He also 
suggested that entire battalions of as many as 300 combatants shared only a handful of military weapons.  RN 
Commander Raúl Hercules estimated that in nearby Guazapa in early 1981, there were 300-400 combatants but 
only 60 rifles. (Montgomery 1995: 117).  U.S. State Department “White Paper” vastly misrepresented FMLN 
capacity.  Robert Kaiser in Gettelman, et al. (1982: 261), cites State Dept Document 83 that in 1981, the FMLN 
had only 626 weapons for more than 9,000 men. 
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122 killed, 195 wounded.334  Politically, the offensive led to the official recognition of the 
FMLN as a belligerent force by Mexico and France later that year.   
The U.S. would pour as much as $1 million per day to expand the Salvadoran military 
by almost tenfold by 1992.  By contrast, FMLN combatant forces would peak at 12,000-14,000 
in the mid-1980s, and rely thereafter increasingly on militia.  Total government combat deaths 
likely exceeded 15,000, while FMLN combat deaths probably totaled no more than 10,000.  If 
we assume that an average of the high and low total estimates of war deaths between 1979-
1992 of about 83,000, the total combat deaths of 25,000 represents only 30% of this total.   
 
                                                 
334 Bosch (1999: 105), Clodfelter (1992: 1175), See also the Table in Appendix F.1 of this chapter, which updates 
a summary of the estimates of military and civilian deaths and casualties in the civil war.   
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Table 5.1  Correlation of Military Force, El Salvador 1980-1992335 
 
FMLN Cumulative 
Combat 
Deaths  
(1980-1992) 
Combatants Militia Civilian 
Base* 
Refugees 
(Honduras, 
Nicaragua, 
Panamá and 
Belize)* 
Military 
Total 
1980 658 3,500-6,000 5,000 20,000 0 8,500-
11,000 
1981 2,258 3,700-15,000 5,000 80,000 5,000 13,700-
25,000 
1984 5,691 12,000-
14,000 
10,000 500,000 25,000-
40,000 
22,000-
24,000 
1988 9,829 
 
7,000 40,000336 500,000 37,000 47,000 
1992 13,163 8,552-11,000 20,000337 500,000 N/A 28,552-
31,000 
      
FAES Cumulative 
Combat 
Deaths 
(1980-1992) 
Military 
Regulars 
Police & 
National Guard 
Paramilitaries 
& Reserves 
Military 
Total 
1980 3,477 10,000 6,000 100,000 116,000 
1981 4,278 16,000 7,500 100,000 123,500 
1984 9,553 42,000 9,500 100,000 151,500 
1988 12,774 47,000 12,500 100,000 159,500 
1992 16,140 63,175 14,000 100,000338 177,175 
 
 
                                                 
335 Cumulative Combatant Deaths do not include estimates of civilian deaths, which could have been as high as 
70,000 during the twelve year period, only reported combatant deaths.  See Table 1 notes in Seligson and 
McElhinny (1996).  Refugees refer to the camps set under international supervision in Honduras and within certain 
parts of San Salvador, but included displaced populations that were considered aligned with the FMLN.  The 
Treasury Police operated under the Defense Ministry.  Government paramilitaries include ORDEN/FDN, civil 
defense units, and death squads.  Table 5.1 is adapted from Seligson and McElhinny (1996, Table 1).  FMLN 
combat deaths are based on government estimates, with some corrections.  FAES combat deaths are an average of 
government and FMLN estimates.  FMLN estimates for civilian and refugee base totals are considered logistical 
support, but not included as military support. 
336 Schwarz (1991: 78) 
337 Combatants were full-time mobile fighters with military assignment to a specific battalion, while the militia 
were active as fighters on an as needed basis and lived as civilians.  Moroni Bracamonte and Spencer estimate that 
FMLN combatant to militia ratios reversed from 3:1 early in the war to 1:3 in the late 1980s. 
338 Civil defense patrollers claiming compensation for wartime duty after the war included a total of 38,000 ex-
members. 
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2.  Explanations for Rebellion, Resistance or Neutrality  
 
Explaining why insurgency occurred and failed militarily takes one a long way toward 
explaining the emergence and orientation of local development institutions in the post-war 
period.  The question is why individuals and sometimes entire communities joined the 
insurgent FMLN, fought against them, or struggled to maintain neutrality to avoid any 
involvement in the conflict.  Few arguments have persuasively explained what Lichbach refers 
to as “the rebel’s dilemma,” why peasants join revolutions in different settings, which succeed 
or fail, for wide variety reasons.339  The most persuasive accounts of 20th century revolutions 
are syncretic, combining structural factors with culture and rationalist arguments.340  So too, I 
will argue, for explaining choices of rebellion, resistance or neutrality in the paracentral region 
of the Salvadoran case, and in turn, post-war agrarian politics and local institutions.   
First, it is worth emphasizing how few Salvadorans actually took up arms.  Of a total 
adult population of about two million during the 1980s, no more than 50,000 participated in 
armed operations with the FMLN (2.5%).  Perhaps another 100,000 served as active 
collaborators in complementary roles.   Combined, the total rebel population is just above 
Lichbach’s 5% rule (1995: 17), and compares with other peasant rebellions.341  Generally low 
numbers of recruits are one dimension of the collective action problem and the solutions that 
FMLN came up with to resolve it, involving accommodation of different levels of activism.  At 
the same time, the total number of combatants was adequate to carry out impressive tactical 
victories and achieve a military stalemate with an adversary that was many times larger.   
If we assume 250,000 people actively participated in government security forces over 
10 years, and another 150,000 for the FMLN, combined active participation represents 20% of 
the adult population.  Four out of every five people, while affected by the war, chose not to 
actively take a side. 
                                                 
339 For reviews of peasant insurgency literature, see Skocpol (1982) and Cumings (1981). 
340 I refer hear to Wickham-Crowley (1993), Goldstone (1993) and Goodwin (1994), and of the earlier generation, 
Wolf (1969). 
341 Algerian rebels began with 500 in 1954 (Greene, 1990; Lichbach, 1996: 353). 
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Second, the act of rebellion must be broken down into specific action categories.  
Among non-combatants, insurgents distinguished between passive (reluctant or resistant) and 
active (voluntary) collaborators.  War taxes were collected from landed elites, local mayors and 
agricultural cooperatives by the FMLN and the military/security forces that left little choice but 
to accept except passive collaboration.   Food and information was requisitioned from 
unsympathetic but fearfully compliant peasant families – also considered passive collaborators 
who valued access to their home, property or family over personal security.  Many also actively 
collaborated with the FMLN, participating in a wide variety of tasks that were authorized by 
regional FMLN commanders.  Some of these adherents to the revolution were beneficiaries in 
post-war land transfer and reconstruction programs as recognized FMLN support populations – 
however the true size of hardcore civilian support of the FMLN was between 500,000 and 
1,000,000.342   
 The FMLN also typically filtered recruitment through strategic stages of performance 
to ensure the commitment and quality of the fighting force.  There were periods during intense 
repression and attempted insurrections when recruits were plentiful as well as periods of low 
morale when conscription was attempted to replenish the ranks.  In both cases, necessity 
obligated the FMLN to relax its recruitment criteria, often having disastrous results.  For most, 
the stages of recruitment began with participation in mass organizations, active collaboration, 
militia, combatant, combatant with increasing geographic responsibility, then possibly to 
special forces.343  Particularly in the early years, new recruits were given significant political 
training in centers located in the northern rearguard and a political officer was assigned to each 
brigade to maintain discipline.  The political training was responsible for a perceived mística of 
moral discipline for which many FMLN combatants were renowned.  Soldiers taken prisoner 
were released.  Torture, theft or abuses of civilians were uncommon.    
                                                 
342 Based on estimates of the civilian population living in conflictive zones controlled by the FMLN, which 
increased from an early estimate of 500, 000 in 1983 (see ECA 1983, Vol. 986-996), divided between 100,000 in  
Morazán and San Miguel, plus 400,000 in Chalatenango, Usulután, San Vicente, La Union, Cabanas, Cuscatlan 
and San Salvador.  
343 Interview, Pablo Parada Andino, FMLN Departmental Commander, Paracentral Zone, April 1998.  The 
combatant rank ascended from militia to guerilla column to zone units to  sub-zone units to  zone vanguard units to 
national vanguard unit, and ultimately to the highest rank of special forces. 
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However the actions of the FMLN, some cited in the U.N. Truth Commission, revealed 
an uglier side of the rebellion that also took its toll, particularly on the commitment and trust 
among the younger generation of combatants and passive collaborators.  Conscription was 
attempted for a short period, unsuccessfully.  Children participated as active combatants on a 
fairly wide scale.  Some weapons, such as landmines and other homemade artillery used later in 
the war, were excessively indiscriminate.  Civilians, particularly informants and government 
officials, were executed or kidnapped, obviously without due process.   While most of these 
acts were of limited scope, the FMLN was not immune to the excesses of violence.  In one 
particularly tragic example that occurred in San Vicente between 1986 and 1990, a zone 
commander ordered the execution of at least 300 FMLN combatants on the suspicion that they 
were enemy spies or had betrayed the revolution in some way.  In some instances these 
executions involved torture.  Suspicions leading to an execution usually began with claims that 
the person had violated an almost perversely exaggerated discipline required by this 
commander of both combatant and civilian supporters. 
This account of FMLN violence represents a view that is not consistent with the 
polemic narratives of insurgency that were conveyed at times by published interviews with 
guerrilla commanders or solidarity organizations (Cienfuegos 1993; Henriquez 1991, 1994; 
Harnecker 1993).  The account offered here is neither a validation of the exaggerated 
propaganda that intended to misinform about the nature of armed struggle in El Salvador, 
which ranged from the psychological-operations planting of false attributions of gross acts of 
violence to the FMLN to more recent post hoc efforts to place equal blame on both the military 
and the insurgents.344  Rather, this description of peasant rebellion in one conflictive zone of El 
Salvador acknowledges a tremendous disparity with regard to human rights violations that is 
laid bare in the Truth Commission Report, but emphasizes how the controversial and 
destructive excesses by the FMLN have undermined the goals they espoused. 
                                                 
344 This tradition of equating left and right extremism in North American writing may be dated back to Schlesinger 
(1949), but occupied much of political science analysis of political change in the 1960s.  The 1981 Reagan 
Government White Paper may be the classic example of this type of scholarship.  See Agee and Poelchau (1982) 
for a deconstruction of the various claims about the FMLN.  Compare U.S. Ambassador Dean Hinton’s statements 
on the Mozote massacre in 1980.  “I certainly cannot confirm such reports, nor do I have any reason to believe 
they are true,” to former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders (1993) effort to 
wash the slate in a post-war editorial for the full continuum of counter-insurgent discourse. 
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On the government side, the military forcibly conscripted men for two year terms of 
service, with the benefits of a monthly stipend of about $100 and pension benefits in the case of 
death.   Over the course of the war, in large part due to U.S. assistance and training, the size 
and capacity of the Salvadoran military improved significantly.  Beginning in 1982, the 
military introduced specially trained and equipped rapid response battalions that were the 
product of U.S. counter-insurgent strategy and could be deployed quickly to any part of the 
country.  The National and Treasury Police also fulfilled roles as security forces in the counter-
insurgency system, but were mostly devoted to intelligence duties and vigilance of fixed 
targets.  In addition, civil defense units were established in many rural villages, headed by a 
cantón commander and usually with the accompaniment of the National Guard or military 
units.  This system operated under the command of a Salvadoran circle of officers, but was 
heavily dependent on U.S. funding and technical guidance.   
 
a. Contours of the Salvadoran civil war   
 
The narrative of the Salvadoran civil war is now well known has been the subject of many 
analyses, which this effort does not seek to duplicate.  As with many prior insurgencies, the 
FMLN, despite geographic and military disadvantages, surprised most by steadily expanding 
territory under its control over the twelve year period, reaching military parity with a 
government force ten times its size, and occupying as much as third of the country when the 
truce was signed in 1992.  The insurgents did so by winning support of a large minority of the 
population, although attempts to ignite popular insurrections on several occasions, in the early 
and later years of the war, failed.  The Salvadoran military never lost the cushion of popular 
support or were threatened by the indifference of a significant segment of the population nor 
the life preserver of the U.S. Treasury (which ensured the unity of the military command), and 
permitted their survival against an escalation of increasingly spectacular and effective attacks 
by the FMLN, particularly during the early years of the war.  The FMLN also counted on 
considerable fundraising, through local kidnapping and extortion enterprises, local and 
international solidarity, military conquest of government supplies, and through savvy 
diplomacy with sympathetic or allied governments in Europe, Asia and Africa. 
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Capitalizing on the gains of the agrarian reform and political tolerance among the 
military high command, the Christian Democrats achieved a majority in the 1982 elections for 
a constituent assembly, and Duarte defeated hard-right ideologue Major Roberto d’Aubuisson 
for the presidency in 1985.345  In the 1985 elections, the PDC swept most municipal seats.346  
Christian Democrat votes came from rural beneficiaries of state sponsored agricultural support 
and land reform programs, middle class professionals, in the generalized hope for a negotiated 
solution to the war.   
A rapid expansion of the Salvadoran air force combined with the demonstration effect 
of elections cast a façade of inevitability upon the uneven transition toward civilian rule under 
Duarte.  These were sufficient to neutralize an FMLN surge in 1983.  A scorched earth 
campaign and massive bombing forced the FMLN to end its initial policy (particularly in FPL 
zones of control) of defending the civilian population within conflict zones, as thousands of 
displaced persons fled to internal and external refugee camps. 
Both sides shifted to alternative strategies to break the stalemate.  An internal move to 
formally unify the five rebel armies under a joint command was combined with the 
deconcentration of its battalion size forces into smaller, more mobile units to avoid aerial 
bombardment and expand the theater of conflict.  This included a build up of urban cadre in 
San Salvador.  The return to guerrilla tactics forced the FMLN to rely again on political 
engagement with expansion zone populations whose political sentiments were not well known 
and that were not yet active collaborators (Miles and Ostertag 1991).  Force levels dropped 
during this adjustment period as recruitment, at times though attempted conscription, became 
difficult.  Expansion zones of FMLN engagement attempted to replenish declining force levels 
after losses in the early years of the war and desertions due to discontent with the prospect of a 
longer war and the more challenging guerrilla tactics.   
The government continued to expand the size and capacity of its armed forces through 
conscription and generous U.S. aid (reaching $360 million per year in 1987).  This made El 
                                                 
345 The U.S. reportedly paid $6-$8 million to stage the 1982 elections and $10.4 million for the 1984 election, 
intervening extra-judicially in both cases to stave off an ARENA victory. Schwarz (1991: 72-73).  See also 
Brodhead (1984) and Karl (1986). 
346 Some have referred to the 1985 elections as the first competitive local vote ever, although political competition 
in the elections was obviously circumscribed by the absence of any left parties.   
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Salvador the third highest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt.  Civilian pacification 
programs were also redoubled with increasing reliance on mayors as the key interlocutors for 
administration of local patronage and intelligence gathering.  In response, the FMLN pressured  
and sometimes killed uncooperative mayors to abandon their posts and seized upon the human 
rights discourse of the elected Duarte government by repopulating conflict zones and 
demanding recognition as civilians, although many actively collaborated with the FMLN.  
Popular protests by left organizations returned during this period as well as the electoral ascent 
of the right wing ARENA party. 
Facing the political deterioration of conditions in Nicaragua, signs of the crisis in the 
Communist bloc countries and U.S. speculation that the FMLN was in decline, the rebels 
prepared a strategic counter-offensive that occurred in November 1989.  While it failed to spark 
a popular insurrection, the impact of the 11 day offensive was a decisive turning point in the 
conflict. Coinciding with the killing of Jesuit priests and followed by the FMLN deployment of 
surface to air missiles to counter government air superiority, the FMLN offensive underscored 
the perception that the war was unwinnable militarily.  At the same time, the status quo was no 
longer tolerable to the business sector.347  Negotiations began in earnest, and both sides 
prepared for peace.  The FMLN occupied contested land and established the organizational 
infrastructure to capture solidarity funding flows in the post-war period.  The ARENA 
controlled government reversed the statist reforms of the Duarte period and consolidated its 
hold on rural municipalities in zones of government control through increased funding to 
mayors. 
In the sections that follow, the intent is to analyze the impact of the war at the local 
level with only intermittent attention to national or international dynamics.  The focus here will 
again be on how elements of the political opportunity structure (agrarian structure, shifts in 
elite access and state repression) influenced insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment 
strategies and gave rise to new local institutions.  Did the war leave the country in a complete 
state of moral and economic ruin, destroying the individual work ethic on which the country 
                                                 
347 Estimates of economic damage caused by the FMLN totaled nearly $600 million in the 1980s, as well as $1.5 
billion due to lost production from a dramatic decline in investment (U.S. Embassy in San Salvador).  Some $6 
billion in U.S. aid over the course of the war helped compensate for these losses. The UNDP (2003: 263) estimates 
the opportunity cost of the war at a loss of per capita income of $1,000 due to the four worst years of economic 
crisis during the 1980s. 
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rested before the war, as the private sector argued?  Had the insurgency triumphed as the rebels 
claimed by transforming a moribund and repressive regime and its stagnant monopoly over the 
means of production?  Exploring these competing assessments of the war’s impact will be the 
basis for constructing an argument about the empowering or disempowering effect of the 
Salvadoran civil war and the specific institutional outcomes that reflected these shifts in the 
post-war period. 
 
b.  Tracing the paths of insurgency and counter-insurgency   
 
Within the paracentral zone and the San Vicente case study municipalities in particular, areas 
of FMLN control were located immediately around the southern half of the Chinchontepec 
volcano (see Figure 5.1).  Other rebel held territory included both sides of the lower Lempa 
River basin stretching from the foothills to the delta, and to the north of San Vicente in an area 
referred to as Cerros de San Pedro.  Expansion zones included the eastern half of La Paz, most 
of Cabañas, the rest of San Vicente and various parts of Usulután.  Other strongholds for the 
FMLN were in Northern Chalatenango and Morazán, the Guazapa region, Cinquera, as well as 
significant numbers of urban forces in San Salvador.  Deep FMLN support in the Western half 
of El Salvador never endured beyond the first years of the war due to a combination of factors, 
the most important of which may have been infiltration by government spies (Gibb 2000).  
Also in the far eastern department of La Unión, particularly to the south, support for the FMLN 
was weak. 
Any explanation of revolution in El Salvador must focus squarely on the impact of 
agrarian inequality.  An entire genre of inequality - violence studies were influenced by 
Russett’s (1964) classic study that found the Gini index of land distribution was associated with 
civil violence.  Using nationally aggregated data, Muller and Seligson (1987) demonstrated that 
agrarian inequality, using national aggregate data, is a major cause of income inequality.  
Consequently, for countries in which agriculture remains a major component of their economy, 
as is the case of El Salvador, inequality of land, inequality of income and political violence are 
inextricably linked.    
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Figure 5.1  FMLN Control and Expansion Zones in late 1980s
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Midlarsky (1988, 1999) argues that agrarian violence is explained by the expected patterns of 
land inheritance and subdivision that assures a different distribution of land among rich and 
poor families. Primogeniture – the practice of transferring inheritance to the first born son, and 
lower birth rates among rich families maintain the average size of landholding among the rich 
relatively steady, while higher birth rates, fewer off-farm opportunities, and subdivision of 
holdings among all children tend to diminish the size of land parcels among poor families. As a 
consequence, Midlarsky argues, the upper and lower distribution of landholdings among the 
rich and poor, respectively, change at different rates.  This differentiated pattern of extreme 
inequality leads to a loss of identification between ruler and ruled, and in turn to political 
violence.  Nevertheless, analysts have long struggled to establish a clear and consistent 
association between structural inequality and political violence.   
The inequality – violence nexus has been well researched by others for the case of El 
Salvador and indicates no simple explanations.  Durham, for example, has shown that 
inequality in the distribution of land overshadowed population growth as the cause of land 
scarcity, ultimately factoring heavily in the explanation of the 1969 war with Honduras and the 
ensuing civil war.  However, the highest land inequality in 1971, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, was in the western third of El Salvador - precisely where agrarian based rebellion 
failed to take hold.348  Land inequality was so severe throughout the country that it likely 
represents an essential but not sufficient condition for rebellion. 
Attempts to strengthen the theoretical link between inequality and revolution have 
turned to analyses of the types of peasants and landlords.  Yet, here too there is little agreement.  
For Scott (1976) and Wolf (1969), smallholding or “middle” peasants are most likely to use 
violence in defense of village moral economy.  For Prosterman (1982) and Huntington (1968) 
landlessness leads to violence, and for Paige (1975) the intermediate categories of 
sharecropping and migratory labor are the most rebellious – especially when combined with a 
landed elite possessing few economic alternatives.349  Does access to land expand political 
                                                 
348 A summary of departmental gini coefficients for different years are provided in Table D.5 in Appendix. 
349 Despite the persistent appeal of these temptingly elegant geographic or occupational based theories of peasant 
rebellion, as illustrated in the 1996 exchange between Seligson, Paige and Diskin, they prove surprisingly weak as 
encompassing explanations for events that we have since learned much more about.  While the FMLN deployed its 
forces, particularly the most mobile units of the Special Forces, it’s likely from other accounts that the majority of 
combatants from the principal conflictive zones were originally from that area. For a similar application to the 
French Revolution, see Markoff (1996: 337-427).   
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options or inject a conservative risk aversion?  Does landlessness intensify grievances and 
lower the consequential costs to high risk actions or deepen the dependence on the powerful? 
 Based on a loose assumption of the geographic origins of peasant revolutionaries, 
Wickham-Crowley has shown that for El Salvador, the areas of highest support for the FMLN 
did not have the most severe landlessness (1993: 244).   Wickham-Crowley’s observation is 
based on the untested assumption that Morazán and Chalatenango provided the highest per 
capita number of insurgents.  However, these rearguard provinces became the refuge of 
thousands of displaced combatants from other departments.  In sum, there is no evidence to 
prove which province had the highest level of FMLN recruits.   
Explicit tenure based arguments would therefore tend to support the moral economy 
explanation.  Based on 1961 Agrarian Census data, he finds that in the departments of 
Morazán, Chalatenango, San Vicente, Cabañas, Usulután and La Unión - all areas of FMLN 
support, had the highest rate of farmers to landless workers.  This suggests that the subsistence 
farmers threatened with loss of land would become the most radicalized.  However, the 
evidence is far from incontrovertible.350  Confounding evidence easily demonstrates the 
incompleteness of the strict versions of land inequality or land tenure based explanations.   
The higher revolutionary participation rates of smallholders in northern regions of El 
Salvador, and the quiescence of wage workers in the coffee dominated West illustrate an 
unlikely pattern of landholding and rebellion according to explanations based on Paige’s 
emphasis on rural proletarianization.  The memory of the 1932 massacre in this same Western 
region, may also explain its acquiescence.  However, the opposite argument of revolutionary 
continuity seems relevant to the FPL militants consciously following in the footsteps of 
Anastasio Aquino.  Journalist Tom Gibb presents a far more compelling analysis of the 
inability of the FMLN to penetrate the western provinces. He describes how as many as 200 
FMLN cadre were betrayed and annihilated in ambushes stages by state security forces.  The 
insurgent network was almost completely destroyed by a high level government infiltrator by 
                                                 
350 While Sonsonate and La Libertad, with the highest proportion of landless workers, were less active politically, 
there are other cases that do not fit either expected pattern (Cuscatlán – high landless, high revolutionary activity; 
Ahuachapán – low landlessness, low revolutionary activity).  While the FMLN deployed its forces, particularly the 
most mobile units of the special forces, it’s likely from other accounts that the majority of combatants from the 
principal conflictive zones were originally from that area. 
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1982 (Gibb 2000: 105).   Gibb’s argument raises further questions about any simple link 
between landlessness or agrarian structure and revolution. 
Paige’s emphasis on rural proletarianization in El Salvador relies heavily on Cabarrus’ 
1983 seminal study of peasant radicalism and indifference in the Aguilares region of northern 
San Salvador during the 1970s (Paige’s Table 2, 1996: 135, based on Cabarrus original Table 
42, 1983: 173).  Cabarrús’ observations of some 812 peasant households, which he then 
subdivides between wage laborers (40%), poor landowners, renters or sharecroppers that also 
work as seasonal or daily wage laborers, what Cabarrus calls semi-proletarians (30%), and 
those smallholding farmers that do not have to seek wage labor, or middle peasants (24.2%).  
This distribution is the basis for some speculation about the roots of the conflict. Cabarrús 
associated peasant household type with political tendency, comparing involvement with 
FECCAS or two other left leaning popular organizations (ATACES, UNO), the paramilitary 
rightwing ORDEN, or not being active in either (apolitical).  Table 5.2 presents a slight 
reformulation of Cabarrús original data, as estimated by Paige. 
Cabarrús data shows that the semi-proletariat workforce (subsistence landowners, 
renters and sharecroppers), which has insufficient land to meet their family’s needs and must 
also earn income as a seasonal or day laborer (jornalero), is the most politically active.  This 
category of peasant, what Paige calls a “pobretariado,” is most likely to experience a visible 
link between the experience of extreme poverty and the actions of the landowning class.  Thus, 
the semi-proletarian is most likely to associate with the radical FECCAS (39.9%) than the 
counter-insurgent ORDEN (26.5%).  Wage laborers and middle peasants are almost two times 
as likely to be apolitical than to join either a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary peasant 
movement.351  All three types of peasant appear equally likely to join ORDEN.   
 
                                                 
351 Carlos Rafael Cabarrús (1983: 167-280, specifically Tables 42 and 43, pgs. 183-184) and Paige’s reformulation 
of Cabarrús data to correct for the error in presenting organizational percentages rather than peasant type 
percentages, although the same generally pattern holds. 
  260
  
 
 
 
   
Table 5.2  Support for Opposition and Army Peasant Organizations, 1974-1977,by Type of 
Peasant, reformulation of Cabarrús data 
 
Type of Peasant Opposition  
FECCAS 
 (Column %) 
Army  
ORDEN 
 (Column %) 
Apolitical  
 (Column %) 
Peasant Type 
Totals  
Middle Peasant 56    (23.0%) 48   (26%)  93    (21.7%) 197   (24.2%) 
Semi-Proletarian 107   (43.9%) 71   (38.4%) 112  (29.2%) 290   (35.7%) 
Wage-Laborer 81     (33.2%) 66    (35.7%) 178   (54.8%) 325   (40.0% 
Organizational 
Affiliation Totals 
244   (100%) 185  (100%) 383    (100%) 812   (100%) 
  
Source: Paige (1996, Table 2, pg. 135), row, column maximums are in bold 
 
 
 
Using my own survey data, a rough assessment of the peasant type argument can be 
made for the paracentral region.352  In the 1998 survey, 912 respondents were asked about life 
before the war (including parent’s socio-economic profile and access to land) and about 
participation in the FMLN, Armed Forces, or the militias of either band during the war.  The 
sample of 214 ex-combatants and ex-militia (23.5% of all respondents, 205 of which provided 
valid responses to questions about parent’s access to land) provides some useful insight into 
explaining the respective revolutionary or counter-revolutionary involvement and reveals the 
high level of participation in the paracentral region.353  This information differs from Cabarrús 
in that I am not comparing pre-war peasant organizational involvement, but rather reported 
war-time participation in political-military organizations.   
First, I try to replicate Cabarrús analysis of the pre-war agrarian structure.  Table 5.3 
compares access to land among peasant households before the war with war-time participation.  
                                                 
352 See Appendix B description of survey sample and question wording. 
353 The higher number of FMLN combatants and base members compared to military and civil defense is clearly 
not aligned with the proportion of total participants reflected in Table 5.1.  These sample results are due in part to 
the greater willingness to discuss past political experiences within insurgent communities, the greater percentage 
of women that participated in the insurgency (in part an artifact of quotas for overall gender sampling in the 
sample), and the higher probability that demobilized armed forces were not in rural areas. 
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My typology of war participation includes both FMLN and Armed Forces veteran combatants, 
but distinguishes two intermediate categories of combatant.  Civil defense includes all 
respondents that reported serving in the civil patrullas cantónales or ORDEN.  FMLN base 
includes all that reported benefiting from the PTT or participating in insurgent mass 
organizations or militia.  A family farm category is added to the original typology to distinguish 
between smallholders with greater or less than 5 manzanas (3.5 ha.) – considered a minimal 
amount of land necessary for a sustainable rural livelihood.354  The results provide evidence 
supporting different peasant theories of rebellion.355   
Over three quarters of the landless wage laborers are involved at similarly high rates in 
both insurgent categories.  One in three armed forces respondents were also from landless 
families.  The semi-proletariat that Paige and Cabarrús feature as the prototype peasant 
insurgent tends to be more represented in all but the government soldier category, but there is 
no clear discernable ideological link between these other three participant categories.  Among 
the middle and medium peasants, the evidence for Scott’s moral economy argument is mixed as 
well.  We do see an even level of participation in the government civil defense as in the FMLN 
base and combatant categories.  However, among the few pre-war medium peasant households 
in the sample, the pattern is somewhat opposite to that expected with the highest rates of 
participation as FMLN combatants or militia.   
The column percentages may be more reliable for the higher numbers of FMLN 
participation, but the distribution also suggests that landlessness and subsistence and middle-
medium peasants are equally present in the two combatant groups (FMLN and armed forces).   
Landlessness is a stronger predictor of FMLN base support, while access to land is a stronger 
predictor of civil defense.  In short, the data from the survey suggest that landlessness and land 
poverty may have swelled the ranks of belligerent forces.  However, these attributes of agrarian 
structure provide no clear indication of which side they would join.   
                                                 
354 The average land reform property is 3.5 hectares, however the actual farm size varies with land quality.  For 
Cabarrus, the cut off was between 3 and 5 manzanas.  
355 The chi-square statistic for this comparison is 17.4  (p < .135).  The probability that the differences between 
these categories reflect the true population differences is below the typically accepted threshold (p < .05), but 
drops to (p  < .06) when the middle peasant and family farm categories are combined.   
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Several examples illustrate common anomalies to such a narrow focus on peasant 
agrarian structure to explain rebellion.  Several of the more notable figures in the FPL came 
from landowning families.  As noted in the previous chapter, the family of Nicolás García from 
León de Piedra were smallholders whose rationale for joining the FPL were largely 
unassociated with their own landholding status.  The family David and Benigno Rodríguez 
owned 7 hectares of land, produced sugar cane and operated a trapiche employing twenty 
laborers.  Rodríguez described his family as “ricos medios” (middle rich) with enough land to 
employ 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Agrarian Structure and Peasant Insurgent Participation, El Salvador’s Paracentral 
Region 
 
Reported Participation in the War 
Insurgent Counter-insurgent Parents’ Access to Land 
Before the War FMLN Row (%) 
Column (%) 
FMLN 
base 
Civil 
Defense 
Armed 
Forces 
Total 
Family Farm  (>=5 mz) 5        
(41.7%) 
 (7.6%) 
4    
(33.3%)  
(6.3%) 
2        
(16.7%) 
(4.8%) 
1          
(8.3%) 
(3.0%) 
12    
(100.0%) 
(5.9%) 
Middle Peasant  (1-5 mz) 16      
(27.1%)       
(24.2%) 
13   
(23.3%) 
(20.3%) 
16      
(28.6%) 
(38.1%) 
10      
(17.9%) 
(30.3%) 
56    
(100.0%) 
(27.3%) 
Subsistence Semi-
Proletariet (<= 1 mz) 
17     
(30.4%) 
(25.8%) 
19  
(32.2%) 
(29.7%) 
17      
(28.8%) 
(40.5%) 
7         
(11.9%) 
(21.2%) 
59    
(100.0%) 
(28.8%) 
Landless Wage Laborer 24      
(36.4%) 
(36.4%) 
26  
(39.4%) 
(40.6%) 
5           
(7.6%) 
(11.9%) 
11      
(16.7%) 
(33.3%) 
66    
(100.0%) 
(32.2%) 
NS/NR 4         
(33.3%) 
(6.1%) 
2     
(16.7%) 
(3.1%) 
2         
(16.7%) 
(4.8%) 
4         
(33.3%) 
(12.1%) 
12    
(100.0%) 
(5.9%) 
Total 67      
(32.2%) 
(100.0%) 
64  
(16.1%) 
(100.0%) 
42      
(20.5%) 
(100.0%) 
33      
(16.1%) 
(100.0%) 
205  
(100.0%) 
(100.0%) 
Source: 1998 Paracentral Survey (Peasant Households only) 
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non-family labor and foot the higher education bill for three children. The attitudes that he cites 
as instrumental to his eventual choice to join the FMLN had to do with the observed violation 
of norms of fairness and honesty in the treatment of local laborers that contradicted his own 
family’s paternalist relations with their workforce.  Rather than an inflexible, calculated 
conservatism that was reinforced by his theological training, Rodríguez responded to the 
provocations of agrarian injustice he found in Tecoluca as a parish priest in ways that some 
theories of agrarian rebellion can not explain.   
The family of Pablo Parada Andino, the departmental commander of the FPL in the 
paracentral region also owned over 7 hectares to the north of Santa Cruz Porillo, Tecoluca – 
which suffered some of the worst violence anywhere in the country.  Against the advice of his 
father and offers of assistance to help him leave the country, he chose to incorporate in the FPL 
in mid 1970s.  The father of Norberto Contreras was a landowner in Zacatecoluca and 
mandador on a large farm.  Despite “always having food on the table, a house and land to 
work,” Norberto joined the BPR as a labor organizer in the coffee and cotton encampments and 
then the FPL.  Margarito Cañas Romero, now a community leader in Santa Monica, Tecoluca, 
was originally from Ciudad Barrios, located in a conservative coffee belt in northern San 
Miguel.  His family owned 10 hectares of coffee and economic conditions were improving for 
them in the late 1970s.  His motivations to join the FPL stemmed from the commitments to the 
poor that evolved during his training as a catechist at El Castaño, but also to the wave of 
repression by the National Guard in his community in 1979, from which he barely escaped.  
Not entirely prepared or comfortable with being a combatant, he worked as a political trainer 
for the militia and eventually requested transfer to be live with his family in a marginal 
community in San Salvador in 1985 until he led the repatriation of his current community in 
1991. 356 
In all of these cases, a combatant’s family landowning or agrarian occupational status 
provides only clues to the eventual decisions to incorporate into the FMLN, rather than 
complete explanations.  Repression, community ties, religious training all condition the 
influence of agrarian structure.  Geographical linkages between agrarian inequality and 
insurgent participation are also complicated by the interplay between economic motivations 
                                                 
356 Interview, Norberto Contreras (“Ramoncito”), San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, April 3, 1998; and Margarito 
Cañas, La Florida, Tecoluca; David Rodríguez, and Pablo Anaya. 
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and political opportunity.  Some combatants experienced the war far from where they were 
born because as Skocpol (1979) has argued, structural conditions (rugged defensible terrain, 
permissiveness of political institutions, the fluctuation of prices and wages, and the defection of 
marginal political elites) also determined the location (and timing) of rebellion.  Thousands of 
potential combatants flooded out of their communities and into the ranks of the five insurgent 
organizations in 1980-1981, which were incapable of absorbing them all.  Consequently, the 
severe challenges of survival during the first years saw many potential revolutionaries quickly 
abandoned the struggle.357   
Again, what motivated a person to consider joining the FMLN was not necessarily the 
same set of factors that made them decide to stay.  Confronting this methodological challenge 
takes us farther from pre-war agrarian structure. However, the link between participation and 
agrarian structure is never entirely severed because the FMLN and the Armed Forces both 
relied on a relatively stable, fixed support base to supply and protect its food and information 
needs.  Producers that engaged in passive or active collaboration with FMLN combatants, 
which I lump into the category FMLN base, suggest that agrarian relations may offer more 
leverage in explaining their motivations that those of the full-time combatants.358    
It’s well known that many urban revolutionaries were forced to the countryside after 
1981.  Conversely, some sharecroppers displaced by export crops joined the revolution only 
after they migrated to the city.  During the war, some combatants fought far from their home 
communities.  However, insurgent mobilization strategies that concentrated forces for large 
attacks now faced certain limits.  One of the determining forces for decentralization within the 
FMLN was a strong desire among combatants and displaced supporters to return and remain 
close to their place of origin, which explains the motivations behind the repatriation movement.  
Deep ties between families also regulated the FMLN mobilization strategy in late 1980s, as 
recruitment hinged upon deployment strategies that allowed greater flexibility to serve in 
proximity to one’s home communities.   
                                                 
357 Gibb (2000: 96-105 and 232) and interviews with various combatants. 
358 Unfortunately, these categories are not so neatly delineated as some combatants and militia transitioned 
between active fighter status and reserve.  A similar cycle likely effected the status of civil defense and conscripted 
soldiers.  In many cases, respondents were both. 
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A large number of combatants and supporters that were originally from the paracentral 
region, remained in there for most of the war.  The central - coastal theater of the revolution is 
unlike the other principal theaters of the war, due to the mixed presence of both smallholders 
and landless laborers.  Large landowners of coffee, cotton, cattle and sugar estates existed side 
by side subsistence and landless grain farmers.  In Tecoluca, according to former combatant, 
mayor and now FMLN Congressional deputy, Nicolás García, the violence was often most 
intense because the revolutionary peasants were attacking the very foundation of the landed 
elite’s power – not where it was weakest, but where it was strongest.   
 
What existed here was a direct relation between the National Guard, the army and the large landowners.  
And the landowners, in the very midst of the civil war, had not lost their faith that they would regain 
their property.  From San Miguel to San Vicente, FARO ruled.  It was FARO that provoked the 
violence and ordered the Guard where to go to dislodge and massacre people.  Here you had some of 
the largest landowners that directly financed and organized these death squads.  Unlike the smaller 
properties in Chalatenango and Morazán, in Tecoluca the very richest  landowners themselves were 
being hit directly. (Nicolás García, Tecoluca, April 1999)  
 
Given this highly varied social and economic geography, the events of the war produced 
relatively bifurcated patterns of insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization in neighboring 
communities, suggesting the type of peasant may be less important than the effectiveness of the 
mobilizing vehicle. 
Part of the answer is revealed by an expanded view of individual choice. Insurgent, 
counter-insurgent and neutral choices all stem from either beliefs that the respective cause was 
just, the calculation of which side would win and the relative value added by one’s 
participation, or the credibility of the threat to punish insurgent resistance or reward counter-
insurgent cooperation.   
Along these lines, a different view of the inequality –violence nexus is argued by 
Collier and Hoeffler (1999, 2001) who distinguish grievance-driven violence from greed-
driven (economically motivated criminal) violence, to analyze how certain mediating factors 
act as catalysts or deterrents.  Grievance-driven theories of violence, in the vein of those 
structural inequality arguments discussed so far, are rooted in theories of relative deprivation, 
which assume that people are motivated by a sense of moral indignation caused by comparing 
one’s gains or losses to another’s.  It might be argued that by the early 1970s, the sense of 
injustice among the peasant workforce was generalized and widespread and that most if not all 
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of the rural workforce believed that encompassing structural reforms were justified.359  If so, it 
tells us little about why some communities allied with the FMLN while others did not. 
According to greed-driven violence, collective or private participation in acts of 
violence are not the expression of moral outrage or principled actions, but rather the careful 
calculation of the costs and benefits of that participation.  Collier and Hoeffler argue that the 
global pattern of large-scale conflict since 1965 suggests that narrow economic agendas rather 
than political grievances are the driving force behind periods of revolutionary violence (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000). Grossman similarly argues that revolutionary 
success or failure is dependent on the capacity to provide excludable benefits to followers.  In 
effect, “insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits and pirates” (Grossman 1999: 269). 
“Rebellion,” argues Collier, “is unrelated to objective circumstances of grievance while being 
caused by the feasibility of predation” (Collier 2000c: 4).  According to this view, insurgency 
and violent crime can be studied as similar enterprises that succeed or fail on the basis of cost-
revenue criteria espoused by participating organizations. The availability of primary 
commodity export revenue for war taxes, kidnapping ransom and more recently, remittance 
flows, are identified as the key motivating factors behind organized violence. 360   
 The greed-driven violence theory is consistent with the belief, instilled by the 
government forces and officials, that the FMLN were terrorists that planned to expropriate all 
private property, outlaw religion, enslave children and turn the elderly into soap, views which 
were also transmitted in the countryside.  Gross manipulation of insurgent demands were (and 
continue to be) much more useful as threats by the private sector to strike fear in peasant 
communities to motivate their resistance to the “communist hordes.”  Many peasants in 
expansion and government control zones considered government propaganda carefully in their 
rationale for not choosing active collaboration with the FMLN.361  In other words, the 
                                                 
359 In fact, early demands of wage adjustments and improved treatment of workers were quite modest by 
comparison to later demands that escalated to land redistribution, the elimination of the repressive state security 
forces and even laying claim to the right to govern the country.   
360 Collier focuses on the funding source as the strand that links insurgent and criminal enterprises. He argues that 
post-civil war conflict is likely because revenue can be generated through some combination of domestic extortion 
and donations from diaspora populations. However, it has been much more difficult to demonstrate that exile 
populations financially underwrite insurgent or revolutionary activities. See also Grossman (1999). 
361 The most common fears included forced relocation, confiscation of all property and the loss of personal 
freedoms, particularly for children and the elderly under an FMLN government.  These threats have persisted 
  267
perception of the relative costs of an FMLN victory was inflated, while the perceptions of the 
relative gains remained low. 
 However, as a rationalist explanation of the insurgent motivations, the greed-driven 
violence theory emphasizes, like Popkin (1979), that all potential peasant collaborators are and 
remain conservative in their choices, not persuaded by change in consciousness, but rather a 
comparison of the net payoff deriving from his/her participation.  Materialist interests (or 
maximized utility) not norms of justice, explain strategic choice regarding whether and how to 
participate.  A tipping factor may intensify this choice, if a family or respected community 
member was already an active member of either side.  Social networks worked to raise the 
stakes of the choice by increasing the assurance of a payoff or sanction. 
 The Salvadoran conflict provides several ways of exploring this claim. In the early part 
of the 1970s, the perception among most of the rural poor was that state repression would be 
selective.  Instead, military and paramilitary operations unleashed indiscriminate and massive 
violence beginning in the years leading up to the war.362  Some have argued that the selective 
benefits of service to ORDEN were essential for explaining why so many rural peasants opted 
for counter-insurgent alliance with a state that had degenerated into daily abuses against other 
peasants.  Equally compelling, however, are the testimonies of those who participated in the 
civil defense forces for their own security – in other words, to elude more dangerous service or 
sanctions by the local army commanders. 
In the cantón of San Benito, Guadalupe, a small coffee grower explained that his 
unsolicited appointment as sergeant of the local civil defense at the outset of the war was 
                                                                                                                                                           
among ARENA militants and have even been refined.  In the 2004 Presidential campaigns, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State, Roger Noriega suggested one week prior to the elections that the U.S. might reconsider its 
migration policy if the FMLN were to win.  The millions of Salvadorans that receive monthly remittance checks 
have become the target of the new counter-insurgent hearts and minds campaign.   
362 Mark Danner’s (1994) The Massacre at El Mozote, and other grim accounts of the 1980 decimation of over a 
thousand people, mostly civilians, in Morazán by the Salvadoran Armed Forces, are good examples of arguments 
based on this perceived peasant rationality. Danner attributes some of the victim’s reluctance to abandon the zone 
in heed of FMLN warnings to the belief that Protestants like themselves would be spared because only these 
communities associated with progressive Catholics were being persecuted by the military.  Leigh Binford’s (1996) 
The El Mozote Massacre provides a more thorough analysis of local decision making that suggests that religion 
had less to do with it than class.  Migrants who had left El Mozote to pick coffee survived, while many who stayed 
and died were the families of small property owners who were reluctant to abandon their homes and stores.  A 
similar religious explanation is allegedly responsible for the refusal of a large group of women and children from 
Protestant evangelical families to abandon refuge from a 1982 army sweep in a local church in El Campanario, 
Tecoluca.  At least 90 were killed. 
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perceived as a test of his loyalty to the military after an uncle was tortured and executed by the 
death squads as a suspected insurgent: 
 
Two sons from my uncle’s family were disappeared and it was suspected they had joined the 
insurgents. Service in the civil defense was obligatory, although there were no weapons to distribute 
and the elderly men among us were unsuited for effective service.  When I complained to Cantón 
commander about these conditions, I was arrested.  Two of my brothers fled to the U.S. to escape death 
threats, and my father asked me to leave as well.  But instead of joining them, I chose to serve for 
twelve years as a civil defense. 363  
 
Another ex-civil defense patroller from Candelaria Arriba in San Cayetano described his 
situation: 
 
We did not want to abandon our land and so we had to serve in the civil defense, because if we did not, 
the military would say we with the guerilla.  That was how we passed many years pinned down by both 
sides in the skirt of the volcano, under the rains and not even able to visit our homes. When the 
muchachos passed by, we hid and they fired only a few shots.  I think they had pity on us because they 
could have finished us off if they had wanted.  364 
 
Despite the high risks and low returns, active collaboration with the FMLN was never 
an option.  While motivations varied among the civil defense volunteers, few described their 
civil patrol service with sentiments of satisfaction of having fulfilled a duty or moral obligation.  
This pride and joy in the recounted experiences of revolutionary participation, or what 
Elisabeth Wood refers to as “pleasure in agency” when describing the accounts of insurgent 
cooperative leaders in Usulután, is not as apparent in the narratives of former members of the 
civil defense.  Rather, in the interviews of ex-patrollers, the overwhelming attitude associated 
with experiences of counter-insurgent participation coincides with the findings presented in 
Table 5.4 (below), which tend to emphasize a climate of fear and intimidation by the local 
military commanders as the primary motivation.365 
                                                 
363 Interview, Guadalupe, anonymous, July 29, 1998. 
364 Survey interview, Candelaria Arriba, San Cayetano, anonymous, Aug. 6, 1998 
365 Interviews, Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso, anonymous. 
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On the other hand, the escalating violence during the early years of the war should have 
extinguished any rational belief that the FMLN could provide protection from state repression 
or that selective material benefits from joining the insurgency would be had in the short term.   
Given the formidable odds that the FMLN faced at the outset, insurgent beliefs that justify 
participation seem to defy rational justification, and seem at times suicidal.  Many of those who 
joined the FMLN in the early years attested to the impact of the bible circles, the peasant 
schools, the first encounters with local landowners, land occupations or proximity to the very 
first guerrilla cells as the evidence not only of the moral propriety of armed struggle, but also 
that the relative value of one’s participation was indeed significant, and therefore a motivating 
incentive to join.   
What were the motivations? When combatants reflected on the factors that behind their 
decision to join the revolution, invariably religion, landlessness, labor rights, and repression 
were all part of this script.  What about selective benefits?  The few meager successes that 
peasant movements may have won did result in some economic improvement, they were often 
eclipsed by the violence and general economic upheaval of the years leading to war. 
Many remember the slogans a little differently, perhaps due to the rapid inflation during 
the 1970s that depreciated the value of the prevailing rural wage – even after several increases.  
The demands called for wage increases of as much as 14 colones ($5.5) per day, better food 
and treatment on the haciendas for laborers, and increasingly – access to land itself.   
Combatants explained how religion, labor rights and repression converged to forge leaders and 
galvanize support among the rural population: 
 
The UTC formed a negotiating commission that would organize lighting visits to the cotton labor 
camps, arriving and leaving so quickly the people did not see how we did it.  “What do you want 
compañeros? we would ask.  ‘We want rice, tortillas and beans!’ … and what about salary…’fourteen 
colones,’ they responded.  And that’s how it started, and well, we were winning those demands, and 
that’s how we began to organize the people.  We called strikes on various haciendas and sometimes had 
to remove those that crossed to help the landowner.  Where did these things come from? For me, they 
were born from the bible, yes, the things that the bible said and were written and were going to happen.  
This is where the idea surfaced that we the poor did not have to be exploited by the rich.  I remember 
that, that the bible says it.  Some priests also explained this to us through the mass, …some were killed 
because they explained the hard life of the poor….I knew Monsignor Romero, he also died explaining 
the truth. 366 
                                                 
366 Interview, Venicia Velásquez, originally Colono in Marquezado, San Vicente, former FPL combatant, now 
living in La Sabana, Tecoluca, April 4, 1998. 
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 Another combatant described how the escalation of tactics depended upon the 
willingness of the landowner to negotiate concessions to an increasingly organized peasantry: 
 
In 1978, political leaders of the BPR called a strike on the coffee finca of Margarita Cristiani (La 
Florida) demanded a 100% increase in day wages (2.5 colones), better food and sleeping conditions 
during the harvest.  We formed a negotiating commission that delivered a letter to the farm manager 
stating the worker’s demands and threatening to strike or even burn the finca’s assets if the demands 
were not met.  These were some of the first alternatives that were placed as pressure on the negotiation.   
Everyone concentrated in the encampment supported the platform and about 250-300 workers joined 
the strike and occupied the finca.  After the third day, the National Guard was called in and removed us, 
and threatened to kill us if the strike continued.  They dislodged us but at the same time, in order to 
avoid the other threat, the patron decided it would be better to comply in part by paying a higher salary, 
although he refused the other conditions.  Although this was the peak of labor organizing, we knew we 
could not win everything and gaining something to build upon was important. 367  
 
Another ex-militia from Usulután recounts the increasing confidence that culminated in 
the first land occupations (1976-77): 
 
I participated in the very first land occupations, Angela Montano, Corral de Piedra, Platanares. They 
were beautiful moments. We sang songs, read compositions, poetry, people organized political study 
sessions, others came from Cabañas, Cuscatlan, San Salvador bringing food to support us.  Some 
owners were friendly and didn’t give the order for the Guard to kill anyone.  It helped that we had 500 
people armed with home-made weapons.  When the Guard arrived and tried to remove us, we 
surrounded them with sticks and stones.  On three attempts, we didn’t permit it.  In Platanares, people 
were killed when the owner, Nicolás Viuda de Torres and the National Guard forced us off the land.  
When we demanded support from the Bishop, he asked us, “whose land was it and why did we take it?”  
We responded, ‘we took it because she would not share the land with the poor.’ 368 
 
Fear and intimidation were not absent as factors in the motivations in FMLN 
recruitment, one former combatant explains how he was recruited: 
 
My father took me to work with him on cotton hacienda, El Zamorrano, in the Lower Lempa valley 
region [Jiquilisco].  I worked hard, as hard as anyone, but one day the caporal denied me a day’s wage 
claiming I had not completed my share of work.  I challenged the caporal to give me two tasks the 
following day and promised to complete them to vindicate myself and recover the lost wage.  The next 
                                                 
367 Interview, Norberto Contreras, ex-FPL combatant, San Carlos Lempa, April 3, 1998 
368 Interview, Irene, former militia from San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, April 19, 1998,  
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day, a second caporal approached me to talk.  He asked me why I had challenged the foreman and I 
explained my anger.  The second caporal calmed me down.  It turned out that the second caporal was a 
catechist that had infiltrated the hacienda to recruit us for additional training at El Castaño.  Over the 
next few weeks, he helped me channel my anger into a more revolutionary direction.  I learned to be a 
community leader in this moment that began with this encounter. When Monsignor Romero was still 
here, everything was better, but it couldn’t last.  My father was wanted by the National Guard because 
his son was suspected of being a guerrilla.  This was true for many families.  After some time, I was 
recruited to join the FPL.  I did join and participated in the first recovery of G-3 rifles from the National 
Guard in our entire region.369 
 
 To fill in the picture, I turn now to another part of the survey data.  Ex-combatants were 
asked to explain their personal motivations for joining their respective organizations.  The 
answers were then coded under six categories summarized in Table 5.4.   Four column 
categories distinguish modes of insurgent and counter-insurgent participation.  FMLN and 
FAES indicate respondents that reported being formally demobilized as ex-combatants.  FMLN 
base includes respondents that were Land Transfer beneficiaries or self-ascribed militia.  Civil 
defense also refers to self-reported participation in support of the Armed Forces.  
Several points are worth noting.  First, the motivating factors of principled voluntarism 
and repression are more heavily represented in the choices of insurgents.  Conversely, the 
issues of conscription and economic benefits weigh more heavily in the choices of government 
soldiers.  Fewer than 20% of the civil defense veterans interviewed reported voluntary 
participation and none indicated economic benefits, while nearly two thirds reported 
conscription.  Family ties, meaning the probability that one’s decision was heavily influenced 
by the prior participation or death of a family member, is also important for FMLN militia.  
Furthermore, it is significant that a large number of the FMLN base (21%), many of whom are 
beneficiaries of land in the post-war period, did not know or would not state specific 
motivations for their participation.  Thus, within the former FMLN militia there exists a 
substantial variation in the level of commitment to war-time participation.   
What these reported ex-combatant motivations begin to illustrate is a pattern where 
participation with the FMLN was forced to a disproportionate degree by state repression, but it 
was more than that.  Unlike the estimates that some have proffered where repression was the 
undisputed motivation behind the effective recruitment of insurgents, FMLN participation 
                                                 
369 Interview, Carlos Urbina, La Florida, Tecoluca, Aug. 25, 1998 
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reflects a much higher level of free will when compared to government forces.  Government 
forces, on the other hand, were subject to much higher levels of forced recruitment, although 
the FMLN used this policy sporadically as well.  In sum, the survey evidence suggests greater 
bottom-up motivations among the insurgents compared to top-down carrot and stick methods 
among the military. 
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Table 5.4  Reason for Joining Revolutionary or Counter-Revolutionary Organizations 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, all households) 
 
3 5 6 10 2 6 3 35
11.5% 7.5% 17.6% 27.0% 10.5% 66.7% 13.6% 16.4%
2 8 4 23 2 0 3 42
7.7% 11.9% 11.8% 62.2% 10.5% .0% 13.6% 19.6%
10 13 15 2 10 2 14 66
38.5% 19.4% 44.1% 5.4% 52.6% 22.2% 63.6% 30.8%
11 41 9 2 5 1 2 71
42.3% 61.2% 26.5% 5.4% 26.3% 11.1% 9.1% 33.2%
26 67 34 37 19 9 22 214
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Armed Forces
Civil Defense
FMLN militia
FMLN
Total
Repression
Free
Will
Free will,
principles,
plus
recruitment or
repression Conscription
Family
Ties
Economic
Benefits
Don't
know or
did not
respond
Reasons for Joining
Total
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Finally, Table 5.5 simply presents a breakdown of participation in the case study 
communities.370  Here, we see that insurgent presence was quite low in the Jiboa Valley, 
FMLN forces were predominant in Tecoluca and a balance of government and insurgent 
experiences are represented in San Ildefonso.  This pattern suggests that the conflict 
experiences in each of the three case study regions were considerably different.  I argue that 
these three contexts where rebellion or resistance took deep root or was contested now 
represent important factors in and of themselves as explanatory variables for behavior and 
attitudes in the post-war period. 
  Effective recruitment, either by force as was the case in the military or through 
principled voluntarism among many FMLN combatants, confounds any simple moral or 
rational explanation of peasant behavior.  By recruiting similar peasant types, both sides 
consolidated a solid base of support in the countryside that was decisive in blocking victory by 
their respective adversary.   
As elegant as Paige’s two variable explanation for rebellion may be (agrarian producer 
type and landlord income source), the most instructive studies of rebellion have turned toward 
exploring multivariate explanations that encompass some of these other factors.  Wickham-
Crowley’s persuasive explanation of rural political violence or peasant revolution strongly 
suggests that violence in wartime El Salvador can’t be explained by agrarian inequality alone.  
Comparing 26 cases of attempted peasant revolution, he finds two factors are necessary for 
revolt to become a successful revolution: a rigid, dictatorial regime and solid peasant support.  
Peasant support combines elements of agrarian structure with cultural and social ties.  In the 
Salvadoran context, these last two variables account for the impact of shifting elite alliances 
(e.g. liberation theology or conservative Catholic parishes and priests, guerrilla leaders, etc.) 
and the reactions to state repression.   
 
 
 
                                                 
370 The percentage of FMLN combatants and militia in the sample might be viewed as higher than the national 
average of 5-10%. This can be explained in part by selection of a conflictive zone for the survey universe.  Also, 
the higher representation of women in both insurgent options, compared to the Armed Forces and Civil Defenses, 
increases the possible sample for the FMLN.  While the sample includes one female soldier and it is known that 
women did serve in some rural civil defense brigades, the known absolute and reported levels were both low.  This 
resulted in essentially limiting the population of surveyed government combatants to just the male population.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5  War-Time Military Participation in Case Study Municipalities 
 
 
 
13 5 3 14 35
44.8% 7.9% 8.6% 16.1% 16.4%
16 2 10 14 42
55.2% 3.2% 28.6% 16.1% 19.6%
0 19 15 32 66
.0% 30.2% 42.9% 36.8% 30.8%
0 37 7 27 71
.0% 58.7% 20.0% 31.0% 33.2%
29 63 35 87 214
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Col. %
Armed Forces
Civil Defense
FMLN militia
FMLN
Total
Jiboa
Valley Tecoluca
San
Ildefonso
Secondary
Municipalities Total
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Analogous to Wickham-Crowley’s emphasis on regime type, Brockett (1991) has argued 
that the inequality-violence nexus is mediated by a multivariate political opportunity structure of 
elite allies, institutional openness, and state repressive capacity.1  Fully open or fully closed 
political opportunity structures are least likely to facilitate rebellion.2 
In the early 1970s, one political opportunity structure existed, comprised by a reformist pause 
that signaled the weakness in the military regime, intense inequality generating a surplus of 
discontent and a plethora of dissident political and religious elites.  By 1980, this opportunity 
structure had changed, dramatically narrowing the choices for political participation.  The 
escalation of state repression both eliminated the prospect of pacific political organizing and 
forced many to choose as a matter of survival in the face of conscription or the difficult decision 
of taking vengeance against or refuge from the reprisals associated with the killing of family or 
friends.  Midway through the civil war, it had changed again as the military stalemate 
                                                 
 371 See also Goodwin (1994, 2001) 
372 Markoff (1996: Ch7) meticulously compares patterns of revolt in the French Revolution, trying out the fit of many 
of these theories, but finding few unified explanations for the many kinds of rural insurrection that were observed.  
Various theories helped explain one or two kinds of insurrection at one or two moments in the revolution but that 
practically nothing (other than commercial ties to distant markets) helped explain many kinds of insurrection at 
many moments.  
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and electoral legitimacy opened space for old and new forms of political engagement to 
reappear.   
In each scenario, a specific configuration of contending elites, both nationally and 
regionally, prompted strategic innovations by both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces to 
exploit perceived windows for action and recruit participation in their respective initiatives.  
One such innovation was land reform by the Christian Democrats as a safety valve to bleed off 
the pressure of accumulated rural grievances.  Another was the combination of indiscriminate 
repression by the security forces and death squads plus the jacking up the costs of insurgency 
with civic pacification programs (Goodwin 2001: 162).  A third innovation was the civilian-
combatant alliance that was deftly employed by the FMLN to lower the costs of insurgent 
participation by offering a menu of options, to adapt the concept of mass organizations in the 
context of war, and to inevitably experiment with decentralized self-governance.  Each 
innovation was a reaction to competing efforts to pry open or slam shut the political 
opportunity structure for rebellion.    
Social and family networks were significant in channeling reactions to state repression 
(and to a lesser degree FMLN violence) into revolutionary or counter-revolutionary 
participation. One FMLN organizer described how recruitment was selective to exploit the 
victimization of the early repression: 
 
As a mass organizer, it was critical to show how only through organization we would win.  Every 
community would have their benchmark achievement (hecho) that made the struggle real for them.  The 
trauma of the early repression played a role in the FPL recruitment strategy.  In the 1970s, I worked as a 
driver on the Hacienda Obrajuelo, and joined like many out of an idealistic conviction to change the 
misery I saw around me.  At the same time, it became clear early on that the dominant class would use 
indiscriminate repression to stop us.  In Tecoluca, the National Guard commander, Sergeant Chele 
Ramos, instructed the cantón patrols that those peasants that had strayed from their mother would 
inevitably become communists and the law compelled that they be identified and killed.  Ramos 
personally executed dozens of suspected guerrillas using a makeshift guillotine within the Tecoluca 
National Guard garrison.  In my own family, ten were killed in a massacre at La Raya in 1982, one of 
many in Tecoluca that was carried out trying to break the will of the people.  Instead, through the 
construction of a “mother collective” (madre collectiva) of ties to families of combatants, the repression 
only reinforced our recruiting capabilities.   In my case, I founded a network linking over 200 extended 
families of combatants.  When one family member fell in combat, these ties allowed us to effectively 
recruit other family members.  Like me, many joined based on ideals and conviction, but these values 
were clearly forged into something else by vengeance.  The struggle became something very personal.  
(Interview, Omar, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, April 9, 1998) 
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The question raised by Stoll is whether this strategy based on the effects of state 
violence was pre-meditated and amounted to placing peasants on the anvil of state repression as 
a means for inducing those on the sidelines to join.373  Recruits who followed in the footsteps 
of a fallen family member may have joined the revolutionary movement based on agreement 
with what the FMLN was doing, but the deep desire for military combat was a consequence of 
the repression.  Conviction was forged “by making the struggle personal.” On both sides, 
family and social ties became important motivating influences over time, within which 
competing notions of injustice were only triggers to compel service in tribute to a fallen friend 
or family member.    
As the war reached a stalemate and the numbers involved grew, the sense of one’s 
relative value added declined significantly, reflected in FMLN difficulties replenishing its ranks 
by the mid-1980s and the continued government reliance on conscription and threats to 
motivate civil defense units.  The FMLN had far more recruits than arms before 1983, a 
situation that was exacerbated during the 1981 final offensive.  However, this pattern was 
reversed as the war ground on and supply lines were consolidated.  By the mid-1980s, the 
FMLN traded older M-16s for AK-47s, a sign that it could guarantee any combatant (as well as 
many militia) the necessary equipment (Gibb 2000: 290).  The evidence presented suggests that 
a combination of principled motivations, material benefits, family networks and fear enabled 
the FMLN to overcome these challenges.  As a result, the threat capacity of the rebels increased 
steadily throughout the war, even as the perceived perquisites declined in relative value to the 
individual recruit.   
A similar temporal decline in incentives to join the Salvadoran military was offset by 
sustained provision of material benefits and forced conscription.  Despite suffering humiliating 
defeats at various points in the war, the armed forces expanded from 12,000 to 63,000 during 
ten short years.  Most of the government’s soldiers were young men, many in their teens that 
had been pressed into service for a minimum tour of two years.  Conscripts from families with 
means could buy their way out or had already sent their children to the U.S. or Mexico, thus the 
conflict found the poor fighting the poor.   The salary and pension benefits were significant 
motivations to join the military, but did not necessarily guarantee dedication on the battlefield.  
                                                 
373 Seligson (1996) also argues that the significance of repression is also underestimated in explaining participation 
in the Salvadoran conflict. 
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Numerous accounts reveal the frequency of surrender by the military, knowing they would 
likely be turned over to the Red Cross by the FMLN as prisoners.  In places like the Jiboa 
Valley, National Guard and some civil defense units were more renowned to fight to the death.  
Moral incentives to join the counter-insurgent forces diminished further by the tremendous 
corruption within the Salvadoran military command. War became good business and many 
senior officers skimmed U.S. military and economic aid from every aspect of the civilian 
economy that they administered and pocketed pay for ghost battalions of soldiers and black 
market weapons sales.374   
We might conclude that subjective or rational individual calculations were probably 
more important in the early years of the war in explaining choices to join the FMLN, armed 
forces or stay neutral.  In later years, the conflict assumed its own rhythm, operating more on 
the basis of relatively stable commitments that had been made years before.   When external 
factors (the interests of foreign benefactors of the conflict) began to slow this rhythm, peace 
talks became necessary. 
What I have attempted to argue in this cursory analysis of why peasants joined 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the paracentral region of El Salvador is 
that beliefs, social networks, organizational capacity, and external factors are not easily 
reconciled by simple or elegant explanations of rebellion.  It is true that the combined 
penetration of export crops transformed the paracentral economy in a way that made it unlike 
the rest of El Salvador, setting in motion a conflict between peasant and landowner that 
approximated Paige’s (1975) notion of agrarian revolt.  The superior land quality in this region, 
the historic ties of many local landowners with the death squads and proximity to the capital of 
San Salvador all deepened landowner intransigence toward reforms of any kind.  This 
approximated but stopped just short of the inflexible single minded dictatorship that Wickham-
Crowley refers to as “mafiacracy” (1993:9).  A critical factor was U.S. support, which rather 
than withdrawing made El Salvador the top per capita recipient of counter-insurgent funding, 
but also conditioned that aid on a modest restraint of right wing extremists.  Thus, all five of 
Wickham-Crowley’s key variables explain why a rebellion began and perhaps why it ended in 
stalemate.  However, to understand how the political experiences of the war shaped the 
                                                 
374 Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador’s Military Leaders,” Report to the U.S. House Arms Control and 
Foreign Policy Caucus, May 21, 1990; also Millman (1989: 47)  
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development agenda in the post-war period, we have to dig deeper to parse the individual and 
collective choices behind these variables.  
As was depicted in the previous chapter, the massacre at La Cayetana was precipitated 
by the show-down between recently displaced sharecroppers and an export minded landowner 
whose family income and political prestige were considerably dependent upon farm operations.  
This was a classic Paige confrontation, although Paige’s explanation only tells us part of the 
story.  The community of La Cayetana, like many in Tecoluca, had several years of 
engagement with dissident religious and political elites.  Binford (2004) argues that catechists 
trained by Miguel Ventura, David Rodríguez, Rafael Barahona and other liberationist priests, in 
particular, performed critical roles as organic intellectuals (what Wickham-Crowley refers to a 
revolutionary entrepreneurs), in widening the social network between communities in the 
parish and broadening the appeal of the revolutionary participation by virtue of their religious 
or economic credibility in the community.    
La Cayetana illustrates how the perception of costs and benefits in insurgent 
participation is an evolving calculus, informed as much by endogenous processes as watching 
and then responding to what choices your neighbors make (Popkin 1979; Markoff 1996: 273; 
Wood 2003: 239).  Many from the community of La Cayetana met regularly, often in counsel 
with FPL leaders or David Rodríguez, to assess, rationally or otherwise, the anticipated risks of 
each provocative step in the process that led to the confrontation with the Angulos and the 
National Guard.  However, the unintended outcome of the confrontation was that the martyrs of 
La Cayetana were not only the displaced sharecroppers that confronted the local landowner, 
but the smallholding peasants from León de Piedra who came to their defense.  The latter were 
motivated by a somewhat inexplicable yet engrained sense of moral commitment to their 
neighbors, emboldened by an accumulated exposure to liberation theology, opposition political 
organizers and brief, yet effective experiences with collective action.  This unintended outcome 
rooted in a network of reciprocal local social ties, almost obligated the survivors of La 
Cayetana to intensify collective resistance rather than pursue individual escape from the 
struggle.  Structural factors explain only how the conflicts might take shape, not how people 
will react.  Having achieved a solid footing as an opposition movement, the traumatic blow of 
state repression catapulted the peasant movement forward, rather than annihilating it as was the 
case in San Pedro Aguas Calientes.   
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Similarly, the absence of many of these factors that prevented any prior foundation of 
collective action helps explain why any peasant sympathy toward the FMLN crumbled in San 
Ildefonso after initial hard-line policies toward reform cooperative leaders backfired.  The 
explanation of why the state succeeded in launching a peasant insurgency in Tecoluca but 
suffocated another in the Jiboa Valley and why FMLN repression snuffed out latent peasant 
sympathies in San Ildefonso forces us to look beyond mere categories of peasant and 
landowner to the timing of these decisive events with respect to elite alliances and the 
formation of internal unity.   
The political opportunity structure for revolution or counter-revolution, itself the target 
of strategic innovations of all parties to the conflict, provides a thin explanation of the rise and 
fall of the insurgency.  There is much more to the story.  For those who joined the FMLN (Path 
one), a principled commitment to changing agrarian injustice was an overwhelming attitudinal 
motivation, reinforced by the confidence derived from what Wood refers to as iterative 
collective actions (Wood 2003: 267-274).   Conversely, as the survey data showed in Tables 5.4 
and 5.5, the incentives for counter-insurgent participation (Path two) rested heavily on 
individualist material benefits, loyalty to the local elite and fear.  The vast majority of 
Salvadorans were caught somewhere in between these choices. This third path combined 
efforts to escape violence by avoiding identification with either side, passive collaboration if 
necessary and often, temporary or permanent migration.  Repression also factored into choices 
to take any of these three paths, but was probably not as decisive for insurgent choices as some 
have argued.  A closer look at the interplay between the configuration of political opportunity 
and insurgent or counter-insurgent mobilization/empowerment strategies is the focus of the 
next section.   
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B. INSURGENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENT EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES 
DURING HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT PERIOD (1980-1984) 
 
 
The first five years marked a period of high intensity war.  U.S. efforts to legitimize a middle 
road focused on soft-counter-insurgency tactics that featured land reform and engineering 
Duarte’s victory over d’Aubuisson in the 1984 Presidential elections.  The FMLN surprised 
many by surviving, doubling its own forces and fighting to a military stalemate against a much 
larger and well financed, but corrupt and undisciplined government military.  Key to the 
insurgent empowerment strategy was the strategic conversion of its mass organizations into a 
civilian support population that provided logistical support and increasing service as a popular 
militia.  The FMLN formed popular local governments in up to a third of the country under its 
control as an alternative to provisionally appointed mayors and resistance to the land reform.   
The U.S. also invested heavily in a hard-line counter-insurgency strategy of quadrupling 
the Salvadoran armed forces and encouraging an unprecedented dirty war of official and 
unofficial violence.  Backed by $260 million in U.S. military aid and the advantage of air 
power, the Salvadoran government spent most of these years trying to remove the FMLN 
civilian support population from its zones of control, while providing a modicum of support to 
newly established cooperatives and beleaguered local officials.  In so doing over 50,000 
civilians were killed and another 500,000 displaced during this five year period.   In this 
section, I explore the impact that these wartime empowerment strategies had on the respective 
populations. 
 
1.  Soft-Counter-Insurgent Mobilization: The 1980 Agrarian Reform and its impact 
 
The defining counter-insurgency tactic of the U.S. backed moderates within the ruling junta 
was the land reform.  The reform package was announced on March 6, 1980 just weeks before 
the assassination of Archbishop Romero.  Land redistribution was the central component of a 
three part program that included nationalization of the depleted banking system and controls on 
the export trade of agricultural commodities.   
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 State programs to redistribute land trace back to the 1932 rebellion, after which the 
government began purchasing land through a colonization program that was formalized as the 
Institute for Rural Colonization in 1950.  Government land purchases largely ended by 1951, 
and by 1979, ISTA and ICR combined had acquired 114 properties totaling about 75,000 
hectares (5% of total farmland).  Only 82% of acquired land had been redistributed to 14,563 
families.375  At the same time, particularly between 1966-1975, El Salvador experienced a 
wave of large commercial farm subdivisions into 50-200 hectares properties that were sold or 
distributed within landholding families.376  Many large farms in the lower Lempa valley and 
other parts of the paracentral zone were in ISTA’s hands in the 1970s and had been unofficially 
transferred to pre-reform cooperatives before the formal land reform began. 
 Table 5.6 summarizes the scope of the planned and actual land reforms in 1980.  Phase I 
of the 1980 land reform expropriated 472 estates in excess of 500 hectares, belonging to 262 
owners and compensated owners in the form of 30 year bonds at six percent interest.  The 
farms were converted into 346 cooperatives, incorporating over 34,700 peasants as members.377  
The land was transferred in the tenancy form of “proindiviso,” which meant that the 
beneficiaries were collective owners of the property that could not be broken up and sold as 
individual plots.  These big farms alone constituted 23% of all cotton land, 36% of sugarcane 
cultivation, and between 9 - 14% of coffee land.378   
 In Phase II of the proposed 1980 Land Reform legislation, 1,700-1,800 properties 
between 100-500 hectares were to be transferred to some 36,000 peasant families – far less than 
                                                 
375 Montes (1986: 286).  Some of these partitions served to resettle the population displaced from Honduras prior 
to the 1969 war – including part of Archie  Baldochi’s  Hacienda Nancuchiname being perhaps the most well-
known. 
376 This wave of property sales was probably influenced by the increasing attractiveness of export crop cultivation, 
particularly cotton, to new investors that included a number of urban professionals.  Also, it may have represented 
a defensive gesture to obscure concentrated land ownership as talk of redistributive reforms grew louder. 
377 Of the properties seized, 194 were in excess of the limit, the rest (278) were cases of multiple holdings of the 
same owner that when summed exceeded 500 hectares.  The now famous 1977 study by Eduardo Colindres lists 
the wealthiest landowning families, including the Dueñas (22,764 ha.) the Guirolas (28,403 ha) the Sols (15,830 
ha.) the Daglios (11,711 ha.), and some 47 other families whose holdings exceeded 1000 ha.  The largest 
expropriated farm was 6,672 ha., and PERA (1988) reported the average farm size for the 310 reform cooperatives 
was 686 ha. 
378 See Thiesenhusen (1993).  Strasma (1993) argues that 69% of Phase I land was used for grazing and only 9% 
was producing coffee. 
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projected.379   Phase II threatened the heart of the coffee, sugar and cotton sectors, but reserve 
holding rights would have probably protected the expropriation of the most productive 
farms.380  In any event, Phase II was never implemented. 
 
                                                 
379 My estimate of 270,000 hectares in land potentially distributable had Phase II been executed is derived using 
Browning’s data on number and average size of farm holdings, see Table 7, note c. in Browning (1983). The 
author estimated that the Phase II reform could have affected an estimated 1,200 properties between 100 and 200 
hectares and 600 properties between 200 and 500 hectares, which together would total an estimated 350,000 
hectares or 25% of farm land.   However, each of the owners could claim 100-150 hectares in reserve holdings 
from farms that averaged approximately 200 hectares.  With multiple holdings by the same owner and the fact that 
only 97 of the 262 Phase I owners claimed and were authorized reserve holdings averaging less than 100 ha. 
(ISTA data, 2000), we can conservatively estimate that about half of all properties (800) would have been subject 
to reserve claims of 100 ha..  Subtracting reserve land totaling 80,000 ha. yields an estimate of 270,000 ha. of land 
that would have been transferred in Phase II.   
380 Phase II targeted an additional 31% of all land cultivated in coffee, 30-41% in cotton, and 14% in sugarcane, to 
be expropriated (1971 Censo Agropecuario, Tables 20, 21, 26).  Prosterman claims that had it been implemented, 
Phase II would have affected little of the 50-60,000 ha. of coffee within the 100-500 ha strata, and that most of the 
export crops would have been retained under reserve rights of 100-150 ha..  Paige (1996:136), citing a study by 
Saade y de Rosa (1983), argues that 60% of the production of coffee was found in the early 1980s on fincas 
between 150 and 500 hectares.  In 1979, of some 1.5 million ha. of farmland (including pasture), there were 
185,000 ha. of coffee, 91,000 ha. of cotton, and 27,000 ha. of sugarcane, compared to 276,000 ha of corn, 55,000 
ha. of beans, 143,500 ha. of soya and 15,000 ha of rice (Pelupessy, 1998: 271). Using the estimates of Prosterman 
and Paige as minimum and maximum estimates, between 100,000-150,000 ha. of farmland were planted in export 
crops in 1979 (not including cattle).  If the estimate of 80,000 ha. in reserve holdings is accurate, between 20% and 
50% of the medium strata export crop farms would have been transferred. 
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Table 5.6  Summary of 1980 Land Reforms in El Salvador 
 
 
Reform 1980 a 
Phase I  
 1980 
Phase II 
 1980 
Phase III 
 Total 
Reform c 
 
 Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual b Plan Actual 
Land area affected (ha) 
247,248 216,000 
 
270,000 
 
0 220,000 d 66,486 737,248 282,486 
% farm land d 
18.4 16.1 
 
20 
 
0 16.4 5.0 54.8 21.0 
Individuals affected 
60,000 37,000 e 
 
50,000 
 
0 150,000 45,698 260,000 82,698 
% EAP in agriculture f 
10.7 6.6 
 
8.9 
 
0 26.7 8.2 46.3 14.8 
Ave. farm size (ha) 
4.9 5.8 
 
5.4 
 
0 1.47 1.45 2.9 3.4 
Table Notes:  
a. ISTA Registry of Reform Properties, obtained Feb. 2000 lists a total of 588 properties, 113 of which are properties of the “traditional” 
cooperative sector acquired by the Rural Colonization Institute (ICR) and ISTA prior to 1979 totaling over 65,000 hectares and redistributed to 
some 14,500 families as cooperatives administered by ISTA prior to the March, 1980 reforms (Checchi,1981).  Reform properties total 475, and a 
total Phase I Planned farm area of 247,248 ha.  Actual Phase I farm area affected is obtained by subtracting the reserve area claimed by Phase I 
owners of 11,172 ha, and an estimated 20,000 ha. that was expropriated by ISTA and redistributed to 24-28 cooperatives that were subsequently 
abandoned, but then transferred later through the PTT in farms greater than 100 hectares.  Thiesenhusen (1993) gives an estimate for net Phase I 
land at 215,167 ha, which includes the 65,000 ha. of pre-1980 land transfers in this table – contrary to data obtained from ISTA.   
b. Data provided by ISTA, Feb. 2000. 
c. Total farmland is estimated at 1,334,458 hectares, based on McReynolds, et al. (1988).  The economically active population (EAP) in 
agriculture is estimated for 1980 at 560,000 based on McElhinny and Seligson (2000).  Prosterman and Reidinger (1987: 154).  Of the 2,100 
square kilometers of surface area, on the eve of the 1980 agrarian reform, Salvadoran producers could count on only 60% (1,253 sq. km) that was 
both available and suitable for farming.  By 1990, urbanization and deforestation had reduced this area to 55% of the total land surface (1,156 sq. 
km).   Of this farmland, almost half (44%) is used as pasture.  While land suitable for agriculture has declined since 1980, I will use the 1992 
farmland estimate of 1,340 sq. km. as a baseline for measuring the impact of land redistribution.  IICA (1997) estimates that only 966,000 ha. 
(46%) are apt for farming activities without restrictions.  The FAO (1997) reduces this estimate of available land surface suitable for farming to 
39%, with only 18% classified as Class I-III (land with the best agricultural potential).  By either estimate, between 400,000 and 500,000 ha. in 
crop cultivation represents severely overexploited soil.   
d. The World Bank (1998: 175) provides this higher estimate of 37,000.
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 In Phase III, as many as 150,000 peasant families were to become eligible to own farms 
no larger than seven hectares to which they already had had access as tenants.381   The so-called 
“Land-to-the-Tiller” program was intended to redistribute as much as 150,000 hectares of what 
was typically the least productive land.382  For many properties, it was not the large landowners 
who were affected, but rather many small and medium peasants and professionals who rented 
some of their land to neighbors who were affected.  Phase III of the reform caused tension and 
even reprisals among new and former small property owners and made some reluctant to claim 
rented land.  Brockett (1992) argued that because of the insufficient response by beneficiaries 
and government alike, the program was extended three times until it finally expired in June of 
1984, by which time only 63,660 peasants had registered for land.  Phase III was intended to 
eliminate the perceived problems of insecurity related to tenancy in El Salvador.  However, 
renting among small producers continued to increase throughout the 1980s.  These and other 
administrative problems associated with the Phase III administrative agency (FINATA) 
relegated many beneficiaries to continued rural poverty, and likely had a mitigating effect on 
broad based solidarity for more far reaching demands.  Not surprisingly, Phase III did not 
contribute as expected to rural stability.   
As a whole, the 1980 land reforms delivered less than half of what had been promised.  
As much as 55% of all farmland was potentially redistributable, which would have benefited as 
many as 260,000 landless and tenant farmers, or 46% of the economically active adult 
population in agriculture in 1980.  Even had the planned reforms succeeded, they would have 
affected only about half of the population underemployed in agriculture. However, only 82,698 
peasants (15% of adult 1980 economically active population in agriculture) gained access to 
land totaling about 21% of all farmland (282,500 hectares).  The reform sector in 1981 
accounted for 12% of national coffee production, 34% of cotton, 43% of sugar, 31% of fruits 
and vegetables and 6% of basic grains.  La Paz, San Vicente and Usulután of the paracentral 
                                                 
381 Although there was a seven hectare ceiling, the average Phase III parcel was 1.6 hectares.  Prosterman boasted 
that Phase III would be “self-implementing,” because claims could be initiated by beneficiaries by registering with 
FINATA, which would then negotiate the price of land to be transferred with the owner.  The beneficiaries would 
in turn owe FINATA this amount, payable over a period and at an interest rate similar to Phase I coops. Wise 
(1986). 
382 While Phase III was expected to affect 10-15% of all farmland, very little was being farmed in cash crops. 
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zone were some of the departments that experienced the greatest transformation, with between 
15-25% of total area intervened.   
 Under pressure from the U.S., the land reform was implemented with haste and from 
the top down in the face of severe opposition and before the appropriate administrative capacity 
could ensure its success.383  Qualified technicians were in short supply and beneficiaries were 
not prepared to assume ownership, much less provide the authority or space to make decisions 
for themselves about operating large commercial farms.  Many owners had decapitalized their 
properties and programs for credit, training, marketing or services were inconsistent for the 
cooperative sector and generally unavailable for the Finateros.   Like much of the Salvadoran 
economy, agriculture suffered due to the war.  The total cost of just the Phase I of the land 
reform at the time it was implemented was $1.2 billion, of which half consisted of 
compensation to former owners.  On an annual basis, the cost of reform consumed about 15% 
of government expenditures, which was subsidized in large part by U.S. assistance.384 
 The government (ISTA and FINATA) effectively assumed ownership of the intervened 
Phase I farms and Phase III properties, and the former would be co-managed with ISTA 
technicians until the cooperatives achieved the capacity for self-management – an intentionally 
vague benchmark.  Describing the procedure to achieve cooperative autonomy, a 1983 report 
by USAID put it, “after the cooperative’s debt has been established, final negotiations between 
the cooperative’s board of directors and ISTA are completed, and the land transfer title is 
executed” (USAID 1983).  However, by late 1983, only 26 titles had been issued for 426 
properties, although 194 owners had been compensated (Diskin (1984: 16). 
 More than three fourths of the Phase I cooperatives consistently received credit between 
1980-1983, much of which went to financing export production.  Only about 10% of FINATA 
beneficiaries accessed credit or technical assistance of any kind.  Cooperatives in less 
conflictive zones tended to outperform cohort farms in the non-reform sector (productivity and 
                                                 
383 Much has been written on the Salvadoran land reforms, see USAID studies by Chechi and Co. (1983), 
Paarlberg, Cody and Ivey (1981), Wise (1985, 1986) Gore (1987), McReynolds, Johnston, Gore and Francis 
(1989), Seligson, Theisenhusen, Childress and Vidales (1993) as well as independent studies by Diskin, Simon and 
Stephens (1982),   Strasma (1983),  Prosterman and Reidinger (1987), Thiesenhusen (ed.) (1989), Montoya (1991) 
as well as periodic assessments by the Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture OSPA-PERA Department, ISTA and 
FINATA. 
384 Paarlberg, et al. (1981: 131-133).  Between 1980-1982, the U.S. provided about $100 million to finance the 
land reform. 
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repayment of credit), but credit and commercialization increasingly became bottlenecks.385  
Between 1980 and 1985, national production was stagnant for both basic grains and export 
crops, in terms of area planted and volume produced.  Cotton production declined by 50%, 
although sugar cane replaced cotton to some extent.   In the cooperative sector, the trends were 
similar except that production of basic grains tended to shift away from collective to individual 
production (Wise 1986: 34-42).  
 A shortage of qualified technicians with institutional incentives to expedite the self-
sufficiency of the cooperatives, proved to be a central and persistent weakness of ISTA.386 The 
promotion of cooperatively organized production dropped significantly after 1980.387   By 
1985, only 32% of transferred Phase I land was farmed collectively.388  ISTA technicians 
blamed cooperative problems on “asistencialismo” or dependency on transferred goods and 
services, backward looking work habits and corruption among the cooperative members 
themselves.389  Interviews of ISTA officials surprisingly still employed nearly two decades 
after the agrarian reform revealed as late as 1998 a paternalistic, often contemptuous view of 
the campesino that was reportedly widespread among the land reform agency staff in the 
paracentral region.   
 The beneficiaries of both Phases I and III were expected to pay off the agrarian debt 
over 20-30 years, although few were informed of the amount.390  Debt continued to accumulate 
                                                 
385 See Montoya (1991) and Childress, Seligson Vidales, and Thiesenhusen (1993) for different analyses of the 
productivity and other measures of cooperative sector versus private sector performance.  Cooperative produce 
was purchased by parastatal marketing boards.  Cooperative debt accumulated rapidly and in turn ISTA 
dependence deepened.   
386 Paarlberg, et al. (1981: 46-50)  ISTA technicians often viewed the cooperative’s dependence as the basis for 
their own job security, as well as a means of extorting additional income, thus few incentives existed to expedite 
cooperative autonomy. 
387 By 1983, USAID reports that over 50% of coop farms had no social promoters – those responsible for aiding 
ISTA in the conscientization of the membership.  Diskin (1983:27) reports that ISTA viewed social promoters as 
“excess baggage.” 
388 ISTA, compared to 11% individually, 22% pasture, 16% forest, 4% infrastructure, 8% idle, and 7% unusable.   
389 Interview, Ing. Rolando García and Lic. González Amaya, ISTA San Vicente; Aparicio Mejía ISTA 
Guadalupe. 
390 Confusion about the debt total stemmed from the altering of pre-war land values by owner’s to maximize 
compensation while bearing little association with the actual productive value of the property.  In many cases, the 
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due to the general decline of agriculture and terms of trade, compounding 9.5% interest, and 
increased lending. By 1984, 95% of the cooperatives could not service their total debt load. The 
issue of the cooperative debt would prevent many titles from being issued, prolonging 
dependence on ISTA and subjecting cooperatives to debt reduction deals by the government. 
Trading debt reduction for accession to individual titles would lead to the breakup of many 
collective properties in the late 1980s.  The mounting agrarian debt would also emerge as one 
of main producer grievances in the post-war period bringing the cooperative sector closer to the 
FMLN.  The administrative defects of the reform alone created tremendous obstacles for 
development in the reform sector. 
 Violence surged in El Salvador in 1980 and cooperatives were among the groups 
targeted by both the right and left.  In the first four years, some 8,000-10,000 FINATA 
beneficiaries were evicted by recalcitrant owners, equaling nearly 15% of the total number of 
applicants.  USAID found that by early 1984, as many as one-third of FINATA beneficiaries 
were not farming the land for which they had registered, “because they had been threatened, 
evicted or had disappeared.”391  By 1985, between 28 and 48 cooperatives located in conflictive 
zones had been abandoned at some point (the most affected departments being San Vicente and 
Usulután).392  The UCS, which claimed affiliation with nine Phase I cooperatives and to have 
organized 108 cooperatives among the Phase III beneficiaries, reported that 90 members were 
killed in the post-reform violence targeting cooperatives.  ACOPAI, which claimed to have 
organized 78 cooperatives among the FINATA beneficiaries, also experienced selective 
repression of some members (Paarlberg, et al, (1981: 119).   
 Most of the violence toward the coop sector was attributed to the right.393  Many coop 
leaders were assassinated to block the reforms as well as for reluctance to pay protection 
money to the military.  Attacks and intimidation by both sides enabled the military to extract 
                                                                                                                                                           
landowners were overcompensated, and cooperative debt was set unrealistically high.  The FMLN refused to 
recognize any legitimate cooperative debt. 
391 USAID internal FINATA audit, cited in Brockett (1992: 144). 
392 ISTA, cited in Paarlberg, et al, (1981: 66-67) and Wise (1986: 25)  At least 9 of these farms were located in the 
department of San Vicente (Sihuatepeque, El Coyol, San Nicolás, Los Angeles, La Cañada Arenera, El Chorro, 
Guajoyo, La Joya, El Marquezado), 7 more in Usulután and 3 in La Páz. 
393 Richard V. Oulahan, AIFLD Director, memorandum, Nov. 12, 1980. 
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protection insurance.  According to one source in ISTA at the time, an estimated 40% of the 
peasant cooperatives were paying tribute to the army at an average of $120 per month for each 
of the six to eight soldiers who “guard” the farms.394   
 Early FMLN policy toward the cooperatives was inconsistent, but began on the premise 
that compensation to former owners was unjustified, and thus opposed the mediation by or 
repayment to ISTA or FINATA. Those properties transferred to known ORDEN members were 
attacked, while others transferred to neutral or sympathetic populations were generally treated 
more benignly.  According to Elisabeth Wood’s detailed investigation of cooperative 
experiences in contested regions of Usulután, sympathies toward the FMLN varied between 
active and passive collaboration (Wood 2003, especially chapters 6 & 7). 
 According to former UCS leader Leonel Gómez who narrowly survived a massacre of 
his cooperative in 1980, “Phase I farms that were intervened by ISTA under military escort 
were turned over to the salaried workers who had been steadily employed there.  They were 
trusted and hence relatively conservative campesinos” (Gettelman et al. 1982).  Families with 
ties to a piece of land were more likely to remain in the conflictive areas and thus be available 
for civil defense service.  Anecdotal evidence from several cantónes that included FINATA 
beneficiaries in the Jiboa Valley seems to bear this out.  New and old landowners tended to stay 
and resist the FMLN, sometimes vigorously, while landless populations were more likely to 
seek refuge in the cities and towns.395 
 As exemplified in the killing of coop leaders in San Ildefonso in 1980, the FMLN 
relationship with the reform sector was skeptical and badly mishandled at the outset in the 
expectation that a military victory over the reformist junta was within their grasp.   As 
insurrection became less probable and support for the agricultural economy fell, ties between 
the FMLN and the coop sector would recover out of mutual interest. 
                                                 
394 Raymond Bonner, New York Times, Aug. 3, 1981.  Gómez is cited in Bonner (1984: 200).  Pyes (1983: 8) 
estimates that between 1980-1983, ORDEN was responsible for most of the killing of 260 local and national 
leaders of the Christian Democrat Party, including 35 mayors. 
395 Finateros in Candelaria Abajo and coffee smallholders in San Emigdio (both in the Jiboa Valley) were known 
for their effective service in the civil patrols, while other neighboring villages of mostly renters or landless 
jornaleros such as Loma Alta in Nuevo Tepétitan, Joya de Munguía, Guadalupe and San Pedro Aquas Calientes, 
Verapáz were abandoned in the early 1980s. 
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 The 1980 reforms affected between 10% and 13% of total farmland in each of the three 
case study areas, but the impact was not uniform.  In the Jiboa Valley, with the exception of 
one 200 hectare Phase I farm, most of the redistributed land was in small to medium Phase III 
properties – mostly low quality land unsuitable for coffee or sugar cane.  The only reform 
cooperative, El Nuevo Oriente in Verapáz, had employed 300 colonos to farm about 210 
hectares of rice, corn, sugar cane, bananas and cattle before the war. Fabio Releyea Morán had 
come to own the farm after several transfers in the 1970s.  Morán along with some of the 
workforce abandoned the property under FMLN pressure in late 1979.  It was then occupied by 
peasants from neighboring Cuscatlán that were sympathetic to the rebels.  The military 
massacred eight squatters and the land lay idle for over a year.  ISTA eventually purchased it 
and relocated peasants from the village of El Marquezado in the municipality of San Vicente, 
which had been depopulated by the violence in May of 1981.  The coop members maintained 
strict neutrality during the war, thereby avoiding the worst violence.396   
The largest FINATA transfer in the Jiboa Valley was a 120 hectare property, the 
Hacienda Candelaria, owned by the Navarrette family that was broken up among 125 
beneficiaries living in the villages of Candelaria Arriba y Abajo, which bordered Cristiani’s 
Finca El Carmen in the town of San Cayetano Istepeque.  Some of the FINATEROS suggested 
that their newly acquired land was the only reason they did not flee during the war, thus 
ensuring a permanent civil defense force.397   
Most of those who were forced to sell their land to FINATA were small and medium 
owners. Some local elites are still quite resentful at having to part with even these modest 
holdings, while others have rationalized the sacrifice.  Max Menjivar is one local landowner 
forced to sell to FINATA.  Menjivar at 79 years of age still pays his permanent and day 
laborers personally from a small desk in large house that faces the central plaza in the town of 
Guadalupe.  The house is flanked by the church and the mayor’s office and once served as the 
National Guard post.  Through hard work and some alleged opportunism with others’ 
misfortune, Menjivar scrabbled together 70 hectares of coffee, sugar cane and fruit orchards, 
plus cattle and cattle feed factory. Still, he considered himself a “small producer” who was 
                                                 
396 Interview, Valentín Flores, Cooperative President, El Nuevo Oriente, Verapáz, Aug. 5, 1998. 
397 Interviews, Candelaria Arriba, anonymous, July-Aug. 1998 
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singled out when he was forced to sell off 17.5 hectares of lower grade land to FINATA.398  
Few of the largest and most feared coffee elites lost any property in the Jiboa Valley, perhaps 
because their holdings on the volcano were below the 500 hectare limit or because peasants in 
the region were not organized to claim the land. 
 
 
Figure 5.2    Land Reform Properties in Paracentral Region (San Vicente properties are 
numbered and listed in Appendix (Table F.2) 
 
In Tecoluca, by contrast, many of the most despised landowners had their properties 
intervened. In addition to the Angulos, many notorious death squad, oligarchy and local elite 
families had large farms intervened (Sagrera, Molina, Borgonovo Pohl, Cristiani, Torres, 
Nuñez, Homberger and Carballo, among others.399  By ISTA accounts, 15 farms were 
                                                 
398 Interview, Max Menjivar, Aug. 4, 1998.  It was not clear how the land claim was initiated, due to the relative 
passivity of most tenant farmers in the area. Menjivar owns two houses facing the town square, one formerly the 
residence of the National Guard and now the local CENTA office.  In addition, Menjivar controlled several small 
businesses, including a pharmacy and bus company.  
399 The names of former property owners and farm information were obtained through various sources, including 
interviews, monographs by FUNDE (1997) and Fogaroli and Stowell (1997) on Tecoluca, ISTA and FINATA 
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intervened after March 1980, in addition to another 15 farms that had already been transferred 
to ISTA, for a total of 8,767 hectares – or 30% total farmland.400  Phase III was considerably 
less important (725 ha) in Tecoluca. The actual impact of Phase I interventions (about 10%) 
was significantly reduced due to the abandonment of many farms.  Some of these same 
properties and others would be repopulated by the former cooperative members and FMLN 
supporters or combatants (as well as six farms that went to the demobilized soldiers) and titled 
in the postwar land transfer program.   
 In Tecoluca, where communities had become organized and the FMLN established 
political allegiance, the militarized takeover of farms and the placement of ORDEN members 
as beneficiaries under the leadership of ISTA was not acceptable.  A military outpost was 
placed at the Guajoyo cooperative, site of the infamous 1977 UTC occupation, and ORDEN 
members from the urban town center of Tecoluca were invited by ISTA to farm the property.  
The new reform cooperative was then organized into civil defense units that accompanied 
military patrols and informed on suspected rebels in neighboring communities who were 
summarily executed.  The coop endured one planting season before the FMLN used violence 
and intimidations to drive them out.401 By early 1981, the only two surviving cooperatives in 
Tecoluca were the TECOOP savings and loan and Los Naranjos in the lower Lempa valley.   
The agrarian reform experience In Tecoluca was by no means uniform.  As many as 
thirteen ISTA or FINATA cooperatives survived in some form, although some were idle for as 
long as five or six years.  Cooperative loyalties to the government were consolidated with the 
repopulation of displaced civil defense forces from other departments, as in the case of La 
Betania II situated strategically at the intersection of the littoral highway and a through road to 
the town center.  These pro-government cooperatives were perhaps singled out for more severe 
attacks during the war.  FMLN combatants made several references to human rights violations 
in references to excessive attacks against cooperative members at La Betania. The FMLN 
                                                                                                                                                           
registries obtained in 2000, FMLN proposed land inventories, and PTT land transfer program registries.  The latter 
databases were shared by Elisabeth Wood, whose assistance on the land question has proven invaluable.  Antonio 
Alvarez of FUNDESA, who worked closely with the PTT program, also provided data on transferred properties in 
the paracentral zone. 
400 ISTA database of Phase I properties, accessed in Jan. 2000.   
401 Interview, Don Eliseo, Socorro. 
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negotiated collaboration with nearly all cooperatives in the area, although those located closer 
to military garrisons in Santa Cruz Porrillo, San Nicolás and the town center Tecoluca, 
collaborated less than others.  In almost every case, the ISTA and FINATA farms that endured 
in Tecoluca shifted toward individual production, with only a few groups setting aside a small 
portion of their land to be farmed collectively.   
 The disruption of the cooperatives that had been established prior to 1980 did not 
always generate greater support for the FMLN.  Before the war, Los Naranjos was a 325 
hectare farm that cultivated melons, cashews, corn and cattle on the sandy coastal plains several 
kilometers from the Pacific Ocean.  The farm was owned by Luís Torres Portillo, son of former 
PCN Minister of Defense, Fidel Torrés and also owner of Petacones cheese processing plant in 
Santa Cruz Porrillo. The farm was sold to ISTA by the Torres family to avoid losing any 
compensation, and in turn Los Naranjos was turned over to the colono population before 1980.  
A single corn harvest was all that could be achieved by the cooperative before production in the 
entire lower Lempa valley was disrupted by the war.  Many in the cooperative fled to 
neighboring departments, and the land was eventually worked by FMLN civilian support 
populations sporadically over the following years.   
 People began returning to farm Los Naranjos in 1986, largely independent of the FPL.  
Some were prior beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, both from the original Los Naranjos 
cooperative or other nearby cooperatives.   Others were not.  In 1991, Los Naranjos became 
one of about 100 properties claimed by the FMLN in Tecoluca as part of the negotiations to 
end the war.  Among the current beneficiaries of the post-war land transfer program, in which a 
fraction of the original ISTA property was claimed, only about half are demobilized FPL 
militia or combatants.  Among some original reform cooperativistas there is a notable 
ambivalence toward the FMLN the experience of losing access to their land in 1981.402   
In sum, the 1980 land reform had only a modest impact in terms of altering the pre-war 
agrarian structure in Tecoluca, and failed almost completely in its counter-insurgent aim of 
arresting FPL activity in the region.  However, the attempted reform did succeed in harnessing 
some peasant counter-insurgent support in the most defensible areas. 
                                                 
402 Interviews, Los Naranjos coop members, Aug. 19, 1998; Fogaroli and Stowell (1997) 
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In San Ildefonso, the reforms had the deepest, if uneven, influence in reshaping the 
social and economic landscape.  The reform cooperative influence predated the war in places 
like highland San Ildefonso, due to experiences of nearby cooperatives in San Jose los 
Almendros, San Felipe, San Lazaro, and El Guayabo that formed as early as 1976.  In these 
villages, cooperativistas viewed with reservations both political extremes as a threat to the 
economic conditions that appeared to be slowly improving and that had been achieved without 
violence. In turn, these early cooperative communities were actively organized civil patrollers 
during the war and yielded few recruits for the FMLN.403   
Only a small amount of land within San Ildefonso was officially redistributed through 
FINATA in 1980, the largest of which was San Francisco de la Cruz (220 hectares).  Claims 
had been registered through FINATA for several other properties, but they were never formally 
transferred.  Perhaps reflecting Orlando Arevalo’s influence within FINATA, none of the 
lowland properties in San Ildefonso where Arevalo worked as a youth were claimed despite 
high levels of landlessness and the concentration of farmland within a handful of families.  
Among the highland properties where FINATA had initiated transfer, centrist PDC peasant 
organizations, such as Arevalo’s ACOPAI in San Francisco de la Cruz and the larger PDC coop 
federation FESACORA in Las Canoas, competed for allegiance.  These local battles for 
peasant affiliation reflected institutional fights for hegemony within the land reform agencies 
themselves.404 
Four large local landowners were forced to sell to ISTA (Aguilúz, Lazos, Navarrette, 
and Hernandez).405  However, some of these properties were below the 500 hectare limit and 
were sold to ISTA because the owners were almost bankrupt and were facing liens.  Other 
landowners escaped the land reform due to lack of organization among the labor force or 
favorable relations with land reform officials.  Most of the reform properties were located in the 
highland sector of San Ildefonso, while lowland owners generally escaped interventions.   
                                                 
403 Marchand (1996); Interview Amilcar Palacios, FMLN ex-combatant, Apastepeque, Aug. 2, 1998; Interview, 
Lucio Adalberto Mendez, Coop President, San Jose los Almendros, Oct. 13, 1998 
404 See Wise (1985) referring to a CLUSA evaluation of the organizational structure of ISTA and FINATA. 
405 Phase I cooperatives included Guachipilin, Sihuatepeque, San Pablo Canales, Izcatal and Los Almendros.  
Larger FINATA properties included San Francisco de la Cruz and Las Canoas.   
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Among the highland communities, the land reform represented the first visible change 
in peasant-owner-military relations.  Combined with little to no prior concrete experiences of 
collective political organization, exposure only through gossip about the work of nearby 
liberationist Catholic priests, and the damage caused by a poorly conceived FMLN policy 
toward the coop leaders, the land reform had a moderating effect that seemed to satisfy what 
San Ildefonso’s colonos wanted most – their own small piece of land.406   
As bad as were the working conditions under landowners like Manuel Aguilúz, the 
president of the Sihuatepeque cooperative recalled that the land reform was no panacea, 
bringing both benefits and costs: 
 
ISTA came one day and told us that the land was theirs, and acted as if they were in control – like the 
‘nuevo patrono’ or new boss.  They said the land was not going to be given as a gift and we would have 
to pay.  But they ended up destroying a good part of the cooperative patrimony through poor 
administration.  Credit was given collectively, but we had to separate out our part from that which went 
to pay for ISTA promoters.  Then ISTA stopped coming, and we received no more credit.  Despite not 
having a title, we organized ourselves during the war.407 
 
As flawed as the reform implementation was, it nevertheless was the key to peasant 
sympathies in this region.   This made the FMLN assassinations of new cooperative leaders in 
Sihuatepeque, Las Canoas and other highland villages of San Ildefonso all the more damaging 
to long-term relations.  In the Ceros de San Pedro front in northern San Vicente and in parts of 
Usulután, the cooperative appeal established a clear buffer zone between insurgent bases and 
military garrisons. 
 After about a year of functioning under ISTA, the violence of the war and an FMLN 
prohibition of planting on area farms, forced most of the San Ildefonso cooperative 
communities to be abandoned between 1981 and 1984.  People fled to other villages in lowland 
San Ildefonso and as far as San Miguel.  With authorization of FMLN command in the region, 
people returned to the zone to plant but were forced to pay a war tax to the insurgents.  One 
group of coop leaders complained that even this policy was implemented by the FMLN with an 
                                                 
406 Interviews with San Ildefonso coop members in the villages of Sihuatepeque, Guachipilín, Limón, Las Canoas, 
San Francisco de la Cruz, Los Almendros, May and August, 1998. 
407 Interview, Juan Martínez, president Cooperative Sihuatepeque, Aug. 24, 1998. 
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unnecessarily heavy hand, with insensitivity to the meticulous attention that peasant farmers 
exercised in improving their minimal margins of income.  Begrudgingly, most of them 
collaborated, although without the threat of coercion many would probably have not done so 
voluntarily.408  
The 1980 land reform was described with euphoric enthusiasm by it’s U.S. sponsors, 
with predictions that it would effectively eliminate the FMLN within a year.  The land reform 
undoubtedly loosened the grip that the landed elite had upon the country.  Yet it fell short of its 
aim to spawn a class of middle income family farms and would ultimately have a small effect 
on the structure of inequality.  As a top-down reform, cooperative member participation was 
not prioritized and allowed some owners to escape where local peasants were unorganized to 
claim the land.  Where land was transferred, the agrarian reform failed as platform for 
development.   In the years following the land reform, it became clear that many technical and 
political defects would rob the reforms of their potential impact.   
De Janvry (1981) long ago distinguished between land reform and agrarian reform.  The 
former involves some redistribution of land holdings, while the latter contemplates a range of 
policy adjustments that impact all stages in the agricultural production chain.  In El Salvador, 
U.S. policy advisors and military officers opted for a counter-insurgent land reform that was 
inconsistent and expedient, often mixing limited and partly implemented reforms with 
repression.        
Segundo Montes argued that the land reform may have had the opposite effect than 
intended, sharpening the underlying agrarian conflicts that it was designed to soften.  Among 
the limitations cited by Montes in 1980, was “the resistance, at least passively, of the peasantry 
that has not been taken into account in the reform, that systematically distrusts the promise of 
benefits and gifts, that prefers individual property as a guarantee of subsistence and security, 
and that has not been prepared nor educated for a solution that is not understood” (Montes, 
1986: 316).  This early epitaph of the Salvadoran land reform was not only a critique of the 
government’s counter-insurgent aims, but also a warning to the insurgent project of the FMLN 
that also rested on certain assumptions of peasant preferences.  It is to this insurgent 
mobilization strategy and consequent hard-line reaction that I now turn. 
                                                 
408 Interview, coop and community leaders from Sihuatepeque, El Limón, Aug. 24, 1998. 
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2.  The FMLN “Final Offensive” and Hard-line Counter-Insurgent Reaction 
 
During the nine months of 1980 after the land reform was announced, the FMLN prepared for 
its first concerted offensive.  It began on Jan. 10, 1981, when the FMLN staged attacks on forty 
different cities and towns across the country.  Overall, the total estimated number of trained 
FPL combatants in the paracentral zone by the time of the offensive was 50, 40 of which were 
in Zacatecoluca and another 10 in San Vicente.  By early 1982, there were as many as 400 FPL 
combatants in and around Tecoluca, and between 1,000 and 1,500 in San Vicente.409   Still, 
only a small fraction of these combatants were armed and other equipment and clothing were in 
short supply.  The battles for Tecoluca and Zacatecoluca offer some sense of the impact of 
these initial confrontations of the civil war and the challenge of early years of the 
insurgency.410   
In the paracentral zone, the principal target of the FMLN during the 1981 offensive was 
the army barracks in Zacatecoluca.  Two columns of about 200 FMLN combatants participated.  
Only about one in five were armed and trained, the majority were unarmed masses 
experiencing their first military operation.  In the initial attack that began at dusk on the 10th, 
one column entered from the volcano to the northeast, and the other from the littoral highway 
along the southeast.  The latter column was delayed in entering the city, and so the expected 
coordination of the beginning of the attack was impossible.  The rebels also failed to catch the 
military off-guard.  Heavy fighting was initiated by a perimeter defense of the city that delayed 
most of the second FMLN column before they could reach planned positions in the city.  The 
first column was quickly pinned down by superior military firepower.  Calls to insurrection 
went generally unheeded, leaving the FMLN insurgents on their own.  Home made mortars 
using makeshift artillery were fired into the military barracks, but only one discharged.  The 
                                                 
409 Interviews, FPL ex-combatants, Pablo Parada Andino, Norberto Contreras, Audelio Díaz, Pablo Anaya. 
410 Based on interviews with FMLN combatants, narratives from Moroni and Spencer (1995: 96, 117) and Benítez 
Manaut (1989). 
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military counter-attacked with armored cars mounted with machine guns, which effectively 
disrupted the attack.  Without communications equipment, the insurgent attack disintegrating 
into isolated shoot outs, with FMLN combatants carefully using the few rounds that they had.  
Command of the FMLN operation broke down and became disorganized, although individual 
fighting endured for almost 24 hours before government reinforcements arrived from Usulután.  
Having sustained heavy losses, the FMLN withdrew at night on Jan. 11.  According to one 
source, the FMLN suffered 8 killed and 10 wounded in the attack.  A second similar attack was 
mounted two days later. 
The attacks on the smaller town of Tecoluca were perhaps the longest sustained battle 
of the entire offensive, enduring five days.  On Jan. 10, a group of about 30 poorly armed 
combatants attacked the National Guard post with plans to surround and lay siege to it.  Only 
10 of the FMLN forces carried guns or had military training.  They lacked any radio 
communication with a central command.  The post, under the authority of Guard Sergeant 
Chele Ramos, was renowned for the beheadings of dozens of suspected insurgents. The 
remains of the victims were reputedly buried in a common grave within the building.  The 
fighting began in late afternoon and the call for insurrection resulted in about 150 people 
joining the combatants, digging trenches and constructing barricades.  But the FMLN 
expectation of a massive popular insurrection to rise up in support of the attack did not occur.  
The FMLN inflicted heavy casualties on the Guard, whittling down resistance to five 
Guardsmen, before support arrived from 5th Brigade in nearby San Vicente.  The FMLN squad 
commander was killed and two more combatants were wounded before withdrawing from the 
town after the first day of the attack, followed by sustained but less effective attacks over the 
next few days. 
Several lessons could be drawn from the first coordinated action of the insurgency.  
First, the FMLN was able to inflict significant damage despite facing a larger and much better 
equipped and trained adversary.  Second, the offensive served as a test of strength and 
commitment, both for individual combatants and as a group.    Third, the failure to trigger 
greater popular support raised questions about the innate sympathies or level of fear among the 
urban population.  As one combatant put it, “the offensive taught us one of the key strategic 
errors we had made in discounting the need to ensure urban popular support after we had pulled 
all of our people from the cities.”  Pablo Anaya argues that, “the FPL estimated it had 
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sympathy from 60% of the people in Zacatecoluca, and even though many refused to join the 
battle out of fear, the offensive revealed many other equally valuable offers of logistical 
collaboration.”411 
Third, the January offensive unlocked the flow of U.S. support to the Salvadoran 
provisional government.  The apparent irreversibility of the land reform and the FMLN attack, 
combined with the shift in the level of support by the U.S. government all served to motivate 
the Salvadoran security forces and death squads to step up indiscriminate violence against the 
civilian population.   
A Rand Institute review of the U.S. dominated policy of “low intensity war” observed 
that, ”fully aware that Salvadoran society was one of the sickest and most repressive in Latin 
America,” the U.S. sought to marginalize the “powerful extremists on both sides.”  The strategy 
was two-pronged: “fortify the Salvadoran armed forces to wear down the rebels in combat, and 
bolster democracy so as to weaken the rebels’ claim to legitimacy” (Schwarz 1991: v-ix).  In 
discourse, equal responsibility for the “sickness” of Salvadoran society is assigned to the 
extremism of both sides, although in practice the U.S. allied with the Salvadoran military, the 
de facto power within the provisional government, to eliminate or transform the more 
dangerous threat implied by the FMLN taking power.    
The years of 1980-83 were a period of extreme violence that attempted to disarticulate 
the capacity for mobilization and resistance that had been achieved during the previous decade.  
Violence by the right-wing paramilitary organizations, the National Guard and the Salvadoran 
Armed Forces (FAES) became indiscriminate.  However, the United Nations Truth 
Commission established in the Peace Accords to formally investigate political violence during 
the war, strongly suggests that the violence was disproportionately born by the opposition 
communities perceived to side with the FMLN.  While the impact of the violence defies simple 
statistical descriptions, the numbers are sobering.   
Between 1980-1992, as many as 82,000 Salvadorans were killed the vast majority by 
the military and state security forces.412  Figure 5.3 and Table 5.7 show that San Vicente 
                                                 
411 Interview, Pablo Anaya, April 1998. 
412 Total does not include military deaths.  See Seligson and McElhinny (1996).  A 1995 survey by the University 
of Pittsburgh found that 55% of the families who reported losing family members in the war identified themselves 
with the FMLN, compared to only 30% who identified themselves with ARENA.   
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experienced the second highest per capita murder rate during the war, 127 per 100,000.413 The 
intensity of the civil war in the paracentral zone can also be summarized by the fact that San 
Vicente was the only department in El Salvador to report a negative population growth rate 
( -0.33%) between 1971-92 (DIGESTYC, 1997).   
In and around Tecoluca, the violence was particularly severe, where no fewer than 25 
individual massacres were perpetrated between 1980 and 1982 by the government security 
forces in coordination with the local paramilitary forces killing over 3,000 people, including 
many women and children.414  The town itself was subject to approximately twenty two attacks 
by the FMLN, by one ex-mayor’s count. Most of the massacres in the region were never 
reported in the media nor confirmed officially by the U.N. Truth Commission, but were 
recounted in graphic detail by survivors and former combatants.  Unlike some of the most 
publicized government massacres in El Mozote and Sumpul, this wave of violence in the 
Tecoluca region has never been fully described.   
 While the violence throughout the paracentral region generally targeted populations 
suspected of actively collaborating with the FMLN, no one felt secure.  Informants fingered 
innocent families out of self-preservation and many personal scores were settled.  Many people 
who were otherwise politically neutral were forced to choose sides. In San Ildefonso, a PDC 
activist who worked as a construction supervisor recalled how the sergeant in charge of 
organizing the civil patrols had raped and killed a young girl from the town.  Each Sunday 
during military training and field duty in neighboring Villa Dolores, the sergeant would instruct 
the trainees how to kill and mutilate the corpses of suspected subversives to create a climate of 
fear.  He also threatened that a similar punishment was in store for civil patrollers that did not 
report for duty.  Like many serving in the civil defense only out of fear, the man decided to flee 
to Mexico with his family for six months until a new commander for the area was appointed.   
In all three case study communities, the wartime violence left a lasting negative 
impression in all three regions.  However, an important distinction can be made.  By my 
                                                 
413 Data is from the U.N. (1993) Truth Commission Departmental distribution of reported violations.  
Chalatenango, Cuscatlán and Morazán were the other departments with the highest reported death rates during the 
war.   
414 Sources for these massacres include Americas Watch (1991, 1993), Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
(1978, 1984), EPICA (1990), United Nations (1993), survivor and witness testimony, news reports, human rights 
reports.   
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estimation based on interviews, the level of fighting in San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley was 
a significant order of magnitude less than Tecoluca. Towns in contested and government 
controlled zones, such as San Ildefonso or the Jiboa Valley were attacked and occupied by the 
FMLN throughout the war on an average of four or five instances, at times suffering heavy 
bombing in government counter-attacks, yet never approaching the near constant fighting 
endured in Tecoluca.  Many families living in the town centers in all three municipalities that 
had the means, sent their children abroad to avoid conscription.    
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Figure 5.3  Homicides per 100,000 population during the Civil War, 1980-1992 
 
San Vicente
Cuscatlán
Chalatenango
Morazán
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1960s?   Hacienda El Pulpito, San Ildefonso   6 
1974   La Cayetana, Tecoluca      6 
1976   La Cayetana,       ¿ 
Mar 27, 1978  San Pedro Perlupan, Cuscatlan    27 
1979     S. Zacatecoluca & El Golfo, San Juan Nonualco  ¿ 
Mar 23, 1980  San Pedro Aguas Calientes, Verapaz   20 
Abr 4-9, 1980   San Francisco Angulo (Las Lomas), Tecoluca  ¿ 
Abr 30, 1980  Ctn El Jobo, El Espino, Zacate    10 
Nov 14, 1980   Llanos Grandes, Tecoluca    11 
May 1, 1980    San Benito, Tecoluca     300 
Sept 27, 1980  Ctn Platanares, Zacatecoluca    8 
Nov 1980  Cooperativa Nvo Oriente, Verapaz   8 
May 1, 1981   San Benito, Tecoluca     ¿ 
Abr 6,  (Jun 4) 1981 Hac La Pena, Volcan Tecoluca (16 day mil. operation) 400 
Jun 19-20, 1981   Las Lomas, Campanario, San Benito, Tecoluca  ¿ 
Jun-Aug, 1981   San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca                  43 
Jul 25, 1981   San Francisco Angulo, Tecoluca (survivors of La Pena)  52-55  
women & children (150) 
Oct 30, 1981    Las Lomas del Pajaro, Tecoluca    220  
Oct 23, 1981  Hac. Linares, San Agustín,     365 
Jan. 25, 1982    Campanario, Tecoluca (evangelical church)  90 
1982      Cerro los Filos                                  15 
May 12, 1982  SF Angulo, Tec      45 
Jun 19/25, 1982    La Raya, Tecoluca     300-560 
Jul/Aug 27, 1982   La Pita, Tecoluca     40/75 
Jul/Aug 82   La Conacastada-SAndres Achiotes, San Juan  
Buenavista, Tecoluca     300-400 
Aug. 17, 1982  San Jorge, San Jeronimo, Santa Clara  23 
Aug. 17, 1982  Ctn San Alfonsito, Cso El Chilillo, San Esteban 20 
 
 
 
Yet, the memories of one or several violent events recounted by the residents of San 
Ildefonso or the Jiboa Valley, while varying in terms of the frequency or intensity in each 
narrative, stand out in testimony as the single defining characteristic of the civil war.  There is 
an implicit argument in these narratives that everyone generally suffered the same. In 
government control or contested zones, little distinction was made between experiences 
involving the hardships caused by single instances of the aerial bombing, the destruction of an 
FMLN attack on a town center, or a kidnapping, with the almost constant military operations in 
Tecoluca throughout the war.   
Table 5.7 Unofficial Paracentral Zone Massacres 
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Violence, like access to land and shifting political alliances, represented together the 
principal features of the political opportunity structure for strategic survival choices by peasants 
and communities during the war.  The violence was traumatizing in every case, yet in the 
Tecoluca narratives of the war it was only one factor among many that configured the political 
experiences of many informants.  Despite the relatively lower intensity of violence in the other 
case study communities by comparison, it nevertheless played a more definitive role in shaping 
political experiences there.  It is to this comparison that I turn next. 
 
 
3.  Insurgent and counter-insurgent competition over local government 
 
As the insurrection’s failure sunk in, the FMLN combatants suffered a decline in morale, 
exacerbated by the dramatic supply shortage and the onslaught of the first sustained military 
counter-offensive in the first half of 1981.  The coming years of hunger, illness, lack of 
adequate equipment and constant flight were the most difficult of the entire war.  These first 
years of the war were a test of principled commitment and practical survival for the FMLN 
forces.  In the paracentral region, the FMLN faced several paramount challenges.  The first 
involved expanding force capacity, both in terms of size and effectiveness.  The second 
involved laying the foundation for alternative local governance through a policy of maintaining 
a civilian base within the conflict zone despite the devastating level of violence.  A third hurdle 
involved achieving closer coordination between the various insurgent organizations operating 
in the zone – a key factor that prevented the optimal timing of first offensive in 1980.  
Overcoming each of these challenges was crucial first and foremost for survival, but also in the 
formation of an insurgent experience that is distinct from the pre-war political culture. 
The scorched earth policy deployed by the Salvadoran military during the early years of 
the war destroyed much of planted food and forced the FPL to constantly relocate its civilian 
mass base to avoid entrapment.  Some of worst massacres occurred during this period when 
large groups of people were caught trying to evade military incursions.  Many civilians, 
particularly children and the elderly, died of hunger related illnesses.  According to local 
commanders in the paracentral region, little advice was offered from central command as to 
how to surmount these challenges of protecting the civilian population.   
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The principal strategy of the FMLN, particularly in areas of FPL influence, was to 
create alternative systems of local governance designed to supply the insurgents as well as to 
transform the institutions that would be needed to govern in the event of an FMLN victory.  
The FPL established popular local governments (Poderes Populares Locales, or PPLs) early in 
the war as an expression of revolutionary local authority.415  Although short-lived (1981-1984) 
due to the tremendous violence in the region, the PPL experience was significant in altering 
local power relations and were the foundation for subsequent governance experiments within 
refugee camps and repopulations.   
The PPLs represented a parallel system of government where production, justice, basic 
services and security were organized by popular councils.  Each cantón under FMLN influence 
set up the equivalent of municipal councils in resistance under elected leadership of a president, 
vice-president and secretaries in five areas (legal affairs, political education, health and 
education, production and trade, and self-defense.   
San Vicente was divided by the FPL into five major sub-zones, within which various 
PPL were clustered: 
 
1.   Southern Coast – Juan Mendez 
2.   Volcano 
3.   Center (based in San Francisco Angulo) 
4.   Eastern highlands - Marcial Gavidia (Playon, Achiotes, Marquezado,  
             San Bartolo Ichanmico, La Joya) 
5.   Northern San Vicente (San Sebastian, San Lorenzo, Santa Catarina) 
 
 
Governance: The PPLs were an experiment in popular democracy within the limits of 
the civil war but continuing the legacy of peasant participation that had begun in the bible 
circles and peasant unions.  It was clear to all who were interviewed that the PPLs primary 
function was in service of the war effort.  If the FMLN achieved a military victory, the 
insurgent high command was expected to assume the executive offices of the national 
government, while the lower tier political-military leaders would become mayors.416  In the 
                                                 
415 With the exception of Pearce’s (1986) oral history of the PPLs in Chalatenango in Chapter 8 of her book, 
information about the experience of the PPLs is scarce. This section relies on interviews with PPL officials in San 
Vicente.  See Luciak (1987) for a critical analysis of the Nicaraguan model of rural popular democracy in the 
1980s. 
416 Interview, Porfirio Ramos, Las Anonas, Aug. 22, 1998. 
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meantime, leaders were elected and major decisions were made by popular assemblies.  
Militias were strengthened as the first line of defense against army invasions and home-made 
weapons workshops were established.  Brigadistas were trained to provide basic and 
emergency services to civilians and combatants and social policy was debated.  According to 
one PPL leader: 
 
In the fashion of the UTC, we organized mass committees, which were steps toward the formation of 
the Poder Popular, with a President, a Vice-President, a secretary for organizing and one for political 
cohesion, one for health promotion, and on and on.  The responsibilities were the same as that which 
the current mayor of Tecoluca has now.  We had a council and organization of women (Association of 
Salvadoran Women, AMES), and for my part I always liked to organize, and helped organize youth and 
children.  We had a youth festival right here in the middle of the war, with prizes.  The only difference 
was that we could not set off fireworks in order not to be detected by the enemy.  All of these levels of 
organization was the PPL, and there three just here in San Carlos Lempa (San Carlos, Las 
Anonas/Conejos, and Taura/Rancho Grande).  These emerged in 1982 and lasted until some time in 
1985. (“Omar”, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, April 9, 1998)  
 
 
Gibb refers to the PPL governance process as democratic centralism – which in practice 
left real power in the hands of the political-military command and military leaders (Gibb 2000: 
140).  The PPL experiences were uneven and debates were frequent regarding the prioritization 
of political versus military objectives.  In practice, authentic autonomy emerged because the 
PPLs were often left to their own devices for resolving problems.  However there was constant 
tension between the military demands of the war and the growing confidence of the PPLs as 
catalysts for social change.   
In her analysis of FPL controlled zones in Chalatenango, Pearce argues that: 
 
 
The PPLs were always seen by the FPL as an institution of government which would not be subject to 
control of the party.  They were intended to be autonomous organs of the peasantry, whose emergence 
reflected the collapse of the political and military authority of the ‘enemy’, and the establishment of the 
power of the people.  Close collaboration between the military command of the FPL and the PPLs was 
necessary but only to coordinate retreats and defense when the army invaded.  But the situation in 
which the PPLs emerged did not allow for the full realization of this aim.  As there was no central 
government to coordinate the PPLs within a wider process of social transformation, the FPL de facto 
played an orienting role and its priorities inevitably influenced the development of the PPLs (248). 
 
 
Economy:  Unlike the cooperative communities of San Ildefonso, producers in the PPLs 
were intentionally organized to produce food for the insurgency. Abandoned land was 
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redistributed and farmed both collectively and individually. A cooperative spirit was 
encouraged, but not enforced.  Collective production was organized to supply the combatants, 
but individualistic and cooperative production occurred side by side.  Harvests were frequently 
destroyed by the military, so food, medicine and various other supplies were also acquired 
through purchases from stores in the towns and by requisitioning of local landowners or 
commercial vehicles.   
One woman who identified herself as “gente de masa,” or FPL base member that 
remained in the conflict zone the entire war and now lives in San Carlos Lempa described the 
risks that many women assumed to travel to the towns to transfer messages or purchase and 
transport needed supplies: 
 
 
We would travel on the buses to the market in Zacatecoluca, buy small things, like batteries, boots, 
clothing, and bury them under other food in our basket.  We would always carry two baskets, so if 
stopped at a checkpoint, we could deny knowing anything about the first.  Important documents were 
baked in bread.  We devised all sorts of ways to avoid being caught, which would have meant death.  
Many women died that way. (Interview, Irene, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, Apr. 19, 1998) 
 
 
At the same time, as the FMLN survived and grew stronger and more self-confident, 
new attitudes began to dismantle and replace the past agrarian social structure that privileged 
the few.  Audelio Diaz, PPL President in the FPL controlled coastal region of Tecoluca, recalls: 
 
We asked the former colonos of the Hacienda San Jeronimo, where the feared Chepe Diablo was now, 
why an “hombre pactado” was suddenly unwilling to confront his former peasant workforce.  Slowly, 
fear was being transformed. (Interview, Audelio Diaz, FPL ex-combatant, mass organizer and PPL 
President in Jicaro Lempa and Rancho Grande, Tecoluca May and June, 1998)   
 
 An ad hoc system of progressive taxation was implemented for all commercial traffic 
stops where flexibility in payment was directly related to the class of driver.  Diaz explained: 
 
The local militia stopped the trucks identified by well-known brands such as Diana and ADOC.  These 
were sacked without hesitation and the cargo was requisitioned.  Poor and middle class drivers were 
treated differently, requisitioning only percentage of their cargo according to their wealth.  Landowners 
as well who chose to remain in the region, collaborated by ceding land, donated income and goods as 
well as making purchases in the cities, all in return for not having their land confiscated.  This activity 
was to support the compass, but the PPLs acted independently in deciding how and where to carry them 
out.  (Interview, Audelio Diaz) 
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Basic  Services: Special brigades were trained to provide education and health care 
services. Particularly for tending to wounded combatants, mobile clinics with trained medical 
professionals and stocked with supplies were located in the former Hacienda Paz Opico, 
among other clandestine FMLN encampments.  Literacy was mixed with political training 
regarding the history and goals of the revolution.  The PPLs also provided the means to 
continue the work of the popular church through activist priests accompanying the FMLN 
communities and through CONIP.  Through the persistence of bible reflection groups, Christian 
values remained a central part of the insurgent principles.417   
Security: The base organizations also participated directly in all facets of combat, from 
ancillary tasks such as shuttling mail and gathering intelligence on targets or troop movements 
to armed facilitation of military operations and the movement of FMLN mobile forces.  The 
base organizations were responsible for early warning and self-defense against army incursions, 
which including military engineering, (i.e. bunkers, ambush sites, escape and transport routes, 
and storage structures) as well as providing a reserve of fresh combatants and militia.  
Movement between revolutionary municipalities was coordinated through checkpoints with 
verbal passwords and symbols due to the low levels of literacy.   
 Justice: Dispensing local justice also relied to a great extent on the collective judgment 
of the PPLs.  Not only did the PPLs ensure that recruits moving into positions of military 
responsibility had the right character, they had the power to sanction infiltrators and to 
intervene in cases where the FMLN had accused someone of a crime.  Although far from 
meeting even minimal due process considerations, the mass organizations through the 
mechanism of the PPLs exercised collective authority over the life and death of many accused.   
As significant as establishing the PPLs was the goal of destroying traditional local 
government in conflictive zones.  U.S. architects of counter-insurgent strategy in El Salvador 
came to appreciate the political fallout of the death squads and that the rebels would not be 
easily defeated militarily, but enjoyed  significant popular support.  The symbolic fight slowly 
shifted to a contest over democratic legitimacy, which was designed to isolate both the extreme 
right and the insurgent left.  The U.S. State Department believed that as the FMLN neared 
                                                 
417 Interviews, Pilar Clímaco, David Rodríguez, Trinidad de Jesus Nieto, and Miriam Abrego 
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military victory in late 1983, “the death squads and their backers in El Salvador [and 
Guatemala] are enemies of democracy every bit as much as the guerrillas and their Cuban and 
Soviet sponsors.”418   
Counter-insurgent policy was designed to strengthen local democracy from the top-
down, arguing that this would undermine the FMLN, whose objectives and practices Schwarz 
and others characterized as inherently anti-democratic.  The cornerstone of this program was 
the re-establishment of municipal authority by constitutional reform in 1983, and the 
channeling of civic action projects of services and infrastructure in conflictive zones through 
local mayors.419 
After an earlier suspension of local elections in El Salvador they resumed in 1952, 
although candidates were often pre-selected by party elites or the military.420  The municipal 
council, which consists of a mayor, between 4 and 12 regidores (aldermen), and a sindico 
(auditor, or legal representative of the municipality), is elected by a closed list winner take all 
format.421  Voters actually choose from a ballot where slates are indicated by the party name, 
symbol and colors.   
Beyond policing functions for the local landed elite, rural municipal government was 
little more than a ceremonial institution.  Restoring mayoral legitimacy meant re-inventing it.  
Under the provisional government between 1979 and the 1985 municipal elections, mayors 
were simply appointed and there was significant turnover. The Christian Democrats passed 
several laws intended to restore municipal autonomy, increase state transfers and establish a 
municipal training institute.422  The 1986 reform of the municipal code transferred 28 functions, 
                                                 
418 Quoting Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth W. Dam, in Rivard (1983: 57). 
419 The new constitution also gutted Phase II of the land reform by raising the legal reserve limit to 245 hectares, 
virtually assuring the it would never be implemented. 
420 Appointment of municipal officials was reinstated by the Martínez dictatorship in 1932, before which local 
elections existed.   
421 Parties winning a plurality are elected to all town council seats for a term of three years.  Re-election is 
permitted.  Non-proportional winner-take-all local elections in multi-member districts are quite rare in Latin 
America 
422 Prior to the 1983 constitutional reform, departmental governors intervened in many municipal functions.  The 
countries 262 municipalities were divided into 39 districts, where an assistant governor closely supervised local 
decisions and had the power to impose fines.  Districts were abolished and the powers of departmental governors 
over local government were ended with the constitutional reform, and municipal autonomy was codified in 1986. 
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by one estimate, to local government.423  However, in many of these the central government 
exercises veto power.  Revision of tax policy, for example, requires legislative approval. 
The only administrative funds were stamps sold for issuing documents, irregular local 
taxes, fees for a variety of services that were frequently suspended by the conflict, a derisory 
state transfer, projects financed by the National Commission for the Restoration of Areas 
(CONARA) – the government’s principal counter-insurgency program, or the Ministry of 
Interior (DIDECO) and finally, NGO relief donations.  Rural mayors were given little support 
and even less protection, fulfilling their duties out of a sense of civic responsibility.  Coming 
after decades of “demunicipalization,” where local governments were neglected or local 
functions were recentralized, lack of substantive progress following these reforms is 
unsurprising.424 
In San Ildefonso, Cesar López received his appointment notification as mayor in 
December 1979 by telegram.  While he cited as one of his achievements the improvement of 
the road that passed in front of his house, Lopez tired of the job and turned over responsibilities 
to one of the councilmen, who in turn passed duties over to López’ wife, Rosaminta from 1982-
1985.  As middle class medium landowning residents of the town center, Cesar and Rosaminta 
were prototypical mayors for a rural municipality.  The October 1979 coup deposed many of 
the PCN local authorities that had controlled the municipal council, and who also happened to 
come from the principal landowning families in places like San Ildefonso and Guadalupe.425  
The provisional government appointments, at the very least, opened up local governance to 
individuals who were not necessarily at the center of the local power structure.  Cesar was the 
                                                 
423 Nickson (1990: 179).  These responsibilities were dominated by basic services: solid waste management, public 
lighting, regulation of markets, slaughterhouses and cemeteries, and civil registration.    
424 Op cit, pp. 16-19 
425 PCN Decree 198:Substitution of Members of the Municipal Council in Various Departments of the Republic,  
Jan. 28, 1961, issued after the military overthrow of the reformist Lemus government in 1961, identifies the 
landowning family nexus among the local elites appointed to municipal posts.   In both San Ildefonso and 
Guadalupe, we see the coincidence between locally dominant landowning elites, clergy and local governance.   In 
San Ildefonso, the mayor was Don Eusebio Antonio Marín, First alderman: Don Gilberto Domingo Amaya, 
Second alderman: Don Fredy Amaya, Síndico: Don José Adrián Gavidia, and Alternates: Don Dolores Romero 
and Don Manuel de Jesús Ruiz.  In Guadalupe, the mayor was Don Odilón Rigoberto Platero, First alderman: Don 
José Pablo Adalberto Pineda, Second alderman: Don Roberto Torres, Síndico: Don Jesús Pío Chávez, and 
Alternates: Don Jesús Monge & Don Francisco Platero Valladares.   
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foreman for a nearby cattle hacienda that was being bled by FMLN taxes and eventually sold to 
FINATA.  His wife managed a cheese processing and delivery business out their home.   
Rosaminta described how the part of the mayor’s office was destroyed in one of the 
early FMLN attacks on the town and a war tax of 5,000 and 10,000 colones ($1,250 - $2,500) 
was paid periodically to the insurgents.  She was also forced to turn over the stamps, 
typewriters and forms, but refused to destroy the birth, death, marriage and sales records in 
overt defiance of rebel demands.  For these discretions, she faced death threats from the local 
military and survived only through an intervention by her son-in-law who was colonel at the 
time.426  The Lopez’ sent their children to the U.S., their house was damaged by aerial 
bombing, and their cattle were requisitioned.  However personal and official collaboration with 
the FMLN was the perceived cost of serving as mayor.427   
In Verapáz, Mauricio Alfaro, the appointed mayor between (1979-1985), characterized 
a typical PDC supporter at the time.  His family owned a small store and ten hectares of sugar 
cane.  He identified with the electoral opposition in their disgust with the past political abuses 
of the PCN.  However, armed struggle was never an option.  He described his perspective as 
one of a critical but neutral observer – which he illustrated by holding out his arms to appear 
like a fulcrum of the scales of justice with the opposing extremes hanging as weights on either 
side.   
During Alfaro’s term, the municipal building was burned and the health clinic was 
destroyed.  Alfaro complained that government projects (DIDECO) only used the municipal 
government as a pass through and to organize donated labor, while the funds were administered 
by the Ministry of Interior.  Eight tons of U.S. food aid arrived monthly in the early 1980s to be 
distributed to the displaced population.  The municipal office was destroyed by the FMLN and 
a brother-in-law was assassinated.  But when advised to seek asylum in the U.S. he refused.  
Seeing his role as almost a puppet and wanting to dedicate more attention to his farm, Alfaro 
attempted to resign on three occasions, but was forced to continue until 1985. 
The examples of San Ildefonso and Verapáz point to the challenges facing mayors 
during the war’s early years.  However, the levels of collaboration and FMLN strength varied, 
                                                 
426 Interview, Maria Zoila Rivas de Zelaya, Municipal Secretary, May 22, 1998 San Ildefonso. 
427 Interviews, Carlos and Rosaminta Lopez, former mayors of San Ildefonso, May 26, 1998. 
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resulting in distinct treatment of mayors in different regions.  Eleazar Cruz Iraheta, ARENA 
mayor of San Cayetano Istepeque, was assassinated by the FPL on April 3, 1983.   Pyes (1983) 
estimates that 35 PDC mayors were killed between 1980-1983, most at the hands of ORDEN. 
 In sum, mayors were thrust into duty during the early years of the war with little 
authority or resources.  For the most part, they served as channels for improvised relief projects 
with little local coordination nor an overarching plan from the central government.  Those 
mayors that seemed to manage well did so through passive collaboration with the FMLN. 
 
 
4.  FMLN Coordination and Military Stalemate   
 
The FMLN recovered and eventually reached military parity with government forces. After the 
first coordinated attacks were carried out during the Jan 1981 offensive, the next two years 
were mostly independent operations by the five factions of the FMLN.  In zones of FMLN 
control, by late 1982 most of the National Guard posts had been destroyed and attacks 
involving concentrations of thousands of combatants were increasingly effective and 
embarrassing the government.  Soldiers surrendered quickly and civil defense units were called 
on to put up the toughest resistance.   
While the FMLN took the towns of the Jiboa Valley on various occasions they failed to 
clear the military control of this side of the volcano.  Particularly resistant areas included the 
cantón of San Emigdio of Guadalupe and Candelaria Lempa, both of which bordered 
Cristiani’s coffee finca which housed its own detachment of soldiers.   At a time when FPL 
forces were neutralizing entire companies of soldiers, the coffee producing village of San 
Emigdio fended off numerous attacks even by FPL Special Forces.  Unlike the teenage soldiers 
who collapsed quickly under fire, the civil defense patrollers in San Emigdio were 40 to 50 
year old smallholders who were fighting to defend what little security they had preserved.  An 
FPL commander also attributed the tremendous resistance in San Emigdio to a deeply rooted 
conservative and anti-communist Catholic faith: 
 
In the heat of a battle to take San Emigdio, our forces could hear the civil patrollers in near rapture 
singing religious verses and appealing for God’s justice to guide their defense of the town.  Their 
resistance was so tenacious and profoundly motivated by these religious appeals that it began to sew 
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doubt among some of the FMLN combatants that God may not actually be siding with the insurgency.   
This religious zeal was one of the reasons our forces failed to take and hold San Emigdio.  (Interview, 
Pablo Parada Andino, May 4, 1998)  
 
By the end of 1982, the constant repression and the influx of better equipment swelled 
the rebel ranks to approximately 2,500 fighters in the province alone.428  The militia were 
receiving equipment and began to play more central roles in military operations.  The FMLN 
dealt the military a steady string of black eyes.  Combatants described with an air of 
invincibility how FMLN battalions were capable of destroying the most formidable U.S. 
designed fortifications on the Chinchontepec volcano, taking 95 soldiers prisoner in the assault 
on the military garrison at Siete Joyas, in May, 1983.429  Another entire battalion, El Nonualco, 
totaling some 300 soldiers, was destroyed in a battle at El Salto.430  High ranking U.S. military 
officials raised the probability of an insurgent victory unless dramatic changes were made.   
The level of self-confidence and independence among FMLN field commanders also 
contributed to excesses that suggested an imbalance in the strategic mix of politics and 
militarism.  In June of 1983, an FPL battalion under the command of Mayo Sibrián ambushed a 
company of government soldiers in a village below San Ildefonso called Quebrada Seca.  Some 
42 soldiers killed in the battle, but an additional thirty surrendered.  Of these, at least 15 were 
executed after being taken prisoner.  An FMLN political officer attempted to intervene to stop 
the killing but was only able ensure the escape of an officer and another soldier (Gibb 2000: 
185-186).  This action ensured that the massacre would be reported.  News of the massacre was 
damaging to the FMLN’s principled discourse and indicative of the risks of a rather 
decentralized strategy up to that point.  One combatant involved in the incident spoke openly 
about the level of ruthlessness under Mayo’s command for which his battalion was becoming 
notorious.  He referred to Quebrada Seca as evidence of the imbalance that had emerged 
between the rapidly increasing military capacity of FMLN and the almost spontaneous episodes 
                                                 
428 Gibb (2000: 177).  PRTC estimates indicate that as few as 150 armed combatants remained in Northern SV by 
late 1982, not nearly enough to protect thousands of civilians.  Interview, Chaca, PRTC commander. 
429 Interviews, Nicolás García; Alejandro Valladares, and Pablo Parada Andino.  Nearly 100 soldiers were 
reportedly killed, wounded or captured in this operation.  An overarching concern that motivated the FMLN 
strategy of military superiority during the early 1980s was not only in reaction to the perceived weaknesses of 
government forces, but also to prepare for what was then considered an inevitable invasion by U.S. forces.   
430 Accounts estimate 45 prisoners, but the majority was killed. 
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of vengeance that were effectively eliminating any moral distinctions between the Salvadoran 
army and themselves.431  However, the Quebrada Seca killings also signaled a much more 
delicate internal crisis that had emerged under the command of Mayo Sibrián and would 
eventually illustrate the downside of trust in the FMLN commanders on which the insurgency 
depended.432   
Still, most of the military activity in the region was not well coordinated and the goal of 
military superiority began to outpace the political work.  Competition between the five rebel 
organizations explained the missed opportunity for insurrection in March 1980.  By the mid 
1980s, deepened competition for authority within the FMLN and for recruits and arms 
contributed to turf battles and poor coordination that often resulted in friendly fire deaths.  
Toward the later years of the war, these same competitive motivations would lead to the 
establishment of five parallel networks of solidarity organizations for both strategic on the 
ground services and fundraising in the exterior.   
In one such instance, an FPL combatant describes the tensions that impeded political 
and military coordination in the region: 
 
Our unit had planned an attack on the ATONAL Battalion for weeks near Santa Clara in Usulután, 
alerting the RN units in the region to avoid confusion.  During the battle, in which the FPL inflicted 
heavy losses, RN troops crossed into the line of fire.  Both insurgent squads knew to some degree that 
the other was not the enemy, but the RN didn’t indicate or respond.  Combatants in both groups were 
killed by friendly fire.  However, after the battle, the FPL Battalion moved to surround the RN 
encampment in order to demand the return of six rifles capture in combat from six wounded FPL 
fighters that in fact still belonged to the FPL (with serial numbers to prove it).  The threat of violence 
was necessary to recover the arms.  In this early expansion period of the war, without strict coordination 
between the revolutionary armies, there were numerous losses to friendly fire. 433 
 
                                                 
431 Interview, Carlos Cortés, Feb. 3, 1999, La Sabana, Tecoluca.  Quebrada Seca was the extreme at that point in 
the war, but only one of numerous incidents of revenge killing of prisoners or excessive violence in combat.  An 
internal evaluation after Quebrada Seca stressed efforts needed to correct the lack of attention to the political 
dimension of the war, but it is not clear whether any sanctions were imposed.     
432 Sibrián was a member of the FMLN high command for the eastern front “Francisco Sanchez,” in 1981 and 
commanded the operation that destroyed the first of two bridges that connect the eastern and western halves of the 
country in December of that year.  See Benítez-Manaut (1989: 264). 
433 Interview, Carlos Cortés Hernández, La Sabana, Tecoluca, Jan. 22, 1999 
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The FPL had the largest army and led the joint command in the paracentral region, 
allying with the PRTC in the north of San Vicente, RN forces operating in eastern Usulután and 
a small Communist Party (FAL) contingent operated from a base on the Chinchontepec 
volcano.  ERP forces dominated the north-south corridor from Jucuarán to northern San 
Miguel-Morazán. Each military organization operated according to a different political 
philosophy and different military capabilities.  The philosophy of prolonged popular war 
espoused by the FPL’s legendary and most intransigent leader, Salvador Cayetano Carpio 
(Marcial), made it least open to cooperation with other groups.    
However an internal crisis within the FPL and a shift in the political and military tactics 
of the Salvadoran government resulted in the FMLN altering its own tactics.  In a power 
struggle, on April 6, 1983, Marcial ordered the execution of the FPL second in command, then 
killed himself.  The crisis came at perhaps the apex of FMLN military effectiveness, which 
may have mitigated the psychological damage of the loss of the top two FPL commanders.  Yet 
it also removed a major obstacle to greater integration of the FMLN as a political – military 
force.  With the FPL in disarray at the central command level, steps were taken to establish 
unity within the central command and harmonize tactics through intentional cooperation on the 
ground.   
However, greater unification and harmonization of command and operations had 
already been occurring on the ground by necessity in reaction to a more effective military 
strategy of aerial bombardment and troop placement.  This more aggressive military strategy 
was combined with the introduction of civilian pacification programs and cushioned as well by 
the growing government legitimacy following the electoral victory of Duarte as President in 
1984.  The massive buildup of the Salvadoran air force effectively eliminated the decisive 
FMLN advantage to rapidly concentrate forces.  Aerial bombing raids were stepped up to 
remove the civilian population that remained in FMLN control zones, followed by efforts to 
win the allegiance of those choosing to stay though public works and social service provision 
(Corum 1998).   
Colonel Waghelstein, then head of the U.S. military training group in El Salvador, 
argued that this new tactic of civic action programs should be viewed as a “War on the Crowd - 
the type of war in which the civilian population, or more precisely the support of the 
population, was the objective,” (1985: 119) The CONARA initiative was launched in June 
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1983 in San Vicente and Usulután.  The paracentral region was selected to pilot the civic action 
programs, according to U.S. State Department, “because of its economic importance (cotton, 
sugar, coffee) its central position, its function as the highway, electric and communications link 
to the Eastern portion and its heavy concentration of displaced persons...If successful, it would 
quietly militarize civilian life within the model provinces, ensuring government control without 
the constant presence of the armed forces.” 
With Operation Well-being for San Vicente, the Salvadoran army launched its largest 
concerted counter-insurgency operation of the war, intended to remove the FPL and co-opt its 
support from the Chinchontepec volcano.  After about a month of steady bombing, some 6,000 
troops moved in to occupy most of the volcano and parts of the coast in Tecoluca.   The FPL 
was forced to relocate several thousand people first to Usulután then back to the north of San 
Vicente to avoid the army.  In some contrast to the recent military policy of indiscriminate 
violence, the operation was designed to create a space for CONARA to provide emergency 
services for the displaced population, rebuild roads and houses, with the hopes to resettle 
sympathetic civilians in areas that could then be policed by civil defense units.  The Salvadoran 
Territorial Services admitted that civil defense patrols were not actually defending themselves 
but served essentially as human antennas and buffers for the Army by attracting attacks by the 
enemy (Lawyers Committee on Human Rights 1984; Miles 1984; Siegel and Hackel 1988).  
In San Vicente, the CONARA strategy had little effect and in fact illustrated the level of 
sophistication that FMLN coordination with mass organizations had achieved.  Before 
Operation Well-Being for San Vicente was underway, the FPL withdrew its combatants to 
Usulután, directed an offensive against key towns there and stepped up attacks from bases in 
Chalatenango.  Instead of trying to block the civic action program, the FMLN organized 
communities showed a neutral civilian identity and simply gathered to accept the humanitarian 
supplies, much of which were then diverted to the insurgency.434   
The plan Operation Well-Being for San Vicente failed to lower the general distrust that 
most peasant communities held for the military, which was visibly in charge of and skimmed 
funds from CONARA.   For civilians aligned with the FMLN this practice of poder de doble 
                                                 
434 An unpublished ERP document written in 1987 indicates that that this strategy “two-face power”, was a crucial 
aspect of re-establishing civilian bases of support throughout the war.  ‘El poder de doble cara’ Lilian Mercedes 
Letona (Comandante Luisa), internal FMLN manuscript, Morazán, 1987. 
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cara (two-faced power) evolved as both a means for survival and an explicit strategy for 
revolutionary organization.  This practice of two-faced power was an extension of the PPL 
strategy in which rebel fighters depended upon the support of hundreds and even thousands of 
masas.  Ultimately, the armed forces were forced to reallocate troops to Usulután and just 
months after the end of the program, the FPL and its base were operating normally on the 
volcano.   
The CONARA debut was considered a failure as far as its short term goal of altering 
peasant sympathies on the volcano.  By August of 1983, the FPL again massing its forces with 
other elements of the FMLN with spectacular success. 
CONARA and its various reincarnations during the war would not be very effective in 
winning peasant sympathies or reversing distrust toward the military.  Nevertheless, it was 
expanded to have a presence in all departments by the 1987, although its programs were limited 
to urban areas and cantónes in areas where FMLN influence was weak, but also where political 
sympathies were strongest.  An Armed Forces document projecting the areas for consolidation 
of the CONARA pacification program, under the new name United for Reconstruction, targeted 
the Jiboa Valley in San Vicente as the highest priority.  Tecoluca was too insecure and San 
Ildefonso was of lower strategic importance.435   
Despite CONARA’s explicit association with the military objectives and the highly 
centralized allocation of resources, these projects were about the only development resources 
available in most rural conflictive communities.  Particularly in small urban centers that were 
struggling to provide basic services to hundreds of families that had been displaced from rural 
conflictive zones, CONARA assistance was critical, if only symbolic in any development 
sense.  
In San Ildefonso and other conflictive areas where government control was not as 
tenuous, the impact of CONARA was substantial.  According to one local construction 
supervisor, CONARA funded one room schools in many of the lowland (less conflictive) 
                                                 
435 FAES (1986) - General Adolfo O. Blandon, Chief of Salvadoran Armed Forces High Command, Operational 
Plan No. 1 of the United to Reconstruct Campaign - Areas of Consolidation by Department, internal document, 
(1986) mimeo.  In neighboring La Paz target areas included Hacienda Santa Teresa, Santiago Nonualco, San José 
Obrajuelo, Platanares, El Callejón, Piedra Grande Arriba, Santa Lucia, Las Animas, Tehuiste Arriba. In Usulután, 
target areas included the cascos of Ozatlán, Jiquilisco, Puerto El Triunfo, San Dionisio, Concepción Baitres, Santa 
Elena and the cantón of Los Campos. 
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villages and urban road improvements under Duarte.  Local labor was paid six colones per day 
($1.25).436  Local claims of corruption were indicative of larger problems that CONARA faced 
at the national level under Christian Democrat administration. 
Perhaps the determining factor for the FMLN in this period was the narrow election 
victory of Duarte over ARENA founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson, in the 1984 presidential 
elections.  Fair or not, the transfer of power to a civilian government conveyed significant 
legitimacy away from the rationale for armed struggle and in turn stole energy from any hope 
for a popular insurrection.   
The confluence of all of these shifts forced the FPL in the paracentral region to 
contemplate dismantling the PPLs, evacuating the mass organizations and for the entire FMLN 
to shift back to guerrilla war strategy. The later paper on doble cara strategy recognizes that, 
“the FMLN in openly declaring its relationship with these people, made them illegal, which put 
them into confrontation with the enemy.  But the masses were unarmed, and so only had 
options of running or hiding, which in turn made them even more illegal.”  Miles and Ostertag 
(1991) argue the PPLs had become a burden on the FPL as the air war reduced the tactical 
advantage of large concentrated forces.  “As civilian governing bodies, the PPLs were intended 
as an open, formal expression of dual power in the rural areas where the Armed Forces had lost 
permanent control.  But the participatory characteristics of this form of organizing exacerbated 
many of the difficulties the revolutionary movement was facing” (23).   
Unlike the PPL experiences described by Pearce in Chalatenango, the PPL strategy was 
short-lived in the paracentral zone (Pearce 1986).  The brutality of the repression reflected by 
the wave of above noted massacres forced constant mobilizations of thousands of people and 
eventually the depopulation of most of Tecoluca and northern San Vicente. After the August 
1982 Calabozo massacre in Amatitan Arriba, about 20 km to the west of San Ildefonso, all of 
the FMLN organizations began withdrawing their civilian base from northern San Vicente to 
refugee camps to Zaragoza, La Libertad, San Miguel and ultimately, San Antonio, just across 
the border in Honduras.   
Demonstrating reluctance to abandon the initial strategy of maintaining a civilian 
presence in the zone, the FPL initiated a one year campaign beginning in late 1983 to prepare 
                                                 
436 Interview Santiago Melendez, May 23, 1998, San Ildefonso. 
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the strategic withdrawal of its own mass organizations.  This involved explaining the rationale 
to the PPLs and setting up the logistics channels that would facilitate safe passage.  Against the 
wishes of many who preferred remaining in the region, in 1984 the FPL began the controlled 
relocation of its mass organizations to Mesa Grande refuge in Honduras, as well as various 
urban centers.437 The depopulation of much of the FMLN control zones in the paracentral 
region forced two contradictory effects, a centralization of the FMLN command structure but 
an even greater decentralization of the on the ground military operations that would 
characterize a return to guerrilla tactics. 
 
5.  Competing Hierarchies: Insurgent and Counter-insurgent experiences 
 
Insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies appealed to and in turn, shaped 
attitudes and behaviors in their respective areas of control.  In this section, I examine more 
closely these respective political experiences during the high intensity phase of the conflict. 
El Salvador is small, densely populated, and in turn, geographically inhospitable to 
armed insurrection.  The FMLN boasted that the people served as the mountains that the 
insurgency lacked.  In the early years of the war, survival of the insurgency depended on 
achieving a high level of trust with the civilian population.  Many combatants, as suggested in 
the survey data, were motivated to join by the popular grievances shared by many rural poor.  
However, instruction as combatants reinforced and honed this discontent into the values and 
discipline that a successful guerrilla war would require.   FMLN discipline also required the 
imposition of a military code by the political and operational officers.  
 The FPL was selective in its early recruitment.  Ascendancy within the FMLN involved a 
succession of steps, beginning with participation in the PPLs: 
 
First were the poderes populares locales, which were involved mostly in agriculture work and requisition.  
The PPLs, like BPR in the 1970s, were connected to the FPL structure by mass organizers that were 
                                                 
437 The principal refugie centers were Calle Real, San Salvador; Domos Maria in Mejicanos, and several villages 
in Usulután.   
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charged with accompanying the masses.  From there one passed to the ranks of guerrilla militia, and then to 
the army of popular liberation (EPL).  Later on, Special Forces battalions were formed. 438  
 
 
Veterans described a meticulous screening process where aspirants would be evaluated 
in all areas of their behavior and attitudes.  These ranged from eliminating basic vices to 
developing more subtle skills like the capacity to cultivate the self-confidence of the civilian 
population.  FPL training, according to one veteran, was as much about military tactics as it 
was about the ground rules and sensitivity for engaging the civilian population: 
 
To begin with, when one began, there were twenty-six guidelines, of which you had to fulfill at least half to 
be accepted before taking on any responsibility.  If you had fulfilled less than 50%, you weren’t given the 
opportunity, and were told, “Look, we’re sorry but it’s necessary for you to work a little harder on the 
negative parts, which count more in your personality, your conduct and all that allows you to be an 
example for the organization among the people.  For example, to give you some idea, in the context of 
personal habits, first, you had to be someone that didn’t drink too much, or that didn’t interact poorly with 
one’s comrades or neighbors, or people.  It involved knowing how to first listen to the people and after 
listening to them and analyzing what they said to provide them answers that were appropriate but not in 
a drastic or negative way, but to take into consideration the opinion that had been given.  It meant, at 
the least, not taking opportunities with women.  One shouldn’t dedicate oneself to the profit of the 
organization itself, or misuse funds, and not mislead in any way the organization, yourself or other 
people.  These are some of the positive rules that a person had to follow.  If of the 26 guidelines, the 
negatives weighed the most heavily, they sent you back to be educated with the rest.  But if at least half 
of them were fulfilled positively, you were told, ‘we accept you and expect you to take into account 
those other areas that need improvement.’ 439 
 
 
Combatants described the emphasis in FMLN political training on the so-called fifteen 
principles of combat, the most fundamental of which was not to dehumanize the war.440  
Solidarity with the poor, self-sacrifice, and equality were all part of the perceived mística of the 
                                                 
438 Carlos Urbina, ex FPL combatant, La Florida, Aug. 25, 1998.  The structure of the EPL went from squads of 5-10 
combatants, peletones of 15-30, sections of 45-90, detachments of 135-270, and battalions, which ranged from 405-
810.   
439 Interview, Alvaro Alfaro, ex –combatant for the FPL and cooperative leader in, San Bartolo, Tecoluca, April 
23, 1998.  Alfaro died of a cerebral hemorrhage days after assisting in the October, 1998 evacuation following 
Hurricane Match.  “Que supiera entender, escuchar primero a la gente y después de escucharles y analizar y darles 
una respuesta si la tenía que dar pero no era que diera respuestas drásticas negativas, sino que tomara en cuenta la 
opinión de lo que le habían aportado.”  
440 Interview, Norberto Contreras.  The exact number of rules or principles differed in combatant testimony. 
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FMLN and acts that damaged this reputation were treated as serious offenses in order to 
reinforce a sense of internal discipline and trust.441  Revolutionary justice went hand in hand 
with principled voluntarism for instilling the rules of engagement in the early years of the war.   
Acts of pilfering, extortion, vandalism, accumulation of luxury items – all of which induced a 
perception of inequality and sowed resentment, were punishable offenses.  Although these were 
lower grade crimes, typically drawing double or triple duties for first time offenders and 
expulsion or execution for severe offenders.  Rape, the murder of another combatant, repeated 
abandonment of a weapon, or giving information to the enemy were all punishable by death: 
 
What did acceptance into the ranks of the revolution mean?  In the first place, being accepted had three 
phases.  The first phase was sympathizer, or someone that aspired to be a member of the organization.  
Then this advanced more by becoming a member.  The new member, this was the most watched over, the 
most controlled phase, because he had to walk a straight line (con los pies rectos).  Any slip up would bring 
harm to him, and punishment – a mountain of corrective measures to prevent him from giving a bad 
example.  Various comrades had to be punished because they disobeyed and were a bad example.  If the 
people recognized or found out that this member or aspirant of the organization ran around doing these 
things, they might think that these behaviors are what the FMLN is all about.  For example, the rape of a 
woman, for this the death penalty was applied because confusing force with voluntarism brought discredit 
on the organization, a situation that was not tolerated by the organization’s principles.  Abandonment of 
one’s weapon – if a guerilla abandoned their weapon, this brought a correspondingly severe penalty, or if 
this had happened on two or three prior occasions, the death penalty was applied as a military law.  Then, 
misuse of fund in those periods when I worked within some organizations [that handled money] this was 
also serious, and could result in a death penalty.  These were the three most relevant ones. (Interview 
Alvaro Alfaro, San Bartolo, Tecoluca) 
 
 Most offenses were dispensed with after collective discussions among fellow 
combatants.   When crimes involved civilians, popular local government (PPL) assemblies  
were called where testimony could be offered on behalf or against the accused.  After open 
discussion, a political decision would be reached by tribunal.442  In sum, the FMLN was 
capable of reinforcing the desired internal values and beliefs through the effective monitoring 
and capacity to sanction compliance with what most considered a fair set of rules. 
The insurgent rules of engagement also had a significant external component.  One 
example was the policy of releasing prisoners.  Having no prisoners for which to trade in the 
                                                 
441 Interviews with various combatants 
442 In the cases of PPLs that I researched, the tribunal consisted of the PPL government. 
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early years of the war, FMLN policy was to release captured soldiers with the exception of 
those who were found to be active in death squads or as spies.   Those determined to be a future 
risk were executed.  FMLN combatants had to determine whether the soldier had fought 
aggressively or not, typically evident by the number of unspent bullets remaining in the 
cartridge or tone of voice.  Most captives were released conditional upon future collaboration.  
Civilian informants were often given similar ultimatums before more decisive retaliation was 
taken.  Despite effective sanction mechanisms, it was a constant struggle to mitigate the deep 
desire for revenge, which led in some instances to vigilante justice.443   
Another central theme in combatant instruction involved the de-emphasis on material 
incentives as a motivation to fight.  Most, although not all, joined the revolutionary movement 
as extremely poor people.  Nevertheless, most asserted that they were not fighting for the 
money.  Post-war conditions among the demobilized seem to validate these claims.  Indeed, 
few were permitted to carry or accumulate money during the war and others described their 
discomfort with responsibilities involving money due to the risks associated with its misuse.   
To cite one instance, a combatant describes the looting of a local bank: 
 
Combatants were not to carry large sums of money, and was not even necessary because meals and 
other material needs were provided for collectively or not at all.  There were small exceptions, as in the 
case of family visits.  But handling money was considered nothing more than the potential for crimes, 
although it would have been difficult to spend as a combatant anyway.  I led a bank robbery after taking 
the city of Berlin in February 1983.  It was not the risks associated with the military side of the 
operation that worried me most, but the responsibility in holding the money until it could be turned 
over.   
 
 
The man had seen years of combat and had lost an arm in the first attack on Tecoluca 
during the 1981 offensive.  Still, it was the responsibility of holding the money until it could be 
turned over to the high command that weighed most in his assessment of the operational risks.  
He personally transported $160,000 to designated contacts and took great pride in the fact that 
every cent made it safely.444 
                                                 
443 Interviews, FMLN officers, Carlos Cortes, Audelio Díaz, Pablo Parada Andino, Chaca. 
444 Interview, Audelio Diaz, bank robbery was confirmed in a news report in La Prensa Grafica, Feb. 1983. 
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Building trust among the civilian population was paramount given both the security pre-
requisites as well as the vast and diverse mobilization network employed by the FMLN to 
conduct the war.  Building trust involved breaking down an anti-communist ideology that had 
deeply penetrated the collective consciousness of much of the rural population.  To overcome 
these misconceptions, the FMLN adopted a policy of defending its policies publicly with the 
civilian population, even to the point of encouraging complaints if people believed that they 
were treated unfairly.  The expropriation of private property among passive collaborators and 
the destruction of property of active opponents or those who refused to collaborate, were not 
disputable. However there were limits to both types of actions and the FMLN through its 
communications capacity devolved some authority to the civilian population in setting these 
limits.  Injustices committed by FMLN combatants could be denounced to the zone commander 
and in some cases, adjudicated.   
Benjamín Molina, a medium sized sugar grower with several sugar mills living in 
Verapáz was kidnapped by the FMLN early in 1986.  He recognized his kidnappers as former 
laborers at his mill from local families.  They had demanded and, Molina contended, won wage 
concessions in the run-up to the war.  Molina considered himself  un buen patrono.  His family 
paid the ransom and he was released.  Several weeks later, the local FMLN commander visited 
Molina to verify details of the kidnapping.  Apparently, the kidnappers had kept some or all of 
the ransom.  Soon after the commander reported to Molina that the squad charged with the 
kidnapping had been “ajusticiado”, or executed.445  Accountability was a strategic priority of 
the insurgency, even to the population considered adversarial to the tactics of the FMLN.  
One zone commander reflected that despite the various reasons for joining the FMLN, 
whether it was the pursuit of a girlfriend, to seek refuge from the repression, or simply 
ideological commitments, once in, each person was obliged to a moral rectitude that 
distinguished the FMLN from the armed forces.   In part, this was because trust was so 
fundamental to the FMLN effectiveness in its mission.  Unprincipled recruits (gente 
prepotente) who joined primarily out of a need for revenge, were viewed with caution because 
they often failed to fulfill their specific responsibilities in an operation.446  Another combatant 
                                                 
445 Interview, Benjamín Mejía, Verapáz.  Benjamin Molina was kidnapped for a ransom of $12,000, and robbed 
(taxed) on another occasion for $1,500.   
446 Interview, Pablo Parada Andino, sub-zone commander for San Vicente in the early 1980s. 
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estimated that only 10% joined the FMLN for unprincipled motives (voyeurism, personal 
disputes) but that they did not last.  Most knew that only through experience would a 
trustworthy combatant be proven.447  
For a period during the early years of the war, care was taken to plan each of the major 
operations, which were preceded by political discussions to assess and debate the merits of the 
overall mission and role each individual would play.  Actions were not taken in haste, but only 
after sufficient training and preparation would assure that all tasks would be carried out.448  The 
disadvantages of guerrilla warfare meant that operations involved many synchronized but 
decentralized actions, by combatants and civilians alike that required a high level of internal 
and external trust. Among the participating combatants, the success of a deliberate and planned 
operation left one with a profound sense of mission and a commitment to sacrifice for others.   
The FMLN argued that their efforts would transform themselves and in turn Salvadoran 
society, which had been corrupted by structural injustices.  This struggle for “self-
transformation,” to produce the “new revolutionary man” as Che Guevara had argued, melded 
evenly with the liberation theology foundations of the insurgency to reinforce a spiritual 
mentality for building a revolutionary socialist conscience (Guevara 1966a: 21, 1966b: 13; Liss 
1984: 256-265). The influence of Guevara is evident in the moral incentive structure upon 
which the FMLN achieved the extraordinary revolutionary discipline that made the guerrillas 
such an effective fighting force for so many years.  The successful guerrilla combatant, 
according this thinking, required: 
 
the ability to fight all night with only twenty bullets, to have the patience to wait until the right moment 
to fire during an ambush, or to make the right decision judging another comrade’s error.449 
 
 
In his analysis of the rise and fall of social movements, Tarrow is skeptical about just 
how much a rebellion can change the underlying culture.  “When the dust of revolution settles, 
                                                 
447 Interview, Audelio Diaz, April 26, 1998 
448 The intensification of the air war by 1983 reduced the space for regular discussion of operations and strategy, 
both within the FMLN and within most PPLs in the paracentral region. 
449 Audelio Diaz, Apr 26, 1998. 
  326
the culture of consensus is often more enduring than the costume of revolt” (Tarrow 1994: 
118).  An FMLN commander operating in northern San Vicente offered a similar reflection:  
 
The circumstances of the war called forth a set of values, a fraternal solidarity that was authentic and 
necessary, not so much as a new culture but as a form of survival.  The differences are therefore more 
apparent between older and younger combatants.  Those who joined at the beginning experienced many 
“final offensives” and had to overcome an accumulation of deception and self-deception to assimilate. 
450  
 
 
 This “self-deception” refers to the daunting challenges that doom the majority of 
peasant rebellions to fail and quickly diminish the romanticism of choosing insurgency.  Like 
others who served “punto a punto,” or from the beginning to the end of the conflict, survival 
involved a philosophical reconciliation that the sacrifices were unlikely to be compensated in 
the short term.  Revolutionary ideals would not necessarily perfect a messy reality, 
humanization of war was at best a rhetorical contradiction.   
It is worth adding that these same bedrock attitudes of discipline, trust and high levels 
of self-confidence in the historical justness of their cause all posed a potential risk for the 
FMLN.  Efficacy can be vulnerable to an unquestioning overconfidence and idolatry.  The 
reliance on trust increased FMLN susceptibility to uncritical acceptance of military leadership, 
and this became especially difficult when success on the battlefield conflicted with the 
violation of those values that most were fighting to universalize. This problem was particularly 
acute when trust was betrayed by infiltrators and decisions regarding executions or expulsions 
were taken by the leadership alone to cleanse the organization.  Caciquismo and over-
dependence on military leadership, in the eyes of some combatants, tended to perpetuate the 
pre-war culture by simply replacing the unquestioned authority of the landed elites rather than 
transforming it. 
  
 
 
 
a.  The formation of a counter-insurgent political culture   
                                                 
450 Interview, (Chaca) PRTC commander, N. San Vicente. 
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Compared with the FMLN testimony, far less has been written about the rationale or values 
associated with participation in the counter-insurgency. In part, this may be due to the observed 
reticence to speak openly about the war in general in these regions or to justify the actions 
taken by groups often characterized as death squads.  To be sure, these paramilitary 
organizations found sufficient support in certain regions such as the Jiboa Valley, to leave little 
doubt regarding the loyalties of at least a segment of the population.451  At the same time, many 
of the smaller landowners, some of whom had been kidnapped or ceded land in the agrarian 
reform, expressed comprehension and even sympathy for the FMLN goals, despite their own 
hardships.  Within the Jiboa Valley, these local elites represented a PDC base prior to the mid-
1980s and would have favored the gradual, stable democratic transition augured by Duarte 
Presidency in the 1970s.  However, the rapid ascent of the ARENA party during the 1980s, 
resting upon indiscriminate violence and the psychological demonization of all political 
opposition effectively marginalized these moderate voices and found a particular appeal among 
the poorest households in the countryside. 
 Most served in the civil defenses reluctantly, out of fear of reprisal by the local military 
authority. This stated ambivalence toward civil defense service was due in part to preferred 
avoidance of all conflict.  But in the Jiboa Valley, most simply complained that civil defense 
service was not compensated and too risky due to the lack of proper equipment.  U.S. advisors 
observed that peasants avoided civil patrol duty because they considered these groups as “ugly 
symbols of uncontrolled repression,” rather than providing security (Schwartz 1991: 52). An 
effective civil defense was not achieved, according to Schwartz, because of their perception as 
mercenaries for the rich, the lack of official military support, and the lack of compensation.  
U.S advisors concluded, “In many areas where civil defense units have been formed, those 
units are armed instruments of the local power structure rather than democratic instruments for 
community protection” (Schwarz 1991: 54-55).  This loyalty to local landowners and defense 
of their own parcels was possibly seen as a positive motivation by many civil defense 
volunteers. 
                                                 
451 However, in my interviews only in FMLN controlled towns were death squad leaders, living and dead, named.   
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Few ex-soldiers of civil patrollers spoke with any enthusiasm or detail about the 
principled motivations behind their decision to join.  Conscription proved to be a far more 
salient rationale for military service, although it represented the antithesis of any selective 
criteria in shaping the politically sensibilities of the rank and file fighter.  Demobilized soldiers 
spoke less of values or patriotism, than of duty or simply of years of service.  There is 
resentment, particularly among the uncompensated civil patrols, at the perceived benefits that 
the FMLN combatants have received.  Some ex-soldiers attribute their actions to positive 
changes in the political system.  However, most emphasize the negative economic costs of the 
war, to themselves and in general. 
 In Guadalupe during the war until his death, Padre Platero rallied the civil defense 
forces into service, calling upon the wives of the male patrollers to be prepared to serve, “with 
cuma or club,” in replacement of their husband should he be killed.  Platero prophesized the 
war, or “cataclismo,” in apocalyptic terms challenging parishioners to fulfill their faith in 
God’s plan by their unquestioning defense of their town from the violence that they would 
face.452   
Similarly, Bishop Aparicio increasingly served as the government’s attack dog against 
the popular aspirations of the revolution by issuing pastoral statements and itinerant interviews 
that castigated any moral authority associated with the insurgency.  The influence of liberation 
theology arrived after 1975 to the Jiboa Valley and was forced to operate almost entirely 
underground.  The voice of opposition priests from the progressive church were largely 
silenced during the war in regions where the FMLN was not in control.453  The traditional 
Catholic Church, and increasingly, the evangelical sects of the Protestant church, continued to 
play a significant role during the war as a motivation for pro-government sympathies and a 
refuge for many in government controlled zones. 
 Few escaped victimization from the repression, and most distinguished clearly between 
acts of war and crimes.  However, most were apprehensive in describing in any detail their own 
specific actions in the war and even fewer ventured to attribute the violence in their own lives 
                                                 
452 Recollection of Platero’s homilies from interviews Guadalupe, La Laguna, El Chile, San Emigdio, San Benito. 
453 In Verapáz, Father Valladares, a priest merely suspected of sympathies to the FMLN due to family ties, was 
reportedly tortured.   
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to specific individuals or choices.  Most described the powerlessness of being caught in the 
middle.  In the FINATA beneficiary cantón of Candelaria Arriba that benefited under Phase III 
of the agrarian reform, San Cayetano, one women describes the experience of her community: 
 
We have always suffered.  During the war we were threatened by both bands and we were pressured to 
take one side in order to be left in peace.  But when we collaborated with one, the other side attacked 
us.  In my case, the guerillas used me as a messenger and when the Armed Forces found out they cut a 
branch from the Guayabo tree and beat me and my mother with it until we collapsed on the ground.  
That is why I tell you that we the poor (uno de pobre) are the ones that always suffers.  Thankfully God 
has not abandoned us and we were able to endure and were able to stay on our land. 454 
 
 
  
One of the few exceptions that did speak about the war was an ex-Christian Democrat 
mayor and store owner that describes how the war unfolded in Verapáz: 
 
PCN Presidents were imposed by wealthy men.  The PCN called people to elections and fanned out to 
the cantónes to buy votes with the promise of work, cash and meals.  The Armed Forces were bought 
and at the moment of opening the ballot boxes, they played a key role in intimidating the population to 
withdraw from the electoral offices.  The ballots were always removed under force of arms and even 
though the Christian Democrats won every time, the military stuffed the boxes with pre-marked PCN 
votes.  It was then that opposition formed and people stopped believing in the vote, but rather in the gun 
and left for the hills.  In 1979, a squad of eight National Guard in the town demanded that we organize a 
civil defense, maybe to identify who was with the subversives.  We formed eight groups of 25-30 men 
civil patrols that went on rounds every three hours.  In this time, the PCN financed the death squads and 
ORDEN.  They received a monthly salary for identifying subversives.  That is how the hate began.  
ORDEN members were targeted by the guerrillas.  Some families like the Ramirez family, were divided 
by the conflict.   Alfredo Ramirez was municipal secretary and an officer in ORDEN.  He fled to the 
U.S. after death threats.  Another Ramirez family member was executed by ORDEN as a suspected 
insurgent.455   
 
 
Another ex-mayor from Verapáz from an earlier period the 1950s held a slightly different view:   
 
 
I was mayor and justice of the peace in the time of General Martinez until 1955.  I didn’t earn a salary, 
unlike the officials now that earn well.  I was alderman and in those times there was more respect.  Now 
                                                 
454 Survey Interview, woman, Candelaria Arriba, San Cayetano,  
455 Mauricio Alfaro, former PDC mayor and sugar cane grower in Verapáz. 
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no one respects anyone.  The role of the National Guard was very important.  They imposed respect and 
protected the honest citizens.”  456 
 
 The war, in the discourse of counter-insurgent participants, seemed to acquire its own 
logic and they were swept along in a spiral of revenge killing that seem to lose political 
justification.  Strict discretion, bordering on self-censorship, envelopes the narratives of 
counter-insurgent war experiences, although several key attributes associated with the 
described action choices are evident.  Whatever trust that existed in communities under 
government control during the pre-war period was almost completely destroyed during the war.   
One survivor of the massacre in San Pedro Aguas Calientes whose husband was killed by the 
military as a suspected guerrilla for not showing up patrol duty, reflected: 
 
In these years, no one knew to whom we could complain.  In the eyes of the civil patrol commander, 
everyone was evil.  We had to bury our dead by ourselves.  The National Guard did not permit anyone 
asking for assistance in burying their family.  One woman was killed for burying her sons against Guard 
orders.  As a result, many people buried family members within their own homes. 
 
 
Roberto D’Aubuisson referred to opposition leaders and revolutionaries as a cancer and in 
his periodic television broadcasts and public speeches.  Within the hard-line counter-insurgent 
villages, the descriptions of the FMLN were never as strident or sensational as the rhetoric used 
by political leaders on the right. Locals described insurgents as bandits or brutal killers, but also 
as “muchachos” and other more approving labels.   Among the local landed elites, most of 
whom had been heavily taxed by the FMLN and some of whom had been kidnapped, there 
exists comprehension among some, in contrast to a profound bitterness among the hard-
liners:457   
 
La guerrilla were understanding because the only thing they asked of me was collaboration.  In 1979, I 
lived in los Ranchos, just below Guadalupe.  The Armed Forces arrived and a Lt. Guzman spoke to me, 
‘Look, son of bitch, I will only tell you once.  If I come back and find you here, I won’t be responsible 
                                                 
456 Survey interview, 115, Verapáz town center, ex-mayor, 90 yrs old. 
457 To fund the war, kidnappings were continued but directed at local elites and public officials: Benjamin Molina 
(Verapáz), Max Menjivar, who at 66 years of age was kidnapped and held by the FMLN for three months in 1985, 
released only after his wife paid a ransom of $160,000. 
  331
for what happens.’  So I left immediately for the town.  Then the same Lt. Guzman came to Guadalupe 
and told us to gather all of the men that night.  ‘Those men that don’t show up will be considered 
guerillas and killed.  Whoever doesn’t agree should get out now.’  We all accepted and that is how we 
were obliged to take up arms, which were not even suitable for hunting.  We spent many years 
defending the town that way.  The truth is that there wasn’t much of choice. 458   
 
Indeed, there was little observable reverence for the military leaders of the counter-
insurgency, who were widely viewed as corrupt and incompetent.  While both sides are viewed 
as responsible for indiscriminate attacks, disproportionate blame for the worst abuses is placed 
on rogue individuals within the armed forces.   
 Repression frequently backfired in solidifying civilian opposition to the FMLN.  
Among the local elites that expressed greater understanding of the insurgent goals, experiences 
of victimization by the military had softened their perspective.   In fact, the kidnapping and 
extortion of local elites in exchange for protection and political stability had existed long before 
the civil war.  The FMLN had merely broken the military’s monopoly on the protection market.  
Many kidnappings of wealthy farmers and businesspeople during the war were conducted by 
the army and security forces.459   
In some cases, passive collaborators among local counter-insurgent elites shifted to 
active collaboration when their actions raised suspicions among local military authorities.  In 
one Usulután city, a Christian Democrat mayor that was collaborating with the FMLN arranged 
a staged kidnapping to restore his personal credibility with the community.  In another case, a 
corrupt National Guard officer on the Island of Mendez, off the coast of Tecoluca, struck a deal 
with the PPL in the Bajo Lempa to share half of the government arms and supplies that were 
transferred to the post on the island in return for preservation of his authority from guerrilla 
attack.  Rebel ambush operations would be tipped off prior to each delivery.  The post 
commander would further strengthen his control on the island by dispatching those that had 
committed the worst offenses to guard the supply retrieval operation.  When his superiors 
detected anything, he would arrange an FMLN attack on the post.460    
                                                 
458 Survey Interview, Mauro Clímaco, Guadalupe, Aug. 6, 1998 
459 Stanley (1996) especially chapter seven.  Gibb (2000: 240-248) also provides considerable evidence of this 
process.   
460 Both incidents were recounted by FMLN combatants involved in them, and validated by news coverage. 
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In the counter-insurgent communities, the perception of injustice behind the violence 
was largely personal and not systemic, leading to individualist survival and escape strategies.  
The most common of these were strategies involved helping family members escape the war, 
often requiring sophisticated negotiations with military commanders and sending family 
members abroad, as on ex-civil patroller from Molineros recounted: 
 
Many sons in Molineros were conscripted.  When my son received notification, I went to the military 
headquarters in San Vicente and persuaded the Sergeant to overlook my son’s failure to report for duty.  
I argued that I had advanced arthritis in my right arm, and without his son’s help, it would have to be 
amputated.  The first time this worked, but the letters kept coming, and every three months I would 
travel to the cuartel to replay the drama.  Even when the first Sergeant was transferred, and another, “El 
Chino,” who was widely known as a murderer, was put in charge, I was able to stop the conscription for 
two years.  Finally, my son was drafted and served two years, just narrowly surviving an FMLN attack 
on Cristiani’s Acahuapa Beneficio just two weeks before his release.  Soon after, I helped pay for him 
to stay with an relative living in Los Angeles, although he left a pregnant wife and two children.  Some 
time after, the wife became pregnant with another man and the son stopped sending money to her.  I 
now help care for the grandchildren. 461 
 
The account represents a common escape strategy by Salvadoran families that was 
chosen disproportionately in government control zones during the war, particularly urban 
centers and those in close proximity to military garrisons.  Different versions of these 
improvised negotiations that depended upon favored treatment by the local military authority 
represent the fragile social contract that existed in government controlled zones, often 
recounted with great satisfaction at the cunning and deceptive capacities employed.   
Not unlike the insurgent tales of how they fooled the government and the military to 
survive and resist, the stories that dominated counter-insurgent testimonies are distinct in their 
tendency to resemble escape strategies. While the social fabric of communities and families 
was frayed by the war, this deterioration was only exacerbated by massive migration flows, 
which shifted the burden of childcare to extended families members.  Although offset by 
remittance flows on which the Salvadoran and local economies are now largely dependent, 
migration to the U.S. which exploded in the early 1980s, also introduced a variety of perverse 
incentives that have yet to be converted into catalysts for development (Adams 2003). 
 
 
                                                 
461 Interview, Jorge Martinez Cornejo, July 8, 1998. Cantón Molineros, Verapaz 
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b.  Reformist counter-insurgency in San Ildefonso   
 
In San Ildefonso, early preferences during the civil war clearly favored the populist middle road 
projected by Duarte and the Christian Democrats.  However, the experience of the early 1980s 
was dominated by their displacement from zones of conflict and the relative insecurity that 
prevailed.  Communities that pursued a neutral strategy meant that they were trusted by neither 
the military nor the FMLN.  Thus, levels of external trust were low.  PDC base organizations 
were also incapable of providing adequate assistance.  Weak ties with the clientelist 
organizations of the PDC peasant base during the early years of the war may have had the 
unintentional effect of promoting local self-confidence and organizational capacity.  The 
civilian base of the PDC, with whom many highland communities of San Ildefonso identified, 
were left to their own defenses to develop survival strategies during the early years of the war.  
Although individualist strategies predominated, the loosened grip of local landowners and the 
lack of military control permitted a variety of collective self-help experiences to slowly emerge.   
 Where cooperatives were established, local efforts to organize were challenged by the 
early mismanagement of ISTA, FMLN threats and violence against coop leaders and problems 
associated within the cooperative boards themselves.  The local capacity to confront these 
obstacles was mixed.  In San Francisco de la Cruz, the confrontation with the FMLN seemed to 
stiffen community resistance toward incursions by either side into local politics.  The ability to 
hold the FMLN accountable for its mistakes by refusing active collaboration in most of the 
highland communities contributed to a change in insurgent policy toward the cooperatives and 
a factor in the strengthened sense of local autonomy.462   
 At the San Pablo Canales farm, the cooperative members were divided between a 
contingent of ex-colonos that had been favored by the Aguilúz family and the rest of the former 
workforce.  According to several accounts, the more privileged workers monopolized most of 
the working capital of the farm after its transfer and were reportedly involved in corruption 
associated with initial credit allocations.  The incidents were never fully investigated and trust 
within the community never recovered.463 
                                                 
462 Interviews, Gerardo Rodríguez, San Francisco de la Cruz; Las Canoas; cooperative members and a PRTC 
commander. 
463 Marchand (1996) and interviews with the author. 
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 In any event, many of these communities were depopulated between 1981 and 1984.  
As they were resettled, loyalty to the PDC in the region was more contested as the UCS and 
other centrist peasant organizations steadily lost influence to right and left alternatives.  The 
primary centrist peasant coalition was secured by the return of AIFLD, which orchestrated a 
split in the radicalized UCS in 1980.  The dissenting faction broke with the government and 
allied with the left.  UCS members that remained loyal to the government saw their leaders 
appointed to relatively prestigious positions in all of the agriculture agencies.  AIFLD steered 
the pro-Duarte UCS faction into a new center-right coalition, the Democratic Popular Unity, 
(UPD) that included Orlando Arevalo’s ACOPAI among other organizations.464  In 1983, the 
UPD pressured the provisional government to fully implement the land reform, countering 
ARENA efforts to weaken legal commitments to it (i.e. Phase II) in the constitution reform 
process.465   
Orlando Arevalo was appointed as the President of FINATA in 1985, after several years 
of leading ACOPAI and at a time when support for Duarte among the peasant organizations of 
the UPD was wavering.466  Arevalo remained loyal to Duarte, even at the critical moment in 
1986 when the government’s austerity plan was galvanizing broad-based opposition.  The drift 
to the right among the historic centrist peasant leadership increasingly alienated the PDC rural 
base. 
Some centrist cooperative movement leaders were growing more radical and exploring 
alignment with the leftist super-coalition UNTS.  Arevalo refused to abandon Duarte and was 
unceremoniously removed by the ACOPAI membership as President for being out of step with 
growing discontent toward the government – even among land reform beneficiaries.  He would 
continue to serve as President of FINATA until 1989, when Duarte’s term ended.   
The ascent of Orlando Arevalo provided concrete employment opportunities to allies 
and family from San Ildefonso as promoters, secretaries, auditors and clerks, but it also 
                                                 
464 Casper (1986: 210).  At this time, AIFLD was financing about 80% of the ACOPAI budget.   
465 Diskin (1984: 8-11).  A key compromise in the 1983 Constitution set the maximum land ownership at 245 
hectares, when Phase II of the reform would have set it at only 100 hectares. The scope for state intervention and 
expropriation was also scaled back. 
466 Duarte rewarded other UCS/UPD leaders.  Samuel Maldonaldo became head of ISTA.  Jorge Camacho, another 
ACOPAI leader, became deputy secretary of Agriculture, and Ramon Aristides Mendoza of the UCS was given a 
job in the Agricultural Development Bank (BFA). 
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solidified the electoral support of the rural sector for Duarte in the 1984 and 1985 elections.  
The effect in places like San Ildefonso produced a deep regard for populist leaders like Duarte 
and Arevalo, and by association, hope that there was indeed a middle road between armed 
insurgency and the reactionary militarism of the right.  As one former promoter for ACOPAI 
described, the centrist perspective of the Christian Democrats from the top-down was 
politically neutral rather than counter-insurgent, gradualist in its approach to social change.  
This view was not entirely consistent with the expectations for change among the rural base, 
especially when many of Duarte’s social programs failed to gain traction.  It was also either 
politically naïve or hypocritical to think that any redistributive benefits would not be resisted by 
the agrarian elite. As such, the PDC philosophy in practice ended up facilitating the hard-line 
anti-reform efforts of the landed elite and dampening any enthusiastic support for the more 
radical discourse by the FMLN. 
The political divisions within the PDC peasant base also suggested a discomfort with a 
top-down and largely utilitarian empowerment strategy.  Trust in the party was personalized 
toward populist leaders, but attitudes toward PDC institutions such as ISTA, ACOPAI and the 
UCS deteriorated over time.  The axes of the relationship between leaders and the peasant 
communities remained relatively vertical, revolving around ameliorative reconstruction 
projects and instrumental electoral mobilization.    Accounts of local capacity differed, however 
they reveal a level of wartime organization that remained low by comparison to FMLN zones 
of influence.  The people of San Ildefonso feared the military, were ambivalent about the 
insurgency and viewed the risks of identification as too high.  Political choices were ultimately 
reduced to voting for the Christian Democrats.   Nevertheless awakened by the land reform, 
many communities in San Ildefonso overcame weak ties to external political forces and honed 
their organizational skills in the pursuit of a locally oriented strategy of neutrality. 
This testimony recounting political experiences so far points to the way in which action 
choices in the early years of the war were associated with competing sets of values, beliefs and 
dispositions – in short, the shaping of different political cultures.  Trust, fairness, equity, 
accountability, self-confidence and valorization of one’s participation are all key vantage points 
for exploring the impact of the war on initial choices to join the insurgency, join the counter-
insurgency or attempt to remain neutral.  I argue that this first stage of the war begins to 
sharpen the contrasting implications of these choices.   
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The FMLN, the military and government reform agencies under Duarte all relied on a 
mix of coercion, clientelism and voluntarism to mobilize supporters.  However, within areas 
controlled by the FMLN, despite tremendous hardships, empowerment strategies challenged 
pre-war agrarian relations and eroded the edifice of attitudes, beliefs and actions that sustained 
inequality.  The FMLN ability to tap into and expand a reservoir of principled voluntarism 
among its supporters allowed the empowerment strategy to move over time from a 
“hierarchical” strategy for solving collective action problems to a more social norm oriented 
“community” strategy that prevailed within CEBs and rural unions before the war.   
In contrast to insurgent areas of control, the relative absence of pre-existing institutions 
or popular disposition to assume the risks of counter-insurgent participation forced the military 
and the government to rely ever more extensively on coercion and selective benefits.  In 
government controlled areas, pre-war agrarian relations were adapted by counter-insurgent 
empowerment strategies that tended to fluctuate between “hierarchy” and “contract” solutions 
to the collective action problem. In other words, a negotiated participation was attempted 
through policies that targeted the costs and benefits of action or inaction, but state sponsored 
violence insured compliance with any deal. 
In areas that were contested by both sides, both empowerment strategies failed to alter a 
resilient preference for the perceived middle road offered by the Christian Democrats.  A key 
distinction between these empowerment strategies was that in the FMLN experience, the 
eventual decentralization of power in areas of control provided local autonomy, and were often 
unplanned and initiated from the bottom-up, while the counter-insurgent empowerment 
strategies employed by the military and government remained a highly contrived, top-down, 
and imposed delegation of responsibility with little transfer of actual power.   
The weakness of these narratives as the evidence for shifts in the local political culture 
is of course that these accounts are incomplete, and possibly skewed or simply not well 
remembered.  Individual memory is selective.  Proponents of the greed-driven violence theory 
might postulate for example that despite rebel vows of poverty that moral justifications are 
typically post hoc, and intended to obscure the cold economic calculus at the root of all 
rebellion.  Similarly, government officials typically contend that silence or acquiescence in 
counter-insurgent zones of influence is evidence of approval rather than fear.   
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Methodologically, these concerns are valid.  The basis for contrasting these accounts of 
insurgent and counter-insurgent beliefs and behaviors is to suggest the foundation for 
expectations and motivations behind later choices – particularly those shaping postwar 
development expectations and leading to the creation or reinvention of new local institutions.  
The true test will involve how these claims hold up in explaining postwar behavior.  For the 
moment, I suspend judgment on the validity of this evidence, except to suggest two caveats to 
the greed-driven rebellion arguments, which essentially reflect the foundation of the U.S. 
framing of FMLN motivations as well.  The first is that it is generally accepted that the FMLN 
would have been quickly stopped unless it had established a significant bond of trust with the 
civilian population.  Given the intensity of the violence and duration of the war, this trust was 
most likely not couched in hopes of quick material payoff.  The ebb and flow of effective 
recruiting by the FMLN suggests that selective benefits, material or otherwise, were 
insufficient to retain a peak fighting force. 
The second point is that FMLN combatants, for the most part, described the overall 
collective discipline of insurgency with great pride, but were also surprisingly willing to 
discuss mistakes, excesses, and war crimes.  The capacity for open self-criticism, albeit limited, 
was a quality not found as widespread among the counter-insurgent constituency.  FMLN 
admission of errors and detailed accounts of quite serious human rights violations stands in 
stark contrast to the refusal on the part of combatants, civil defense forces, and civilian 
witnesses in government zones of control to discuss even well documented comparable 
offenses.  The silence of active and passive collaborators of the government in counter-
insurgent zones of influence strongly suggests a continuation of pre-war agrarian relations.   
 
 
C.  EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES DURING LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: 
DECONCENTRATION OF POWER 
 
 
The period between 1985 and 1989 marked a shift from an almost exclusively military strategy 
by both the government and the FMLN to one that re-emphasizes the political component.  This 
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strategic shift in the war served as a catalyst for decentralization for the FMLN and the 
government.  Failing to overrun the Salvadoran military or spark a popular insurrection, the 
FMLN was forced to fall back to a guerrilla war strategy conducted by smaller, more 
independent units within a wider more decentralized support system. Base organizations were 
dispersed into temporary internal and external refuge, only to repopulate FMLN control zones 
beginning in 1986 and demand human rights protections as citizens and seize land. These 
repopulations sparked the formation of many of the grassroots and non-governmental 
organizations that appeared in the final years of the war. In government controlled conflictive 
zones, the attempted pacification of rural civil society continued to be guided by a top-down 
stabilizing strategy that steered demands, grievances and some increased funding toward a 
revived municipal government.  While most key decisions were still made by centralized, 
donor-driven government agencies located in the capital, responsibility for security and 
humanitarian assistance was deconcentrated to mayors. Both strategies created new space 
during the war for experimentation with semi-autonomous local governance, albeit within the 
strict limitations of the conflict. 
The shift in internal party politics began not long after Duarte’s election in 1984, which 
the U.S. viewed as a critical step in legitimating procedural democracy as a wedge between the 
paramilitary right and the revolutionary left.  The institutionalization of Christian Democrat 
rule and the perception of a moderate path to political stability was also essential to mollify an 
unsettled U.S. Congress that generally restricted any overt support to D’Aubuisson or other 
death squad supporters in ARENA.   
Soon after taking power, the PDC suffered a steady decline under the pressure of an 
increasing fiscal imbalance, the party’s own corruption and the incapacity to negotiate with 
either an ARENA-PCN faction that controlled the legislature or the FMLN at the nascent peace 
talks.   Duarte again attempted expansionist economic policies before reverting back to 
stabilization policies as a condition for desperately needed U.S. assistance.467  By 1985, U.S. 
aid replaced the IMF stand-by lending agreement as the principal adjustment authority and 
continued aid flows, which had reached $429 million in 1986 alone, were tied to a new 
                                                 
467 By expansionist policies, the PDC increased salaries for public sector employees, minimum wages for urban 
workers, reduced interest rates, increased credit and social spending and fixed prices for food and basic services.  
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stabilization effort beginning with an official devaluation of the colon.468  Further austerity 
reforms that included relaxing price controls, export promotion (particularly non-traditional 
goods) and dismantling public protections against imports, failed to stimulate the economy and 
Duarte steadily lost popular support.  The U.S. conditioned aid on a second devaluation, but the 
government refused.  Instead, a “war tax” proposal designed to shift a greater burden of the 
public expense of the war to the wealthy was met with a boycott of Legislative Assembly 
sessions by ARENA and the PCN, a one day business strike on January 22, 1987, and a spate 
of successful constitutional challenges to the proposed tax, all of which forced Duarte to 
rescind the tax under no opposition from the U.S..469  Fiscal deficits were therefore reduced 
through cuts in public spending, investment and wages.  U.S. aid and growing remittance flows 
effectively sustained the Salvadoran economy and prevented a debt crisis. 
By the mid-1980s, Roberto D’Aubuisson had become the second most popular political 
figure in the country, particularly among the most reactionary elites, and a wide segment of the 
rural population.  As the reputed leader of the Salvadoran death squads, the U.S. blocked his 
candidacy for President. The defeat of D’Aubuisson by Duarte was soon followed by ceding 
party leadership to the allegedly moderate, Alfredo Cristiani, who won the presidency in 1989 
on the heels of sweeping municipal and legislative gains a year earlier.  Beginning in the late 
1980s, ARENA emerged as the leading political force and the PDC was on a downward 
trajectory to minor party status.470  
Despite having different political goals, both the PDC and ARENA endorsed the U.S. 
sponsored stabilizing approach to empowerment, built around a fundamental consensus that 
opposed the FMLN.471  While they disagreed fiercely on questions of economic policy, 
                                                 
468 The exchange rate remained 2.5 colones to the dollar, the official rate since 1970, although the black market 
rate reached 6.5.  In 1986, the colon was devalued to 5, but black market devaluation pressure continued to push 
the value downward exceeding 8 colones per dollar in 1990.  Remittances were generally not included in the 
formal monetary system during the 1980s, but rather fueled an extensive black exchange market.  Rosa and 
Segovia (1989) 
469 The proposed package included increased direct taxes and a variable surcharge on capital asset taxes over 
$20,000.  See Segovia in Boyce (1995), Hedges (1987: 20a), Preston (1987: A15). 
470 The PDC won only 16% of the vote in 1994, 9% in 1997, and barely avoided extinction in 1999 with 4%. 
471 Differences in policy orientation between the PDC and ARENA are diminished when it comes to actual 
implementation.  Despite promoting populist protections for small producers and businesses that were also 
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throughout the war, the leading Salvadoran private sector lobbying association (ANEP), and 
economic think tank (FUSADES) found common ground with the Duarte government in 
delegitimizing the economic war tactics of the FMLN. Union organizing, strikes, land 
occupations, takeovers of state institutions, and organized pressure of legislators, were 
condemned as FMLN orchestrated measures to destabilize an elected government.  Conversely, 
the exercise of voting was elevated to the level of ceremony, as the only acceptable channel 
through which acceptable political opinion might be transmitted (Brodhead and Herman 1984; 
Bonner 1984: 290-321). 
The deconcentration of FMLN forces, the dispersion of mass organizations and the 
annual provision of about $400 million in U.S. military aid all fed into claims that the 
insurgency was winding down.  In November 1989, the FMLN launched a strategic counter-
offensive that became the Salvadoran Tet.  Together with other internal and external factors, 
the 1989 offensive effectively opened space for a negotiated end to the war.   
 
1.  Insurgent Mobilization II: FMLN Deconcentration  
 
The re-election of Reagan and U.S. military buildup, the intensification of the air war, and 
Duarte’s electoral victory in El Salvador forced a shift in FMLN strategy toward a war of 
attrition and economic sabotage.  Contrary to some arguments that external support dictated 
shifts in FMLN political and military strategy, in this section I make a case for domestic and 
very much bottom-up factors that also informed the reforms taken.  As noted in previous 
chapters, external shifts matter for explaining FMLN strategic choices.  While the insurgents 
were not dependent upon external aid, a revolutionary government mostly likely would have 
been.  Smyth argues that the Soviet reform government under Gorbachev had communicated its 
preference for a negotiated agreement as early as 1986.  Similar signals were conveyed from 
Latin American allies.  The shift toward alternative endgame strategies began well before 1989 
(Smyth 1992). 
                                                                                                                                                           
contrary to the interests of the oligarchy, most failed to have any enduring effect and were easily blocked and 
quickly rolled back under fading U.S. support and ascending ARENA political power. 
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The idea was to expand the theater of war through a greater frequency of smaller, more 
geographically dispersed attacks.  In this new strategy, each combatant had to become a leader, 
both militarily and politically.  Squads were reduced to 3-5 people that were expected to be 
self-sufficient.  This meant establishing trust among new communities whose political 
sympathies were undefined.  Successful, alternative supply structures were re-established in a 
much more decentralized way to provide food, shelter, information and a network for new 
recruits.   Theft was prohibited, but war taxation was sanctioned.  According to one combatant, 
minimal funds were provided for basic expenses and combatants reassembled in camps twice a 
month to report on progress.  
One combatant described this shift in strategy: 
 
We had to form our own self-support structure, to provide supplies and food, without altering our ideals 
and becoming thieves.  We were given funds for the basics, like cigarettes.  Every fifteen days we went 
to the encampment to give a report on our actions.  We had to arrive in a zone where we were not 
known without friends, to open new territory without cover like Columbus did in his first voyage.  The 
slogan was walk, understand, win (andar, entender, conquistar).   (Interview, Omar, San Carlos Lempa, 
Tecoluca, April 9, 2006) 
 
Gibb gives a detailed illustration of how the FMLN small group tactics worked to open 
new corridors between rebel control zones by recruiting networks of civilian collaborators to 
provide information, food and shelter.472  Massive concentrations of force, while effective in 
the early stages of the war, would be of less utility now.   
 
The first problem arriving in new areas was that they had no idea who they could trust.  As a first step, 
therefore, two of them would blacken their faces, put on captured army Special Forces uniforms and go 
into hamlet pretending to be soldiers – to gauge the reaction.  In many households they could feel 
people’s rejection.  After this initial visit, the third member of the group would turn up in civilian 
clothes, pretending to be selling things.  He would find out as much as possible about the villagers, 
angling to find their views, asking whether their children were able to go to school, whether they got 
enough work to buy food, whether they were worried about illness.  Finally, he would ask whether they 
had seen soldiers or not.  If they reported the appearance of [the first two rebels] disguised as Special 
Forces – then they knew they had a potential recruit.  The final step would be for all three of them to 
return at night dressed as guerrillas – and try openly to sell their cause. 
 
                                                 
472 Gibb (2000: 230-231).  See also Chris Norton, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 26, 1986; April 14, 1987 
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Deconcentration of forces was a slow and meticulous reaction to the shifting demands 
of the war and new conditions for sustained participation made by rank and file FMLN 
combatants.  Disillusionment with the failure to defeat the government militarily prior to the 
elections, long assignments far from home, loss of the civilian masses, and the challenges of 
working more independently in new uncharted regions, all resulted in widespread desertions 
after 1984.473  Deconcentration of forces was in part a strategy to allow combatants to fight 
closer to home and join for larger operations only periodically.  The FMLN’s initial response to 
force depletion was a campaign of forced recruitment, which ended as an utter failure.  Overall 
force levels in the FMLN dropped during this period.   
To some extent, the process of adaptation occurred from the bottom-up.  A shift to the 
new tactics of the counter-insurgency forced greater coordination and innovation on the ground 
to concentrate and deconcentrate resistance and invent more effective tactical weapons long 
before the top officers of the five armies formally decided to unify the central command.  Much 
of the strategic debate within the national leadership of the FMLN, including preparations for a 
possible U.S. invasion, were for popular consumption.   Major strategic shifts were often 
responding to decisions that were being taken by field commanders in reaction to the choices or 
preferences of the combatants themselves.  Despite the vertical command structure of the 
FMLN, tactical decisions were decentralized.  One former FPL commander in the paracentral 
zone argued that, 
 
In reality, it was central command that was adapting to our reality.  When the decision came down that 
we were going to move from concentrated to deconcentrated forces and carry the war to every street 
and town, we had already been doing that for months out of necessity.474   
 
 
                                                 
473 Gibb (2000: 232) notes that U.S. intelligence estimates of casualties on both sides were down significantly in 
1985, and that among RN forces on the Guazapa volcano, civilian supporters declined by 80% and RN combatants 
dropped from about 800 to 200.   
474 Interview, Pablo Parada Andino, zone commander of southern Tecoluca and Zacatecoluca during 1982-83.  
One  example of invented weaponry was the “rampla” as an invented anti-aircraft device that catapulted a charge 
that exploded at particular altitudes that was designed for the sub-500s helicopter gunships that were introduced in 
1985. 
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Deconcentration was also a central feature of the U.S. orchestrated counter-insurgent 
strategy, which continued to focus on a revived municipal government.   Local elections in 
1985 gave a boost in legitimacy to rural mayors.  The municipal code was amended in 1986 
giving local governments greater autonomy and citizens greater means for local participation.  
The formal autonomy of the municipal government was recognized in the 1983 Constitution, 
which abolished the powers of departmental governors over mayors and eliminated an 
intermediate administrative tier of 39 districts.  CONARA funding increased, often in alliance 
with food for work programs administered by international relief organizations allied with the 
U.S. government.  To surmount administrative problems, civic pacification programs were 
retooled by the U.S. when it launched Municipalities in Action (MEA) in 1986, a small grants 
initiative for basic infrastructure administered by CONARA.475   
MEA targeted municipalities in conflict zones still under government control.  Projects 
from a pre-determined short list of social infrastructure and essential services were “chosen” 
through “cabildo abiertos,” or open town meetings which are proscribed by the municipal code 
to be convened four times per year.  Accountability improvements were inferred by the higher 
frequency of complaints and demands being directed at mayors, the frequency of cabildos and 
the formation of local project oriented associations.  In addition to obligating quarterly cabildo 
abiertos, the 1986 constitutional reform made it possible for citizens to form officially 
recognized communal associations to advise local councils and call popular consultations on 
municipal initiatives.  Although labeled “apolitical,” the MEA program listed as its success 
greater coordination with the military, which conveyed an improvement in the military’s image 
in the eyes of the beneficiaries.  MEA was considered the most effective of all U.S. counter-
insurgent efforts in El Salvador.476 
The alleged success of the MEA project stood in stark contrast to the failure of 
CONARA more generally.  Both initiatives were initially operated as highly centralized 
programs, where all financial and planning decisions were taken in San Salvador.  CONARA 
also suffered from the high levels of corruption and clientelism in the participating line 
                                                 
475 The MEA operations manual capped the maximum cost of eligible infrastructure projects at $12,500. 
476 Austin, et al. (1988: 11). On the donor perceptions of MEA as a counter-insurgency program, see also Sollis 
(1993a, 1993b) 
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ministries (public works, health, education).477  Despite this top-down legacy, MEA was 
intended to be the principal mechanism for reinforcing community input into local 
reconstruction efforts, thereby stabilizing areas faced with insurgent challenges to government 
influence. 
The initial internal evaluations of MEA by USAID were effusively positive, arguing 
that the increasing numbers of cabildos were evidence of participatory accountable local 
democracy. “It [MEA] has proved to be extraordinarily successful, popular, and an exemplary 
use of scarce resources….there have been significant changes in attitudes;... the project 
identification and implementation process is promoting local participatory democracy in 
significant ways.” 478   
These benefits of MEA are somewhat overblown considering that they represented less 
than 3% of public investment in the targeted departments and provided less than 1% of total 
employment.  Subsequent evaluations played down MEA’s impact, arguing that the quality of 
local participation was often ignored, although far more important than the quantity (Seligson 
and Córdova Macías 1995).  In the context of weak or non-existent state assistance for years, 
any project was welcomed by rural communities in conflictive zones.  However, the program 
encouraged mayors to mobilize much greater demand for projects in the cabildos than available 
funding could pay for.  Schwartz challenges many of USAID’s success claims by underscoring 
the limits to MEA success in the eyes of U.S. military advisors. “Since the program is 
conceived and financed by the United States, and since its orientation is specifically local, it 
establishes little loyalty toward the government and armed forces of El Salvador.” (53)  In an 
effort to sidestep the corruption of military administrators, the U.S. created a parallel agency 
that was more accountable to USAID than to the PDC or military.   
The invention of MEA was significant because it was the first quasi-independent social 
investment fund in El Salvador, a phenomenon that attracted increasing donor investment in the 
post-war period and would proliferate throughout Latin America.  It sidestepped the problem of 
                                                 
477 Sollis (1993) on CONARA corruption associated with projects in Usulután. 
478 Stout, Ternent, and Orr (1990).  MEA operated almost exclusively in some 30 municipalities in Chalatenango, 
Morazán and Usulután up to 1990.  See also Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc (1994); Blair, Booth, Córdova, 
and Seligson (1995: 31-38), and Seligson (1994). 
  345
ineffective and corrupt line ministries or military officials by erecting a parallel agency that 
duplicated some services and redirected the chain of command primarily to the foreign donor.   
The FMLN response to CONARA and MEA, particularly after the local election sweep 
of ARENA mayors in 1988, was to give ultimatums to the new mayors – cooperate, leave or be 
killed.  Of course, the killing of adversarial mayors was not unprecedented, beginning in the 
region perhaps with Atilio Cañas of Tecoluca in 1977 by the FPL and Napoleón Chavela, a 
UDN opposition mayor in San Cayetano Istepeque in 1979 by right wing death squads.  
However, the ERP publicly announced the new anti-mayor policy and began killing, abducting 
and generally forcing out mayors considered to be working against the FMLN, mainly in 
Usulután and Morazán.479  By mid-1985, FMLN forces had killed two mayors, kidnapped 
another 8, and 32 municipal offices had been destroyed.  By October of that year, 25% of the 
262 mayors had been forced out.480   
Beginning in 1985, San Ildefonso elected five PDC mayors in a row, some of whom 
turned over duties after fleeing under threat of execution from the FMLN.  Carlos Soriano was 
elected to the first of two terms beginning in 1990 after finishing the term of his predecessor.  
He credited his survival in office to his collaboration with FMLN demands.  A construction 
supervisor working with the PDC mayors described the 52 CONARA projects that he managed 
for the PDC mayor beginning in the late 1980s.  Most were road repairs, school construction, 
and other small public works projects that provided work and were located close to the town 
center or main road.  There was no public deliberation about priorities besides the mayor 
simply deciding where the projects were most needed and where relative security could be 
ensured.481 
In Tecoluca, Mauricio Alvarenga, was elected to three consecutive terms as mayor 
under ARENA between 1985-1994, albeit under conditions where few people voted.  He 
attributed his endurance to a mutually respectful working relationship with FPL leaders.  This 
                                                 
479 Human Rights Watch (1993: 17), United Nations (1995: 365).  The policy was eventually approved by the 
FMLN high command.  
480 Miles and Ostertag (1991: 222) put the number of mayors who resigned at 120, and the number that were 
forced to move to the provincial capitals at 64, which combined with 8 mayors who were killed, sum to 192, or 
73% of all mayors.  
481 At least two former San Ildefonso mayors have noted with pride their administration of municipal road projects 
that also happened to pass in front of their homes. 
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political pragmatism derived in part from Alvarenga having brothers active on both sides of the 
conflict.482  Local development projects were limited to small scale infrastructure, and local 
organizing was confined to security functions (civil defense), since an estimated 70% of the 
homes were occupied by caretaker families that had been displaced from the cantónes.  Despite 
few local achievements, Alvarenga boasted of his participation in various USAID funded trips 
and trainings for mayors in the U.S. 
In Guadalupe, Juan Cerritos epitomized the hard-line counter-insurgent mayor.  Cerritos 
was elected for the first time in 1985 and would go on to serve four consecutive terms as an 
ARENA functionary, and then a fifth in 2003 under PCN.  Unlike his peers, Cerritos did not 
collaborate with the FMLN and survived perhaps due to protection afforded by the military 
detachments posted on nearby coffee fincas.  His persistence in office had less to do with the 
capacity to deliver projects or to leverage provided by his allegiance to the large coffee growers 
in the municipality.  Although a steady trickle of USAID funded MEA or CONARA projects 
were sprinkled around, throughout the war, Guadalupe remained one of the poorest towns in 
the region.  Rather, he represented the pre-war style of local rule that equated good governance 
with political stability and a acquiescent population.  As in most ARENA towns, his success in 
limiting the influence of the FMLN was rewarded with repeated appointments by the party as 
ARENA candidate, which almost guaranteed re-election among the staunchly conservative 
voters of Guadalupe.  
 The municipal dimension of the counter-insurgent empowerment strategy rested on 
weak local institutions that were almost entirely dependent on outside assistance and generally 
unaccountable to the public in local decision making.  If only symbolically, mayors were 
nevertheless viewed as increasingly legitimate interlocutors between state and society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
482 Alvarenga had one brother in the FMLN, another in the air force and a third in the civil patrol. One, Raul 
Alvarenga, was the justice of the peace and reportedly directed death squad activities by the local National Guard.    
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a.  Refugees and repopulation   
 
By the mid-1980s, the problem of the displaced population had become a crisis.483  The 
Salvadoran government attempts to resettle displaced families in secured areas under its 
influence did not work.  Pressure was building for repopulation independently of CONARA or 
the military, often driven by FMLN organizing within the refugee camps.  The first attempt to 
establish a permanent repopulation in a non-militarized zone occurred in 1985 in Tenancingo, 
Cuscatlán under the auspices of the Catholic Church and FUNDASAL, a Salvadoran NGO.484 
Taking advantage of the Duarte policy on human rights and with hope of reconstituting 
local popular governments that could challenge newly elected mayors, the FMLN decided to 
begin a strategy of repopulation in 1985.  The Christian Committee for the Displaced of El 
Salvador (CRIPDES) was formed in late 1984  and the National Coordination for Repopulation 
(CNR) averaged two years later by the FPL as civilian non-governmental advocates for the 
rights of the displaced.  At least 25% of the population had been displaced, with nearly 250,000 
living in external exile in Mexico and Central America.485  This shift in policy also responded 
to a desire by many families of combatants who had reluctantly left the conflictive zones in 
1983-84 to be closer to their sons, daughters or siblings and to serve the revolution in some 
capacity.  A second factor was the loss of confidence among the refugee population that the 
government or UNHCR would ever achieve the conditions necessary for safe return.  A final 
rationale for the repopulation strategy reflected the increased probability of an eventual 
negotiation, before which as much liberated land as possible would need to be occupied by the 
civilian base.   
Repopulation was viewed as necessary in order to improve supply and recruitment 
networks, occupy strategic properties and in some cases to reunite combatant families. The 
FMLN carefully orchestrated the repopulation of control zones as early as 1987 when a 
meeting was convened of some 20 national non-governmental organizations to strike an 
                                                 
483 The 1986 earthquake that left 300,000 homeless exacerbated the war related displacement. 
484 Wood (2003) provides the most extensive analysis of the Tenancingo experience. 
485 The UNHCR estimated that by 1984, 400,000 Salvadorans had been internally displaced, 500,000 had migrated 
to the U.S., and 200,000 had sought refuge in camps or individually in Mexico and Central America.   
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agreement regarding how the accompaniment work would be rationalized.  Organizations were 
given a geographic responsibility, but were given some autonomy for how to conduct their 
paperwork.  This type of political accord demonstrates the high level of coordination of which 
the FMLN was capable at that point.486   
Exercising elaborate ties to international solidarity, the FMLN deftly utilized the cover 
of humanitarian protection and support to expand their rearguard by including flows of recruits 
from the network of refugee camp populations, both internal and external.  By the mid-1980s, 
some 40,000 Salvadorans were living in external camps in Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá and 
Belize.  Within the camps, self-governance structures and development initiatives continued to 
evolve and mature, again, responsive to the war effort (Thompson 1995).  Production 
cooperatives were set up with international assistance, literacy and health training was 
intensified, and refugee demands for protection and respect for human rights grew more 
belligerent behind the shield of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and other 
solidarity groups.  At the same time, as much as 30% of all donations were diverted to the war 
effort and the camps provided both a haven for recuperating combatants and a source of fresh 
recruits.487  As a result, violent incursions into the camps by Honduran and Salvadoran soldiers 
were common and security measures were also a standard aspect of camp organization. 
As with other stages of the FMLN experiment in empowering local people to find 
solutions to the many challenges of fighting an insurgency, the refugee camps reflected the 
essential tensions of emerging self-governance under the hostile and authoritarian climate of a 
civil war.  Leaders were provided the space to rise up, and they did.  However, the 
consequences of this newfound autonomy did not fit perfectly with the military demands of the 
war.  Accommodations were made by both civilian camp leaders and FMLN commanders, but 
within the civilian and combatant population loyal to the FMLN a dispersion of power was 
underway that could not be reconcentrated as before.  As an intended or unintended 
consequence of the tactics necessary to sustain the insurgency, previously silent and fearful 
                                                 
486 Among other examples, Gonzalez (1993) cites a 1983 meeting between the FMLN and the principal religious 
humanitarian organizations working in El Salvador to negotiate an end to FMLN interference in relief programs.  
See Foley (1996: 74-75). 
487 Prior research on the functioning of the refugee camps in Colomoncagua, Honduras under the ERP was 
conducted in 1995 and 1996.  See McElhinny in Lauria-Santiago and Binford (2004:147-165) and Macdonald and 
Gatehouse (1995).   
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people found their voice and shed their misconceptions that any leader, landholder or 
revolutionary commander alike, were “endiosado.”  At the same time, the refuge opportunities 
were almost entirely dependent on outside donations.   
Through CRIPDES, the FMLN sent the first group of 85 families from nearby internal 
temporary refuge sites that set out from the hills to the east of Tecoluca to resettle San Carlos 
Lempa in June 1986 – the third major national repopulation since 1985.488  After arriving 
clandestinely in San Carlos Lempa, with the accompaniment of the Red Cross and the Non-
Governmental Human Rights Organization, the repatriated families began to clear land.  After 
about a week, the military was tipped off by informants in the area and arrived to arrest the 
group.  They were held and some were tortured during a six week incarceration at the garrison 
in Zacatecoluca, but escaped death after the human rights community protested the capture.  
After being released from military arrest, the families were sent to Calle Real – an urban refuge 
on the northern outskirts of San Salvador run by the Catholic Church.  Soon after, the first 
group of eleven families made their way to another refuge in the village of Santa Cruz, in 
Berlin, Usulután.  Grassroots organizing typically intensified during resettlements to meet basic 
needs and demand protection for the rights of displaced people.   
According to one estimate, some 50,000 displaced people challenged the government’s 
restrictions on resettlement and with the accompaniment of local and international solidarity, 
returned to conflictive zones during the war (Kevin Murray 1995: 188).  Most did so in support 
of the FMLN.  
 
b.  Agricultural Cooperatives   
 
Parallel to the repopulations, the agricultural cooperative movement began to mobilize 
politically as well as they returned to farms that had been relatively abandoned since the early 
years of the war.   This recovery of the agricultural cooperatives reflected the opening of the 
space to once again produce in conflictive zones and to organize politically as rural gremios.  
Cooperativismo meant different things in each of the case study municipalities, but in general it 
                                                 
488 Interviews with repopulation leaders, José de Jesús “Chungo” Amaya, Alicia Hernández, San Carlos Lempa, 
and Alejandro Valladares, Las Pampas, Tecoluca.  Other repatriation sites included Sisiguayo, Santa Cruz, Berlin, 
Las Mesitas, and parts of Zacatecoluca.  See also Moreno (2001: 35) 
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reflected a crumbling allegiance between the principal agrarian reform cooperative federations 
for the Christian Democrats.  For some, this shift in elite access resulted in a stronger alliance 
with the FMLN or ARENA, while many cooperatives clung to their loyalty to Duarte as the 
ever more elusive middle road. 
The cooperative movement was re-emerging during a disastrous period for agriculture, 
buried by debt and increasingly vulnerable as Duarte’s agricultural protections were dismantled 
by an administration voluntarily willing to cede to U.S. and IMF imposed austerity measures.  
On the other hand, at the national level progressive social forces, including cooperative 
federations, were uniting.489  Within the repopulation movement almost all production was 
organized collectively during the war and demanded training.  Similar to what Wood refers to 
as “insurgent” cooperatives in her analysis of shifting agrarian relations in wartime Usulután, 
the collective farms were also established in the late 1980s in FPL control zones in San 
Vicente.   
Despite the stimulus that the repopulation movement and insurgent cooperatives gave to 
the principle of collective production, this choice was severely conditioned by the protection 
and insistence of the FMLN.  ARENA began linking debt forgiveness proposals for the 
cooperative sector to the dismantling of “proindiviso” restrictions to land ownership and sale. 
In the traditional reform cooperative sector, the area under collective production was declining 
steadily.  In government control zones, service cooperatives dominated by large growers that 
farmed individual plots were the norm.  The paradox of revitalized rural activism in the late 
1980s, was that it combined an unprecedented rewriting of pre-war property relations 
provoked by insurgent communities with a secular shift toward individual modes of 
production.   
In the paracentral region, the Federation of Cooperative Associations of Agricultural 
Production in El Salvador (FEDECOOPADES) supported cooperatives, both old and new, that 
regrouped in the central and coastal sub-regions of Tecoluca and Zacatecoluca beginning in 
1987.490  FEDECOOPADES formed at the outset of the agrarian reform and at its peak was 
                                                 
489 Some of these organizations including elements of Duarte’s major coalition formed the UNTS.  The U.S. 
quickly sponsored the formation of UNOC, a similar cluster of organizations although more loyal to the Christian 
Democrats.  
490  FEDECOOPADES organized as many as 200 traditional reform cooperatives and had significant influence in 
the coop sector.   
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supporting some 200 different cooperatives.  Services focused on all aspects of legal and 
practical training, credit and infrastructure to strengthen cooperative production as well as 
meeting basic needs.  Loosely aligned with the FPL, FEDECOOPADES closely accompanied 
the formation of the FMLN cooperatives in the southern paracentral region.    
In the Jiboa Valley, production was less affected than in other conflictive zones, despite 
periodic attacks on all of the principal agro-industrial targets, including severe damage to 
Cristiani’s Acahuapa Beneficio.  The two primary cooperatives in the region, the coffee 
growers Nonualco Cooperative, and the local sugar grower’s organization, ACOPARVE, were 
service coops that focused on pooling member purchasing power on credit, inputs and 
commercialization.  Producers in both sectors were affected by the war and the cooperatives 
themselves stopped functioning under unpaid debts, but there was a relative continuity in the 
pre-war agrarian relations despite being labeled as cooperatives.   
In San Ildefonso, the agrarian reform had a much more profound effect than in the other 
municipal case studies.  People that fled the highland communities returned in 1984 with a 
green light from a more tolerant FMLN command in the zone.   Prior FMLN errors had not 
been forgiven, but cooperative members were anxious to cultivate their lands.  The FMLN had 
not permitted the planting of ISTA land in the early years of the war, but relented.  A modest 
war tax was imposed on cooperative and individual alike, which appeared indiscriminate and 
unfair to many small farmers in the region.491  
In addition to the four ISTA properties, FINATA had partially negotiated the transfer of 
three others (Las Canoas, San Francisco de la Cruz, and La Carbonera).  Absentee owners 
continued to charge rent for land use during the war, and questions regarding debt and titling 
amounted to an insidious web of deceit between the reform beneficiaries and ISTA or FINATA 
officials.  Most of the cooperatives were simply misinformed by government officials about 
their rights and options to achieve legal ownership of their land, thus perpetuating dependence 
on these agencies.  It was also evident that these humiliating and costly interactions with the 
government were never enough to trigger more organized pressure by the cooperatives to 
demand their rights.   
                                                 
491 Interview, Coop leaders, Sihuatepeque and El Limón. San Ildefonso, Aug. 24, 1998. 
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In contrast to the ambivalent views that many cooperative members held for the FMLN 
during the war, sympathy or loyalty toward Duarte and Christian Democrat leaders are 
evidently unshaken by the failure of the PDC to consolidate real improvements for their rural 
base.  PDC activists from the town center of San Ildefonso and ACOPAI promoters from 
nearby cooperative in San Vicente visited the highland farms regularly throughout the war.   
The extreme poverty in most of highland San Ildefonso persisted even after they returned to 
cultivate their lands.  Still, loyalty to goals and frequently promised favors of the Christian 
Democrats, tactically translated into political neutrality. 
ACOPAI was perhaps the most influential peasant association in San Ildefonso as well 
as the client organization of Orlando Arevalo, who attempted to balance his constituency 
between the hard-line counter-insurgent forces of the right and the FMLN aligned organizations 
on the left.  However, Arevalo, like his mentor, Duarte, was a resilient politician.  Alliances of 
convenience were struck repeatedly during the period of renewed rural activism that at various 
moments linked ACOPAI with the FMLN, then at another moment with ARENA.  Arevalo was 
acrobatic enough to manage these rather dramatic political swings, and could always ensure the 
loyalty of a significant segment of his followers.  However, many cooperative members in San 
Ildefonso began to lose faith, although the decisive moment was not until the PDC was 
virtually marginalized as a party and as a PDC deputy in the Salvadoran Congress, Arevalo 
switched to ARENA in 1991.   Some of Arevalo’s critics within ACOPAI had little choice but 
to follow him to the right as he reinvented his political organization under the auspices of 
ARENA.  Arevalo helped engineer rural support for ARENA in return for a slot for deputy on 
the party’s national slate in the 1991 elections and patronage for his organization. 
The influence of Arevalo was responsible in part for one of the most visible investments 
to strengthen the cooperative sector in the paracentral region – the Lempa Acahuapa irrigation 
district.  The details of this project, which take us into the post-war period, illustrate many of 
the contradictions of the Christian Democrat empowerment strategy. The original cooperative 
that Arevalo held found, Miralempa, which was wedged between San Ildefonso and San 
Vicente on the southern ridge of the Pan American highway, was one of the prime beneficiaries 
of this megaproject. Arevalo’s allies within the cooperative and the National Peasant 
Confederation more broadly, were positioned to govern the political operation of the district’s 
water users association.   Included as one of the four famous irrigation districts that were 
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associated with former President Molina’s ill-fated agrarian transformation plans in the 1970s, 
the Lempa Acahuapa project had been on the drawing board for decades.492  It was resurrected 
in the mid-1980s as a mechanism to improve the productivity and diversification of cooperative 
farms on both sides of the upper Lempa valley, but the project was also guided by counter-
insurgent aims.493   
On the San Vicente side, the ISTA and FINATA cooperatives were located in what the 
FMLN considered an expansion zone at the time, with many of the most prominent 
cooperatives offering only passive collaboration.  With the Fifth Brigade garrison located in the 
city of San Vicente to the east, and the Pan-American Highway to the north, the Acahuapa 
River valley that flowed into the Lempa was difficult to enter for FMLN forces to the North 
and South.  On the Usulután side of the Lempa, the rugged slopes of the eastern villages of 
Berlin and San Agustín facilitated the presence of several FMLN factions.  Cooperative farms 
were either abandoned or under threat by the FMLN and attitudes toward the government were 
less favorable.   The Lempa Acahuapa project was designed as a stabilizing investment for both 
sides of the upper Lempa valley. 
Financing in the form of a $10.5 million Inter-American Development Bank loan was 
approved in December, 1986, and after several years of costly delays, construction of the 
irrigation channel got underway in 1991 that would divert water from the 15 de Septiembre 
dam to a potential user population of some 1,100 farmers and a potential area of 2,600 ha.494  
Operational irrigation didn’t begin until 1994 and by 1998, only between 50 and 100 farmers 
were paying to irrigate 200 to 400 hectares.  The Lempa Acahuapa district was the least 
                                                 
492 Two irrigation districts were constructed in the early 1970s to the northwest of the capital, in Zapotitan (3,000 
ha) and Aticoyo (4,000 ha).  The other planned mega-districts targeted the Pacific Basin of the Rio Grande river in 
San Miguel-Usulután; the Lower Lempa valley of La Paz-San Vicente-Usulután.  More recently, a fifth project has 
been proposed for the Rio Jiboa Valley of La Paz.  According to a 1998 Technoserve irrigation study, about 
273,000 hectares are suitable for irrigation in El Salvador, but less than 45,000  (22%) have access to it. 
493 ISTA cooperatives on the San Vicente side included Parras Lempa (1144 ha), La Quesera (703 ha), El Chorro 
(367 ha), and El Marquezado (435 ha), as well as several FINATA coops like Miralempa.  On the Usulután side, 
three ISTA farms were affected, Las Piletas (529 ha), El Corozal (565 ha), and los Horcones (693 ha).   
494 Delays in the start up of the project increased the overall costs of the project and required an additional 
extension loan for approximately $4 million.  To give some idea of the costs that these delays, payments on the 
principal on the original loan will begin in July, 2005 and continue until July 2027.  Even before the first 
repayment, El Salvador has paid $2.2 million in interest (%20 of the original loan amount).  By the end of the 
repayment period, another $1.9 million in interest will have been paid, bringing the total cost of the loan to $4.1 
million (28% of the total project cost).   
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contentious and smallest of the planned irrigation megaprojects, but it was the first major 
investment in Salvadoran agriculture in over a decade.    
Designed to be operating near full capacity by 1993, the project failed to meet expected 
targets in almost every area.  A variety of factors were cited, many of which may be 
attributable to the general decline of agriculture in the 1980s (low government extension 
capacity, titling problems) but also donor inflexibility and inadequate grasp of the political 
aspects of the project.  The overarching problem was a top-down design that was skewed by the 
technical advice of IDB and Ministry of Agriculture officials, few of which had any credible 
understanding of the political challenges facing the targeted beneficiaries.  Repeating many of 
the errors of the agrarian reform, heavy-handed attempts to organize water users ultimately 
created deep divisions between the San Vicente water users loyal to ISTA and Arevalo, and the 
Usulután water users that included a mix of independent small and medium farmers and FMLN 
occupied properties.495                                                                                                                                              
 
c.  “Algo feo paso” (Something Horrible Happened)  
 
Of the self-deceptions that were considered necessary by FMLN combatants to assimilate, the 
unquestioned loyalty to Mayo Sibrián, during the period between 1986 and 1990 when most of 
the paracentral region was under his command,  represents the most grave miscalculation of 
FMLN of the entire war.   
The push for a military victory in 1983-1984 had exhausted the human capacity of the 
FMLN.  For the first time, guns outnumbered recruits.  In fact, most combatants were re-
equipped in mid-1980s.  The period of deconcentration was followed with an increase in 
desertions and a decline in force levels due to exhaustion, disillusionment with the inevitability 
of a longer war, and refusal to serve without the security of a large group, sometimes far from 
home.   The FMLN war of attrition strategy began with a reduced fighting force, and the period 
following the 1985 unification was one of rebuilding.  Conscription, first attempted by the ERP 
                                                 
495 Oscar Gutierrez, ex-Minister of Agriculture under ARENA President Armando Calderon Sol is also one of the 
larger landowners on the Usulután side. 
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for six months in 1983, was used intermittently to replenish the ranks.  Children (below 18 
years of age) were increasingly used as eligible combatants. 
In addition to land occupations, new groups of young men and women were returning 
from the Mesa Grande and San Antonio refugee camps in Honduras to serve in the FPL in San 
Vicente.  According to the only reconstructed record of the San Vicente front during this 
period, Mayo Sibrián was known to prefer young recruits.496  Deeply convinced that the front 
had been compromised by government infiltrators, younger recruits were less likely to be 
“contaminated,” by spies.  The refugee camps and repopulations continued to provide a fresh 
flow of new recruits, mostly teens.   
Combatants who served under Mayo during 1986 described his rule with a strange mix 
of admiration and fear.  He had been a highly effective, if ruthless, military commander who 
was captured in 1985 when returning from Cuba.  He was tortured, and then somewhat 
surprisingly released without the exchange of prisoners.  He was sent to recuperate in Managua 
before assuming command of the San Vicente front in 1986.   
Many told stories of Mayo’s exaggerated class hatred with an express resentment 
toward elite abilities.  Mayo punished any perceived arrogance with almost tyrannical 
assignments that seemed to reward the lowest common denominator.  Highly educated or 
skilled combatants were assigned extra remedial tasks involving manual labor or practicing 
handwriting to instill a sense of humility and equality within the ranks.  The climate under 
Mayo’s rule approached the re-education experiences suffered by the Chinese and Vietnamese 
elites and middle classes under Mao and Ho.  Among some, this commitment to building a 
classless society was respected, but others detected a deeper problem. 
There were reports of a number of inexplicable events in which the military seemed to 
have remarkably precise information about FMLN locations and movements, allowing them to 
inflict severe damage.  Mayo increasingly responded to these losses as acts of betrayal.  His 
paranoia became the basis for ever more indiscriminate and brutal “ajusticiamientos.”  
Relatively small or rather unsubstantiated errors were punished with death.  Reports emerged 
detailing scores of internal executions.  The first tipping point came when an entire group of 
returning youths from Mesa Grande to serve in San Vicente were executed under Mayo’s order 
                                                 
496 This section relies heavily on the reconstruction of this period by Tom Gibb, (2000: 248-264) as well as 
interviews with about 10 ex-combatants that were affected directly by the actions of Mayo Sibrián. 
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as suspected spies.   These purges that occurred in 1986 were allegedly investigated by the 
FMLN high command, but Mayo was only reprimanded and his command would be extended 
until 1990.   
While the executions slowed, they did not end.  Over the four year period, at least 300 
and as many as 500 FMLN combatants were executed under Mayo’s orders in what amounted 
to the most devastating collapse of moral authority and criminal negligence within the FMLN.  
The victims openly recounted their experiences as episodes of a longer stream of random 
violence that they had not yet fully comprehended.  It was not simply the number of executions 
that Mayo and his intelligence network carried out, but it was often the garish brutality with 
which they were conducted.  Victims described acts as horrific as any committed by the right 
wing death squads, sometimes with intense pressure for collective participation – particularly 
by close family members.   
One woman described her experience as an FPL cook citing many of the benchmarks 
that dozens of other combatants had mentioned – the suffering of life under constant bombing, 
guindas, and endless work.  The story then took a gruesome turn, recounting what amounted to 
a series of shocking abuses that occurred during her time on the Chinchontepec volcano.  She 
lost two children under conditions that appeared to involve unjustified and excessive 
punishment for petty offenses.  Labeled by Mayo’s commanders as “enemies of the people,” 
she does not know where they are buried. 497  
She personally witnessed another instance of ajusticiamiento that involved a boy 
working in the encampment kitchen and was found to have given a box of cigarettes and some 
crackers to a friend.  Because no one had any money, he was investigated for theft.  The same 
night the boy was tied to a tree and members of the encampment were obliged to beat him with 
a club. The woman said that she was told to stab the boy in the throat as he was being hung, but 
refused.  For doing so, she was expelled along with her son from the encampment.  Like other 
families holding similar grievances, she holds the FMLN command responsible. “There were 
errors.  For many people, there now is this thorn.  They feel damaged.  These are consequences 
of the war, but there is resentment.” 
                                                 
497 Interview, Coyol, Tecoluca, April 9, 1998 
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Another combatant attributed the situation to a shift in the beliefs by the later years that 
had guided the revolution: 
 
Many people stopped believing in the later years of the war, and simply out of selfishness, various 
comrades were executed.  For example, the sons and daughters that served in the guerrillas, when they 
visited their parents, they would return with ten or twenty pesos.  The parent’s would give them 
something small.  But maybe someone did have any money and would report those who did to the 
commander accusing them of taking bribes from the enemy.  Often these allegations were not 
investigated.  There was more selfishness than honesty and it contaminated things.  It was the worst 
mistake the organization could have committed, but we were not following our principles.  After the 
war, many combatants remained a little traumatized by those bad examples, on one hand.  On the other 
hand, there are many comrades that are understanding and do not compare these personal failures with 
the direction of the revolution [la linea].  There is great resentment among some combatants, but not 
among the majority of the population.  Perhaps there is a generational difference. Many of the parents 
of these children are not confused because they joined out of conscience, with knowledge of the 
movement and they are clear about things.  But the son or daughter, they dedicated themselves more to 
the physical and military training, and politically they didn’t have the knowledge or preparation of the 
majority.  They were only soldiers, and when soldiers are ordered to risk their life they do it, and 
sometimes even against their will.  And maybe this explains why some lost their way. 498 
 
 
Pilar Clímaco, a political organizer for the RN recounted how her family and many of 
her in-laws were targeted as infiltrators in 1988.  Both families had been involved in the 
revolutionary movement since the early 1970s.  One of the women whose name had appeared 
on the list was in 1998 on the board of directors of CRIPDES.  An investigation by the RN into 
the claims found that there was little basis to them, but by then Pilar’s brother had been 
executed.499 
Varying accounts persist regarding just what led to the killing of 300-500 FMLN 
combatants by their own leaders.  Most are convinced that infiltration existed to a lesser degree 
and some of the executions were justified.   Some argue that Mayo was the infiltrator, 
compromised after an early arrest and betrayed the FMLN as a spy for the U.S..   
Remarkably, some combatants rationalize Mayo’s paranoia and extreme authoritarian 
methods as an excess of dedication, understandable and even admirable in the context of a dirty 
war, especially for a commander that seemed to get the job done militarily.  In this view, Mayo 
                                                 
498 Interview Alvaro Alfaro, San Bartolo, Tecoluca, April 23, 1998. 
499 Interview, Pilar Clímaco, ASMUR President, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, Nov. 20, 1998 
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simply pushed the principles of the revolution to the extreme.  Most believed that the vast 
majority of killings lacked justification. 
No formal investigation was conducted of the killings or the negligence within the 
FMLN central command that permitted Mayo to remain in command of the paracentral zone 
almost four years after the initial purges in 1986.  Privately, some of Mayo’s subordinates 
involved in the killings have attempted to make amends with victim’s families, but to little 
avail. Victims also complain bitterly about unfulfilled promises by FPL leaders to address these 
directly with the survivor families.  
 Discussions with a number of those whose experiences were tinged by the psychosis of 
Mayo Sibrián, revealed a profound anger, humiliation and grief at not knowing where one’s son 
or daughter is buried or the real conditions of their death.  It would seem that of the many self-
deceptions that were required to assimilate the tremendous sacrifices of choosing revolution, 
this last one crossed the line.  As a result, a notable rift has deepened between the treatment of 
the revolution as something sacred and the erosion of trust in its historic leaders.  One man 
stated that: 
 
among large segments of the civilian population that is considered the FMLN base in San Vicente and 
Usulután, they silently hold an accounting of these crimes, and are prepared to present this social debt 
to the FMLN leadership at a particular moment.  They are only holding back out of sympathy for the 
fragility of the larger project of consolidating the victories achieved in the Peace Accords, but will not 
actively support the party. 500   
 
 
Among the younger generation of combatants, there exists a perception that the 
secretive way that the Mayo Sibrián period has been covered up may explain why so little 
space has been created by party leaders for new leaders to ascend.  Most remarkable of all, 
while these errors have not been forgotten or forgiven, there appears to be a higher priority 
placed on the reconciliation of the past and continuing the hard work of the present. 
In 1990, after an investigation by the FMLN high command, Mayo Sibrián was 
executed for his crimes, although even the alleged indignation and arrogance that he maintained 
in his final defiance of his commanding officers is recounted with admiring respect by some.   
                                                 
500 Interview, Alejandro Valladares, Las Pampas, Dec. 18, 1998 
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 As in 1983, the internal crisis surrounding Mayo Sibrián occurred at moment of surging 
military capacity within the FMLN as it prepared for the Strategic Counter-Offensive.  
Leveraging the full capacity of the guerrilla strategy that had seemingly inflated the confidence 
of the U.S. and Salvadoran officials, the FMLN mounted an unprecedented offensive in 
November 1989.  An estimated 6,000 combatants participated in coordinated assaults on major 
cities, the most dramatic of which involved a battle that raged for more than a week in the 
peripheral suburbs surrounding San Salvador.   Despite the logistical feat that enabled the 
attack, the rebels failed once again to ignite the hoped for insurrection and were driven back by 
a savage bombing of urban neighborhoods. 
 The offensive cost an estimated 2,000 deaths and as many as 4,000 casualties among the 
FMLN ranks, as well as almost $70 million in economic damage (FUSADES 1989; Montoya y 
Martínez 1990).  However, it was the government’s decision to execute seven Jesuit priests – 
the country’s leading intellectuals, and their two civilian assistants during the offensive that 
effectively backed the Cristiani government into a corner.  Peace negotiations were the only 
escape.   The urgency of negotiations was stepped up by the FMLN deployment surface to air 
missiles that were acquired from Nicaragua in 1990.  The missiles, which had been available 
but not used due to fears about U.S. reactions, instantly inflicted heavy damage on the 
Salvadoran air force.  This confluence of tactical realignments forced both sides to the 
conclusion that the war was unwinnable militarily.   
 
 
D.  EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES DURING THE TRANSITION TO PEACE (1990-1992) 
 
The final years of the war following the 1989 offensive were ones of frenetic political 
jockeying for post-war position.  In all three aspects of the political opportunity structure (land 
inequality, elite access, and state repression), the period was one of both continuity and change, 
depending in large part on the path chosen in the 1970s.  In the run up to the peace 
negotiations, the FMLN carried out hundreds of land occupations, altering perhaps more than 
any moment in the country’s history the underlying agrarian structure and the connected social 
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relations of inequality.  However, the impact of the land redistribution varied with the depth of 
FMLN support on the ground.   
The end of the war also signaled the eventual end of U.S. military support, and in turn, 
the collapse of the Christian Democrats.  At one end of the political spectrum, ARENA 
consolidated its electoral defeat of the Christian Democrats as the dominant political force and 
rapidly subjected the Salvadoran economy to the shock therapy of structural adjustment.  In 
exchange for the political reforms that would be conceded in the Peace Accords, ARENA 
ceded to itself the command of the economy and rewarded many party loyalists with the spoils 
of privatized state assets.  In perhaps the most audacious move, Cristiani liquidated the debts of 
the nationalized banks before selling them to himself and other oligarchs at rock bottom prices.   
At the other end of the spectrum, years of planned and unplanned efforts to decentralize 
authority in zones of FMLN control were taking shape. NGOs and grassroots organizations 
proliferated and institutional competition for the lion’s share of reconstruction funding 
intensified.  A panoply of donor-driven institutions and programs associated with the FMLN 
pursued a vague notion of constructing a popular alternative economy in insurgent control 
zones as it prepared to trade bullets for ballots it transitioned to a legal political party.   
The middle strata of Salvadoran politics, just like the middle road to social change, 
proved to be least susceptible to these turns in the political field of power.  Inevitably as well, 
the negotiation of peace would bring about significant changes in the state security forces, 
curtailing the impunity of these institutions and reducing repression.  As such, the principal 
guarantor of the counter-insurgent solution to collective action would be gone, and the search 
for a new solution would be found in the redemption of market forces.    
 
1.  Land Occupations 
 
Between 1989 and 1993, the FMLN and allied rural organizations moved large numbers of 
civilians into all corners of the zones under its control to establish the basis for negotiating the 
transfer of the occupied land from ISTA and the former owners.  Between November 1990 and 
July, 1991, FMLN groups occupied 13,000 hectares of some the best farmland in the country.  
By March 1992, another 6,000 hectares had been occupied.  Within the framework of the peace 
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negotiations, peasant organizations and the government reached agreements not to dislodge the 
squatters at the September 1991 peace talks held in New York.  On the ground, local 
organizations with the backing of demobilizing insurgents were defending the occupations.   
The massive occupations would enable the FMLN to negotiate these properties under 
the land transfer program (PTT), which would become the crown jewel of the economic side of 
the Peace Accords.  The first FMLN inventory presented in Feb. 1992, claimed 12,280 
properties for a total of 500,000 manzanas (350,000 ha.).  This claim represented more than the 
entire 1980 land reform, was roundly rejected by the government as excessive.501  The second 
FMLN inventory (May 1992), listed some 5,821 properties totaling 263,200 ha..  As 
embargoed and non-negotiable properties were removed, the third FMLN inventory declined to 
4,666 properties, equal to at least 210,000 ha.  Finally, the government and the FMLN settled 
on a total of 4,600 parcels, or an area equal to between 122,500-166,250 ha.  Of this land, 
70,000-113,400 ha. would go to FMLN combatants and supporters.  At the same time, peasant 
organizations under the direction of the FMLN, were occupying some 20,000 ha. of abandoned 
farms in conflictive zones.    
 Within the 1992 Peace Accords, the land transfer program (PTT) was viewed as crucial 
to consolidating the fragile “negotiated peace.”  Table 5.8 shows that this latest stage of land 
reform has redistributed 103,000 ha. of state owned and privately held land to 36,089 ex-
combatants of the FMLN and Salvadoran military, as well as civilian supporters of the 
FMLN.502  Like other stages of land reform in El Salvador, the total expected beneficiary 
population and farm area actually transferred were both substantially lower than planned.   
The PTT had the greatest impact in the departments of Cuscatlán, San Vicente and 
Usulután (10-14% of total departmental land area, the latter two being subject to major land 
invasions in 1991-92).  In San Vicente, total land claimed by the FMLN according to the 
                                                 
501 No properties were claimed in the departments of Sonsonate or Ahuachapán, but about 75,000 ha. over a third 
of total area of Chalatenango was claimed.  Also, the first inventory included 197 state properties (83 ISTA, and 
67 FINATA). 
502 The U.N. estimated that an average of 3.5 ha would be needed for as many as 47,500 beneficiaries for a total of 
166,250 ha.  Initial government estimates of available land to be transferred included 34 expropriated farms 
abandoned during the war and administered by ISTA equal to 17,500 ha.  (mostly in San Vicente, and Usulután), 
47 large properties identified as “excedente” (or above the legal limit of 245 ha.) totaling 9,100 ha. held by the 
state (ISTA), 18,900 ha. in land offered for sale to the Land Bank in reconstruction zones, and 14,000 ha located 
outside reconstruction zones.  U.N. (1995) Doc. 2/25812/Add.2, May 25, 1993.  
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proposed inventory of May, 1992, was 21,785 hectares (8% of total national land claimed).   As 
of 2000, the final PTT total for San Vicente was 17,317 hectares, transferred to an estimated 
5,434 beneficiaries. 
 
Table 5.8  Summary of Land Reforms in El Salvador, 1980-1998 
 
 
 1980 
Agrarian 
Reform 
1980 
Agrarian 
Reform 
1992 
Land Transfer 
Program 
Total 
Reform503 
 Actual  Actual 
Corrected
504 
Plan Actual Plan Actual 
Land area 
affected (ha) 282,486 264,127 166,250 103,363 799,750 367,490 
% farm land 21.0 19.6 12.3 7.7 59.7 27.3 
Individuals 
affected 82,698 77,298 47,500 36,089 248,500 113,387 
% EAP in 
agriculture  14.8 13.8 8.5 6.4 44.4 20.2 
Ave. farm size 
(ha) 3.4 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 
 
 
 Far from fulfilling the demands embodied in the initial FMLN inventory of 350,000 ha., 
the PTT redistribution increased total farmland affected by two decades of land reforms by a 
                                                 
503 Total values for the 1980 Agrarian Reform are obtained by adding the respective Phase I, Phase II and Phase III 
totals.  Totals do not include Decree 839 voluntary transfers of some 10,000 ha after 1989.  Net planned impact of 
Phase II in terms of land is estimated at 270,000 ha., (obtained by subtracting 245 PTT properties greater than 100 
ha., equal to 54,000 ha, from the estimated 270,000 ha. of potential Phase II land) (see notes for Table 5.6).  Net 
Phase II beneficiaries of 20,500 are estimated by subtracting 15,500 PTT recipients on large farms from the 36,000 
estimated Phase II beneficiaries.  The grand total of planned reform beneficiaries of 260,000 sums 60,000 for 
Phase I, 50,000 for Phase II, 150,000 for Phase III, (and 47,500 for PTT, then subtracting an arbitrary 20,000 for 
double counting of beneficiaries).  The grand total of land affected by all land reforms is 737,248 ha, which sums 
247,500 ha for Phase I, 270,000 ha for Phase II, 220,000 ha for Phase III , (and 166,250 for PTT, then subtracting 
50,000 ha. for double counting of land parcels).   
504 FMLN and FAES beneficiaries of the PTT settled or were assigned some 18,359 hectares of ISTA reform 
farmland, according to the OCTA 3rd PTT Census, pg. 9.  To avoid double counting this land, the amount was 
deducted from the 1980 actual land.  Based on 3.4 hectare ave. for the 1980 reform, the land deduction translates 
into 5,400 individual beneficiaries that are also deducted from the total 1980 affected population. 
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substantial, if much more modest 7.7%.505  The impact of the PTT on land distribution equality 
is actually less then one might imagine since as much of 20% of the redistributed land was 
already in possession of the state.506  Wood argues that the impact of the PTT was political 
rather than economic.  She contends that, “despite rhetoric to the contrary, neither the 
government nor the FMLN ever saw land transfer as a measure to redress distributive concerns 
that had fueled the civil war.  Rather, land transfer was intended to facilitate the reintegration of 
ex-combatants and FMLN supporters into the economic and social life of the country” (Wood 
1995: 82). 
Taken as a whole, Salvadoran land reforms delivered only about half of what had been 
promised.  As much as 60% of all farmland was potentially redistributable, benefiting as many 
as 248,500 landless and tenant farmers, or 44.5% of the economically active adult population in 
agriculture in 1980.  However, only 113,387 peasants (20.2% of adult 1980 PEA in agriculture) 
gained access to land totaling about 27% of all farmland (367,000 hectares).  The departments 
of Sonsonate, La Libertad, Ahuachapán, La Paz, San Vicente and Usulután experienced the 
greatest overall transformation, with between 23-30% of total area redistributed.  In these 
departments we would expect the greatest decline in land inequality. The appendix (Table D.5) 
shows that this is largely the case, with the exceptions of La Paz and San Vicente, the other 
departments register the greatest improvements in estimated land inequality between 1961-
1998. 
 The 1998 estimate in Appendix table D.5 suggests that overall land inequality remains 
high in San Vicente, underscoring the mixed impact of the land reform process.  This becomes 
clearer when looking at the case study municipalities.  The political experiences within the 
three case study municipalities are no better distinguished than by the impact of the land 
transfer program.  While each case represents the logical culmination of a twenty year struggle 
that began with relatively similar, modest aspirations, the different outcomes are 
comprehensible by knowing how the paths diverged after different action choices were taken.  
                                                 
505 FUSADES (1992: 151), Binford (1994) U.N. op. cit.)  Elizabeth Wood graciously provided documentation 
supporting the initial estimates of FMLN and government land inventories. 
506 ISTA lands identified in the MAG-OCTA, Tercer Censo Agropecuario del PTT, April 1997.  It is also worth 
noting that the second FMLN inventory included 46,400 ha. of state owned property.  “Tierras Propiedad el Estado 
que Aparecen en el Inventario del FMLN,” mimeo.   
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a.  Tecoluca  
 
In Tecoluca, the FMLN claimed approximately 15,000 hectares in their second land inventory 
(April 1992).  This represented over 50% of the total municipal surface area.   The final PTT 
land total in Tecoluca was 9,934 hectares.  The families of the national oligarchy and regional 
patronage structure, from Cristiani to Chepe Diablo, were all affected by the reform.   
Land occupations in Tecoluca began before 1991, but the majority of repopulations 
occurred just before and during the official troop demobilization that ended in 1993.  The 
decision was taken by the FMLN command prior to the 1989 offensive that preparations for 
repatriation of the refugees in exile would begin.  According to one investigation, the FPL 
directed the repopulation to areas in Tecoluca that would be easily negotiable (state lands), 
prioritized places of origin, and private farms of historic significance (mostly on the volcano) 
(Fogaroli and Stowell 1995: 33).  
In the days leading up to the Peace Accords, a series of repopulations began.  Here in 
Tecoluca, some people arrived in search of land, for the necessity of finding a means of 
subsistence.  Other people were directed by commanders to occupy specific farms.  One ex-
combatant describes the process: 
 
“In late 1991, there was much noise about the signing of the Peace Accords, and in this moment there 
were already various resettlements here, with people in San Carlos Lempa, Las Anonas, Los Naranjos, 
El Guajoyo, although these were relatively few.  The massive repopulations began then, guided by the 
criteria that farms should be occupied as a necessity for negotiation rather than if the people liked it or 
not.  The objective was to return people to their place of origin, but when the signing of the Peace 
Accords started to look serious, we also tried to occupy vacant lands in order to negotiate the transfer of 
this land through the PTT.  So, throughout the municipality, we tried to occupy the highest number of 
farms possible. Some people came on their own looking for land, others were sent on orders from the 
Party.  507 
 
 
Given the amount of high quality land that had been abandoned, Tecoluca was a magnet 
for resettlements of both the right and left that brought non-Tecolucans from at least half of the 
countries provinces from exile in Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as many that were originally 
                                                 
507 Interview, Francisco, Municipal Secretary, Tecoluca, Oct. 9, 1998 
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from the municipality but displaced at some point.508  Some ISTA or FINATA farms were 
abandoned then resettled by ISTA around 1986.509   Other ISTA farms were resettled by both 
former cooperative members and new people (i.e. los Naranjos, Guajoyo, and Gran Sasso.  
Many other notorious and prized private farms were also occupied.   The social landscape was 
completely reconfigured with a mix of ex-combatants from both sides, civil patrollers and 
original ISTA cooperativistas, new FMLN cooperativistas and displaced civilians from far and 
wide.   
One artisan cooperative coordinator in Managua, Jesus Amaya, recounted the 
challenges of the second attempted repopulation of San Carlos Lempa. At the time, the four 
artisan cooperatives were generating substantial revenue that helped cover refugee camp 
expenses, but at least 25% of which was donated to the FMLN.  As part of the preparations for 
preparations from Nicaragua, FMLN leaders announced unilaterally to the cooperative 
enterprises that had been established in exile that they would be appropriated with the 
expectation that subsidization of the war effort would continue but that ex-combatants would 
receive privileged slots for post-war employment.  Resentful toward the decision, cooperative 
leaders resisted and were able to negotiate greater control over the workshops.   
Amaya was chosen to scout potential sites of repopulation, spending four months in late 
1990 assessing land in the coastal paracentral region.  A plan was designed whereby the 
cooperative members would request incorporation into an existing cooperative located in 
southern Zacatecoluca, just several kilometers to the west of the real destination of San Carlos.  
The subterfuge facilitated the reentry and registration of the 300 families from Nicaragua to 
settle initially at the first site, only then to move quietly with the accompaniment of CRIPDES 
into San Carlos Lempa and the other communities in the lower Lempa region of Tecoluca.510   
The civilian settler’s themselves took the initiative and assumed responsibility for many 
of the decisions associated with the wave of land takeovers that began in 1990, from deciding 
which land to occupy, taking the land, identifying the owner and negotiating the terms.  Always 
                                                 
508 In neighboring Usulután, Wood (2003:182) estimates that cooperatives allied with the FMLN numbering 
approximately 10,000 claimed 482 properties totaling some 66,500 hectares, or about 32% of the departments total 
surface area. 
509 Examples include El Casino, El Salto, El Delirio, Barrio Nuevo, Cañada Arenera, El Pacún 
510 Interview, Jesus “Chungo” Amaya, San Carlos Lempa, March 1999. 
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with the explicit backing of FMLN military capacity and negotiation with the relevant mass 
organizations, the repopulation experiences re-invigorated the truncated process of self-
governance that had been attempted in the PPLs, transferred to the refugee encampments, then 
transported and adapted to the construction of community within expansion zones of FMLN 
influence.  Given the reluctance of USAID financed counter-insurgent programs and hostile 
owners to facilitate in any way these independent resettlement initiatives, ad hoc committees 
were formed to resolve all economic, social and political aspects of life on the resettled farms.  
New leaders emerged to lead this process demonstrating the skill and acumen accumulated over 
years of prior organizing: 
 
The displaced began to repopulate expansion zones in 1986, beginning Chalate and Suchitoto, and that 
was how CRIPDES was born.  Some of us were in Santa Cruz, a cantón near Berlin but many were in 
Calle Real (San Salvador).  I looked into leading a group of 12 to 14 families to repopulate to the 
cantón of Santa Cruz, in Berlin.  I went to talk with CRIPDES and did the procedures and then to Calle 
Real to talk with families that wanted to come to Santa Cruz.  And it was not easy, I had to fight with 
the soldiers in Berlin because we were entering a conflictive zone full of security checkpoints.  Where 
were we going, they wanted to know, because there was nothing in Santa Cruz except guerrillas and 
fighting.  And it was true, the combat was tremendous, but this did not mean that we were not going to 
get the people there. The families insisted and we entered.  We were there six years before the zone of 
San Vicente was opened up and we could take this land that we wanted here [Las Anonas, Tecoluca].  
In 1991, we came together from Santa Cruz, and it cost us greatly. 511 
  
 
 A cooperative organizer with ANTA, Maria Cristina Pena, described how the 
occupation and settlement of La Florida, a property that like many in Tecoluca had been 
abandoned, was carried out by a small group that were working on the adjacent cooperative, La 
Betania 2.  The land was taken in 1988, a decision taken after several years of organizing in the 
zone.  Although shots were fired at the surveyors the lots were measured and corn was planted.  
La Florida’s owner, Hector Mariano Salazar, attempted to enter the farm with his tractor to 
destroy the corn.  He was captured by FPL forces in the region and then released on the 
condition that he lease the land to the new cooperative for four years and pay a $3,000 fine.  
Two copies of the signed contract were delivered, one to the cooperative and the other to the 
FPL commander.   
                                                 
511 Interview, Silverio Mendez Chicas, Las Anonas, Tecoluca April 1998. 
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 In 1991, as the contract was due to end and land occupations were escalating, Maria 
Cristina was appointed to a joint land negotiation committee, tasked with conducting similar 
negotiations with other owners to facilitate the transfer their property to insurgent squatters, 
through the Land Bank established by the Peace Accords.  As a woman with little education, 
she said she would not have expected to find herself driving hard deals with region’s 
landowners.  These skills, she reflected, were not ones she aspired to acquire but necessary to 
survive.512  
 In both cases, as in many others, the FMLN civilian leaders that took charge of the land 
occupations after a lifetime of prior leadership in cooperative organizing and resistance 
collective actions of resistance.  Upon securing access to land, these repopulation leaders 
transitioned into cooperative and community organizer roles, following a path that Wood 
describes as driven by moral commitments that allowed for few alternatives.  Similar to the 
experiences of insurgent cooperativistas in Usulután, “they saw their participation in each stage 
as a continuation of their insurgent identity, “naturally” arising out of earlier choices and 
experiences” (Wood 2003: 203)  
 
 
b.  San Ildefonso  
 
In San Ildefonso, much of the land claimed by the FMLN, was never successfully negotiated.  
Over 5,000 hectares were identified on the April 1992 FMLN inventory for San Ildefonso.  In 
the end, only about 1,500 hectares were effectively included in the PTT program.  Unlike the 
1980 agrarian reform, some lowland properties were affected. 513  
The lower than expected area affected by PTT reveals the fragility of confidence in the 
FMLN within expansion zone municipalities like San Ildefonso.  The moderating impact of the 
agrarian reform, FMLN errors toward the cooperatives and a residual level of goodwill toward 
local landlords all contributed to a hesitation in local organizing that placed significant 
                                                 
512 Interview, Maria Cristina, La Florida 
513 San Francisco Lempa, another property partially intervened by FINATA, was claimed by the FMLN on its 
original inventory, but did not make the final cut. 
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limitations on property redistribution.  San Ildefonso was not uncommon, but perhaps 
characteristic of the largest share of contested territory of El Salvador where the FMLN was 
unable to mobilize the support necessary to consolidate the transfer of many claimed farms. 
  El Castaño, perhaps the hacienda of greatest prestige in the area, best illustrates how the 
prevailing reservations, fear or lack of readiness resulted in many local landowners getting let 
off the hook.  En El Zaiti, a caserío of former colonos located adjacent to the Hacienda El 
Castaño of Ebelio and Francisco Noboa, included some trained insurgent militia.  However, 
according to one combatant from nearby Los Almendros, El Zaiti was typical of many villages 
in San Ildefonso, in their ambivalence toward confrontations with former landlords, the longing 
for the perceived security of pre-war colono tenure and the generally mixed political experience 
during the war.   
In one of the last operations of the civil war, five militia members from El Zaiti were 
escorting PRTC commander Camilo Turcios from Usulután to Tortugero, but were ambushed 
near Rio Frio.  Turcios, originally from the community of San Pedro Aguas Calientes, and 
three militia from El Zaiti were killed in the combat.  The PRTC commander explained that this 
event caused resentment within the community toward both the FMLN and the military, 
contributing to the deep reservations toward overt political activity that came to define the 
community.514  The lack of community activism was decisive in 1992, when he approached the 
Noboa’s to negotiate the transfer of their land.  Ebelio Noboa claimed that he was open to 
selling his farm if the price was right. He claimed he had been losing money grazing some 
cattle and renting out other parcels.  However, he was acutely aware that his colonos in El Zaiti 
regarded him as a “buen patrono,” and lacked the confidence or ambition to operate the farm 
themselves.515  The PRTC commander agreed that El Zaiti was not organized to pressure the 
Noboas to sell.  Not long after the war, the Noboas were seeking to re-establish the pre-war 
colono contracts with landless peasants from El Zaiti to tend to the 500 cattle that they moved 
back onto the property. 
The oligarchs and local elites of the Chinchontepec volcano and founders of the 
ARENA party that had banded together behind D’Aubuisson to defend the privileges of a 
                                                 
514 Interview, Genaro Henríquez, former PRTC commander in Northern San Vicente, May 21, 1998 
515 Interview, Ebelio Noboa, San Ildefonso, May 1998.   
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subservient labor force and uncontested land rights, watched as the FMLN pried away some of 
the most prized farms in Tecoluca, San Vicente and Zacatecoluca.  On the side of the volcano 
facing the Jiboa Valley, it was a different story.  Few lands were claimed by the FMLN, largely 
preserving the prewar agrarian balance of power.  No land was transferred in the PTT program.  
In fact, D’Aubuisson and other party elites from the region focused on the relocating peasants 
loyal to ARENA to contested properties in the Bajo Lempa.516  
 
2.  Institutional Innovation and Competition: NGOs, Mayors, Social Investment Funds 
 
In the final years of the war, both the right and left, insurgents, government officials and donors 
alike, rapidly constructed or consolidated their preferred institutional network for the post-war 
period.  USAID intensified its efforts to fortify CONARA and MEA in support of mayors, 
while the other multilateral and bilateral donors funded competing national or local institutions.  
The World Bank returned to El Salvador and the IDB scaled up its operations during the 
Cristiani government to underwrite proposed structural adjustment reforms.  Sollis argues that, 
“because of CONARA’s counter-insurgency activities, neither the World Bank nor the Inter-
American Development Bank were convinced of its capacity or reputation as a development 
agency” another social compensation agency was created, the Social Investment Fund (FIS), in 
June, 1990 (Sollis 1993: 448).  Local governments now counted three competing agencies 
(CONARA, MEA, FIS) that provided somewhat similar services but were accountable to 
different vested national or international interests.   
For its part, the FMLN began the conversion of its base organizations into CSOs and 
NGOs, which given the past hostility for mayors, became the preferred form of local 
organization.  The fact that each political military organization within the FMLN created its 
own network of NGOs suggested that the professed unity during the war was less than it 
seemed and would be tested in the post-war transition to electoral competition.  The FPL 
established the Association for the Cooperation and Communal Development of El Salvador 
                                                 
516 In a desperate effort to stave off the transfer of all the best farms to the FMLN, D’Aubuisson and other ARENA 
leaders in the region settled people in Zamora no and Nuevo Manager, in Jiquilisco and Pichiche, Zacatecoluca.  In 
the latter case, some of these families eventually relocated to Rancho Grande in Tecoluca in search of more 
responsive local organizational support. 
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(CORDES) as the primary development support organization for it base population and a 
channel for mainly European funding.517    
CORDES was created in 1988 with two employees, an office within the Catholic 
University and seed funding from two solidarity organizations in the U.S. and one from 
Canada.  The NGO’s motivation was to prepare to execute the FPL’s vision of development in 
the post-war period, although the first two years were overwhelmed with emergency needs of 
repopulated communities.  Perceived as fronts of the FMLN, CORDES offices were broken 
into and equipment was stolen during the 1989 offensive.  CORDES was also shut out of 
USAID funding, despite early efforts to submit joint proposals through CII, an NGO 
consortium.518 
With the repopulation of zones such as the lower Lempa valley in Tecoluca and 
Jiquilisco, CORDES established a strategic regional presence there in 1991 to accompany the 
resettlements, meet emergency needs and eventually promote development activities.   
Establishing a base in the village of San Carlos Lempa, CORDES and CRIPDES then 
coordinated the organization of new communal and productive structures in the zone.519  The 
accumulated experiences and leadership of the FMLN base organizations were naturally 
transferred into the post-war institutional architecture of this and other FMLN controlled zones.  
Perhaps the paramount goal that distinguished this period from the rest was the defense of the 
land.  CORDES, CRIPDES and by 1994, an FMLN municipal government and a host of other 
local organizations presided over a panoply of post-war reconstruction needs that began with 
one fundamentally new feature –one of the most dramatic reversals in agrarian inequality in the 
country.   
                                                 
517 The other primary development NGOs created at this time were FASTRAS (ERP), FUNSALPRODESE (PC), 
ASDI (PRTC), REDES (RN).  Together with CORDES, these five organizations managed a project portfolio of 
more than $15 million in 1993.  Sollis (1993: 12).  See Binford (1997, 1999), Cagan and Cagan (1991), 
Macdonald and Gatehouse (1995) for a similar description of work of Patronato para el Desarollo de las 
Comunidades de Morazán y San Miguel (PADECOMSM) in northern San Miguel and Morazán, Wood (2003 and 
2004) for Comus and Fenacoa in Usulután, Flint (2003) for el Comité de Desplazados y Marginados de La 
Libertad (CODESMA), and Silber (2004) Coordinadora de Comunidades y Reconstrucción de Chalatenango 
(CCR). 
518 Interview, Salvador Orellana, CORDES founder 
519 CORDES is headquartered in San Salvador, with two other regional offices in La Libertad and Suchitoto.  
Interview, Emilio Espín, CORDES regional manager, 1998.  CRIPDES has five regional organizations, la 
Corporación Comunal para el Desarollo Rural (CDR) working in the paracentral region.  By 1993-1994, 
CRIPDES was accompanying 168 communities in nine departments and 32 different municipalities. 
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The FMLN was not alone in staking out the non-governmental space in anticipation of 
the reconstruction windfall and post-war contest over political gains.   The U.S. international 
NGOs that had remained in the country scaled up their operations with increased funding from 
USAID.  Some U.S. NGOs were selective in accepting funding from USAID and becoming 
associated with the counter-insurgency project.  Most U.S. international NGOs espoused their 
independence and political neutrality, but few have refused USAID funding outright.  
Beginning with the CONARA pacification operation in San Vicente, USAID recruited U.S. 
NGOs to help.  NGOs like World Relief, Project Hope, CARE, Technoserve, the International 
Rescue Committee jumped on board.  Others such as Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, 
Save the Children, and OEF Foundation were more selective in their relationship with USAID.   
The ties and tacit cooperation between U.S. NGOs and the USAID sponsored military 
and pacification programs represented the cost of doing business in much of Central America.  
In some cases, U.S. NGOs attempted to maneuver within the surveillance of the embassy to 
support opposition grassroots organizations.  In other cases, the coincidence of interest was 
unproblematic.  Catholic Relief Services and its community development program, CARITAS, 
have channeled millions in food aid donations from USAID and other donors but have declined 
to participate in USAID financed CONARA programs that are deemed too political.  By 
contrast, Tom Hawk served as country director for World Vision in Honduras administering 
USAID funded projects in Honduras before making a natural transition to USAID as head of 
Municipalities in Action.  For his efforts and experience, he was rewarded with the executive 
director’s slot at the revamped FISDL and charged with steering the country’s local 
development initiatives. 
Still other U.S. NGOs that were generally opposed to U.S. policy in El Salvador, 
including Oxfam America, the SHARE Foundation, the Lutheran World Federation and 
American Friends Service Committee, all refused USAID funding and chose instead to 
accompany repopulation campaigns led by partner organizations closely aligned with the 
FMLN.   These organizations considered hostile to U.S. goals faced constant harassment, 
restricted mobility within conflictive zones and insidious efforts to block their projects.  This 
hostility was not always unsubstantiated as such organizations worked closely with a global 
solidarity network that generated millions of dollars in direct and indirect support for the 
FMLN. 
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According to one study of U.S. international NGOs with a presence in El Salvador in 
the late 1980s, USAID actually preferred NGOs over government line ministries or agencies as 
instruments for its political-economic strategies.  NGOs were viewed as more efficient and less 
corrupt than the government.  They typically worked in areas where the government was 
absent.  They represent a private alternative to state-led development which dovetailed nicely 
with the goals to privatize much of the public sector and particularly the humanitarian or 
religious NGOs tended to legitimize the U.S. military presence (Inter-Hemispheric Education 
Resource Center 1988: 10).  A major difference between the FMLN aligned NGOs and those 
cooperating with USAID is that the former tended to work with pre-established community 
organizations while those closer to the government, “supplant, divide, or avoid existing popular 
organizations” (IHRC 1988: 10).   
Perhaps the most influential and well heeled Salvadoran NGO with historic ties to 
ARENA is FUSADES, the economic think tank created in 1984 and bankrolled by $156 
million in USAID funding over the following ten years (Cuenca 1992; Rosa 1993; Foley 1996).  
With the exception of FEPADE and several other NGOs which were spun off from FUSADES 
in 1986 to promote business education, the right was slow to acknowledge the significance of 
community development NGOs.  However, the small family of right wing NGOs were capable 
of capturing an estimated $30 million from USAID between 1984 and 1992 (Rosa 1993: 86). 
FUSADES half-heartedly launched its own communal association strengthening 
program (FORTAS) in 1988.  FORTAS was designed to capture reconstruction funding, 
channel technical assistance and strengthen cooperation between private sector organizations 
and new local development foundations in pro-government communities.  As the focus of 
FORTAS shifted to rural communities, La Fundación Guadalupe was founded as a associate of 
the program in 1993. 
 The FUSADES manager of the FORTAS program explained that the intent was to 
organize local and external business expertise to launch new enterprises and provide social 
assistance in coordination with local government.  As a free market proponent, FORTAS was 
provided only a small operating budget of $120,000 to coordinate 45 foundations, which 
reflected its low priority status for FUSADES.520  According to FundaGuadalupe founders, 
                                                 
520 Blair puts the estimate of FORTAS Associations as high as 60, however many existed only on paper. 
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almost no assistance was provided by FUSADES and initial projects simply extended the 
CONARA tradition of administering donor determined projects (basic infrastructure).  The 
program demonstrated little interest in organizing demand through local community 
associations.   Instead, excessive energy was invested in competition between the Church, the 
mayor, and the foundation over which institution would inaugurate new public works.521  Since 
many of the NGO’s individual members lived in San Salvador and only returned on the 
weekends to the Guadalupe, the presence of the foundation was barely noticeable to most that 
lived there.  During the war, these areas remained dependent upon government transfers 
through ISDEM or CONARA.   
Beginning with the almost negligible impact of Phase I of the agrarian reform, the 
cooperative experience in the Jiboa Valley remains weak.  Sugar producers in the valley that 
belonged to service cooperative ACOPARVE, were in crisis due to falling international prices 
and the accumulated impact of the war.  Higher up on the volcano, the Coffee growers 
Cooperative los Nonualcos was formed in 1988, comprising some 200 mostly smallholding 
coffee producers cultivating over 800 hectares in Guadalupe and San Pedro Nonualco.  Unlike 
the other five cooperative members of larger federation to which they belong (UCAFES), Los 
Nonualcos Cooperative did not place any ceiling on the land a member may, permitting what is 
diplomatically stated as “a greater diversity of owners as members.”522   
The majority of smaller finca owners that are members of the Coop Nonualcos 
complain that cooperative decision making favors the largest owners.523  Not unlike many 
struggling agricultural enterprises in the region, the cooperative reportedly mismanaged a 
USAID loan awarded in 1988, and the losses were eventually condoned even though large 
growers, such as Max Menjivar, benefited disproportionately.524  The historic distrust between 
                                                 
521 Interview, Emilio Henríquez, FundaGuadalupe President and founder, June 29, 1998 and Padre Leonardo 
Francisco Rodriguez, parish priest of Guadalupe, July 6, 1998 
522 Interview, Victor Mencía, Appropriate Technology International, April 10, 1999.  UCAFES is a small USAID 
and IDB funded federation of 22 coffee cooperatives, including Coop Los Nonualcos, and 4,500 producers.  
UCAFES operates one of its seven beneficios in San Pedro Nonualco.  
523 Interview, cooperative member, Guadalupe, Aug, 1998. 
524 Menjivar reportedly accessed a large credit through the program, then lent some back to the cooperative.  
Although the USAID credit was ultimately forgiven, Menjivar forced the cooperative to pay him back. 
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large and small producers in the coffee sector of the Jiboa Valley was viewed by some small 
producers as a formidable obstacle to optimal organizational and marketing decisions from the 
very outset.  The cooperative struggled for a variety of factors, not the least of which has been 
the low initial level of collective spirit, according to an outside consultant.525 
As described earlier in chapter four, the creation of new grassroots and non-
governmental entities increased exponentially in the early 1990s as reconstruction money 
began to pour in.  Consequently, NGOs and CSOs of every imaginable stripe rushed into the 
void.  Despite being a relatively new phenomenon, the challenges associated with NGO 
involvement in local development quickly emerged.  Highly sensitive questions regarding NGO 
presence in El Salvador began to raise doubts about their credibility.  Some of the doubts 
included:  
 
• the ability to be neutral while accepting USAID funding given government and USAID 
hostility toward “FMLN NGOs,”  
 
• the myriad challenges of moving from humanitarian relief to sustainable and 
participatory development,  
 
• how NGOs contribute to the general chaos of uncoordinated, duplicative and inefficient 
development activities 
 
• the unresolved tension between NGOs, mayors and government agencies in local 
reconstruction projects.526   
 
 
Overall, these concerns fueled a quiet debate regarding whether NGOs contribute to 
social and economic development or merely provide a substitute for ineffective or exclusionary 
government services.  By 1991, four ministries and central government agencies, each funded 
by different foreign aid donors, were operating in nine separate poverty alleviation initiatives in 
the poorest municipalities (Sollis 1993: 455).  By 1993, El Salvador counted some 700 NGOs, 
most of which had formed after 1985 (Pearce 1999: 64).  At the same time, local government 
was denied any significant coordinating role in reconstruction many programs and this led to 
                                                 
525 Interview, V. Mencía, April 10, 1999 
526 This last problem was particularly sensitive in municipalities where the FMLN forced mayors to leave. 
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widespread duplication of activities, as well as increasing congestion as programs amassed at 
the community level (Nickson 179; Sollis 1993: 455-456).   
 
3.  The legacy of violence 
 
Standing beside the monument that was raised to the six “martyrs of the struggle for land,” at 
the site of the 1974 massacre in La Cayetana, Pablo Anaya, speaks with the conviction of 
twenty-two years of service to the revolution.  His experience began as a delegate of the word 
and early FPL recruit in La Cayetana and ended with coordination of the takeover and 
resettlement of the properties that once belonged to the Cristianis and the Angulos on the 
Chinchontepec volcano in 1991.  His experiences were nothing short of legendary, from four 
years as personal security to FPL top commander, Marcial, and leading the very first military 
operations, to having to flee the region in the mid-1980s when the command of Mayo Sibrián 
questioned the loyalty and took lives of even the families of the FPL founders.  At 58, with the 
payoff of a hectare sized farm where he cultivates beans and corn on the volcano and a small 
two room house in Nuevo Tehuacán that he shares with his wife and extended family, he 
offered a reflection on the war that is shared by many ex-FPL: 
 
If I had known what we happened to be getting into, I might not have joined at first.  However, one did 
not know what the war would require of us, only that we knew there was a need to change things, to 
achieve something, and it was us who were present.  We were told to organize for peaceful change, but 
I am absolutely certain that through peaceful change little would have been achieved.  Only with the use 
of violence, was the space for peaceful participation opened. 
 
 
The legacy of the violence for El Salvador is obviously viewed differently, depending 
on one’s experience during the war.  Early in the war, some in the Salvadoran private sector 
spoke openly of the need to kill up to 100,000 people to stabilize the country and possibly 
restore the pre-1979 status quo ante (Montgomery 1995: 260, Woodward 1985: 185; Paige 
(1997: 36).  Some 5,000 U.S. soldiers entered the country between 1980-1991 to help to carry 
out this plan as advisors and trainers for the Salvadoran military during the course of the war.  
Ensconced within the massive compound of what is said to be the largest U.S. embassy in Latin 
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America, designed to withstand a siege for as long as three months, the U.S. consulate in El 
Salvador hides a small monument to the 21 U.S. servicemen that were killed in combat there.  
A similar headstone sits in Arlington cemetery, dedicated at a low key tribute in May, 1996, 
that simply reads, "El Salvador 1981-1992. Blessed are the peacemakers. In sacred memory of 
those who died to bring hope and peace."527 
The names of a dozen or so U.S. civilians, including the four Cleveland churchwomen 
commemorated every December 3rd that also were killed in the conflict are not named on either 
U.S. memorial.528  Until recently, there were not even plans for a monument to the estimated 
83,000 Salvadorans, mostly civilians that were in fact killed in the twelve year civil war.  
Hundreds of thousands more were wounded.  One in four was displaced.  Virtually no one can 
say they escaped unaffected. 
As deeply personal and polarizing were the competing perspectives of the violence 
during the 1980s, the Peace Accords signed in January, 1992 officially ended this chapter.  
Thus began a process in which 15,009 FMLN members, of whom 30% were women, 
concentrated in 50 designated demobilization points around the country, which were then to 
further concentrate in 15 verification centers. The 62,000 member Salvadoran armed forces 
demobilized in 100 locations and then further concentrated into 62 designated positions in the 
country, places where they would normally be posted during peacetime.  In these 
demobilization camps, nearly 11,000 FMLN combatants surrendered their arms to be destroyed 
and about 31,000 soldiers would also formally disarm under the oversight of ONUSAL, but 
their weapons were put in storage.  These locations were traditionally in zones where both 
combatant organizations had the most influence and to some extent, benefited from the trust of 
the local population.  The PTT population, a rough estimate of the number of families in the 
FMLN base, numbered 36,089, compared with the civil patrollers that totaled another 38,000 
combatants.  Adversaries that could not defeat each other on the battlefield would attempt to 
return to a normal life, some living side by side in the same community. 
                                                 
527 Bradley Graham, “Public Honors for Secret Combat: Medals Granted After Acknowledgement of U.S. Role in 
El Salvador,” Washington Post. May 6, 1996. 
528 A monument to the deaths of the four U.S. churchwomen is located in Salvadoran department of La Libertad. 
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The Peace Accords created a Truth Commission that investigated more than 22,000 
reported acts of violence that occurred between Jan. 1980 and July 1991 (Betancur et al. 1993).  
Of these, the Commission registered more than 800 complaints of serious acts of violence 
attributed to the FMLN, half of which involved extrajudicial executions, with the rest including 
disappearance and forced recruitment.  Political killing of high ranking civilians, mayors and 
other public officials represented violations of international humanitarian law.  However, the 
vast majority of non-combatant killing was attributed by the Truth Commission to the state 
security forces and paramilitaries.   An amnesty approved by an ARENA controlled legislature 
has prevented any senior military officers from prosecution for war crimes. 
El Salvador is now, and has been for many years, the most violent country within the 
most violent region of the world in terms of homicides per capita.  During the civil war, El 
Salvador came to have rates up to 400 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.  Before the war, the 
level of violence was already higher than the regional average.  In 1974, the Pan-American 
Health Organization reported that the annual homicide rate in El Salvador was greater than 30 
murders for every 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest levels in the Western Hemisphere, 
surpassing even countries such as Nicaragua or Colombia.529  In the transition to peace, El 
Salvador has maintained one of the highest indices of violence on record, with a homicide rate 
that reached 141 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 1995.  Figure 5.3 illustrates the trend in the 
Salvadoran homicide rate over a thirty year period, typically far exceeding the average 
homicide rate for all of Latin America (7-12 per 100,000) for the entire time period, a region 
that has the highest levels of homicide worldwide.530    
 
                                                 
529 These two countries, for the same period, exhibited a homicide rate of 20 to 25 for every 100,000 inhabitants. 
530 The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) homicide rate is given by Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) 
using data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys (www.ifs.univie.ac.at/~uncjin/wcs.html#wcs123).  LAC 
homicide rates range from a low of 5 per 100,000 in Argentina and Costa Rica, to 20 for Mexico and Brazil, to 66 
for Colombia.  The LAC homicide rate is higher than the U.S. rate of 7, as well as that of both Asia and Africa – at 
5.4 and 5.1, respectively.  Homicides worldwide have increased steadily from 5-7 per 100,000 between 1971 and 
the mid-1990s.  Salvadoran homicide rates for 1969-1974 are from Pan American Health Organization (PAHO, 
1980), for 1977-1991, and from and 1994-1999 are from Cruz, et al (1999).  Estimates for 1975-1980 and 1992-
1994, are extrapolated from various sources.  Homicide rates for the period 1980-1991 are based on yearly 
estimated totals in Seligson and McElhinny (1996), and therefore differ from the PAHO based yearly estimates 
published in Cruz (1998) 
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1980 8.0 408
1981 378
1983 216
1985 7.9 52
1987 60
1989 12.2 78
1991 24
1993 60
1995 141
1997 111
1999 62
2000 57
Source: Cruz, Trigueros, (2000); La Fiscalía General de al Repúbl
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Figure 5.4  Violence in El Salvador and Latin America (Homicides per 100,000 population, 
1969-2000) 
 
The relative continuity of high intensity homicide over a span of three decades suggests 
that in El Salvador the violence during the civil war not only had political roots but was also the 
product of criminal activity and social violence which has prevailed in the country for some 
time (Alvarenga 1996; Cruz 1997; González 1997).  The negotiations that eventually ended the 
conflict not only ended open hostilities between the guerrilla and the government, but almost 
completely eliminated politically motivated violence – not least of which through the 
transformation and downsizing of the state security forces.531  Nevertheless, in the post-war 
period surprisingly high economic and social violence suggests an inertia of the civil war, 
although the specific links are not well understood.532 
                                                 
531 Mandated cuts reduced the Armed Forces from 62,000 to 31,000 officers and soldiers.   The Treasury and 
National Police forces were dissolved, although some members of the FMLN, army and old police forces joined 
the new civil police force. 
532 See Holden (2004).  Other differences between the various periods of violence in El Salvador, including spatial 
shifts and comparisons within Central America are explored in McElhinny and Cruz (2002). 
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 In his critique of the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy in El Salvador, Schwartz argues 
that deeply rooted tendencies in Salvadoran culture ultimately proved remarkably impervious 
to U.S. intentions to build democracy as a bulwark against the political extremes of the right 
and left:   
 
 
Despite the hopes of the low-intensity conflict doctrine, ten years of limited progress and great 
frustration have revealed the limits of American power.  America’s conviction that it can create 
democracy abroad is an illusion, at least in most lands at most times.  Because a well-intentioned, but 
misguided, assumption that techniques, technology and programs alone could fundamentally transform 
a violent and unjust society into a liberal and democratic one, America perhaps did not consider 
sufficiently that human character, history, culture, and social structure are highly resistant to outside 
influence. 
  
 
This reading of war might lead one to the inaccurate conclusion that the inherent 
cultural vices of injustice and violence that were exacerbated by “misguided” U.S. foreign 
policy left the overall Salvadoran population less empowered.   Indeed, there is evidence in 
some communities that supports this conclusion.  However, they tend to be found in counter-
insurgent communities that were supposedly aligned in some way with the government.  Alicia 
Campos, of San Pedro Aguas Calientes, who also experienced the war on the volcano just 5 
kilometers from La Cayetana, offers a common perspective of the Jiboa Valley communities:   
 
 
The balance of the war – for the poor, was more poverty and the loss of our beloved family, while the 
rich take advantage of the humanitarian relief.  We are still waiting for the fulfillment of promises of 
foreign aid made by Cristiani in 1994.  There has been nothing so far.  Perhaps, only for those who died 
in combat, not for those who died in their own homes. 
 
State repression facilitated by U.S. hubris had a profound disempowering effect on many 
communities in the Jiboa Valley, the same effect that the military and its U.S. advisors hoped it 
would have on FMLN controlled populations.  I have argued that because other aspects of the 
political opportunity structure were different, the effect of violence has had quite the opposite 
effect on FMLN communities.    One of the few FMLN activists in Jiboa Valley, described why 
things turned out differently there: 
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Without the foundation of Christian Base Community organization, the occupations of coffee fincas 
that occurred in the Jiboa Valley were unprepared to weather the blows of landowner sanctioned 
repression.  The coffee owners responded with overwhelming force.  What resulted was not an opening 
for dethroning the patron, but rather a deepened climate of intimidation.  This pattern of control still 
exists today – in sharp contrast to the perceived changes on the other side of the volcano. (Atilio Peraza, 
Verapáz, Aug. 1998)  
 
In some areas, repression by the military, and the FMLN to a lesser extent, was capable 
of silencing the clamor for social justice or diverting social energy toward reformist 
alternatives.  In FMLN zones of control, state repression and equally conflictive strategies of 
survival and resistance played a vital role in the empowerment of insurgent communities.  
Miguel Cornejo, an FMLN ex-combatant and cooperative president from Los Almendros, San 
Ildefonso, put it this way: 
 
If there had not been a war, we would not be talking here.  You would be talking with someone else, the 
foreman, the owners,…the colonos were never permitted to talk to outsiders. 
 
 
A woman combatant from Tecoluca described the change not so much in expectations 
realized, but by the assurance of a more hopeful future for the next generation: 
 
 
Before the war, everyone looked out only for themselves.  Now, no. The war has taught us much.  
When we fought in the war, we learned much, in the first place, to share with one another, to live 
together, to suffer together, you see it was something we had to learn I will never forget it.  That is what 
I would like my children to take as an example, for them and other children to take this experience from 
us to advance themselves.  You see, if we suffered it was to learn something.  (Venicia Velásquez, 
FMLN ex-combatant, La Sabana, Tecoluca, April 4, 1998) 
 
 
Another former combatant and community organizer in San Carlos Lempa describes a peasant 
culture that is transformed: 
 
 
I will always struggle so that others will have until God decides to call to heaven or send me hell.  I am 
proud that now they have land, now they are owners of the land, owners of their animals, things that 
before were very difficult.  Before, this here was a hacienda but I had my little plot, my small manzana, 
and this landowner did almost the impossible to buy my land and remove me from there, converting me 
into a colono.  ‘Sell it to me and just be a colono.’  That was then, there were none of the freedoms that 
there are now.  Now, everyone thinks they can work the land and can have their own life.  In the past, 
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no!  Then we worked from 5 in the morning, with a few pieces of tortilla, our tecomate, and the cuma, 
because the only thing that 75% to 80% of the workers had was nothing more than their labor power, to 
go and sell it for a few cents to the patrono.  No one cared about your dreams.  Now, one’s aspirations 
to improve their lives are everyday closer and that is why we fought and well, we have no regrets.  
(Jesus “Chungo” Amaya, San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca, Dec. 11, 1998)  
 
 
 
 Who gets to speak, who gets silenced and under what conditions represent just one 
dimension of the opposing insurgent and counter-insurgent perspectives.  The legacy of 
violence depends upon the way conflict itself factored into these different empowerment 
strategies.  For the FMLN, empowerment was often a zero-sum process and conflict was 
considered a central and necessary strategy for confronting inequality.  For other communities 
that were loyal to the government or neutral, empowerment was presented as a positive-sum 
process in which conflict was considered a cost to be minimized or avoided and inequality 
could be accommodated.   
 
 
 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Studies of political behavior often assume relatively homogenous interests, and thus similar 
obstacles to collective action (Evans 1996: 1127).  The principal goal of this and the previous 
chapter have been to illustrate why this would be a seriously flawed assumption for 
understanding how the civil war has affected the success or failure of post-war development 
strategies.  This narrative of the war in the paracentral zone explicitly challenges the notion of 
uniform interests and expectations by establishing insurgent (challenging) and counter-
insurgent (stabilizing) political experiences of empowerment.  The composite images of the 
three case study communities that represent left, right and middle positions on the revolutionary 
continuum are far from neat and tidy boxes that are clearly distinguishable and that can be 
ordered by some set of criteria.  However, I contend that the outcome of post-war decentralized 
development can be explained in large part by examining any one of these three broad 
historical paths taken to get there.   
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Having arrived after this rather arduous journey through recent Salvadoran history, it is 
incumbent to remind the reader of the dilemma of decentralization and the lexicon of 
empowerment that this narrative has sought to illuminate.  The dilemma is that the 
effectiveness of post-war development, which I contend is heavily oriented by policies of 
decentralization, depends upon the capacity for collective action to challenge local inequality.  
Alternatively, decentralization can be a top-down process that recognizes an imposed 
consensus of self-restraint that in practice emphasizes the expansion of power rather than 
changing distributional imbalances.   
Faced with the circumstances leading up to civil war, Salvadoran peasants had three 
choices: revolution, reform or reactionary defense of the status quo. The path of revolution 
involved a contentious challenge to many aspects of highly unequal pre-war agrarian relations.  
The counter-insurgent path involved a range of efforts to stabilize or to accommodate pre-war 
norms to a shifting opportunity structure.  Individuals and communities made choices prior to 
the civil war to place them on one of these paths. These choices were influenced by changing 
conditions of agrarian inequality, access to dissident or ruling elites and the effect of state 
repression.  Initial choices once made were then reinforced by war-time survival strategies that 
tended to be very different.  Insurgent choices were associated with substantially greater 
bottom-up initiative, and greater dependence on collective action that often encompassed many 
groups within a transnational mobilization network.  Counter-insurgent choices were associated 
with top-down, elite enforced collective action, greater fragmentation among likeminded 
groups, and a higher frequency of individualist action.  The political experiences acquired 
while traveling along these separate paths reveal the elements/foundation of empowerment. 
Who rebelled and why does this matter? The FMLN failed to defeat the Salvadoran 
armed forces militarily and it did not galvanize a sufficiently broad political opposition needed 
to cut the decisive military and electoral support of the U.S.. The FMLN did assemble the most 
formidable guerrilla army in the hemisphere that controlled up to a third of the country and 
forced a much better equipped and larger adversary to concede significant political reforms at 
the negotiating table.  However, only a minority took up arms, perhaps no more than 10% of 
the total Salvadoran population.  Most pursued a somewhat neutral course between the two 
fires, finding refuge perhaps in the cooperative movement or fleeing to the cities or beyond.  
Nevertheless, given the low success rate of attempted peasant revolutions in Latin America, the 
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FMLN demonstrated an unlikely political capacity to sustain recruitment of active and passive 
support as well as transform active opposition into passivity.   
In examining the logic behind insurgent, counter-insurgent and neutral choices, I find 
that beliefs, social networks, organizational capacity, and external factors are not easily 
reconciled by simple or elegant explanations of rebellion.  The evidence presented suggests that 
a combination of principled motivations, material benefits, family networks and fear enabled 
the FMLN to overcome these challenges.  The seminal revolt at La Cayetana shows that the 
protagonists were motivated by an engrained sense of moral commitment to their neighbors 
that is somewhat inexplicable by the operating assumptions about Salvadoran culture, and 
emboldened by an accumulated exposure to liberation theology, opposition political organizers 
and brief, yet effective prior experiences with collective action.   
The unintended outcome of La Cayetana and many other political experiences leading 
to insurgent participation involve networks of reciprocal local social ties that transformed 
repression into deepened solidarity rather than escape. Having achieved a solid footing as an 
opposition movement, the traumatic blow of state repression catapulted some peasant 
movements forward. The absence of these factors that prevented any foundation of collective 
action also explains why potential peasant sympathy toward the FMLN crumbled in San 
Ildefonso after initial hard-line policies toward reform cooperative leaders backfired.  The 
explanation of why state repression succeeded in launching a peasant insurgency in Tecoluca 
but suffocated another in the Jiboa Valley and why FMLN repression snuffed out latent peasant 
sympathies in San Ildefonso forces us to look beyond mere categories of peasant and 
landowner to the timing of these decisive events with respect to elite alliances and the 
formation of internal unity.   
Structure, agency and mobilization networks? The political opportunity structure for 
revolution or counter-revolution, itself the target of strategic innovations of all parties to the 
conflict, provides a thin explanation of the rise and fall of the insurgency.  Structural factors 
explain only how the conflicts might take shape, not how people will react.  There is much 
more to the story.  For those who joined the FMLN, a principled commitment to changing 
agrarian injustice was an overwhelming attitudinal motivation, reinforced by the confidence 
derived from what Wood refers to as iterative collective actions.   Conversely, the incentives 
for counter-insurgent participation rested heavily on individualist material benefits, loyalty to 
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the local elite and fear.  The vast majority of Salvadorans were caught somewhere in between 
these choices.  Repression also factored into choices to take any of these three paths, but was 
probably not as decisive for insurgent choices as some have argued.   
 Rationalist explanations of the same experiences, such as those associated with Collier’s 
greed-driven rebellion theory, would emphasize that all potential peasant collaborators are and 
remain conservative in their choices, not persuaded by change in consciousness, but rather a 
comparison of the net payoff deriving from his/her participation.  Materialist interests (or 
maximized utility) not norms of justice, explained strategic choice regarding whether and how 
to participate.  In turn, the FMLN could only have been motivated by material gains and as the 
Salvadoran right argued, were little different than criminals.  
I find little to support this argument.  The inferior material resources and distinct 
logistical disadvantages of the FMLN forced a greater reliance on principled voluntarism for 
survival, than the counter-insurgent forces that fought for salaries or other selective benefits.  
The FMLN had to rely largely on voluntary recruitment and a limited sanction capacity in order 
to preserve a fragile relationship with their peasant base, the vast majority of whom were only 
passive collaborators.  The Salvadoran armed forces relied more systematically on forced 
recruitment and coercive relations with peasant communities.  FMLN forces and civilian 
supporters, with a few exceptions, shared rather equitably, the duties and hardships of fighting.  
This social gap between civilian, civil defense patroller, soldier and officer in counter-insurgent 
zones tended to remain highly stratified.  
The three paths are also distinguished by their preferred mobilization methods.  Shifts in 
the balance of power among elites, both nationally and regionally, prompted strategic, often 
innovative mobilization tactics by both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces to exploit 
perceived windows for opportunity and to recruit participation in their respective initiatives.  
One such innovation was land reform and related constraints placed on the agrarian oligarchy 
by the Christian Democrats as a safety valve to bleed off the pressure of accumulated rural 
grievances.  Another was the combination of indiscriminate repression and the resurrection of 
municipal authority within civic pacification programs by the Salvadoran military to 
manipulate the perceived costs and benefits of choosing insurgency.  A third innovation was 
the civilian-combatant alliance that was deftly employed by the FMLN to lower the costs of 
insurgent participation by offering a menu of options, to adapt the concept of mass 
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organizations in the context of war, and to inevitably experiment with decentralized self-
governance from which the development NGO eventually emerged.  Each tactical innovation 
was a reaction to competing efforts to pry open or slam shut the political opportunity structure 
for rebellion.    
On one hand, the sheer scope, intensity and duration of the conflict forced the 
protagonist organizations to expand mobilization networks and on the other hand to 
decentralize their insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization strategies.  Both insurgent and 
counter-insurgent networks established sophisticated alliances between peripheral, metropolitan 
and international actors.  However, these networks differed in the level of centralized authority 
over how resources were allocated or the menu of actions that could be taken.  They also 
differed in strength or weakness of within-group ties that resulted from participation, as well as 
range of cross-class ties that each attempted to achieve. 
Both insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies were organized initially 
as hierarchies to overcome collective action problems. The FMLN, the military and 
government reform agencies under Duarte all relied on different mixes of coercion, clientelism 
and voluntarism to mobilize supporters.  However, the reality of vertical and horizontal ties 
between elites and base was substantively different. 
Within areas controlled by the FMLN, despite tremendous hardships, empowerment 
strategies challenged pre-war agrarian relations and eroded the edifice of attitudes, beliefs and 
actions that sustained inequality.  The FMLN ability to tap into and expand a reservoir of 
principled voluntarism among its supporters allowed the empowerment strategy to move over 
time from a “hierarchical” strategy for solving collective action problems to a more social norm 
oriented “community” strategy that prevailed within CEBs and rural unions before the war.  
Within-group ties tended to be strong, although insurgent tactics alienated most prominent 
elites and thus limited the extent of alliances to the working class and marginal elites within the 
country.  Internationally, the FMLN established solid alliances with a grassroots solidarity 
movement and socialist government and party leaders throughout the world. 
In contrast to insurgent areas of control, the relative absence of pre-existing institutions 
or popular disposition to assume the risks of counter-insurgent participation forced the military 
and the government to rely ever more extensively on coercion and selective benefits.  In 
government controlled areas, pre-war agrarian relations were adapted by counter-insurgent 
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empowerment strategies that tended to fluctuate between “hierarchy” and “contract” solutions 
to the collective action problem. In other words, a negotiated participation was attempted 
through policies that targeted the costs and benefits of action or inaction, but state sponsored 
violence insured compliance with any deal.  Although the counter-insurgent mobilization 
network included private sector interests and peasants, the internal cohesion of rural poor 
communities associated with the government was generally less stable than insurgent ones. 
  In areas that were contested by both sides, both empowerment strategies failed to alter 
a resilient preference for the perceived middle road offered by the Christian Democrats.  
However, the inability of the PDC government to implement its proposed agenda weakened its 
ultimate appeal among both rural constituents and the U.S. government.  Even before the U.S. 
switched horses to back ARENA, mobilization networks of communities allied with the 
Christian Democrats tended to be fragmented within the country and within organizations.  The 
PDC failed to divide the progressive business elite from the more intransigent agrarian elite, so 
counted few private sector allies in its coalition.  Finally, the transnational scope of the PDC 
mobilization network was more narrow given its dependence on the U.S..  
Thus a key distinction between these empowerment strategies was that in the FMLN 
experience, the eventual decentralization of power in areas of control provided for greater local 
autonomy, and actions to disrupt and transform pre-war agrarian relations were often 
unplanned and initiated from the bottom-up, while the counter-insurgent empowerment 
strategies aimed at stabilizing agrarian inequality employed by the military and government 
remained a highly contrived, top-down, and imposed delegation of responsibility with little 
transfer of actual power.  In both approaches, space was created for local institutional 
innovations to emerge that set the stage for competing patterns of post-war development. 
Framing: The FMLN framed its struggle with the symbology of social justice, 
emphasizing ideals of equity, mutual respect, human rights, participation, accountability and 
cooperation as the vague socialist principals that would guide the building of a revolutionary 
society.  Among supporters, FMLN combatants were endowed with a “mística” of discipline, 
creativity, intelligence, honesty, and determination in the face of a militarily superior adversary 
and its collaborators.  This image was tarnished by notable errors and internal violence that was 
caused in some part by the vulnerabilities associated with FMLN’s vertical yet decentralized 
decision making structure. The mirror image was used to frame the government and the 
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Salvadoran Armed Forces, with emphasis on impunity and the irrational defense of agrarian 
inequality as a failed development philosophy.  
 The hard-liners on the Salvadoran right asserted the countervailing belief that the 
FMLN were criminals and terrorists who planned to expropriate all private property, outlaw 
religion, enslave children and the elderly.  This anti-communist propaganda, espoused also in 
the conservative church, deeply penetrated popular rural beliefs.  The complementary framing 
of pre-war El Salvador as orderly and progressing when guided by the benevolent elite ethic of 
hard work has found fewer believers among the poor. 
The soft counter-insurgent discourse focused on a populist, gradualist and non-violent 
middle road that rested on a modest reformist agenda that in the end was close to what the 
FMLN had to settle for. 
The battle to frame the insurgent or counter-insurgent actions offered competing cures 
for a sick Salvadoran culture.  The medicine prescribed by the U.S. was northern democracy 
and gradual reforms.  The hard-line right prescribed a heavy dose of repression and a return to 
the pre-1979 agrarian status quo.  The FMLN prescribed a radical redistribution of property 
rights and with it, the reordering of national values toward socialism. 
Summary of case study characteristics:  Individuals and communities associated with 
FMLN control during the war, having chosen insurgent roles, were exposed more 
systematically to an empowerment strategy that contested prevailing inequities during the war.  
It is no small fact that land inequality was transformed in revolutionary strongholds such as 
Tecoluca, redistributing over 50% of total farmland.  With this asset redistribution and the 
traditional authority of the landlords and the National Guard were all challenged and 
transformed, not only by theoretical discussions, but by and practical experiences of collective 
action based on principled equality. Individuals and communities associated with 
government/military control, chose counter-insurgent roles and were also mobilized, but to 
defend a challenge to the status quo.  It is no surprise then that the war effectively redistributed 
no land in places like the Jiboa Valley. Here, traditional authority between peasant and lord was 
left intact.  Finally, a middle category of experience did not formally choose either insurgency 
or counter-insurgency, instead opting for any means of viable neutrality.  In San Ildefonso, 
communities such as these had their hopes raised by the 1980 land reform which loosened the 
yoke of landholder control but failed to organize any viable alternative.  Although this third 
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group may have been mobilized periodically by both the FMLN and GOES forces (what I refer 
to as soft counter-insurgency), they were most clearly exposed to non-contestation strategies of 
neutrality.  I argue that rooted in these types of wartime political experiences, counter-
insurgency roles will tend to be associated with preferences for accommodative empowerment 
by invitation strategies, while insurgent roles will tend to prefer a empowerment through 
conflict strategy.  
When the political war ended in 1992, the experiences that distinguished those 
individuals and communities that rebelled, resisted or stayed neutral would be so profoundly 
rooted that they would shape the expectations and behaviors of a generation of Salvadorans that 
came of age in these years.  For better or worse, these political wartime experiences are the 
decisive attributes of local development in most conflictive rural communities today.
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VI. CHAPTER SIX:  THE POST-WAR POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
DECENTRALIZATION (1992-1998) 
 
 
The political and economic implications of the Peace Accords triggered a profound 
recomposition within the insurgent and counter-insurgent political movements and their 
respective mobilization networks.  No political party or economic interest group was unaffected.  
In tracing these political and economic shifts, I argue that the respective realignment of elites 
within the two contending political movements played out quite differently.  This difference is 
no more visible than in how local actors were included.  The trends in political competition, the 
performance of the economy and the declining importance of the agrarian sector also speak to 
features of empowerment at the societal level in the areas of political stability, accountability and 
equity.   
To end the war, ARENA traded political concessions to the FMLN in return for control 
over the economy.  The economic reform process prioritized a massive redistribution of state 
assets and a shift in investment away from the rural economy.  The declining dependence on the 
agrarian export sector exacerbated political divisions in the ruling party and its rightwing 
coalition, particularly among the disenfranchised landlords that hoped to recover land lost to the 
FMLN.  Modest economic gains, fueled in part by external cooperation and remittances, have 
lowered poverty but the benefits of growth and investment were shared unevenly, reflected by 
the extremely high level of post-war inequality.   The restoration of civil authority over the 
military meant that enforcing the priorities of the party would require a more diverse set of 
collective action strategies.  On both counts, the segment of the Salvadoran oligarchy most 
opposed to democratization was weakened. Decentralization was viewed by ARENA as means 
to both expedite the privatization of the state and to stabilize its ruling coalition through the 
distribution of new selective benefits to ascendant party elites but also to the descendent agrarian 
elite that controlled many rural municipalities by the war’s end.  
The FMLN ceded control of the economy in exchange for political reforms and an 
economic reinsertion package for ex-combatants.  Impressive electoral gains, increasingly 
dependent upon urban mobilization, have secured the FMLN’s place as the principal opposition 
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party, but at the same time have triggered recurrent internal divisions over political strategy.  
Lacking any legislative leverage before 2000 and failing to win the Presidency have severely 
limited the FMLN’s ability to advance alternative economic policies in the post-war period, or to 
offer viable rural development options in particular.  Absent the same normative incentives and 
institutional allies (e.g. the Catholic Church, strong mass organizations) to rally collective action 
by its base as during the war, the FMLN has also had to cede greater autonomy to new local 
actors (NGOs, municipal and community authorities) in order to shore up its own mobilization 
network.  Decentralization and local economic development initiatives have provided the means 
for reinventing the principled incentives for collective action during the war and for channeling 
significant resources to local actors as a platform to mount contentious challenges at the national 
level.   
While both FMLN and ARENA have incorporated local actors into their post-war 
mobilization networks as a way of adapting to shifts in the political opportunity structure, these 
insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies share some similarities but display 
many differences.  Both parties promoted decentralization in response to a transition between 
new and old elites.  However, the shift was largely horizontal for ARENA – transferring control 
from one segment of the oligarchy to another.  For ARENA, the space opened for local actors 
was minimal and contingent – consistent with centuries-old patron-client tradition in El 
Salvador.  For the FMLN, the shift was vertical. Local actors have opened the space for 
themselves in a process that has been both expansive and spontaneous – rupturing in some 
localities the exclusionary pattern of development. 
In this chapter, I step back from the regional analysis to lay out three macro-linkages 
between post-war shifts in the political opportunity structure, decentralization and the respective 
insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies. These linkages are: 1) Decentralization 
began to gain national traction only when the FMLN began to consolidate electoral gains, which 
have improved the accountability of legislative and municipal institutions. Local processes of 
empowerment have continued all along in FMLN areas of influence locally, upon which national 
gains by the FMLN were contingent; 2) Decentralization transferred power to local processes 
embedded within a rural economy in decline, lowering expectations for economic success;  3)  
Inequality, especially land inequality, remains very high nationally although exceptions exist in 
areas of FMLN influence.  Inequality is associated with the highly visible instances of political 
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capture at the national level, primarily as a mechanism to maintain stability within the ruling 
coalition.  Decentralization is not likely to work under these national conditions, except in places 
where the national pattern of inequality has been disrupted. 
The chapter will be organized in two sections.  In first section, I provide an overview of 
the key political and economic shifts in the structure of political opportunity for decentralization 
during the post-war period (1992 forward) - one dominated by ARENA governance at the 
national level but increasingly contested by an opposition FMLN party at both the local level.   I 
focus here on the instability of elite alignments provoked by the Peace Accords, electoral gains 
by the FMLN, the demobilization of key allies such as the Catholic Church and the military, and 
the consequent dispersal or concentration in elite access.  In section two, a summary of available 
data and my own household survey analysis show unequivocally that income and land inequality 
have persisted in the post-war period and the rural livelihoods have declined.  This evidence 
suggests that the capacity for collective action may be more important than ever for post-war 
decentralized rural development.   
 
A.    SHIFTS IN THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: 1992-1998 
 
 
The Peace Accords enshrined an unprecedented democratic bargain in El Salvador.  The FMLN 
traded economic goals of broadly redistributive, socialist state-led development in exchange for 
guaranteed political franchise.  The ruling ARENA leadership conceded monopoly control of 
political power in exchange for political stability and the acceptance of accelerated economic 
liberalization.   The international finance community gained the benefits of regional peace – 
clearing an important obstacle to the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment reforms 
throughout Latin America, in exchange for $1 billion in reconstruction credits and grants.   
ARENA got the better end of the deal, reflected in two decades of uninterrupted control of the 
Presidency.  However, each aspect of the compromise reflects a significant realignment among 
elites within the respective parties to the peace negotiations.   
 With neither side able to win the war militarily and the winds of political change 
foreclosing future patronage, the FMLN and modernizing forces within the government settled 
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for second best outcomes and negotiated to end the war politically.533  The balance of power 
between the FMLN and the ARENA-led Salvadoran government was clearly influenced by 
political swings in the U.S. and Europe, which anticipated the collapse of the Soviet bloc.534  The 
first Bush administration (1988-1992) had signaled its preference for a negotiated resolution to 
the war, suggesting lower future funding.  The decline of socialist bloc in Europe combined with 
the electoral defeat of the Nicaraguan FSLN in 1990, set certain limits to both insurgent and 
counter-insurgent strategies to pursue the war.535  Both shifts signaled political realignments 
among the principal benefactors of the conflict that reshaped the political opportunity for 
negotiated settlement to the civil war. 
The FMLN moved away from a Hierarchy collective action strategy of hegemonic 
insistence on military victory and the establishment of a socialist state to a contract bargaining 
strategy over the rules of post-war political competition.  Socio-economic demands became 
secondary to the re-integration package for FMLN ex-combatants, political reforms and the 
transformation of the security forces.536  ARENA defied the hardliners that had founded the 
party to gamble future political and economic security on the ability to deliver peace with as few 
structural concessions as possible.   Land transfer represented the most contentious economic 
issue separating the two sides and the final agreement left the issue conveniently vague.537  
                                                 
533 The recounting of the peace negotiations here is a synthesis of more detailed accounts, resting on Gibb and 
Smyth (1990), Karl (1992) Stanley (1996), Byrne (1996), Wood (2000), ONUSAL (1995). 
534 Smyth (1992) argues that “the FMLN's transition began as a direct result of changes in the Soviet Union. 
Although by the late 1980s the FMLN was not dependent on the Soviet bloc to continue fighting, the insurgency 
would have needed direct foreign aid if they had ever taken power by force. But as early as 1986, the reform 
government of Mikhail Gorbachev communicated to the FMLN that it favored a negotiated settlement and would 
not finance a new leftist government.” 
535 The fact that the FSLN turned over power without violence allayed fears among some in the Salvadoran private 
sector that negotiations with the FMLN would backslide into political instability. 
536 Gibb and Smyth (1990) The FMLN was formally registered as a legal political party on Dec. 15, 1992 and its 
members elected a 15 member political directorate one week later. 
537 Wood (1995: 46) states that the FMLN agreed to respect existing tenancy in conflictive areas as an interim 
measure during which land would be transferred to ex-combatants and civilian supporters.  However, specifics 
around land redistribution and what constituted “conflicted zones” were left intentionally vague, a problem that 
dramatically delay the land transfer process in the following years. 
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Significant concessions were made on both sides to end the conflict and the final 
agreement reshaped the political opportunity structure for the foreseeable future.538  Both the 
peace agreement itself and the implementation of the reconstruction program for which it called, 
involved both protagonists adapting their wartime empowerment strategies to the more complex 
post-war terrain. 
The Peace Accords comprised a strategic bargain between the elite representatives of the 
revolutionary FMLN and what Wood refers to as the “agrarian-financial-industrial” segment of 
the business community, represented by ARENA.  In return for the extension of political 
franchise to the FMLN, and with it the expansion of democracy, command over the deep 
restructuring of the economy along the lines of the Washington Consensus reforms was ceded to 
ARENA.539  The January 1992 bargain that ended the conflict represented the basis for a 
fundamental reordering of Salvadoran society, both politically and economically.   
Specifically, the FMLN settled for a gradual demobilization of its armed fighters in 
exchange for the disbanding of the National Guard, the civil defense patrols, the National Police 
and the Treasury Police, the regulation of private security forces and for partial control over the 
newly created police force.540 An Ad Hoc Commission of three Salvadoran civilians was charged 
with making recommendations for purging the officer’s corps of the Armed Forces of the worst 
human rights violators. The significance of the elimination of the most notoriously repressive 
elements of the state security forces cannot be understated in the insurgent expectations that post-
war political competition free from violence would inevitably favor them.   
That optimism was tempered by a tenuous period of intermittent political violence during 
the first years of peace. Repression and intimidation associated with right wing parties, 
particularly during electoral campaigns, persisted in stoking a climate of fear that influences rural 
                                                 
538 The FMLN was legalized as a political party, a new police force was established, a human rights ombudsman and 
Supreme Electoral Council were created.  Judicial reforms included the election of the Attorney General.   
539 The government’s economic policies were considered beyond the scope of the Peace Accords.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, structural adjustment began prior to 1989.   A cycle of stabilization – expansion reform policies 
were attempted during the war under IMF and U.S. pressure, although the U.S. grew frustrated with the Christian 
Democrats unwillingness to impose painful austerity reforms.  See Rosa (1993) and Segovia (1995) 
540 Stanley (1995).  The FMLN dropped their demand for the integration of the two armed forces.  A quota of 20% 
each was established for ex-FMLN guerrillas and ex-National Police (after clearance) to join the National Civilian 
Police. 
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voters to continue supporting status quo leaders.541  Threats of post-electoral violence and 
uncertainty over the implementation of the peace accords were deciding factors in the 1994 
electoral outcome – the first in which the FMLN would participate as a legal party.  According to 
Stahler-Sholk, “during the last two months of the campaign, the television airwaves were 
saturated by ads that featured gruesome pictures of wartime destruction warning that a vote for 
the FMLN would mean a return to the past” (Stahler-Sholk 1995).  Polls showed that rural 
voters, which constituted a majority of the electorate, clearly placed threats of political violence 
and law and order above land reform and other economic demands when casting their ballots in 
the 1994 presidential election.   Even some top FMLN officials thought that a victory by their 
party could endanger the country’s stability (Vickers and Spence 1992).  In anticipation of this 
outcome, Wantchekon argues that the FMLN coalition with Christian Democrats and the 
National Revolutionary Movement decided not to run competitively (in the presidential election), 
but instead to favor deal making on key issues such as state building and land reform. 
The threat of violence by ARENA was quite real.  According to one report, “the U.N. 
documented the violent deaths of fifteen (FMLN) candidates and campaign workers in the three 
months prior to the vote. At least 32 FMLN members have been assassinated since the cease fire 
went into effect on February 1, 1992.”  From 1992 to 1994 six top ranked leaders of the FMLN 
were assassinated by right-wing death squads.542  Episodes of vigilante justice also surfaced 
periodically, but most were quickly contained.543  In general, the level of politically motivated 
violence and fear has steadily diminished with the restructuring and downsizing of state security 
forces.   
                                                 
541 Political immunity granted by President Cristiani as a condition for the Peace Accords has prevented any high 
ranking military or political leaders of the right or left from being prosecuted for war crimes.  Roberto D’Aubuisson 
died in 1992 and many of the original death squad leaders have retired to the U.S.  See for example, Phillips (2003). 
542 April 7, 1994 report by the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, CISPES, cited in 
Wantchekon, 1999: 9-10).  At least four ARENA affiliated persons were also killed in the run-up to the 1994 
election. 
543 One such instance was the “sombra negra” (black shadow) that appeared and began executing gang members and 
local thieves in San Miguel in 1995.   Some rural repopulated communities of ex-combatants publicly advertise 
security measures, “thieves will be shot.”  A great deal of attention is placed on been gang retaliation violence, 
which for El Salvador has become a peculiar form of public “lynchings” that have occurred more broadly in other 
countries (Guatemala, Bolivia, Brazil). 
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However, an extremely high rate of post-war homicide rates and criminal victimization 
suggests that violence continues to shape the political opportunity structure – albeit in a manner 
that is different than the past.  Security has now become a non-ideological public good, and an 
organizational priority in many communities.544  The new civilian police force, which was 
constituted from ex-combatant applicants from both sides, ex-national police and new civilian 
trained officers, has often been viewed as too weak in the face of post-war criminal and social 
violence.   The relative incompetence of law enforcement agencies to reduce violent crime has 
permitted “mano dura” policies by ARENA that have had little effect on improving security, but 
has strengthened their political popularity by asserting FMLN association with crime or 
oversimplifying the problem as a gang violence issue.  At the same time, a reduced military 
repressive capacity has enabled the opening of political space for the FMLN to survive and 
expand. 
If the military has ceased to be repressive arm of the ruling elite, the media has 
compensated for this retreat by intensifying a campaign of disinformation and defamation attacks 
against the FMLN.  For the most part, the Salvadoran media has demonstrated a greater 
independence and balance.  However, contentious legislative proposals by FMLN officials or 
sympathetic civil society organizations are still frequently labeled as “communist”, and 
disruptive strategies are painted as extreme social deviance.   Intolerance still permeates much of 
the journalistic discourse.545   
 The two leading newspapers have reduced the steady stream of sensationalist coverage of 
the FMLN, and have offered a more critical view of ARENA and formerly untouchable icons of 
the elite.  Pro-FMLN editorial writers now occupy a token space on the opinion pages.  During 
                                                 
544 Anecdotal evidence of the links between right wing politicians with the largest private security firms, particularly 
among ex-officials of the state security bureaucracy, suggest some continuation of the “protection racket” strategy 
described by Stanley (1995). 
545 Informal remarks and public advertisements during recent campaigns constantly remind any observer of the 
permanent campaign by ARENA hard-line leaders to sew fear among potential FMLN supporters.  The ARENA 
party theme song still literally calls for “burying the reds in their tombs”.  ANEP’s anti-kidnapping ads in 1998 were 
directed exclusively at the FMLN with symbolically infused ads having black and red backgrounds.  Each electoral 
campaign predictably features highly suggestive media coverage that associates FMLN leaders with past 
kidnappings, the “discovery” of clandestine weapons stocks, reckless economic proposals and general authoritarian 
orientations.  The tendency for campaign coverage to foment intolerance for the opposition parties by associating the 
prospect of wider, more effective political participation with the sensationalized threat of socio-political violence, 
lead one of the most widely respected political experts, Hector Dada Hirezi, to label the major media organizations 
as “cloacas,” or sewage drain pipes.  (radio interview, YSUCA, Feb 18, 2000). 
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the recent elections for president and for mayors and congressional deputies, both major 
newspapers have given unprecedented coverage to opposition candidates.  This represents a 
significant advance over the systematic press distortion of both the factual events of the war and 
the censored analysis of the most extreme human rights violations.546   
These improvements aside, during key political moments there occurs an inevitable 
retrogression back to slanted reporting of the past.  In an unexceptional editorial entitled, “We 
Don’t Need That “Participation,” published during the electoral mobilization prior to the 1999 
Presidential campaign, El Salvador’s most conservative newspaper declared, “The experiences of 
the ‘participatory’ model are very negative, beginning with the corporative experiment of the 
Fascists to the Communist soviets that served as the instrument to crush all liberty in the former 
Soviet Union.” 547  
The Communist symbolism never loses significance in demonizing the threat of an 
FMLN victory, embodied as it is by substantial part of its “rank and file [that] continue believing 
in the Soviet Union, in the brotherhood of socialist nations, in the sharing out of riches, in the 
collectivization of the land and in the walls where executions take place as part of “social 
purification.”548   The left leaning Jesuit publication Proceso argues that there is a link between 
this media’s manipulation of fear and its intended effect on citizen participation. “What have not 
entirely disappeared are the subjective imprints of terror on the deepest collective consciousness 
of Salvadorans.  This translates into social paralysis and a reluctance to take risks and commit 
oneself publicly…as a consequence, civil society does not play its proper role in the Salvadoran 
transition.”549 
Crucial to this campaign is the neutralizing of any attribution of discontent to structural 
injustice.  The post-war media have adapted the predominant wartime strategy of the military 
                                                 
546 See Truth Commission Report (1993: 54), Annex II, for a summary of wartime news analysis.  It is also worth 
mentioning that television news coverage has improved largely due to the popularity of progressive TV journalism 
of Mauricio Funes, which until 2004, served as the most watched news commentator of TV12.  Recent kidnapping 
of the owner of TV12, as well as Funes own political missteps, have played a hand in the firing of Funes by the 
Mexican owners of TV12. 
547 El Diario de Hoy, Jan. 21, 1999   
548 El Diario de Hoy, March 14, 2000, as cited in Proceso, March 22, 2000.   
549 Proceso, 767, July 23, 1997. 
  397
press relations agency, characterized in news analysis that was published in the late 1980s. “The 
growing misery is attributed more today to the war than to structural injustice, and the war is 
attributed more to the FMLN than to the armed forces or to the United States.  Rational analysis 
of the war, of its causes and effects, shows the enormous responsibility of the business class, the 
international economic order, U.S. interests, etc.  But the emotional impact, orchestrated by the 
major media, shows sabotage, social disorder and other actions attributed to the FMLN as the 
principal causes of the growing misery.”550  Operating on these same principles, the Salvadoran 
media have played an active role in campaigns to frighten would be FMLN voters into 
quiescence.551   
Typically uncontested by alternative political information, such campaigns are often 
effective in neutralizing the undecided.  The Catholic Church represented one alternative 
information source that was crucial to the success of opposition movements in the past.  In the 
post-war period, the appointment by the Vatican of a conservative archbishop in 1995, Cardinal 
Francisco Saenz Lacalle, has effectively neutralized the institutional Catholic Church as a 
catalyst for social mobilization.  The remnants of the popular church that survived the targeted 
violence of the war, have continued in the liberation theology tradition at the margins of an 
institution that now sides unabashedly with ARENA.552  The effect has been to diminish and 
concentrate the elite linkages between clergy, catequists, lay workers within those regions that 
were historically associated with this tradition in the 1970s – most of which are also zones of 
FMLN governance at the local level.  In contrast, the influence of the Catholic institutional 
networks, particularly among the more conservative seminarians serving in rural areas, has 
reverted back to strictly sacramental priorities that provide silent endorsement of executive 
                                                 
550 “Editorial: Recrudecimiento de la violencia en El Salvador,” Estudios Centroamericanos 480 (Oct. 1988), 874-
876. 
551 In the 2004 U.S. Presidential campaign, ARENA television ads fed the rumor that the US would expel the two 
million Salvadorans living in (and remit nearly 15% of the Salvadoran GDP) if the FMLN won. The TV ad showed 
a woman opening an envelope from the USA and reading a letter from her son, “Sorry mom, if the FMLN wins, this 
will be your last money coming from the USA.”  
552 The same is true for the respective elements of the Lutheran, Baptist and Episcopal churches that were and 
continue to identify with contentious  issues of human liberation 
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prerogative on most policy matters.  The proliferation of evangelical churches has only 
reinforced a religious preference for spiritual fervor and political acquiescence.553   
Against these considerable odds, the FMLN has struggled to consolidate itself politically.  
In the 1994 elections, ARENA candidate, Armando Calderón Sol defeated FMLN coalition 
candidate Ruben Zamora, winning 49% of the national vote (650,000 votes), 39 of the 84 seats in 
the national assembly and 211 of the 262 municipal governments (50 more than 1991). The 
FMLN coalition received 25% of the presidential vote (331,000 votes), winning 21 seats in the 
assembly, and only 15 municipal governments.554  The Christian Democrats and PCN won 
16.2% and 5.4% of the vote, respectively.  Although the FMLN only contested 206 
municipalities, the left suffered an undeniable defeat.   If the FMLN and CD had run in coalition 
in all municipalities, they would have won between 50 and 60 (See Tables G.1 – G.6 in 
Appendix for summary of municipal and legislative election results from 1994-2003) (Lungo 
1995: 33; Montgomery 1995: 265). 
 The FMLN quickly faced internal divisions, as the unity that permitted unprecedented 
levels of coordinated political-military action during the war came unglued.  The RN and ERP, 
the two least ideologically bound factions of the FMLN during the war, distanced themselves 
from the positions of principled opposition adopted toward ARENA and the Salvadoran private 
sector.  The ERP formally declared itself a social democratic party in early 1994 and after a 
series of disputes, withdrew from FMLN along with the RN later that year to form the 
Democratic Party (PD).  The PD then shocked many by breaking party unity to vote for an 
ARENA candidate for Assembly President, in exchange for a PD slot as Assembly Board Vice-
President.  Several months later, the PD then signed the San Andrés Pact, a deal which obliged 
little by the government but delivered the crucial PD votes to pass an increase in the value added 
                                                 
553 Estimates of the evangelical share of the spiritual market vary widely depending on the source (between 5-20% 
of the total population).  Worth noting are two attempts by evangelical movements to spawn political parties for the 
1994 elections, but have since disappeared. 
554 The March 1994 “elections of the century: were the first in El Salvador’s history where a full range of political 
parties participated legally, although serious registration anomalies cost the FMLN as many as 200,000 votes 
(Spence, Dye and Vickers, 1994).  ARENA won 68.4% of the second round runoff vote.  Elections for president, 
deputies and mayors all coincided in 1994.  Presidents are elected by a majority runoff system.  A second round is 
required for the two top candidates if a simple majority is not reached by anyone in the first round.   
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tax from 10% to 13%.555  In reaction to expulsion from the FMLN, the ERP and RN responded, 
"We reject the contentious and anti-system attitudes that calm ideological consciences but do not 
produce concrete results for the people and create a bellicose and confrontational impression that 
alienates us from a large portion of the population."556 
Whether this split between the “pragmatists” and the rest of the FMLN  reflected past 
rivalry for FMLN hegemony or authentic political differences, it cost the FMLN seven 
legislative seats after the 1994 elections.  The split also forced the FMLN to dissolve its previous 
federated arrangement (where each of the five parties had one vote), legalizing a single party 
where former organizational attributions were formally ended and the political commission was 
expanded to 15 allegedly non-partisan representatives as the highest decision making 
authority.557 
  As they did many times in war, the FMLN rebounded in the 1997 elections, winning in 
54 municipalities, including the capital, 7 of the 11 municipalities of San Salvador Metropolitan 
Area (AMSS) and 6 of 14 departmental capitals.558  After 1997 elections, the FMLN now 
governed a majority of the national population at the local level.  In the national assembly, the 
FMLN won a total of 27 legislative seats – one less than ARENA.  The significance of this gain 
is underscored given the FMLN total had been reduced to 14 seats.  Five smaller parties, 
including the PD, divided up 11 uncommitted seats.  At both the municipal and legislative levels, 
the correlation of political power had fundamentally changed. 
                                                 
555 The San Andrés Pact was signed on May 31, 1995, brokered by ex-ERP commander, Joaquin Villalobos.  
Legislative opposition by the PCN initially prevented the bill’s approval ARENA negotiated the PD votes allegedly 
after winning several modest concessions (reducing the VAT rate increase from 14 to 13% and earmarking the 
revenue for fulfilling the expenditure targets of the Peace Accords).  A USAID official argued that municipal 
transfers were to be funded in part by this VAT increase despite the delay by over two years, which is plausible 
since this transfer was eventually funded from the national budget although without earmarks. 
556 NotiSur, May 20, 1994  http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/news/notisur/h94/notisur.19940520.html, accessed November 2005. 
557 Representatives of all five FMLN parties remained, although the FPL retained a de facto majority.  Spence, 
Vickers and Dye (1994a: 26-27). 
558 Of the 54 municipalities won by the FMLN, 6 were in coalition with smaller parties.  The AMSS is the most 
densely populated region of the country, accounting for nearly a third of the national population. 
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Electoral gains after 2000 established the FMLN as the second political force in the 
country, governing in 79 municipalities, including the capital city of San Salvador.559  More 
importantly, the FMLN increased their seats in the National Assembly to 31 in 2000, eliminating 
ARENA’s legislative working majority.  The 1997 elections were the tipping point that greatly 
enhanced the FMLN’s legislative bargaining capacity and dramatically raised their visibility as 
mayors and councils in some of the largest municipalities.   
In the paracentral region, towns governed by FMLN mayors and councils increased from 
just two in 1994, the first elections in which the FMLN competed officially as a legal party, to 15 
in 2000, including the departmental capital of La Paz, Zacatecoluca.560   FMLN post-war 
governance at the municipal level has grown steadily in the region, as fears instilled by ARENA 
propaganda diminished and responsive local rule reflected the deeply rooted support among the 
local peasant population.  As shown in Figure 6.1, political competition in the paracentral region 
has featured the decline of the PDC and ARENA offset by the advance of the FMLN and the 
PCN.  FMLN electoral support is based in ex-conflictive zones in northern and southern San 
Vicente, with moderate but growing support in Usulután and persistently low support in La Paz 
(the latter in spite of winning the densely populated departmental capital since 1997).  
                                                 
559 El Salvador has a unicameral legislature with 7 parties competing for 84 seats.  20 deputies have until recently 
been elected by proportional representation in a national vote, and 64 deputies were elected by multiseat 
departmental districts.  In the 2006 elections all 84 seats will for the first time be distributed in multiseat 
departmental districts.  Since 2003, an additional seven elected deputies and five mayors, including the mayor of 
San Salvador, have split from the FMLN to form a competing left party. 
560 The FMLN have governed 6 of 13 municipalities in San Vicente since 1997, and 8 of 23 municipalities in 
Usulután since 2000.  Yet, the FMLN has only won in 1 of 23 towns in La Paz, the largest municipality of 
Zacatecoluca.  The March 2000 municipal and deputy election results stand in stark contrast to presidential elections 
the year before, in which FMLN won less than 30% of the vote to ARENA’s 54% precluding even a second round.  
Rather than a turnaround for the FMLN, it was the type of election that mattered.  The FMLN has more credibility in 
local rule than at the national level. 
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Opposition mobilization networks could now consider legislative strategies that had to 
transcend obstructionist tactics and contend with the challenges of advancing alternative policy 
proposals.  The capacity to propose development alternatives to the dominant neoliberal reform 
agenda has proven a much more difficult task for opposition deputies, mayors and NGO leaders.  
In part due to the inexperience in proposing viable economic alternatives, despite this impressive 
advance, the FMLN has failed to even force a second round runoff in Presidential races since 
1994.    
Lacking a simple majority in the legislature, the FMLN has rarely been able to form 
stable majority coalitions necessary to advance its own post-war economic agenda in the national 
assembly.561  Instead, the opposition has settled for attempting to slow ARENA’s reform agenda 
by blocking legislative votes that require a two-thirds majority.  Legislative approval of new 
public debt and international treaties (including the ratification or amendment of international 
loans) requires a two thirds majority (56 of 84 votes), constitutional reforms require a three-
fourths majority – votes that the FMLN could and did block in coalition with smaller parties and 
after 2000, independently.  By 2000, 50% of the IDB approved loans were delayed by failure to 
win ratification in the Assembly.562  This change in the correlation of political force opened new 
space for advancing an alternative agenda.  Of the most significant victories was an increase in 
the municipal share of the national budget from 1% to 6% in late 1997.   
Where legislative tactics have failed, organizations associated with the FMLN have 
resorted to challenging the policies of ARENA (and defending perceived social, economic and 
cultural rights) through social mobilization. Although used sparingly in the early years of the 
peace process, FMLN groups increasingly resorted to property occupations, marches, strikes, and 
                                                 
561 One indicator of both the FMLN legislative power after 1997 and the ARENA capacity to block opposition 
initiatives was the record number of Presidential vetos (41) exercised by President Francisco Flores (1999-2004), 
compared to just 4 by Calderon Sól, 1 by President Cristiani, and 20 by President Duarte.  Of the PDC vetos, 18 
came in the 1989, when the PDC lost control of the Congress to ARENA. 
562 Following the 2001 earthquakes, agreement between ARENA and FMLN to redirect some lending to the most 
damaged areas allowed the ratification of four of these loans, leaving five operations totaling $190 million awaiting 
ratification. 
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public demonstrations to advocate various reforms or shift the balance in local disputes.563  
These contentious methods honed during decades of popular protest have been employed with 
limited success during the negotiation of peace and then in the post-war implementation of the 
Peace Accords.564  During the implementation of the PRN, the FMLN combatants and allied 
organizations used pressure to expand the scope, democratize the decision making process and 
increase funding commitments.  However, considerable concessions were made in the areas of 
land and reintegration benefits.   
 In effect, the social forces associated with the FMLN have pursued an empowerment 
though conflict strategy to consolidate and build upon the political gains achieved through the 
Peace Accords. 
The mixed electoral performance of the FMLN (rapid gains at the local and legislative 
levels but ever more resounding defeats in Presidential races) has been one factor contributing to 
deeper polarization within the party.  The relative success at the municipal level reinforced the 
party’s prioritization of decentralization to shift greater economic and political resources to this 
new and growing segment of the party leadership.  The FMLN also encouraged considerable 
autonomy at the local levels in the pursuit of locally defined goals and to negotiate with a wider 
cross-section of interests.565  As such, the means of ascent within the party and points of access 
for the base multiplied rapidly as the FMLN governance expanded at the local and legislative 
level.  Municipal conventions and primaries assumed increasing importance in selecting 
candidates and deliberating on party statute reform proposals.  Leaders rising from the local 
governance tiers of the FMLN or social movement organizations associated with the left brought 
direct governance experience or project execution experience in the NGO sector and have tended 
to appreciate the costs and benefits of building consensus among a diverse set of interests.  Local 
leaders also are more in touch with the unmet economic needs of the party’s base, despite the 
                                                 
563 Disruptive tactics were used somewhat less by the FMLN leading up to the 1994 election, due to at least three 
factors.   Divisions between the ERP and other FMLN parties prevented unity on political strategy.  FMLN NGOs 
were much better prepared to advocate and channel services to FMLN demobilized combatants compared to the 
Armed Forces.  Finally, some FMLN leaders were wary that mass mobilization would be perceived as a threat to the 
peace process and hurt the party’s electoral chances. 
564 See Wood (2000), chapter 4 and (2003) for an analysis of actions taken by FMLN groups in Usulután. 
565 One indicator of this is the variation in party alliances for municipal elections.  In the 2000 municipal elections, 
85,000 votes (25% more than single party FMLN candidates) were gained through various coalitions. 
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transfer of land.  Some of these same FMLN leaders that have ascended through the ranks to 
Congressional deputy or the party’s political commission, have been the ones calling for greater 
compromise in the party’s political strategy and more flexible criteria in the choice of alliances 
and Presidential candidates.   
Leaders associated with a self-described “revolutionary socialist” tendency within the 
national party decision making structure have hardened their non-negotiable positions and tended 
to operate on the basis of what one analyst has characterized as “a messianic belief in its 
electoral invincibility, convinced ARENA could win only if the election were stolen” (David 
Holiday (2004: 5).  Political strategy has increasingly focused on elections and the geographical 
target area has narrowed around the metropolitan San Salvador area, where over 50% of FMLN 
votes come from the 10 largest municipalities.  Running the late former Communist party chief 
Shafick Handal as a Presidential candidate in 2004 reflected the revolutionary socialist faction 
control within the party.  Although the FMLN raised their vote total to over 900,000 (an 
impressive 50% increase), Handal lost in the first round by 22 percentage points.   
Persistent divisions between competing factions of the party have fractured the internal 
party cohesion.  The moderate faction gained control of the party temporarily in 1997, which 
quickly reverted back to the “revolutionary socialist” leadership after the 1999 Presidential 
election loss.566    Nevertheless, the struggle within the FMLN is to a great degree a vertical 
transition between ascending local political elites and many among the historical vanguard of the 
FMLN during the war and is striking in its contrast with the political competition within the 
ruling coalition.   
By the end of the current term (2009), ARENA will have controlled the executive branch 
of government for two decades, an unmatched record among Latin America’s modern rightwing 
parties.  Since the 2003 election, seven FMLN Congressional deputies, including the former 
Tecoluca mayor and recently elected Congressional deputy, Nicolás García and two popular 
sitting mayors of San Salvador elected behind an FMLN coalition, have broken with the party 
and formed the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), yet another opposition splinter party.567    
                                                 
566 The moderates are also referred to as “reformadores,” revisionists, or social democrats. 
567 Estimates of factional affiliation vary, but the moderate faction within the FMLN claims up to 40% support 
within the party. Since 1994, 20 active Congressional deputies have broken with the FMLN.  Despite this apparent 
level of dissent within the FMLN, 50 representatives of the orthodox wing of the party were elected to the 55 
member national council in a questionable vote at the November 2004 General Assembly.  Similar doubts have also 
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An FMLN plurality in the National Assembly has contributed to a qualitative 
improvement in the oversight and deliberative function of the Assembly, and by most accounts, 
FMLN municipal councils have set new standards for transparent local governance.  Yet, 
electoral advances by the FMLN have come at the expense of lower voter turnout.568  The 
intractable political stalemate with ARENA has taken its toll on overall support for these 
political institutions and democracy in general.569 
Although ARENA defeated the Christian Democrats in the 1989 with only 16.1% of the 
eligible electorate (23% of the registered electorate), it had become the leading political force in 
the country, accelerating PDC’s downward trajectory to a minor party status by 1999.570  By the 
late 1980s, the PDC was weakened by infighting and widely discredited for its corruption and 
inability to halt either the war or the economic decline.  For its hesitation to impose painful 
adjustment policies, the PDC increasingly lost U.S. support.  The collapse of the PDC after 
Duarte’s death in February, 1990 revealed the party’s dependence on its principal leader and to 
the extent that the Christian Democrats ever represented a political center, the polarization of 
Salvadoran politics.  Since 1985, no political movement has come close to representing a centrist 
alternative.571  The 1991 Parliamentary and local elections, although replete with fraud, 
preserved ARENA’s control over the Assembly and over 200 town halls.572   
                                                                                                                                                             
been raised about the veracity of the July 2003 primary election that nominated Handal as Presidential candidate by 
a small margin in a vote with less than 40% of the FMLN delegates participating. 
568 Turnout in municipal and congressional elections dropped from 53.4% in 1994, to 39.1% in 1997, 38.7% in 
2000, and 40.5% in 2003, before jumping to a record 70% in 2004.  Estudios Centroamericanos  (2003) Vol. 653-
654, pg. 187. 
569 Surveyed Latin American attitudes toward democracy and legislative institutions have plummeted in recent 
years, but El Salvador ranks close to the bottom (Cruz, 2001).   
570 The PDC won 16% of the vote in 1994, 9% in 1997, and barely avoided extinction in 1999 with 4%. 
571 According to Latinobarometer (2001) and Lagos (2001), El Salvador ranks third from last in terms of the 
surveyed population identifying with the center range on an ideological scale, just above Honduras and Costa Rica.  
A 2003 UCA IUDOP survey on reported ideology presents a somewhat less polarized, center -right estimate of a 6.4 
population average on a 1-10 scale with 10 representing the right.  See Carey (2003: 2) for noted biases in the survey 
methodology. 
572 ARENA won 30 of the 60 Assembly seats in 1988, compared to the PDC’s 22 and PCN’s 7.  In 1991, ARENA 
won 39 of 84, but preserved a working majority in alliance with the PCN’s control of 9 seats.  The PDC maintained 
26 seats, and the newly formed center-left Democratic Convergence won a surprising 8 seats. Eguizábal (1992) 
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A possible coalition between the pragmatic tendency of the FMLN and the PDC in 1994 
never congealed and the Christian Democrats finished a distant third.  A party that won almost 
600,000 votes in 1982 saw it’s total drop below 100,000 by the late 1990s.  After the 1994 
elections, the Christian Democrats split, losing ten seats from their original 18.  The descent of 
the PDC eliminated its mobilization capacity and reduced its leverage to coalition votes in the 
Assembly and a few large municipal governments.  Some of the labor and peasant gremios 
historically loyal to Duarte looked to the FMLN.  Other PDC gremios, such as the 
Confederación Nacional Campesino led by Orlando Arevalo, jumped to ARENA.   
The Cristiani administration surprised many by weathering the 1989 FMLN offensive, 
stiff opposition to peace concessions by hardliners on the right, and the trigger to internal 
divisions caused by the death of ARENA’s founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson, in 1992 to cancer.  
ARENA has continued to mobilize the resources of the country’s wealthiest citizens, but has also 
found a deep loyalty among a wide cross-section of the urban business sector and a conservative 
segment of the poor and rural population.  Like the FMLN, the mobilization network of ARENA 
extends from rural hamlets in the periphery to most urban centers.   
Since ARENA decided to broaden the party base after losing the 1984 election, two 
factions have contested for party dominance – the agrarian export elite with ties to the most 
conservative tendency of the military and the politically moderate financial and industrial elite, 
more concerned with economic and political modernization.  Wood (2000) shows how the 
eventual willingness of ARENA to compromise in signing the peace accords with the FMLN 
was the product of an insurgency induced restructuring of elite economic, and in turn, political 
interests within the party.573  According to Wood and others, the civil war transformed the 
economy from one that had previously depended almost exclusively on export agriculture that 
rested on economic and political coercion to one increasingly dominated by an urban commercial 
sector fueled by remittances and the hidden hand of  market forces rather than military repression 
to extract rents.  The result was a shift in elite power within the Salvadoran oligarchy toward 
those groups capable of diversifying away from export agriculture.    Cristiani’s Presidency  and 
the post 1994 composition of the party’s executive council (COENA) represented the ascent of 
                                                 
573 Wood points to the decline in agricultural investment, particularly in coffee, compared to the surge in the 
commercial sector.  She attributes these shifts to the combined destruction and restructuring of rural property rights 
caused by the FMLN, the effect of international migration, as well as the anti-agrarian macroeconomic policies by 
the PDC government.  See also Johnson (1993), Paige (1993 and 1997), and Stanley (1996).    
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the modernizing elite faction within ARENA, although political concessions to the agrarian 
conservatives were needed maintain party unity.574   
Wood provides a compelling explanation of how this insurgency induced a political shift 
within the Salvadoran oligarchy, which mirrored the economic transformation of the economy, 
made compromise possible. “With the eclipse of labor-repressive agriculture as the core interest 
of economic elites, neither the political nor the economic compromises made in the peace 
agreement – the FMLN’s participation in elections, the disbanding of the army, or the transfer of 
land to former combatants and FMLN civilian supporters – would pose a significant threat to 
postwar elite interests” Wood 2000: 76).   
The competition within ARENA between elite factions became more acute with each 
Presidential succession, when in April and May following an election when the spoils of the state 
are redistributed.  While modernizing elites were appointed to head the key finance, economy 
and planning Ministries in the government of Cristiani’s successor, Armando Calderon Sol, 
several ARENA hardliners gained important positions. Despite winning the 1994 elections by a 
wide margin, Calderon Sol faced a tremendous criticism from the extreme right – in part a 
backlash against political moderation and the perceived interference by the U.N. and other 
outsiders.575  An indication that Calderón Sol was less apt at holding party factions together was 
the “catastrophic” 1997 elections.  Delinked from a Presidential election, a lower turnout favored 
the FMLN, which increased its share of the vote to 33% (the total number of votes increased by 
90,000).  ARENA lost over 200,000 votes and its vote share dropped to 37%.   
In part fueled by resentment with the economic downturn in 1996, ARENA’s base failed 
to turn out in the San Salvador and secondary cities, allowing the FMLN to win the capital and 
eight other medium sized metropolitan municipalities.  However, the government’s inability to 
assuage unsatisfied agrarian elites cost the party lost as many as 10 legislative seats where 
                                                 
574 Paige (1997), Murray (1995:9-15).  The 1991 bank privatization, in which Cristiani himself is widely considered 
to have profited personally, was rigged to benefit ARENA loyalists in both factions.  Roberto Angulo, for example, 
patron of the landowning family that dominated San Vicente, was handed the leadership of the National Assembly.  
575 Four modernizing faction Ministers were forced to resign in the first months of the Calderon Sol Presidency.  
Representatives of the agrarian elite within ARENA included Roberto Angulo (Minister of Interior), Alvarez, 
Minister of Agriculture, and Juan Domenech (ANTEL, then President of the National Assembly), Raúl García Prieto 
(BFA). Perhaps most visible during 1995 was the campaign by Kirio Waldo Salgado, Diario de Hoy columnist 
representing the extreme right, in a campaign of attacks against the corruption associated with Calderon Sol that 
resulted in the resignation of several cabinet ministers and a general sense of paralysis in the government’s policy 
agenda.  See Spence, Vickers & Dye (1995: 23-25). 
  408
ARENA representatives, including Francisco Merino – the ARENA vice-president under 
Cristiani, switched to the PCN.  The PCN, which has historically represented the interests of the 
military has clearly been the second principal beneficiary of voter discontent with ARENA, 
doubling its vote share between 1994 and 2003.  More importantly, the PCN increased its 
number of deputies from 4 to 16 in 2003.  At the local level, ARENA has seen its influence wane 
from 206 municipalities in 1994 to only 111 in 2003.  Again, the PCN has been the primary 
beneficiary as many local ARENERO candidates have defected to the PCN and boosted its 
number of mayors from 9 in 1994 to 53 in 2003.576  Of the 245 PCN candidates for mayor in 
2003, 44 were ex-ARENEROs, or 18%, and 19 were mayors for the ruling party during the 
1997-2000 period. Ten had leadership responsibilities within the party and another 15 were 
councilpersons in ARENA municipalities or prior ARENA candidates.577   
This instability within the ruling party suggests that ARENA has struggled to manage its 
own modernizing transition.578  Cristiani was appointed to head COENA in 1997 and tilted the 
committees balance heavily in favor of party’s modernizing elite.579  Although the PCN may 
increasingly be harvesting the discontent within ARENA and toward the ruling party among the 
electorate, on most substantive policy issues there is little difference between the two parties.  A 
recent UCA-IUDOP survey asked voters to locate their preferred party on an ideological scale.  
Supporters ranked the PCN and ARENA at 7.7 and 8.7, respectively, on a 1-10 scale.580  Elected 
mayors and deputies that have switched to the PCN have often done so to protest the distribution 
                                                 
576 The PCN, like the PDC before it, benefits from political system that rewards the top three parties in the 
distribution of Congressional seats.  In 2000, the PCN won 19% of the Congressional seats (16) despite only 
winning 13% of the vote.  With the elimination of 20 national proportional representation slate in 2006, the PCN 
vote and share of legislative seats fell to 10 seats while ARENA’s share rose. 
577 La Prensa Gráfica, Jan 18, 2003. 
578 A similar shakeup occurred between 1999 and 2000, when Francisco Flores won the Presidency, but lost his 
working majority in the Assembly to the FMLN the following year after high profile elites within the party jumped 
to the PCN.  Although Cristiani was forced to resign as head of the party, his successor, Walter Araujo, maintained 
close ties with the ex-President and the balance within COENA has continued to favor the industrial-financial elite.  
579 Artiga-González  (2003: 189-191).  Since 1997, the business technocrats identified with the Flores administration 
have been the majority within COENA, despite constant finger pointing and apparent reshuffling between agrarian 
hardliners that line up behind ex-President Calderon Sol and modernizers that line up behind Cristiani.  Both groups 
blamed Flores for the 2003 elections. 
580 IUDOP (2003) San Salvador.  FMLN supporters gave their party a 2.6, CDU – 4.9, and PDC – 6.4.  
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of patronage in ARENA controlled governments or exclusion from COENA managed decision 
making processes.  Artiga-Gonzalez points out that in contrast to steady FMLN gains and 
ARENA losses in each department since 1994, the PCN voter base is “volatile, unstable and 
subject to conjunctural swings.”581  In the three legislative elections between 1994 and 2000, 
PCN support rose then fell or vice versa in 9 of 14 Salvadoran departments, and in only 5 were 
steady increases observed.582  The ARENA-PCN bargaining is another aspect of the horizontal 
shift within the counter-insurgent mobilization network. 
Despite these mounting political divisions and the erosion of support at the local and 
legislative levels, ARENA has managed to consolidate its control over the executive.  In turn, 
ARENA Presidents have enjoyed solid support from the national business elite and the IFIs, 
permitting relative freedom to accelerate the implementation of economic stabilization 
reforms.583  Consistent with the stabilizing counter-insurgency framework adopted during war, 
the Cristiani government brokered a conception of post-war reconstruction as primarily a 
technical problem rather than a political one.584  This conception of reconstruction insulated the 
core structural adjustment reforms (privatization and decentralization of the state, trade and 
exchange rate liberalization, tax reform) from other central issues of the Peace Accords: (titling 
of land, infrastructure reconstruction, re-integration assistance for of ex-combatants).585  The 
roles assigned to local actors reflected the ARENA government view that the reconstruction plan 
was a project to be designed by hand picked professionals and executed by beneficiaries.  
                                                 
581 Estudios Centroamericanos (March 2000) Vol. 617, pg. 279.  Factors that determine PCN support can include 
confidence among right wing pressure groups, such as the ex-civil patrollers or transport business owners, that 
ARENA will best represent their demands, as well as personal disputes that lead to both defections and reintegration 
of mayors and deputies. 
582 A similar pattern was observed in the municipal vote in department capital cities. 
583 The World Bank resumed formal lending to El Salvador with the approval of the first structural adjustment loan 
to El Salvador in 1991.  The IDB also stepped up adjustment lending in the early 1990s.  Together, these multilateral  
banks gradually substituted for USAID in supervising the reform of the Salvadoran economy (Segovia, 1995, ch.4) 
584 The technical approach, of course, omitted important domains of the Peace Accords, such as prosecuting human 
rights violators identified by the Truth Commission, negotiating the political economic model to be pursued, and 
reforms to the electoral system, among others. 
585 Privatization included banks, telecommunications, energy distribution and production, as well as various state 
agricultural agencies IRA, pension funds.  In 2000, El Salvador converted its currency to the U.S. dollar.  The 
Heritage Foundation ranked El Salvador as one of the “freest” economies in the world and the top Latin American 
reformer.   
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Decentralization was part of the design of reconstruction, yet the top-down implementation 
belied any stated interest in this reform and funding flows to municipalities were only intended 
to meet emergency needs and mollify the discontent of local elites. 
In effect, ARENA pursued an empowerment by invitation approach to post-war 
reconstruction, where participation was strictly limited to the execution of economic policies that 
were negotiated only with the IMF and multilateral lenders, and thus uncontestable by the public.   
Consent regarding the equity of these policies was presumptively based on the capacity to 
maintain political stability.   
The performance of the post-war Salvadoran economy under ARENA rule is best viewed 
by comparing the first and second halves of the past decade.  In the first half (1992-1996) $3 
billion in funding for the National Plan for Reconstruction flowed into El Salvador, jumpstarting 
the country’s economic growth to an average rate of 6%.586  Trade liberalization helped diversify 
exports away from coffee, sugar and beef with an expansion of the maquila sector in peri-urban 
areas.587  Access to basic services improved, boosting education and health indicators, although 
social spending remains well below levels required to develop a competitive labor force.588 
A decade into the post-war period, significant gains had been made in reducing income 
poverty.  However, a slowdown in that rate of poverty reduction by the mid 1990s and the poorly 
understood impact of remittances in this reduction have fed the perception that the benefits of the 
economic reforms had been oversold and unevenly distributed.589   With a current growth rate of 
2-3% growth, El Salvador is not likely to recover its 1978 per capita income level until 2015.  
                                                 
586 El Salvador also renegotiated $136 million of its external debt with the Paris Club, and in 1992 the United States 
cancelled 75% of its concessional debt ($436 million).   
587 Coffee, sugar and fish products represented 44% of all Salvadoran exports between 1994-1999, but dropped to 
24% between 2000-2004.  The fall in the price of coffee was responsible for more than 50% of this shift, according 
to the SIECA Trade Database (2005), which adjusts total export value by including only the net value added of 
maquila exports. 
588 UNDP (2003: ch.3  point to lower chronic malnutrition in children below five years of age (measured in terms of 
height and weight malnutrition with respect to weight declined from 31.7% to 18.9%, San Vicente 1998, estimate of 
27.1%  and with respect to height declined 16.1% to 10.3%.  The San Vicente 1998 estimate is 15.6% During the 
same period, infant mortality (less than 5 years) also declined from 60 per 1000 to 39.   
589 McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) argue that there is a widespread perception, even among observers 
sympathetic to privatization, that privatization has had negative effects on wealth distribution. Birdsall and Nellis 
(2002) conclude that most privatization programs have, at least in the short run, worsened the distribution of assets 
and incomes.  
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The economy slowed due to a reduction in aid flows, the effects of the global financial 
crisis (1997) and several external shocks.  Despite deep reforms, the Salvadoran economy has 
managed only 2.8% growth since 1997, and with the exception of the 1998 windfall of 
privatization driven foreign investment (6.8% of GDP in 1998 compared to 1-2% on average), 
has failed to attract the expected flows of external investment.  Despite the huge peace dividend 
in the form of oligopolistic rents, high profitability in some sectors and massive external 
subsidies during the first half of the 1990s, domestic savings and investment levels remain 
low.590  Growth in total factor productivity, which reversed a thirty year decline briefly between 
1990-1995, turned negative again in the second half of the decade, indicating that reforms had 
failed to sustain efficiency gains.591  Trade diversified away from primary agricultural 
commodities and increased, however an overvalued exchange rate led to imports outpacing 
exports and a steadily increasing the trade deficit.   The Salvadoran private sector has not moved 
beyond a maquila sector that is increasingly obsolete in the face of more competitive global 
production.   The lack of sufficient competition and risk adversity among the Salvadoran private 
sector has received increasing attention as factors behind the weak dynamism to the Salvadoran 
economy (Segovia 1995, Chapter 4; Rodrik 2003).   
In terms of social sector gains, despite El Salvador’s much heralded education reform, the 
country still lags in most indicators.592  Despite high profile investments in education 
decentralization, school achievements levels increased by only 1 year on average (from 4.4 years 
to 5.5 years) between 1992 and 2002, still almost two years behind East Asia.  Over a third of the 
population lacks adequate housing.593  Another factor that has heavily influenced the post-war 
                                                 
590 Harberger (1993) reports that outside of agriculture, real annual profit rates were 20-30%.  Gross domestic 
savings and gross national savings as a percent of GDP averaged about 3% and 16.1% from 1990-1995, 
respectively, compared to 37% and 36% in East Asia.  Savings and investment have declined from their high points 
in 1995. World Bank (1995, 2004: 7) 
591 TFP estimates adjust productivity (growth divided by capital and labor costs) for changes in the quality of labor 
associated with increases in educational attainment.  While El Salvador’s TFP growth rate was negative between 
1960-1990, then again (-0.7%) from 1996-2001, East Asia experienced a TFP growth rate of 2% on average during 
the same period (World Bank, 2003: 7). 
592 Net secondary enrollment is only about 30%.  Illiteracy declined from 27% to 18.3%, although official figures 
vastly overestimate functional literacy gains. 
593 UNDP (2003, chapters 3 and 9).  About a quarter of the population still do not have access to piped water, half do 
not have garbage removal, a fifth do not have electricity and over half do not have fixed line telephone service. 
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investment climate is persistently high level of social and criminal violence.594  The post-war 
period has been characterized by greater insecurity that manifests in high rates of victimization, 
homicide, kidnapping and in turn lower levels of productive investment.  
Table 6.1 compares estimates of the percentage of the Salvadoran population below the 
relative and extreme poverty lines.  While there is disagreement in the magnitude (10-27 point 
decline), most estimates point to a considerable reduction in relative and extreme poverty, 
although mostly in urban areas.  Rural poverty remains high at 50-60%, depending on the source.  
According to the UNDP data, relative poverty in the paracentral region in 2002 was 61.1% for 
San Vicente, and just above 50% for La Paz and Usulután.  Rural poverty for the region was near 
80%.  Despite relatively wealthy endowments of natural resources, these data suggest very low 
levels of human development in all three paracentral departments.595    
While the estimates of poverty in Table 6.1 all show that El Salvador has reduced poverty 
since 1990, they vary in terms of how much.  At the extremes, the FMLN claims that 80% of the 
population should be considered poor, in contrast to the claim of 33% by the Salvadoran 
government.  Why is there so much variance in the estimates of poverty?  Part of the answer 
rests upon competing estimates of the poverty line, which in El Salvador based on the price of a 
“basket” (canasta basica) of essential goods that is considered the minimum caloric intake.  
Extreme poverty is defined by the government as an individual income below the value of one 
“canasta basica,” relative poverty is income below twice the value of the canasta basica, also 
referred to as the canasta basica ampliada.596  Both the prices and number of items that make up 
the canasta basica and the canasta ampliada are indexed to the rate of inflation.   
                                                 
594 Violent crime direct and indirect costs of violence are estimated at 13% of GDP (see IDB, 2000b).  This estimate 
includes the perverse costs of violence, such as the dramatic increase in private security. 
595 The UNDP measures human development as the composite of per capita income, educational achievement, and 
life expectancy.   The department of La Paz was ranked at 0.559, Usulután at 0.547 and San Vicente at 0.525.  The 
entire country was ranked at 0.609, reflecting an urban-rural disparity.  Similar human development classifications 
for 1996 included Canada, ranked number 1 at  0.985, Costa Rica 0.916, Cuba 0.752,  Guatemala 0.601, Honduras 
0.597, Gabon 0.577, Ivory Coast 0.558, and Cameroon 0.498. (UNDP 1997: 46,66). 
596 The urban and rural canasta basica (CBA) contains 986 and 671 grams, respectively of bread or tortillas, rice, 
meat, oils, eggs, milk, fruit, beans, vegetables, sugar, and cooking fuel.  Both the urban and rural CBA contain the 
minimal caloric intake, although the quality of urban and rural composition of foods differs significantly.  Other 
essential household expenses are included in the canasta ampliada (CA), although the value is typically estimated to 
be double the CB.  The UNDP argues that prices and family size differ in urban and rural areas, thus requiring a 
correction factor to the official CBA and CA estimates.  Annual and monthly pricing of the CB items can be found 
at El Salvador Ministerio de Economía, DIGESTYC, http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/, accessed November, 2005. 
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There are at least two reasons why the poverty line may be underestimated.597  First, 
there are competing estimates of price inflation for the goods that make up the food basket.  The 
official value of the CB and CBA both decreased between 5-7% from 1996-1998 to 2003, due to 
deflation of some commodity prices (based on values derived from the survey itself).  At the 
same time, the official consumer price index, another indicator of overall price inflation, has 
increased at almost double the rate of the CB/CBA.  The difference between these two 
competing indicators of inflation raise questions about the most appropriate valuation of essential 
goods.  Others point out that the canasta ampliada does not accurately reflect the price changes 
of electricity, fuel, housing and education, which have increased by as much as 400% between 
1992-2002 – mostly in urban areas.  Adjustments for these inaccuracies would likely diminish 
the magnitude of income poverty reduction. 
Another factor may be changes in the methodology of the household survey itself.  In 
1991, the baseline year for the current trend line, the household survey was not representative of 
the rural sector and excludes several conflictive zones.  Accounting for these exclusions would 
likely increase poverty during that year.  The overall survey sample size has also fluctuated, from 
20,000 households in 1994, to 10,000 in 1995-1997, back to 12,350 in 1998 and 16,000 in 1999.  
This variation in sample size influences poverty estimates in two ways.  The smaller samples of 
10,000 or less reduce the confidence interval (below +/- 1% of the true poverty level) and 
reduces the probability that the sample if representative of the Salvadoran population (from 99% 
to 95%). 
 
 
                                                 
597 The UCA Economy department has argued in Proceso that official figures underestimate the canasta basica, and 
therefore poverty as well (Editions No. 801 & 802, April 1 - 18, 1998, pp. 7-9, pp. 4-5; No. 840, Jan 27, 1999, pp. 
10-11; See discussion in UNDP 2003, pgs 60-62.  Székely uses $2 PPP as the cutoff for relative poverty, which may 
explain the higher values he estimates. 
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Table 6.1  Comparison of Poverty Estimates for El Salvador, 1990-2003 
 
 
Year Government World Bank UNDP CEPAL Székely 
(IDB) 
 Total Rural Total Rural Total Rural Total Rural Total 
 Rel     
Ext     
Rel     
Ext     
Rel     
Ext     
Rel     
Ext    
Rel     
Ext     
Rel     
Ext    
Rel     
Ext    
Rel     
Ext     
Rel         
1980       68.0    
51.0 
  
1990       74.0
598     
56.0 
  
1991 59.7  
28.2 
66.1  
33.6 
64.4   
31.2    
69.6   
32.0 
65.7   
32.4 
71.2    
36.8 
   
1992 58.7  
27.7 
65.0  
34.0 
  65.0   
31.5 
70.4    
37.0 
   
1993 57.5  
27.0  
65.3  
33.8 
  66.6   
33.3 
74.2    
40.3 
   
1994 52.4  
23.9  
64.6  
34.8 
66.0599 
27.0    
77.0    
35.0 
72.8   
28.8 
71.0    
40.0 
   
1995 47.5  
18.2 
58.2  
26.5 
50.5  
20.5 
65.0    
33.0 
52.9   
21.0 
63.9    
29.2 
54.2    
21.7 
64.4   
29.9 
58.6 
1996 51.7  
21.9 
64.8  
32.3 
  58.1   
26.3 
70.7    
37.0 
   
1997 48.1  
18.5 
61.6  
27.9 
  55.4   
23.2 
 55.5   
23.3 
69.2   
33.7 
61.3 
1998 48.0  
18.5 
   50.5   
22.6 
64.0    
33.3 
  63.98 
1999     47.5   
20.1 
61.5    
31.3 
49.8    
21.9 
65.1   
34.3 
63.98 
2000   40.0   
16.0 
56.0    
28.0 
44.7   
19.3 
 49.9    
22.2 
  
2001   39.0   
15.6 
52.0    
27.0 
44.4   
19.3 
 49.9    
22.5 
62.4   
33.3 
 
2002 33.0  37.2   
15.4 
50.0    
28.5 
42.9   
19.2 
    
 
 
The World Bank argues that there are also reasons why poverty rates might be 
overestimated.  Consumption reported in household surveys tends to be more accurate than 
                                                 
598 The 1980 and 1990 estimates are from Wood (2000: 62), citing CEPAL (1993: 6). 
599 World Bank estimates based on consumption data, reported in the 1997 El Salvador: Rural Development Study. 
Annex 4, although the methodology is admittedly questionable. 
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income reporting.600   However, comparable expenditure data is not available nor used to 
compute poverty estimates here (Londoño and Székely 2000).   
My own analysis of the 1998 household survey using several aggregate family income 
indictors suggests that rural poverty is 65-68%, while urban poverty is between 41% and 46%.  
More than half of those that have moved out of poverty, hover within a narrow 20% margin 
above the defined limit, suggesting that they remain vulnerable to shocks that could easily push 
them down again.  Clearly, post-war reconstruction and the economic policies of ARENA had 
done little to improve rural livelihoods. 
What poverty reduction was achieved can be attributed to fast economic growth, social 
policy, cooperation flows, and a dramatic increase in remittances since the early 1990s.  The 
evidence suggests that the steadily increasing remittance flows (with over 20% of households 
now receiving almost $2.9 billion annually) had as much if not more to do with poverty 
reduction than economic growth or public policy.   
However, migration has also contributed a variety of negative side-effects, including 
exchange rate appreciation, a “brain drain” of an estimated 50% of the country’s college 
graduates, and the fraying the country’s social fabric (World Bank 2005d; Adams 2003). 
External migration and remittances have also been consistent with high income inequality and 
may even influence inequality as the poorest households are less likely to be able to migrate or 
receive remittances.601   Despite these enormous external transfers, the Salvadoran debt has 
increased dramatically to nearly 50% of GDP. 
Within this inauspicious economic climate, many combatants and their families were 
demobilized in rural areas and encouraged to resume or begin agrarian or non-agricultural rural 
vocations.  The National Reconstruction Plan (1992-1996) was designed largely as a rural 
reconstruction plan that would target 115 municipalities most affected by the war (40% of the 
country) and a population of 1.4 million beneficiaries (25% of El Salvador’s population) over a 
                                                 
600 Also, household surveys tend to undercount the wealthy and to under-report some income sources, such as 
production for consumption and remittances.  Both make income a less reliable indicator for poverty estimates and 
tend to underestimate income.  The methodology for calculating both income and expenses is sensitive to various 
assumptions that can significantly change poverty estimates. 
601 Recent World Bank estimates claim that remittances may reinforce inequality, see Wodon (2001); Cox Edwards 
and Ureta (2003); Mason and Arias (2004).  Earlier studies point to the redistributive effect of remittances.  Montes 
(1987) and CEPAL (1993).  There is most likely a redistributive effect toward the second and middle quintiles. 
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five year period.602  The cost of the overall PRN was estimated at $1.8 billion.603  In response to 
FMLN pressure, two of the four principal responsibilities given to the cabinet level Secretariat 
for National Reconstruction, created in 1992, included stimulating citizen participation in the 
process of local decision-making and promoting the participation of NGOs, community 
associations and the private sector in the plan’s implementation.  Competing conceptions of 
decentralization would therefore figure prominently in how the reconstruction plan was carried 
out.   
The PRN encompassed land transfer, credit (housing mortgage, land purchase and 
production), pensions for war-wounded, training programs, housing and basic services, as well as 
other compensatory measures related to structural adjustment.  Some 25,000 former combatants 
received training that offered ex-combatants two or three different career tracks: agriculture, 
technical-vocational (microenterprise) or the officer option, which itself consisted of three tracks: 
vocational-technical (including agriculture), business management, and executive.604  For the 
FMLN, two thirds of all ex-combatants chose agricultural training.  Depending on rank and 
location, demobilized FMLN and Armed Forces combatants were eligible for loans to finance 
economic activities, land purchase, and housing that could total over $4,000 upon 
demobilization.605  Credit service payments quickly surpassed rural incomes, and when 
                                                 
602 This population included 35,400 ex-soldiers, 11,000 ex-guerrillas, 60,000 displaced persons, and 26,000 
repatriates.   
603 The final amount for the PRN fluctuated in response to donor and FMLN pressure. See Rosa and Foley (2000)  
Total estimated funding needs for the PRN presented at the April 1993 Consultative Group meeting were $1,828 
million.  MIPLAN (1993). 
604 Wood (2000: 99) explains that the third track for some 600 mid-level FMLN commanders was controversial, 
resulting from a non-U.N. mediated negotiation between the FMLN and the government.  In return for the “mandos 
medios” program, the FMLN conceded to the transfer of two units of the old Treasury Police into the PNC and to a 
delay in the resignations of the 103 military officers slated for removal by the Ad Hoc Commission. 
605 Ex-combatants could borrow about $3450 and $4600 for land, repayable over thirty (twenty) years at 6% interest 
(a rate indexed to the 1980 agrarian reform and well below the 14-16% market rates).   PTT beneficiaries 
(“tenedores”) received credits of less than $1,200.  In addition, $2874 housing credits were offered at 5% over 15 
years, and basic production or business credits up to $3448 on shorter terms were provided widely by NGOs.   The 
Mid-Level Commanders Program offered higher credit ceilings, $5747 maximum for small business credit, $6897 
for housing at 16%.  Murray, Colletti and Spence (1994) 
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exacerbated by an environment prone to loan delinquency, repayment rates quickly 
plummeted.606 
Proper sequencing of land transfer, training and credit was frustrated by bureaucratic 
delays and lack of funding in the overall reinsertion program.607  Confusion and discontent was 
also exacerbated by the exclusion from benefits of large groups, such as the ex-Armed Forces 
personnel that were not formally demobilized and thousands that served in the civil defense 
patrols.  Demobilized and war wounded members of the FMLN and Government security forces 
clashed violently with the National Civilian Police between 1993 and 1996 in actions designed to 
pressure the government to provide the benefits promised in the Peace Accords.   
The government and USAID (the PRN’s largest overall donor) preferred an assistance 
strategy biased toward infrastructure, as well as austere short-term re-insertion programs that 
treated ex-combatants on an individual basis.  Moreover, the government’s economic reforms 
were financed on a separate track by World Bank and IDB structural adjustment loans, with little 
applicable “peace conditionality” to earmark reform generated benefits toward meeting the 
expectations associated with the PRN.  The cost of reinsertion programs was initially estimated 
by the FMLN at $258 million, compared to an initial government estimate of about half of that 
(Wood 2000: 97).  In the end, the estimated cost had increased to $342 million, although by 
1996, only $240 million had actually been funded.  The $102 million shortfall was picked up by 
the government, in part due to violent protests by veteran population on both sides (Rosa and 
Foley 2000: 131-132). 
Overall evaluations of the PRN varied widely, largely due to differing expectations for 
the PRN.608  USAID and ARENA viewed the PRN as a stabilization measure, with no 
expectations for significant improvements in quality of life but at the same time exhorted local 
institutions to become self-sufficient.  NGOs and many European donors criticized the top-down, 
                                                 
606 In addition to poor weather, an expectation that loans would not have to be repaid, disbursement sequencing 
problems, inadequate producer or microenterprise experience and misuse of funds, all contributing to a culture on 
non-payment during the PRN. 
607 A 1996 survey of ex-combatants in 1996 revealed that only 25% of ex-combatants and 20% of tenedores had 
found work in the area for which they were trained.  Another found that nearly 1 of every 2 land transfer 
beneficiaries were not present working on the transferred farms.  Goodin (1996: 34, 49). 
608 Two opposing perspectives are represented in Goodin (1996) and the Boyce et. al (1995)  
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exclusionary design of the reconstruction plan that privileged loyalty to the government over 
experience with the target population. 
Either as an inevitable fact of political economic history or the deliberate result of 
intentional neglect by the modernizing faction of Salvadoran oligarchy, the PRN failed to augur 
long-term economic reactivation in ex-conflictive zones (Rosa and Foley 2000).  The failure of 
the PRN to halt the decline of agriculture was only intensified when ARENA’s neoliberal 
reforms gained traction.  Land and agricultural livelihoods were the foundation of the grievances 
that sustained an insurgency for over a decade and had managed extract transformative political 
concessions from a recalcitrant Salvadoran elite.  In winning the peace, the FMLN ceded control 
over the rural economy, expecting instead to make good on revolutionary promises through the 
ballot box.  To complete this analysis of the post-war political opportunity structure for 
decentralized development, I turn now to a closer look at the impact of the post-war economic 
policies on agriculture and the agrarian inequality. 
 
 
B.  POST-WAR IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN STRUCTURE 
 
The rural economy, and small producers in particular, have fared poorly in the post-war period.  
The costs associated with the structural adjustment reforms have more than offset the 
reconstruction assistance directed to rural conflictive communities, by dismantling state 
protections and subsidies, while increasing vulnerability to external shocks.  Agriculture grew 
only a third as much as the rest of the economy (2.2%) between 1991-1997, and has declined 
steadily since 1992 as a share of the national GDP.609  Agrarian incomes have also declined. Two 
of every three rural households struggle to meet subsistence needs.  While some diversification 
of household income away from agriculture has occurred, the predominant option of migration 
from the countryside to urban areas and abroad has been disorderly and further destabilizing for 
the rural economy.   
                                                 
609 Agriculture and agro-processing represented 35% of Salvadoran GDP in 1980, but had dropped below 20% by 
late 1990s.   
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As a result, rural producers have experienced a steady deterioration in economic security.  
Rural development options have been limited.  In parallel, rural gremios have lost much of their 
original political clout and have demonstrated a low capacity to do much more than slow this 
decline.  The political and economic shifts within the rural economy have significantly altered 
the landscape for local economic development in the paracentral region.  In the section that 
follows, I lay out the most significant shifts in El Salvador’s agrarian structure and discuss the 
implications for farm livelihoods. 
 
1.  Post-war structures of income inequality 
  
Expectations for post-war reconstruction placed a tremendous premium on narrowing inequality, 
with little apparent success.  As illustrated in Table 6.2, household income inequality in El 
Salvador as measured by the ratio of the top quintile/bottom quintile, has steadily deteriorated 
between 1960-1979, and recovered during the war.  On the eve of civil war, the top-bottom 
quintile ratio of 33:1 underscores an astounding disparity between rich and poor.  After an initial 
decline in the first years of the post-war period, income inequality is on the rise again.   
 
Table 6.2   Income Inequality in El Salvador, 1961-2002 
 
 
 UNDP 
RatioTop20% 
/Bottom 20% 
UNDP
Gini 
CEPAL Székely World Bank 
1961 10.2     
1969 17    .69 
1979 33     
1991     .53 
1992 17 .527    
1995 16 .508 .507 .505 .50 
1997     .51 
1998 17.6 .526 .518 .559  
1999 19.4 .524  .545  
2002 24  .525   
Source: UNDP 2003, CEPAL (2002), Székely (2001), World Bank (2005b) 
all based upon EHPM household surveys. 
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 The World Bank suggests that income inequality may have diminished since 1991, 
however various estimates of income inequality Gini coefficients indicates that any trend in this 
direction has almost certainly reversed after 1997.  Between 1992 and 2002, the poorest 20% 
experienced a decline in their income share to 2.4%, while the wealthiest 20% increased their 
share to 58.3%.  The ratio of the top to bottom quintile increased from 17% in 1992 to 24% in 
2002.   
 In my own analysis of the 1998 household survey, the national Gini for individual 
income inequality was 0.52.  The spatial distribution of income inequality is illustrated in Figure 
6.2. The areas of highest income inequality are the northern departments of Cabañas, Morazán 
and Chalatenango, as well as western departments of Ahuachapán, La Libertad and Santa Ana.  
The relatively less unequal departments are clustered in the central region – Cuscatlán, San 
Salvador and La Paz.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2  Household Income Inequality in El Salvador (1998) 
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 As any survey researcher in Latin America can attest, household surveys tend to 
underestimate the actual level of income and asset inequality because the gated and guarded 
properties of the top 10-20% income strata can refuse to participate. For example, the highest 
reported monthly household income in the 1998 EHPM survey was $57,201.  Only 1,693 
households in 1.34 million reported a monthly income greater than $5,000, compared to over 
300,000 households that report less than $100 per month.  When compared to 1998 reports of 
166,000 annual value added tax filings that averaged $350,000, the gap between surveyed and 
actual incomes of the wealthiest households suggests that the magnitude which the household 
survey understates income inequality maybe significant (Gallagher 2001).  If we made a 
reasonable correction for missing income data for the richest households (by raising the incomes 
of the 5,000 households to $50,000 per month), the national income Gini increases to 0.70.  Has 
El Salvador really made any progress in reducing inequality since the 1960s?   
 To appreciate the true gap between rich and poor in El Salvador, as well the transition 
within the Salvadoran elite, consider the case of the Cristiani – Llach family.  Before his 
designation as Presidential candidate, the family wealth of Alfredo Cristiani ranked in the bottom 
half of the top thirty coffee producers –with $685,000 in assets and 8 businesses.  This changed 
when as President, he authorized what is considered the most audacious political capture of the 
post-war period.  In one week, the state bailed out nationalized banks at a cost of $400 million 
and then privatized them.610  By shielding the sale of bank stock from public scrutiny, the newly 
solvent banks were whisked up by old and new elites, including Cristiani himself, who purchased 
a significant share of the country’s second largest bank, Cuscatlán.  In turn, through Cuscatlan 
Bank, Cristiani-Llach family later acquired 28% of the Pension Fund Confía, when the state 
pensions system was privatized in 1998.   
                                                 
610 Albiac (1999:851).  The Ley de Saneamiento was approved on Dec. 6, 1990.  One week later, the Bank 
Privatization Law was passed.  In addition, the exchange rate was pegged to the dollar, mechanisms were 
established to capture remittances and the Monetary Board was dissolved, transferring authority to the Central Bank. 
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 Paniagua Serrano (2000) builds on the economic ethnography by Colindres (1977) and 
Sevilla (1984) to update the interlocking recomposition of the Salvadoran business class through 
redistribution of state assets in the 1990s.  Through carefully managed marriage alliances and 
overlapping corporate board memberships, diversifying coffee elites such as the Cristiani-Llach 
clan have leaped into the upper crust of the Salvadoran economic oligarchy, while preserving a 
boundary between themselves and the provincial tier below them.611 
 The pre-war Salvadoran social structure described by Adams, despite some turnover 
among the established elite families, persists in the post-war period.  Moreover, the presence of 
cosmopolitan upper class elites, like Cristiani who commutes by helicopter to his family home 
perched above the Jiboa Valley, reinforces the likelihood that post-war inequality will remain a 
central obstacle.  The presence of cosmopolitan elites, according to Adams, heighten attitudes of 
superiority and diminishes the “buen patrono” factor by weakening identification between the 
provincial elites and those below them.  The provincial elite strives to become the cosmopolitan 
elite, and in so doing, weakens whatever reciprocal bonds he/she might have with the lower 
class.  Locals tend to look to the large landowners, such as Cristiani, as the benefactor that solves 
local problems, rather than finding solutions themselves.  Just as the elite realignment within 
ARENA has only reinforced income inequality at the national level, Cristiani’s strengthened 
presence in the Jiboa Valley suggests that the social structure there has changed little in 50 years.   
 
 
 
2. Agrarian Structure:  The long-term view, 1950-1998 
 
Several important shifts have occurred in the Salvadoran agrarian structure since 1991.  In the 
economically active population of 2.4 million in 1998, there has been overall shift toward non-
agricultural jobs.612  The working-age population has nearly quadrupled in the past five decades, 
yet only about half a million people continue to work in agriculture in 1998, a number that has 
                                                 
611 The analysis by Paniagua is suggestive, relying on Board Membership lists rather than stock ownership values or 
net incomes.  Nevertheless, the family names that continue to dominate the prize assets of Salvadoran economy offer 
a strong indication of continuity.  The diagram of primary investors in the private pension fund AFP CONFIA 
identifies some 15 major families. 
612 This section is based on a more detailed analysis by McElhinny and Seligson (2000). 
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varied only modestly in absolute terms over the last five decades.613  Thus, in relative terms, the 
exodus from agriculture of young Salvadorans joining the ranks of the economically active 
population or displaced farmers and agricultural wage workers has accelerated in the past 
decade.  As few as 1 in 5 of all eligible workers now hold jobs in agriculture, down from about 
one in three in 1991, and over one of every two in 1950.   
 Estimating the Landless and the Land-poor:  Comparison of the change in 
occupational structure among the economically active population in agriculture between 1991 
and 1998 in Table 6.3 reveals a considerable increase in the number of small farmers, but an 
equally sharp reduction in the number of farmers who employ laborers.   The combined total of 
these two categories, considered non-impoverished farmers by Seligson’s criteria (1995), now 
represent 27% of the agrarian labor force, up slightly from 23% in 1991.  Temporary wage 
laborers have declined, while the unpaid family workers have increased and permanent wage 
workers have increased slightly. The land-poor population, those farmers with less than one 
manzana (0.7 ha.) to farm, has also increased slightly in relative terms since 1991.  Surprisingly, 
the unemployed population has declined by 52%, but is still four times the national 
unemployment rate for all occupations of 7.9%.614   
 
                                                 
613 El Salvador lacks an agricultural frontier and invested in mechanization before the war.  These factors combined 
with the lack of post-war investment in agricultural intensification, explain why agriculture has not generated new 
employment opportunities. 
614 The difference between 1991 and 1998 unemployment rates may reflect the more difficult employment 
conditions during the war or seasonal factors related to the timing of the survey. 
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Table 6.3  Occupations of the Economically Active Population in Agriculture in El Salvador 
 
   
1991 
 
1998 
 
Occupations 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
 
Number 
 
Percent 
 
Land-poor 
 
85,361 
 
14% 
 
76,006 
 
15% 
 
Temporary day-laborers 
 
169,432 
 
29% 
 
116,401 
 
23% 
 
Unemployed 
 
58,293 
 
10% 
 
30,314 
 
6% 
 
Small farmers and cooperative 
members 
 
74,110 
 
13% 
 
115,070 
 
23% 
 
Farmers who employ laborers 
 
56,808 
 
10% 
 
21,076 
 
4% 
 
Unpaid family laborers 
 
62,008 
 
11% 
 
74,360 
 
15% 
 
Permanent day-laborers 
 
75,649 
 
13% 
 
69,437 
 
14% 
 
Total 
 
581,661 
 
100% 
 
502,646 
 
100% 
     Source:  Authors’ calculations from raw, expanded data from DIGESTYC-EHPM, 1991-1992 and 1998 
 
The increase in small farmers by 40,960 as shown in Table 6.3 no doubt reflects the most 
recent stage of the land redistribution that has been carried out by the land transfer program.  
However the decline in temporary wage laborers and unemployed may not represent the “flip 
side” of the land redistribution coin.  The decrease may reflect the exodus from the agricultural 
sector.  
            Table 6.3 shows that landlessness and land poverty, defined as percentages of those 
actively engaged in agriculture, have diminished as a percentage of the Salvadoran agrarian labor 
force.  There are 222,700 landless and land-poor farmers, compared to 313,000 in 1991. Yet, 
because the agrarian labor force has declined, many formerly landless peasants have most likely 
entered the urban informal sector.  Landlessness and migration have a long-term association in 
El Salvador.615  Net in-migration is measured as the difference between total department 
                                                 
615 El Salvador has experienced several massive population shifts.  Durham found that landlessness forced an 
estimated 300,000 Salvadorans to migrate to Honduras prior to the 1969 war, representing 1 of every 8 Salvadorans. 
One-in-three were displaced in some way during twelve years of civil war.  Despite some repopulation of ex-
conflictive zones, most migration has been toward the cities and toward the U.S. since 1992. 
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population in 1992 and 1998, then subtracting the national population growth for the six-year 
interim period of 12%.  Landlessness and migration rates are shown in Figures 6.3 and  6.4.   
The coastal region stretching from Sonsonate to Usulután has the highest landless 
population in relative terms.  The eastern half of the country (with the exception of San Miguel) 
has experienced a net out-migration since 1992, (i.e. slower that normal population growth rate).  
However, the lower than normal population growth in the 1990s is likely related to the war.616  
The departments receiving the most immigrants are La Libertad and San Salvador, and the less 
politically conflictive zones to the west.617  Migration has been from zones of high landlessness 
to zones of even higher landlessness.618  
                                                 
616 There is a significant and positive association between reported deaths during the war and out-migration (0.315). 
617 It is important to distinguish the violence of the 1970s and 1980s that was most clearly politically motivated and 
occurred largely to the north and east of San Salvador with the post-war social and criminal violence, the incidence 
of which is highest in the Pacific coastal departments to the west of, but including San Salvador. 
618 The association between net migration and landlessness of –0.31 is negative and significant.  There is also a 
moderate positive correlation between net-migration and change in the economically active population in agriculture, 
1992-1998 (+0.38).   
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Figure 6.3  Landlessness in El Salvador, 1998 
  427
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4  Net In-Migration Rate, 1992-98 
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This population shift suggests that many migrants remain involved in agriculture, but are 
settling in urban areas.  Two types of occupations are likely candidates for this type of 
arrangement.  Absentee landowners often relocate to urban areas, preferring to delegate the day-
to-day property or crop management to employed help.  Temporary day laborers may also 
relocate to semi-urban settings, but continue to work in agriculture as well as the commercial and 
light manufacturing economy circling San Salvador.619  This migration suggests that post-war 
reconstruction has apparently not stabilized the livelihoods of re-integrated ex-combatants and 
ex-conflictive communities within the principal PRN departments, but rather encouraged 
migration to historically acquiescent zones in the west.   
 Table 6.4 compares the land tenure categories among farmers.   Overall, Table 6.4 reveals 
that the absolute number of farmers (in terms of principal occupation) has increased by 2.5% 
since 1991 to 222,573.620  If the focus is only on the agrarian labor force whose primary vocation 
is farming, the number and percentage of fee-simple landowners has increased between 1991 and 
1998, while the absolute and relative numbers of renters has declined.  Sharecropping and 
cooperative tenure arrangements have not changed in the post-war period, the latter remaining 
well below the recognized level of agrarian cooperative membership in El Salvador.  Of the 
10,682 respondents who identified themselves as cooperative members in terms of land tenure in 
Table 6.4, only 14% also identified themselves as “cooperativistas” in terms of economic 
occupation (see Table 6.3).621  Cooperative membership is highest in the coastal departments of 
                                                 
619 Adams (1957: 466) notes this process occurring since 1930, thus blurring any sharp division between rural and 
urban. 
620 The gross number of farms in 1998 was 296,728, when all persons having access to land are counted, compared 
to 251,943 calculated for 1991.  The 1991 DIGESTYC-EHPM was a much smaller sample and was prevented from 
sampling the entire country due to the conflict.  For these reasons, rural estimates are probably less reliable than later 
years of the survey. 
621 Over a third of the cooperative members (with respect to land tenure) identified their occupational status as 
“permanent salaried worker,” another 17% as “temporary day laborer, and a third as a farmer with access to some 
size parcel of land.  The inconsistency may reflect the ongoing parcelization of cooperative land, the breakup of 
cooperatives, or the low identification with the cooperative as a form of labor organization, since 1989.  By 1997, at 
least 12 cooperatives have been converted into individual tenancy, and 10 operate as mixed individual and 
cooperative tenancy (World Bank, 1998).  This confusion between tenure and occupational status may partly explain 
a second problem - the DIGESTYC-EHPM underestimation of actual active cooperative membership.  The true 
figure is itself the subject of debate.  ISTA, the Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Agency, estimates approximately 
30,000 cooperative workers, greatly exceeding the 13,000 total respondents who reported cooperative land tenure 
status for first or second occupation.  Montoya (1996: 222) has estimated at least 110,000 agricultural workers 
belong to cooperatives.   
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Sonsonate, La Libertad and La Paz. Sharecropping has declined from 55,769 in 1961 (25% of all 
farms) to 10,188 (less than 5%), although colonato surprisingly continues to represent a viable 
tenure option for 15-20% of farmers in the Central region of Cuscatlán, La Paz and Cabañas.  In 
sum, the data in Table 6.4 also show that less than 50% of all farmers have secure access to the 
land they farm.622   
 
Table 6.4  Land Tenure of the Landed Population of El Salvador 
 
 
 1991 1998 
Tenure categories Number Percent Number Percent 
 
Fee simple landowners 
 
68,569 
 
31.6% 
 
87,009 
 
39.1% 
 
Farmers having free use of land 
 
23,477 
 
10.8% 
 
30,972 
 
13.9% 
 
Cooperative members 
 
10,040 
 
4.6% 
 
10,682 
 
4.8% 
 
Renters 
 
95,517 
 
44.2% 
 
80,953 
 
36.4% 
 
Sharecroppers 
 
10,564 
 
4.9% 
 
10,188 
 
4.6% 
 
Colonos 
 
2,039 
 
0.9% 
 
1,131 
 
0.5% 
 
Land promised to tenant 
 
6,555 
 
3.0% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Other 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
1,638 
 
0.8% 
 
Total landed 
 
217,161 
 
100.0% 
 
222,573 
 
100.0% 
          Source: Author’s calculations from DIGESTYC-EHPM, 1991-1992 and 1998. 
 
 
                                                 
622 Land security remains one of the top three reported concerns of several producer organizations (interviews 
conducted with leaders of CONFRAS, COACES, ADC and CNC in April, 1999.  See also CIDAR (2000). Strasma 
(1989, 1990), and the World Bank (1998) have emphasized the benefits of a rental market in land scarce countries, 
but the contract enforcement conditions are rarely present in El Salvador.  Many small farmers fear a 
reconcentration of landholdings as cooperatives and PTT properties are parcelized and titled.  
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3.  Agrarian Inequality (1950-1998) 
 
The following Tables explore the changes in agrarian occupational structure in land distribution 
in the post-war period compared to the pre-war period.  Table 6.5 summarizes the shifts in tenure 
between 1950 and 1998.  The total agrarian labor force has leveled off at about 500,000 workers.  
The landless population, which stood at 47% of the agrarian labor force in 1991 had declined to 
42% of the economically active population in agriculture by 1998. 623  Table 6.5 also shows that 
in relative terms, landlessness has fallen to 1961 levels (higher if family labor is added), and 
represents a much smaller percentage of the total EAP (6.2% in 1998 vs. 15.7% in 1961).624  
 The long-term results also show negative trends for farmers. While on the one hand, the 
relative number of land-poor has declined (from 23.1% in 1991 to 16.2% in 1998), the relative 
population with access to land in general (landed plus land-poor) in 1998 (39.5%) has not 
recovered from its pre-war low point of 36% in 1971.  Remarkably, after 20 years of land 
reform, few additional farmers as a percent of all agricultural sector workers seem to have 
secured guaranteed access to land.   
 Family laborers continue to increase in both relative and absolute terms, implying a limit 
to the continued subdivision of already small farms that is fostered by the relative absence of 
primogeniture among poor farm families.  Smallholding is squeezed by the fall in agricultural 
wages and the increasing scarcity of land for future generations of peasant farmers caused by 
subdivision rather than expansion of holdings.  Eventually, most sons and daughters awaiting 
land ownership through inheritance may be forced into landless categories of agricultural or non-
farm work.625   
 Thus far, the analysis has focused on the distribution of workers in the agricultural sector.  
Turning to the change in distribution of farms, a much different picture emerges.  Table 6.6 
                                                 
623 Defined as the sum of landless temporary wage laborers and family laborers. 
624 The 30,314 unemployed respondents were assigned to previously reported tenure status. 
625 A smaller 1992 survey by the World Bank found that 32% of rural labor force are farmers that live in rural areas, 
43% are agricultural landless workers and 25% are landless workers in non-agricultural activities.  This 
classification reflects the primary economic activity.  Many people are classified as farmers also do off-farm work in 
agriculture or in other sectors and many landless farm workers also do non-agricultural activities and may have a 
small plot of land (World Bank 1998: 105). 
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Table 6.5  Agrarian Land Tenure in El Salvador, 1961-1998 
 
 
 Agricultural Workers as a % of the Economically Active Agricultural Adult Population and the 
Economically Active Adult National Population 
Category of 
Agricultural 
Workers 
1961 Census 1971 Census 1991  
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
1998 
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
1961 1971 1991 1998 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)     
Landed 
118,687 28.5 78,167 14.4 136,171 23.4 116,948 23.3 16.3 6.7 8.3 5.2 
Land-poor 96,465 23.1 119,350 22.0 96,821 16.6 81,338 16.2 13.4 10.2 5.9 3.6 
Landless 
(temporary day 
workers) 
115,161 27.6 207,116 38.1 198,309 34.1 137,626 27.4 15.7 17.8 12.1 6.2 
Permanent wage 
workers 
51,498 12.4 92,640 17.1 77,001 13.2 70,258 14.0 7.0 7.9 4.7 3.1 
Family laborers 
34,926 8.4 45,606 8.4 73,359 12.6 74,659 14.9 3.8 3.9 4.5 3.3 
Total 
416.728 100 542,879 100 581,661 100 502,646 100 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Unemployed out 
of the above total 
22,008 5.3 33,994 6.3 58,293 10.0 30,314 6.0 3.0 2.9 3.6 1.4 
a. Percentages are yearly category sub-totals divided by the respective EAP above the age of 15 in Table 1. 
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assembles census and survey estimates of farm distribution over the past thirty years.   Data for 
1998 and 1998 (adjusted) are my calculations from the respective 1998 household survey, with  
the inclusion of all reported properties before and after corrections for under-reporting.626   Of 
principal interest is the extent to which land reforms have or have not improved the equality of 
landholding distribution between 1971 and 1998.  Based on census and survey data, Table 6.6 
shows that despite the decline in total farm area the gross number of farms in 1998 was 296,728, 
when all persons having access to land are counted, compared to 270,868 in 1971.  The growth 
in farms coincides with a smaller average size, indicating the subdivision of large and small 
farms over the past three decades. 
 Gini coefficients are derived for each department using the adjusted distribution of farms 
and farm area summarized in Table 6.7.627  The Gini for land inequality has declined only 
slightly to 0.81 from 0.83 in 1961 (calculated using census data for both years).628  After land 
reforms transferred nearly 30% of all farm area, this might not seem logically possible.  Yet, it is, 
for several reasons.  First, we need to recall that as much as a third of this land was transferred 
from small farmers to other small farmers – having little effect on the distributional imbalance.    
           The Gini coefficient for land inequality for the entire country is 0.81 in 1998.  The 
estimated 1998 value is virtually the same as the 1971.  Land inequality changes most when 
there is change within the top and bottom shares.  While the largest farms may have been 
eliminated, there was an equally significant shift toward greater mini-fundismo at the bottom.  
Much of the PTT redistribution was from the already middle-sized (25-50 ha) and small farm (5-
25 ha) segments, to the micro-farm segment (0.33 – 5 ha).  Micro-farms (less than 1 ha. in size) 
have increased as a proportion of total number of farms between 1950 (40%) and 1998 (66%). 
The average farm size of 4.4 ha. in 1998 is somewhat comparable to the industrialized country 
                                                 
626 See Appendix D for section that explains the methodology of corrections for under-reporting large and medium 
properties in the 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM. 
627 One additional adjustment eliminated reported farms less than one fourth of a hectare, which logically cannot be 
considered anything more than a backyard garden.  This eliminated 37,290 farms, leaving a working total of 268,542 
farms.    
628 Montoya (1991:75) estimated a land inequality Gini of 0.75 for the late 1980s.  The Gini values for 1988 relied 
on only four data points per department and required a correction for missing small farms and cooperative farms, 
which may account for the lower than average Gini values. 
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average of 8.8 ha in 1950. However, this indicator of progress toward a more rational use of 
available  
 
Table 6.6  Estimating Change in Farm Distribution, 1971-1998 
 
1971 Census Total 0 - 20 ha. 20-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 270,868 259,703 9224 1941 
% Total No. farms 100 95.9 3.4 0.8 
Total Area (ha) 1,451,895 520,756 369,620 561,519 
% of total area 100 35.9 25.5 38.7 
Ave. farm area 5.4 2.0 40 289 
     
1988 Survey Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 269,832 629  259,243  8390 2199 
% Total No. farms 100 96.1 3.1 0.8 
Total Area (ha) 1,542,343 510,239 390,100 642,004 
% of total area 100 33.0 25.0 42.0 
Ave. farm area 5.7 2.24 46.5 291.9 
     
1998 Unadj. Survey Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 296,728 294,865 1690 173 
% Total No. farms 100 99.4 0.5 0.01 
Total Area (ha) 561,393 442,230 94,883 24,280 
% of total area 100 78.7 16.9 4.3 
Ave. farm area 1.9 1.5 56.1 140.3 
     
1998 Adj. Survey  Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 306,396 296,544 8347 1505 
% Total No. farms 100 96.8 2.8 0.5 
Total Area (ha) b630 1,334,000 610,256  415,229  308,515  
% of total area  100 45.7 31.1 23.1 
Ave. farm area 4.4 2.1 49.7 205 
     
Sources: DIGESTYC Censo Agropecuario 1954, 1967, 1974, 1991; McReynolds, 
Johnston, Gore, and Francis (1989); Ministerio de Economía, DIGESTYC-EHPM 1991 
and 1998 
 
                                                 
629 Includes 40,233 farms less than 2 mz. (1.41 ha.) that were excluded from the original study.  An average farm 
size of 0.5 ha. is estimated to add 20,117 ha. total farm area.  Estimates of small farms were adjusted to account for 
anomalies in departmental distribution in order to calculate department level Gini coefficients.  See Appendix Table 
A5 in McElhinny and Seligson (2000). 
 
630  Total farm area for medium and large farm strata is the sum of the reported farm area in the 1998 DIGESTYC-
EHPM and the additional farm area derived in Appendix D, Tables D6 and D7, also reported in McElhinny and 
Seligson (2000).  Subtracting the large and medium farm area from total area of 1,334,000 produces the total farm 
area for small farms. 
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Table 6.7  Rank Ordering of Salvadoran Departments by Land Inequality Gini 
 
 
1961 
Gini 
1971 
Gini 
1988 
Gini 
1998 
Gini 
Rank Change 
Pct Chg 61-98 
LL .885 SO .878 SV .715 SS .851 CU +8 
SA .859 LL .867 US .682 SO .848 LU +6 
AH .852 LP .845 LU .655 LL .835 SS +5 
SO .849 AH .835 SM .655 CU .835 MO +4 
US .832 SA .832 CU .649 LU .831 LP +3 
SS .809 US .815 SO .636 SV .829 SO +2 
SV .803 SS .811 AH .609 LP .818 SV +1 
SM .797 SV .809 SA .608 SM .818 SM 0 
CH .794 SM .794 SS .605 MO .815 CA 0 
LP .778 CH .780 CH .599 US .795 CH -2 
LU .757 LU .751 LL .592 CH .783 LL -2 
CU .721 CU .735 MO .590 SA .782 US -5 
CA .701 MO .721 LP .574 CA .779 AH -11 
MO .673 CA .678 CA .540 AH .748 SA -11 
TOT 0.83 TOT 0.81   TOT .81 TOT  
 
farmland is deceiving, given the actual level of development.  The skewed land distribution 
disguises a much smaller than expected family farm segment.631 
 Second, the post-war titling activity may have facilitated a reconcentration of more 
productive land through land market transfers.  It is likely that contrary to the stated intent of the 
reforms, land re-concentration has been underway as land prices have skyrocketed and 
cooperative land is sold to pay off debt.  Several laws beginning in 1991 have conditioned the 
parcelization of collective properties to debt cancellation.  Decree Law 747 passed in 1991, 
permitted three options for transforming Reform Cooperatives into individual parcels.  Incentives 
                                                 
631 El Salvador still ranks well above most lower income Asian countries with average farm sizes near 1 hectare.  
The mean farm size used here may be less useful than the median farm size (for which fewer comparable 
international estimates are available). The mean farm size still underscores the weight of large farms that inflate the 
Salvadoran mean upward for a small, densely populated and only moderately industrialized country, for which a 
smaller average farm size would be more appropriate.  Larger average farm sizes are found in more industrialized 
countries where labor costs are higher and agriculture plays a smaller, more specialized role in overall GDP.  The 
EU average farm size, for example, is 19 ha, ranging from Norway (14 ha) to England (68 ha).  U.S. average farm 
size is 173 ha. (USDA, 2005). 
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to privatize cooperative lands were strengthened in 1996. 632  Subsequent debt cancellation laws 
encouraged the sale of newly titled lands to pay reduced debt conditions.  Decrees 698 and 699 
were passed in May 1996, permitting the full cancellation of all debt up to about $2000, and 70% 
cancellation of the rest, on the condition of “pronto pago,” or immediate payment, of the 30% 
debt balance.  Of the Phase I beneficiaries, 10,000 (or less than a third) chose parcelization, 
despite the strong incentives of debt cancellation (Prisma 1996).  The buyers of this land were 
most likely private housing developers or the region’s larger landowners. 
 It is also true that many medium size farms have been sub-divided into urban or semi-
urban parcels for housing.633  Childress estimated that about 11,500 ha. of agricultural land was 
converted into urban plots between 1985-1993, and this process has since accelerated.634  Both 
urban development and creation of forest reserves take land from production.  Neither improves 
the unequal distribution of land.   
 Although variation is relatively low, the region of greatest land inequality is that which 
surrounds San Salvador, including Cuscatlán, and coastal departments of San Vicente, La 
Libertad, and Sonsonate.  Land distribution is somewhat more equal in the northern departments, 
Ahuachapán, Cabañas, Santa Ana and Chalatenango.  Poverty, according to 1998 data, is highest 
where land inequality is lowest, suggesting that land alone is insufficient to raise incomes above 
the poverty level.  Income inequality, on the other hand, is almost the reverse of the pattern 
shown in Figure 6.5.  When the two types of inequality are compared, we see that where land 
ownership is relatively more equal (in the North) income inequality is higher.  Where land 
inequality is highest (the region surrounding San Salvador), income disparities have been 
attenuated.   
                                                 
632 Promising in 1989 to make El Salvador a “nation of landowners,” The Cristiani government issued decree 747 
that provided incentives for cooperatives to parcelize their lands.  The government emphasis on restoring the market 
mechanism in land transactions actually began in 1987, under the previous Christian Democrat administration, 
which issued Decree 839 encouraging the voluntary sale of properties to landless campesinos and urban developers 
by using a land market.  Prior to the PTT in 1992, 6,041 properties for a total of 10,922 hectares had been 
voluntarily sold (Strasma, 1989, 1990; Seligson, et al, 1993, Table 3.1).   
633 It is possible that more farms were broken up within both the large and medium strata than I conservatively 
assumed with only a 10% attrition rate (about 32,000 ha.), above and beyond the farmland that was subdivided 
through the PTT process.  Further research is required to determine whether a higher rate is justified.   
634 A small sample of land sales in 1992 suggested that the vast majority of transactions were less than 1.4 ha. 
(Childress et al. 1993).   
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 If temporal estimates are valid, analysis of Table 6.7 suggests that while land inequality 
has improved in some of the most skewed departments (Ahuachapán, Santa Ana, La Libertad, 
Usulután), the reverse has occurred in departments that were previously more equal in relative 
terms (Cuscatlán, Cabañas, La Union, Morazán).  The Gini coefficient of San Salvador may have 
increased simply because greater numbers of large absentee landowners now reside there instead 
of on their respective farms.635  These changes are overshadowed by the extremely high 
inequality that in general persists throughout El Salvador. 
 A final point addresses the four possible exits from rural poverty – extensification, 
intensification, semi-skilled off farm labor and migration.  Increasingly in the rural economy, the 
average weight of farm income (surplus from production) and farm wages (day laborer income) 
is not as large for most individual earners (and therefore farm households) as one might think.  
By decade’s end, the proportion of household’s that derived its principal source of income from 
agriculture is declining from about 40% to below 20%.  For only about one third of the rural 
income earners, farm related income represents more than 50% of their total income.636  For 
farmers with access to land, farm related income only surpasses 50% of total monthly income 
when they have more than 10 hectares.  Farm incomes in post-war El Salvador are depressed in 
general and diversification has clearly not raised incomes for the majority of small farmers.  For 
the majority of the rural population, farm related income is relatively insignificant.  The World 
Bank (2004) also found that the percentage of households that depended on agriculture as the 
principal source of income declined from 39% in 1991 to just 18% in 2002.   Off-farm and 
remittance income are playing an ever larger role as coping strategies for many rural households, 
landowners and landless alike.637 
 
                                                 
635 Midlarsky (1988, 1999) has criticized the Gini coefficient as a sub-optimal measure of extreme inequality.  He 
argues that the distribution of upper and lower segments of asset distribution under conditions of extreme inequality 
more accurately fit log-exponential or exponential curves, which in turn provide a better mechanism for explaining 
the inequality-violence nexus.  In another study, I test for this pattern of extreme inequality at the department level 
but find no significantly different effect.  See McElhinny and Seligson (2000). 
636 Based on estimates drawn from the rural economically active population of the 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM survey. 
637 See also González-Vega, et al. (2004) and Rodríguez-Meza, et al. (2003) 
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 5.  The Impact of the Land Reform Process 
 
 
Land reform leveled some of the inequalities in El Salvador’s agrarian structure. A total of 21% 
of the adult farming population acquired the right to purchase 30% of El Salvador’s available 
farmland.638   In spite of several major land reforms over a two-decade period and the 
expenditure of enormous effort and political capital as well as international and domestic 
funding, many landless peasants, often the poorest of the poor, have not gained access to land.   
Remarkably, while twenty years of land reform have decreased landlessness of those still 
employed in agriculture, few additional farmers as a percent of all eligible agricultural workers 
have secured guaranteed access to land.   
The lower than expected participation in the PTT was in part due to design flaws in the 
land market, on which the PTT was based (Murray, et al. 1994: 23).  First, in the Peace Accords 
both sides agreed that original property rights would be respected and occupiers would receive 
comparable lands to purchase through loans ($3,450 to $4,600 at 6% interest over 20 years).  
Where large properties were sold as single units, the FMLN would often have to orchestrate the 
placement of families willing to move to the farm.  Post-war migration within the country and to 
the U.S. made permanent up to date beneficiary lists nearly impossible.  Some relocated families 
abandoned the land due to incompatibilities with their new neighbors, or were in a different 
climate uncomfortable taking on debt.   Other complications (unpaid back taxes, inability to 
locate owner, disputed ownership) also sidetracked negotiations between buyer and seller.   
Repeating a central flaw of the 1980 reform, titling proceeded very slowly and lack of 
confidence with the complex transaction forced some beneficiaries to back out.  Over three years 
into the peace process, less than 50% of the prospective land beneficiaries had actually received 
land (Wood 1995: 56-57). 
Other shortcomings of land reform can be seen in the areas of debt, credit, land prices, 
investments in complementary human capital and technology.  Beginning in 1995, thousands of 
                                                 
638 By Latin American standards, the Salvadoran 1980 land reform ranks below Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua 
and Cuba but above Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Ecuador in terms of percent farm families affected.  (De Janvry, et 
al., 1989). 
  438
campesinos and their supporters organized by the Alianza Democratica Campesina (ADC), 
battered by drought and state indifference, began invading idle and excedente lands (above the 
constitutionally allowed 245 hectare limit).639  A joint investigation by ISTA and the U.N. was 
charged with investigating a list of some 452 properties that were believed to exceed the limit.  
Subsequent revision sanctioned by ISTA pruned the list to 95, after only four properties of the 
initial group were found eligible for redistribution.  Peasant organizations claimed that 129 
properties still exceeded the formal limit.640  The investigation proved futile in identifying 
significant new land for redistribution, although it shed some light on extent of dubious tactics to 
subdivide large properties under false holding companies.   
Two decades of land reform left the agrarian sector buried under an accumulated debt of 
$285 million with many thousands still landless.641  In 1996, a broad coalition of agricultural 
organizations and producers, the Foro Agropecuario, formed to demand a resolution to the debt 
once and for all.  At the beginning, some large groups of commercial farmers joined small 
farmers under the banner of debt forgiveness.642  This cross-class coalition put debt on the 
agenda.  In May 1996, ARENA passed a revised version of the 1991 law (Decree 747) that 
linked partial debt forgiveness to incentives for parcelization of cooperatives.  Decrees 698, 669 
and 719 approved 70% immediate debt forgiveness for Phase I and III of debt accumulated by 
the agrarian reform, PTT, and commercial borrowing, conditioned upon “pronto pago” 
(immediate payment) of the 30% balance before June 1997.  Debts up to $1,900 would be 
forgiven in full, and the balance would be eligible for the 70/30 program.  Decree 719 made it 
                                                 
639 Kowalchuk (2000, 2004), Flores (1999).  According to the 1983 Constitution, properties in excess of the 245 
hectare limit would have to sell off or donate the excess land by Dec 20, 1986 or face expropriation.  The U.N. 
(1997) investigated these properties with the assistance of peasant organizations such as the ADC. 
640 Farms that were on duplicate lists had not been titled or transferred yet by ISTA, or had been declared natural 
protected areas, or did not reflect owner reserve holding rights, explaining some of the reductions.  Conservative 
estimates of excedente land suggest that no more than 10,000 landless peasants could benefit from redistribution, but 
probably fewer. 
641 A 1996 study by PRISMA estimated the outstanding agrarian debt at 2.5 billion colones (about $287 million).  Of 
this, the cooperative sector owed over half ($148 million), Phase III beneficiaries owed $19.1 million, and the PTT 
beneficiaries, $82.4 million, and the commercial sector, $37.5 million.  Agrarian debt is equal to the unpaid purchase 
price of transferred land plus interest, but can also include loans extended to cover production costs or infrastructure.   
642 Foley (1997) notes the robbery linked shooting of Ernesto Muyshondt in Oct. 1996, spokesperson for a group of 
disaffected commercial landowners from the Eastern region of the country, is suspected of being related to his 
discontent with the 1996 debt deal and negotiations with Foro Agropecuario. 
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possible for cooperatives to exempt themselves from debt or reduce individual obligations 
through parcelization or to raise funds through the sale of land (PRISMA 1996; Foley 1997).  
With the 1997 legislative elections approaching and unable to win a better deal, the FMLN 
supported these debt relief bills. 
Orlando Arevalo (ex-Christian Democrat now ARENA legislator) had championed 
support for the 70% - 30% debt forgiveness plan among his centrist peasant constituency.643  
Indeed, for Arevalo’s base which included many Phase III Finateros, the average debt was less 
than the $1,900 threshold and would be totally forgiven. A majority of PTT beneficiaries would 
likely have full debt forgiven as well.  Most Phase I cooperatives were not financially able to 
make the 30% payment, and only 24 had done so by late 1996 (Foley 1997).  Cooperatives found 
themselves under tremendous pressure to parcelize, and in so doing, would lose what little 
security that cooperative production and infrastructure provided. 
FMLN gains in the 1997 elections that eliminated an ARENA working majority in the 
Assembly opened the way for negotiating a more far reaching debt proposal before the June 
1997 deadline.  After holding out for the cancellation of 100% of the agrarian debt, the FMLN, 
with the support of the Christian democrats, proposed a bill to forgive 93% of the agrarian debt 
owed to the government. The bill was vetoed by President Calderón Sol.  The executive veto was 
nearly overridden, with almost two-thirds of national legislators favoring deeper debt 
forgiveness.  ARENA’s resistance succumbed to overwhelming protest by peasant gremios and a 
wide political consensus.644  On March 23, 1998 in a near unanimous vote, the Salvadoran 
Legislative Assembly moved to forgive 85% of the agrarian and banking debt for rural 
landholders after two years of debate and various attempts at developing legislative and 
Presidential agreement.645 
                                                 
643 The National Cooperative Federation of the Agrarian Reform, (CONFRAS), also initially backed the 
government’s proposal in addition to Arevalo’s CNC.   
644 El Diario de Hoy, November 18, 1997, pg.1 and December 2, 1997, pg.1 
645 The 85/15% formula was originally thrown into the public debate by ARENA leader Alfredo Cristiani in October 
1997 as an attempt to stop the 93/7% formula. Cristiani's proposal, unlike the bill which passed on March 23, 1998 
did not contemplate re-financing and would have meant immediate repayment of 15% of the debt.  Conceding to the 
higher debt bailout did not prevent ARENA from capitalizing on this concession, as outgoing President Calderón 
Sol did when addressing an April 1999 convention of the Confederación Nacional Campesino to receive an award 
from Orlando Arevalo and urge the 5,000 peasants in attendance to repay the party with their vote. 
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 Debt relief for all loans extended to beneficiaries of the Peace Accords whose debt was 
granted in full, and 85% of the government held, wartime debt of individuals or cooperatives was 
erased.  The remaining 15% of the debt was to be refinanced at 6% over 12 years, or through the 
immediate payment mechanism.646  
Debt cancellation avoided the probable default by numerous cooperatives and small 
farmers that would have re-concentrated land into the hands of the wealthy landowners.  It also 
conceded the failure of land reform to reactivate an agricultural sector battered by the war and 
signaled ARENA’s payoff to the agrarian elite within the party. 
 Debt forgiveness virtually ensured that the financial sector would close its doors to most 
farmers.  The financial sector is highly concentrated, with four banks controlling two thirds of 
loan activity and with preferences for large institutional lending.  The threat of renewed debt 
cancellation has choked off new lines of credit to already financially starved small-scale 
agriculture.  Fewer than 20% of El Salvador’s 220,000 small farmers have access to credit from 
the formal financial sector.  Household survey data suggest that less than 10% of the 
economically active adult workforce in agriculture reported having credit in 1998, and about half 
of these producers relied on non-bank sources.647  Total credit allocated to agricultural activities 
has declined from 30% in 1980 to 13.5% in 1995.  At least 70% of agricultural credit goes to 
coffee.  The Banco de Fomento Agropecuario (BFA), the principal instrument for rural finance, 
is nearly insolvent due to high volume loans in default, politicization of lending and 
                                                 
646 The total debt amounted to $287 million and effected some 82,000 people. 75 out of 84 legislative deputies voted 
to support debt forgiveness.  The laws cancelled 85% of the debt accumulated between 1980 and 1991, and the 15% 
remainder would be refinanced over 12 years, with a 2 year grace period.  Any non-PTT debt accumulated between 
1992-1996 also would be refinanced at 8% over a longer term, affecting 15,000 people.  The 85% debt cancellation 
affected 35,000 persons.  In addition to the debt forgiveness for parcelization reforms noted above, Decrees 262 and 
263 were passed into law on April 2, 1998, canceling 100% of the PTT debt, benefiting some 32,000 demobilized 
ex-combatants and civilian supporters of the FMLN.  In all, the 1998 decree reduced the collectible debt to $46 
million.  Not covered were any and all debt acquired through non-governmental organizations.  However, by mid-
1999, less than 10% of the affected debtors had taken advantage of the new “pronto pago” offer of 15%.  
Agriculturalists were dealt another blow in November 1998, as Hurricane Mitch caused another $125 million in 
damages.  Another bill passed in February 1999 that would have cancelled 100% of the agrarian debt was also 
vetoed by then President Calderon Sol.  See Kieffer (1996), PRISMA (1996). 
647 DIGESTYC-EHPM (1998) household data analysis.  Only 17% of all landholders reported credit in 1998, with a 
similar proportion relying on informal credit suppliers.  These results are consistent with other studies that have 
reported that between 10-20% of rural households receive formal credit.  Molina (1999: 45, 144) shows that one 
reason informal credit prevails in rural areas is the higher transaction costs of formal credit, between 2-3 times 
higher than informal credit.  Lower transaction costs, however, do not mean that the full cost of the loan is lower. 
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corruption.648  Despite formal proposals for a rural development bank by producer organizations, 
no efforts have been made to decentralize rural credit provision.649 
 The World Bank and IDB loans have re-oriented post-war agricultural policies away 
from further compulsory redistribution, and more toward deregulating land markets.650  USAID 
and the World Bank have promoted land markets as an alternative to the expropriation of land.  
Titling of individual parcels of land became an urgent priority in the post-war period.  For PTT, a 
compromise was reached between ARENA, the U.S. government and the World Bank, which 
prioritized individual property titles and the FMLN, which preferred collective property transfers 
and cooperative arrangement where feasible.  Proindiviso tenancy was the compromise, but it 
would expire five years, until which the PTT land could not be broken up and titled or sold as 
individual properties.   
 However by 1998, a decade of reforms intended to privatize the cooperative sector and 
promote individual land holding had reduced incentives for collective production options and 
had substituted a land market rather than the state as the primary mechanism for land 
transactions.  After five years, the crisis in agriculture fueled a demand for subdivision of 
proindiviso.  In what has amounted to a substantively more participatory subdivision and titling 
process compared to the processes supervised by ISTA or FINATA, a variety of rural land use 
planning and ownership formulas were presented for consideration as part of the PTT 
parcelization process.  Where strong local organizations are absent, the most popular choice 
among beneficiaries of the possible options has been a patchwork of individual homesteads that 
reflects little interest in collective production arrangements.651 This result is consistent with the 
government’s strong preference for individual ownership of all titled properties (Wood 1995: 
340; Foley 1997: 18). 
                                                 
648 As of June 2000, 37% of the outstanding BFA debt was delinquent, a disproportionately large part of which was 
owed by a handful of favored clients.  In 1999, only 43 clients (0.14% of the total) owed the BFA 28% of the total 
outstanding debt, while 21,000 others (66%) owed only 6.3% of the total debt. 
649 Comite de Incidencia para el Desarollo Agropecuario y Rural (CIDAR) (2001) mimeo. 
650 See Foley and Thale (1997).  The principal World Bank loan is the 1993 Agricultural Sector Reform and 
Investment Project  (PRISA) for $40 million, including $16.5 million in government matching funds.  PRISA was 
designed to modernize (downsize) state agrarian institutions.  A follow-up IDB Agricultural Competitiveness loan in 
2001 continued along these lines, targeting the privatization of the country’s four irrigation districts. 
651 Interview, Antonio Alvarez, director of FUNDESA, the principal NGO that has administered the parcelization 
project, Feb. 20, 2000. 
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 In the view of some peasant leaders, the combination of mounting debt and the emphasis 
on individual titles resulted in many land reform and Peace Accords beneficiaries selling parts or 
all of their newly titled land to pay off debt.652 In addition to the general decline of agriculture, 
Molina (1999:86) points to several factors which explain the appeal of parcelization among 
reform beneficiaries, including: a) internal problems related to the mismanagement by 
cooperative boards of directors, which contributed to the widespread discrediting of the 
cooperative model; b) the beneficiaries desire to have an individual land title in their name so 
that they can pass it on to their children; c) the absence of an organization that could provide 
training and assistance in areas such as cooperative organization, management and accounting 
needed to run the cooperatives as competitive enterprises; d) pressures from some ISTA officials 
on cooperative members to parcelize and sell part of the land to pay for the agrarian debt; e) the 
speculative bubble in land prices which serve as an opportunity to pursue significant windfall 
profits in the short run. 
Speculative pressures related to urban or tourist development as well as remittance flows 
have pushed land prices much higher in the post-war period, beyond what landless or land-poor 
peasants could ever afford.653  Consider that Phase I owners were reimbursed based on an 
average estimated land value of $340 per hectare, and the PTT was designed on the assumption 
of average land prices of $420 per ha., ranging from the lowest quality agricultural land located 
in northern Morazán valued at $280 per ha., to top-grade land in the Lempa River Valley valued 
at $1,000 per ha..654  By late 1996, land with road access in Morazán was selling for as much as 
$4000-6500 per hectare.655   A study of 1,500 producers by Childress (1997) shows that land 
whose agricultural lease value for basic grains should be about $1000 per ha., was selling at 
$2,300 per ha.. Farms eligible for emergency municipal investments in housing, sanitation or 
                                                 
652 Interview Miguel Aleman, CONFRAS, Feb. 1998. 
653 The 1998 World Bank Rural Development Strategy also points to pent up demand for construction and 
government land purchases as additional factors causing the spike in land prices, adding (without evidence) that the 
post-peace upward trend of land prices is returning to pre-war levels (184).   
654 Phase I average land value is from ISTA Land Registry Data.  Other estimates are from U.N., 1995; Diario de 
Hoy, 6, Oct. 1992, p3 
655 Interviews with property owners in Ciudad Segundo Montes, Morazán 1996.  Reported cases of opportunistic 
collusion suggest that the price being demanded for land is inflated based on assurance that the state or international 
donors will subsidize the sale, after which the seller and buyer share the dividend. 
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roads have extracted much higher prices.  A study by ISTA reported that 14 cooperatives that 
requested authorization to sell land estimated the selling price at $12,000 per hectare in 1997 – 
an amount impossible for Salvadoran peasants to pay.656  A government study showed that the 
ratio of most-to-least expensive land that was to be purchased by the state jumped from a factor 
of 5 in 1992 to 13 in 1996 (MAG-OCTA 1996). 
With the typically low agricultural incomes, speculation over parcelized reform property 
is most likely fueling a reconcentration and a return to higher land inequality.657 Molina notes the 
irony that land reform was designed with the intention of stabilizing rural migration to the U.S., 
but among other things, skyrocketing land prices have transformed reform beneficiaries into the 
most likely candidate to finance migration to the U.S. through the sale of land.658    
 Prices are not completely to blame for undermining the impact of land reform.  
Productivity can improve the profitability of farming, but is dependent on technology transfer 
through the investment in the stock of human capital, effective agrarian institutions and direct 
investment in infrastructure.659  Land reform was not accompanied by these investments.  El 
Salvador’s persistent deficit in human capital reflects the state’s reluctance to invest in the 
reform beneficiary population, or the rural population in general.  Household survey data for 
                                                 
656 Childress (1997) found that land near the airport in La Paz was reported to worth $8,000 per mz. ($5,600 per ha.) 
and land in the flat Pacific fringe in Usulután is reported to be worth an average of $1725 per mz ($1200 per ha.), 
close to $7,000 per mz ($4,800 per ha.) in Zapotitan, and $4,000 per mz. ($2,800 per ha.) of land planted in coffee.  
Molina (1999) gives the most extreme example of $100,000 per manzana ($141,000 per ha.) paid for highly prized 
land near the Pan American highway in the emerging industrial district of San Juan Opico.   
657 This finding is in contrast to the World Bank’s own evaluation of the liberalization process in El Salvador and 
Chile. Touted as a “model for the region,” the World Bank’s evaluation of recent land market reforms 
(www.worldbank.org/research/lap) argues that the evidence supports land market deregulation, “to allow land under 
inefficient management to be restored to productive uses. Feared land reconcentration did not take place. Instead, 
land holding sizes merged towards medium-size family farms, arguably the most efficient. This is similar to what 
happened in Chile in the last decade.”  
658 Interview with Javier Molina, CARE microfinance specialist, San Salvador, January, 1999, about land sales as a 
platform to finance migration. 
659 The rural road deficit is illustrated in a 1994 study by FUSADES (see summary in World Bank, 1998:26-28), 
suggesting that a modest investment in the rehabilitation of 3100 km in rural roads would result in high payoffs to 
rural producers.   
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1998 show that functional illiteracy among farmers remains at 50% and some 36% reported no 
formal education.660   
 World Bank loan conditionality has slashed the number of state agronomists and 
irrigation experts, and the revised extension strategy is widely considered to have had little 
impact.661  Of the 2,441 state extension employees, only 967 remained in 1997.  Extensionists 
fell from 949 to 637, or 1 for every 313 farmers (MAG 1998).   NGOs and the private sector 
were expected to fill the gap, often with less experienced agronomist and promoters.662  As with 
credit, the number of farmers reporting access to technical assistance remains unsatisfactorily 
low and public spending on research has fallen dramatically.663  A two-tier system has evolved 
(or rather persisted) where large and medium growers access the best technology available from 
public and private agencies, while small farmers are forced to rely on under-funded and 
inadequately trained non-governmental organizations for technical assistance. 
As Gurr (2000: 157) has argued with respect to a general pattern of policy 
intermediations in response to insurgent threats, the Salvadoran land reform has been 
inconsistent and expedient, often mixing limited and partly implemented reforms with repression 
and co-optation.  These counter-insurgent motivations ensured that land reforms in El Salvador 
would do little to alter the country’s unusually high land inequality.  
 Land reform, alone, has done little to improve rural livelihoods.  This updated analysis of 
the agrarian structure has shown that the PTT has been the latest in several failed attempts to 
address land inequality through expropriative or market-based redistribution.  The post-war 
period has in fact featured the accelerated abandonment of agriculture policy reforms by the 
Salvadoran state.  Several points that attest to this conclusion bear repeating.  1) Agriculture has 
                                                 
660 Farmers were defined as those 16 or older, with at least half a manzana of land.  The 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM 
estimated primary enrollment rates near 90% overall (81.5% for rural women).  Enrollment rates dropped 
dramatically for high school level education.  For population age 14-18, enrollment rates were 60% overall, 46% in 
rural areas, and 44% for rural women.   
661 Interview with John Horton, IDB, June 1999, and IDB (2001e) Project Profile I: Retooling Agro-Enterprise 
Program.  See also PRISMA (1998), Foley (1997) and Fogaroli and Stowell (1997).  
662 IICA (1997) estimates the NGO and Farmer Cooperative Federations were supplying 386 technical specialists to 
the agricultural sector in 1991.   
663 Survey results for 1995 show that less than 20% of farmers report having received any technical assistance.  Real 
public expenditures in agricultural related research and development has fallen from $ 3.5 million in the early 1980s 
to about $1 million in 1994.  World Bank (1998: 5). 
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declined to just one in five jobs as a source of primary employment.  2) Landlessness has 
diminished in the post-war period, but land security (land ownership or rental as a percent of 
agrarian occupations) has not improved.  3)  Reduced landlessness is largely due to the exodus 
from agriculture rather than the modest increase in access to land, strongly suggesting that rural 
development strategies are dominated by migration from agricultural employment to the urban 
informal sector or the U.S., rather than the extensification, intensification or diversification of 
agriculture.  4) The estimated departmental Gini coefficients suggest that modest improvement in 
land distribution has occurred in some regions, while backsliding has occurred in others.  The 
single owner 500 to 1000 hectare haciendas of the past are for the most part gone, but at the same 
time small and medium farms have become increasingly fragmented and urbanization has taken 
some prime farmland out of production.  The result is a national land distribution pattern as 
skewed as the early 1970s. 
This transition away from El Salvador’s traditional agrarian economy was induced 
internally on one hand by the proliferation of some 80,000 maquila jobs around San Salvador, 
and by a steady decline in credit and investment in rural areas, particularly after 1995 when 
reconstruction aid flows dropped dramatically.  The reasons for the lack of credit and investment 
in the rural economy are both financial and political.  Low profitability and high risk were 
perceived to be associated with unclear land tenure in communities of newly organized PTT 
properties and mounting agrarian debt in the cooperative sector.  Also, many families on the 
boards of directors of the principal banks were also the same families that had lost land to the 
FMLN in the post-war settlement.   
A third factor was the neoliberal reform program that dismantled nearly all publicly 
subsidized price supports, credit subsidies, state marketing programs for agriculture and the 
defense of an overvalued exchange rate.   A final factor that turned against rural investment was 
the decline in international terms of trade for traditional export crops (sugar, coffee, beef), which 
have fallen from an index of 107 to 87 (between 1995-2003).664  The crop price index for 
                                                 
664 BCR, 2005.  Terms of trade deterioration was due in large part to the collapse in coffee prices.  An almost fixed 
exchange rate of 8.75 colones to the dollar was staunchly maintained throughout the 1990s, despite the increasing 
flow of dollars via remittances.  The inflow of dollars caused the appreciation of the local currency, also penalizing 
agricultural exports. 
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Salvadoran producers has declined 35% from its 1980 level.665  As a result, cotton had largely 
disappeared, sugar production has lost profitability, and coffee and beef prices collapsed at 
different points in the 1990s.   
Post-war rural development initiatives were also handicapped by growing environmental 
vulnerability.  Natural disasters (drought in 1993, 1994 & 1997, floods, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999 
and 2005 and two earthquakes in 2001) have disproportionately impacted the rural economy, 
hastening migration as an increasingly essential household survival strategy. 666   In 1998, 2.5 
million people (or 42%) lived in rural areas out of a total estimated population of 6 million.  Of 
the 300,000 farms in the country, 80,000 landowners or renters reside in major cities.  Many of 
the growing number of NGO professionals also live in urban areas and commute to rural 
communities on the weekends.  There are only about 1 million rural incomes.   
 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The political and economic implications of the Peace Accords triggered a profound 
recomposition within the principal insurgent and counter-insurgent political movements and their 
respective mobilization networks.  ARENA traded political concessions to the FMLN in return 
for control over an economic reform process that privatized much of the state and dramatically 
lowered economic dependence on agriculture.  El Salvador now ranks as one of the most open 
economies in Latin America.  Despite El Salvador’s showcase reputation as an economic success 
story, the results have been mixed.  Persistently high inequality affirms that post-war policies 
have continued to benefit the few.  Poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability have failed to 
                                                 
665 Agriculture share of GDP is highly influenced by price shifts in coffee, which are notably volatile.  Agricultural 
exports as a percent of total exports also fell from 70% in the early 1980s to 28% in the early 1990s.  Salvadoran 
Central Bank data, cited in Acevedo, Barry and Rosa (1995), see also World Bank (1998, Appendix 2), Foley and 
Thale (1997) and Pelupessy (1998) 
666 Hurricane Mitch entered El Salvador from Honduras to the north as a tropical storm causing between $300 
million and $1 billion in damages and taking 300 lives.  Two earthquakes occurred in January and February 2001, 
causing over 1,000 deaths and $1.6 billion in damage (12% GDP), leaving over 300,000 homeless.  These 
earthquakes are comparable to the 1986 quake that killed 1,200 and caused $1.2 billion in damages (CEPAL, 2001). 
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generate the expected levels of growth or investment.  Migration, intensified by the abandonment 
of the rural economy, has produced costly side effects, including loss of human capital and social 
disintegration.   
ARENA achieved its primary goal of social and political stability that allowed it to 
engineer the massive state privatizations that culminated in 1998.  However, the political cost 
was an unsettling transition within the ruling coalition that favored the elites that had diversified 
their interests beyond agriculture, and punished those elites most dependent upon agrarian rents.  
The latter extracted political concessions to cushion their economic decline and resisted the 
distributive goals of peace process from within the key posts of post-war government.  The 
restoration of civil authority over the military meant that enforcing the priorities of the party 
would require a more diverse set of collective action strategies.  Decentralization was viewed by 
ARENA as a means to safeguard and expedite the privatization of the state and to stabilize its 
ruling coalition through the distribution of new selective benefits to dissident agrarian hardliners, 
but would open little new space for local actors.  
The FMLN ceded control of the economy in exchange for political reforms and an 
economic reinsertion package for ex-combatants.  Electoral gains, increasingly weighted by 
urban turnout, secured new legislative and municipal power and consolidated the FMLN’s place 
as the principal opposition party.  Backed by the United Nations Observer Mission, the FMLN 
has improved the accountability of key political institutions and has contributed to unprecedented 
contract monitoring and compliance with respect to the most contentious areas of the Peace 
Accords (demobilization, land transfer, funding pledges). However, recurrent internal divisions 
over political strategy have contributed to the failure to win the Presidency, which in turn has 
severely limited the FMLN’s ability to advance alternative economic policies or to offer viable 
rural development options in particular.  For much of the insurgent base, including many 
demobilized combatants in ex-conflictive zones, the PRN did little to improve the quality of life.  
Lacking the same normative incentives and institutional allies (e.g. the Catholic Church, strong 
gremios) to rally collective action in its base as during the war, the FMLN has also had to cede 
greater autonomy to new local actors (NGOs, municipal and community authorities) in order to 
shore up its own mobilization network.  Decentralization and local economic development have 
provided the means for reinventing the principled incentives for collective action during the war 
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and for channeling significant resources to local actors as a platform to mount contentious 
challenges at the national level.   
 Greater political competition, social stability and relative economic gains, all features of 
the national context that have framed the debate over decentralization, nevertheless fail to 
obscure a second consequence of this shift in the post-war political opportunity structure - the 
accelerated decline of agriculture.  The evidence presented suggests that policies adopted by 
successive ARENA governments have hastened the decline in the agrarian labor force and 
depressed the incomes of those still working in agriculture.  Despite two decades of land reform, 
El Salvador continues to have surprisingly high levels of landlessness and land inequality.  Of 
the possible rural development strategies that include diversification or intensification of 
agriculture, small farm families seem to be choosing migration.   
Recomposition of insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization networks has played out 
differently. For ARENA, the fundamental shift was horizontal, between one faction of the 
Salvadoran oligarchy to another.  Decentralization responded to the modernizing elite’s top 
priority of safeguarding the economic reform package, but also to a steady effort to expand the 
party’s base and to consolidate its control over large parts of the countryside.  However, the mere 
promise of devolution of power to municipal authority plus the selective distribution of benefits 
to the hard-line agrarian elite were sufficient to maintain broad party loyalty and preserve the 
capacity to mobilize it rural base during elections.  Control over the spoils of public office has 
enabled ARENA to manage the realignment of ruling coalition elites with lower political costs. 
For the FMLN, the fundamental shift has been vertical, with new leaders ascending or 
entering politics from municipal office or the NGO field.  The exclusion from state office and the 
impulse from below sparked the FMLN’s promotion of decentralization as a central element in 
its electoral and economic strategy.  Without the capacity to redistribute state patronage, the 
FMLN had to rely much more on the actual expansion and improvement of self-governance at 
the municipal level.  While the ARENA strategy enriched the modernizers and placated 
dissenting elites, little space was opened for new local actors.  The acquisition of political 
credibility in local governance by FMLN mayors, councils and NGOs opened unprecedented 
space within Salvadoran society and within the party itself for the inclusion of a new class of 
elites and interests. 
  449
This chapter begins to illustrate how insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization 
networks adapted wartime collective action strategies to an altered post-war political opportunity 
structure.  In both FMLN and ARENA networks, competition between modernizing or reformist 
tendencies and more hard-line elites characterized the extent to which the party diversified its 
wartime reliance on hierarchy CA strategies.  For ARENA, the reform of the military and the 
gradual disappearance of death squad violence forced a shift to alternative strategies for 
mobilizing support and sanctioning dissent.  For the most part, the preferred CA strategy 
remained a top-down and clientelist approach.  With the backing of the primary donors (USAID 
and IFIs) a hierarchy CA strategy was most evident in the insular and exclusive design of the 
PRN, and the defense of the economic reform program.  Beginning with the Peace Accords, 
however, ARENA was forced to negotiate with international authorities (principally ONUSAL) 
and after 1997, an FMLN opposition over a wider cross-section of policy issues.  Like the 
FMLN, ARENA adopted a tit-for-tat Contract strategy (e.g. delays in funding provision, foot-
dragging on the purging of officers) regarding the implementation of the least desirable Peace 
Accords commitments.  ARENA used the selective benefits derived from privatization and the 
distribution of government posts to maintain the discipline within the ruling coalition, as well as 
reward potential voters (extension of civic action campaigns).  However, steady gains by the 
FMLN also forced a heavy investment in public relations (Market) strategies to shape voter 
sympathies.   Still, the counter-insurgent repertoire of collective action strategies remain firmly 
embedded in a hierarchy approach which best characterizes empowerment by invitation. 
In contrast, the FMLN faced two important challenges to reconstituting its mobilization 
network in the post-war period.  The first was a loss of ideological unity in opposition to a single 
enemy and the second was the loss of monopoly control over the flow of resources to the 
insurgent groups.  Having minimal control over the flow of post-war reconstruction funding and 
a weak political capacity in general, the FMLN was forced to abandon hierarchy CA strategies 
that dominated wartime decision making.  Local CA strategies became the platform upon which 
national challenges to ARENA would be eventually mounted. 
 In effect, the transition to alternative CA strategies proved relatively easy because these 
alternatives had been cultivated over the past two decades.  Investments in self-government, both 
at the municipal and community level, as well as the formation of NGOs to defend local 
interests, represented the two dominant post-war CA strategies.  Depending on the local context, 
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both of these local CA strategies have coexisted, but varied between Community related 
contingencies (social norms, informality) or Contract bargaining within established rules.   
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VII. CHAPTER SEVEN: DECENTRALIZATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INSURGENT 
AND COUNTER-INSURGENT EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES 
 
 
The grand bargain embodied by the Peace Accords and the ensuing political and economic 
implications are the primary context for understanding the shifts in political opportunity have 
both opened and closed space for decentralization.  In short, the political viability of the National 
Reconstruction Plan hinged on the participation of the beneficiary population.  Decentralization 
was therefore viewed as the primary mechanism for ensuring this participation (MIPLAN 1991).  
Indeed, right and left ideologies converged to endorse decentralization as a goal of post-
war reconstruction.  From below, NGOs, local organizations and municipal governments 
flourished during the final years of the war and claimed to represent local demands for greater 
democratic control over post-war reconstruction, thus reinforcing FMLN calls for devolution of 
resources and responsibilities.  From above, beginning with the Cristiani administration, ARENA 
proposed the deconcentration and privatization of state functions that privileged a reorganization 
of state level agencies under the control of those local actors that remained loyal to the party’s 
broader economic agenda.  This confluence of interests contributed to the opportunity for post-
war decentralization.  In this chapter, I trace the shifts in the political opportunity structure that 
explain the rise of local government, NGOs and social safety nets as elements of insurgent and 
counter-insurgent empowerment strategies.     
Given the opportunity defined by shifting elite alignments and an unfavorable rural 
economic environment of high inequality, how have rural populations overcome collective action 
problems to make decentralization work?  Competing approaches that have featured stabilizing, 
top-down decentralization versus regime challenging, contentious and bottom-up 
decentralization represent extensions of the wartime counter-insurgent and insurgent strategies to 
the post-war period.  The emergence of local institutions in post-war El Salvador illustrate these 
two rival models of decentralized empowerment.  The government viewed the PRN as 
  452
subservient to the higher priority market reforms that had been carefully insulated from all post-
war negotiations.  The FMLN and many organizations associated with the reconstruction of 
insurgent controlled regions of the country expressed much higher expectations that the PRN 
should be the means for a viable rural economy rooted in a vision of human liberation.   
At the same time, decentralization was a product of civil war, conditioned by twenty year 
contest between insurgent and counter-insurgent forces.  Wartime decentralization involved two 
very different empowerment strategies to solve collective action problems - strategies of 
empowerment through conflict in FMLN zones of influence and empowerment by invitation in 
government zones of influence.  These same strategies have been adapted to political opportunity 
of post-war decentralization, and have shaped an array of new local institutions and leaders that 
in turn have anchored post-war mobilization networks.  ARENA pushed decentralization from 
above, reinvented constantly as an alliance with rural and local actors, but mostly as an 
additional means for removing the state from the market and delegating the residual 
administrative duties to local government. The FMLN organized local forces to demand both 
fiscal and administrative (although not political) decentralization from below as corrective to a 
clientelist, often corrupt central administration of public resources.667   
What allowed decentralization to even get off the ground as a national issue was a shared 
disdain for the ineffectiveness and corruption in the public sector.   The impetus from the right 
and left to empower local institutions and leaders gave decentralization a political constituency 
within the panoply of national reconstruction issues.   
A question raised in this chapter is whether the proliferation of NGOs has increased non-
elite bargaining capacity.  Have NGOs contributed to empowerment or have they merely 
provided a substitute for ineffective or exclusionary government services.  A contest that began 
in the 1970s to win over the "hearts and minds" of the rural population foreshadowed the rise of 
the NGO along with municipal government as the two dominant and competing forms of social 
and political organization in postwar reconstruction.   Donors took sides by funding either 
municipal government and social safety net programs on the right (in the case of several bi-
lateral donors, mainly USAID) or NGOs working in conflictive zones on the left (in the case of 
                                                 
667 Carey (2003: 43-34) provides a list of thirteen political reforms that would largely transfer power from the party 
to the voter.  Some FMLN Congressional leaders have opposed reforms that would eliminate an open list ballot (as 
opposed to closed lists indicated by party symbols) and single member districts, although the FMLN tends to favor 
the other reforms. 
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many European aid agencies).  Communities in zones of wartime FMLN control supported 
NGOs and reserved hostility for many mayors.  This pattern of institutional preferences was 
reversed in zones of government control.  NGOs allied with the FMLN have tended to prioritize 
contentious collective actions to demand among other fulfillments of the Peace Accords, 
expropriative redistribution of assets.  Controlled until recently by ARENA or PCN mayors, 
municipalities have tended to emphasize conventional modes of participation and gradual 
improvements in public services.   
Complicating the NGO-local government competition that resulted from wartime 
empowerment strategies, significant shifts within the NGO sector itself reveal how these 
organizations have been accommodated into competing strategies of empowerment by invitation 
or empowerment through conflict. The spectrum of Salvadoran civil society organizations, 
within which NGOs carry most weight, have had a tremendous influence on post-war 
development, both at the local and national level.  As many as 200 INGOs have channeled as 
much as $30 million per year to some 500 NGOs in El Salvador during the height of post-war 
reconstruction funding.  However the evolution of the NGO sector (which refers to the complex 
network of linkages between donors, NGOs and gremios) also reflects of the shifting balance of 
political opportunity described in the previous chapter.   
Post-war reconstruction revealed the absence of any clear division of labor among local 
institutions.  The improvisation of local institutional roles contributed to growing tension within 
the sector between NGOs and gremios.  NGOs represent a Contract collective action strategy.  
Formal organizations are strategies to improve individual bargaining capacity for development 
resources within an accepted set of constraints.  Gremios represent a Community collective 
action strategy.  Rooted in common values, gremios tend to be less formal but more 
representative of a defined membership.  Collective action among gremios is more contingent 
upon group solidarity. While NGOs initially emerged as service providers, many have 
encroached upon the political space previously reserved for gremios.  Under pressures to 
professionalize and through the crowding out of gremios, NGOs have contributed to a 
depoliticization of this space. 
The chapter will be organized in three parts.  In the first section, I explore in broad brush 
strokes, recent historical trends in the emergence of civil society organizations and local 
government.  In sections two and three, I explain how decentralization was accommodated as an 
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instrument of post-war counter-insurgent and insurgent empowerment strategies.  I conclude by 
summarizing the evidence illustrating how within competing empowerment strategies, municipal 
governments and NGOs evolved on different tracks and coordination between them has become 
a central issue.   
 
 
A.  THE UN-CIVIC ORIGINS OF NGO-MUNICIPAL COORDINATION IN EL SALVADOR 
 
Local institutions have a long, yet poorly understood history in El Salvador.668  To appreciate the 
post-war changes in Salvadoran civil society, parallel to the revival or reinvention of municipal 
government, an abridged timeline of how NGOs, INGOs and gremios have co-evolved in the 
past half century will help fill in this picture. 
For most of the 20th century, Salvadoran civil society has been militarized and civil 
society organizations along with local government have functioned in complement to or as an 
extension of the state’s police function, particularly within the country’s rural periphery.  Prior to 
the 1960s, civil society was divided between elite benevolence, social and professional 
associations, spiritualist Catholic groups (Caballeros de Cristo Rey, Orden de Maria), and the 
dangerous classes that threatened social order.  E.A. Wilson documents the existence of social 
and ethnic clubs (casinos), labor federations (las ligas rojas), indigenous cofradías, and special 
interest associations that were flourishing prior to the 1932.  Typical of these was the San 
Salvador casino which boasted the membership of 429 elite families in 1929 that probably 
enjoyed joint membership in the Salvadoran Country Club and possibly in the Circulo Militar.  
Adams traces the proliferation of casinos to larger rural towns in the 1940s and 1950s, 
noting that Jucuapa, Usulután had three of these social clubs, one for each class.  The Casino 
Jucuapense, composed of local upper class people (provincial elites), and the Casino 
                                                 
668 This section draws from a longer unpublished paper on the evolution of Salvadoran civil society, presented in 
2000 at an ARNOVA Conference.  Historical sources include Richard Adams (1957), E.A. Wilson (1969), González 
(1992) Montes (1984).  More recent civil society sources include UNDP 1992 Registry of NGOs; Fundación Arias 
1998 Directory of Central American NGOs; El Salvador Ministry of Interior; The Inter-Hemispheric Education 
Resource Center (1988);  Montoya (1996), USAID (1996) and other USAID documents, NGO and INGO websites 
and annual reports. 
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Democrático, of middle class people, each had a jukebox, while the Casino Juvenil, a lower class 
club, could not afford one (Adams 1957: 467).  Add to these the local sports clubs, patron feast 
committees, indigenous cofradías, Ladino sodalities, and sociedades de obreros, and one is left 
with an image of relatively vibrant stock of rural social capital that nevertheless served to 
reinforce social stratification and was compatible with clientelist agrarian labor relations.669    
What little information we have about local development associational activity during 
this period suggests that the membership centered on elites or the middle classes and activity was 
limited to charity functions modeled after or consisting of federated chapters of U.S. groups, 
including the National Anti-Tuberculosis Fund, Alcoholics Anonymous, various Societies of 
Wives of the Professions, Friends of Culture, Friends of the Earth, and the National Federation of 
Parent’s Societies.  The focus of these groups was cultural or philanthropic, but largely 
paternalistic in character and strictly apolitical, aiming at assisting individuals or families rather 
than addressing community-wide or broader social problems (Gonzalez 1991: 44). 
The revolutionary tumult that elicited the Alliance for Progress also stimulated the 
formation of humanitarian service oriented organizations, whose aim was the improvement of 
education and health services.  Often following a U.S. model, chapters of northern based 
federated civic associations were opened in El Salvador during the 1960s and 1970s.  These 
included such groups as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Lions Club, International Executive Service 
Corps, the Salesian Brothers Association and the Salvadoran Demographic Association – 
(established in 1960 to council parents in family planning).  Here, Alliance for Progress 
programs joined forces with the newly founded Christian Democratic Party and a renovating 
impulse within the Catholic Church to address rural poverty.   Food for work programs were 
administered by CARITAS, the social service arm of the international Roman Catholic Church, 
and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), an international relief oriented NGO  Rural cooperative 
assistance was provided by Foundation for the Promotion of Cooperatives (Funprocoop), and 
then directly by USAID to the Union Comunal Salvadoreño.  Although these initiatives mark a 
shift in the work of the church toward structural change, mutual aid and anti-communism 
continued to define this deepening of rural associational activity.  Gonzalez (1991: 42)  
                                                 
669 Adams (1957:491) estimates an indigenous population of 400,000 in El Salvador for 1950, although many had 
divested themselves of the distinctive cultural traits to become what the author refers to as the “New Ladino.” 
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underscores the counter-insurgent objectives of these programs that redirecting organizational 
energy from socio-political concerns toward service provision. 670   
With the expansion of the Central American Common Market, the 1960s witnessed a 
spike in the formation of business associations, reflecting the emergence of a Salvadoran 
industrial elite.  The origins of the oldest planter associations (coffee and sugar) date back to the 
1930s.671  With the formation of ANEP, the peak business confederation in 1966, El Salvador 
experienced the creation of trade associations for each industry.  At the same time, increasing 
union activity and political competition by the late 1960s elicited a concerted counter-insurgent 
mobilization of civil society to pacify growing unrest.672  Alliance for Progress policies 
promoted the formation to two types of conservative civil society groups.  The first was rooted in 
the more hard-line anti-communist segments of the elite. The Organización Nacionalista 
Democrática (ORDEN), was established in 1967 as a rural paramilitary network of informers 
and thugs commanded by the military and the more reactionary elements of the Salvadoran right 
and would become one of the most important civil society organizations in the pre-war period. 
673 
Secondly, a slew of small betterment associations, private sector charity foundations and 
development NGOs formed during the 1970s – a period of crumbling political stability.  Like the 
industrial elite that never quite managed to establish political autonomy or economic concessions 
from the reactionary landed elite, this apparent pre-war expansion of civic activity was swept 
aside.  What began in the 1960s as a reformist movement within USAID and the Catholic 
Church collided head on with the Salvadoran oligarchy, resulting in the polarization and 
                                                 
670 The Episcopal Church also created two important social development NGOs during this period, the Christian 
Family Rehabilitation Center (1968) and the Center for Economic Development and the Spiritual Recuperation of 
Man (1972). 
671 Some of the most influential associations include Asociación Cafetalera, 1929; ABECAFE, 1930; Asociación 
Azucarera, 1931; Asociación Ganadería, 1932, Cooperativa Algodonera, 1940. 
672 Two confederations of public worker and manufacturing unions were organized in the early 1950-1957 under the 
Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños with ties to the Communist Party) and the Confederación 
General de Sindicatos (with ties to the PCN), but broad based work stoppages did not occur until 1967. 
673 ORDEN was similar to the Asociación Civica Salvadorena, a network of some 2100 local patriotic committees 
that served a similar function in 1932.  One major difference was that the former included many of the poorest 
peasants as their only hope for upward mobility, while ACS charged a membership quota which effectively made it 
more of an elite club, although equally brutal.  McClintock (1985). 
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politicization of civil society and local government.  Between 1975 and 1980, Salvadoran civil 
society became increasingly divided between the social and political forces of the right and left.  
Centrist Christian Democratic interests lost influence as the military regime grew increasingly 
intolerant of legal political opposition.  In this period, El Salvador experienced a watershed in 
political organization as social demands met with systematic repression.  Socially marginalized 
groups concentrated political activities within mass organizations on the left (Bloque Popular 
Revolucionario) before severe repression carried out by other mass organizations on the right 
(Frente Agrario de la Region Oriente) and ORDEN, eliminated many of former.  Nevertheless, 
many of these gremios represented unprecedented political empowerment through widely 
coordinated disruptive activities.   
As the country slid into civil war, many civil society leaders on the left were killed, 
escaped into exile, or joined the insurgent FMLN.  Similarly, wealthy and middle class families 
alike sent their children abroad and withdrew from public life.  As civil society was drained of 
many of its most talented human resources and political space, association growth fell flat 
between 1980-84, with the exception of agricultural cooperatives.  The 1980 land reform created 
some 80,000 beneficiaries, about half of which were then organized into cooperatives.  
Federations of all political stripes, but most loyal to the Christian Democrats, formed to represent 
the cooperativistas, accounting for some of the growth in gremios during the early 1980s.  These 
agricultural gremios eventually drifted away from the Christian Democrats and shifted their 
support either to the FMLN or ARENA   
An oversupply of unemployed professionals and dissident intellectuals swelled the ranks 
of relief and development organizations.  With the proliferation of local NGOs serving in various 
support roles to internal and externally displaced communities, many of these organizations also 
adopted political goals, aligned to some extent with the FMLN but dedicated to the specific goal 
of rebuilding civil society in El Salvador.  While many of these organizations actively channeled 
assistance and received direction from the FMLN high command, within the community of local 
emergency organizations working in El Salvador during the war, there existed a range of 
political views and relative autonomy with respect to alignment with the FMLN, the government 
or a neutral pragmatism. 
International NGOs flooded El Salvador during the civil war, striking alliances with key 
actors in both insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization networks.  International donors of 
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the right and left were largely negligible prior to 1979 in comparison to donor NGOs of the 
center (including groups whose political orientations are undefined).  However, beginning in the 
1980s, the struggle between protagonist forces in El Salvador was effectively transnationalized, 
both in terms the Cold War struggle among rival donors and the increase in Salvadoran 
migration to the U.S..674  Of the largest 170 INGOs identified in El Salvador, two thirds arrived 
after 1979, 33% have ties to the FMLN, 16% have ties to the PDC, 13% have ties to ARENA, 
and 38% have no political ties.675 
USAID strategically recruited international NGOs for assistance in implementing its 
counter-insurgent civic action programs beginning in 1983.  Accepting AID funds was 
conditioned on explicit or implicit support for counter-insurgent goals.  International donor 
NGOs from center to right on the political spectrum accepted AID funds and participated in 
relief activities supportive of civic action programs.676  The neoliberal think tank, FUSADES, 
and its family of 38 right wing NGOs perhaps best represents the U.S. preference for civil 
society alternative to insurgent organizations. 
The competition among international donors dissipated noticeably after the Cold War 
ended in 1989, as donor interests shifted to other crises and Central America became less 
compelling from a political or humanitarian standpoint (Mujal-Leon 1989; Biekart 1994).  One 
indicator of this decline is the fact that Sister City relationships between U.S. and Salvadoran 
cities reported by one NGO that administers these ties fell from 75 in 1992 to 24 in 2000.677  The 
resurgence of new interest among international NGOs after the 1992 signing of the peace accords 
does not reflect prior ideologically polarized commitments of aid.  While the Salvadoran left has 
                                                 
674 One study of Holt (1988) cited in Gonzalez (1991:53) estimated that by 1988, as many as 100 international donor 
NGOs had installed themselves in Central America, channeling as much as $200-250 million in resources annually.  
Local NGOs formed during this same period were estimated at 600, providing services to some 5 million Central 
Americans, perhaps 20% of the region’s population.   
675 Description of the data is given in McElhinny (2000a). 
676 International NGO allies of USAID during the war included CARE, Project Hope, World Concern, Catholic 
Relief Services, the International Rescue Committee, the Family Foundation of America, OEF International, Knights 
of Malta, AIFLD, Technoserve, NRECA, CLUSA, CREA International, Save the Children, as well as various 
Evangelical Institutions.  Key national NGOs included the Salesian Society, CALMA, the Telethon Foundation, 
CESAD, Fundasal, COMCORDE, AGAPE, Corporación Fe y Trabajo, FUSAI, FEPADE, FUNDASALVA, and 
CONVITEC.  See GAO (1992). 
677 Correspondence with Adam Flint, Ciudades Hermanas, Nov. 1, 2000. 
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continued to depend almost exclusively on international NGO assistance, the government has 
relied more than ever on multilateral and bilateral funding and remittances.   
Following the Salvadoran civil war, it would be no surprise to find a civil society 
depleted and unable or unwilling to assume its critical role in any post-war political system.  
However, observers of the peace process in El Salvador have called attention to the rapid growth 
of NGOs along with the strengthening of local government as evidence that civil society groups 
are effectively “empowering” ordinary citizens to hold the state accountable (Bennett 1995; 
Blair, Booth, Córdova and Seligson 1995).  Political liberalization and the greater availability of 
external funding spurred a wave of growth in the formation of associations to address all aspects 
of national reconstruction.   
Despite the tremendous human costs and continuity of violence in the post-war period, 
Salvadoran civil society has experienced a remarkable associational fluorescence in the last 
decade, in many ways unlike any other phase of civil society growth that preceded it.   The past 
fifty years have seen a slow steady, but increasingly politicized increase in organizational growth 
through 1979, which was then stunted in the darkest days of the civil war violence (1980-84).  
The aggregate trend rises again in the late 1980s as political freedoms were restored, only to turn 
sharply upward in the post-war period of 1990 to the present.678  More Salvadoran groups have 
formed since 1992 than in the previous three decades combined.679  The 5,000 non-governmental 
organizations that are currently registered with the Salvadoran government, represent an overall 
organizational density of 0.8 per 1000 Salvadorans.680  If an estimated 2,000 community 
development groups (Asociaciones de Desarollo Communal, ADESCOs), 1,750 local school 
reform committees (asociaciones comunales educativos, ACE), water users associations, sports 
teams, women’s committees, informal religious groups (1,500 Catholic parishes, 3,300 
Evangelical Churches, or Christian Base Communities), organizational density spikes to 2.0 per 
                                                 
678 Based on estimates of organizational growth in McElhinny (2000a) 
679 Registered NGOs were reported to be 732 in 1992, 2025 in 1996 and 5,000 in 2005.  Source: Communication 
with Ministry of Interior/Gobernación, Nov. 2005.  This suggested pattern is similar to that illustrated in the graph of 
NGOs by year of Ministry certification shown in UNDP (1992: 487), although the missing organizations (some 
2,000 or more) from the UNDP list do not accurately reflect the shifts that I mention.  
680 This statistic doesn’t include Asociaciones de Desarollo Comunal (ADESCOS).  Only 40 such ADESCOs were 
formed during an ill-fated effort between 1980-1984.  Some 1,403 ADESCOS were registered by 1994 with an 
average of 30 members per ADESCO.  Ministerio de Interior (1994a). 
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1000.681  The relative change between the anemic organizational growth in El Salvador during 
the 1960s compared to the frenetic associational activity of the 1990s, by itself, is an impressive 
change.  By some criteria, we would expect to find democratic dividends on this considerable 
deposit of social capital (Putnam 1993). 
How might we characterize the influence of the NGO sector?  One factor is how much 
NGOs now contribute to overall financial capital investment in democratic development?  A 
study by a local NGO estimates that the U.S. and European NGO community alone account for 
$46 million in investment and constitute 6000 jobs.682  In a smaller survey of 80 Salvadoran 
associations/NGOs in 1995, Foley and Hasbún report that the average number of NGO 
employees was 27, and the average budget during 1994 was $300,000, of which two thirds 
passed through as project investments (Foley, Hasbún, Córdova 1995: 24).  Based on a 
conservative extrapolation of this data for the entire NGO sector, total employment by NGOs in 
the mid-1990s would be 12,500 and total budgetary resources would be $50 million.683  Compare 
this to an estimated 23,000 state employees that were fired since 1991 after privatization, or the 
11,000 current municipal employees and total municipal budget of $80.684  Considering that the 
total number of public employees in 1994 was 122,881, the NGO and municipal sectors 
represent 12% and 9% of the total public sector labor force, respectively. 
The proliferation of NGOs since the mid-1980s also defies clear ideological 
classification.  Clearly, this rapid expansion of civil society has departed from the mass 
organization form of the 1970s, toward a smaller, less encompassing form today.  The dominant 
trend has been an increase in NGOs or INGOs without links to any broader horizontal federation 
or placement within vertical or international structures.  These groups tend to represent single 
                                                 
681 These estimates are based on unconfirmed government and denominational sources. DIDECO is the source on 
ADESCOS, most have formed since 1990, increasing from an estimated 718 in 1994 to over 2000 by late 1990s.  
See Orellana, et al. (1999: 149). 
682 PRISMA (1996). The 1992 UNDP registry of 186 NGOs reported a total employment of 6,014 (ave. 32.3). 
Although only 16 NGOs accounted for 50% of these jobs, with AGAPE Association employing 710 at the time. 
683 I conservatively use 500 NGOs, an average of 25 employees, and an average budget of $100,000.  This reflects a 
widely recognized attribution within the NGO sector after the PRN. 
684 Over 40% of the total municipal budget and 31% of municipal employees pertain to San Salvador.  Municipal 
employee estimates are from Nickson (1990:75) for 1994.  Privatization has led to the downsizing of 6,700 
employees at MOP, as well as hundreds more at ANTEL (telephony) and CEL (energy). 
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community or single-issue associations.  It is these types of civil society groups to which Putnam 
pointed in tracing the economic and political success of the Northern Italian regions.  However, 
Salvadoran NGOs have weak or no ties to any other organizations other than their respective 
donors or membership. Very few new regional development NGOs have formed since 1992.  
Similarly, the growth in internationally federated clubs and chapters that were popular before the 
war also remains low, and has dropped sharply after 1992.   
 The prevalence of small, disconnected NGOs tends toward an emphasis on horizontal, 
within-group ties, and to de-emphasize the importance of between-group ties or vertical ties with 
the state.  The vast majority of these newly formed NGOs do not engage in political advocacy 
and collective action strategies tend toward individual or community targets, rather than 
structural or policy issues.685 Especially where political institutions are weak and structures of 
inequality are entrenched, as they are in El Salvador, the proliferation of small groups may leave 
civil society less able to coordinate collective action in contentious defense of political or 
economic rights.   
Local NGO growth has eclipsed gremios as the fastest growing type of civil society 
organization.  Prior to 1960, private sector and professional gremios largely aligned with the 
right far outnumbered those aligned with the left, center or politically undefined groups.  
However, by the 1970s, the sharpest increase in gremio formation was among groups of the left 
and right, who had achieved relative political parity by 1979.  After 1979, the gremio formation 
rate fell dramatically across the political spectrum, with the exception of the left, which 
experienced resurgence after a restoration of some civil liberties in 1984, and again after the 
conflict ended in 1992.   
Gremios assumed an unparalleled importance during the 1970s.  This shift from mutual 
aid or benevolence associations in the 50s and 60s to broad based human and economic rights 
coalitions in the 1970s reveals a pre-war experience of empowered civil society groups, forming 
both horizontal ties to link a diversity of groups as well as vertical ties to the state.  While more 
groups were forming than ever before, a wide variety of groups folded their actions into larger, 
hierarchical organizations.  These same horizontal and vertical ties to the state were strengthened 
among civilian and paramilitary organizations on the right.   
                                                 
685 Crosby, et al. (1997: 36-37)  Foley, Hasbún and Córdova find that less than a third of their 1995 NGO sample 
engage in political advocacy, and only about 1 in 10 promote inter-agency coordination. 
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Another indicator that the increase in local NGOs seems to have come at the expense of 
gremios is suggested by the steady decline in total number of active unions, which have dropped 
from 127 to 103 between 1975 and 1993 (Fitzsimmons and Anner 1998; Aguilar Guillen 1999).    
Union affiliates as a percent of the economically active population have also dropped from about 
5% to about 3%.  Salvadoran unions have decayed for a variety of reasons, not least of which is 
their dependence on external funding and political ties to the left and right.  However, the 
implicit tradeoff within civil society between highly politicized gremios and disparate, single-
issue associations constitutes a shift toward a more accommodative civil society.  This shift also 
reinforces a reorientation from between-group and vertical ties to within-group ties. 
In sum, the evolution of Salvadoran civil society over the past five decades, very much 
rests on the experience of mass collective action and periods of sustained confrontation with 
authorities despite the certainty of repression.  On the one hand, this foundation defies the logic 
of pluralist democratic theorists such as Putnam, who posit the slow, non-conflictive accretion of 
social capital through the face to face encounters within small associations.  Here civilians 
confronted the praetorian state face to face in the streets and suffered tremendous repression as a 
result.  However, a solid foundation of social capital was nevertheless produced in the 
increasingly violent, politicized struggles in which civil society and local government were often 
at odds.  On the other hand, the notable trend toward more accommodative and less politicized 
civil society activity may support Putnam’s thesis in the medium term. 
How has this legacy of social capital formation been appropriated by insurgent and 
counter-insurgent empowerment strategies in the context of post-war decentralization? 
 
 
B.  EMPOWERMENT BY INVITATION 
 
 
In parts of the countryside under government rule during and after the war, Salvadoran peasants 
experienced empowerment by invitation, which involved the tradeoff: accommodation of local 
inequality in return for options to escape conflict.   If a community actively resisted the FMLN 
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and provided support to the Salvadoran military, victimization by state sponsored violence was 
considerably less.  In exchange for loyalty, the government promised protection from FMLN 
attacks, resources for reconstruction and development and recognition as patriotic defenders of 
the nation – even if most of these selective benefits were undersupplied.  In effect, this exchange 
constituted empowerment by invitation – a coerced contract between peasant clients and the 
patron state to withhold support for the insurgents.  This counter-insurgent empowerment 
strategy shaped the post-war bargain around a similarly styled (if not imposed) consensus for 
reconstruction.  Participation of the poor would be confined to non-threatening activities that 
effectively disregarded local inequality and was rewarded with projects.  Out of this 
conceptualization of empowerment emerged the counter-insurgent local institutions that were 
incorporated into ARENA’s vertical post-war mobilization network. 
Reflecting ARENA’s political advantage, post-war decentralized development in El 
Salvador has generally favored this top-down, stabilizing, empowerment by invitation approach, 
which has effectively excluded from the domain of citizen participation in the reconstruction 
huge areas of policy making and specific political tactics that had been at the core of the civil 
war.  Citizens are invited by ARENA to participate only in those matters considered politically 
safe and therefore often irrelevant.  In doing so, Salvadoran elites attempted to resurrect the pre-
war political tradition of mixing coercion with clientelism to preserve their authority in areas that 
were considered off-limits to most Salvadorans.  In the empowerment by invitation approach to 
decentralization, elites have legitimized conventional and non-violent forms of political 
expression and actively discredited contentious forms of challenge to their historic political and 
economic privilege.686  
The programs of post-war reconstruction and their professional staff were expected to 
revive civil society’s original, hard-working but acquiescent character through a process of 
incremental, non-conflictive change.687 This counter-insurgent decentralization strategy found 
support among a wide sector of the rural population whose preferences for stability; peace and 
                                                 
686 This authoritarian regime was no doubt formed in response to recurrent peasant rebellions in the 1830s, 1880s, 
and 1930s, each of which posed modest threats to centuries of oligarchic rule and were brutally often repressed.   
Anderson (1971), Montes (1980), Alvarenga (1996), Lauria-Santiago (1998).   
687 In other words, this view holds that civil society has been contaminated by the extremist, ideological influence of 
the FMLN, and to a much lesser degree by the intolerant violence propagated through paramilitary death squads 
organized by far right. 
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individual freedom outweighed those of equity, accountability or more substantive participation 
in decision making processes.   
In stark contrast to the radical devolution of state assets to the private sector, more far 
reaching fiscal, administrative or political decentralization has encountered stiff resistance in El 
Salvador.  The political system dominated by right wing or military authority remains highly 
centralized.  ARENA concentrates all priority decision making within the party’s 15 member 
executive council (COENA), which appoints candidates for local and national office.  Under this 
vertical system without internal primaries, local voters have almost no inter-election influence in 
ruling party decisions.  Political reforms to deepen democracy in El Salvador, beyond those 
conceded in the Peace Accords have been vigorously and successfully opposed by ARENA and 
the PCN and other itinerant smaller third parties.688  This opposition to political decentralization 
dates back to ARENA’s undermining of the PDC sponsored implementation the municipal code 
reforms after attaining a legislative plurality in 1988.  Local electoral reforms in particular have 
proven futile largely because ARENA and the PCN mayors, councils and a network of private 
contractors rule in over 200 of the countries 262 municipalities, and are disinclined to give up 
even minute quotas of power.689 
Counter-insurgent decentralization was designed to restore a modicum of electoral 
democracy at the national level, to recapture local political authority and to undermine the 
legitimacy of the FMLN through top-down reconstruction programs.  The main government 
pacification programs were fused in 1992 to create the Secretariat for National Reconstruction 
(SRN), in which ARENA agreed that the municipal government play a central, but subservient 
and executing role. Greater responsibility for public service provision was delegated to local 
government, but the purse strings remained tightly controlled by a central government, now 
leaner as a consequence of privatization but still highly politicized (Rodriquez 1999; Orellana 
                                                 
688 See Carey (2003). More accurately, ARENA has ensured the loyalty of PCN by refusing to table these reforms, 
many of which favor the third party, including changes to the proportional representation formulas (until 2006), 
extending suffrage to Salvadorans living abroad, campaign finance transparency, aggregation of low income 
municipalities, open-list PR elections at the municipal level, public voting records, public hearings and sequential 
nomination for prominent appointments.  PR elections of municipal councils was proposed by opposition parties 
prior to the 1994 elections, specifically allowing the winning party half of council seats with the mayor’s vote 
capable of ensuring a working majority.  ARENA opposed it.  Montgomery (1995: 311, fn 51) 
689 Of course FMLN mayors can be found that are equally self-interested, but both the disproportionate number of 
rightwing mayors and the relative openness to political reform by FMLN mayors suggest that the political resistance 
emanates from the former. 
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1997; Morales Ehrlich 1995; Murray 1994; Nickson 1995).  While the principal goals of the 
SRN were to integrate some 50,000 ex-combatants into Salvadoran society and address the 
reconstruction needs of the most devastated municipalities, the early allocation of projects 
reflected a perceived bias against FMLN communities.690   Unaccountable government influence 
over reconstruction programs forced several European donors, including the EU, to channel its 
post-war assistance around the SRN and directly to NGOs working in conflictive zones and 
refugee camps (in the case of many European aid agencies).691 
Local development initiatives under the Cristiani administration beginning in 1989 were 
also firmly rooted in the neoliberal framework being advised by the multilateral banks and 
USAID.  Market reforms that raised the price of basic services and food staples but removed 
public subsidy programs, required decentralized compensatory strategies that recruited local 
actors in service delivery, poverty reduction programs and quieting local discontent.  Local 
participation was channeled into the conventional and pre-determined parameters of state 
administered social safety net programs.   
As a top-down strategy, ARENA’s approach to decentralization focused 
disproportionately on a hierarchy of state level institutions in which power was concentrated at 
the top.   Within this scheme, highest priority was assigned to the state assets to be privatized 
(banks, telecommunications, energy).  The second tier included state agencies with authority 
over local actors.  However, competition within the ruling elite and donor community over the 
prospects of political capture of the spoils of reconstruction, led to the creation of parallel 
institutions performing similar functions but accountable to different elite constituencies.  Below 
this level, mayors were only cautiously and selectively incorporated to the near exclusion of 
                                                 
690 Yariv and Curtis (1992), Murray, Coletti and Spence (1994), Stanley (1993), Spence and Vickers (1994), Sollis 
(1993), WOLA (1994).  A 1992 GAO report challenges the claims of political bias against opposition NGOs, but 
confirms many of the obstacles that unnecessarily prevented greater FMLN NGO participation.  Despite spending 
considerable resources to counter these charges, USAID funded evaluations of the MEA program have effectively 
conceded to these arguments.  See Checchi (1995), Blair, et al (1995:38-52), Goodin (1996). 
691 This is not to discount that centrist political parties in Western Europe did not also provide support for political 
movements in El Salvador, such as West Germany’s and the Christian Democrats (CDU) support of the Duarte 
government.  In general, all types of European political favoritism began to fade soon after 1989.  See Mujal-Leon, 
1989.  A political genealogy of NGOs is offered by Gonzalez (1991), Foley (1996) and MacDonald (1997).  Some 
of the larger, international NGOs (CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, Plan International, Catholic Relief 
Services) also accepted U.S. funding during the war.  Most donors were reluctant to fund both NGOs and local 
government directly. 
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NGOs.  While ARENA’s post-war mobilization network represents a dispersion of access points 
to elites for civil society, direct citizen participation between elections is channeled into local 
processes that are heavily mediated by the upper institutional tiers.   
This decentralization process began with Cristiani’s first selection to implement his 1989 
“Social Rescue Plan,” through the reinvention of CONARA, the USAID funded rural counter-
insurgency program, as a social fund.692  CONARA’s principal function would be to prevent 
social instability in reaction to the stabilization reforms.  The National Reconstruction Secretariat 
(SRN), formed in 1992 to implement the PRN, incorporated CONARA and the Municipalities in 
Action Program and many of their core staff at the request of USAID but against the wishes of 
other donors.   
The influence of USAID in the first several years of reconstruction can be appreciated in 
several ways.  First, the U.S. was the most generous donor to the PRN, “front-loading” much of 
its $250 million non-reimbursable contribution in the first year when other donors were slowly 
formulating their own pledges.693  The U.S. Embassy - AID mission complex, which following 
its own reconstruction was one of the largest in the world, housing more people than were 
employed in the entire SRN.  Many on the USAID staff during PRN implementation had carried 
over from involvement in the counter-insurgency period.  Among the Salvadoran staff in 
particular, a deep suspicion of NGOs associated with the FMLN and a palpable contempt for 
FMLN leaders reinforced a climate for reconstruction that was heavily pro-ARENA.694   
Continuing the pattern set during the war, the SRN favored channeling reconstruction 
funds through municipal government with little involvement from the affected population in the 
design of these programs.  By excluding many NGOs in the initial reconstruction programs 
based on strict application of legal criteria, particularly those organizations with close ties to the 
                                                 
692 USAID provided an initial $15 million and the entire SRP was funded at about $115 million in 1989-1990.  Sollis 
(1993: 446). 
693 This timing and comparative volume of each donor to the PRN is outlined by Rosa and Foley (2000). 
694 Based on interviews with USAID staff in 1990, 1995, and 1996.  See also, Montgomery (1995: 230).  Staff that 
displayed tolerance toward any proactive collaboration with opposition organizations were in the minority.  Several 
USAID staff, both Salvadoran and expatriates, have assumed high ranking positions under various ARENA 
administrations, including the current Vice President, Vilma de Escobar. 
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FMLN, the SRN came under severe criticism and an effective boycott by European donors.695    
A GAO study found that a combination of USAID inflexibility and unenthusiastic outreach to 
opposition NGOs resulted in their exclusion from early PRN funding.  Having legal certification 
(personería jurídica) was one criterion, despite the fact that no FMLN NGO applications had 
been granted and one organization’s application had been pending for nearly four years.696   
Capacity building of opposition NGOs was needed, but few San Salvador based 
organizations had nearly the same experience with the PRN target population.  PACT (Private 
Agencies Collaborating Together, a U.S. INGO) was awarded a $2 million contract to train 
Salvadoran NGOs, yet had no experience in El Salvador.697  The UNDP complained that 
overhead charged by government friendly and international SRN contractors ran above 30%, 
while the prevailing average for UNDP projects was 10%.698  USAID has privately 
acknowledged the bias, but has only intervened reluctantly after U.S. Congress responded to 
reports detailing the more notorious resistance to community demands for broader decision 
making power.699 
In its 1994 Annual Report, the SRN claims to have channeled more than a third of its 
contingent funding through NGOs, however most went to U.S. based NGOs or local NGOs with 
a track record of USAID contracts of ARENA loyalty and none involved direct funding of 
                                                 
695 Initially, NGOs could only submit proposals through a local planning process coordinated by the SRN and 
typically dominated by a mayor.  Prior to 1994, very few mayors were receptive to opposition NGO or CSO project 
proposals (see Murray, 1994: 17-18).  NGOs without legal certification (personería jurídica, which required 
government approval) or an adequate accounting system were considered grounds for exclusion by USAID.  Despite 
some changes in the final PRN that reflected these concerns, mayors and the MEA process continued to limit the 
participation of opposition organizations. 
696 GAO (1992: 15).  USAID blamed institutional requirements for their insistence on minimal administrative and 
accounting systems. For their part, FMLN NGOs insisted that participation would have to be on their conditions, 
which included refusal to have mayors, largely ARENA or PCN, sign off on proposed projects or interference by 
USAID or SRN in the substantive nature of the proposal. 
697 The program trained 45 NGOs the first year, but dropped to only 12 in the second.   
698 Murray (1994).  Foley and Hasbún (1996) found that average administrative costs among a sample of Salvadoran 
NGOs was 29%. 
699  One author of the 1992 Yariv and Curtis study on MEA recalled that USAID officials threatened personal 
retaliation in an attempt to block the report upon its release.   
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grassroots organizations with the most experience in conflict zones.700  Another assessment of 
this money suggests that 0.62% of the NGO funding actually went directly to opposition 
NGOs.701 
In the early post-war period, community participation in local reconstruction decisions 
was limited to the cabildo abierto, or town meeting, as the primary inter-election mechanism for 
mayors to elicit citizen views on municipal resource allocation decisions.  The cabildo was first 
established under colonial rule and was associated with the “golden age” of local democracy by 
some accounts of the early post-independence period in Central America.  Nickson contests that 
the alleged virtues of the cabildo were embellished to mythologize aspects of municipal 
administration during and after Spanish rule that did not square with reality.702  Efforts by 
USAID to revive this colonial institution in advocating post-war decentralization represents 
another chapter in this mythology. 
Nickson’s account of the Latin America’s colonial legacy of local rule is instructive for 
understanding the present.  The noble virtues of popular participation and autonomy inherited by 
the post-war cabildos tends to ignore the more significant rationales and functions of the 
institution’s first cabildos.  Nickson notes that the cabildos were established in the first half 
decade of colonial rule to give legitimacy to economic aggrandizing by emerging local elites that 
was not specifically authorized and potentially inhibited by the colonial bureaucracy.  “The 
cabildos immediately became the main institution for defending and representing the interests of 
the conquistadores, and the means by which they could be rewarded financially for the risks 
undertaken during the conquest…The cabildo was responsible for distributing the land that the 
regidores (appointed council members) as settlers, craved.”  The cabildo also served to fix 
                                                 
700 SRN (1994) estimate of $137.5 million total funding allocated, $52 million was assigned to some 100 
participating NGOs. Blair, et al (1995:38).  This estimate includes 41 NGOs trained by PACT and 30 NGOs assisted 
by CRS.  In 1992, Sollis (1993b: 16) reports that of the estimated $10 million that the SRN channeled through 
NGOs, over half went to Creative Associates, $1.8 million to Catholic Relief Services, $1.3 million to FEPADE and 
FUSADES, and the rest through NGOs based in the U.S. or with ties to government. 
701 Murray et al (1995:17) provides an independent breakdown of $40.5 million SRN project funding between Feb. 
1992 and Nov. 1993, in which U.S. based INGOs received $10.95 mn. (27%), Salesian NGOs ($21.2 mn, 52.5%), 
UNDP ($5.1 mn, 12.5%) and other NGOs ($2.9 mn, 7.3%). 
702 Nickson (1990, chapter 1).  He notes that the concept of municipal autonomy was recreated by Spain in its 
colonies at the same time such institutions were increasingly under threat by centralizing forces within Spain itself 
(7). 
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prices, enslave indigenous laborers, and elect the first magistrates, although these powers were 
gradually reigned in by a predatory Crown to avoid any revolt by the towns.  Cabildo activities 
were confined to urban areas where the Spanish colonists resided, abdicating any responsibility 
to provide services to rural indigenous communities.  In other words, rural inequality in Latin 
America began with the cabildo.   
Regidores were appointed, local posts were sold or inherited, and administrative duties 
deteriorated to those most essential for delineating social status between elites and others.  
Moreover, the cabildo abierto was also a counter-insurgent institution from the outset.  Nickson 
argues: 
 
In the event of local emergencies, especially the need to organize defense against Indian attacks, or else 
for the celebration of royal occasions, the leading male citizens were invited to join the regidores in an 
open town meeting, known as the cabildo abierto.  The democratic credentials of this institution have 
been greatly exaggerated by modern historians.  Those who attended did so by invitation, not by right, 
and their opinions and suggestions were of an advisory nature and were not binding upon the cabildo. 
(1995: 10) 
 
The choice by the modern colonial power to reintroduce the cabildo abierto system could 
not have been better suited to the current chapter in this long history of empowerment by 
invitation approach to decentralized rule in El Salvador.  Cabildos were undemocratic, 
subservient, subject to strict surveillance and a fundamental mechanism for legitimating a 
redistribution of wealth among local elites – features that were less pronounced but still present 
when cabildos were restored in the late 1980s.  Nevertheless, cabildos provided a selective 
foothold for the ascent of Creole local elites (peripheral elites in my vernacular) within the 
system of colonial rule.  Independence movements used cabildo abiertos to elicit popular support 
in the years leading up to the fall of Spanish monarchy.  Architects of modern decentralization 
reforms tend to overemphasize this brief democratic moment in cabildo history, despite the 
institution’s failure to instill democratic values during the previous 300 years nor the capacity to 
stem the decline of the institution for the next century and a half (ISAM 1995: 14, Checchi and 
Checchi 1994; Blair, Booth, Córdova, and Seligson 1995: 31-38, and Seligson 1994). 
USAID qualified CONARA/SRN success in strengthening local democracy by counting 
the number of cabildos held each year, which peaked at 448 for the 115 PRN municipalities in 
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1993, then declined steadily.703    Some mayors complained that were being forced to hold 
cabildos “without knowing what to say or having resources to meet citizens needs.”704  Projects 
were selected with little if any input from the community and were motivated by “make-work” 
goals rather than any interest in participatory development.  Cabildos of this type were criticized 
for producing a one-way flow of information.  “Citizens are able to voice their views on project 
needs, but they do not have adequate access to cost or budget information to truly participate in 
priority setting.  It is rarely clear how public officials translate the voice of the community 
expressed in this manner into a list of projects to be financed” (Peterson, 1997:16).  The initial 
experience of cabildos and the MEA program failed to live up their public billing as “the key 
mechanism by which civil society is being rebuilt (Blair, Booth, Córdova and Seligson, 
1995:25).705 
The U.N. helped negotiate the return of 44 of the 68 exiled mayors that had still been 
prevented from returning to their municipalities in FMLN controlled regions.  Part of the deal 
that allowed mayors to return was an FMLN demand that changed the cabildo abierto process to 
permit that participation of a wider range of local actors in all aspects of local planning.  The 
agreement established a date for the mayor’s return, after which a  town meeting would be called 
to elect a reconstruction and development commission, determine priorities and inform the SRN 
of the community’s decisions.  NGOs, gremios and grassroots community organizations (CSOs) 
actively joined local development and reconstruction commissions.  However, the conditions 
placed by USAID on aid and ARENA influence in CONARA/SRN practices continued to focus 
on mayors as the key decision makers and project implementers.  With few elected FMLN 
                                                 
703 The municipal code obligates councils to hold 4 cabildos per year, which for the 115 PRN municipalities would 
total 460.  Goodin (1996:79) found no evidence of two other civic participation mechanisms called for by the PRN, 
(Social Monitoring Committees and Reconstruction Technical Committees) nor utilization of the Popular 
Consultation mechanism under the Municipal Code. 
704 Morazán mayor, cited in USAID (1996: 47). 
705 Despite the Municipal Code requirement that a municipal council must convene four cabildos per year in order to 
access MEA and FODES funds, a USAID survey found that most people (about two thirds of those surveyed) feel 
the cabildos do not provide enough opportunity to participate in local government, and that most attendees viewed 
cabildos as an opportunity to ask for projects rather than a space for discussing development priorities (Checchi and 
Carr, 1994:9).  The principal evaluation of USAID support for PRN programs find that quality of participation rather 
than quantity of cabildos attended matters most for local development. Goodin (1996: 70). 
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mayors before 1997, many efforts to broaden local participation in municipal reconstruction 
committees were effectively blocked or met by intimidation and violence.706 
Discomfort with USAID’s effort to corner the local development market and 
CONARA/SRN’s counter-insurgent track record and reputation for corruption, forced the 
multilateral banks to create their own alternative.  The Social Investment Fund (FIS) was created 
with funding by the Inter-American Development Bank in June 1990.  Modeled after the 
Bolivian experience, the FIS was designed to be a semi-autonomous agency with greater agility 
than the line ministries, staffed by professionals rather than political appointees and reporting 
directly to the executive.  A four year term was fixed for the FIS as a temporary complement to 
structural adjustment, with a planned budget of $180 million.  Instead, the FIS would become a 
permanent state agency, sustained by $128 million in IDB loans between 1990 and 1997.707  
 The FIS portfolio expanded upon the pre-approved menu of social infrastructure project 
that had been perfected by MEA, which in practice remained limited to schools, rural roads and 
bridges, clinics, latrines, community centers, sanitation, some reforestation and markets.  This 
menu, while redressing the tremendous deficit in social infrastructure, did not coincide with 
either the magnitude nor the diversity of locally defined needs, particularly in the areas of 
productive infrastructure, capacity building and policy advocacy.   Lacking a clear blueprint for 
how reconstruction would engage local actors, CONARA and FIS and their respective donors, 
competed to become the primary channel of compensatory funding within ARENA’s reform. 
A blueprint began to emerge in 1991, when the Cristiani administration charged the 
Ministry of Planning and Coordination of Social and Economic Development (MIPLAN) with 
the design of a Decentralization and Municipal Development Strategy as part of its global 
modernization strategy for the public sector.  A preliminary decentralization plan was announced 
in 1993 and a group of senior policy makers, the Comisión Técnico de Descentralización y 
                                                 
706 Compare the well-known experiences in Suchitoto, Nejapa and Tecoluca before and after the 1994 elections in 
which FMLN mayors, backed by strong network of NGOs, entered and the local planning processes escaped 
ARENA control to become three of the most exemplary participatory budgeting experiences in the country.  See 
Murray (1994), Yariv and Curtis (1992), SACDEL (1998).  ARENA strongholds, such as in much of department of 
La Union, saw little space opened for FMLN participation before or after the 1994 elections.  Montgomery (1995: 
231)  
707 IDB loans Local Development Program (1067/OC-ES, ES-0109) and Local Development Program - Stage II 
(1352/OC-ES, ES-0120). 
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Desarollo Municipal (CDM) was formed to formulate a five year decentralization plan, as well 
as a pilot project.708   
As successor to Cristiani in 1994, President Calderón Sol re-stated his government’s 
commitment to decentralization and produced a new plan with some important innovations (the 
formation of departmental municipal councils).  Yet despite this new proposal and the marginal 
increase in the funds assigned to local government through the municipal transfer program, Fund 
for Social and Economic Development (FODES), the CDM process stalled.709  Decentralization 
qua privatization of public services advanced in education and energy, but was blocked in the 
areas of health and water.710   Rodríguez (1999) notes that of 17 measures in Calderon Sol’s 
1994 Plan de Gobierno, fewer than half had substantially advanced toward full implementation 
by the end of his term in 1999.  Where progress was made (increase in transfers to local 
government) external donor pressure and financing were instrumental.   However, by the late 
1990s, even ARENA’s principal backers, USAID, complained about the lack of real progress in 
decentralization and questioned the government’s political will.711 
In addition to fiscal and legal constraints, both of which have been surmounted, low 
municipal capacity is the rationale given by ARENA preventing more rapid deconcentration of 
state responsibilities.712  Critics challenge that deconcentration is mediated by ARENA’s 
capacity to shore up party discipline through distribution of the spoils.  A decentralization expert 
representing the German cooperation agency, GTZ, and a member of the ad hoc council contends 
                                                 
708 The CDM was composed of MIPLAN, the National Reconstruction Secretariat (SRN), COMURES (the gremio 
of mayors), ISDEM (the government agency that provides technical support to municipal government), and the 
Treasury. 
709 FODES was created under Duarte in 1988, setting a fixed (non-indexed) amount of $2.86 million.  Calderón Sol 
increased FODES to $14.3 million in 1997. 
710 In the area of education, a World Bank loan financed the EDUCO program (1991-1995) which shifted some 
administrative responsibilities to community groups. See Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999).  In the area of health 
and water, the IDB financed the deconcentration of health and water services, with the privatization playing a major 
part.  See Public Services International (2000), Córdova Macías and Orellana (2001). 
711 Crosby, et al. (2000).  Focus of USAID criticism was the unsustainability of local finance without tax reform and 
the lack of movement on key political reforms. 
712 Half of El Salvador’s 262 municipalities have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, 65 have fewer than 5,000, which is 
inconsistent with the municipal code requiring a minimum of 5,000.  Many mayors and council people have no more 
than a primary education.  Some legal confusion exists in defining the functions of the municipality versus the 
central government.  Córdova and Lara (1996). 
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that ARENA’s resistance attributed resistance to decentralization to the veto capacity of political 
bosses that shadowed the Ministers of Education, Health and Public Works Ministries, as well as 
the Water and Sanitation agency (ANDA).713  A facade of new consultative and deliberative 
structures on decentralization was created on paper, but very little actual progress was made.   
Rather than responding or cultivating local demands, the government’s focus was on 
upward accountability to donors, or the capture of new development resources by state level 
institutions (Crosby, et al. 2000: 11).  Writing for USAID, Crosby observes, “most of the recent 
efforts in the area of local government decentralization have been organized from and directed 
by institutions or organizations at the center.  If there has been any serious effort from below it 
has been largely, if not entirely, unapparent….the lack of bottom-up initiative for 
decentralization is striking.” 
ARENA’s approach to decentralization has focused more on diversifying the state 
mechanisms for capturing public resources and ensuring that even modest policy advances shore 
up party control over lower level actors.  Within this scheme, Salvadoran Institute for Municipal 
Development (ISDEM) and the Community Development Directorate (DIDECO) have been 
deployed to train mayors and form local development councils, respectively.  Supported largely 
by USAID, ISDEM has existed to provide technical assistance to municipal governments, 
channel state transfers and extend lending to local governments.  In theory, COMURES, the 
mayor’s gremio would set policy demands, and if approved, ISDEM would implement the 
technical aspects of these policies. In practice, however, COMURES has done little under 
ARENA control (before 2000).714  Moreover, ISDEM has failed to fulfill its technical function 
and instead, has performed more as the political arm of the governing party by assisting friendly 
mayors and harassing opposition ones.  Currently, ISDEM provides technical assistance to only 
48 municipalities (18%) (RDL 2003: 15).  ISDEM’s survival is tied to its function as the 
                                                 
713 Interview, Dr. Oscar Mena, April 1999.  Mena was the representative of GTZ-Promude, a program designed to 
support municipal strengthening and promote decentralization.  Crosby, et al (1997: 57) illustrates similar 
perceptions in his decentralization stakeholder map. Subsequent corruption scandals involving officials in these 
institutions only reinforce this perception.  Former ANDA President, Carlos Perla and various family members are 
currently being prosecuted for diversion of ANDA funds to finance private housing and other personal assets. 
714 COMURES was created in 1941, was inactive for much of the interim, and was revived again in 1992.  The 
governing Board of Directors consists of 29 seats.  For the 1997-2000 term, ARENA mayors held 11 seats, while 
FMLN mayors held 9. 
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mechanism for about two thirds of all state transfers to local governments, which explains its 
opposition to further administrative decentralization.715   
DIDECO is a community development agency within the former Ministry of Interior 
(now Gobernación) – long considered the franchise of the most conservative elements within 
ARENA. Created in the 1970s to promote and fund small, rural public works projects, DIDECO 
represented an early version of wartime civic action programs, which then served as the 
centerpiece of Molina administration’s program of “gobierno móvil.”716  Since 1989, DIDECO 
promoters’ main task was to facilitate the formation and legalization of Community 
Development Associations (ADESCOs), of which some 2,000 were created.717  At the same 
time, DIDECO promoters also served as departmental and local campaign organizers making no 
bones about associating any service delivered to expectations of support for ARENA candidates.  
The performance of ADESCOs as local catalysts for improved governance and development 
depends less on DIDECO than on whether ties to the local mayor or state officials pay off.718 
Three types of NGOs flourished in the post-war period, all driven in large part by the 
needs of the displaced populations and the flow of foreign funding.  We might locate these 
NGOs at left, right and center positions on the political spectrum.  In contrast to grassroots 
NGOs that evolved into increasingly formal organizations associated with the FMLN, a much 
                                                 
715 USAID and GTZ has provided significant to support to modernize ISDEM, with questionable results.  As the 
primary agency dealing with local financial administration, the scarcity of comparable local budget and expenditure 
information is only indicator of ISDEM capacity. 
716 Molina’s Gobierno Móvil involved a policy of traveling by military helicopter to each department regularly to 
inaugurate small public works projects financed by the Ministry of Interior.  DIDECO (which before was FOCCO) 
was established to administer food for work programs with food aid donations from World Food Program, US PL-
480 program and the European Community.  By the late 1970s, DIDECO had five regional offices and functioned 
similar to a modern social safety net, with $2.5 million budget for small communal development projects in areas of 
poverty and a $1 million municipal loan portfolio.  By 1983, the Interior Ministry budget for municipal projects had 
increased to approximately $10 million.  Not surprisingly, high priority “critical areas” were designated as Northern 
Chalatenango and Northern Morazán - two areas of intense recruitment by revolutionary forces.  Memoria del 
Ministerio del Interior, Periodo 1977-1978 and 1982-1983. San Salvador. 
717 Ministerio del Interior (1994b).  Between 1989-1994, DIDECO reports the legalization of 1,403 ADESCOs, 
1,500 small infrastructure projects, and over 3,000 trainings of local leaders.   
718  Despite the earnest voluntarism of the community efforts, the anecdote provided in Blair et al (1995) of the 
noble efforts of a local ADESCO in Santa Ana to circumvent the corrupt ARENA mayor, this positive example ends 
up illustrating the very limitations of the DIDECO system.  Strictly precluded to non-political challenges, even 
access to government officials will not likely compensate for the formidable power of political capture by local 
elites. 
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larger community of relief and development NGOs that profess political neutrality have 
emerged.  The vast majority of these centrist NGOs are not pressure groups and refrain from any 
political advocacy, promoting self-help programs with private or government funding.   
The growth of a third cluster of rightwing NGOs more oriented to the demands of the 
private sector were funded primarily by FUSADES and USAID.719  Given the hierarchy 
approach to decentralization, the right was slow to acknowledge the significance of development 
NGOs.  Distrust of citizen consultation and participation and a greater dependence on central 
government agencies to lead development interventions tends to concentrate any local decision 
making authority in the hands of the mayor and excludes most Salvadoran NGOs.   USAID’s 
disdain for a wide segment of opposition NGOs has contributed to this exclusion (Murray 1995; 
WOLA 1994; Blair, et al. 1995, and Crosby 1997). A 1994 USAID report attempted to 
distinguish between NGO and donor roles in politics and development,  
 
NGOs will probably be a desirable and necessary resource for participatory project design and 
implementation,…one cautionary note, USAID should be sensitive in its dealings with NGOs with 
predominantly political agendas as opposed to development agendas, the inclusion of which in a USAID 
funded program could antagonize the host government and general populace and weaken the non-political 
image of the project. (USAID 1994: 31).  
 
 
This struggle by USAID and ARENA to define the political boundaries of development 
as well as assign local institutions their respective roles in it clearly reflects the top-down nature 
of government led decentralization.   Empowerment by invitation involves the tradeoff of politics 
in exchange for participation.  Development work requires the abandonment of contentious, 
social movement tactics.   Many NGOs had long accepted this tradeoff, particularly those U.S. 
INGOs that channeled U.S. relief as part of wartime civic action programs.  Many others, with 
roots in the insurgency were willing to explore the bargain.  In both cases, recognition by USAID 
as a legitimate political interest group was contingent upon eschewing disruptive politics, but had 
                                                 
719 FUSADES itself was the creation of USAID in 1984 in response to the Christian Democrat resistance to the U.S. 
proposed stabilization reforms.  As a beneficiary of over $100 million in largely U.S. assistance between 1984-1992, 
FUSADES became the principal private sector NGO think tank and an incubator of business oriented NGOs.  Rosa, 
1993b) and Barry (1993). 
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material benefits.  FUSAI is considered by many as the model for this type of centrist NGO, 
moving from a solidarity-driven organization to a benefits-driven one.  By the 1997, the 
Salvadoran Foundation for Integral Support (FUSAI) had five regional offices and their 
infrastructure and micro-credit programs had amassed an annual budget of over $6 million.720  
Among some partners (and perhaps other NGOs that were not as competitive in resource 
mobilization), FUSAI was criticized for privileging the donors over the quality of services 
delivered, much less to solving the more structural challenges of rural poverty. 
This not to say that all of the social forces associated with counter-insurgency had 
accepted this invitation.   In January 1995, veterans of the Salvadoran Armed Forces 
(ADEFAES) and allied veterans of the other state security forces, blocked highways, organized 
public demonstrations and seized the Treasury Ministry, the Armed Forces Social Provision 
Institute, and the National Assembly for three days, taking 28 Congressional deputies as hostages 
to demand the benefits promised during the Peace Accords.  By the 1998, 20,000 members of the 
former civil patrollers (APROAS) organized increasingly defiant and contentious demonstrations 
(highway blockages) to demand $2,000 indemnification for themselves and war widows, and a 
similar re-integration package as that offered to the FMLN.  Violent mobilization by forces on 
the right that were excluded from the post-war distribution of benefits forced significant 
concessions from Presidents Calderon Sol and Francisco Flores to maintain political stability.721   
One of the ironies of the early post-war period was that ex-soldiers, ex-police and civil 
patrollers applied some of the insurgent collective action tactics with greater frequency and, 
some argue, more effectiveness than the insurgents themselves.  The FMLN did refrain from 
street demonstrations prior to the 1994 elections.  One noted exception was in May 1993, when a 
group of former soldiers and former guerrillas staged a joint demonstration in front of the 
Presidential palace.  In a clash with the anti-riot police, one ex-combatant with the FMLN was 
killed, six soldiers and guerillas were wounded and twelve more were captured.  The 
demobilized security forces of the right had no network of NGOs or gremios to defend their 
                                                 
720 FUSAI 1997 Annual Report.  See http://www.fusai.org.sv, Accessed Nov. 2005.  According to the website, 
FUSAI boasts an annual program budget of $1.5 million between 1992 and 2002. 
721 The government rushed benefits to some members of ADEFAES, and added others to the rolls.  In 2001, 
President Flores allegedly used earthquake reconstruction funding to issue small grants to a lower number of ex-civil 
patrollers in 2001.   
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interests under the Peace Accords and so were dependent on the government.  The intensity of 
protests by ex-soldiers and civil patrollers may reflect this lack of effective advocacy by allied 
civil society organizations. 
The decidedly political FORTAS network of local business development foundations 
were reluctantly launched by FUSADES as an alternative mechanism to capture reconstruction 
funds.722  FORTAS was designed to appeal to the philanthropic interests of the local private 
sector and the family names of the country’s wealthiest landed gentry (Dalton, Alfaro, Kriete, 
Novoa, Homberger, Duke, Avila) could be found on the FORTAS board of directors.723   The 
almost exclusive menu of social infrastructure projects (80%-90% schools), built with 
government, USAID or IDB funding complemented by a small member counterpart, reinvented 
the paternalist charity model of elite run NGOs that prevailed in El Salvador before the war.  
More accurately, the mission of the foundations as to diminish concerns about inequality in poor 
rural towns, as program director Cesar Mendez stated, “to make it that working people are 
content that the private sector is doing something for the community.”724  However, true to the 
ARENA model for NGOs, the largely disconnected FORTAS NGOs have steered clear of policy 
solutions to local problems, as in say, decentralization, preferring to enable local organizations to 
deliver improved services (Crosby 1997: 53). 
In addition to social stability, the business sector was sold the FORTAS model as a 
possible tax haven.  Blair (1995) reports that an unsuccessful ARENA 1995 tax reform proposal 
would have allowed coffee producers to divert taxes to locally controlled FORTAS foundations 
instead of the state.  Elite interest in FORTAS is also rooted in the capture of public funds that 
act as cross subsidies for private needs, increasingly dealing with the costs of redressing 
environmental deterioration.   To take one example, the NGO Friends of Ilopango Lake 
Foundation is controlled by the largest property and industry owners surrounding the lake, which 
                                                 
722 See Murray (1994) and Foley (1996) for a discussion of the FUSADES spin-off NGOs.  Foley argues that 
FORTAS was a low priority within the FUSADES NGO family, emerging only after USAID pressure to cut 
funding.  Several foundation representatives also complained about the lack of FUSADES support.  An interview 
with FORTAS director Max Mendez in February, 1998 revealed uncertainty about the future budget support, which 
had fallen from $450,000 in 1996 to about $120,000.  While Mendez claimed that this subsidy leveraged as much in 
$1.7 million in total project funding – this amounts to the annual budget of $40,000 for each single Foundation.   
723 FEDES Board of Directors, 1995-1997, published in Diario de Hoy, Dec. 17, 1995. 
724 Interview, Cesar Mendez, Feb. 1998.   
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include ex-FISDL director Norma de Dowe, Sherwin Williams franchise owner, Ernesto Freund, 
and other local industrialists.725   These landowners and local business owners are now under 
scrutiny after years of unsustainable land use and contaminated water discharge by the adjacent 
industrial park has led to high levels of heavy metals and fertilizer residue in the water, dramatic 
loss of topsoil, diminished tourist potential and vulnerability to landslides.  Rather than invest 
their own resources to redress the environmental damage caused in large part by the owners 
themselves, the Friends of the Lake Foundation was established in 1993 to capture public funds.  
In its 1996 Annual report, FORTAS reports that it helped channel USAID funds to subsidize the 
reforestation of hillsides around Lake Ilopango.726  Similar linkages between “conservation” 
NGOs with ties to agrarian and industrial elite and FORTAS foundations exist throughout the 
country.727 
Interviews with six FORTAS foundations revealed that all maintained offices in San 
Salvador and no more than half still operated in any substantive way.728  The FORTAS network 
(Federación de Fundaciones de Empresariales de Desarollo Social, FEDES) has not coordinated 
on larger resource mobilization or pursued broader political advocacy initiatives.   The low 
expectations held for the FORTAS initiative explains the complacency with the results. “Civil 
society, FORTAS-style, reproduces and reinforces the top-down structure of political and 
economic power in the communities where the foundations are located, including the very 
individuals who have always wielded that power.” (Foley 1996: 79).  
Lacking confidence in any of the government local development assistance agencies, the 
IDB and GTZ funding for FIS effectively created a competing source of technical assistance for 
mayors.  As conditions for implementation of FIS social infrastructure projects, municipalities 
were obliged to pay for FIS project supervision.  These supervisory functions were considered 
paternalistic and often as corrupt as with ISDEM.  In October 1996, the FIS was converted into 
                                                 
725 Proceso, July 1, 1998, Vol. 19, pg. 813, “Smokescreen over Lake Ilopango,” 
726 FUSADES Annual Report (1996: 29-31).  The recent landslides caused by heavy rains and earthquakes in El 
Salvador raise questions about the technical adequacy of these minimal investments. 
727 FundaCoatepeque, a similar Foundation in the coffee heartland of Santa Ana, was awarded by the Inter-American 
Foundation as one of the best public-private partnerships in 1998. 
728 Visits to FundaGuadalupe, San Vicente, Jiquilisco, Funde Nonualco, Berlin, Jucuapa in 1999. 
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FISDL (adding Local Development), and effectively absorbed the MEA and the SRN, becoming 
a permanent government agency.   At that time, a scandal came to light that resulted in the firing 
of SRN and FIS President, Norma de Dowe, and three other directors, on charges of misusing $2 
million in public funds.  De Dowe was accused by the Court of Accounts of arbitrarily increasing 
the salaries of 250 FIS employees, including some executives, before their contracts expired in 
December 1995, which entitled them to inflated indemnity payments (by as much as $90,000).  
De Dowe then hired as many as 100 of these same employees to new contracts in January 1996 
at the higher rates.  Her resignation was a blow to the credibility of the FIS and derailed de 
Dowe’s fast track ascent within ARENA.   
Two years hence, de Dowe and her colleagues were absolved by the state Attorney 
General, arguing that a “mechanical error” was responsible for the series of administrative 
missteps.729  By then, she was relegated to the NGO sector.  Behind the scenes, it was revealed 
that the original charges and their derogation were elements of political divisions within ruling 
coalition of ARENA and the PCN.  The President of the Court of Accounts that brought the 
investigation to light was Francisco Merino, former ARENA Vice-President with Cristiani that 
had defected to the PCN in 1994.730  Traditionally the Court of Accounts is the political 
patrimony of the PCN under ARENA rule.  The charges were introduced in 1996, thrown out in 
1998, reintroduced in 1999 and 2002, as a reflection of the ebb and flow of political jockeying 
for control over public resources between ARENA and the PCN.731 
The reconstruction emergency caused by Hurricane Mitch and a fresh infusion of funds 
by the IDB rescued efforts to convert FISDL into the lead local development agency.  The third 
IDB loan to FISDL in 1998 was intended to improve accountability by deconcentrating staff to 
                                                 
729 La Prensa Gráfica, Sep. 2, 1998, pg. 5; Proceso, Oct 30, 1996, Vol. 17, pg. 732.  
730 Merino is also known for exercising immunity granted to legislators to avoid prosecution after shooting a police 
officer in a dispute after being stopped for drunk driving as well as the illegal sale of environmentally restricted 
property in 1996.  Merino’s family also ran two reconstruction NGOs that won large contracts from USAID early in 
the reconstruction, but have since stopped operating. 
731 Diario de Hoy, Oct. 28, 1999; Vertice, July 7, 2002;  The list of corruption scandals involving ARENA and PCN 
officials in the post-war period is too long to mention.  While businesses owned by ex-President Cristiani are 
implicated in at least a half dozen cases involving claims in the millions of dollars, he has so far remained 
untouchable.  With the harvest of low hanging fruit in El Salvador, the tepid and unsystematic treatment of 
corruption by the principal media can only be construed as collusion.  Compare the treatment of ex-Presidents and 
other high ranking officials in Costa Rica. 
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regional offices and move the agency toward an advisory function with respect to participatory 
budgeting and away from project finance. 732  At this point, there was more confusion than ever 
among mayors about reconciling the demands of competing local development institutions, both 
governmental and non-governmental.   ISDEM and FISDL were viewed as performing the same 
function, but responding to different principal donors. 
The shock of the 1997 elections forced the Presidency of Francisco Flores to revise the 
party’s strategy with local officials.  In 1999, as part of the New Alliances strategy of the Flores 
government (1999-2004), ARENA designated FISDL as the “ente rector” (normative agency) of 
local development and instituted greater emphasis on participatory local planning to prioritize 
local investment.  FISDL was charged with implementing the National Strategy for Local 
Development, which placed an increasing premium on local matching funds (including 
remittances), participatory planning, and competition.  At the same time, NGOs comprising the 
Local Development Network criticized FISDL’s reticence in engaging the central debates around 
decentralization, including absence from legislative initiatives to reform the municipal code, 
create a locally administered land tax, and create laws to regulate transparency and citizen 
participation in budget processes and for municipal public employees (RDL 2003: 182).  In sum, 
the rhetorical commitments to decentralization in the New Alliances program, like that of the 
two ARENA administrations before it, were unmatched by practice. 
The opportunity to move beyond ARENA’s top-down, accommodative approach to 
decentralization was also enhanced in 1999 with the results of yearlong national consultation 
(Plan de Nación) conducted by the non-partisan National Development Commission.733  The 
results of the consultation revealed a strong popular endorsement for greater, faster 
decentralization to local authorities.  Rather than use this political capital provided by the 
consultation to surmount the political resistance to decentralization within the line ministries, 
Flores instead shelved it and proceeded with his far less ambitious original plan.   
In sum, political competition within the ARENA controlled ruling coalition has given rise 
to multiple agencies charged with local development responsibilities.  What all of the local 
                                                 
732 Interview, Roberto Huezo, FISDL Director, March 18, 1999 
733 Plan de Nación was a six person commission authorized by President Calderon Sol in 1997 to consult nationally 
in a yearlong series of small meetings to identify and prioritize problems, solutions and develop a shared vision of 
national development.  CND (1998) 
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development agencies associated with the central government agreed upon was an aversion to 
subjecting the adjustment reforms to any litmus test of public consensus.734  Most of the critical 
decisions, from the creation of these institutions to their budget allocations, were taken at the top 
with almost no participation by the affected population.  The modus operandi of these agencies 
also reflected ARENA’s distrust and unwillingness to deal with most NGOs and more directly 
through community organizations.  NGOs created by the business sector or ones that prioritized 
the reduction/avoidance of conflict with the government were tapped as allies in this top-down 
local economic development model.  However, like the various government agencies charged 
with attending local needs, there was a tendency to pursue individual strategies with local target 
populations rather than coordinate more broadly.  Competition for development resources rather 
than building coalitions either at the NGO level or as a means for strengthening local 
populations, became the norm in the context of strong preferences for market principles. 
This convergence of interests between donors and the ascendant ARENA government 
resulted in a project implementation strategy that placed little premium on consultation, 
participation or accountability to the vast majority of local actors.  As Sollis observed early on: 
 
 
the important Bolivian ESF [Economic Social Fund] lesson about participation does not fit the El 
Salvador government’s managerial view of poverty and what to do about it.  As objects of relief, the poor 
are told what they can expect.  At best they will participate as implementers of projects, but more likely 
municipal governments will reinforce a tradition of vertical decision-making and authoritarian politics 
which has never been at ease with independent community activity. (Sollis 1993: 452).    
 
  Government decentralization strategy centered around the FISDL.  Since its inception in 
1990, FISDL has channeled $542 million to local governments.  On average, FISDL projects 
represented less than 10% of public sector capital investment, so can only take proportional 
credit for any improvement in the provision of local services or improvements in local decision 
making.735  Half of FISDL funding went to build schools and improve tertiary roads.  Another 
25% went to water, sanitation and electrification.  Less the 3% was invested in technical 
                                                 
734 Multilateral lending eclipsed all other sources of external finance to El Salvador in 1993, with the exception of 
remittances which now constitute the equivalent of annual tax revenues at $1.34 billion. 
735  MEA had transferred an estimated $130 million between 1986-1994, or about $10 million per year.  Prior to 
1994, transfers through the MEA program represented 50% of local government revenue for smaller municipalities. 
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assistance (which included participatory planning after 1999).  Even fifteen years after its 
creation, no funding has gone to direct productive infrastructure.736  Short of the glowing 
evaluations it assigns itself, the evidence reinforces cross-national studies that have challenged 
the effect these programs have had on improving access or quality of basic services. 
FISDL was fashioned as an honest broker between NGOs, local government and the 
poorest communities.  With the exception of the 1995 scandal, FISDL has generally received 
high marks for efficient and relatively pro-poor allocation of resources.737  Yet it has fallen short 
in many of the other performance goals tied to past IDB loans.738  Beneficiary participation was 
negligible before 1998, leading to persistent maintenance problems and raising questions about 
local ownership..  Claims regarding FISDL’s contribution since then to a local culture of 
participation and accountability” are not typically backed up with evidence.   The meaning of 
“participatory budgeting” is left intentionally vague.  Opposition mayors have also complained 
the ARENA misses no opportunity to politicize FISDL projects, attributing undo responsibility 
to the ruling party and exaggerating impact even though the projects are no where near the level 
of investment demanded by local governments.   
Although state transfers have increased, FISDL has contributed little to overcoming 
ARENA’s opposition to property tax, or comparable measures to strengthen local fiscal 
sustainability.  In terms of creating a suitable legal and regulatory framework for decentralization 
or local development, an official with the IDB, which has invested $250 million in modernizing 
the FISDL concluded that, “El Salvador still lacks an ‘ente rector’ for local development, despite 
over ten years of trying to make FISDL that agency.” 739 
                                                 
736 The figures are taken from a FISDL “Achievements” fact sheet for the period 1990-2005, 
http://www.fisdl.org.sv, accessed in November 2005.   Although the IDB has favored greater investment in rural 
economic infrastructure, remittances are preferable to FISDL funding to avoid the provision of private goods with 
public finance. 
737 IDB (2005, Annex).  Data on project execution efficiency reflects well on FISDL, but little empirical evidence on 
local empowerment is available.  One IDB official argued that the Bank considered it a success that the FISDL was 
not politicized during the 1999 election.  Yet, a municipal official from Tecoluca complained the FISDL was 
holding up nine projects in March. 1999, weeks before the election because too many FISDL employees were 
working in the campaign.  He also charged that FISDL regularly pads projects budgets and diverts this surplus to 
favored contractors that overbid and reportedly kickback some profits to FISDL employees.   
738 Reference to IDB Project Completion Report for ES109/Loan 1067/OC-ES, cited in IDB (2005). 
739 Interview, Priscilla Phelps, IDB Local Development Specialist, June 28, 2005 Washington, DC 
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Despite new packaging, the FISDL continues to be viewed by many as a top-down effort 
by the ruling party to retain control over local development as FMLN victories at the municipal 
level have made political capture more difficult.  Any political autonomy enjoyed by the FISDL 
has depended on external financing, which could end in the coming years.  In direct competition 
with COMURES and ISDEM, FISDL has steadily traded off stronger alliances with community 
organizations and NGOs, for closer ties to government in the interest of preserving its own 
budget.740 As a consequence, FISDL funded municipal projects (largely the choice of a fixed 
menu of social infrastructure) have increasingly become disconnected from broader questions of 
economic development, particularly in rural areas.    
Nevertheless, the deficit of social infrastructure is so profound that social investment will 
remain one element of local economic development strategies in the foreseeable future.  As the 
flagship local development agency, FISDL has tended to forego or be politically restricted from 
entering larger coalitions to achieve the higher levels of resource mobilization or political 
advocacy.741  To its credit, FISDL has explored the prospect of financial partnerships with 
hometown associations of Salvadorans living in the U.S. as investors in local infrastructure 
projects.  FISDL’s new program, Unidos por la Solidaridad, channels remittances as co-
financing matching funds into local investment through FISDL projects.  In 2003, FISDL 
reported that of the 509 projects executed for a total global investment of $102 million, 45 
projects included investments of remittances by hometown associations totaling $11.2 million.742   
Strengthening this transnational dimension to local development has tremendous promise, 
and remittances are the top investment target in El Salvador far outpacing traditional levels of 
foreign direct investment.  Exercising the advantage of access to greater public resources, 
ARENA established stronger ties than the FMLN to the Salvadoran hometown association 
leaders. This advantage has given ARENA the edge in terms of transnational links to its 
mobilization network.  While a test of a remittance receiving municipality lies outside the scope 
                                                 
740 A more recent reorganization of FISDL in 1999 was intended to decentralize the agencies work by relocating 
staff to regional offices.  There is little information available that these measures have changed the institution’s prior 
centralist approach. 
741 Observed participation of FISDL in several institutional networks reveals a technical value added that is offset by 
its own sense of superiority.  As a government agency, advocacy participation is institutionally challenging, even if 
there existed the political will. 
742 Diario de Hoy, Jan. 22, 2004; See also http://www.fisdl.gob.sv.   
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of this study, my hypothesis holds that no form of decentralized funding flows can escape the 
empowering or disempowering effects of inequality and political capture unless local capacity 
for collective action can to ensure the effective use of these funds. 
 
 
C.  EMPOWERMENT THROUGH CONFLICT 
 
The FMLN has sustained a more contentious strategy of decentralized development in regions 
where traditional local inequality was uprooted as a consequence of insurgent political and 
economic control during the war.  FMLN regional hegemony nurtured a fundamentally different 
conception of citizenship to that prevailing in government controlled zones and that embodied in 
pre-war Salvadoran political culture and institutions.   
Political-military support for the FMLN endured for over a decade in control zones 
because certain decision-making was carefully decentralized.  The definition of local needs and 
the decisions over how to allocate resources in zones of FMLN control permitted an 
unprecedented exposure to principles of equity, accountability and participation.  While 
mobilization was from the top-down, often steered by commanders, many of which who came 
from the urban middle class, a reciprocal relation with peasants and workers broke with the 
clientelist and repressive cycle of past relations.743  Violent disruption of elite power in much of 
the Salvadoran countryside by the insurgent FMLN was a shock to the structure of political 
opportunity that reduced the asymmetric power and unaccountability of the rich, shifted the 
balance of distributional conflict toward the interests of the poor and induced the grudging 
adoption of redistributive policies (Wood 2000; Binford 1998).    
The process of accompanying the displaced and combatant population facilitated a break 
with the past paternalist institutionalization of Salvadoran civil society.  The administration of 
these programs involved experiences of self-governance among groups of the displaced 
population as well as within the NGOs themselves.  New organizing skills were learned, contacts 
with the international donor community were established, services were provided independent of 
                                                 
743 With some notorious exceptions noted by Gibb (2000). 
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state support, and a vibrant spirit of solidarity all constituted a source of social capital that 
emerged out of the conflict.   
In the post-war period, FMLN local development experiences have continued to 
emphasize bottom-up, and at times, conflictive challenges to the political and economic elite.  In 
practice, this approach to decentralization has involved simultaneous and non-preferential 
investments in both elite and local institutional capacity.  Lacking any control over state 
agencies, the NGOs, municipal governments and community organizations associated with the 
FMLN have acted with considerable autonomy if not incentives from the party to design and 
implement local reconstruction plans, pursue funding and channel local demands upward.   
At the elite level, the FMLN legislative deputies have pushed measures in the Assembly, 
and to some extent in COMURES, that advance a progressive local development agenda.  The 52 
member National Council and the 19 member FMLN political commission, legislative deputies 
and mayors are more vertically (downward) accountable to democratic mechanisms and this 
dependence on local credibility is reflected in collaboration between national actors and mayors, 
NGOs and gremios to convey legitimacy and introduce political pressure needed to win approval 
of difficult reforms (FODES increase, reduction of the agrarian debt).744  Although the FMLN 
has also tended to revert to hierarchical decision making within its political commission and 
commitments to democratic mechanisms have wavered, particularly in periods of internal 
division, the notably more horizontal relations between national and local actors accentuates a 
fundamentally different notion of decentralization.   
Despite the authoritarian command structure that prevailed during the war, the categorical 
framing of the FMLN and their supporters as enemies of democracy stands in stark contrast to 
pragmatic, often innovative participatory experiments in national and local governance that have 
emerged in many FMLN communities.   The FMLN has instituted local and national primary 
elections for municipal, legislative and national candidates, which allows a unprecedented voice 
for local party members in El Salvador’s political system.  Open council meetings in FMLN 
municipal governments, such as San Salvador since 1997, represent the exceptions to the rule in 
the country’s closed door governance culture.  The FMLN has also been the principal force 
                                                 
744 The FMLN National Council consisted in 1994 of 66 members: ten representatives from each of the FMLN's five 
constituent organizations, one representative from each of the country's 14 departments; the head of the FMLN's 
block of deputies in the legislature; and a coordinator of FMLN mayors.  Since the consolidation of the party in 
1994, the size of the National Council and Political Commission has varied. 
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behind other electoral reforms, such as home vote, extension of voting privileges to migrants in 
the U.S., gender quotas for political candidates, term limits (self-imposed), as well as the tax and 
transfer mechanisms most suitable for improved financial sustainability.745   
On other political reforms (single member electoral districts, proportional representation 
on municipal councils, campaign finance, on the formation and termination of political parties), 
FMLN leadership has been more calculated.  There has been a decline in women’s participation 
since the 1995 peak that neither party has been able to correct.  ARENA is not known for the 
promotion of women’s participation or legislation aimed at improving social and economic 
conditions facing women.746  Just fifty years after winning the right to vote in 1953, women’s 
participation in government remains limited.  Women currently hold only 2 of every 10 
government posts, or 20% (UNDP 2003).  Only 10% of congressional deputies, 12% of cabinet 
ministers, 6.5% of mayors and 13% of Supreme Court justices are women. In congressional 
leadership positions, women’s representation has actually declined in recent years, from 33% in 
the period from 1988 – 1991 to 18% from 2003 – 2005.  Rising violence against women has only 
underscored the limited advances toward gender equity in the post-war period (Paterson 2006).  
However, FMLN has not fared much better in the representation of women.  The FMLN 
adopted internal statutes that insure at least one third of all its candidates for public office are 
women and 50% of all party leadership position nominees are women.  In 1994, the FMLN 
elected the largest number of women to the Assembly, despite holding only 21 seats.  
Subsequent elections have failed to fulfill these mandates, which the party attributes to the lack 
of voluntarism among potential women candidates. In the 2000 municipal elections 22 women 
had won office.  In the 2003 legislative and municipal elections, only nine women were elected 
to the legislative assembly. Seven were from the FMLN and two from ARENA.  In municipal 
elections 17 women were chosen out of 262 municipalities. Ten women mayors are from 
ARENA, five from the FMLN, two from the National Conciliation Party (PCN) and one from 
                                                 
745 Absentee voting for Salvadorans living in exile was first proposed by the FMLN in the 1989 electoral proposal to 
postpone the March 1990 elections.   Term limits for Congressional deputies was adopted in 2000.     
746 The Alfredo Cristiani government (1989-1994) opened three clinics for women victims of abuse, and the 
Armando Calderón Sol government (1994-1999) created the Salvadoran Institute for Women’s Development 
(ISDEMU) following the Beijing World Women’s Conference in 1995, but neither government created legislation 
that responded to social discrimination, political exclusion or the causes of domestic violence.  According to Las 
Dignas, the government altered the findings of the first ISDEMU report in 1997, raising government compliance 
with gender-related goals from 10% to 60%. 
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the coalition FMLN-CDU (United Democratic Center).  The fact that in 2003 nine of the 17 
recently elected women mayors were re-elected is a clear sign that many of the women who take 
office are capable of maintaining voter confidence.747   
According to a CID-Gallup poll conducted in 2003, 37% of the women surveyed say that 
they do not participate in politics because their husband will not allow them to; 32% because 
they felt that the population would not vote for a woman; and 10%, because they felt they were 
not prepared for governing.748 
Based largely on FMLN criticism, early post-war evaluations of the municipal town 
meeting approach to administering local reconstruction funding showed that local governance 
was not seen as very participatory, and tended toward ritualistic validation of local authority 
(Goodin, et al. 1996).  Some mayors and NGOs, including many within the FMLN party, have 
transformed the cabildo abierto into a participatory budgeting mechanism that has deepened 
citizen involvement in the allocation of local resources.  Municipal planning processes have also 
emphasized building horizontal ties with other mayors and NGOs as well as vertical linkages 
with the state and international donors and grassroots community organizations in the 
coordination of local development efforts.   
 NGOs have figured more prominently within the empowerment through conflict 
approach to decentralization (although the effects are mixed).  While USAID excluded FMLN 
NGOs on technical grounds, these same organizations were considered trustworthy enough by 
European donors to channel an estimated $25 million in ex-conflictive zones between 1992-1994 
(Murray 1995: 109).  The creation of many FMLN NGOs, gremios and community organizations 
have involved decisions taken by the insurgent high command, but the autonomy and 
accountability of these organizations in the post-war period has shifted.  Some of the principal 
development NGOs allied with the FMLN now enjoy direct and independent donor relations and 
the space for maneuver rests less on party relations and more on credibility at the community 
level.    In turn, access points to elite decision makers tend to be more dispersed in FMLN 
mobilization networks. 
                                                 
747 Despite factional divisions, the FMLN elected Dra. Violeta Menjivar as the first woman mayor of San Salvador 
in the March 2005 elections. 
748 Inforpress Central America Report, Nov. 28, 2003 
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One concrete aspect of FMLN rule in local government or through the presence of NGOs 
has been the mobilization of the poor to demand greater redistribution of land and productive 
resources.  The empowerment through conflict strategy includes ample focus on class conflict 
between rich and poor and on both absolute and relative gains for the poor as necessary 
conditions for empowerment.749  Examples include campaigns to fulfill the commitments of the 
Peace Accords, cancellation of the agrarian debt, challenges to the privatization of water and 
health care and as well as dozens of localized protests for and against infrastructure projects.  
Contentious collective actions have forced expropriative redistribution of assets, which have 
lowered inequality and reduced the asymmetric bargaining power of local elites.  It is not 
surprising that FMLN rural municipalities defy national indicators of income and land inequality 
that persist at levels as high or higher than ever. 
Scholars of revolution have attributed a variety of pathologies to insurgent rule and the 
FMLN strategies to the collective action problem have no doubt generated certain 
disempowering effects (Skocpol 1979; Lichbach 1995: 261-275; Grossman 1991, 1999; Collier 
1998).  Some critics of the FMLN argue that the politics of disruption have created as many new 
obstacles to collective action as they removed.   Stimulating civil strife can lower economic 
growth, foster intolerance and criminal activity, and weaken the legitimacy of political 
institutions – all of which tend to negatively impact the poor.  The post–war effects of insurgent 
strategies are evident in the inequality of privilege between leadership and base, poor 
administration of reconstruction funding, the routinization of protest, and participation in 
criminal violence.   
Perhaps the more complex contribution of FMLN strategies of empowerment through 
conflict derive from the difficulties of reconciling a highly centralized organizational structure 
with the incentives for decentralized decision-making autonomy.  During the war, these 
“pathologies” of insurgent collective action contributed to destructive competition between the 
five principal insurgent groups, an alleged culture of “asistencialismo” that undermined local 
self-reliance, and the failure to monitor abuses of leaders at the local level.750    The possibility of 
                                                 
749 The relative-absolute gains distinction is particularly important for evaluating the impact of empowerment 
strategies in light of the accumulated evidence that development interventions frequently empower the already 
powerful rich and middle classes prior to or instead of empowering the poor.  
750 Asistencialismo is a term created by the donor community to describe the alleged habit of foreign aid dependence 
among communities whose livelihoods are destroyed by conflict or natural disasters. 
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winning the war unified disparate social forces until the 1992 ceasefire, but has unraveled under 
post-war political competition.  Internecine power struggles among party elites are largely to 
blame for the FMLN’s failure to win the Presidency since 1994 and the fumbled implementation 
of municipal and national primaries have been at times more damaging to the legitimacy of the 
party than otherwise. The fragmentation of the former coalition of five insurgent organizations 
into competing ideological or personalist factions has dramatically deflated the mystique with 
which most ex-combatants have viewed the party leadership.   
The challenges of democratic transition as well as the differences between ARENA and 
the FMLN were no more visible than the FMLN’s 1998 effort to elect a slate of candidates for 
following year’s Presidential election.  In 1996, the FMLN approved internal primaries to elect 
candidates at the national level.  Since 2000, the FMLN has been the only party to elect its 
leaders through a universal and secret vote of some 1,000 party delegates.  ARENA, by contrast 
treats party delegates as the rubber stamp of closed door decisions taken by COENA.751   In 
practice, FMLN efforts to devolve decision making power to the base have been unpredictable 
and disorderly, perhaps the antithesis of ARENA’s emphasis with top-down control. 
During the first half of 1998, FMLN held municipal committee meetings to sound out 
support for potential Presidential candidates.  National delegates arrived at the 6th National Party 
Convention on Aug. 15, 1998 after four months of informal lobbying between that had narrowed 
the pre-candidates to a fiercely competitive race between a “renovadores” formula behind San 
Salvador Mayor, Hector Silva and the “ortodoxos” formula of Human Right Ombudsman, 
Victoria Marina de Aviles and Economist, Santiago Arias.    
The FMLN Convention would be the first in the nation’s history to elect a Presidential 
candidate, and a woman candidate, by secret ballot.  The media speculated on the significance of 
the event with members of the invited revolutionary and political dignitaries from Latin America, 
Europe, and Vietnam as well as a large contingent from the UCS, a centrist party contemplating 
an alliance with the FMLN Presidential ticket.  Gregarious lobbying by a minority of militant 
supporters of both candidates contrasted with the quiet but optimistic participation of the vast 
majority of delegates that ranged from ex-combatants to former to NGO staff to organizers for 
                                                 
751 COENA chosen candidates at all levels are ratified by show of hands in a general assembly.  In 2004, ARENA 
attempted its first primary where Tony Saca won a questionable internal vote over Carlos Quintanilla Schmidt by a 
vote of 900 to 5.   
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Duarte’s PDC.752  An invited representative of the UCS that also headed one of the FORTAS 
Foundations, commented on the historic significance of the convention: 
 
outsiders see this convention as an important achievement in civic education, not simply for the FMLN as 
a party but for the country.  This example of contesting for political representation in an election in which 
the results are genuinely uncertain is unprecedented.  Before the political space was opened in 1997, this 
type of event would have been impossible.753 
 
 
At 6:30 pm, after hours waiting to register and listening to nomination speeches, 921 of 
the official 1,034 delegates finished casting their ballot for one of the two proposed formulas.  
The result was announced at 8:00 pm, 441 votes for Aviles, 431 for Silva, 49 abstentions.  The 
orthodox delegates erupted in celebration, only to be stunned in hearing what came next.  As 
representatives of the party leadership and candidates huddled to interpret the results, it was 
announced that the party statutes required a winning vote to equal to 50% of the 1,034 delegates 
plus one (518) – which neither candidate had achieved.   
Few of the delegates were apparently aware of this rule, although one elections 
supervisor assured me that the Convention was prepared with the ballots and boxes for a second 
and even a third vote.  Both sides expected a clear victory.  The convention committee had not 
provided for a tie vote, and as night fell many delegates slipped out to make the long bus trip 
back to their rural homes.  By the time it was established that a new vote would be called, there 
were too few delegates for a call a quorum.  Puzzled but patient, the remaining delegates waited 
for nearly four hours as the candidates and party commissioners negotiated an official 
interpretation.   
By midnight, patience was exhausted.  The ranks of the delegates had visibly thinned.  
The candidates announced in succession that a consensus decision had been reached with the 
Political Commission that the vote did not meet party statutes and a second simple majority vote 
would be necessary.  When Silva announced that the next vote would be held in two weeks, the 
Aviles supporters began to demand his resignation.  Despite the assurances from Aviles, and 
other party leaders that they endorsed the decision, the delegates from both sides disrupted the 
                                                 
752 Polls showed the FMLN and ARENA tied at 30% approval going into the convention. 
753 Interview, Eddy Henríquez, Fundación Guadalupe. 
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speeches, shouting them down.  As order disintegrated, the remaining party militants rushed the 
stage demanding an alternative arrangement that favored their candidate.  Even among the 
delegation of invited revolutionaries that sat in observant approval for most of the day, decorum 
had fractured into finger pointing as FMLN ex-commanders tried to mediate between their 
septuagenarian colleagues.   
The party leaders backpedaled, at one point floating a trial balloon of a snap vote of the 
delegates present to validate the proposal for a second vote.  This final improvisation simply 
confused matters, with too few delegates left or clarity on the measure to ensure that any vote 
would be valid.  As the entire process was about to slip out of control, Facundo Guardado (head 
of the Political Commission and the renovador faction) declared that the convention had ended 
and turned off the microphones.  Delegates departed for waiting buses disgruntled and unclear 
about what had happened. 
The debacle was captured in its entirety by several radio stations and the negative 
publicity was costly.  Two weeks later, a second convention was held where only one of the two 
prior formulas was voted on.  Uneasy with the controversy, Silva had withdrawn.  Aviles also 
fell far short of the votes needed to launch her candidacy (more than 50% of the delegates 
present).  The convention decided to have departmental bodies consult on a new formula. 
Facundo Guardado and Maria Marta Valladares, two ex-commanders of the FPL, were 
nominated as the revisionist formula.  In the third convention on Sept 27,1998 voting rules were 
changed to permit a simple majority victory and to vote for formulas rather than separate votes 
for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.  Guardado and Valladares won by a 33 vote 
margin (463-430).   
Some praised the experience as an inevitable lesson in democratization, others disparaged 
the FMLN, and confidence in the party’s capacity to govern fell among many undecided 
voters.754  Guardado eventually lost by 23 points and the revisionist wing was blamed for loss.  
This competition that spilled into the public domain in 1998 was not new nor was it 
confined to the political arena.  Factional competition contributed in the early 1990s to the 
                                                 
754 The UCA radio station, YSUCA provided complete coverage of the convention.  Writers for the UCA Jesuit 
weekly magazine, Proceso, which has historically disagreed with the FMLN on many aspects of the party’s political 
strategy, have been the most openly critical of the perceived governing inexperience.  The divide between many 
leftist intellectuals and FMLN politicians has grown to such an extent that both sides are more capable of 
establishing working alliances with their respective peers on the right than with each other. 
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existence of five separate and competing post-war mobilization networks associated with each of 
the five FMLN organizations, with mirror image templates of NGOs, gremios and local 
development initiatives, sometimes within the same local space.  Some attribute these internal 
divisions to the centralism of party leadership, others to the natural pluralist tendency with which 
any democratizing society must cope.  Nevertheless, the benefits of post-war decentralization 
reforms within the party have not clearly outweighed the costs so far for the FMLN, as greater 
voice for delegates and constituent groups has contributed to invigorating factional disputes that 
have splintered party interests.  Appeals to class struggle that served to mobilize collective action 
during the war must now accommodate pluralist and subaltern demands (women, war wounded, 
environmentalist, children, migrant) to reinvent a coalition that is capable of winning national 
elections. 
Coordination among local, national and international institutions has been one of the 
central challenges to post-war development, particularly in FMLN communities where 
decentralization was pulled down from below.  A lack of clarity about appropriate roles and 
relations between NGOs, mayors and community organizations, and a climate charged by past 
rivalries, has hindered post-war collaboration.  The war left a legacy of distrust between NGOs 
and mayors.  Donor preferences contributed to this problem by failing to coordinate closely 
themselves. Competition between USAID and European bilateral agencies channeled resources 
to local development along two separate tracks, one offering incentives to municipal 
governments and the other offering incentives to NGOs.    FMLN gains at the municipal level 
have softened divisions between NGOs and mayors.  Within the NGO sector that was 
sympathetic to the FMLN, lack of coordination in the early post-war period reflected internal  
party divisions.755 Under increasing criticism that the NGO performance had not met post-war 
expectations of the FMLN base organizations and donors, the primacy of political allegiances 
has also receded.   
Empowerment through conflict strategies place a premium on coordination.  
Conceptually, the actions by local organizations can range from an extreme of active adversarial 
                                                 
755 The PD breakaway and ultimate demise as a political party contributed to a similar fate for principal NGOs 
associated with the ERP.  The NGO PROESA, for whom Ana Guadalupe Martinez was the iconic representative, 
has survived only with support from USAID and the IAF.  FASTRAS, once the principal ERP NGO, was reportedly 
moribund in 1996.  Two years later when it received a large, delayed grant from a European donor that apparently 
had not verified the organization’s pulse. 
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competition to the other extreme of the reciprocal and planned actions and commitments 
necessary for collaborative political advocacy.  There are both horizontal and vertical dimensions 
to this range of institutional coordination.  The horizontal dimension involves institutions at a 
similar level, as within the field of NGOs or INGOs.  Vertical coordination focuses more on 
relations between different nodes on the development food chain, as in the level of coordination 
or competition between NGOs and gremios, community organizations and international actors 
within a transnational network.  On both axes, insurgent mobilization networks have achieved 
impressive levels of coordination. 
Opposition NGOs have experienced several phases of coordination at a national level.  
The first phase involved efforts to coordinate the actions and policy positions of a diverse set of 
humanitarian NGOs in areas of wartime advocacy.  CIPHES, the Interinstitutional Coordination 
of Human Promotion of El Salvador, was the first instance of an inter-agency coordinating body 
for 50 human development agencies.  Another early network was the International Conference 
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA).  These initiatives represented two examples of early 
attempts to coordinate NGO actions, focusing first on refugee relief but then shifting toward 
development.756   The goals of these informal networks were to share information, avoid 
duplication, establish alternative consultative mechanisms for donors and to advance incipient 
advocacy positions toward the government and the IFIs.757   
In the second post-war phase, the focus of coordination shifted to development issues.  A 
campaign to cancel the agrarian debt was led by a large umbrella organization, Foro 
Agropecuario, that reconciled much (although not all) competition among small farmer 
organizations to build a formidable advocacy vehicle.  In response to Hurricane Mitch, civil 
society organizations at all levels came together to formulate alternative proposals for 
reconstruction that helped shape the government’s position in the 1999 Stockholm Consultative 
Group meeting.   All examples represent impressive levels of coordination between progressive 
NGOs that involved the most challenging goal of political advocacy, rather than resource 
                                                 
756 CIPHES was formed in 1985 and CIREFCA in 1989 as independent (i.e. of USAID) spaces for NGO 
coordination.  See Pearce (199:62-64)  
757 Interviews, Elena Martell, CIPHES, 1996;  Elizabeth Hayek, UNDP NGO Liaison, Jan 27, 1999 
  494
mobilization or distribution.  The modest results of these efforts also underscore the weakness 
and divisions that still limit the effectiveness of these post-war mobilization networks.  
The unmet expectations of insurgent communities have forced local institutions to 
innovate beyond the boilerplate decentralization schemes motivated through government 
selective benefits.  FMLN underestimation of the complexities of post-war development have 
also forced a revision of the “new popular economy” models with which many FMLN 
communities had experimented.758  High levels of cooperative productive experience and strong 
moral incentives were not easily transferable to the post-war context.  Unprecedented resource 
flows could not offset the myriad challenges posed by the relative chaos of the first several years 
of peace.   Delayed land transfers, poor sequencing of re-integration programs, the unsuitability 
of the insurgent cooperative model, the emergence of inequality, and an explosion of the 
accumulated frustrations of the war, all served to exacerbate an unfavorable environment 
structured by the government’s anti-agriculture adjustment policies.   
Much has been written about the effects of war and the FMLN was its own worst critic.  
Many ex-combatants spoke of the decompression and exhaustion during the first years of the 
post-war period in their own lives and among their peers, some of whom were extremely 
disciplined during the war, but soon became self-indulgent, and degenerated into individualism, 
inequality, and machismo: 
 
With greater democracy and personal freedom, many people simply exploded, wanting to unload all of 
their memories of the war, sometimes going to the extreme of doing the opposite of any direction from 
the outside.  They began attacking all of the rules of being a combatant.  Before the Peace Accords, few 
expected to live, or had plans for the future.  After the war, a great frustration that had been suppressed 
under the pressure of discipline began to unravel.  A missed childhood, years of sacrifice and suffering, 
resentment about injustices during the war that could not be talked about, the idea of being able to use the 
skills and knowledge acquired during the war to help themselves afterward, and the recognition of not 
winning.  The idea of having to start from zero to catch up with those who didn’t serve, having lost all of 
one’s family, watching others abandon the principles of conduct while one struggled to maintain them, 
became the source of great resentment.  Small loans were wasted frivolously or invested in businesses 
that quickly folded in the face of greater competition 759 
 
                                                 
758 The term “new popular economy” was coined by Aquiles Montoya in two books describing the experiences of 
emerging alternative economic organization and principles within insurgent areas of influence.   
759 Interview Carlos Cortés “Adolfo”, former officer in the FPL, mayor of Tecoluca and now Congressional deputy, 
Feb. 1999. 
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Transferring the organizational strengths of the insurgency to this post-war context has 
proven no less challenging.  FMLN NGOs were effective in the channeling of external support 
during the war, engaging in what one sector representative characterized as a role of “political 
accompaniment of a project that appeared to those involved like national liberation” (Orellana 
and Urbina 2004: 66).  While the post-war material expectations of insurgent communities were 
obviously great, the windfall of NGO resources did not entirely facilitate a smooth transition.  
Many small organizations were suddenly awash in external funding, despite weak administrative 
capacity.  For several years, financial oversight and accountability remained secondary to 
solidarity.  As cooperation levels declined, greater professionalization of NGOs was expected.   
Initially used as a filter to screen out FMLN NGOs from USAID reconstruction project 
funding, professionalization became a general standard applied by donors to all NGOs. New 
accounting requirements have forced organizations to devote more to administration and be less 
flexible with beneficiaries.  By the mid 1990s, most donors had joined USAID in demanding 
strategic log frame planning, transparent administrative controls, gender benchmarks, improved 
quality of technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation reports, decentralized programming 
(toward the communities) and above all – results.   
In 1996, the Salvadoran government began regulating the NGO sector with a law that 
raised technical standards for non-profit certification and established grounds for an external 
financial audit.760  Sufficient legal ambiguity in the prevailing law pertaining to legal recognition 
of civil society organizations served to make the application process a political issue that favored 
NGOs friendly to the ruling ARENA party, and disadvantaged those with ties to the FMLN.  
While the new legislation would depoliticize the certification process, it also forced all NGOs to 
adopt professional accounting standards, a precedent of transparency that most were not 
accustomed to providing even to their own clients.761  Later banking reforms stipulated new 
lending requirements for micro-credit NGOs. 
                                                 
760 AGAPE, FUSAL, FUSAI, FLACSO (1996) Forum Proceedings on the Analysis and Recommendations about the 
General Law of Associations and Foundations, San Salvador 
761   Interview with Luis Salazar, FESPAD, 1995; Elena Martell, CIPHES, 1995.  The first government proposal was 
roundly rejected by wide cross-section of NGOs and INGOs, including FUSADES, and was withdrawn. The entire 
law would have been scuttled had international donors not threatened to pull out.  A compromise law was passed in 
1996.  Crosby, et al. (1997: 38) 
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In FMLN zones of control, the demands for NGO professionalism from above signaled a 
crisis of identity that coincided with calls for more accountability from grassroots constituents.  
Prior to the proliferation of NGOs, it was understood that gremios advocate, while NGOs 
mobilize resources and execute.  NGO critics argue that most gremios have collapsed in the post-
war period.  Political organizing has ceased, and with it, the bottom-up, capacity for self-
governance. NGOs have occupied greater political space, despite their original function as 
technical advisors.762  A survey of 80 Salvadoran NGOs in 1995 by Foley and Hasbún report a 
surprisingly low level of effort invested into participatory mechanisms, few coordination 
linkages to other institutions, and a reluctance to become policy advocates (Foley and Hasbún 
1995). The authors find a correlation between these NGO attributes and reported 
professionalization.  As cooperation flows tapered off in the mid-1990s, civil society leaders 
voiced concerns that NGOs were losing their way, becoming too politically accommodating, 
prioritizing consensus when consensus is neither possible nor the most effective means for 
achieving local goals.  As a counterweight to NGO self-interest, some donors have also 
demanded greater local capacity building by NGOs to improve CSO self-management and 
independence.763  
Some NGOs admit they are improvising in their post-war role, learning what they should 
and should not do, how to lead from below.  The regional director of CORDES San Vicente 
argues that, “civil society or NGOs in general cannot solve poverty, small examples can show 
how poverty might be solved, but that job is for the state and private sector.” 764 While struggling 
to comply with upward and downward accountability, many local NGOs have complained that 
the pendulum has swung too far and too fast in the opposite direction.  The pressure for short-
term results was viewed as an unfortunate break in the solidary relations of the past that 
disproportionately reflected domestic political shifts within donor governments rather than the 
reality of Salvadoran reconstruction.  However, demands for upward accountability gave NGOs 
some leverage to resist unrealistic community expectations of NGO cooperation as an 
entitlement.   
                                                 
762 Interview, Andres McKinley, Jan 15, 1999, then working as advocacy program representative for WOLA in San 
Salvador. 
763 Interview, David Holiday, Director of USAID Advocacy project in El Salvador 
764 Interview, Emilio Espín, CORDES San Vicente, 1998 
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These combined pressures have thinned the NGO field in general, and highlighted the 
differences between left and right NGOs in particular.  Among the center-right NGOs these new 
requirements have fed a tendency to pick winners.  Larger, more competitive partners are 
favored over those that require greater investment to meet donor expectations.765   These NGOs 
end up adopting the very clientelist and predatory attributes of the government and donors that 
they may have once criticized.  The lack of results are typically attributed to the low capacity of 
beneficiaries, rather than flaws in the strategy.  Despite espousing support for decentralization, 
their operations remain highly centralized, with most technicians living in the San Salvador and 
commuting to rural target population. Finally, there is a tendency to emphasize outputs (houses 
built, trainings held, credit repaid) rather than impact (empowerment resources and 
achievements).  While these NGOs get stronger, the communities they serve fall behind. 
In contrast, NGOs with an insurgent base have taken a different route, albeit with varying 
levels of success.  After demobilization, the five political organizations within the FMLN 
exercised great influence in the formation and staffing of NGOs.  The failure of the PRN to 
provide employment left the FMLN with little choice than to inflate the payrolls of many NGOs 
with unemployed militants. When cooperation flows dried up after 1995, NGO employment 
dropped dramatically and party intervention in hiring diminished.   
In some instances, intervention by the party was excessive and contributed to resentment 
within the organization and among the local partners, in part due to the poor performance of 
projects.  Appointments of ex-combatants to NGO jobs for which they had little or no experience 
quickly resulted in a weakening of the NGO in the eyes of the community.  Party-NGO relations 
tended to reflect past differences in political organizing among the five FMLN factions.  The 
ERP made some of the most egregious and documented errors in claiming NGO programs and 
capital, which for some is consistent with the party’s historic disdain for mass organizing.766  
The FPL’s insistence on building mass organizations has engendered more autonomous relations 
with its respective sphere of NGOs.  It is not clear how widespread a problem FMLN 
                                                 
765 A prominently placed Knute Rockne quote on the wall of Elizabeth Murcia, FUSAI manager, accurately frames 
the philosophy of this NGO, “The world wants more winners, not losers.”  
766 See Wood (2000: 102-103) discussion of ERP meddling in CODECOSTA and FENACOA in post-war Usulután.  
See Binford (1999) and (2002), McElhinny (2004) for a discussion of ERP heavy-handness in the communities of 
northern Morazán.  
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intervention in the NGO sector became, but the decline of several high profile NGOs and 
gremios and setbacks in electoral gains in departments such as Morazán and Usulután are 
attributed to the hierarchical decisions imposed by party leaders. 
 Those NGOs and gremios associated with the FMLN that have developed some 
independence from the party also tended to reject full responsibility for local development and 
have instead steered the social tension created by the donor and community expectations into 
advocacy initiatives directed at the state, private sector and international actors.  Among those 
NGOs with strong roots in the communities that they serve, there exists the political humility that 
NGOs are unlikely to ever play more than a complementary role to achieving sustainable 
development.  “Their importance lies in making the point that poverty can be tackled, rather than 
tackling it to any large extent” (UNDP, 1993: 98-99).   
It follows that NGOs pursuing empowerment through conflict strategies invest significant 
resources into political advocacy, in contrast to the general tendency among NGOs to eschew 
taking a role in public policy.   Insurgent organizations were expected to use contentious political 
tactics, and in defiance of the USAID conditionality, have in fact done so to pursue their goals.  
What distinguishes the FMLN empowerment by conflict strategy in not only the choice and 
capacity to employ collective confrontational tactics, but their capacity to complement 
oppositional protest with effective conventional advocacy strategies.  While there exists deep 
divisions on this issue, FMLN organizations tend to demonstrate a wider repertoire of advocacy 
strategies along a continuum separating what Korzeniewicz and Smith (2001) refer to as the 
“insiders” from the “outsiders”.  Insiders refer to those groups favoring cooperation, gradual 
reform and a willingness to compromise with elite defined processes, while outsiders prefer 
denunciatory and oppositional pressure, the accumulation of social and political force toward 
systemic transformation.  “The labels of ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ refer to a spectrum of 
positions on strategic choices regarding the extent to which organizations and networks should 
make use of  - or seek to subvert or transform – the rules and procedures characterizing existing 
institutional arrangements” (5). 
To varying degrees, FMLN local organizations demonstrate agility in switching from one 
track to the other, under conditions that are deemed appropriate.   Opposition NGOs, municipal 
governments and gremios are active leaders in actions that range from blocking roads, marching 
to Presidential palace or stopping institutional processes.  Many of these same organizations are 
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equally capable in preparing and lobbying viable legislative proposals, defending alternative 
development priorities, or participating alongside government officials in a variety of relevant 
commissions, working groups or consultations.   
Still, the timing and balance of insider/outsider advocacy strategies remains a source of 
conflict within the FMLN.  Reformist tendencies within the party argue for more investment in 
relative gains through aggressive engagement of political spaces that confer some legitimacy on 
the policy preferences and authority of the ruling party (tax policies, political reforms, broader 
political alliances).  Orthodox factions within the FMLN tend to focus on absolute gains, which 
maintain relations with an ideologically narrower set of institutional contacts and prefer 
principled opposition to compromise.  The balance of power between these competing 
tendencies is regulated by the flawed but meaningful democratic mechanisms within the FMLN 
to elect candidates, lobby preferences within the party, or defect as a number of ex-FMLN 
leaders have done as positions have polarized in recent years.   
The shift in the FMLN as a single mobilization network has clearly been from an extreme 
outsider position of armed insurgency to a surprisingly sophisticated and increasing employment 
of insider strategies.  To some degree, greater use of conventional strategies was inevitable given 
the FMLN’s electoral gains.  Credibility associated with local governance contributed to 
dramatic FMLN gains in the 1997 elections at the municipal and congressional levels, which 
signaled the first substantive political realignment of the post-war period.  Local credibility 
derived not only from good governance but also out of support for empowerment through 
conflict strategies in a context marked by high inequality and political capture. 
The stronger minority position of the FMLN within the assembly tipped the political 
balance in favor of the legislative vote needed to approve a substantial increase in the amount 
transferred to municipal government – the first substantive decentralization reform of the post-
war period.  Behind the lobbying of NGOs, a COMURES motivated by increased FMLN 
representation, increased demand by mayors from all parties, and several high profile donors, an 
FMLN led coalition in the assembly overrode a presidential veto to pass Decree 271, reforming 
the FODES law by raising the municipal quota to 6% of net current income (equal to $82 
million, or about 0.55% of GDP).767   
                                                 
767 In 2004, FODES was increased to 7% of GDP, although well below FMLN proposed target of 15% by 2011. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
At the outset of this dissertation, I posed the following questions: Why have local institutions 
become so important so quickly to post-war development in El Salvador?  Is decentralization 
being pulled down by local actors from below, or pushed down by elites from above?  The 
answer is that local institutions and decentralization have become necessary elements of post –
war empowerment strategies – but in very different ways.  Decentralization was viewed by 
ARENA as means to both expedite the privatization of the state and to stabilize its ruling 
coalition through the distribution of new selective benefits to party elites and some local actors.  
For the FMLN, decentralization provided the means for reinventing the principled incentives for 
collective action during the war and for channeling significant resources to local actors as a 
platform to mount contentious challenges at the national level. 
Given the opportunity defined by shifting elite alignments and an unfavorable rural 
economic environment of high inequality, how have rural populations overcome collective action 
problems to make decentralization work?  Competing approaches that have featured stabilizing 
and top-down decentralization versus regime challenging, contentious and bottom-up 
decentralization represent extensions of the wartime counter-insurgent and insurgent strategies to 
the post-war period.  The emergence of local institutions in post-war El Salvador illustrate these 
two rival models of decentralized empowerment.   
  ARENA slowed the deconcentration of state authority to local government and firms 
and has sought, above all else, political and macro-economic stability.  ARENA pushed 
decentralization from above, reinventing a counter-insurgent alliance with rural and local actors 
to safeguard economic reforms and to delegate residual administrative duties to local 
government. Decentralization permitted ARENA to cushion the effects of economic reform and 
to reward loyal local elites while reducing the political benefits for the FMLN, thereby 
preserving its governing coalition.  Social safety nets figured prominently in this strategy.  
Participation of the poor would be confined to non-threatening activities channeled primarily 
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through mayors that effectively disregarded local inequality and was rewarded with projects.  
Out of this conceptualization of empowerment emerged the counter-insurgent local institutions 
that were incorporated into ARENA’s vertical post-war mobilization network. 
ARENA’s preferred solution to collective action problems continues to center around a 
Hierarchy strategy that has served the party well in its twenty five year history.  However, the 
demobilization and reform of the state security forces have limited the Right’s ability to repress 
dissent, and have therefore forced ARENA to diversify its repertoire of CA strategies in the post-
war period.  The loss of majority control in the National Assembly has required greater 
negotiation (Contract), both among the minor players of its own coalition as well as with 
opposition parties.  ARENA has also had to invest more in Market incentives (to placate a 
dogmatically loyal press and to provide increasing, although still anemic provision of public 
goods) to preserve its electoral plurality.  Community strategies have even received a modicum 
of ARENA interest, although the goal is to recover a work ethic, a respect for property rights and 
social order that were perceived to exist in the rural sector before the war.   
The FMLN organized local forces to demand both fiscal and administrative 
decentralization from below as a corrective to a clientelist, often corrupt central administration of 
public resources.  The local institutions associated with the FMLN have attempted to combine 
the capacity for protest with effective and propositive local governance as a platform for 
acquiring the political capital necessary to derail ARENA’s neoliberal reforms and win the 
Presidency.  Lacking any control over state agencies, the NGOs, municipal governments and 
community organizations associated with the FMLN have acted with considerable autonomy if 
not incentives from the party to design and implement local reconstruction plans, pursue funding 
and channel local demands upward.   
The FMLN has adapted an empowerment through conflict strategy to the post-war 
opportunity of decentralization by employing a shifting balance of all four collective action 
strategies, contrary to the more dire predictions about the insurgent pathological tendencies 
toward greed, opportunism, corruption and coercion.768  If we were to believe the arguments of 
Salvadoran elite and it’s U.S. benefactors, before, during and after the civil war, FMLN rule 
would be intolerant, authoritarian, secretive, unrestrained in the violation of property rights and 
                                                 
768 Lichbach (1998, Chapter 8) provides an extensive list of scenarios in which rebel solutions to the CA problem 
create unintended and perverse consequences that undermine future collection action. 
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human rights. The predominant strategies of FMLN governance at the local level have been, in 
fact, more pragmatic - to perfect local governance through Contract (NGO promotion, self-rule) 
and Community (social oversight, reinforce equity norms) collective action strategies, despite the 
noted tension and interconnectedness between them.   
Both strategies have had very different results.  FMLN reliance on Contract and 
Community strategies are likely to have contributed to the reduction in local inequality in zones 
of insurgent influence, both in absolute terms and as an obstacle to collective action.  
Conversely, principal reliance on Hierarchy collective action strategies explains the persistence 
of inequality in areas of counter-insurgent influence. Both tendencies have left their mark on 
post-war development processes. 
A final issue that is raised in this chapter is whether the proliferation of NGOs has 
increased non-elite bargaining capacity.  A contest that began in the 1970s to win over the 
"hearts and minds" of the rural population foreshadowed the rise of the NGO and the municipal 
government as the two dominant and competing forms of social and political organization in 
postwar reconstruction.   NGOs and municipal authorities were initially associated with 
insurgent and counter-insurgent projects, respectively.  Donors took sides by funding either 
municipal government (in the case of several bi-lateral donors, mainly USAID) or NGOs 
working in conflictive zones (in the case of many European aid agencies).  Communities in 
zones of wartime FMLN control supported NGOs and reserved hostility for many mayors.  This 
pattern of institutional preferences was reversed in zones of government control.  NGOs allied 
with the FMLN have prioritized contentious collective actions to demand expropriative 
redistribution of assets.  Municipalities have emphasized conventional modes of participation to 
gradually improve lives through expansion of public services.   
Do NGOs contribute to social and economic development or merely provide a substitute 
for ineffective or exclusionary government services.  Large numbers of NGOs ought to indicate a 
most viable civil society. Yet, the NGO sector in El Salvador is fragmented, highly politicized at 
the margins, and in many respects given their numbers, spectacularly unable to advance a 
progressive social agenda. 
Despite the praise heaped on the NGO sector, dependence on NGOs in local development 
schemes has a down side.  In addition to challenges NGOs of all stripes have had in making the 
transition from wartime relief to promotion of economic development, a more fundamental 
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problem has emerged.  NGOs were never intended, and in fact will never be able to mobilize the 
resources necessary for sustainable development.  The value added of effective NGOs is in 
making modest, partial contributions to local development that demonstrate how development 
might be solved, and to empower local actors to act collectively to achieve these solutions.  
Instead, many NGOs have tended to assign themselves the full responsibility of solving local 
needs, and in so doing have failed to coordinate widely enough and have diverted local energy 
away from addressing structural obstacles such as inequality and political capture, or to look 
beyond the local environment for the required investments of the private sector and the state.  
Contrary to NGO intentions, this confusion over appropriate roles can be disempowering. Where 
the unmet expectations of insurgent communities have forced local institutions to innovate 
beyond the boilerplate decentralization schemes motivated through government selective 
benefits, these pitfalls are more frequently avoided. 
A final question raised at the outset was how we might we evaluate the pro-poor claims 
of decentralization – specifically in terms of empowerment?  In other words, what conditions 
make decentralization work?  An empirical comparison of these competing empowerment 
strategies in the three case study municipalities is taken up in the next chapter. 
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VIII. CHAPTER EIGHT:  REGIONAL AGRARIAN INEQUALITY, AGRICULTURE & 
EMPOWERMENT 
 
 
As the two main political parties in post-war El Salvador, FMLN and ARENA, have 
incorporated local actors into their post-war mobilization networks as a way of adapting wartime 
political experiences to shifts in the political opportunity structure. Both insurgent and counter-
insurgent empowerment strategies promoted decentralization in response to a transition between 
new and old elites.  This shift has been horizontal for ARENA – transferring control from one 
segment of the oligarchy to another and opening space for local actors was minimal and 
contingent.  For the FMLN, the shift was vertical. Local actors have opened the space for 
themselves in a process that has been both expansive and spontaneous – rupturing in some 
localities the exclusionary pattern of development. 
This pattern has been no more evident than in the disruption or continuity of land 
inequality and agrarian relations, which remains the single most significant factor in explaining 
the expectations for and performance of local institutions in a context of decentralized post-war 
development.  This chapter shows that insurgent and counter-insurgent political experiences in 
the paracentral zone are associated with disruptive change and relative continuity with the pre-
war agrarian structure, respectively.  Where the power of elites, both the landowning and 
modernizing types, has been restricted by land redistribution, empowerment through conflict 
strategies have shifted agricultural development responsibilities to new local institutions and 
leaders. Where there is relative continuity in land inequality and relations between the various 
social classes, empowerment by invitation strategies circumscribe the options for local producers 
and decentralization of rural development resources are more prone to political capture.   
Land distribution and agriculture are not as closely identified with the national debate 
over decentralization, but represent a significant dimension of this post-war development puzzle.  
Decentralization of the agricultural economy is best characterized by ARENA’s efforts to carry 
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out the IFI strategy of privatizing the state’s role in agriculture and moving toward a more 
market driven economy in land sales and production.  Change or continuity in the local agrarian 
structure has triggered different responses to the crisis in agriculture that these reforms have 
caused.  In settings of high inequality (Jiboa Valley) communities rely mostly on hierarchy and 
market collective action strategies that emphasize individual competition and tend to reward 
elites through the political capture of resources freed by agricultural policy reforms.  Where  
agrarian inequality has been leveled (Tecoluca), communities have relied increasingly on 
Contract or Community collective action strategies, rooted simultaneously in new institutional 
solutions to the retreat of the public sector and solidarity based contentious challenges to this 
retreat. As a result, effective vigilance against political capture is greater.  Where political 
experiences were less clearly defined and agrarian inequality left partially intact (San Ildefonso), 
competition between top-down and bottom-up contract collective action strategies have 
neutralized each other and consequently resulted in the weakest economic performance. 
Given the inhospitable climate for agricultural development in the post-war period, the 
economic dividends of these empowerment strategies for producers have been low.  Particularly 
between 1992 and 1998, most rural development initiatives have performed a stabilizing function 
more or less like a social compensation program.  The vast majority of producers in the region 
are land-poor subsistence grains farmers, with little education and low risk propensity to adopt 
alternative methods.  NGOs and to a lesser degree, the private sector, have attempted to fill the 
gap of downsized public support for the agriculture sector, but each has demonstrated 
deficiencies in their respective partnerships, including inadequate technical assistance, bias 
toward certain producer groups, ineffective organizational technologies and uncoordinated 
duplication of effort.  The sobering results stand in sharp contrast to donor discourse of self-
sufficiency and results that came to dominate the rural sector by the mid-1990s.   
Just as important is the political capital that these initiatives have created (or not) in terms 
of the capacity to respond to the crisis in agriculture provoked by ARENA  policies.  These 
capacities include autonomous local participation, oversight and criticism by the poor in the 
many rural development initiatives sponsored by the state or NGOs in the paracentral region.   
Political capital also includes both the capacity for mobilized and contentious advocacy as well 
as pragmatic alliance building and proposition of viable alternatives in the face of a shrinking 
public commitment to rural producers. 
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In this chapter, I illustrate the link between post-war land inequality, agriculture and 
empowerment.  In the first section, I present survey evidence of economic and human capital 
accumulation by rural and farming households in the paracentral region.  In each of the following 
three sections, I discuss the principal differences in the impact of the war on land inequality and 
in turn, the post-war agricultural development strategies chosen in the three case study 
municipalities.  Focusing on land inequality, the level of producer organization and social 
structure relations, these differences begin to highlight the contrasting empowerment strategies 
of invitation and conflict and signal the extent of change or continuity in the post-war structure 
of socio-economic relations and expectations for development.   
 
 
A.  LAND INEQUALITY AND POST-WAR AGRICULTURE IN THE PARACENTRAL 
REGION 
 
The Land Transfer Program (PTT) represented the only formal economic redistributive 
mechanism in the Peace Accords.  Even if the planned PTT was to have been fully implemented, 
resolving the problem of land access for as many as 75,000 adults, this would have left as many 
as 300,000 other landless farmers with no land.  As designed, the PTT would not have corrected 
El Salvador’s land inequality.  It is also likely that land became less important to some FMLN 
commanders, many of whom relocated to urban areas, benefited from incentives to begin non-
agrarian careers, or entered politics within which land was simply one of many competing issues.  
Population dynamics reinforced an FMLN electoral strategy that became oriented toward urban 
lower and middle class communities over its historic rural base.     
However, to the FMLN base still living in the countryside, the transfer of land was at the 
center of politics and a shared vision for development.  Wood points out that during the troop 
demobilization process, “FMLN field commanders in Usulután – many of them of peasant 
origins – repeatedly conditioned the concentration and demobilization of their forces on progress 
in the transfer of land, at times without the authorization from their central command” (2003:4-
5).  Carrying forward a capacity for autonomous collective action rooted in group solidarity 
(Community) and gradually distancing themselves from the Hierarchy strategies of insurgent 
central command, these and many other examples of local collective action in defense of hard 
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earned land rights prevented encroachment by former landowners and kept rural demands front 
and center within the FMLN. 
 In the departments of La Paz, San Vicente and Usulután of El Salvador’s paracentral 
region (see map below), the PTT transferred 37,000 hectares of state owned and privately held 
land to 13,931 ex-combatants of the FMLN and Salvadoran military, in addition just over 22,000 
civilian supporters of the FMLN.769  Without the benefit of an updated agrarian census, Table 8.1 
illustrates the key shifts in the local agrarian structure between the case study municipalities, 
including the differential effect of the PTT program.  In Tecoluca, an estimated 3,300 individuals 
gained access to land (42.5% of the agricultural workforce), compared to 11.5% (377 
individuals) in San Ildefonso and none in the Jiboa Valley.  The PTT redistributed a remarkable 
54% of arable land in Tecoluca, 70% of which was already expropriated by ISTA, compared to 
15% in San Ildefonso - over a third of which was owned by ISTA (DIGESTYC-EHPM 1974).  
No PTT land was redistributed in the Jiboa Valley.  Recalling that less than half of the planned 
land redistribution associated with all reforms was actually carried out, the local redistribution in 
the municipality of Tecoluca is what El Salvador might have looked like if the full land reform 
had been executed. 
Data from my regional survey of 432 landholders provide some indication of the 
variation in land inequality at the local level to which historical processes of land conquest and 
redistribution have contributed.   For the entire sample of 432 landowners or renters, the Gini 
coefficient for land distribution was 0.55, much lower than the previously noted department land 
Gini coefficients.  This difference is likely due to the absence of large landowners from the 
survey.770  The overall surveyed distribution of land among owners suggests that inequality is 
highest in the Jiboa valley (Gini of 0.57), exceeding the survey average.771   The land inequality 
coefficient of 0.34 for Tecoluca and 0.47 for San Ildefonso are below the survey average, 
                                                 
769 PTT beneficiary  and land data were provided by FUNDESA, as of Feb. 18, 2000, which included rolled over 
ISTA properties that were occupied by the FMLN in the final years of the war. 
770 The largest declared property was 500 manzanas (350 hectares), which was removed as an outlier since the limit 
is 245 ha and if included it increased the overall gini to 72. 
771 The municipal level Ginis were calculated from the distribution of land among owners or renters in each case.  
One large landowner was excluded from a secondary municipal sample as an outlier.  We interviewed 42 
landowners and 31 renters in the Jiboa Valley, 72 landowners and 17 renters in Tecoluca, 53 landowners and 30 
renters in San Ildefonso, and 150 landowners and 68 renters in other municipalities.  The regional survey Gini 
values are not comparable to the department gini due to the absence of large farms in the former.  Thus, the regional 
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Table 8.1  Paracentral Agrarian Structure before and after the war (1971-1998) 
 
 
 Tecoluca San Ildefonso Jiboa Valley San Vicente 
 Hard-line 
Insurgency 
Disputed 
Zone 
Hard-line Counter
Insurgency 
Department 
Pop. 1971 25,413 9,013 15,640 153,398 
Pop. 1998 26,000 11,000 23,000 156,000 
Post-war agrarian structure     
Total Land Area (ha) 28,500 13,600 7,300 118,100 
Arable Land for Ag Use 18,474 10,892 5,265 74,143 
Cultivated Land772 11,533 3,170 3,845 42,740 
1980 Ag Reform land (% arable) 2,250 (12%) 1,589 (14.5%) 515 (9.5%) 12,100 (16%)   
1992 PTT land  (% arable) 9,934 (54%) 1,625 (15%) 0 17,317  (23%) 
Total Reform land  (% arable) 12,184 (66%) 3,214 (29.5%) 9.5% 29,417  (39%)  
Total Ag. Producers (1998)773 7,750 3,300 6,000 28,000 
1980 Reform benefic (% 
of total ag. labor force 
700 (9%) 250 (7.6%) 471 (8%) 2,700 (9%) 
PTT beneficiaries 
(% of total ag labor force 
3,300 (42.5%) 377 (11.5% 0 5434 (19%) 
Land Inequality Gini 0.27 0.49 0.64 0.60 
 
reflecting the higher percentage of municipal land that was transferred to local producers in the 
respective land reform processes.  Despite the small sample, these estimates reinforce the 
perception that empowerment strategies in insurgent Tecoluca, hard-line counter-insurgent Jiboa 
Valley, and moderate counter-insurgent San Ildefonso have diverged significantly in terms of 
change or continuity with pre-war agrarian structures.   
Despite these local shifts in agrarian structure, the post-war economic gains, particularly 
in agriculture, have been modest.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 compare progress on relevant 
economic and human capital indicators, based on data from a 1992 government municipal survey 
and the 1998 paracentral regional survey.   
Economic capital is measured first in terms of current basic needs – access to housing, 
water, electricity and paved roads.  Local basic service needs in the paracentral zone, like most 
areas affected by the conflict, were formidable following the war.  As detailed in Table 8.2, the 
level of unmet basic needs in the early post-war period within the case study municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ginis probably underestimate the absolute land inequality in the respective municipalities, but are believed to be 
valid for relative comparisons. 
772 Total equals sum of temporary crop land, permanent crop land, prepared pasture, and forest. 
773 Estimated as a percentage of total population, based on 35% economically active population over 15 years of age, 
85% rural and 85% rural population employed in agriculture. 
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illustrates the disparity between urban and rural areas, as well as certain differences between the 
conflictive cases themselves.  In 1992, one of every two Salvadoran families lived in rural areas, 
yet the levels of unmet basic needs were 50-75% lower in San Salvador when compared to San 
Vicente, or the predominantly rural case study municipalities.  In San Ildefonso, which ranked 
highest among the three case study areas in terms of unmet basic needs in 1992, nearly 50% of 
the population was illiterate, 60% living in conditions of overcrowding, and 95% lacked access 
to water or sewerage.  In Tecoluca, infant mortality was 41 per 1,000 births, nearly 70% lacked 
electricity and fewer than a third of school age children were enrolled in primary schools.  By 
most accounts, the Jiboa Valley was somewhat better off (particularly in terms of education 
enrollment, illiteracy, and access to electricity).  However, Jiboa Valley residents suffered very 
low levels of access to water or sanitation as well as poor health indicators.  
 
 
  510
 Table 8.2  Indicators of Unmet Basic Needs in Case Study Municipalities (1992) 
(Percent of households) 
 
 
Indicator  
San 
Ildefonso Tecoluca 
Jiboa Valley 
(simple ave.) 
San 
Vicente 
San 
Salvador 
National 
Average 
Ranking index 96 91 73.5 98 19.1  
Rural population pct. 79.2 84.6 63.6 57.9 19.0 49.6 
Infant mortality 26.0 41.0 33.4 46.3 28.2 33.2 
Illiteracy  >10yrs 46.9 37.9 26.1 28.6 14.7 23.9 
Overcrowding 60.3 49.7 48.6 47.4 19.7 32.7 
Dirt floor house 72.8 65.7 63.3 57.1 15.0 39.5 
Temp. house (rancho) 12.6 10.8 2.7 5.6 2.5 4.2 
W/o water access 95.8 88.8 85.8 70.0 24.9 53.5 
W/o sanitation 64.3 40.5 23.7 29.7 4.6 18.9 
W/o sewerage 97.2 89.9 95.4 79.5 29.2 60.3 
W/o electricity 61.7 69.2 37.5 44.3 8.8 30.7 
Net enrollment (grades 1-6) 34.3 28.9 54.5 48.3 65.3 50.3 
Net enrollment (grades 7-9) 14.1 15.3 26.9 27.0 41.6 28.8 
Enrollment all ages (1-6) 55.6 58.1 47.4 47.3 39.7 45.6 
Enrollment all ages (7-9) 43.1 45.6 44.3 45.2 40.8 42.2 
Source: Government of El Salvador (1995) based on 1992 population census data.  Infant 
mortality is per 1,000 births; Illiteracy is defined for the population 10 years of age and older, 
Overcrowding is defined as more than 3 persons per room; water access includes public spigots; 
Enrollment all ages includes adult students 
 
Turning now to Table 8.3, we might first compare the pre-war socio-economic status of 
case study families.  Three indicators of parent socio-economic status provide additional 
information about the pre-war agrarian structure in the three municipal cases, specifically: 
whether a family owned or rented land prior to the war, the head of household’s occupational 
status, and if a family member migrated to seasonal harvest as a source of off-farm employment.  
Jiboa communities reported the highest pre-war land security, with 38% of families owning land, 
and another 58% renting - producing a total of 96% of families having access to land.  Land 
access drops to 25% ownership and 78% total access in Tecoluca, and 24% ownership and 67% 
total access in San Ildefonso.774  Head of household occupation status suggests that over 80% of 
all households relied principally on agricultural employment.  In the last category, Tecolucan 
respondents reported the highest dependence on coffee, cotton or sugar harvest income.  Given 
the sub-human conditions of the harvest work, migration was typically an indicator of extreme 
                                                 
774 The average reported farm was very small, about 0.5 hectare, consistent with reported inequality data. 
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poverty.  Pre-war dependence on the harvest was high (54%) in all cases.    This data on parent’s 
socio-economic status suggests that Jiboa Valley families may have held a slight material 
advantage over the other two cases before the war. 
Jumping ahead to 1998, San Ildefonso continues to exhibit the most severe human and 
economic capital deficit, although these conditions most likely prevailed before the war.  Jiboa 
Valley residents reported an average education of 5.1 years, while the other two municipalities 
reported an average education of less than 4 years.  Respondents in Tecoluca reported a lower 
average education level (as well as age, and family size) - signifying a deprivation of human 
capital attributable to the war.  The education gap is especially striking among women, with a 
full two years difference separating women in Tecoluca and San Ildefonso from the average 
among women in the Jiboa Valley, the secondary municipalities, and San Vicente in general.  
Given the participatory obstacles faced by women, the link between education, participation and 
empowerment might hinge on a gender axis.775   
Private access to water refers to the percent of households reporting a private well or 
piped in source. The percentages in Table 8.3 do not reflect access to potable drinking water nor 
do they address the irregularity of service.776   San Fonchanos comment ironically that they lack 
sufficient drinking water and struggle without electricity in most homes, despite the fact that 
municipal lands were donated and families were relocated for the construction of the 
hydroelectric dam that sits in plain view of their homes.  The Jiboa Valley has a higher 
percentage of people with access to electricity, roughly twice the number reported in San 
Ildefonso or Tecoluca.  Despite the privatization of telecommunications, nearly four of five in 
each municipality lack fixed line or cell phone service.777   The UNDP has shown that both 
service access and service quality tracks El Salvador’s pattern of high inequality, with poorer 
                                                 
775 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1985) have shown that among socio-economic resources, education is the strongest 
predictor of political participation.   
776 The San Vicente Productivo reports that in 2000 only 46% of the San Vicente department population have piped 
water access in the home.  Water from wells often disappears in the dry months and wells are frequently ruined by 
floods, but have the distinct advantage of providing relatively cost-free water.  Piped systems are slightly more 
reliable in the dry months, although outages are frequent, and carry the added burden of a monthly charge.  Water 
quality is poor, often non-potable, both cases.  Wells and piped systems are comparable, thus grouped as a single 
category. 
777 Privatization of telecommunications has helped increase the number of installed telephone lines from about 35 
per 1,000 to over 100 (compared to 235 for East Asia). 
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households enjoying disproportionately lower access and poorer quality of services than top 
quintile households.778 
Tecoluca held a slight advantage in terms of permanent housing, most likely due to the 
2,000 new concrete block houses built between 1992 and 1998 in projects associated with the 
Peace Accords.  In San Ildefonso, over a third of those surveyed were living bahareque style 
houses (a combination of plant fiber and mud) - typically a sign of extreme poverty.779  Finally 
the Jiboa Valley reported a lower proportion of beneficiaries of recent local development 
projects, although at least 60% have reported benefiting from at least one.  The 2001 earthquakes 
destroyed over 8,000 houses in the three case study regions, nearly 80% in the Jiboa Valley, 50% 
in Tecoluca, and 15% in San Ildefonso.  Many of these have since been replaced by permanent 
houses. 
Transport infrastructure is now considered the top development priority in much of Latin 
America, and is clearly an obstacle for the intensification of agriculture or the creation of non-
agricultural employment in rural areas.  El Salvador made modest gains in infrastructure 
improvements, particularly in terms of tax incentives for maintenance but most investment was 
biased toward urban areas.780 
  Of the 12,840 km of highways in El Salvador, only about 20% are paved and among the 
non-paved roads less than 10% were in good condition before a concerted rural roads plan was 
underway in 1999.781   However, only a small fraction of the rural road network has been slated 
                                                 
778 UNDP (2003), World Bank (2004).   Regional inequalities in water distribution are striking.  In 1994, the San 
Salvador Metropolitan Area with 26% of the nation’s population consumed 64% of all potable water, while the four 
eastern provinces with roughly the same percentage of the population settled for access to only 5% Chavaria (1994), 
Rosa and Barry (1995).  In addition to corruption associated with ANDA, the state water company, the failure of 
several IDB loans designed to privatize water distribution is attributed to the refusal of unmetered higher income 
water users capacity to block the reform.  PSI (2000) and interviews with IDB officials in the water sector. 
779 While adobe block houses possess certain thermal and cost advantages, the clay-straw construction material has 
proven inadequate for long term needs, collapse under flooding or tremors (both relatively frequent in the zone), and 
contribute to respiratory problems by producing higher internal airborne particulate densities.  Despite local 
preferences and the low cost of adobe, I do not consider such housing permanent. 
780 IDB (2005: 5) The establishment of FOVIAL – a road maintenance fund was created in November 2000 with 
resources generated from $0.20 per gallon surcharge on fuel.  The outsourcing of road maintenance has been part of 
the overall privatization of the Ministry of Public Works, which was also a condition of several IDB loans and 
resulted in the reduction of public staff at MOP from 7,400 to only 650 in 2005. 
781 World Bank (1998) and FUSADES (1996) estimate the average distance between the Salvadoran farm and the 
closed paved road at 5.8 km. 
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for improvement (785 km by 1998).  Some 6,150 km of rural roads (almost two thirds of the 
highway network) in have long been a top priority for reactivating the rural economy.782  Over 
20% of all roads (mostly tertiary dirt roads) are the responsibility of municipal governments.  
What rural roads that have been improved tend to benefit the non-poor (in part due to the 
prioritization of lowering costs for agriculture export producers and tertiary roads that link 
municipal seats to the primary highway network).  Average distance for extreme poor 
households from paved roads continues to be 80-90% greater than the non-poor in rural areas.783   
Less than 20% of all municipal roads in the study area are paved, with San Ildefonso 
having the lowest (3%).  The principal entry roads to the town centers of the Jiboa Valley and 
San Ildefonso registered as priority investments as well.  Most of the road network is comprised 
of unimproved dirt roads that are largely impassable during the rainy season. Tecoluca, one of El 
Salvador’s largest municipalities in terms of total area, has 110 km of roads.  The coastal 
highway and the highway connecting San Vicente to Zacatecoluca consist of 28 km of paved 
roads.  In 1995, 70 km of rural roads were unimproved and another 12 km were of slightly higher 
quality.   
In 1998, local development project activity, measured by the reported beneficiary status, 
is highest in Tecoluca and San Ildefonso, likely a reflection of higher levels of reconstruction 
activities directed toward ex-combatant communities.784  Over two thirds of the paracentral 
region surveyed in 1998 reported benefiting in some way from development projects underway 
in their community.  Of these projects, almost 90% were infrastructure or services projects.  Only 
3.5% were identified as production support projects and 2.1% were identified as organizational 
strengthening.   
 
 
  
                                                 
782 FUSADES 1996.  Rural roads do not include 1,050 km of tertiary roads. 
783 World Bank (2004).  The average distance to the closest market is also a third higher for the poorest households. 
784 Self-reporting as a beneficiary of a project is also a subjective ascription, as projects were underway in nearly 
every community surveyed and it depended on the evaluation of the respondent as to whether they felt they would 
eventually realize a benefit.   
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Table 8.3  Case Study Municipalities – Economic Capital Indicators 
 
 
 Survey Sample Descriptives EHPM HH Survey 1998 
 Jiboa Valley 
 
n=155 
Tecoluca 
 
n=155 
San Ildefonso 
 
n=119 
Secondary 
Munis  
n=482 
Total 
Sample 
N=912 
San Vicente 
[Rural] 
National 
Average  
[Rural] 
PARENTS SES        
Family owned/rented land prior to the 
war 
38/58 25/54 24/43 28 29/41   
Parent’s Ocup. Status 
prior to war (% non-farmer) 
14 17 18 23 25   
Family migrated to harvest prior to 
war 
60 69 52 47 54   
% who reported family member killed 
in war (a) 
59 77 41 47 54  34.0 
ECONOMIC CAPITAL        
Ave. Education  
(women) 
5.2 
(5.1) 
3.6 
(3.2) 
3.8 
(3.1) 
5.6 
(5.1) 
4.9 
(4.6) 
4.2 [2.8] 
4.2 [2.8] 
5.1 [5.0] 
% w/o Private access to water 33.5 20 44.5 68.5 31.6 47.1  34   [64.4] 
% w/o Electricity 14.8 60 62.2 31.7 37.6 [44.3] 18.5 [41.6] 
% w/o Telephone (fixed or cellular) 80 85 73 N/A N/A   
% w/o Permanent House 67.8 57.4 89.9 62.1 65.9 42.6 4.0 
% Roads paved (1998) 10 21.5 3 - -     52 
% Project benefic. 62 81 80 63 68   
Ave. Monthly Income $148 $115 $133 $180 $171 $289 [$197] $410 [$224] 
% Hholds Rec. Remittances 15 15 16 24 20 18 16.3 
% Farm occupations of EAP 37 41 51 37 40 37.8 23.5 
% Indiv. Agric. Monthly Incomes 
>=Rural min. wage of $75 
57 46 22 34 38 42  
AGRIC. INDICATORS (% farm hh) n=70 N=93 N=73 N=231 N=467   
Ave.Owned Plot  (ha) 2.4 2.2 3.9 5.1 3.3 3.0  
Ave. Rented Plot 0.7 1.0 1.1 2.0 1.5 1.0  
Ave Plot  1.9 2.1 3.3 3.0 2.7   
% Cultivate Basic Grains Only 50 68 96 74 73   
% Report Prod. Increase 97- 98 60 46 34 32 40   
% Farmers w/access to Tech Assist 35 50 19 36 36  20%  
% Produce for consumption 6 13 47 35 29   
% Sell produce independently 63 58 35 31 41   
% Sell produce thru intermed/coop 31 29 19 34 30   
% Access to credit 33 43 18 36 34  [12%] 
% Use Organic Fertilizers 38 27 11 18 21   
% Access to irrigation 7 29 11 18 21  5% 
% Storage capacity 47 47 42 21 34   
% Own Tractors/Ox Team 1/20 0/21 0/14 2/10 3/14   
Source: 1998 Paracentral Region Survey, Rural San Vicente derived from 1998 EHPM survey. For 1998, the minimum rural 
nominal wage of $75 compares to the real rural minimum wage of $48, the average nominal rural wage of $135 and urban 
nominal minimum and average wages of $144 and $264, respectively.   
  
 
 Reported overall monthly income was highest in Jiboa Valley, almost twice the rural 
minimum wage of $75 per month, and slightly above the urban minimum wage of $143.  
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Reported average wages were lowest in Tecoluca.  In all cases, reported wages were 
substantively less than the average of $197 for rural San Vicente. Slightly more than 1 in 6 
families reported cash remittances from family members working outside El Salvador, a 
percentage similar to the departmental average and with little difference between cases.  More 
recent estimates of households receiving remittances do indicate a higher percentage in San 
Ildefonso, and considerably lower percentage in Tecoluca.  FISDL estimates presented in a 
baseline study for San Vicente Productivo estimate municipal poverty levels in 2002 at 80% for 
San Ildefonso, 58% for Tecoluca, and 54% for the Jiboa Valley (Melara et al. (2004: 32). 
Farming remains one of the poorest paying occupations.  Among agricultural 
occupations, 57% of respondents in the Jiboa Valley earned an equivalent of the urban minimum 
wage or more.  Only 23% of San Ildefonso agricultural occupations reported similar earnings.  
Fewer than half in Tecoluca make more than the minimum wage from their agricultural work.  
Low agricultural income is inversely linked to dependence on farming as the principal 
occupation.  San Ildefonso reported the highest farming population - 51% of the respondents.  In 
Tecoluca, fewer than half, and in the Jiboa valley as low as 1 in 3 were dependent on farming.   
 Diversification and intensification of production are widely considered to offer the only 
possibilities for security in micro-parcel farming.  The size of the average land parcel varies little 
between cases or with respect to the departmental average, when taking into consideration the 
higher average land qualities in Tecoluca and the Jiboa Valley.785  One important change is that 
average farm size has likely fallen significantly, particularly in Tecoluca and San Ildefonso 
where post-war average farm sizes are approximately one fourth the 1971 average.   A second 
notable difference is between owners (3.3 ha ave.) and renters (1.5 ha ave.). 
Alternatives to basic grains are most likely to be found among Jiboa producers, and least 
likely among San Fonchanos, an indication of diversification that is contingent upon both land 
quality and the concentration of the best land and productive resources among fewer producers.   
Higher subsistence production is another indicator of low diversification.  On an index from 1 to 
7, crop diversification was estimated at 2.77 for the Jiboa Valley, 2.22 for Tecoluca and 1.11 for 
                                                 
785 A subsample of 467 agrarian occupations in the Paracentral survey includes 309 landowners and 121 land renters, 
and 70 agricultural laborers.  Many respondents qualified for more than one category. 
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San Ildefonso, compared to 1.83 for the other municipalities.786  Similarly, San Ildefonso 
producers are much more likely to consume the food they produce (47%), indicating a 
combination of disincentives to sell, such as storage and transport costs.  Producers in the Jiboa 
Valley and Tecoluca sell some part of their harvest independently (58-63%), or through local 
intermediaries and cooperatives (29-31%).   
Only two of every five producers in the entire survey reported an increase in production 
between 1997 and 1998. Tropical event, El Niño in 1997, brought drought conditions that 
reduced production levels in San Ildefonso and parts of Tecoluca, but especially in Usulután to 
the east (explaining the low survey average).  Jiboa Valley communities were least affected by 
the drought, with over 60% of Jiboa producers reporting increases in production.  Tecoluca was 
slightly above average (48%).  Access to credit and irrigation can also improve production and 
reduce risk exposure to climatic events, although both resources seem to be relatively 
unavailable to most.  Tecolucan producers reported a greater access to irrigation.  However, the 
flatness of the land and proximity to the Lempa river has also been a curse to occupants of the 
coastal valley.  Floods have destroyed crops, homes and livelihoods for thousands living in the 
lower Lempa valley five times in the last decade.  Some 43% the producers surveyed in Tecoluca 
reported access to credit, compared to 33% in Jiboa Valley and 18% in San Ildefonso.787  
Technology in the form of access to organic fertilizers is similarly distributed.   Finally, just 
below half enjoy some form of storage capacity for grains and the survey found only 3 producer 
owned tractors in the region, compared to 444 alone reported in Tecoluca in 1971.  Ox teams for 
plowing are relatively more common, found in about 20% of the farms.   
 Overall, the survey data summarized in Table 8.3 show that all three communities contain 
a great number of households living in poverty (defined at less than $200 per month in household 
income).  Of the three, the Jiboa Valley communities report a small advantage over Tecoluca and 
San Ildefonso.  San Ildefonso may have a slight human capital advantage over Tecoluca, but in 
most agricultural and basic needs categories, ranks below the others.  If these results may be 
                                                 
786 Producers were asked to identify the range of crops cultivated.  The answers were ranked on a crop 
diversification index scaling from 1 for basic grains only to 7 for mix of basic grains, fruits or vegetables, and export 
crops such as coffee, sugar cane or non-traditional crops (cashews, etc.).  Cattle ranchers were not included. 
787 Tecoluca reported a wider distribution of both credit and technical assistance, both which are due to the greater 
presence of NGOs. 
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viewed as the achievement of the first generation of post-war agricultural development projects 
in the paracentral region, their comparison leads to the conclusion that nearly all performed 
below expectations, perhaps unsurprising given the economic and political climate.   
The frequency of prioritized local problems is summarized in Table 8.4, based on the 
1998 Paracentral Survey.  The lack of basic infrastructure and services is far and away the most 
pressing local problem.  However, vulnerability to violent crime ranks very highly (17% in the 
Jiboa Valley and 13% in Tecoluca) and a cluster of problems associated with economic 
insecurity ranks third.   Between the three case study municipalities, there is slight variation.  
Economic conditions, poverty, land insecurity are reportedly to be worse in San Ildefonso, least 
bad in the Jiboa Valley.  Violent crime is not considered to be a major problem in San Ildefonso 
(1%).  Lack of local organization is considered a significant problem (6%) only in Tecoluca. 
 
 
Table 8.4  Survey Results: Local Problem Identification by Case Study Municipality 
 
 
Top Local Problem Count Percent
Lack of Basic Infrastructure 259 28.4 
Lack of Basic Services 247 27.1 
Insecurity-Crime 159 17.4 
Unemployment 90 9.9 
Economic conditions 43 4.7 
Lack of organization 28 3.1 
Corruption 25 2.7 
Land insecurity 12 1.3 
Environment 12 1.3 
Other 14 1.6 
NS/NR 23 2.5 
Total 912 100 
 
 
Why so few of the post-war rural development initiatives seem to have achieved 
significant impacts in terms of improved farmer incomes, crop diversification, or production 
turns our attention to the respective empowerment strategies deployed to address the post-war 
agricultural crisis.  The next section discusses how elites and local development institutions were 
incorporated into post-war insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization networks to contest the 
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distribution of agricultural resources and control over policy space being abdicated by the public 
sector.   
 
 
B.  COUNTER-INSURGENT CONTINUITY, ARENA AND THE JIBOA VALLEY 
 
 
Figure 8.1  Map of the Jiboa Valley Microregion 
 
 
The Jiboa Valley, composed of four municipalities of Guadalupe, Verapáz, San Cayetano and 
Nuevo Tepetitán, represents the political experience of hard-line counter-insurgency that is 
associated with negligible change in the pre-war agrarian structure.  For ARENA, the concession  
 
of land transfer and the implicit legalization of land takeovers by the FMLN implied either the 
diminished significance of land in government’s economic strategy, or the inherent tradeoff 
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between the old agrarian elite (particularly in the east) and the modernizing elite (less dependent 
on agriculture, although including the coffee elite, based in the west – a region less affected by 
PTT) (Wood 2000).  Affected landowners did organize in the early post-war period, influenced 
by the agrarian party elites within ARENA and the PCN, and threatened not to sell to prospective 
PTT buyers.  However, either through FMLN or ONUSAL mediation, this resistance never 
endured.788   The division between the old agrarian and modernizing elites within ARENA 
played out differently depending on the relative influence of each faction in a specific region, 
and became a significant factor in the success or failure of land redistribution under PTT.  In San 
Vicente, the post-war local politics between ARENA’s old guard and the FMLN were as bitter 
and contentious as the war itself.  
The trajectories of Alfredo Cristiani and Roberto Angulo illustrate the contest for 
representation of ARENA in the paracentral region as a microcosm of national trends.  The 
fortunes of President Cristiani himself were much less dependent on land, having diversified into 
banking, insurance, and commerce.  Regional elites representing the old guard of ARENA, such 
as Roberto Angulo, were less diversified and therefore much more opposed to the land transfer 
program and the consolidation of FMLN power in general.  However, few if any of Cristiani’s 
land assets, mostly located in the Jiboa Valley, were affected by the PTT in San Vicente, in 
contrast to significant reductions in the Angulo estate located in FMLN controlled Tecoluca.789   
FMLN leaders identified Angulo and other ARENA landowning hardliners from the 
region with early violence targeted at FMLN municipal and regional leaders and argued as well 
that they had a hand in the repeated flooding of the lower Lempa valley caused by excessive 
water discharge from the 15 de Septiembre dam after heavy rains and an unannounced opening 
of the flood gates.  These and other measures were viewed as pressure tactics by dispossessed 
landowners to recover farms lost in the war.  As head of COENA from 1997-2000, Cristiani also 
intervened personally to discipline mayors if they collaborated too closely with FMLN 
                                                 
788 See Wood (2003) for Usulután and Kiefer (1995a, 1995b, 1996c) for northern Morazán. An incentive for this 
negotiation included the cancellation of agrarian debt, which benefited many large farmers. 
789 El Carmen, Cristiani’s prize coffee estate, was targeted by the FMLN, but according to former FMLN deputy for 
San Vicente, Marta Valladares, this was the first property that refused to sell to the Land Bank.  Interview, June 18, 
1998.  Another coffee property owned by the Cristiani family, El Perical, was sold and assigned to demobilized 
Armed Forces. 
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leaders.790  A community leader from Guadalupe complained that ARENA politics were placed 
above effective local governance.  He recounted a familiar incident when Roberto Angulo, then 
Assembly President, appeared during a campaign making promises that were never delivered.  
When the mayor, Juan Cerritos complained, he was told that he had to choose between his 
loyalty to Angulo and the party over the community’s needs.791  
 
 
Figure 8.2  Chinchontepec Volcano from the southern ridge of the Jiboa Valley 
 
 
Inequality and the prevailing fear of authority both contribute to low expectations for post-war 
development among agricultural producers.  The absence of any land transfer meant that few in 
the Jiboa Valley expected the change in the structural power relations of local institutions.  The 
                                                 
790 Interview, USAID official, alleged that Cristiani pressured local mayors (in the paracentral region) when 
outreach or collaboration with FMLN groups exceeded ARENA’s comfort level.  In another instance, COENA 
under Cristiani unilaterally announced the reduction of the Usulután City mayor’s salary from $4,500 to $1,700. 
791 Interview, ADESCO leader, Guadalupe, July 1, 1998. 
  521
post-war landscape is dominated by a mix of landlessness and subsistence renting (perhaps two 
thirds of the agricultural labor force) mixed with a number of family farms in a patchwork of 
small plots in the Jiboa Valley.792  A third of all farmers in 1971 were renters on plots averaging 
less than one hectare, and this situation has barely changed despite some 471 farmers gaining 
access to land through the 1980 reform (mostly Finateros).  A small number of medium to large 
landowners are expanding their farms through local land purchases.  The landless and renter 
households combine wage labor during on the coffee and sugar farms or as San Salvador maids 
and maquila factory workers with subsistence livelihoods at the margins.  Among the landless 
and land-poor, there is nostalgia for the return of the patrono to provide work as well as a fear 
that an FMLN Presidency would nationalize all production and restrict freedoms.   
Expectations for the future are placed in the hands of God, or the benevolence of “los 
acomodados.”  With Bishop Aparicio’s death in 1996, it is the latter that continue to set the day 
to day spiritual agenda in the Jiboa Valley.  In Guadalupe, the bells toll nightly calling forth 
hundreds of rich and poor alike to worship, clearly underscoring the convening power of the 
church.  However, the fervent religious devotion remains almost exclusively sacramental and 
paternalist in its class blindness.  Guadalupe parish priest, Leonardo Rodríguez, recognizes that 
the root of rural poverty can be traced to local inequality, but redistribution of resources is a 
delicate issue.  He describes himself as a conservative within in a conservative diocese. His few 
homilies about inequality offended certain individuals, so his approach is gradualist, looking 
outside the region for solutions and careful not to alienate certain sectors.  He expressed interest 
in inviting U.S. military training program, Fuertes Caminos, to dig wells in Guadalupe.  Special 
masses are reserved to pray for emergencies, which in one typical instance was the theft of an 
uninsured parish vehicle.793    
 In contrast, the poor that survived the worst wartime violence quietly attribute their 
collective suffering to the sins of a few.  Criticism of the government or one’s neighbors is still 
against God’s will -  punishable then as well as now.  An ex-Armed Forces member from Nuevo 
Tepetitán suggests that voting is still considered a risky choice and could lead to problems.  “The 
                                                 
792 Based on interviews with agronomists working in the region and comparisons with 1971 agrarian census. 
793 Interview, Father Leonard Rodriguez, Guadalupe, July 6, 1998.  The church in Guadalupe was destroyed by the 
2001 earthquake, along with hundreds of houses.  This real emergency may have expanded the horizons of church 
involvement in reconstruction activities. 
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people don’t vote because they have been led to believe that voting will not provide food on the 
table.  Work provides food, not voting.  Perhaps a person can be harmed by meddling in politics.  
Better to work with a clean mind, without fear of having offended anyone.794  Spiritual justice is 
considered a higher power than the rule of law.  One woman stated, “Where God is present, we 
shall be consoled.  I have no fear of speaking because God will fix everything. 795  Aspirations 
for the future prosperity are similarly placed in God’s hand. “Only the Virgen knows, because 
we are here at the will of God.”796 
Typical are the coffee communities of La Laguneta and El Chile, located near the summit 
of the Chinchontepec volcano, described by local health promoters with a powerlessness toward 
elite domination that has frustrated local development efforts: 
 
The Espinozas left in 1984 when the FMLN burned their coffee hacienda (San Antonio La Laguneta) and 
the farm was left unprotected and unclaimed by the 120 families that now live in the vicinity.  Most were 
former civil patrollers that were disarmed by the FMLN and now work as day laborers, selling firewood 
or in a microenterprise.  No effort has been made to reactivate coffee and fruit production, in part because 
the property is embargoed by the bank.  The desire for economic reactivation depends upon the return of 
the patronos who could provide more stable jobs.  In an adjacent finca owned by the Iglesias family, 
landless peasants from El Chile tried to negotiate the sale of land for the construction of badly needed 
housing, but the Iglesias refuse to sell.  Direct relations between the mozos and dueno do not exist, but are 
mediated by the mandador.  The community is unwilling to push harder out of fear of greater 
reprisals.”797 
 
Another woman from Nvo. Tepetitán offered a similar view: 
 
 
It was better before the war, things were less expensive.  Now things are more expensive.  The 
hacendados left for the capital, and there is no work on their estates.798 
 
 
 
                                                 
794 Survey Interview, Armed Forces veteran, Nuevo Tepétitan, August, 1998 
795 Survey Interview, woman from La Virgen, Nuevo Tepétitan, August, 1998 
796 Survey interview woman, San Pedro Aguas Calientes, August, 1998 
797 Interview, Ernesto Hernández, La Laguneta and Julio Alfredo Crespín, El Chile, July, 1998. 
798 Woman from La Virgen, Nuevo Tepétitan, 77 yrs. old, August 1998 
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Coffee continues to dominate the post-war agrarian structure of the Jiboa Valley despite 
representing as few as 20% of all farms.  The Association Cafetalera, which claims 160 
members in the Jiboa Valley and 12,000 nationally, criticizes rich and poor alike for squandering 
a pre-war coffee culture where investment, savings and a work ethic were valued.  Land 
inequality is acknowledged, but attributed to “overpopulation and low reproductive discipline 
among the poor, rather than stingy landowners.”799  Land inequality among coffee producers is 
only one among several essential factors that determine profitability, including altitude, level of 
technology, age and density of trees, capital costs, processing capacity and finally, price.  Larger 
growers tend to own the best land (between 1,200 and 1,800 m), invest more and generate yields 
that exceed by four times the national average, and secure the best price, leading to profits per 
hectare of $5,000 to $6,000.  The profit gap between a medium size and small grower can far 
exceed the ratio in land inequality.800  Small and medium producers take a small share of total 
coffee profits, which go disproportionately to the retailers, processors, and traders, while only a 
few cents of every $2 dollar cup of coffee is paid to small producers and temporary laborers for 
the beans picked to brew it.801 
An Inter-American Development Bank grant designed to strengthen the 240 members of 
the Nonualcos Cooperative had mixed results.  Credit was extended to about 35 members of the 
cooperative as coffee prices began to slump in the late 1990s, boosting production levels and 
financing major improvements in cooperative beneficio.  However, producer incomes 
declined.802  Despite a restriction in the IDB contract that specified a 10 hectare and $1,500 
annual income ceiling for eligible participants, these rules were ignored by permitting a number 
of medium sized growers in Guadalupe to participate.  The larger growers ultimately took 
                                                 
799 Interview, Cuno Salvador Maties, Paracentral Regional Director, Asociación Cafetalera, July 15, 1998, 
Guadalupe. 
800 Using conservative estimates from price and producer costs in recent years, the difference in profits for a typical 
25 hectare and 2.5 hectare coffee finca can reach 70:1, when difference in farm size is only 10:1. 
801 Comparisons and coffee value chain estimates are taken from Gresser and Tickell (2002: 24).  Coffee harvest 
laborers in El Salvador make about $3-$5 per day. 
802 IDB Technical Assistance Project ATN/SF-4273-ES and SP/EP-93-10-ES (1995-1998) for $650,000, of which 
approximately a third went to Cooperative Nonualcos, the largest of six coffee cooperatives that participated under 
the Union of Salvadoran Coffee Cooperatives (UCAFES).  Final Program Execution Report by Appropriate 
Technology International (Feb. 1999: 22). mimeo. 
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control of the cooperative board of directors. The historic distrust between the 10% medium 
sized and 90% small landowning members of the Nonualcos Coffee Cooperative prevented the 
cooperative from supplying enough member produced coffee to make their own beneficio 
profitable.  Neither could they purchase inputs collectively or pool financial resources with other 
cooperatives to lower credit transaction costs.803   
A technician advising the cooperative under the IDB grant contract recognized that large 
growers have rigged the market and exercise private exit options by diverting production to 
alterative buyers or seeking credit from preferential sources, destroying collective trust: 
 
Cristiani owns two banks and a fertilizer import agency and will never have problems finding credit or 
cheap inputs, while the majority of cooperative members are dependent on the Agricultural Development 
Bank (BFA) and the five firms that control the inputs market.  The obstacles to fair competition are 
concrete, but not insurmountable.  In the best scenario, the challenge for small producers is to manage 
dependency more efficiently, making UNEX (the largest coffee exporting consortium on which Cristiani 
holds a seat on the Board) work a little harder for its slightly smaller paycheck. (Interview, Victor 
Mencía, ATI, Oct. 4, 1998)   
 
 Max Menjivar, one of the medium landowning members of the cooperative, had 
accumulated property in Guadalupe and in La Paz, owned several businesses and had 
administered for the Borgonovo family one of the two coffee purchasing houses in the region for 
45 years.  Like other provincial elites, he casts his small fortune as self-made and distinguishes 
his hard earned achievements with those of the larger patronos that appropriated most of the best 
lands when ejidal restrictions were lifted, or in his words, “when the land was free” a century 
ago:   
 
When I worked for Mauricio Borgonovo, they supported me.  When a piece of property was about to be 
put up for sale, he advised me to buy it.  I didn’t have the $8,000 or $12,000 the property was asking, but 
little by little…I am a founding member of the Nonualco cooperative, but most of us are small producers, 
no more that 20 hectares.  It was I that guided our decision in Guadalupe to join, because I like 
cooperativism.  I also owned a bus transport company and belonged to a transport cooperative and learned 
there are many advantages to cooperatives in terms of reducing costs.  (Interview, Max Menjivar, July 4, 
1998) 
 
                                                 
803 Interviews with Cooperative members, Guadalupe, Aug, 1998 and Victor Mencía, ATI representative, Oct. 4, 
1998.  Small is defined by Mencía as between 1.5 and 7 hectares.  The Nonualcos beneficio requires a capacity of 
20,000 quintales to run a profit, but in 1997 only 16,000 qq were processed in 1997 despite UCAFES total 
production of 24,500 quintales.  Members preferred to sell a portion of their coffee to middlemen – often to get a 
better price or quicker payment. 
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Small producers argue in private that this image of Menjivar as a self-made man 
disguises a history of predatory lending to the poor through which he has acquired many land 
titles when minor debts were not repaid.  Smaller finceros grumble over the misuse of past funds 
by a cooperative board dominated by the largest producers, while blame is recast by the board on 
the poor judgment by individual producers.804  No attention in the IDB program was given to 
addressing structural impediments within the national or international coffee market, and the 
individualist strategies prevailed.  Despite some positive effects of the IDB program, the benefits 
appear to have excluded the majority of coffee producers in the region.   
PRODAP is a much larger internationally funded program designed to support 5,000 
producers in the paracentral region, including 170 in the Jiboa Valley, 100 in Tecoluca and 10 in 
San Ildefonso.805  The $20 million program began in 1993 to provide technical assistance and 
organizational training to small farmers that did not benefit from the PTT or demobilization 
process, most of whom were renters on marginal soil.  After six years, PRODAP had become 
another social compensation fund, having fallen short of most of its goals in raising farmer 
incomes, diversification, credit, conservation measures or commercialization.806  The program 
proved unable to ensure compliance by participating government institutions in areas of 
extension and credit causing unforeseen gaps in coverage.  Alternatives that involved bypassing 
the BFA or CENTA (the state extension agency) with communal banks or greater reliance on 
NGOs were vetoed by the government, which opposed measures that devolved too much 
administrative authority to the communities.  Lack of coordination with local NGOs or municipal 
governments increased the programs dependence on state extensionists.  However, CENTA 
extensionists were facing layoffs of 50% of its labor force, pending implementation of a World 
                                                 
804 Cooperative members did not want to be named.  Interviews with representatives of ISTA and CENTA 
repeatedly characterized the failure of agrarian reform on profligate and irresponsible peasant culture. 
805 PRODAP I is funded by U.N. International Fund for Agriculture, the Bank for Central American Economic 
Integration and the Salvadoran Government.  The target population is the rural population of San Vicente and 
Cabanas, farmers owning or renting less than 7 mz. 
806 IFAD (1999) Some social infrastructure improvements were financed, but Debt delinquency was 40% before the 
portfolio was restructured.   
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Bank loan to restructure the Ministry of Agriculture.807  As a result, the agency saw little 
incentive to expand its role in PRODAP and withheld services due to pre-occupation with job 
security. The Director of PRODAP also noted that even when the program was effective in 
improving the competitiveness of smaller producers, the control of regional markets by the 
largest growers could suppress prices and financially cripple these new competitors. 808  Both 
uncompetitive market practices and a retreating state severely limited PRODAP’s impact. 
Sugar cane is the second most important crop in the Jiboa Valley.  As with coffee, small 
and even medium sized producers complain that price setting by the closest mill favors the 
largest producers and arbitrarily gouges the profits of the weak.   The sugar growers’ cooperative 
is moribund due to unpaid debts, member indifference toward selling collectively or challenging 
unfavorable prices.  An initiative to organize the eighty sugar trapiche operators (CANISA 
panaleros) was only beginning in the late 1990s.809   
A PRODAP agronomist argued that the organizational challenges were largely 
responsible for the disappointing results. “In the Jiboa region, there exists a legacy of 
disorganization, perhaps as a result of the war and the perception among producers that 
organizing is dangerous.  Most small producers choose individual strategies, which are more 
secure but less profitable.”810  The challenges of enterprise modernization are certainly not 
unique to the Jiboa Valley, but the lack of attention to the legacy of distrust left by persistent 
inequality has prevented much progress.  The prevailing control of the Jiboa Valley by larger 
landowners rests on weak community organization, a collective nostalgia for the pre-war 
economy, and a latent fear of jeopardizing the minimal social contract to which they still cling.   
So too among the political elites of the Jiboa Valley, inequality has inevitably 
exacerbated tension among local, provincial and cosmopolitan elites. Prior to the 2003 elections, 
founding ARENA member Roberto Angulo, four term Guadalupe mayor, Juan Antonio Cerritos 
                                                 
807 A $40 million loan was extended to reform the Ministry of Agriculture and its respective extension agency.  A 
second $50 million loan was approved in 1996 to modernize the countries cadastral and land registry lists.  Both 
loans have been controversial in their tendency to support the interests of large growers over those of small producer 
groups.  Foley and Thale (1997). 
808 Interview, Frank Escobar, PRODAP Director, Feb. 8, 1999. San Vicente. 
809 Interview, Mauricio Alfaro, Verapaz, Aug. 11, 1998; Demetrio García, San Benito, Guadalupe; sugar growers 
810 Virgilio, PRODAP, Aug. 12, 1998 
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and six other ARENA officials from San Vicente made a highly publicized switch to the 
rightwing rival PCN.  ARENA’s vote preference in the Jiboa Valley has been reduced to 35% in 
recent elections as Verapáz alternates between ARENA and PCN support, and San Cayetano and 
Nuevo Tepetitán have elected FMLN mayors.  Dissatisfaction with the control by the 
modernizing elite faction over COENA, which translated into disputes over the distribution of 
patronage, blocked ascent within the party, or excessive intervention by COENA in local affairs, 
all of which led to this exodus that lifted PCN legislative and mayoral gains and eliminated 
ARENA’s working majority in the Assembly.  On the day that Angulo was credentialed as a 
Congressional deputy, he was nearly killed by a hail of stones that smashed threw the windows 
of his vehicle on a road leaving Guadalupe, where he’d taken part in the inauguration of Cerritos 
as PCN mayor.811  Political tolerance remains a work in progress in the Jiboa Valley. 
In many ways, this horizontal shift in the balance of elite politics that has done little to 
alter the hierarchy or market individualist collective action strategies that prevail in the Jiboa 
Valley.  Few NGOs have worked there.  One of the principal NGOs in the region is Fundación 
Guadalupe, the FUSADES and business community’s response to the expanded FMLN presence 
in National Reconstruction Plan communities.   The focus of FundaGuadalupe has been almost 
exclusively on basic infrastructure and service provision, but it has also been an active 
participant in efforts to form a micro region in the Jiboa Valley.  FundaGuadalupe’s 50 
individual members are all originally from the region, but most live in San Salvador and work on 
a volunteer basis.  Their interest in local development is driven in part by a self-interested desire 
shared by many who now work in the contaminated and congested neighborhoods of San 
Salvador to retire in their hometown.   
The director of FundaGuadalupe argues that the institution has been abandoned by 
FUSADES in terms of financial support and has faced competition with area mayors and the 
church regarding control during ribbon cutting ceremonies for public works or assuming 
responsibility for problem projects.812  Despite efforts to build alliances with a wider range of 
leaders and institutions and moving toward interventions that address structural obstacles to 
economic development in the region, the party allegiance of most members of the Foundation 
                                                 
811 La Prensa Gráfica, May 3, 2003. 
812 Interview, Emilio Henríquez, Executive Director, FundaGuadalupe, San Salvador, June 29, 1998 
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have prevented these innovative efforts from getting off the ground.  A bipartisan effort to 
establish a departmental economic promotion commission, Iniciativa Vicentina, was chaired by 
FundaGuadalupe and the CORDES Foundation, but ended prematurely when the ARENA 
officials withheld local endorsement.813  In 1996, FundaGuadalupe included FMLN legislative 
deputy and ex-commander from the region, Marta Valladares, as an ally in the lobbying 
campaign behind the paving of the Jiboa Valley’s principal access road with funds from a 
pending international loan.814  The two ARENA mayors retreated from the advocacy initiative 
and were rewarded with government funds to pave small segments of the road that leads into 
their respective municipal centers.815  Competition between FundaGuadalupe and local mayors is 
not simply institutional rivalry, but political due to the perception that the Foundation is not 
squarely in ARENA’s camp. 
First with FUSADES and then ARENA, the ambition of FundaGuadalupe has fallen on 
deaf ears as requested funding is refused when the projects fall outside party control.  The 
director of FundaGuadalupe has vowed to move from constructing schools to a culture of 
development with or without ARENA, but has avoided confrontation by not disclosing to local 
partners any details about ongoing conflicts between the Foundation and provincial elites.  By 
withholding this information, the Foundation has reserved for itself the power to acquiesce or 
challenge, a choice that ultimately reinforces the status quo power relationships.  To the extent 
that FundaGuadalupe has broken with the paternalist and party oriented interests of the FORTAS 
Foundations, it has been boxed in by the low expectations and fear of conflict among the 
members and the passivity of the beneficiaries.  Participatory alternative development projects 
are circumscribed by the condition that they co-exist with a highly inegalitarian local economy.  
In nearly every initiative that has challenged loyalties between the provincial elites of the Jiboa 
Valley to the ruling coalition, the initiatives have failed.    
                                                 
813 Interview, Emilio Espín, CORDES,  
814 Panoramic road proposal, mimeo.  The road was subsequently paved in 2005, several years after the 2001 
earthquakes and after San Vicente Productivo Program helped allocate funds and attention to it. 
815 The Ministry of Agriculture also refused to endorse the project proposal by including it in an appropriations 
request because it ran the risk of enhancing the political credibility of opposition politicians. 
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Figure 8.3  Cristiani’s Beneficio Acahuapa with coffee pulp deposit pits, adjacent to decorative 
plant export facilitity in San Cayetano Istepeque 
 
 
Where exceptions exist to the pattern of top-down authority, they are often associated 
with FMLN influence.  Residents from communities in San Cayetano organized to protest the 
pollution induced health problems caused by Cristiani’s beneficio.  Despite support from local 
ex-combatants living in the area and FMLN Congressional leaders, resistance by the ARENA 
mayor and Environmental Ministry allowed the problem to continue.816  José Evanol Funes, the 
first FMLN mayor of Nuevo Tepetitán (1997-2000) the Jiboa Valley, promised to open an 
investigation of irregularities involving the sale of municipal property to Cristiani when the 
Beneficio was built in the 1970s.  However, the coffee crisis and recent earthquakes may have 
delivered the decisive blow by forcing the closure of the beneficio in 2002 and with it the loss of 
200 jobs. 
                                                 
816 Interviews, Lino Murcia, La Entrevista, San Cayetano Istepeque; Maria Marta Valladares, FMLN 
Congresswoman. 
  530
In the Jiboa Valley, we see continuity between the pre-war and post-war agrarian 
structure and the associated socio-economic relations.  Economic reconstruction has depended on 
state institutions, with little autonomous initiative from local producer organizations.  
Expectations for local economic development are low and the risk of political capture of new 
resources is high. 
 
 
 
 
C.  INSURGENT DISRUPTION, THE FMLN AND TECOLUCA 
 
For the FMLN, the PTT was a far cry from the initial goals of the insurgency but it has come 
close in places like the insurgent case of Tecoluca.  Some 3,300 beneficiaries of the post-war 
Land Transfer Program (PTT), almost 40% of the producer population in Tecoluca, will 
eventually receive legal ownership to this land.817   When asked about the differences before and 
after the war, the inevitable was response given by most Tecolucans emphasized land.   “Before 
the war, half of Tecoluca was owned by twelve families.  This land is now owned by 2,000 
peasants.”   In fact, the number of family farms in Tecoluca (greater than two hectares) has 
increased from only 227 in 1971 to well over 4,000 in 1998.   
Large private farms have been redistributed, although the agrarian landscape in Tecoluca 
is now a complex mix of medium and small properties; native Tecolucans and settlers from other 
provinces, cooperative, association and private property rights; and every political affiliation.  
Initially, ISTA controlled 30 reform properties in Tecoluca, but the FMLN occupied 18 of these 
(over 70% of all occupied land) and these state farms were rolled into the PTT program, in 
addition to 14 large occupied private farms. An estimation of the post-war agrarian structure in 
Tecoluca is summarized in Table 8.5.   
 
                                                 
817 Of the FMLN PTT population, 83% are “tenedores” and 17% are demobilized ex-combatants, although the 
distinctions are blurred in many cases.  There is considerable confusion about PTT occupancy rates and therefore 
impossible to say what percent of this estimate actually resides in Tecoluca. 
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In all, 7,500 hectares of prime farmland were distributed to 2,300 FMLN ex-combatants 
and tenedores (average PTT parcel was about 3 hectares).  As many as 1,000 PTT beneficiaries 
in Tecoluca are demobilized members of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, although a fraction 
actually occupies the 2,300 hectares of land assigned to them.818  ISTA managed cooperatives 
(including FINATA) still represent 2,250 hectares (12% of all local arable land), which have 
been transferred to some 700 cooperative members and individual Finateros.  In addition, large 
private owners holding of as much as 100 hectares (the permissible reserve limit under Phase I of 
the agrarian reform) are still about 1% of the labor force, although the total amount of land in 
large farms has declined.  Medium sized owners holding much less land are scattered throughout 
the municipality.  Finally, renters and day laborers continue to represent a smaller but relatively 
significant percentage of the local labor force.  Land reform in Tecoluca, according to one 
source, has reduced landlessness from 85% in 1971 to 20% in 1995 (Grajeda, et al. 1997: 95).   
                                                 
818 Molina (1999: 112) reports that over 70% of the land transferred to ex-members of the Armed Forces nationally 
remained idle, representing some 10,500 hectares. 
Table 8.5  Estimation of Post-war Land Tenure in Tecoluca  
(% of 1994 ag labor force) 
 
Landless farmers     6% 
Small Renters (<2 ha)    15% 
Small landowners (<2 ha)   10% 
1980 Land Reform beneficiaries  25% 
Land Transfer Program beneficiaries  40% 
Medium Size Farmers    3% 
Large Farmers     1% 
Total                100% 
 
Source: Grajeda, Cummings, Moreno, Almendárez (1997:89) Does not reflect 
FAES-PN PTT land distributed to demobilized Armed Forces or National Police. 
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Figure 8.4  Map of Tecoluca 
 
 
In 1994, Nicolás García was elected as the first FMLN mayor of Tecoluca and one of 
only fourteen in the country, at a time when Blanca Avalos de Angulo, García’s former grade 
school teacher and wife of Roberto Angulo, was the appointed ARENA governor of San Vicente.  
Two decades after the massacre at La Cayetana, the protagonists of the crucible event for the 
revolution in San Vicente now faced each other on new political terrain.  An FMLN municipal 
government and a host of other local organizations presided over a panoply of post-war 
reconstruction needs that began with one fundamentally new feature –one of the most dramatic 
reversals in agrarian inequality in the country.  However, the local agrarian structure is far from 
monolithic, economically or politically.  Former landlords are conciliatory and many manage 
their property from outside Tecoluca.  The remaining provincial elites, albeit reluctantly, couch 
their hopes for an economic recovery on FMLN leadership.  FMLN ex-combatants have steadily 
gained control or assumed key roles in the local institutions in Tecoluca (the police, police 
inspector’s office, the justice of the peace, heath promoters, teachers, municipal government and 
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the National Assembly).  Both in terms of having neutralized the economic impunity of local 
landlords and by removing their control over most local institutions, the FMLN opened space for 
alternatives. 
Change did not come without resistance. The Angulos and other reactionary Vicentian 
landowning elites in ARENA were instrumental in efforts to block the FMLN from winning 
municipal office in 1994.  Violence and intimidation marked the first campaign and governing 
demanded skills akin to survival as combatants during the first years as municipal council.  On 
Nov. 10, 1994 after a visit to USAID to lobby for funding to improve the feeder road to La Pita 
connecting the coastal highway to communities in the lower Lempa basin, three ex-FMLN 
commanders and local officials in Tecoluca, David Merino Pablo Parada Andino, and Carlos 
Cortés were dining at a restaurant in San Salvador.819  Two men approached the table and fired, 
emptying their pistols a point blank range.  Franco was killed after seizing one of the attackers, 
Parada Andino and Cortés were wounded, the latter escaping over a wall and finding the police.  
No arrests were made.820    
 Nicolás García and Carlos Cortés reported escaping similar attacks by armed assailants 
near their homes, as well as constant surveillance and sabotage of municipal property.  The 
kidnapping of a municipal employee was derailed when García and other ex-FMLN commanders 
were able to identify the kidnappers and issue an equally convincing counter-threat of 
retaliation.821  Based on insider intelligence, García argued that ARENA landholding elites were 
behind most of violence, expecting that a campaign of fear would prevent the FMLN from 
winning local office and set in motion a means for recovering lost property.822 Although many 
ex-combatants travel armed, FMLN leaders in Tecoluca have prevented violence from escalating 
in retaliation to provocations from the right. 
                                                 
819 La Prensa Grafica, Nov. 11, 1994.  Merino was a member of the FMLN central commission, departmental 
director and head of PTT land transfer process in Usulután.  For Parada Andino, a former zone commander and 
employed at the Tecoluca justice of the peace, this was the third attempt on his life.  Cortés was the sindico of 
Tecoluca and would eventually succeed García as mayor of Tecoluca in 2000. 
820 Interviews, Carlos Cortés, 11.17.98; Nicolás García, 3.4.99; Pablo Parada Andino, and press reports. 
821 Interview, Carlos Cortés, Nov. 17, 1998.  Subsequent investigation determined that 12 ex-soldiers living in Santa 
Cruz Porrillo, Tecoluca were responsible in the kidnapping.  Six are now in jail, four others were found dead in 
sugar cane fields near their homes and two were still “at large.” 
822 Interview, Nicolás García, Tecoluca, April 1999. 
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The post-war church in Tecoluca is also sharply divided.  The official church, consisting 
of two priests, is conservative and uninterested in politics. The abandonment of the liberationist 
ministry of the pre-war period left faithful open to evangelical and protestant alternatives that 
quickly appeared.  In parallel, the popular Catholic church has re-emerged in FMLN 
communities, bringing priests from outside Tecoluca to offer mass and help organize 
catechists.823  As before, the pastoral struggle around restoration of peasant rights must work 
within the hierarchy of a conservative church that has expelled over 200 seminarians and 
reassigned dozens of priests over ideological differences since the appointment of the current 
archbishop.  The liberationist church that remains active in Tecoluca. In the view of one 
organizer, the role of the municipalities Communal Pastoral Development Association is to: 
 
assure that the experience of Archbishop Romero is never forgotten, to instill in the actions and behaviors 
of the youth the compromise of a living religion.  Romero was not interested in restoring the Cathedral 
(the obsession of current Archbishop Saenz Lacalle) but in constructing a church among the poorest.  This 
pastoral plan is reflected in the work plans of local NGOs that try to integrate Christian, communal and 
productive leadership, although with very little funding from the hierarchical church.  Independent of 
official recognition by the bishop, this work will continue.  (Miriam Abrego, ADESCO Pastoral 
President, San Carlos Lempa, December,1998)  
 
 
 To surmount opposition from the state and local elites, many newly landed farmers 
deposited high expectations for post-war development with the local institutions.  Post-war 
collective action strategies built on the foundation of improved land equality to tackle other local 
needs.  The Grupo Bajo Lempa (Lower Lempa Group) consortium represents one of the most 
promising insurgent collective actions in Tecoluca.824  The Grupo Bajo Lempa is a diverse set of 
social and economic organizations that work with 50 communities, populated by 12,500 people 
in the lower Lempa valley of Tecoluca and parts of Zacatecoluca to the west.825  Cummings 
                                                 
823 See Binford (2004) for analysis of post-war religious organizing in Morazán.  David Rodriguez, who had been 
expelled from the church, was now living with his wife and children in Zacatecoluca, and served a term as 
legislative deputy in 1997 for La Paz. 
824 This section and subsequent chapter sections on the development institutions present in Tecoluca draw heavily 
from several monographs on Tecoluca that were written in the 1990s (Graceda, Cummings, Moreno, Almendárez 
(1997) and Fogaroli and Stowell (1997) as well as a detailed analysis of the business initiatives in the Lower Lempa 
by Cummings in his 2005 doctoral dissertation.  The authors of all three studies have provided generous access to 
background studies and relevant notes that informed which this analysis.   
825 Annual Report, Fundación CORDES, various years; Grupo Bajo Lempa, 2002, mimeo. 
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(2005) describes the creation of this highly innovative network of associative business ventures, 
combining small-scale agriculture and cattle production, agro-industrial processing, organized 
commercialization and the business services (financing, agricultural inputs, machine leasing and 
repair, among others).   
 The driving force behind the Grupo Bajo Lempa Initiative is the CORDES Foundation, 
one of the five principal FMLN NGOs, which has had an office in Tecoluca since 1991, and has 
employed up to 20 staff.826  CORDES provides direct support for 250 producers, producing 100 
hectares of organic cashew trees, and 500 additional hectares of vegetables, fruit, livestock and 
basic grains.  By 1997, CORDES managed a regional budget of a quarter of a million dollars in 
Tecoluca – more than three times the entire local tax revenue stream of the municipal 
government.827  Agroindustry investments that CORDES has steered to the lower Lempa region 
of Tecoluca include a cashew processing plant, a dairy processing plant, a 30 hectare agriculture 
teaching - demonstration farm, and an organic sugar mill.  The majority ownership of these and 
other rural service enterprises has been transferred to micro-regional community council 
(Sistema Economica Social, SES) and the workers associations, although the authentic 
appropriation of control by the latter remains, according to Cummings, one of the most 
significant challenges facing the Grupo Bajo Lempa (Cummings (2005: 179), SES (n.d., 1998).   
 The crown jewel of the Grupo Bajo Lempa is a small agroindustrial processing factory 
that can fry, shell, dry, peal, sort and package as much as 200 metric tons of organic cashews, 
which are cultivated on now subdivided PTT cashew farms that were left idle for over a decade 
during the war.828  The growing, processing and selling of cashews (in both national and 
international markets) employs about 150 people at wages that hover just below the standard  
monthly maquila wage ($158).  Cashew profitability is not as profitable as coffee, but is superior 
to most other crops in the region in terms of risk and income.  Organic certification and the 
                                                 
826 Created in 1987-88 along with several other NGOs in anticipation of the transition to peace, with historic ties to 
the FPL, CORDES began with 1 staff person and has since become a stable development institution.  In 1998, 
CORDES employed over 124 people nationally and is working in six of the countries 14 departments.   
827 CORDES national budget was $2.1 million for that year. 
828 Interview Rafael Rodriguez, SAMO Plant Manager, Jan. 13, 1999; and Cummings (2005: 154-168).   
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recently acquired “fair trade” status will increase the marginal profitability achieved for the first 
time in 2003, and production volume has grown steadily from 60 MT to 225 MT in 2004.829   
The fair trade certification encourages constant improvement in the strengthening of the 
growers association toward full ownership and control of the processing factory, including 
awareness of their rights to unionize. Cummings describes the “certain apprehension in the 
Directive Council,” that this option created, “due to their perception that the organization of a 
labor union would lead to labor/management conflicts.  However, this has stimulated the process 
of incorporating workers that meet certain established criteria, as cooperative owners of the 
processing plant.” 830   
 While perhaps mostly at a demonstrative level, the Grupo Bajo Lempa’s chosen 
economic activities and consistency in pursuit of goals have opened the space for alternatives to 
subsistence agriculture to be considered.  A central feature of future economic success, rather 
than an arbitrary by-product or obstacle, is the local ownership of the process even as power 
relations are subjected to unprecedented public scrutiny. 
CORDES maintains a regional office in Tecoluca and the majority of its regional 
employees (perhaps most importantly – the regional director) live in the communities, although a 
number of agronomists and technicians commute to San Salvador on the weekends.  The 
constant presence of CORDES within the community it serves cannot be understated in terms of 
a demonstrated commitment (reflecting a Community strategy of strengthening local norms) to 
share both the costs and benefits of the development experience.  Accessibility of the NGO also 
lowers the bilateral transaction costs of monitoring and enforcement of the social contract that 
CORDES holds with the communities of Tecoluca.  Responsiveness and the simple 
demonstration effect of leading by doing are all advantages to CORDES work that none of the 
other principal NGOs in the case study municipalities, and few in general, are able to meet.   
Heavily dependent on subsidized investment and modest in terms of generated 
employment (356 local jobs), production or income improvements, the Grupo Bajo Lempa 
initiative has expanded slowly, but shares many features of any struggling rural enterprise and by 
                                                 
829 Op cit, 2005:160-161, of the 2004 volume, 70% was organic.  One study estimated the financial equilibrium 
point for the cashew factory at about 100 MT if 100% organic.  An additional 175 hectares of cashew production 
was contracted by the Tecoluca processing facility in order to increase production to meet international demand. 
830 Op cit, 2005: 166-167. 
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itself does not represent a viable solution to rural poverty in Tecoluca.   Despite certain 
successes, improvised experimentation has resulted in sizable losses for many producers 
(associated with experiments in multi-cropping, organic sugar cane, and incompatibilities 
between certain fruit and vegetable seeds with soil varieties on coastal farms.  Audits, impact 
evaluations, internal controls and information systems for most projects were largely missing 
prior to 1997.831  Thus it was impossible to say whether the benefits of any investment 
outweighed the costs.  Following Hurricane Mitch and a series of other climatic events, as much 
as 80% of the $1.3 million in credits issued to local producers was in default by 1998.832   
On the other hand, CORDES and other NGOs in Tecoluca have created an informal 
insurance system for rural producers that is generally absent in the rural sector.  While there is a 
high propensity for failure among small enterprise in general, even higher with rural SMEs, a big 
gap filled by NGOS like CORDES is in lowering the risks and consequences of failure, or to 
lower the costs of recovery.  While far from perfect, CORDES seems to be allowing learning to 
happen (i.e. learning from failure) without that experience leading to a reconcentration of land 
and power.   
Moreover, the Grupo Bajo Lempa experience for the most part stands in contrast to 
examples of failed NGO development investments in other parts of Tecoluca.  Three storage 
silos sit empty near the road passing the village of Santa Monica, and the cattle feed complex sits 
idle in the nearby village of Las Pampas – both highly visible examples of poorly designed 
productive infrastructure projects that hastened the decline of FEDECOOPADES in the region. 
The silos were constructed below the minimum elevation to prevent moisture and keep grains 
dry.  In addition the lack of credit or cooperative supply commitments have conspired to ensure 
the silos sit empty.  The collapse in beef prices in the mid-1990s contributed to heavy losses in 
livestock projects and triggered a decision to liquidate investments in cattle. Cooperative 
promoters for FEDECOOPADES blame mismanagement of cooperative funds by coop board 
                                                 
831 CORDES (1998); CORDES General Assembly Feb. 27, 1998 
832 Interview, manager Social Financial System (SFS), San Carlos Lempa, Tecoluca; CRECER report on SFS 
(1998).  Upon restructuring the debt, forgiving about $1 million, delinquency rates have improved but credit 
restrictions have excluded many previous borrowers.  Some 37% of the current 700 members of the newly 
reconstituted savings and loan cooperative, 37% are women.  Escobar and Zepeda (2003: 405-6) cited in Cummings 
(2005). 
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members, lack of member skills and market forces, while cooperative leaders criticize the poor 
technical advice, inconsistent oversight and adaptive capacity of FEDECOOPADES.833   
  Demobilization revealed a deep crisis in the cooperative production model, to which 
local producers and NGOs have struggled to find an appropriate alternative that avoids the 
pitfalls of individualism and risk aversion.  Cooperative members in Tecoluca were estimated at 
close to 2,000 in the early 1990s, but have fallen dramatically.  FEDECOOPADES promoters 
declined from over 100 in 1992, including 50 in the paracentral zone, to only 22 in 1998.834  A 
shift from large cooperatives to family based production units has vastly reduced the formally 
organized productive sector.  FEDECOOPADES was perceived by some to have initially 
imposed a cooperative model and was then reluctant to change.835  An INGO representative in 
the region gives three reasons for the demise of the traditional cooperative model in Tecoluca: 
failure to adequately provide for the titling of individual plots, inability to achieve planned 
economic targets, and drift by gremios such as FEDECOOPADES into other areas of assistance 
that weakened the primary goal of cooperative strengthening.    For all three reasons, “the 
essence of the cooperative model was being lost.” 836 
ISTA has been widely accused of pressuring cooperatives to subdivide and sell off land 
to pay the agrarian debt.  Performance of the agrarian reform cooperatives has been less effective 
than those organizations that introduced more flexible organizational models.  Of the few 
remaining ISTA cooperatives, only four operated under collective forms by 1997.  The others 
were subdivided and titled to 650 individual members, and in some instances a portion was sold 
to pay off debt.837 
                                                 
833 Interviews, Santos Ramirez, May 6, 1998, FEDECOOPADES promoter, Santa Monica, Feb. 25, 1999; Las 
Pampas; Nelson Escobar, SHARE Foundation; Elmer, FEDECOOPADES; Emilio Espín, CORDES,  
834 Interview, Miguel Mejia, FEDECOOPADES, San Salvador, Mar. 1, 1999. 
835 The FEDECOOPADES model stressed centralized decision making, forced collectivization of members’ labor, 
and a refusal to permit individual property. 
836 Interview Nelson Escobar May 6, 1998; Elmer, representative for FEDECOOPADES in Tecoluca since the late 
1980s, argues that catastrophic decline in terms of trade for beef, largely affected by one large ranch owner that sold 
enough beef to drive down the price.  He adds that FEDECOOPADES helped avoid the most severe losses by 
selling cattle and then pulling out of many communities in Tecoluca. 
837 Molina (1999:108) The subdivided cooperatives include: Santa Teresa, San Ramon Grifal, Las Pampas, 
Tehuacan, Lotes los 45, San Nicolás, and San Jeronimo.  
  539
As an alternative to large cooperatives, CORDES and other NGOs have formed smaller 
productive units (UDPs) consisting of 10 to 15 PTT families that possess individual property 
titles, but work some portion of their land collectively.  Part of a family plot is dedicated to 
subsistence food production and farmed individually, while another part is dedicated to 
collective activities (mostly traditional export crops, cattle or vegetables).  Total land farmed 
collectively in a UDP may reach 20 to 40 hectares.   
Other factors that have hampered efforts to foster alternative crop production include the 
inadequate expertise and lack of sensitivity among NGO agronomists, the impact of natural 
disasters and the profound distrust among the producers.  Some have questioned whether the 
professionalism of NGOs has come at the expense of sidestepping communal values.  The 
preparation that was required to become an FMLN combatant has not been replicated for training 
NGO staff.  In a detailed survey of six resettled Tecoluca villages in the 1996, Fogaroli and 
Stowell (1997) find that differences in the expectations for participating in development 
interventions, particularly among the younger promoters and producers has contributed to the 
erosion of solidarity that was inherited from the war.  As one of the NGOs most committed to 
structural change, CORDES has yet to acquire sufficient reciprocal trust from producers in the 
region to ensure a product supply that will in turn enable economies of scale for its processing 
and commercialization businesses.838    
A related criticism involves the risk of NGOs displacing gremios.  While CORDES’ 
efficiency has impressed its donors and leveraged resources for the region, it has contrasted 
sharply with the decision making pace of most gremios and community organizations causing 
friction when CORDES was leading processes in which it should have been following the 
initiative from below.  Critics allege that CORDES was usurping the authority of those it claimed 
to serve.839   
                                                 
838 Interviews, Luis Erazo, Martin Melendez, CORDES agronomists, and various producers. Cummings (2005: 135-
139).  Some rationales given for this lack of success in commercialization include technical questions of crop 
suitability to the region, adequate funding to pre-purchase stock of production, low discipline or other obstacles 
(theft, credit) affecting individual producers. 
839 Many interviews concentrated their praise or contempt for CORDES on the actions of the regional director, a 
Spanish émigré and ex-FMLN combatant, Emilio Espín, whose frenetic planning capacity both bewildered many 
local leaders and was considerably influential in the strides that CORDES and Tecoluca had taken in the past 
decade.  On balance, the attribution of all responsibility for the successes or failures of CORDES in the paracentral 
region on Espín seemed unwarranted.   
  540
Although a number of national gremios have had a strong presence in Tecoluca, the 
effective role of these organizations has become less clear over time.  While CRIPDES was 
instrumental in having achieved heroic protections for the repopulated communities during the 
war and the first years of the post-war period, the organization has failed to shift to a new, 
equally needed accompaniment role in the post-war period.  CRIPDES was expected to continue 
to invest in community organizing, while CORDES would specialize in support for agricultural 
producers and incubation of local businesses.  In practice, CORDES has drifted into both areas, 
and CRIPDES has attempted to execute projects, losing its value added in the process.840  By late 
1990s, CRIPDES had essentially lost its orientation in the paracentral region, ceding almost all 
protagonism to CORDES.  These gremios are faulted by many for discarding their responsibility 
in leading the communal organizing process in ways that give communities a stronger voice in 
local and national decision making processes.   
The research by FUNDE (1997) and others point not to a lack of organization but to the 
lack of coordination among the many development initiatives, erecting layer upon layer of an 
elaborate organizational structure well beyond the point of diminishing returns.  Communities 
struggling to sort out and adapt the legacy of wartime organization have been paralyzed by 
overdeveloped, duplicative structures that exceed local capacity to make them work.  As one 
analyst put, “Tecoluca is all brain, and no legs.” 841  Coordination has since become a higher 
priority. 
One of the earliest decisions in 1988 to coordinate was by decision by CORDES, 
FEDECOOPADES and FUNPROCOOP – the three most visible development NGOs, to focus 
their respective work in the south, central and volcano sections of Tecoluca.  This decision, 
which involved significant reallocation of resources intended to reduce overlap and expand 
coverage, was one of the first in a series of steps to coordinate development actions in 
                                                 
840 CRIPDES San Vicente has coordinated local youth sports programs, literacy circles for women, assistance with 
legalization of community organization, and training of leaders.  However, in the view of many, the historical social 
and political organizing work that CRIPDES has performed in the past has stalled. 
841 Interview, Ana Eugenia Marín, Intermon-Oxfam, San Salvador, March 10, 1998. 
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Tecoluca.842  In effect, these decisions were taken with no local consultation and represent 
hierarchy solution to a local collective action problem. 
To compensate for the local realignment between NGOs, gremios and communities, 
CORDES and other NGOs have combined insider and outsider advocacy strategies to lobby 
development issues relevant to the region.  Again, CORDES has crossed traditional political 
lines to pursue vertical strategic alliances (both financial and strategic) with centrist INGOs, 
bilateral donor agencies, the IDB, and government officials from the governing party.  In the 
lower Lempa valley of Tecoluca CORDES became the de facto government, often to the chagrin 
of the mayor and municipal council.  Despite constant demands, ministerial presence was spotty 
and improved only after years of lobbying.  With respect to USAID, CORDES overcame mutual 
suspicions between the agency and FMLN producers in the lower Lempa valley to broker 
financial support for organic cashew and vegetable production and the paving of the main feeder 
road.   
FUSADES highlighted the 22km road in Tecoluca (connecting San Nicolás Lempa to the 
village of La Pita on the coast) among the 3,000 km high priority rural roads in a 1996 study.  
Improvement of this road was determined by the World Bank to have tremendous potential 
returns for nominal investments to pave it.843  Yet nearly six years of intensive lobbying by 
CORDES, the Tecoluca municipal government and other local organizations was necessary 
before the government finally authorized this and other feeder roads in the Bajo Lempa to be 
paved.   
When insider strategies stall, CORDES, CRIPDES and the local organizations in 
Tecoluca easily shift to outsider strategies.  An international NGO representative described a 
visit in the early 1990s by a USAID official to Santa Marta, an FMLN community in the Lempa 
valley, staged in coordination with local organizations to drive home the area’s vulnerability to 
flooding and the need for infrastructure investments.   
                                                 
842 The decision forced FEDECOOPADES, literally a cooperative federation rather than an NGO, to cede 
cooperatives in the south to CORDES, which it was initially not inclined to do.  Interview, Emilio Espín, Dec. 11, 
1998. 
843 For a series of roads in the Bajo Lempa, including the road to La Pita, the World Bank (1998: 27, citing a 
FUSADES 1996 study) estimate of an internal rate of return of as much as 523% for an investment of $7.5 million.  
Two thirds of the San Nicolás – La Pita road was eventually paved with funding from USAID for a cost of about $2 
million. The expected benefits estimated on average in priority areas suggested an increase of 7% in agricultural 
production, derived primarily from facilitating the intensification of agriculture.   
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The visit was intentionally scheduled during the rainy season and the vehicle got stuck in 
the mud filled access road several times before arriving to greet a large crowd that had turned 
out. Upon opening the meeting to questions, one man raised his hand, “Senorón,” he began, “we 
fought hard to win this land, but we know that the land alone is not enough.  When we started, 
we didn’t have anything, only slingshots.  But little by little, we began accumulating arms, and 
just as easily we can begin again the same way if our situation doesn’t improve.”  After a 
nervous few moments, the tension passed, but a credible threat had been issued.  The point was 
taken and while not achieving full commitment, the encounter led to USAID opening space for 
negotiating demands for new investments in crops and infrastructure that hadn’t existed before.  
CORDES and other NGOs have helped Tecoluca reciprocate by filling this space with solid 
proposals and when necessary, additional pressure.844   According to its regional director, 
CORDES San Vicente “broke the mold of doing business with USAID, by getting the money 
without having to abandon our development principles.” 845   
Land subdivision is another area where contentious and pragmatic collective action have 
converged.  In 1997, proindiviso properties were legally eligible for individual titling and a 
tremendous demand for alternatives had accumulated.  Delays in land titling have increased land 
insecurity and inhibited coordination and investment among producers.  At the same time, by 
breaking proindiviso, property owners had to decide on parcelization plans that would facilitate 
individual or cooperative economic activities.  The high level of local organization in Tecoluca 
influenced the decision by USAID to pilot Proseguir, a novel titling initiative, in the Bajo 
Lempa.  FMLN PTT beneficiaries in Tecoluca avoided the worst pitfalls of the post-war PTT 
program after forcibly occupying the lands that were eventually titled to them.  With the 
assistance of FUNDESA, another NGO that was founded by FMLN ex-combatants, Tecoluca 
became a model for community decision making over how to dissolve pro-indiviso without 
abandoning cooperative options.  Where local organization exists, titling patterns opted for 
models that did not rule out collective property use (natural reserves, social property, common 
productive land, joint housing areas). 
                                                 
844 Interview, Nelson Escobar, SHARE Foundation, San Salvador, Feb. 10, 2000. 
845 Interview, Emilio Espín, Dec. 11, 1998 
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In contrast, many other potential beneficiaries (including most ex-members of the Armed 
Forces) were assigned land or were dependent upon a flawed land market to find it, which often 
resulted in plots that were of poor quality and far away from their homes.  Where local 
organization was weak or rigidly opposed to parcelization (as in the case of FEDECOOPADES), 
titling involved costly delays or led to a matrix of independent homesteads with each house 
positioned in one corner and as far from the neighbor as possible.846   
Despite the evident flaws, significant differences set the economic development 
initiatives in Tecoluca apart from other rural towns. The noted setbacks are relatively modest by 
comparison to most rural municipalities, and have so far failed to dampen the optimism of most 
in Tecoluca, where the post-war expectations may been moderated but not diminished.  Rather 
than derailing communal participation or polarizing local competition, criticism of local leaders, 
particularly in the area of economic development has served to revise strategy and influence 
corrective measures.  The vertical command structure during the war left little room for deep 
criticism.  Lichbach argues that dissident groups are almost always opposed to internal dissent.  
Indeed, grave episodes of internal repression have suggested that this was indeed the case.  
Intolerance, according to Brinton (1965: 194) is the hallmark of all Great Revolutions.  The more 
violent or intense is a conflict, the more conflict leads to the suppression of dissent and within 
each conflict party as well as forced conformity to norms and values” Turner (1986:174). 
While there is some evidence that supports this argument for national level politics within 
the FMLN as the local level, FMLN insurgents in Tecoluca have somehow avoided this destiny 
of intolerance.  In post-war period, an ex-commander can give one opinion and an ordinary 
peasant can stand up and voice a very different opinion.  Both views are considered as legitimate. 
Military leaders are nervous about losing prestige and sometimes act to preserve power, even 
when that power is not in the community interest.  Yet, few are spared from this vibrant debate 
and new mechanisms exist to monitor and sanction poor leadership.   There is little doubt that all 
of these fundamental governance questions are openly debated and no one fears offering their 
opinion.  Whether healthy for democracy or not, many in Tecoluca feel empowered to criticize.   
                                                 
846 Interview, Antonio Alvarez, Fundesa, Feb. 9, 2000.  Proseguir contracted with Fundesa and two other 
organizations to title 16,000 individual plots by late 2000.  The process involved 25 steps, with 5 models for 
breaking up proindiviso property, and participatory methods for selecting preferences.  Alvarez argued that the most 
popular one was the individual homestead model 
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In practice, the actual performance of CORDES and the municipal government has 
steered between the denunciations of critics or the praise of advocates.  Without a template for 
success, contradictory advice has deepened a tension between the expectations of certain donors 
and the PTT communities.  CORDES was advised by USAID and other donors to abandon all 
forms of cooperativism and adopt business principles by slashing payroll costs and delinquent 
borrowers.   In contrast, CORDES was criticized by local agrarian leaders for reducing subsidies 
and embracing market discipline when local producers were not ready to compete.  CORDES 
was advised that economic goals had been undermined by unnecessary social investment, while 
popular education organizations criticized CORDES for investing too little in producer education 
as a means for greater accountability.  These frictions highlight the conflict between technical 
and participatory expectations for NGOs that remain a work in progress. 
The proactive presence of Tecolucans in many national and regional post-war advocacy 
campaigns reveals a refusal to lose sight of the structural obstacles to local problems and the 
capacity to overcome local challenges to mounting these larger collective actions.  The 
environment is one of these emerging postwar battlefields.  One farmer described the 
transformation of his community in terms that are common to many Tecolucan communities and 
highlights the accumulated experience in confronting encroachment on hard earned property 
rights.  His community of El Socorro was one of many Tecolucan communities that protested to 
pressure the Jiboa Mill to stop dumping its refuse into a local stream that had poisoned land and 
animals – a practice that had endured for years: 
 
Before the war, some of the best paid work was clearing forest for cotton, for example in the Hacienda 
Nancuchiname [in nearby Jiquilisco].  The people were removed and the trees were brought down in such a 
rush that the owner, Archie Baldochi, had us simply bury them.  After three years, it was done.  The trees 
were gone.  Then things turned bad, cotton came and land for corn disappeared and we then had to go to the 
hacienda to work.  We were treated like animals by the farm foremen, who were corrupted by the owners.  
The foremen said “do this” and we had to do it, because they owned everything.  Before, you could not say, 
‘Look, I’m not going to work for them because they treat us poorly.’ It was prohibited, saying it amounted to 
defrauding the hacienda, and so it was that one simply had to put up with it.  But it became too much, people 
got tired over so many years, and began to explore, to discover new things.   
 
Before, the people were easy to fool.  You’re not going to believe it, but even now we have to move forward 
or we are going to wind up how we were before.  Even with the right to vote, you were still screwed and we 
don’t want to return to the old days when the business was able to do what it wanted, the businessman was 
maladjusted to getting what he wanted and nothing happened because the businessman had money.  When he 
saw you, the poor, voting in mass, he threw you in jail because you are poor.  The rich were untouchable and 
this was the law.   
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But things have changed, these days, for example, not only do people rise up but this little community right 
here goes right up to shout our demands to the big boss (propio vergón).  Now people are fed up and tired of 
so many abuses.  When the sugar mill dumped their waste water into our river, we went to take the mill.  
When the Rio Bravo became dirty and killed our animals and crops, community leaders organized and 
surrounded the sugar mill.  Some of the men entered the mill and threatened to burn it down if our 
demands weren’t heard.  In no time, each affected farmer had received a payment, and the mill stopped 
dumping the waste in the river.  We knew that there was an environmental law, and if we didn’t do 
something things were going to go back to how they were – the businessman accustomed to doing what 
he wanted, and the poor peasant who complains is taken prisoner.  Now that the people are able, the rich 
are not untouchable. 847 
 
 
Tecoluca’s mobilization capacity, exercised as a last resort and often embedded within a 
profound sense of legal and juridical rights, has blocked the political capture of hard won land 
rights and associated development resources.  However, even the sophisticated advocacy 
strategies in Tecoluca have been insufficient in fending off all cases of political capture.  
Organizations representing the people living in the lower Lempa flood plain have written letters 
to government and IFI officials, had their views published in local papers, marched in front of 
government offices, blocked roads and lobbied tirelessly since 1994 for flood control 
infrastructure, beginning with a network of levees, drainage canals and raised shelters.848  After 
Hurricane Mitch revealed again in 1998 the region’s vulnerability, the IDB began preparing a 
small $10 million loan that would redress local demands for investments in flood control, 
irrigation and sustainable development.  The Bank even took the rather unprecedented step of 
approving three technical cooperation grants beginning in late 1999 for a total of $650,000 for 
the purpose of strengthening local organizational capacity and initiating consultations on the 
design of this plan.849   
                                                 
847 Don Eliseo, El Socorro, Tecoluca, April 22, 1998;   Contamination by the mill washing sugar residue in the rivers 
was a constant problem, but became intolerable when farmers from at least three villages in Tecoluca lost animals 
and crops.  El Socorro lost 9 cows and 7 hectares of marigolds, and an irrigation pump.  As several hundred peasants 
blocked the mill entrance, a trailer grazed one elderly protester.  The demonstration threatened violence until a 
negotiating delegation sent by the mayor won some concessions.  Indemnification was paid by the mill to each 
community (although below demanded amounts) and contamination stopped.  Interview, Juan de Jesus Gavidia 
Belloso, Nueva Tehuacán, Aug. 29, 1998. 
848 Irrigation officials at MAG that were involved in the design of the Bajo Lempa Irrigation District in the 1970s 
have suggested that the pre-war private landowners who cultivated most of the flood plain were much less 
susceptible to flooding because they were able to maintain a drainage system, largely with the cheap labor.  
849 With Japanese Cooperation (JICA) funding, partial construction of the levees began in 2001 and local 
communities formed an oversight and advocacy committee to monitor the process and push for completion of entire 
proposed system.   
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Figure 8.5  Classroom in San Bartolo, Tecoluca after showing the flood tide after Hurricane 
Mitch  
 
 
 
However, after nearly five years of stringing the Bajo Lempa communities along and 
with the levees unfinished, the loan was unceremoniously cancelled by the outgoing Flores 
administration in 2004.  Despite considerable prodding by the environmental specialists within 
the IDB, the Salvadoran government reportedly blocked the loan to avoid benefiting an 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  547
opposition region - although not on technical grounds but on political ones.850  Just months prior 
to a 2005 storm that flooded the Bajo Lempa for the sixth time since 1992, a loan manager for 
the IDB stated her disappointment with the Salvadoran government’s decision on the Bajo 
Lempa loan: 
 
 
This is a good example of a loan where the Bank invested a relatively large amount of grant resources to 
prepare and involve local communities in the development of the loan, but also more important, in the 
articulation of a locally-driven strategy for development.  I’ve always thought,…,that this had the 
potential for an innovative poverty-targeted loan.  It’s never been completely clear to me, given the small 
size of the loan, why it never obtained more support from the government. 851 
 
 
The redistribution of land and economic power has by no means eliminated inequality in 
Tecoluca.   Still, the possibility for elite political capture of local public goods has been 
dramatically reduced.  Yet other forms of inequality are emerging at the individual level related 
to income and basic needs, employment opportunities, gender, disability, and between 
communities in terms of levels of organization, internal cohesion, institutional support, and 
funding distribution rules.  Equally contentious disputes have involved the misuse or theft of 
community project funding, representing a new mode of political capture.  Common are the 
complaints that ex-commanders have become acomodados and contribute less than their fair 
share to communal development goals.  The more isolated, poorest and ideologically 
conservative communities resent the perceived surplus of financial investment in communities in 
the lower Lempa valley or those communities more ideologically aligned with the FMLN mayor.   
Finally, Tecoluca has not been immune to the divisions within the FMLN.  Nicolás 
García and Carlos Cortés were both aligned with the moderate and orthodox factions within the 
FMLN.  Unlike other FMLN municipalities, this competition within the municipal council did 
not have a significant effect on the continuity of FMLN governance nor the related consultative 
and planning mechanisms that are often dependent upon a particular mayor.852  The greater 
                                                 
850 Interview, IDB official, El Salvador Country Office, Feb. 2002. 
851 Correspondence, Michele Lemay, IDB Bajo Lempa loan manager.  June 24, 2005, IDB (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 
2001d) 
852 These same divisions in neighboring Jiquilisco and several other major cities led to the FMLN loss in these towns 
in 2000 and in subsequent elections.  See chapter nine for further discussion of local politics 
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expansion of access to party decision making for lower level elites, such as mayors, council 
members, NGOs and gremio leaders, has diffused a sense of selectivity that has triggered the 
level of discontent and defections within ARENA.  While loyalties have been challenged at the 
national level and two FMLN deputies from San Vicente are among the ranks of those in dispute 
with the party’s orthodox faction, the process has resulted in strengthening democratic decision 
making processes within the party at the local level.  FMLN candidates have won by consistently 
lopsided margins in local elections.  Competition between the “renovadores” and “ortodoxos” 
has increased participation in local political and decision making processes rather than 
diminished it.   
 The link between land and elite power was broken in Tecoluca, opening up new 
challenges to post-war development but freeing people to devote more energy to resolving them.  
What FMLN leaders lacked in formal skills, they excelled at in terms of practical problem 
solving and political instinct.  Tecolucans enjoy a higher level of self-confidence that is absent in 
most peasant communities and act with determination to transform the pattern of rural 
underdevelopment in resettled ex-combatant communities.  New forms of inequality have 
cropped up and efforts to develop a solidary local economy coexist with individualist attitudes 
and a political economic environment that is hostile to small scale agriculture.  What 
distinguishes Tecoluca is the capacity for contentious collective action that has not only 
eliminated one form of local political capture, but remains rooted in community values and 
focused on structural targets rather than the imposition of hierarchical leadership or the 
suppression of open, constructive criticism.  These factors have kept revolutionary principles 
front and center in the debate over post-war development and have restrained local leaders from 
becoming the new “patrono endiosado.”  Local institutions responsive to these expectations have 
taken important strides in demonstrating possible development alternatives, but they have also 
emphasized and have invested in structural change.  These communal checks and balances have 
combined with the expansion of political opportunity for emerging local elites to short circuit the 
breakdown of the utopian expectations.   
 
 
D.  COUNTER-INSURGENT REFORM, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND SAN 
ILDEFONSO 
 
  549
 
The political experience of San Ildefonso as contested territory between insurgent and counter-
insurgent forces during the war left an imprint of ambivalence regarding post-war loyalties and 
uncertainty in seizing political opportunity.  This ambivalence is rooted in the partial 
transformation of the local agrarian structure.  A combined reservoir of good will toward some 
provincial landowners and a thin allegiance to the FMLN contributed to hesitation in occupying 
or even claiming potential PTT land, which resulted in less than a third of all originally claimed 
land being distributed.  In all, 377 persons in San Ildefonso received 1,625 hectares of land 
through the PTT program, or 12.5 % of the town’s agricultural labor force.853  Fifty demobilized 
Armed Forces and another 50 tenedores were settled near the town center.  Most if not all of the 
PTT land was allocated through land market transactions rather than occupations by 
beneficiaries, and in turn many highland beneficiaries have land in lowland areas (Lajas).   
According to the 1971 Agrarian Census, San Ildefonso had 939 farms, two thirds of 
which were small rental properties (ave. 1.2 hectares) growing subsistence grains.  Together, the 
1980 land reform and 1992 PTT converted about 10 large farms into 1,500 new small farms (5 
hectares).  Although most of these new smallholders continue to grow basic grains, this shift 
represents a significant decline in renting or sharecropping tenure arrangements and agrarian 
inequality in general.  However, the land transfer was limited to the western highland half of the 
municipality, leaving many medium sized landowners located to the east of the main road 
unaffected.  Subsistence renting on about half of the highlands farms was converted into land 
ownership.  
The post-war agrarian structure of San Ildefonso is a jumble of PTT, private and 
cooperative properties.  On PTT and ISTA cooperatives in San Ildefonso, which represented the 
most promising base for social transformation in the municipality, producer organizations were 
in various stages of disarray.  After almost two decades since land had been turned over to them 
and several years of post-war assistance, many of these cooperatives were without a title to their 
land and relatively abandoned in ongoing reconstruction efforts.  Molina (1999: 89) characterizes 
some in the reform sector as beneficiaries that were never interested in becoming independent 
                                                 
853 This includes 515 ha and 70 members of the Cooperative Los Almendros, which was transferred from ISTA to 
PTT. 
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farmers.  Some farmers received land not because they fought for it, but because they just 
happened to be working as laborers in large farms when the land reform law was passed.  Those 
acquiring land in such ways may hold less clear preferences regarding the assumption of risks 
involved in cooperative enterprises, preferring the security and predictability of a wage.  Many 
within the San Ildefonso PTT and reform cooperative sector might be described this way. 
San Pablo Canales consisted of two separate properties, one located near the cantón and 
the other (Sihuatepeque) several kilometers to the east.  San Pablo Canales, an admired and 
hated hacienda that before the war supported 1,000 head of cattle, included 250 milk cows, and a 
colono population of over 100 people was subdivided in 1994 after collective activity by ISTA 
supported cooperative members had long since ended.  The process favored some cooperative 
members over others and has contributed to a reconcentration of land.854  In 1998, collective 
activity had long since ended and most were working without external technical assistance or 
credit, preferring not to risk losing their land.   
Sihuatepeque had by 1999 resisted ISTA pressure to pay off remaining debt in order to 
acquire land title.   ISTA argued that the cooperative agreed to debt forgiveness under Decree 
719, which forgave individual debt below $1,900, parcelized the property, and scheduled 30% of 
the balance to be paid in full.  The cooperative has 320 hectares and 48 members.  The average 
farm size is 6.7 ha.  The original owner was paid the equivalent of $75 per hectare in 
indemnification.  Cooperative leaders argue that there is no remaining debt, because at this value 
total individual debt would be less than $500, well below the $1,900 threshold.  ISTA has 
asserted that a new value for the land leaves a balance of up to $500 for some members, which 
has not been paid.855  Cooperative members do not have even this modest amount and have  
 
                                                 
854 Marchand (1996) suggests that the cooperative disintegration process began in the early 1980s when the 
cooperative was decapitalized and some members acquired more than others.   
855 Interview, Ing. Rolando García, ISTA, San Vicente, July 20, 1998. 
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Figure 8.6 Map of San Ildefonso  & Northern San Vicente 
  
 
insisted that ISTA is providing contradictory and misleading information to justify the debt, 
which was perceived by many as a bribe.856   
 Los Almendros passed from ISTA to PTT after former colonos and demobilized FMLN 
militia occupied the farm.  Several members of the Almendros cooperative also represent the 
Regional Peasant Organization of Northern San Vicente (ORC) in San Ildefonso, which began in 
1987 under the PRTC and supported land struggles in northern San Vicente. 857  Fewer than half 
of the 70 land beneficiaries occupy their land in los Almendros, but the cooperative has received 
support from several NGOs in reforestation, production and social infrastructure projects.  Other 
                                                 
856 Interview Juan Martínez, Sihuatepeque, President Cooperative La Carbonera; Leonardo Martínez, El Sitio, San 
Ildefonso, July 16, 1998.  ISTA and FINATA both are widely known to be associated with corruption in the 
administration of the agrarian reform.  During this period corruption and fraud have been rampant involving current 
and ex-employees of both institutions offering false advice regarding parcelization requirements to qualify for debt 
forgiveness.   
857 The ORC emerged in the late 1980s to represent 16 communities and approximately 1,000 peasant farmers in 
Santa Clara, San Esteban Catarina and San Ildefonso.  
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neighboring PTT communities, including San Francisco de la Cruz and Las Canoas, both of 
which were transferred from FINATA, share the same perception of institutional neglect.   
ASDI, the principal development NGO in Northern San Vicente, has provided credit, 
technical assistance, commercialization and organizational training to about 70 families in 9 
highland communities in San Ildefonso.858  Given the relatively poor soils in much of the region 
and the general lack of attention by other extension agencies, ASDI’s assistance to small 
producers was crucial.   Post-war support to as many as 680 producers has hewed more than the 
other two case study municipalities toward modest diversification beyond basic grains, 
improvement of livestock, organic techniques and organizational training.859  In 1997, the credit 
program was legalized into a savings and loan association, although half of the original 
borrowers that were delinquent were not initially included. With an office in neighboring Santa 
Clara and San Vicente, ASDI technicians commute to the region from San Salvador and other 
towns.  Accompaniment of the FMLN communities began during the war and faced many of the 
noted challenges of supporting small scale agriculture and rural employment in the post-war 
period.  Unlike CORDES, little had been achieved by 1999 in terms of agroindustry. 
However, despite many similarities with CORDES in Tecoluca, the relations between 
ASDI and peasant gremios turned sour.  The eventual split between ASDI and its historic base in 
northern San Vicente began in the mid-1990s with the organization’s rigidity on debt forgiveness 
and inconsistency in support of the area’s producers.  The program objective of strengthening 
peasant gremios, and thereby reducing the role of ASDI as intermediary, was a stated condition 
of EU funding.860  Yet, ORC leaders in communities such as Los Almendros expressed criticism 
of the inconsistency in post-war support of ASDI and other NGOs.   
Highland PTT community expectations for support from municipal authority were also 
frustrated.  In 1997 after over a decade of Christian Democrat control over local government, 
Maria Julia Costanza won the mayoral election as an ARENA candidate.861  A former DIDECO 
                                                 
858 ASDI was formed in 1987 by the PRTC, has worked in northern San Vicente since 1989, as well as four other 
departments, including southern and northern Usulután. 
859 Interview, Orlando Mancia, Roni Hidalgo, Agronomist, ASDI Santa Clara, March 10, 1999 
860 Interview, Hector Fuentes, Regional Director, ASDI, San Vicente,  March 20, 1998 
861 At 29, Costanza became the youngest elected mayor in the country. 
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promoter for ARENA, Costanza was well-known and generally liked by many in the rural 
communities.  However, her first term as mayor was plagued with allegations of incompetence 
and intolerance toward opposition.  In March, 1998, three of the town’s four councilpersons 
representing highland communities and the secretary resigned over alleged misuse of municipal 
funds.  Costanza closed ranks by replacing them with loyal colleagues from lowland 
communities, including a CNC organizer and member of Arevalo’s Miralempa cooperative. 
An effort was made in 1997 to approach the mayor of San Ildefonso by representatives of 
FMLN gremios conducting a development needs assessment in northern San Vicente.  In 
October 1997, ORC and ASDI arranged a meeting with Costanza to present the results of the 
study and explore how to involve San Ildefonso in the coordination of recommended follow-up 
actions.  In the meeting, the mayor reportedly refused the invitation to participate in any of the 
proposed inter-municipal actions.  Costanza viewed the study as a disguised FMLN effort to 
undermine the work of an ARENA mayor and stated that she needed no one else’s analysis of 
her community’s needs.862   
 Costanza’s political support derives from lowland communities and the urban town 
center, which now represent 66% and 25% of the municipal population, respectively.  At least 
ten farms over 200 hectares in lowland communities and owned by prominent families in San 
Ildefonso were identified by an early 1992 FMLN property registry but ultimately not affected 
by the PTT.  The survival of these provincial landowners, many of whom now live in the town 
center, has depended on electoral reciprocity with departmental politicians (Arevalo and Amado 
Aguilúz) and influence in the municipal council.  The introduction of basic services, the paving 
the main access road and improvements in the town center, have in turn received higher 
prioritization from local and state funding sources.  One half of the lowlands area farmers are 
small subsistence renters (less than 1 hectare) and complain about the deteriorating social 
contract with local owners and vote buying during elections, but are unorganized and unwilling 
to challenge the status quo. 863   
                                                 
862 Interview, Rosaelia Hernandez, ASDEC and Nohemi Portillo, ORC/CDD, San Vicente, 5.18.98.  Portillo was 
present at the meeting with Costanza. 
863 Interviews with farmers in the lowlands villages of Cumiste, Palmeras, Ahogadas, Mariadiga and Divisadero, 
May 1998. 
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 The influence of Father Macias of San Esteben Catarina and the catequists that emanated 
throughout the parish of northern San Vicente is still recognized as one of the principal 
influences of revolutionary organizing in the region, although less in San Ildefonso.  The post-
war church in the San Ildefonso, as in other northern municipalities, is defensive and a relatively 
insignificant institution in local politics.  In one municipal exercise to prioritize local problems, 
the lack of attention to spiritual aspects of local issues was ranked by community leaders on a par 
with lack of credit, basic services, organizational weakness and delinquency (FUSAI 1996: 17).  
Evangelical churches have made strong inroads in urban neighborhoods and rural villages that 
are unattended by the local Catholic priest and competition between Catholics and Evangelical 
protestants is the overarching dynamic in church relations with local people.  On the anniversary 
mass of Macias’s execution, the priest (Father René) in San Esteben Catarina was reported to 
have warned parishioners of the dangers of political involvement.864   
The lack of any unified reconstruction effort in San Ildefonso only became worse with 
the prospect of a $20 million, four year department wide development program for San Vicente, 
which has exacerbated tensions between gremios, NGOs, the government and the FMLN.  San 
Vicente Productivo emerged in late 1995, sponsored by European Community and modeled after 
a similar program in neighboring Usulután.865  Initial consultation by EU representatives were 
with NGOs (ASDI, CORDES, FUNPROCOOP, FEDECOOPADES, and ASDEC), in the name 
of 60 departmental communities of some 4,100 PTT beneficiaries (both FMLN and 600 
FAES).866  The five NGOs and cooperative confederations created the Convergence for the 
Development of San Vicente Communities (CDD) to campaign for the program, which required 
government approval and co-direction.   
                                                 
864 Interview, Chaca, PRTC ex-commander, San Salvador, March 16, 1998 
865 The SV Productivo program was modeled after the EU ALA I & II Program in Usulután (1993-1999).  EU ALA 
was created independently of the PRN, representing the level of distrust that European donors held for the National 
Reconstruction Secretariat and government Ministries in general to provide the necessary services to the 
demobilized ex-combatant population.  As an alternative, the EU established a $20 million program of integrated 
development for communities of demobilized combatants in one department - Usulután.  The all encompassing 
program would address land titling, production training and credit, education, health and basic infrastructure needs 
of a target population of 2,100.  In effect, the EU ALA program replaced the central government for Usulután.  
(Murray 1995). 
866 Its not clear why only 600 Armed Forces beneficiaries of the PTT were included. 
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 Disagreement between ASDI and ORC within the CDD began in 1997, when the 
advisory committee of NGOs was perceived as monopolizing the steering committee’s 
administrative role defined by the EU contract.  CDD autonomy in the definition and 
prioritization of projects was a constant source of tension.867  The ORC and other gremios 
directly representing PTT producers demanded greater control over the funds designated for 
training community leaders, which would have initially been channeled through ASDI.  ASDI 
refused, and ORC in turn, refused to sign the accord.  “They treat us as if we are infants,” 
complained one ORC leader, “swinging us in the hammock, when in fact we are grown and can 
speak for ourselves.”  In Dec. 1997, a CDD assembly decided that the gremios would take the 
decisions, and the NGOs would act as an advisory council, without voting rights.  NGOs would 
propose technical projects and the CDD would set priorities.   
As the division between the ORC and ASDI deepened, the CDD members of northern 
San Vicente barred ASDI from being the primary bidding agent in any projects that would be 
administered in that sub-region.868 With the prospect of losing out on the SVP funding as well as 
access to ORC communities, ASDI became more flexible in adapting its role in the CDD project.  
An evaluation of ASDI by one of its principal European donors that had funded the NGO’s work 
in northern San Vicente explained their decision to terminate support.  “It boiled down to a 
simple revelation, when we asked them to trim the program to meet available funding, the first 
thing they cut was community participation.  This suggested to us that they had lost touch with 
the people they claimed to be serving.” 869  By competing with the ORC, ASDI was weakening 
peasant capacities to advocate and defend their own interests.  In contrast to the split between 
ORC and ASDI, CORDES and SES have become the reference for PTT beneficiaries in southern 
San Vicente and FUNPROCOOP in the Central region with relatively less debate. 
 In part, the authority of the CDD was rooted in its mobilization capacity.  In 1998 the 
Salvadoran government was delaying the approval of the EU-government accord to initiate the 
program.  The CDD introduced a letter to the legislative assembly critical of the government 
minister in charge of negotiations.  The letter contributed to the executive’s eventual approval of 
                                                 
867 Interview, Nohemi Portillo, CDD Coordinator, 4.20.97, San Vicente. 
868 Interview, Nohemi Portillo, CDD Coordinator, Aug. 24, 1998, San Vicente 
869 Interview, Eric Marchand, IIZ, December 1998. 
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the accord, which then went to the legislature for its approval.  ARENA continued to delay its 
approval of the accord in order to extract FMLN support for two multilateral loans sought by the 
government to finance education and local development.870  CDD brought several thousand 
peasant farmers inside the National Assembly to pressure for legislative approval, which was 
eventually achieved in June of that year. 
While the CDD achieved some success in wrestling control of direct negotiations with 
the government and EU over the San Vicente Productivo contract from the NGOs and placing it 
in the hands of the beneficiaries themselves, sustaining the movement to shape the program once 
ratified was a more difficult challenge. A crisis in the ORC leadership within the CDD 
contributed to its demise in 2000, just as the program was taking off.  In the absence of a strong 
beneficiary organization, San Vicente Productivo under government – EU co-direction, has 
fallen short of the original expectations by funding mostly infrastructure in San Ildefonso and 
paying minimal attention to transparent and participatory processes that address the structure 
inequities of rural development originally envisioned by the CDD. 
The fragmented and unsustainable bottom up mobilization effort of the CDD share some 
similarities with the other major development project that has had some impact on post-war 
agriculture in San Ildefonso.  In 1986, the Christian Democrat government sought from the IDB 
an $11 million loan for the construction of the Lempa Acahuapa irrigation district and a program 
of technical support for water users.871  Orlando Arevalo remained at the time of project approval 
one of Duarte’s most loyal supporters even as many in the Christian Democrat base, and in 
Arevalo’s own organization (ACOPAI) were shifting toward opposition to the PDC’s austerity 
policies.  Arevalo’s Miralempa cooperative and part of his San Ildefonso base would directly 
benefit from the Lempa Acahuapa project, which was initiated during the height of conflict.  The 
decision to proceed with the project suggests both the counter-insurgent underpinnings to which 
the IDB acquiesced, as well its capture by Arevalo to reward his base in San Vicente.  The 
                                                 
870 FMLN opposition to the loans was based on the lack of accountability regarding large components of the loans 
that could be diverted for electoral purposes, but on more wide ranging negotiations with ARENA as well. 
871 The full project costs were $14.5 million, with $5.2 million in government counterpart funding, $650,000 in EU 
funding and $2.14 million from JICA.  The IDB also provided a $690,000 technical assistance grant to fund 
extension services.  In addition to almost a $1 million in fees that accumulated during a decade of project delays, 
related deficiencies in maintenance and efficient water use will undoubtedly lower the working life of the canal and 
severely reduce the effective value to Salvadorans for the $20 million amortized debt. 
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dismal results underscore how the project’s counter-insurgent intent ultimately undermined the 
medium term benefits, clientelist or not, to the end beneficiary. 
  The funding to build the Lempa Acahuapa irrigation district was approved in 1986, but 
by 1998, over a decade after the six year project had begun, only 150 hectares of the 2,500 
hectare district were actually being farmed using irrigation.872  Several years later, only 730 ha 
(29%) of the district is being farmed with irrigation, a significant portion of which was dedicated 
to sugar cane and traditional crops rather than non-traditional crops for which it was intended.873  
Lempa Acahuapa became an icon for failed rural development, plagued by three main 
problems.  First, infrastructure completion was delayed for almost ten years by a combination of 
bidding problems and indifference by the successive ARENA administrations.  Second, the plan 
for the two state agencies, the Agriculture Development Bank (BFA) or CENTA to provide 
extension, investigation and marketing services to the water users collapsed.   As in the case of 
PRODAP, both agencies declined to provide the service as Ministry of Agriculture employees 
retreated under the downsizing pressure of IFI institutional reforms.874  An emergency grant to 
expedite the provision of these services was largely unable to redress CENTA indifference, and 
under pressure from the IDB to spend the money, provided training in 1992, three years before 
irrigation began flowing.875 
Third and perhaps most importantly, the water users’ organization was divided between a 
faction on the San Vicente side of the Lempa River loyal to Arevalo and ARENA, and a faction 
on the Usulután side composed largely of FMLN ex-combatants that contested association 
                                                 
872 IDB (1998b) and interview Octavio Duarte, MAG/CENTA, Puente Cuscatlan, San Vicente. May 14, 1998.  Only 
1,330 hectares had adequate infrastructure for access to irrigation, 236 ha. covered by forest, and a 292 hectare 
private farm provided its own access infrastructure.  Water users had to pay about $80 for access and plus monthly 
quota of $24 per hectare for water usage.  
873 UNDP (2003: 219).  Only 8% of El Salvador’s potentially irrigable land (273,183 ha) was actually under 
irrigation in 1998 and most of this is underutilized. (Technoserve 1998). Compare Lempa Acahuapa to the other two 
irrigation districts, Zapotitan – 1,500 ha (47%) of 3,200 hectares farmed under irrigation, and Aticoyo 2730 ha 
(94%). 
874 Water user services that were finally provided preceded the actual use of irrigation by several years, diminishing 
the impact considerably.  Additional demonstration plot and extension services were provided through PRODAP as 
well as through various NGOs working with FMLN ex-combatants on the Usulután side (CRS, IBE, REDES). 
875 Interview, Ing. Alirio Mendoza, Technoserve, Feb. 18, 1999, San Salvador. 
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leadership.  Inherent organizational weaknesses on both sides have contributed to competition 
and the debilitation of the water users association as an effective gremio. 
Land inequality among water users exacerbates these internal organizational weaknesses 
and political tensions.  The agrarian reform cooperatives, (including Arevalo’s Miralempa) 
originally occupied 75% of the district, but have parcelized their property into small plots.  IDB 
specialists argue that this subdivision is incompatible with the most efficient use of irrigation, 
raising the costs of access, training and administration of the district (IDB 1998 op cit.: 26).  A 
small number of larger landowners, including an ex-ARENA Minister of Agriculture, Oscar 
Manuel Gutierrez, own farms over 200 hectares and were the first to have access channels built 
from the principal water canal to their properties.876  One estimation of the distribution of land 
within the Lempa Acahuapa district showed that 47% of the properties were between 1 and 3 
hectares, 20% between 3 and 25 hectares, and 33% (721 ha.) represented farms greater than 25 
hectares (CEL 1999: 38). 
The resulting lack of unity prevented the beneficiary population from exercising greater 
pressure or oversight on the IDB, state and international donors that each shared responsibility 
for the project’s disastrous management.  According to a Salvadoran irrigation engineer involved 
with Lempa Acahuapa, the project’s most significant oversight was the failure to strengthen the 
local organization of the water users to hold project manager’s accountable: 
   
 
There was never a coherent entity that could coordinate the interests of the water users and be vigilant 
against the abuses of the management.  They are divided by the river, as well as internally.  Most 
beneficiaries have almost no knowledge of big projects, are not consulted and are therefore distrustful and 
obstruct the process of implementation.  The capacity to promote the project, unifying the affected 
population, presenting the costs and benefits, always produces better results.  The Ministry of Agriculture 
has no capacity or political will to do this. 877 
 
 
 When CNC President Orlando Arevalo posed with President Armando Calderon Sol to 
inaugurate the Lempa Acahuapa district on June 4, 1998, the project was six years behind 
                                                 
876 Gutierrez and 30 other landowners in the region sued CEL for damages after the managers at the hydroelectric 
dam released excessive water prior to Hurricane Mitch in 1998.  Gutierrez and family members claimed nearly $1.5 
million in damages to 210 hectares of sugarcane.  La Prensa Gráfica, Jan. 10, 2001. 
877 Interview, Abelardo Flores, Ortega and Cia., Jan. 20, 1999, San Salvador. 
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schedule and $2.3 million over budget. Calderón Sol recognized Lempa Acahuapa as an 
embarrassment that would hopefully not be repeated. ARENA’s empowerment strategy for rural 
producer organizations and a policy of abandoning agriculture both destined the project to fail. 
Yet, Arevalo succeeded in taking both sides of this argument as one of the rural sector’s most 
capable politicians that switches fluidly between insider and outsider roles. Arevalo’s CNC 
claims representation of 200,000 affiliates, organized in 821 cooperatives and 300 ADESCOs.878  
Despite CNC assertions to have delivered the 1998 debt forgiveness deal, Arevalo negotiated 
largely behind the scenes and his organization never participated in land occupations or 
mobilizations.  Instead, the CNC turned out 5,000 members to fill an Escalon amphitheatre to 
congratulate Calderón Sol as he left office in April 1999 for fulfilling the bargain he and Arevalo 
had made there to win the Confederation’s electoral support in 1994.  Arevalo’s astute political 
skills have ensured a continuous supply of unremarkable state funded rural projects that have 
done little to alter the decline in economic livelihoods in places like San Ildefonso.879   
 
                                                 
878 CNC Pamphlet.  Clearly inflated, these figures have varied considerably in different CNC publications and press 
statements by Arevalo. 
879 CNC Annual Report, 1995-1997. The 1997 CNC balance sheet reports nearly $500,000 in assets, most of which 
is from one $300,000 credit in 1996.  The CNC employees 250 people, including various family members. 
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Figure 8.7  Orlando Arevalo (left) with Agricultural Minister and President Calderon Sol (third 
from left) at June 4, 1998 inauguration of the Lempa Acahuapa irrigation district 
 
 
CNC patronage has nevertheless solidified a loyal peasant base for several parties, which 
has legitimated Arevalo’s status as a pragmatic dealmaker.  He has now brokered elite pacts with 
three different counter-insurgent political parties.  His pragmatism has never conveyed into 
strategic alliances with the FMLN, but he has at times attempted to emulate their empowerment 
though conflict strategies.  In Oct. 2000, while still a deputy for ARENA, Arevalo led a protest 
march of ex-civil defense patrollers that blocked government offices.  To underscore the crime of 
openly challenging COENA authority, Arevalo was handcuffed and delivered by the police to 
the National Assembly in direct violation of his sovereign rights as a legislator.  The attempted 
humiliation backfired and increased his national popularity.  In 2001, he switched to the PCN.   
Arevalo’s signature on the politics of rural development is difficult to classify.  From the 
debacle of Lempa Acahuapa to the cacique style of loyalty that he commands in dirt poor rural 
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towns, the ultimate reliance on vertical power relations with his base restricts the possible 
collective action strategies.  The inability of ASDI or the CDD to consolidate support in the 
highland communities of San Ildefonso is in part due to sympathies for the CNC.  A cloud of 
impropriety and opportunism has followed Arevalo throughout his political career and the 
personalism of his authority has effectively demobilized his followers in terms of autonomous 
local capacity.  He remains the single source of power within the CNC.  Deal making has come 
at the expense of more sustainable rural mobilization that would transcend any single leader. 
Arevalo’s flexible political identity works well in San Ildefonso, where the antipathy held 
for opposition NGOs by Costanza’s municipal government in San Ildefonso has also proven to 
be less ideological than opportunist. After ARENA attempted to remove her following another 
instance of open disobedience with COENA on an FMLN policy proposal, Costanza also 
switched to PCN has been elected three times since.  Supporters of the FMLN, divided 
somewhat over Christian Democrat or FMLN organizing tactics, have failed so far to capitalize 
on this political opening.880    
Like most Fonchanos, particularly those living in the town center, the fear associated 
with the war was never tempered with any experience of successful collective action linked to 
FMLN influence only individual survival strategies.  Distrust of the FMLN is not ideological, but 
rather an artifact of this truncated insurgent political experience that penetrated only the highland 
communities of San Ildefonso, and even there left an mixed legacy.  With the collapse of the 
Christian Democrats, the political vacuum has been filled by marginalized provincial elites with 
no clear party loyalty. 
As a result, San Ildefonso’s agrarian structure was only partly transformed by the war. 
The space opened for a reallocation of local power to NGOs, gremios or other local actors has 
been contested by a weak and divided insurgent mobilization network on one side and a 
diminished, ideologically undisciplined provincial elite on the other.   What’s left is a terrain 
where an empowerment-by-invitation strategy and an empowerment-through-conflict strategy 
compete, but neither became consolidated.  A combined suspicion among many land 
beneficiaries regarding opportunities to challenge structures of power and a significant cushion 
of goodwill and economic control among provincial elites have contributed to an ambivalence 
                                                 
880 In 2000, an urban based, former PDC organizer ran as FMLN candidate and split the opposition vote to Costanza, 
winning on 24% of the total vote.   
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toward both empowerment strategies.  The core insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization 
networks have distanced themselves from the uncertainty of this contested zone leaving a mutual 
sense of abandonment. 
 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
 
Roberto Angulo, Miguel García, and Orlando Arevalo all now sit in the legislative chamber of 
post-war El Salvador some three decades after each chose different collective action strategies 
for resolving agrarian inequality that had pushed San Vicente and the country to the brink of war.  
Their respective political careers closely track the hard-line counter-insurgent, insurgent, and 
moderate counter-insurgent empowerment strategies that distinguish the three case study 
municipalities.  None are currently members of the political party in which they made their initial 
political ascent, a reflection of the tensions that drive the ongoing recomposition elites within all 
three mobilization networks.  Yet, each represents a different empowerment strategy that has 
been adapted by mobilization networks in the Jiboa Valley, Tecoluca, and San Ildefonso and to 
the political opportunity of decentralized rural development since 1992. 
Land inequality remains a fact of life in El Salvador, but some communities are no longer 
paralyzed by this formidable obstacle to development.  This chapter illustrates how variation in 
local land inequality helps explain the continuity or change in pre-war agrarian relations.  In 
Tecoluca, the predatory hold of the landed elite was broken, creating space for a variety of 
locally driven, often contentious and collective development initiatives.  NGOs, local gremios 
and community organizations have been assigned unprecedented authority in fulfilling high 
expectations for post-war development.  The remarkable stability in patron-client relations in the 
Jiboa Valley has underscored the individualist, acquiescent and nostalgic attitudes that continue 
to enable top-down initiatives to favor the prerogatives of a small group of larger owners.  An 
empowerment through invitation strategy to rural development opens very little space for local 
actors or new alliances to compete with, much less confront, the modernizing elites within 
ARENA that control the allocation of patronage and discipline dissent.  In San Ildefonso, the 
ambivalent collaboration with both sides during the war has resulted in partial land reform, but 
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also the absence of a strong identity or political ally to fend off the encroachment on power by 
provincial elites. 
The dividends of both empowerment strategies in terms of gains in economic or human 
capital have been small.  IFI loan conditionality has been instrumental in shifting agrarian reform 
away from expropriation and redistribution toward the promotion and enforcement of market 
principles and individual property rights.  As the state has withdrawn from agriculture, state 
sponsored social investment programs, municipal governments and internationally funded NGOs 
have tried to fill the gap.  For the most part, none of the first generation of post-war agricultural 
development initiatives have succeeded in achieving sustainable livelihoods for beneficiary 
populations.  Most shared the same defects and were never more than social compensation 
programs in an economic climate highly inhospitable to small scale agriculture.   
Far from being monolithic, each case study illustrates different correlations of power and 
internal tensions between landed and modernizing elites, individual peasant farmers, organized 
farmer groups, NGOs, state agencies, and international financial institutions.  Counter-insurgent 
empowerment strategies have relied to a greater extent on the top-down benevolence of the state 
and the disciplinary capacity of hierarchical institutions such as COENA to manage an orderly 
reduction in economic dependence on agriculture.  In contrast, insurgent empowerment strategies 
opened greater space for local institutions to explore alternative post-war agricultural 
development alliances and challenge the retreat of the state from the agricultural economy 
through the contentious and mobilized defense of hard won rights and assets.   
The more important distinction beyond the failure to create much economic capital has 
been the accumulation of political capital in demonstrating a long term alternative for local 
economic development that rests on widespread credibility and an organizational capacity to 
defend it against political capture.  Despite an improved post-war opportunity structure, the risks 
of political capture remain – illustrated by political influence on the internationally financed 
investments in the strengthening of rural producers in all three municipal case studies 
(Cooperative Nonualco and PRODAP in the Jiboa Valley, Lempa Acahuapa in San Ildefonso, 
and the Bajo Lempa loan in Tecoluca).  Resistance to these instances of political meddling in the 
provision of public goods has depended on transparent, accountable and equitable structures of 
local governance.  In Tecoluca alone, where land inequality had been reversed most profoundly, 
were these attributes visible.   
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IX. CHAPTER NINE:  MESO-LEVEL EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
 
 
 
Historical variation in political experience explains different empowerment strategies and their 
respective outcomes in post-war El Salvador.  In response to the changing structure of political 
opportunity (land inequality, elite realignments, the emergence of new local institutions in 
reconstituted mobilization networks), political wartime experiences set otherwise similar 
communities on different tracks.  Sharply distinct political experiences involving challenging, 
bottom-up versus stabilizing, top-down decentralization have influenced competing notions of 
empowerment that in turn have deeply marked the institutionalization of local authority in 
NGOs, municipal governments and their articulation with social safety net programs.  Thus, the 
assigned roles, interests and performance of these local actors in decentralized postwar 
reconstruction will vary according to their respective underlying aggregate political experiences 
and their associated empowerment strategies.  Given these different starting points, this chapter 
will explore how decentralization has empowered Salvadoran citizens differently by exploring 
their contrasting models of post-war local governance and resource mobilization. 
As argued in the opening chapter of this dissertation, inequality has net undesirable 
effects on development that operate through a variety of mechanisms.  Inequality robs 
development of its potential by lowering economic growth, by lowering the elasticity of growth’s 
impact on poverty reduction, by reducing institutional capacity to respond to shocks, by 
increasing perverse effects such as violent crime or political instability and finally, by lowering 
institutional resistance to political capture.  Efforts to redress inequality have deep local roots 
that are revealed in the types of institutions and expectations that emerged after the war.  In this 
chapter, I focus on these micro-processes of the inequality-local governance-resource 
mobilization linkage in the three municipal case studies of the paracentral region.   
The central argument of this chapter is that decentralization outcomes were shaped by 
competing empowerment strategies whose primary impact has been to change local inequality.  
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Where inequality remained high (unchanged) after the war, decentralization has tended to 
reinforce local power relations that have made institutional governance susceptible to political 
capture by local elites as it weakened the capacity for local collective action.  By contrast, where 
inequality was lowered, decentralization has tended to reinforce this shift by opening new, more 
democratic spaces for local governance and strengthening the capacity and prioritization of 
collective action that diminishes exposure to political capture.  The economic outcomes of these 
contrasting local scenarios, albeit still very much in their incipient stages, underscore the 
profound impact that inequality has for local development initiatives. 
Given the ambiguous mandate of decentralization in post-war El Salvador, this chapter 
proceeds on a more systematic basis in exploring how the empowerment claims of decentralized 
development might be evaluated. Effective decentralization assumes that local actors will be 
empowered to act collectively to hold local institutions more accountable than remote, 
centralized, possibly corrupt agencies.    By collective action, I refer to the coordination, 
management and delivery of a basket of local public goods essential for rural development--
roads, extension services, power, telecommunications, irrigation, education, public health, 
sanitation, and security.  In the provision of local public goods, collective action involves 
mobilization of money, labor and material resources, the design of rules governing resource use, 
the monitoring of rule compliance, and the enforcement of sanctions against rule breakers – all of 
which must be coordinated between jurisdictions of government.   
Expectations for post-war local economic development differed significantly between 
insurgent and counter-insurgent communities.   These expectations have informed the design and 
performance of local institutions.  Which type of political experiences are most associated with 
the collective capacity to confront and transform local inequality as a pre-requisite for 
sustainable local economic development?  Using survey data as well as evidence gathered from 
municipal planning processes and interviews with organizational representatives, I compare local 
performance in three key areas of local governance: inter-municipal cooperation, inter-
institutional coordination within municipal cases, and participation, transparency and 
accountability in local resource mobilization.   
The chapter is organized in six sections, five of which compare the three local economic 
development experiences in the paracentral zone with attention to how political experiences and 
competing empowerment strategies have shaped the expectations and performance of local 
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institutions.  Section one summarizes the trends in public investment at the national and local 
levels in the post-war period.  The analysis of local development finance shows how 
decentralization has expanded new local opportunities for resource mobilization, but has failed to 
compensate for significant and persistent biases in public investment that do not favor local 
economic development in rural areas.  Section two compares the local politics of inter-municipal 
coordination, explaining how the emergence of municipal government has prevented close 
cooperation for departmental level initiatives.  Section three describes the variation in 
institutional fields (organizational density and ties) and evaluates efforts to surmount challenges 
to institutional coordination.  Section four compares the level of citizen participation, 
transparency and overall effectiveness of budget making and resource mobilization in each 
municipal government.  A specific comparison of the cabildo abierto process illustrates how 
competing empowerment strategies have aligned the performance of this participatory 
mechanism to insurgent and counter-insurgent expectations for local institutions.  Section five 
reviews the evidence on agency for insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies, 
linking them with concrete examples of political capture.  The final section concludes by 
summarizing the factors that make decentralization work at the institutional level. 
 
 
 
A.  PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL CAPTURE 
 
 
Decentralized local governance suggests a reallocation of public investment, which has 
traditionally favored urban areas and politically connected rural elites.  Large public 
infrastructure projects in the export boom of the 1950s and 1960s are the earliest example of this 
type of political capture.  Credit, market information, and protections of monopoly power 
historically have been skewed toward those already controlling wealth in key productive sectors 
despite competition between elites for the largest share.  This vicious cycle of self-reinforcing 
inequality has endured periodic horizontal redistribution of opportunity within the Salvadoran 
elite, yet has stifled vertical redistribution of opportunity.  Has the emergence of new local 
institutions altered this pattern of investment and concomitant inequality in the post-war period?   
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1.  Public Investment and Spending Trends 
 
Development finance is at the center of decentralization and El Salvador has been rather 
reluctant to share the already low levels of public resources with local actors.  At the fifteenth 
annual conference of mayors in San Salvador in 1999, speakers from nearly every political party 
and rank insisted that decentralization reforms have worked in El Salvador, but must go further.  
Typical was the intervention of a consultant for USAID, one of the strongest institutional 
proponents of decentralization, who stated, “There is a strong correlation between 
underdevelopment and the level of public expenditure, in the most underdeveloped countries of 
the world - the most backward countries are the most centralized ones, where the municipality 
represents nothing.”881  Echoing a common refrain, the state is the problem. 
 Yet, this argument is built upon popular misconception of the Latin American state.  The 
Salvadoran state is small by both Latin American standards, and by developing country 
standards.  Before the war, Salvadoran government spending was about half of OECD levels, 
and about two-thirds the East Asian average.  By the late 1980s early 1990s, public spending in 
El Salvador had fallen further behind, at 33% and 50%, respectively.  Even by Latin American 
standards, the Salvadoran government spends less than 60% of the regional average.  The 
Salvadoran state was small during the 1970s, grew in proportion to the externally financed war 
economy of the 1980s, then declined again towards the end of the war.   
In the 1990s, public spending has remained flat, inching up to 15% by 1998.  Since then, 
the added expenditures of the pension reform and response to natural disasters has pushed central 
government expenses to 18%.  Low central government expenditures are in part due to one of the 
world’s lowest levels of tax revenue - hovering between 10-12% of GDP.  Decentralization 
originated not from the overextension of the state, but from a political crisis resulting from a 
weak state and dominant private sector.  As a result, El Salvador’s investment and savings levels 
also tend to be low by peer country standards.  Savings have dropped from 18% in 1994 to about 
                                                 
881 Comments of Dr. Marino Henao, Consultant for the USAID office for human development, published in 
Proyección Municipal. (Oct-Dic. 1999), San Salvador: COMURES. p. 41 
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11% currently (2003).  Investment levels have stagnated at about 16% since 1998, down from 
20% in 1995.  These notable deficiencies in national resource mobilization reverberate at the 
local level, where El Salvador only 3.3% of total spending was done at the sub-national level 
(COMURES 2003).  
 Table 9.1 compares the development finance over the past three decades.  The balance of 
influence has shifted from U.S. bilateral cooperation (which comprised 80% of tax revenue in the 
1980s) toward the multilateral lending in the 1990s.  Remittances from the estimated 1.5 million 
Salvadorans living abroad now contribute as much in foreign exchange as the equivalent 
domestic tax base of 2.4 million (economically active population in 1998).  Table 9.1 also 
underscores El Salvador’s dependence on foreign resources for investment toward development 
(about 60% of overall investment including remittances) - a dependence that has persisted since 
the late 1970s.882    
Bilateral cooperation (typically non-reimbursable) has declined by over 50%, propped up 
still by recurrent flows for disaster reconstruction.  The level of funding through INGOs has also 
declined, reaching as high as $25-30 million per year in the early 1990s.  The INGO flows have 
equaled roughly half of the USAID commitments and two thirds of FISDL project funding, thus 
representing a significant financial source at the local level.883  Finally, El Salvador’s investment 
grade rating in 2000 has permitted access to the international bond market and the government 
has placed commercial market debt to offset a growing fiscal deficit.  The country’s total public 
debt has increased to 45% of GDP with debt service consuming a third of public revenues (IMF 
2005). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
882 IDB (2001f: 7, Table I-1). The IDB alone has loaned El Salvador $430 million for three road investment 
programs.  Of the $155 million that El Salvador invested in all aspects of its road system between 1995-1999, 
external financing accounted for 54.5%.  In 2000-2004, dependence on external financing of roads increased to 
59.2%.   
883 The INGO estimates are based on Biekart (1994), Gonzalez (1992), Foley (1997), and organizational interviews, 
adjusting for overlap between INGO and bilateral cooperation. 
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Table 9.1  Development Finance in El Salvador, 1970-2002 
 
 
Yearly  
Average 
($ million) 
GDP Cent 
Govt 
Tax 
Rev 
FDI Ext. 
Pub 
Loans 
(IFIs) 
Ext 
Priv 
Mkt 
Loans
884 
(bonds) 
U.S. 
ODA
Other 
Bilat  
ODA 
INGOs Remit Debt
885 
El Sal 1970s  260  45 0 12 ? ? 35 500 
El Sal 1980s  440  75 0 360 ? ? 127 1,500
El Sal 1990s 10,300 990 207 275 0 145 40 20-25 885 3,300
El Sal 1998   12,000 1,228 900 260 0 35 100 15-20 1,340 3,633
El Sal 2002-3  14,300 1,595 286 650 500    30   140  10-15 2,032 5,600
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators (2003); World Bank Global Development Finance (2003); 
El Salvador Treasury Ministry, IMF (various years); IDB-Pew Remittance Study (2006). Agosín et al. 
(2002, 2004), PNUD (2000), BCR (2000) 
 
a.  IFIs include IMF, WB, &  IDB;  
 
b.  Donor NGOs include CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, Project Concern 
International, Oxfam International affiliates, World Vision, the SHARE Foundation, Lutheran World 
Federation, Action Aid, Christian Aid-UK,COSUDE, Acsur las Segovias, PTM, HIVOS, NOVIB, 
Diakonia, all of whose budgets are estimated excluding direct governmental support. U.S. ODA includes 
both U.S. economic & military aid 
 
 
 
2.  Distribution of National Public Spending  
 
Despite commitments to decentralize public expenditure, a pattern of highly centralized 
investment persists.  Figure 9.1 illustrates the geographical focus of public investment in 1999, 
and on average between 1993-2001 compared to 1998 poverty levels and population shares.886  
Almost 45% of all public investment goes to San Salvador and La Libertad, despite relatively 
                                                 
884 In July of 2000, $354 million in international bonds were issued to finance part of the budget deficit, and 
accelerating the increase in the country’s internal debt. 
885 The most recent estimates (Sept 2004) put the total national debt at $7.2 billion, or 46% of GDP and rising.  IMF 
(2005). 
886 Source for this information is the Salvadoran Ministry of Treasury for non-financial public investment data, and 
the UNDP (2003) for poverty (average population in relative poverty, 1993-2001) and population data (1999).  The 
public investment budget for 1999 was $240 million. 
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lower poverty levels (40%) and representing only 42.3% of the population.  By comparison, the 
departments of highest poverty (Cabañas, Ahuachapán, Morazán, San Vicente and 
Chalatenango) all of which receive a share of the national investment budget that is smaller than 
their population share and far below levels needed to breach the historic inequity between urban 
and rural investment.   
San Vicente, with only 2.6% of the national population has received only 2.4% of public 
investment on average between 1993-2001, despite having the third highest level of poverty. In 
1999, Cabañas and Morazán received 0.2% and 0% of public investment respectively.  Even 
departments with the second and third largest cities (San Miguel and Santa Ana), have less than 
half of their population share in public investment.  Clearly, the national budget favors the 
metropolitan San Salvador area.887 
In turn, social spending has also been low, but more importantly, that spending has been 
skewed away from rural populations.  The National Reconstruction Plan committed to increase 
health and educations spending from 2.7% of GDP in 1989 to 4.6% by 1994.  This goal in 
addition to most other social spending benchmarks, were missed by the Salvadoran government.  
Despite massive aid flows, spending on health and education only reached 3.2% of GDP by 
1995.   By 1998, El Salvador spent on 4.3% on education and health, below the Latin America 
average and other countries at similar levels of development.888  El Salvador continues to sustain 
one of the lowest levels of overall public social spending (8.1% GDP, including social security). 
 
                                                 
887 The total allocation of national public investment has improved, but remains heavily biased toward urban areas.  
For example, some 70% of health spending goes to urban hospitals.   
888 The World Bank estimates that El Salvador still faces a deficit of 3.2% - 3.6% of its GDP in additional social 
spending to meet minimal education, health and social protection goals (2004).   
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Figure 9.1  Poverty, Population and Public Investment 
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3.   Local Revenue and Spending Trends 
 
Local governments are the primary, although not the exclusive channel for development finance 
flows to the local level.  Typically, local public finance can be one of five main sources: local 
taxes, inter-governmental transfers, international cooperation, community based donations (in 
kind and monetary) and borrowing.  There are competing arguments about which source or what 
composition of revenue flows are most likely to be associated with local empowerment.   
Raich (2005: 6) argues that increased locally generated revenues are more likely to 
improve local accountability and participation.  “The more capacity that local governments have 
to extract revenue from their own tax bases, the greater their accountability to citizens.  
Conversely, the more fiscally dependent on the other non-local sources of revenue, the less 
locally accountable to citizens they would be.”   
However, many small, poor municipalities face natural limits on raising needed 
development revenue locally, making this argument contingent on the municipal size and 
capacity.  In the case study municipalities of the paracentral region, high levels of poverty 
translate into as few as 10 and no more than 50 individuals declaring income tax or making value 
added tax payments.   Given the insufficient amounts and relatively fixed menu of projects that 
can be funded with transfers through ISDEM or FISDL, Salvadoran local governments have the 
option of looking outside the conventional channels to the private sector, NGOs or directly to 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation for additional development finance.  These alternative 
sources of local finance are not only important as supplements to local tax revenue, but in terms 
of increasing the discretion with which local governments can allocate resources.  Others argue 
that budget flexibility is more important than the source (Hansohm 2002).  
Another problem with an exclusive focus on primary source or composition of local 
revenue is the tendency to ignore the distribution.  Rauch argues that transfers and aid are 
associated with the lower accountability, suggesting the strong possibility of capture by central 
government or external donors.  Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000) argue that of the three primary 
financing mechanisms for local governments (local taxes, user fees, and transfers), user fees are 
the least ambiguously immune to elite capture.  Local taxes, if national patterns are any 
indication, are likely to be regressive.  Pro-poor transfer spending that is contingent on projects 
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can be diverted to non-poor users.  Devas (2002) is neutral on local revenue source, and argues 
that the effectiveness of service provision is what matters most.  However this also assumes an 
assessment of the cost sharing with service access.   
Of equal significance is how local institutions manage to mobilize collective action to 
achieve increased development resources.  To take the challenge of tax reform or tax 
compliance, a Market strategy would focus on promoting the intrinsic value of improvement of 
local services and governance to encourage individual taxpayers to comply with existing or new 
taxes.  Alternatively, new local taxes might be levied with little consideration for perceived 
value, relying instead on a Hierarchy strategy of generalized coercion to enforce compliance and 
reduce evasion.  A Community strategy would seek to socialize the population about the fairness 
or moral commitment to a tax to stimulate compliance.  A Contract strategy that is based on 
taxpayer voluntarism with a targeted, escalating penalty only on the detected delinquents might 
be the most effective compromise.   
Monitoring and enforcement activities and costs are also related to the performance of any 
local tax initiative.  The cabildo abierto serves as the most common mechanism for controlling 
local resource use, both revenues and expenditures.  Collective action strategies toward 
improving participation in the cabildo abierto as a legitimating control mechanism, outlined in 
chapter one, are therefore relevant to improving revenue collection strategies themselves.    
A Market strategy would focus on the costs and benefits (perceived and real) of individual 
participation.  The perceived benefits might be raised by increases in the budget, which is 
positively associated with citizen participation.  As such, we should expect the FODES increase 
in 1998 to enable greater cabildo participation.  Lack of transparency and perceptions of 
corruption are also act as a disincentive to citizen participation in municipal meetings.   A risk 
taking Market strategy might involve greater transparency about past budget implementation, or 
the expected impact of the proposed budget to build confidence and commitment in the cabildo 
process.  The costs of participation might also be lowered through subsidies to reimburse travel 
costs.   
However, there are many reasons why Market strategies for collective action fail.  The 
examples of participatory budgeting that demonstrate the budget size-citizen participation 
association leaves unclear whether the increased budgets have contributed to greater incentives 
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to participate or whether participatory mechanisms led to increased revenues and budgets.889  
Given the incapacity or unwillingness regarding financial transparency in the context of weak  
institutions and power asymmetries, such a strategy would likely require negotiation, force, or 
cultural incentives.   
A Contract strategy may compensate for some of these deficiencies through prior 
negotiations over the distribution of benefits, the representation in the rule making process, or 
increase in the numbers of socio-economically disadvantaged participants to ensure their voice is 
heard. Still, as with the Market strategy, the Contract strategy toward participation emphasizes 
influence over the rationality of individual participation. 
A Hierarchy strategy would focus on selective benefits and sanctions as incentives for 
participation of a targeted population.  The selective benefit/sanction strategy might be oriented 
in two ways.  A clientelist orientation often used by political bosses might provide some bonus 
(per diem) or threat (verified by attendance lists) to people dependent upon the patron to ensure 
participation that was ultimately reinforcing of the power relations between the patron and client.  
Alternatively, the patron might provide the same incentives to coerce participation of groups that 
are not necessarily dependent and whose participation coincides with a view of the common 
good.  For example, a benevolent despot might enable the voice of excluded groups through 
lowered costs of participation (i.e. holding a meeting in remote, high poverty communities) in a 
way that might be oriented toward strengthening community norms and dispositions at the 
eventual expense of the despot’s power.   
Finally, a Community strategy might appeal to existing norms of reciprocity and past 
experiences of collective action that encourage participation in the cabildo to ensure democratic 
representation.  A Community strategy does not require incentives from outside or a priori 
bargaining, but relies instead on informal organizing that is flexible yet appropriate to each new 
instance of representation.  While costs and benefits matter to the effectiveness of community 
collective action strategies, they are not decisive.  Particularly in contexts where participation 
implies the possibility of physical intimidation or even violence, it is likely that only the type of 
communal solidarity that values the right to participate will be sufficient for it to occur.  With 
                                                 
889 Souza (2001).  Fox and Aranda (1996) suggest the converse is also true, small budgets prevent or act as a 
disincentive for rural or indigenous participation in Oaxaca, Mexico. 
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these possible revenue collective action strategies in mind, we return next to El Salvador’s actual 
performance at the national and local levels. 
 
a.  Tax collection:    
 
Between 1992 and 2003, national tax revenue in El Salvador hovered at 10% to 12% of the GDP, 
near the bottom in Latin America and perhaps as low as half the level compatible with its level of 
development.890  Raising domestic tax revenues was expected to be one of the big payoffs of 
neoliberal reforms.  ARENA’s tax reform during the Cristiani administration (1989-1994) 
consisted of simplification (elimination of the wealth tax and the coffee export tax, reduction of 
corporate taxes from 30% to 25%, a significant reduction of income taxes for the upper bracket, 
converting the sales (stamp) tax to a value added tax in 1991 and the steady elimination of trade 
tariffs.  Calderón Sol raised the VAT from 10 to 13% in 1995.  The VAT now represents 63% of 
all tax income, and combined with the other reforms, has produced a highly regressive system.891 
Of taxes collected, almost 90% comes the departments of San Salvador and La Libertad.  
Most of the paracentral region departments collect less than 7% of the national tax base and have 
only several thousand contributors.  The UNDP (2003) shows that tax collection for small 
municipalities like Nuevo Tepetitán, for example, is only $40,260 or $8.6 per each of its 28 
registered income or VAT tax payers, while San Salvador collects over $700 million in taxes, 
where the 77,000 taxpayer average more than $1,300.   
Total municipal revenue between 1986-1989 amounted to about 2.5% the national budget 
(without Municipalities in Action or CONARA transfers).  By 1999, total municipal revenues 
had declined to less than 0.5% of GDP (about $50 - $60 million), and 40% of this is collected in 
San Salvador.892  Reliable municipal budget data is notoriously difficult to find in El Salvador.  
However, Gallagher (1999) estimates that the median value of taxes collected by Salvadoran 
                                                 
890 See Velasco and Rodríguez (2003), Barriex et al., (2005), IMF (2005) for estimates of tax burden for El Salvador. 
891 In 2004, a tax reform was passed which included a temporary tax amnesty for delinquents, generating 1.5% of 
GDP and providing some indication of the level of prior evasion (IMF 2005).   
892 Goetz, et al (1992); Gallagher (1999)  Local revenues consist local direct taxes (fees charged on urban properties, 
business tax on net assets), fees for services (public lighting, cemeteries, market space, sanitation) and licenses 
(birth, death, marriage, civil registry).   
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municipality of about 10,000 inhabitants in 1998 is $21,110, or about $2.4 per capita.  This 
compares to the median transfer (FODES) amount of $265,000 ($26.7 per capita).  Thus the 
median total budget for Salvadoran municipalities at just below $300,000 is heavily dependent 
on transfers versus local tax revenue. 
The obstacles to increasing municipal financial autonomy through tax reform remains an 
urgent task, but blocked more by political obstacles than technical ones.  ARENA and many in 
the Salvadoran private sector tend to view poverty as the result of individual failure, and are 
reluctant to redistribute taxes to compensate for bad choices.  Secondly, central government 
officials oppose the surrender of fiscal authority to the municipalities and use influence in the 
National Assembly to block most local tax proposals.  Finally, certain measures, such as a 
property tax are most likely to be progressive (the tax rate is positively associated with wealth or 
assets) and are thus vetoed by the wealthy or would be effectively captured if implemented by 
weak local officials.893   
A locally controlled property tax would be the most effective and efficient tool to 
increase municipal financial autonomy and reduce dependence on transfers.894  El Salvador is the 
only Central American country without a property tax (Dillinger 1991; Gallagher 1999; Tanzi 
1987; Bird 1974).  Globally, property taxes generate 40-75% of municipal revenues and up to 
3% of GDP.  According to one study by USAID, which has endorsed the introduction of a 
property tax since the early 1990s, “a local property tax, locally controlled, would reverse a 
paternalistic tradition of central government control and local dependence existing for more than 
a century in El Salvador” (Goetz, Pace and Stout 1992).  Indeed, median estimates of annual tax 
receipts that could be collected by a sliding flat tax on the area and value of land in El Salvador 
were $12,500 (for area method) and $88,000 (for self-assessed value method), the latter equal to 
over four times the median tax receipts in 1998.895   
                                                 
893 It might be argued that the prior existence of the Wealth Tax, which was also progressive in theory, contradicts 
this argument.  However, the wealth tax was widely evaded, generating no more than 5% of tax revenue, and was 
quickly dispensed with in 1992. 
894 See Loría Chaves (2000), and Gallagher (2000), that compare several alternative tax instruments to raise 
municipal revenue (eg. earmarking VAT taxes, income taxes, ecological taxes, and property taxes based on value or 
area). 
895 A value based land tax levies not only the land area but the value of improvements made to it.   
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Yet, despite efforts by USAID, the SRN, and FUSADES, various property tax initiatives 
have failed to gain approval in the National Assembly, which retains authority over the setting of 
new tax rates.896  Upon his election as the first FMLN mayor of San Salvador, Hector Silva 
proposed a modification of the asset tax for the city.897  The measure, like all subsequent efforts 
to pass relatively modest property tax proposals, was roundly rejected by the business gremios 
(ANEP, ASI, ABANSA, CASALCO).   In 2001 under FMLN leadership, COMURES also 
lobbied a value based land tax proposal based on USAID research.898  However, no consensus 
within COMURES was possible when the proposed legislation was presented at the 17th National 
Mayor’s Congress, and it was decided that the Corporation would cease promotion of such a tax 
(RDL 2003: 144). 
Another obstacle is the general lack of transparency regarding tax payment, where the 
traditional interpretation of privacy provisions in the law prohibits open access to relevant 
information, such as cadastral information.  Two World Bank loans have gone toward renovating 
the national property registry (CNR), however the cost of this information effectively excludes 
poor people.  The CNR has also refused to collaborate with large municipalities, such as the 
eleven that compose the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, by negotiating a reasonable fee for 
access to the new property registry.  Although financed by national debt, the CNR has treated the 
registry information, which is essential for implementing any property tax, as a private good.   
Despite a decade of intense and expensive lobbying backed by U.S. financed empirical 
research, property tax proposals have failed.  Gallagher places equal blame on the parochial self-
interest of the private sector and the weakness of COMURES as an effective advocate. 899  
Various experts contend that simple, self-assessment based on flat rates that exempt the smallest 
                                                 
896 According to the tax code, municipalities can propose tax reforms, but the National Assembly must ratify them. 
897 Silva’s proposal involved modifying the current tax rate tables on property to bring them into compliance with 
the General Municipal Tax Law (passed into law in 1991), which prohibits regressive taxation.  A study funded by 
USAID determined that of 95 tax reform bills, only 1 complied with the Municipal Tax Law.  Of another 73 tax 
reform bills that had been approved, none were in full compliance.  See Gallagher (2000). 
898 “Bill proposal for a Law to Create a Value Based Asset Tax,” Oct 2001 
899 Interview Mark Gallagher, August, 2001 
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properties would generate significant revenue for municipalities – effectively replacing 
transfers.900   
 
 
b.  Inter-governmental transfers  
 
Municipal revenue remains highly dependent upon inter-governmental transfers (FODES).  Until 
1998, transfers amounted to 1% of public spending, or $14.3 million.901  The increase to 6% 
resulted in a transfer of $82 million in 1998, of which $1.14 million was for administration costs 
for ISDEM and FISDL.902  Of the balance, 80% is earmarked for capital investment in the form 
of local infrastructure projects (5% for pre-investment expense and 95% for direct investment).  
The remaining 20% ($16.3 million) can be spent on municipal administrative costs (50% for 
salaries, 50% on other expenses, including 1% returned to ISDEM, COMURES and FISDL in 
the form of membership quotas).  Between 1998 and 2003, total FODES transfers have averaged 
$94 million. 
Of this amount, 38% of FODES during 1998 was channeled through FISDL, financed by 
loans from the IDB and BCIE.  The other 62% was channeled through ISDEM.  The lack of 
resources to implement the 6% transfer resulted in long delays and confusion about the differing 
conditions of each agency.903  The funding for small infrastructure projects was distributed 
according to a complex formula that weights municipalities according to their population (50%), 
a poverty index (20%), territorial extension (5%), and 25% gets distributed equally to all 262.904   
                                                 
900 Because small farmers (less that 5 ha) would be effectively exempt and conditions would balance the impact on 
cooperatives, a property tax would be one of the most progressive taxes possible.   
901 As noted, CONARA and MEA transfers represented as much as $10 million annually and 50% of local revenue 
on average.    
902 The total amount transferred never actually reached 6%, increasing from 5.66% in 1998 to 5.94% in 2002.  The 
highest percentage of FODES transfers that derived from national budget resources was also 2002, at 95%.  RDL 
(2003: 138). 
903 Mayors complained that ISDEM, FISDL, MEA/SRN each had different spending requirements and auditing 
procedures.   
904 The funds are assigned with several conditions.  Only 20% of all FODES funds may be used for institutional 
costs, the remaining 80% must be invested in projects.  Dependency on FODES transfers is high.  One estimate 
suggests that over 90% of municipalities receive FODES transfers equal to or exceeding their own revenue 
generations Gallagher (1999). 
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The boost in transfers in 1998 dramatically increased overall budgets (as much as 
threefold), increased capital expenditures by local governments, and reduced the locally 
generated revenue share of local income from 75% in 1997 to an average of 26% (1998-2002).905   
If transfers are considered a gift rather than a right by local governments and citizens, 
Rauch (2005) suggests that transfers are likely to shift a local government’s accountability 
upward toward the politicians and officials that have most influence over these flows.  Others 
espouse the fiscal concerns that without greater performance requirements (revenue sharing, 
matching funds, infrastructure maintenance, administrative efficiency), that without suitable 
accountability mechanisms, transfers can contribute to less effective governance. 
There is some evidence from a recent survey of 20 Salvadoran municipalities that a third 
of state transfers are spent in areas in which the central government has primary responsibility 
(health, education, water, electrification) (COMURES 2003). To do so, other areas where the 
municipality has exclusive responsibility (tertiary roads) are receiving less attention.  For this 
sample of municipalities, transfers represent 68% of municipal income.  This emphasizes the 
confusion that prevails over distinct authority between levels of government and how transfers 
may be shifting burdens to already over strapped municipalities without the commensurate 
control over the revenues.  
How transfers are viewed depends on the context, a political factor that is central to this 
study.  In fact, it is entirely possible that some localities both view a redistribution of resources 
by the state as an entitlement and identify the state as a legitimate target of political pressure.  
Some donors view this prospect of asistencialismo as a defect of centralization.  Proponents of 
strong state-society relations view demand making toward the state not as dependence but 
empowered action.   Benefactors that manage hierarchical patronage networks are skeptical of 
any new transfers that challenge their own distribution of selective benefits or may divert local 
demand making beyond parochial issues. 
By any standard, the $100 million in annual state transfers to 262 municipalities falls far 
short of meeting local needs.906  Rather than settle for insufficient local resources, the local 
                                                 
905 Source is ISDEM chart comparing locally generated revenue (taxes and fees) with total local total municipal 
income (not including income earmarked for projects).  http://www.isdem.gob.sv, accessed December 2005 
906 As noted in chapter three, El Salvador ranks well below other Latin American countries in terms of the national 
budget share transferred to local government. 
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government in this context is expected to facilitate advocacy for more resources toward various 
agencies of the state.  Whether this strategy precludes local burden sharing for increased revenue 
through new taxes or cost cuts remains an open question.  The effect of transfers on 
accountability depends on the context. 
 
c.  International cooperation & remittances   
 
Aid flows to El Salvador have declined by 50% from wartime highs of $360-$400 million per 
year during the 1980s (largely from the U.S.).  UNDP estimates of technical and financial 
cooperation flows to El Salvador between 1992-1998 suggest that annual bilateral assistance 
averaged $180 million, multilateral assistance averaged $275 million, and cooperation channeled 
through INGOs averaged $8 million.907  Total cooperation flows during this period summed to 
$466 million annually.  Prior to the spike in aid flows in response to the 1998 hurricane and the 
2001 earthquakes, bilateral flows dropped from $330 million in 1993 by 80% to $48 million in 
1998.  At the same time, multilateral flows (over 90% of which are loans), increased from $116 
million in 1992 to over $400 million in 1997, and have become the largest source of 
discretionary development finance.908   
Much more can be said about INGO funding.  The UNDP data underestimates by as 
much as perhaps 50% the likely amount that INGOs channeled to El Salvador in the early post-
war period.  The largest U.S. INGOs, such as Plan International, CARE, CRS had annual 
budgets of between $4 and $7 million during peak years in the post-war period, inflated by 
medicine and food aid transfers.  Still, the top 10 INGOs sustained average budgets of over $1 
million during the 1990s.909  The estimate of $15-20 million in total INGO cooperation considers 
net flows (excluding USAID, bilateral contracts).  
                                                 
907 UNDP Summary of Technical and Financial Cooperation by Institution and Sector, 1993-1998, mimeo. 
908 IFI loans are typically conditioned upon a 5-20% counterpart financing from the national government.  IFIs also 
provide as much as $10 million in non-reimbursable financing, in the form of grants and analytical contributions. 
909 There are no reliable estimates of INGO funding flows, in part due to the lack of financial transparency in this 
sector (gross figures are provided in INGO annual reports), but national program budgets are rare.   
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At the municipal level, flows of INGO and NGO funding sometimes exceed the 
municipal budget.  However, these resources are rarely taken into account as official local 
finance.  This off-budget status of INGO and NGO funds typically delinks them from the 
accountability mechanisms at the disposal of citizens and the local government.  While INGOs 
and NGOs are responsive, in varying degrees, to local assemblies and boards of directors, these 
accountability mechanisms are nascent and hardly uniform across the sector.  There are no 
minimal standards for transparency or accountability.  Under these circumstances, it is highly 
possible that large amounts of aid can undermine the accountability that local governments have 
to their citizens, at the same time that it fortifies the responsiveness that these institutions have to 
their donors.   Lack of coordination between non-governmental organizations only exacerbates 
this problem.   
Remittances have more than doubled since 1990, now totaling almost $3 billion per year.  
Although household surveys underestimate by about 66%-75% the official remittance flows of 
the BCR, they provide a possible indication of departmental and municipal remittance flows.  
EHPM surveys suggest that San Vicente, which represents 2.5% of the national population, 
received $6.4 million in remittances in 1998, and $13.2 million in 2002.  San Vicente’s share of 
national remittance flows is about 2%, and 22.5% of the households reported receiving 
remittances.  If adjustments were made to correct for under-reporting, San Vicente could be 
receiving between $12 and $20 million annually in remittances between 1999 and 2002.  
Considering that the department’s share of public investment is less than $10 million, the 
significance of remittances becomes obvious.  Nevertheless, the lack of reliable local data on 
household remittance receipts allows no more than highly speculative estimates.910 
 
d.  Community donations   
 
Most municipal funding requires at least a 20% community counterpart donation of donated 
labor or in-kind material donations.  Bases on estimates of the official development assistance 
                                                 
910 Although speculative as well, it is worth adding that in terms of transfer charges, San Vicentians are paying 
companies like Western Union between $4 and $6 million, conservatively, to send remittances home. 
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(ODA) and FODES funding that is likely spent on projects, the annual value of community 
donations could be as high as $30 million.911 
 
e.  Borrowing   
 
Municipal governments are legally prohibited from running a deficit.  However a few municipal 
governments have taken on debt through ISDEM, using FODES flows as a guarantee.  Between 
2000-2003, total accumulated municipal debt totals $70 million, with 18.6% owed to ISDEM 
and the rest to commercial banks.  Current municipal debt taken by five of the largest 
municipalities is about $12 million, quite low by developing country standards. 
 Table 9.2 provides a breakdown of global spending on decentralization programs in the 
civil war and post-war periods. 
 
 
Table 9.2  Expenditures on Decentralization Programs in El Salvador (US$ mn) 
 
 
 Min. Interior 
CONARA 
MEA, 
DIDECO 
CONARA/S
RN 
FIS/FISDL 
FODE
S 
ISDE
M 
COMUR
ES 
 International 
Programs  
1980-83 $ 42 - - -  
1984-89 $21.5 - - -  
1989-94 $113.5 $93 $14 $0.75 $5.0 
1994-1999 n.d. $165 $108 $4.0 $10.0 
1999-2000 n.d. $110 $149 $2.0 $5.0 
Sources: CONARA data from Austin, Flores and Stout (1988); MEA data 
from MSI 1996, M. Rodríguez estimated total MEA funding at $150 
million.; COMURES – the gremio of mayors, budget comes from 
international grants and dues from each of the 262 municipalities; 
International Programs - include  the principal externally funded programs 
of local development sponsored by EU, UNDP, GTZ, DIAKONIA, 
USAID-(RTI, FUNDE, FUSAI, SACDEL, FUNDEMUNI, 
FUNDAUNGO, FEMICA) UNICEF, SPAIN 
 
                                                 
911 This estimate assumes that only between 75-80% of total transfers of these three sources ($275 million) are 
potentially available for projects after administrative costs, and discounted further (50-75%) for tied purchase 
requirements for ODA and INGO funding.   
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In sum, while local revenues have increased, largely due to state transfers and remittance 
flows, even the best governed local development initiatives have inadequate rural investment.   
Addressing this deficit requires not only good administration of the resources that exist, but 
aggressive, creative, possibly contentious demand making toward government and donors to 
mobilize greater resources for rural areas.  Tax reform is one avenue, although local governments 
can’t do it alone.  Coordination among local actors and looking beyond local resources toward an 
expansive resource mobilization strategy is likely to be most effective.  I turn now to the case 
study municipalities to assess the respective approaches and performance in the design and 
implementation of local economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  COMPETING EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES 912 
 
 
1.  Demographics & Local Politics 
 
The severity of the civil war in San Vicente made it the only one of El Salvador’s fourteen 
departments to experience a negative population growth rate between 1971 and 1992 (0.33% per 
year).913  By 1992, about 33% of the San Vicente population resided in San Salvador or adjacent 
La Libertad, the highest share of any department (Melara et al. 2004b: 37).   Tecoluca and San 
Ildefonso are only now returning to 1971 population levels.  Government control in much of the 
                                                 
912 Research of Tecoluca upon which my own investigation rests include FUNDE (1997),; Fogaroli and Stowell 
(1997) .  Serena Fogaroli, co-author of the latter study, and Andrew Cummings of FUNDE, active in participant 
researcher in Tecoluca since 1994, generously provided historical and in-depth community knowledge that greatly 
facilitated what I now know about the communities that I visited.  Eric Marchand (IIZ) and the documents produced 
by the EU program, San Vicente Productivo provided equally important background data for San Ildefonso.  For the 
Jiboa Valley, relatively less detailed documentation was available, but GTZ (the German Aid Agency) and SVP 
background research was relied on here.  
913 Population growth was near zero (+0.25%) for Usulután, and 1.4% for La Paz. 
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Jiboa Valley prevented the same level of violence and thus slowed the rate of population 
expulsion.   
Economic restructuring in the 1990s added to the political violence of the prior decade to 
increase international migration.  Estimates of the number of households receiving remittances 
(22.5% in 2002), households headed by women (34%) and persistent levels of extreme poverty 
(28%) all indicate the exodus of working age men (and increasingly, women) to the U.S. and 
other countries.   
According to the 1992 census, just over 16,746 people were living in Tecoluca.  By 1998, 
the population had grown to 26,000.  In six short years after the Peace Accords, the population 
had increased by over 50%.  This massive population growth represented a flow of displaced 
residents originally from Tecoluca, as well as many new migrants, some from neighboring 
departments and municipalities and others from as far as Chalatenango, northern San Miguel or 
Morazán.914 Tecoluca had 24 cantónes and 69 caseríos before the war.  The repopulation led to 
the creation of at least 7 new caseríos to accommodate the inflow of people.  Tecoluca may soon 
recover pre-war population, which approached 31,000.915   
The repopulation of original villages and the formation of new settlements brought 
together people of all political stripes in the search for land and security, displaced by the war, or 
resettled formally as part of the demobilization plans.  Many families with wealth before the war, 
fled to other cities or the U.S., and only a few have returned.  With the possible exception of 
refugee or combatant experiences, many of the repopulated or new communities lack long-
standing histories together.  Trust within and between many communities was not deep.   
Table 9.3 summarizes the differences in the extent of population, infrastructural and 
social recomposition in resettled communities as a consequence of events associated with the 
civil war.  Based on migration data collected in the 1998 regional survey, community wide 
averages were used to estimate the respective percentages of original, displaced, repopulated and 
                                                 
914 Santa Marta were repatriates from Nicaragua, San Bartolo had people from Chalatenango and repatriates from 
Honduras, and the majority of those in Santa Monica are from Cacaopera, Morazán, with others from La Libertad, 
and Ciudad Barrios, San Miguel.   
915 This estimate is from 1977 (Gochez et al., 1997).  The 1971 census put Tecoluca’s population at 25,413, with a 
3.5% population growth rate. 
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repatriated members as well as the overall level of community change.916  Recomposition that 
effectively created new communities was limited to 20% of the surveyed population in the 
paracentral region, but was higher in Tecoluca than anywhere else.917 
 
Table 9.3  Definition of Community Change Variable918 
 
 
Level of Social 
Recomposition 
Definition Survey  
Frequency
1.  Reduced 
Community of Origin 
A community that experienced a net out-migration to 
municipal center, other cantónes, neighboring 
municipalities or San Salvador.  Post-war population 
is greatly reduced. 
26% 
2.  Stable Community 
of Origin 
A community that experienced both out-migration 
(early in the war) but also some in-migration from 
other nearby cantónes and caseríos, including the 
return of original community members, temporarily 
displaced. 
17.8% 
3.  Recipient 
Community of Origin 
A municipal center, or larger cantón that experienced 
net in-migration from nearby cantónes and 
municipalities, yet the original population remains the 
majority. 
30.7% 
4.  Repopulated 
Community of Origin 
Most residents were forced to abandon then repopulate 
the community.  Net population loss, moderate 
transformation. 
5.4% 
5.  New Community of 
Internally Displaced 
Refugees/Combatants 
Change in residential composition, the in-migration of 
people who were largely displaced, demobilized from 
non-neighboring municipalities. 
9.1% 
6.  New Repatriated 
Community 
Change in residential composition, in-migration of 
people who returned from external exile, who 
originally lived in non-neighboring municipalities. 
2.% 
7.  New Mixed 
Community 
Change in residential composition, a combination of 
displaced and repatriated individuals who represent 
the majority of post-war residents along with a 
minority of original community residents. 
8.5% 
                                                 
916 The survey asked two questions related to community change.  The first question asked where a respondent lived 
prior to the war.  The second question was how many years they have lived in their current community.   
917 The mean for a community change score representing the cardinal scale in Table 9.3 was 5 for Tecoluca, 2.15 for 
Jiboa Valley and 1.9 for San Ildefonso.   
918 Original indicates a community that has experienced a loss or gain of residents from the nearby villages, but little 
change in the pre-war territorial, infrastructural or social arrangements.  New indicates a community that has 
experienced considerable change in the original population composition, as well as the territorial, infrastructural and 
social arrangements. 
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The perceived availability of high quality land was perhaps the principal motivation for 
immigration.  Migrants’ expected that services and economic assistance would be provided, first 
through the SRN and aid agencies, then by the municipal authorities.  For people associated with 
the FMLN, the party helped coordinate these inflows of people and in effect, underwrote the 
social contract between the repopulation and the local institutions.   
Rapid resettlement of Tecoluca presented untold challenges for administration of basic 
services.  Many began with nothing except sheet metal “champas,” or provisional houses.  
Significant levels of cooperation facilitated meeting basic needs, but only complicated the 
underlying problem of territorial order.  Coordination of the inflows of people and money fell to 
the local government.  In some cases, PTT beneficiaries settled in Tecoluca long enough to 
secure provisional title to their share of the transferred property (particularly among demobilized 
Armed Forces), only then to relocate to San Salvador or elsewhere.    
Traditionally, each of the 24 cantónes was an independent territorial center, often 
associated with a large hacienda or urban center.  However, beginning with the post-war 
governance under FMLN leaders and institutions, the municipality was subdivided 
geographically into six zones.919  Since the arrival of CORDES and CRIPDES to San Carlos 
Lempa in 1991, the coastal sector has been the most organized, documenting in some detail the 
population change in the sector.  In 1994, the coastal sector of Tecoluca was organized into a 
sectoral assembly that represented between 15 and 20 communities of some 718 families totaling 
about 2,800 people.  By 1999, the total population of the sector had grown to 958 families and 
3,663 people.920  This represents an annual increase of over 5% (more than double the national 
average).  Some communities lost population in this period, others gained, largely due to internal 
migration within the sector.  San Carlos Lempa, one of the principal cantónes of the sector and 
site of CORDES regional office until 1999, saw its population increase from 368 in 1994 to over 
700 in 1999, almost doubling in size.   
                                                 
919  Seven zones if the urban town center is considered an independent unit.  There remained in 1998 considerable 
lack of consensus on the final territorial divisions, with the idiosyncrasies of each competing development initiative 
contributing to a slightly different geographical framing of the municipality. 
920 There has been no official census in El Salvador since 1992, and many view that data as obsolete for  rapidly 
changing municipalities such as Tecoluca.  Despite the slight changes in the communities that are considered part of 
the SES or not, the population changes between 1994 and 1998-99 are based on estimates in the population data at 
the caserío level provided by CORDES, but are comparable to a 1994 partial municipal census conducted by 
MIPLAN under the Social Information Initiative for the 108 municipalities that were targeted by the PRN. 
  587
What is perhaps most remarkable about this population growth is that is coincided with a 
period when the coastal sector of Tecoluca was damaged by four severe floods and two droughts.  
Many perceive the constant flooding, attributable to the rapid discharge of excess water from the 
reservoir of the 15 de Septiembre hydroelectric dam, as the calculated strategy of the former 
landowners to drive the FMLN population out of the zone and recover their properties.  Not only 
did the repopulation stabilize, but it grew – suggesting the depth of commitment that these 
insurgent communities enjoy as a defense mechanism against the challenges of post-war 
reconstruction.  Also suggestive of this local commitment is the relatively low percentage of 
families (12.8%) that receive remittances (implying lower out-migration rates), compared to the 
22% department average (Melara et al. 2004a). 
San Ildefonso was also devastated by wartime violence, but has experienced a 
considerably different post-war population shift.  Total population increased from just over 8,000 
in 1992 to over 11,000 in 1998 – a 25% increase.921  Part of this increase stems from a 
repopulation of conflictive highland communities, but does not reflect a strategic land occupation 
process of non-original residents that occurred in Tecoluca.   
A more significant trend in the post-war period for San Ildefonso is urbanization.  The 
municipality counted 6 cantónes and 62 caseríos before the war.  The population is divided 
among fewer caseríos, in part due to displacement by the reservoir, and is now 50% urban.922  
Lowland communities that were more stable during the war represent 66% of total population, 
while highland communities that were repopulated in 1984, represent the other third.    
The final and perhaps most significant population shift in San Ildefonso has been 
migration to the U.S.  Nearly 24% of the families in San Ildefonso report receiving remittances, 
one of the highest rates in the region.  This suggests a prevalence of international migration and 
dependence on external finance that is common throughout northern San Vicente. 
Population growth in the Jiboa Valley experienced the least disruption of the case studies.  
Estimated population in 1998 was 23,000, indicating a 10.5% growth over 1992 and largely 
consistent with a four decade trend.  The war did cause displacement in the Jiboa Valley, mainly 
                                                 
921 1998 estimate is based on growth projections and SRN data.  The SVP census of San Ildefonso in 2003 estimated 
municipal population at 12,814 . 
922 Estimate from SVP (2003) based on preliminary data cited in PNODT SNIT (2004) 
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to San Salvador and nearby cities.  Some of the region’s more remote and indefensible caseríos 
were depopulated and a few are no longer occupied.  Yet the magnitude of displacement was 
lower and in fact, the Jiboa Valley served as a refuge displaced people from nearby communities.   
After the war, some resettlement of the 19 rural cantóns and 32 caseríos has occurred, but 
both urban and rural population growth has been below the national average.  Migration abroad 
appears to be somewhat lower as indicated by the proportion of families reporting receipt of 
remittances, ranging from 11% in Guadalupe to 24% in Nuevo Tepetitán.  
In part, the population stability was associated with the military protection of the coffee 
harvest, the higher number of small landowners and the negligible turnover in land ownership in 
the region.  Anecdotal information based on interviews suggest that coffee and sugar cane 
farmers took pride in remaining in the region to safeguard property, but sent children to San 
Salvador or abroad.   
The trends in post-war local politics are now well known.  Table 9.4 summarizes the 
most recent local election trends.  The FMLN has now governed in Tecoluca since 1994, one of 
the first municipal governments.  The PCN and ARENA have rotated as the majority party in the 
Jiboa Valley, although the FMLN has won in the two smallest Microregion seats (Tepetitán and 
San Cayetano).  In San Ildefonso, the near two decades of Christian Democrat rule ended in 
1997, giving way to the four successive terms under the current mayor who has switched parties 
from ARENA to the PCN.   
The paracentral region reflects national political realignments in municipal and legislative 
elections since 1994.  On one hand, the FMLN has made steady inroads consolidating the 
support of one third of the electorate.  ARENA, by contrast, has seen its near majority decline to 
a similar level of support (one third of the electorate).  The PCN has displaced PDC as the third 
political force, advancing most rapidly where disgruntled ARENA party members defect.  This 
new correlation of political force favors the FMLN at the local level, but continues to favor the 
ruling coalition (ARENA-PCN and a conservative fraction of the PDC) in control over the 
executive and agenda setting power in the National Assembly.  Local politics in the case study 
municipalities mirror the vertical and horizontal realignments within the respective insurgent and 
counter-insurgent mobilization networks at the national level. 
In Tecoluca, the FMLN has consolidated control over municipal office by winning over 
60% of the vote in the last four consecutive elections.  Nicolás García voluntarily stepped aside 
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after two terms to compete in the FMLN primary for Congressional deputy from San Vicente, 
but lost in the departmental primary to the FMLN departmental coordinator.  He ran again in 
2003, won the nomination and was elected to the Assembly.  Carlos Cortés, Tecoluca’s sindico 
under García, was elected and served in the subsequent two terms as mayor, before also being 
elected as legislative deputy in 2006.   Both García and Cortes are demobilized officers with the 
FMLN and like many other former insurgents, represent a generation of aspiring local politicians 
that seek to convert the political capital of their military experience to post-war local governance.   
One third of the six council members in Tecoluca were women prior to 2000, rising to 
two thirds through 2003 – well above the national average of 20% of local government posts 
occupied by women (2000-2003).  
Leading up to the 1999 elections, Tecoluca was not immune to factional divisions.  
Within the municipal government itself, García supported the moderates and Cortés, the 
“ortodoxos.”  These divisions contributed less than full support for García’s candidacy for 
legislator in 2000.  As profound as the internal party divisions were, continuity in local office by 
an FMLN administration was uninterrupted as the former insurgents have continued to enjoy 
close to two thirds support within the municipality.  ARENA, which governed Tecoluca under 
conditions of very low turnout from 1985 – 1994, has not polled more than 26% in the post-war 
period. 
In San Ildefonso, the PDC base splintered between ARENA, the PCN and the FMLN.  
The current mayor, Maria Julia Costanza, has enjoyed solid support from urban and lowland 
communities despite losing nearly her entire council after they resigned in 1998 over charges of 
corruption.  The three who resigned represented highland communities, and were replaced with 
lowland community representatives.  Although Costanza is one of 22 women mayors (2000), no 
women were serving on the local council. 
In addition to fighting off allegations of corruption, Costanza also lost the endorsement of 
her party.  In 1998, COMURES sought the endorsement of San Vicente mayor’s council (CDA) 
for a standing proposal to decentralize the execution of road repair projects, previously 
centralized under the administration of the highly politicized Ministry of Public Works.  The 
proposal involved leasing the construction equipment to the CDA during the dry season.  The six 
FMLN mayors approved the proposal and tabled the decision for CDA endorsement.  ARENA 
mayors were instructed by the party central committee to withhold their support because 
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endorsement was viewed as a concession to the FMLN.923  Breaking ranks with the party 
leadership, Costanza, whose municipality suffers from virtually no paved roads, gave her support 
to the proposal.  ARENA party leaders reacted by attacking Costanza personally in the media.924   
Within the CDA, FMLN mayor García proposed a resolution that the San Vicente 
mayors’ council issue their unanimous backing to Costanza in a public letter to ARENA.  García 
recounted how ARENA mayors had to consult by phone with COENA officials to get permission 
to sign the resolution.  The unanimous resolution ultimately opened a rift between ARENA, the 
San Vicente CDA and GTZ – one of the strongest bilateral proponents of decentralization in El 
Salvador.925  The experience also demonstrated how national party politics trumped local 
initiatives for ARENA officials, in stark contrast to the political autonomy with which local 
FMLN politicians like García appeared to operate. 
The Court of Accounts has investigated several instances of apparent misuse of funds in 
San Ildefonso, but no penalties have been assessed.  Despite the fact that such errors were likely 
due to poor administration, the relenting of government investigators was not unrelated to 
Costanza switching from ARENA to the PCN, which has historically controlled the Court.  
Since, defecting from ARENA, Costanza has been re-elected three times.  San Ildefonso has only 
had two three term mayors in the post-war period, and despite the political opportunities, the 
FMLN has been unable to poll more than 25% of the local vote.  San Ildefonso reflects the 
typical horizontal realignment that has forced ARENA into a more concerted bargaining 
relationship with the PCN.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
923 Interview, Nicolás García, Dec 4, 1998 
924 San Vicente Governor, Blanca Avalos de Angulo and officials from ISDEM, which were also lobbying for 
control over the transport equipment, called for Costanza’s substitution, reportedly going as far as having a letter 
published in the national papers signed by a local doctor and questioning Costanza’s mental health. 
925 GTZ is the German aid agency that began its municipal strengthening work in San Vicente in 1997. The San 
Vicente CDA published a statement on Feb. 27, 1998 in national newspapers criticizing ISDEM and held a staged 
ceremonial event in San Ildefonso to lend Costanza some moral support. Other FMLN mayors on the CDA reported 
similar experiences where ARENA mayors called on their cell phones to consult with COENA representatives 
before taking decisions tabled at CDA meetings.  FMLN mayors strategically introduced measures that would 
demonstrate this lack of autonomy in order to enhance their own authority within the CDA.  
  591
Table 9.4  Local Political Trends in Paracentral Case Study Municipalities,1968-2006 
 
 Paracentral Case Study Municipalities Department National 
 Tecoluca San Ildefonso Jiboa Valley 
Political 
Experience 
Hard-line 
Insurgency 
Disputed 
Zone 
Hard-line Count
Insurgency 
San Vicente El Salvador 
Political Orientation  FMLN PDC ARENA ARENA ARENA 
2006-2009 FMLN (60.6% PCN (44.2%) ARENA (41.7%) FMLN (34.5%) ARENA 
2004 Pres. Election FMLN  ARENA ARENA ARENA ARENA    (60%)
2003 -2006 FMLN   (63%) PCN     (56%) ARENA/PCN PCN  (44%) ARENA    (44%)
2000 -2003  FMLN   (66%) PCN     (39%) ARENA (35%) ARENA  (42%) ARENA    (42%)
1999 Pres. Election FMLN   (60%) ARENA (48%) ARENA (60%) ARENA     (53%) ARENA    (52%)
1997-2000  FMLN   (64%) ARENA (52%) ARENA (39%) ARENA     (40%) ARENA    (37%)
1994-1997 FMLN    (47% PDC    (48%) ARENA (54%) ARENA     (47%) ARENA    (49%)
1991-1994 ARENA (59%) PDC    (56%) ARENA (47%) ARENA     (46%) ARENA    (45%)
1989 Pres. Election  ARENA (57%) PDC    (45%) ARENA (61%) ARENA     (54%) ARENA    (54%)
1988-1991 ARENA (54%) PDC    (52%) ARENA (51%) ARENA     (47%) ARENA    ( 
1985-1988 PDC    (52%) PDC    (59%) PDC    (50%) PDC          (53%) PDC       (53%) 
1984 Pres. Election  ARENA (49%) PCN    (34%) PCN/PDC(31%) PDC/AREN(35% PDC       (43%) 
1982-1985 ARENA PCN PDC PDC Provisional Junta
1979 Appointment     Provisional Junta
1977 Election (M) PCN   PCN PCN 
1972 Election (M) PCN   PCN PCN 
1970 Election (M) PCN   PCN PCN 
1968 Election (M) PCN   PDC PCN 
 
 
The conservative base of ARENA, particularly among the coffee communities of 
Guadalupe, has long held the upper hand in local politics throughout the Jiboa Valley.  Even at 
its peak, the PDC could barely edge out ARENA in local races.   Despite its steady decline, the 
PDC has rotated with ARENA in Verapáz, San Cayetano and Nuevo Tepetitán.  As the former 
PDC base has shifted toward the FMLN in each of the latter two towns, FMLN candidates have 
won two out of the last three local races.  Still, the FMLN has attracted no more than 25% of the 
overall regional vote.   
The Jiboa Valley has also had its share of two and three term mayors, but Juan Cerritos is 
in a class by himself having serving seven terms as mayor of Guadalupe.  First elected on an 
ARENA/PCN coalition ticket in 1985, Cerritos prides himself as a wartime mayor that has 
sustained levels of electoral support comparable to the FMLN in Tecoluca.  It was only when 
COENA intervened to insist on an alternate candidate that Cerritos did not run in 2000.  
However, unable to ascend within the party, Cerritos ran with the PCN in 2003 and has won 
twice.   
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These divisions within ARENA at the local level and the decline in support for ARENA 
in general are attributable, in the view of Bezaleel Rivera, sindico in Guadalupe and 1999  
Presidential campaign manager for ARENA in San Vicente, to the authoritarian imposition of 
candidates by party elites in several places.  “Many ARENA supporters punished the party by 
not voting.”926  Part of the punishment was multiparty competition.  Within the Jiboa Valley 
Microregion between 1991 and 2003, Cerritos was challenged to explore consensus on regional 
development policies with a two term PDC mayor from Verapáz, Orlando Paredes a farmer from 
the cantón of Molineros, a two term ARENA colleague from San Cayetano, Pedro Arcenio 
Hernandez (1994-2000), a truck driver in a local family business, and Jose Evanol Funes, an ex-
combatant, Finatero and two-term FMLN mayor from Nuevo Tepetitán.   
 Despite these recent political openings, local politics remains quite traditional in the Jiboa 
Valley.  When surveyed about prior vote preferences in the 1997 elections, over two in five 
deferred their responses by emphasizing that their vote was secret.  This level of discretion was 
significantly higher than Tecoluca (33%) and San Ildefonso (31%) and indicates the differences 
in the perceived freedom of political expression.  Among the twelve Jiboa Valley council 
members, only two are women (17%).    
 
2.  Inter-Municipal Cooperation: the San Vicente Mayor’s Council 
 
Attempts to build a departmental mayors council in San Vicente illustrate how political 
experiences inform different expectations for the institutions of decentralization.   Early in his 
first term as mayor and prior to NGO interest in municipal coordination, Tecoluca’s mayor 
independently approached other departmental mayors to coordinate their work.   A first meeting 
was scheduled for November, 1995 in Tecoluca.  Shortly before the meeting, García and several 
council people received death threats if the meeting were to go forward.927  ARENA mayors 
cancelled their participation after being invited on short notice to visit the U.S. on a USAID 
                                                 
926 Interview, Bezaleel Rivera, Sindico and San Vicente ARENA Party chair, Guadalupe, May 9, 1998 
927 A representative of FUNDE argues that the meeting was also cancelled because the Tecoluca council was not 
prepared. 
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sponsored international training seminar.   As in earlier attempts to intimidate Tecolucan 
officials, COMURES and ISDEM offered no assistance.  This initial municipal coordination 
effort was abandoned. 
About a year later, a similar invitation to formalize a departmental mayor’s council 
(CDA) was convened by the more neutral party, the German cooperation program, GTZ-
PROMUDE.   GTZ made San Vicente CDA a pilot initiative with the goal of socializing best 
practices of budgeting technique and citizen participation, providing a forum for information 
sharing and mutual support among the department’s thirteen mayors.  Funding from Diakonia 
supported four promoters and contracted FUSAI to provide technical assistance on participatory 
planning. 928 
In the first years of the CDA, Tecoluca attempted to set a politically relevant agenda only 
to see proposals effectively vetoed by ARENA party officials.  As only one of two FMLN 
mayors out of total of thirteen, García recalls being treated with contempt from hard-line 
ARENA mayors.  An early confrontation between the mayor of San Vicente, an ex-school 
teacher named Santamaria and Tecoluca’s García ended the ARENA mayor’s practice of 
presiding over meetings as if the other mayors, even from the same party, were her pupils.929   
The electoral gains by the FMLN and the strategic leadership eventually diminished open 
opposition to FMLN mayors within the council.  However, limited autonomy for engagement 
provided to ARENA mayors effectively precluded any meaningful collective action and reduced 
the CDA to a poorly attended discussion group.  
A central discussion topic was the arcane and contradictory accounting requirements 
associated with the FODES increase and the reform of FISDL and ISDEM.930    Because FODES 
was funded by two international loans and national budget resources, new accounting rules 
established no less than five separate funding sources, each with a unique set of standards.  
                                                 
928 FUSAI facilitating local planning exercises in Guadalupe, San Ildefonso and San Sebastian in 1996, but came 
under increasing criticism for using Diakonia funding to the CDA to pad administrative expenses with little 
perceived value added.  A 1999 proposal to extend FUSAI’s technical assistance contract was roundly rejected by 
the CDA.  Interview, Alberto Monterrosa, GTZ-PROMUDE, March 9, 1999. 
929 Interview, Nicolás García.  As a damage control measure, ARENA intervened to remove the mayor before her 
term expired. 
930 Based on observation of CDA meetings between April 1998 and March 1999, review of CDA archives, and 
interviews with participants.   
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Already low accounting capacity in most municipalities was clearly overwhelmed with the 
avalanche of new procedures. Delays in processing of FISDL projects undermined the legitimacy 
of mayors and exacerbated accounting challenges.  FISDL blamed understaffing and the poor 
quality of proposals, suggesting the new requirements would eventually smooth out the 
inefficiency.  FMLN mayors attributed delays to the political involvement by FISDL staff.  
FMLN critics have also leveled charges of collusion between FISDL and an approved list of 
contractors to inflate costs and kickback profits.931  Despite claims by FISDL officials that their 
actions were accountable, mayors complained that they exercised little control over significant 
aspects of the project design and funding allocation process. 
 FISDL was also attempting to decentralize its operations with the creation of 14 separate 
offices (FISDL 1999).  Employees would be provided relatively generous incentives to relocate, 
responsibilities would be reduced, and increasing responsibility would be transferred to the local 
government.  If effective, one official claimed, FISDL would no longer need to exist.932  One 
local development expert suggested that as late as February 2000, FISDL still had a significant 
backlog of unspent funds from 1998 that had yet to be transferred to the municipal level and that 
project funding practices had become no more transparent or participatory.  The project focus of 
FISDL continues to resist disappearing and has undermined its mandate to set the local 
development agenda.933 
In light of the challenges that mayors faced, coordinated actions were essential.  
However, the minimal achievements by the Vicentian CDA suggest political capture.  Indeed, 
observation of CDA decision making processes revealed the two different empowerment 
processes at play.  FMLN mayors urged collective action by the CDA on political issues where a 
consensus was possible and attempted to diffuse the focus on any single mayor.  Tecoluca tabled 
                                                 
931 Interview, Carlos Cortés, March 11, 1999. Cortés recounted a frequently heard complaint, charging that FISDL 
assesses arbitrary unit cost surcharges for all project materials that are pooled into a line item labeled “indirect 
costs.”  The project cost estimates are shared with contractors, who in turn overbid.  Bids are awarded based on 
loyalty to the bid rigging scheme, and the winning contractor shares the “indirect cost” with FISDL staff.  FISDL 
discretion to alter municipal proposals and the general lack of competition in the construction industry prevents local 
control. 
932 Interview, Roberto Huezo, Patricia Fortín, FISDL, San Salvador, March 18, 1999. 
933 Interview, Guillermo Galvan, FUNDAMUNI, Feb. 15, 2000; This is a central argument in the critique of the 
Local Development Network of NGOS (RDL, 2003) 
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proposals for the CDA to address electricity overcharges, to push for a further increase of 
FODES to 12% of national budget and to have funds go directly to mayors, depoliticization and 
the decentralization of FISDL and ISDEM, among other contentious issues.  García and other 
FMLN mayors challenged the higher unit prices of FISDL supervised projects compared to those 
administered directly by local government and criticized the inefficiency of the centralized 
FISDL operations in the capital.934  The transfer of direct control over contracting professional 
services to the CDA or to individual local governments was demanded by Tecoluca, challenging 
the very core of FISDL’s operational existence.   
García was also instrumental in a meeting between eleven FMLN mayors and Norma de 
Dowe, then director of FISDL, in 1997 to demand that new representation of FISDL be assigned 
to their municipalities or the FMLN mayors would demand that FISDL withdraw all 
representation.  The group threatened to publish the demand in a newspaper ad, after which 
relations improved.  GTZ argued that behind the insistence of Tecoluca, one of CDA’s few 
concrete achievements was to force FISDL to deal more directly and impartially with local 
mayors, although no progress was made on reforming ISDEM.935 In most interventions, FMLN 
mayors demonstrated ownership of the local development resources channeled through state 
agencies and attempted to use the CDA to exert greater control over these agencies.  
Decentralization was being pulled down from below.   
ARENA mayors were typically silent on most political demands.  Interventions focused 
instead on individual grievances by municipal governments, saddled with increasing demands 
but with too few resources or technical assistance to provide any substantive development 
leadership in their respective communities.  Criticism of FISDL emphasized appeals for the 
expedition of delayed funding proposals rather than institutional reform.  Before signing on to 
any proposed CDA resolution, ARENA mayors consulted closely with party bosses by.936  
                                                 
934 At a Aug 14, 1998 CDA meeting at FISDL offices in San Vicente, Tecoluca officials argued that the costs for a 
common school construction are double when bid out by FISDL compared to municipal administration.  In their 
defense the FISDL officials argued that the frequency of accounting errors pointed out by audits of CDA-SV 
municipal accounts suggests that mayors often take procedural shortcuts that lower the final project cost, but also 
reduce the accountability, thus justifying FISDL supervisory costs.  The quality of project administration capacity 
and accountability mechanisms vary between municipalities.  
935 Interview, Dr. Oscar Mena, GTZ-PROMUDE, Dec. 16, 1998 San Salvador 
936 Interviews, Nicolás García, 1998; various letters were sent to the COMURES President requesting attention to 
CDA concerns, including the ISDEM/COENA attacks on San Ildefonso’s mayor, clarification on rules governing 
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Guadalupe’s Juan Cerritos, who presided as President of the CDA between 1994 and 1997, 
argued that that CDA support for FMLN proposals to have 100% of FODES come from the 
national budget was incorrect because it encroached upon the discretionary powers of the 
President.  San Cayetano’s mayor, Arcenio Hernandez praised his town’s relations with ISDEM 
and FISDL, offering only modest criticism of understaffing and procedural delays.937  ARENA 
mayors demonstrated that empowerment was by invitation only and the conditions were non-
negotiable.   
San Ildefonso, which suffered from considerable deficit in technical capacity, was absent 
from nearly half of the observed CDA meetings and offered little substantive input.  The 
participation by FMLN and ARENA mayors in CDA fora provide one illustration of the 
competing empowerment strategies at play.  Voluntary term limits, proactive coordination, 
politically oriented collective action, and contentious demands for expanded local autonomy 
contrast sharply with perennial candidacies, reactive or defensive engagement with opposition 
mayors, emphasis on individual needs and subservient acquiescence to the party line on political 
advocacy. 
 In addition to the phenomena of multi-term mayors, some analysts have pointed to the 
deficiencies in local representation due to the growing number of municipal governments that 
take local office despite winning a relatively low share of the overall vote.  Since 1994, the 
number of Salvadoran mayors and councils (elected together in winner take all vote) that have 
been elected with more than 50% of the local vote declined from 94 out of 262, to 68 in 2000.  
The number elected with more than 33% of the vote declined from 162 to 147.  Municipal 
governments elected with less than 33% of the local vote increased from 5 in 1994 to 47 in 2000.  
Political reforms that enact some form of proportional representation on municipal councils have 
been promoted by USAID and NGOs to remedy the risks that growing abstention may reflect 
diminished sense of representation in local government.    
 In the twenty four local elections held in the case study municipalities since 1994, on 
only one occasion (Verapáz, 2000) has a mayor and council been elected with less than 33%.  
                                                                                                                                                             
use of municipal funds, improved regulation of excessive electricity charges, and FODES reforms.  FMLN and GTZ 
insistence is largely responsible for these actions, for which COMURES offered no concrete response. 
937 Interview, Juan Cerritos and Arcenio Hernandez, Guadalupe and San Cayetano mayors, March 11, 1999, San 
Vicente 
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However, in half, support fell below the 50%.  Although proportional representation on the 
municipal councils is a laudable goal, it is not likely to be among the most significant challenges 
to making decentralization work.  Would new, imposed legal requirements achieve what deeply 
rooted and exclusionary patron client relations have long and effectively resisted?    
The analysis so far suggests otherwise.  Nothing prevents local actors from exploring 
mechanisms for greater participation and accountability, yet most do not because their 
constituents do not expect them to. Variation in the assigned roles, interests and performance of 
these local actors in local governance depends to a greater degree on the underlying aggregate 
political experiences and their associated empowerment strategies. Decentralization tends to 
strengthen the distribution of power that exists a priori at the local level – an argument that will 
be illustrated by a comparison of how the available opportunities for decentralized development 
have been used differently. 
 
 
C. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL CASES 
 
1. Comparison of Local Institutional Fields 
 
Figures I.1, I.2 and I.3 (located in the Appendix) represent the range of local development 
institutions that have been present in the three municipal case studies in the post-war period prior 
to 1999.938   Included are the key governmental and non-governmental organizations that each 
municipal government has identified as supporting or implementing some aspect of local 
development.  A comparison of these institutional maps reveals striking differences in 
organizational density, ideological diversity, and transnational reach.  For each, the 
                                                 
938 The communities, organizations, gremios, government agencies represented in these maps is compiled from a 
variety of sources, but primarily interviews with municipal council members, the regional survey, a review of the 
organizational literature.  The proportionate weight in terms of funding or membership is not reflected, and some of 
the identified organizations were present in the early 1990s, but have since left.  Late 1998 was used as a time cutoff 
due to the influx of new organizations after Hurricane Mitch, so the maps do not necessarily provide an accurate 
picture of the current institutional presence in these three areas.   
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expansion of local institutions has posed different coordination challenges.  This section 
summarizes the observations drawn from the three institutional maps and then describes the 
primary effort to coordinate institutions in each case.   
 
a. Organizational density 
 
In Tecoluca (Figure I.1) the institutional field is clearly the most crowded.  The lowered 
institutional presence of specific state agencies is offset by large numbers of NGOs, INGOs and 
gremios.  By comparison, these organizations are relatively absent in San Ildefonso and the Jiboa 
Valley.  Table 9.5 lists the most frequently identified NGOs in 1998 Paracentral Survey.   
Clearly, NGOs are far more visible to respondents in Tecoluca than anywhere else (100 of 155 
respondents), 51 of 119 in San Ildefonso and surprisingly only 1 on 5 respondents in the Jiboa 
Valley could identify an NGO.  With the exception of HIBASA/PCI – a European Union 
financed water service program that in the case of San Ildefonso was partnering with a U.S. 
based INGO but was present in many communities, the most noted NGOs vary for each case 
study municipality (CORDES in Tecoluca, Habitat for Humanity in the Jiboa Valley and ASDI 
in San Ildefonso) tend to specialize in one or a few municipalities.939  The list includes both 
Donor NGOs (INGOs, CARE, Habitat, HIBASA/Project Concern Intl), as well as Salvadoran 
NGOs and one producer cooperative federation (Fedecoopades).   
In San Ildefonso, beyond ASDI, and the U.S. INGO, Project Concern International, the 
institutional field reflects a lack of interest by both FMLN and ARENA mobilization networks.  
Arevalo’s CNC and several internationally funded programs (PRODAP, HIBASA potable water 
project) are present in only a handful of communities.  Similarly, the Jiboa Valley counts very 
few NGOs beyond FundaGuadalupe and Habitat for Humanity International.  The relative 
absence of these programs has increased community dependence on municipal or central 
government programs for investment in local development.  FUSAI is the only NGO that is 
present in all three municipal case studies, due to the technical assistance provided to CDA 
councils and small infrastructure projects in various communities. 
 
                                                 
939 HIBASA-PCI was an EU-U.S. INGO consortium working on water in dozens of municipalities. 
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Table 9.5  NGOs most frequently identified in paracentral region (1998 survey) 
 
 
   Total Jiboa 
Valley
Tecoluca San 
Ildefonso 
Other 
1. Hibasa/PCI Water INGO 53 1 5 21 17 
2. CORDES Production NGO 37  37   
3. Habitat for 
 Humanity 
Housing INGO 23 18   5 
4. FUSAI Housing NGO 21  12  9 
5. ASDI Production NGO 23   13 10 
6. FUNDASAL Infrastructure NGO 14  4 2 8 
7. FEDECOOPADES Production Coop 
gremio 
10  8  2 
8. CARE Water/credit INGO 10    10 
9. FUNDE Research 
Training 
NGO 9  1  8 
10. Fundacion 
 Guadalupe 
Infrastructure NGO 8 5   3 
11. IBBE Bautista Credit gremio 8    8 
Other NGOs   75 4 33 10 153 
Don’t recall name   32 3 8 5 16 
Total NGOs 
 identified 
  323 31 100 51 141 
 
 
b.  Ideological diversity  
 
Perhaps two thirds of the 20 plus NGOs and many more INGOs working Tecoluca are 
considered strategic allies that share much of local development philosophy.  However, a 
significant number of centrist INGOs and NGOs can also be found working in non-FMLN 
communities (Santa Cruz, San Nicolás, ISTA cooperatives) and operate for the most part 
independently of the local planning and advocacy processes.  World Vision, for example, is an 
INGO that has relationships with five communities all of which are less closely associated with 
the FMLN.   
As illustrated in the case of ASDI and the CDD in San Ildefonso, the ideological diversity 
between the mayor, most NGOs and gremios has prevented any collaboration.  Neither has the 
relative political homogeneity of local organizations has not translated into significant 
coordination in the Jiboa Valley.   
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Over fifteen gremios are present to varying extents in Tecoluca, representing a wide 
range of local issues and interests.  Gremios represent a wide variety of local interests, including 
landed and landless producers (FEDECOOPADES, CDD, ANTA), community leaders 
(CRIPDES), women (MAM, ASMUR), war wounded (ASALDIG), and a savings and loan 
members (TECOOP).   The Coordinadora del Bajo Lempa (lower Lempa valley Coordinator) 
formed in 1995 to advocate for long term solutions to constant inundation in the Lempa valley 
flood plains.   A few gremios from the center-right are also present in Tecoluca, although the 
balance clearly favors support for the FMLN.   Again, in both San Ildefonso and Jiboa Valley, 
the density of advocacy gremios is less and in the latter case, limited to center-right producer 
organizations.   
 Government ministries are present in every institutional field, but ideological differences 
with FMLN government in Tecoluca hinders close coordination.  At one extreme, DIDECO, a 
community development agency of the Ministry of Interior, supports political organizing in open 
competition with the FMLN in the town center and several cantónes with populations historically 
associated with ARENA.  In San Cayetano, Guadalupe and San Ildefonso, municipal council 
members also serve as DIDECO promoters.  State health, education and agriculture officials are 
also reluctant to proactively coordinate with the FMLN government in Tecoluca.   
 
c.  Transnational reach   
 
INGOs in Tecoluca channel as much as $1-2 million annually through local NGOs, cooperatives 
and community organizations.  Perhaps just as importantly, these international organizations act 
as a bridge between national mobilization networks in Tecoluca and Northern policymakers and 
constituent groups.  To take one of the more prominent examples, the SHARE Foundation has 
been a catalyst in transnational advocacy initiatives involving Tecoluca communities around the 
issues of land transfer, agrarian debt, flood infrastructure and lobbying for increased bilateral 
cooperation.  In addition to channeling significant resources into Tecoluca through direct project 
funding and several sister city or sister parish relations, the SHARE Foundation has facilitated 
solidarity and brought international political pressure to bear at strategic moments in local 
advocacy campaigns.   
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In contrast, linkages to Europe or the U.S. in San Ildefonso are mediated by itinerant 
politicians like Orlando Arevalo, and in the Jiboa Valley by ARENA party officials, bilateral 
donors like GTZ and USAID, or through the individual transfer of remittances in both places. 
 
2.  Local institutional performance and coordination 
 
How do the services provided by NGOs and relationships with communities compare to those of 
municipal government or agencies of the central government in the eyes of the case study 
municipality residents?  Figure 9.2 compares an NGO performance evaluation index composed 
of four questions about people’s assessment of their treatment engaging each institution, the 
quality of services provided, the perceived interest level that each has in citizen’s participation in 
the resolution of local problems, and who the beneficiaries are for NGO projects.940   
The results are presented for the most frequently identified NGOs.  For a scale of 0-10, most 
NGOs perform well above average (5.0).    The survey mean for NGO performance is 7.6, and 
INGOs are typically rated higher while local NGOs (ASDI, FUSAI, CORDES) receive below 
average evaluations.   
It is surprising that these local NGOs are the most frequently recognized and have had the 
longest presence in the communities, yet are the most heavily criticized.  INGOs, whose roots in 
the communities are not as deep, are viewed more positively.   To take one illustrative example 
of this divergence, a third of all respondents that identified CORDES (12 of 37), argued that the 
work of the NGO benefits exclusively its own employees.     
 
                                                 
940 Scores are the mean evaluation score for the four questions converted to a scale of 0-10. See appendix for 
complete question wording (Questions 3.10-3.12, 4.6-4.8, 5.7-5.10).  The means of each evaluation are based on an 
N that varies from a low of 27 to a high of 150 within the case study municipalities.  The scale for each question 
runs from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). 
  602
g
8.1 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.3
6.7 6.6
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
O
th
er
 IN
GO
s
HA
BI
TA
T 
fo
r H
um
an
ity
O
th
er
 L
oc
al
 N
G
Os
Do
n't
 re
ca
ll N
GO
 n
am
e
HI
BA
SA
/P
CI
AS
DI
FU
SA
I
CO
RD
ES
NGO Service Assessment Scale (0-10) 1998 Paracentral Survey
 
Figure 9.2  Mean Performance Scores for various NGOs present in the Paracentral Region 
 
 
In Figure 9.3, an index of three indicators of the quality of services provided by the 
municipal and central government is compared with that provided by NGOs.941  First, it is 
important to note that almost 80% of the survey respondents could name their mayor, 46% could 
name their legislative representative, but only 31% could name their local council delegate and 
32% could identify an NGO.  Second, it is worth adding that only between 16% and 26% 
reported engaging the NGO, municipal government or central government agency for some 
service.  So, there is a large gap between those who are informed about or active in engaging 
institutions working at the local level.   
                                                 
941 For the cross institutional comparisons of performance, only a three question scale is used, excluding the last 
question about beneficiaries. 
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Figure 9.3 compares institutional evaluation in the three municipal case studies.    The 
overall performance (treatment, level of participation, quality of services) of NGOs is ranked 
much higher than local government or central government agencies.  The gap between NGO 
performance and local government or central government performance is greatest in San 
Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley, where the fewest NGOs are actually working.  The assessed 
performance of local government is highest in Tecoluca, the only institutional evaluation 
difference that is statistically significant.  In Tecoluca, the evaluation gap between NGOs and 
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Figure 9.3  Composite Evaluation of Local Institutions 
 
 
 local government is the smallest.  The non-significant difference between NGO and INGO 
evaluations is surprising given the preponderant influence that NGOs have in Tecoluca, versus 
their relative absence in Jiboa Valley.  This association between the relative weight of NGOs in 
duration and density of their presence with the subjective assessment of their performance 
suggests that criticism of NGOs may be increasing over time. The smaller gap between NGO and 
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local government performance in Tecoluca may also represent the improvement in municipal 
services.   
In all three cases, government services (health, education, infrastructure, FISDL, and 
agricultural extension) are rated the lowest, although in San Ildefonso there is little difference 
between perceived performance of local government and national government.  Nine out of ten 
report that the projects of NGOs benefit the poor or everyone, while on one in five say the same 
for government services.  Figure 9.3 also tells us that many local needs are not being met, but 
within the range of local service providers, NGOs are viewed most positively.942   
 Figure 9.4 compares another indicator of confidence in institutions.  Respondents were 
asked to rate the level of confidence they held for each institution (none, little, some much).  
Here again NGOs rate near the top (3.1 compared to a maximum of 4).  Only the Catholic 
Church is worthy of greater trust – a reminder of the tremendous and unrivaled influence that this 
institution enjoys among the Salvadoran population.  Most state institutions and political parties 
rank near the bottom, marking a severe depletion of democratic support as the expectations 
associated with the post-war period become aligned with a disappearing reality.943  Local 
government is viewed favorably by comparison.   
 
                                                 
942 An UCA survey in July 1997 reported that nearly two in three feel that their interests are not begin represented by 
their local municipal government, although 50% said that they had benefited from projects implemented by their 
local government, reported in Proceso, 775, Sept. 24, 1997. 
943 Latinobarometer and USAID surveys have shown the steady decline in confidence for political institutions in 
most of Latin America since the “third wave” of democracy peaked in the mid-1990s.  Seligson and Córdova (1999) 
have shown that one troubling effect in El Salvador is the surprisingly high approval for a coup d’etat. 
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Figure 9.4  Institutional Trust 
  
 
 
3.  Local Coordination Spaces 
 
 
 
While the evidence on institutional evaluation underscores general disapproval of government 
institutions, not all local development actors are viewed similarly.  From the institutional maps, 
we know that NGOs have concentrated in ex-combatant re-integration areas such as Tecoluca, 
although this phenomenon presents costs as well as benefits.  Over saturation in coverage by 
NGOs and poor coordination with municipal governments has contributed to competition for 
beneficiaries and the poor execution of projects.  Other areas are completely neglected feeding 
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the perception of unequal distribution of local resources.  Where organizational density would 
appear to offer an advantage to the lack of state services (Tecoluca), the performance of local 
institutions is somewhat uneven.  Local government performance is ranked highest, but the 
views are more critical toward NGOs – particularly those that have worked in the communities 
the longest.  More NGOs don’t necessarily translate into better performance and greater civic 
engagement.  Conversely, where NGOs are the most scare, the performance is assessed more 
positively.  In areas with few NGOs, the novel presence of a single new project can invite 
disproportionately more activity among local counterparts.944  The coordination problems and 
competition between local institutions may prevent the conversion of this social capital into the 
expected empowerment achievements.  Each municipal case has attempted to address internal 
coordination differently and these mechanisms are assessed in the next section. 
 Early in the post-war period, various initiatives attempted to better coordinate the design, 
planning, implementation and control of the local reconstruction and development process.  
What are now referred to generally as Local Development Committees were inaugurated in three 
municipalities governed by the FMLN in 1994 (Nejapa, Cinquera and Tecoluca).  However, the 
starting points for these processes can be traced to opposition NGO demands for greater voice in 
local decision making under ARENA mayors as early as 1992.  
 One study that compares the Local Development Committee experience since 1994, 
Rodríguez has identified some 85 distinct initiatives Rodriguez (2005: 60).   Over half are 
located in FMLN municipalities, although 33 are found in ARENA or PCN municipalities as 
well.  For the most part, these efforts to coordinate local development actors and explore 
participatory budgeting at the municipal level depended upon the support of an NGO.  Only 60% 
of the initial CDL efforts continue to actually function with any regularity, with a considerable 
number stalled when a mayor from a different party is elected.  In only 20% of the CDL cases 
where the municipal government has changed hands to a new party, have the CDL mechanisms 
continued to function.  Even within FMLN municipal governments where internal divisions have 
generated renovador and ortodoxo candidates, the local coordination mechanism has faltered.945   
                                                 
944 For example, the strong response to Habitat for Humanity in the Jiboa Valley and Project Concern International 
in San Ildefonso is not consistent with either organization’s interest in addressing the structural problems in the 
respective municipalities. 
945 Rodriguez (2005: 104) points to the examples of Soyapango, Apopa, San Marcos and Jiquilisco. 
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A large percentage of Salvadoran municipalities are too small and vulnerable to actually 
be viable administrative entities.  Microregions of contiguous municipalities have been promoted 
to reduce the unsustainable costs of an obsolete political administrative structure.  Microregions 
are defined as “the process of free association of neighboring, connected municipalities in the 
function areas of access routes, environment, economic patrimony, cultural traits, and the 
presence of social processes through which citizens and local governments express their will to 
associate in order to promote common projects and initiate a mancomunal (shared) development” 
(RDL 2003: 192).  El Salvador now counts 53 efforts to establish micro-regions affecting over 
40% of the municipalities, with some belonging to as many as three different ones 
(MOP/IBERINSA 2002; RDL 2003, chapter 6).  The depth and scope of these initiatives varies 
considerably, but most have focused on more efficient service provision, zoning and territorial 
planning, environmental risk management, and economic development.  The proliferation of 
municipal association is often responsive to donor funding and has deepened the debate over the 
most appropriate revision to the current political administrative system.  
 Unlike the Tecoluca (CDM) or the Jiboa Valley Micro-region, no municipal or regional 
coordination initiative took root in San Ildefonso.  Comparison of municipal coordination or 
planning efforts will be limited to the first two cases and focus on the diversity of participants, 
the scope of discussion, the strategies considered and the likely sustainability of the process.   
 
a.  Tecoluca: The Municipal Development Council (CDM)946   
 
Early in the post-war period, improved coordination was identified as one of the keys to reaching 
the municipality’s development potential.  Many NGOs, INGOs and gremios were present in 
Tecoluca, and the duplication of effort was criticized.  According to a municipal document, “One 
of the principal problems that confronts the Municipal Council to promote local development is 
the lack of a strategy to take advantage of the potential, as with the weak articulation between 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that operate in the municipality” (Tecoluca 
(1997b: 4).  The CDM emerged as a way of better coordinating local action and improving 
                                                 
946 This section is based on participant observation of five CDM meetings from March 1998 to April 1999, 
interviews with the principal NGO facilitators (FUNDE, GTZ-Promude, SHARE Foundation), as well as meeting 
minutes, action plans and funding proposals. 
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planning.  It was also viewed as a transparency mechanism, in the words of one municipal 
official, ‘to respond to people’s right to know what is going on.’ 
  With the support of an NGO, FUNDE, the CDM process began in 1995.  CDM goals 
included improved coordination by those institutions already in Tecoluca and filling the gaps 
where coverage was lacking.  Early meetings were attended by a relatively wide range of actors 
in Tecoluca, including centrist INGOs, various ministerial representatives, DIDECO promoters, 
and ISDEM.  In addition to as many as ten local NGOs, early planning meetings also counted on 
INGO and gremio representatives.  Attendance initially was both extensive and politically 
diverse – a rare accomplishment. 
However, over a period of three years the CDM did little more than convene meetings, 
facilitate exchange of information about ongoing work in the municipality and attempt to 
formalize a complex organizational structure.  The process bogged down in its complexity and 
participation declined.  The proposed structure rested on a general assembly, in which every 
sector, governmental and non-governmental alike, would have representation.  Prior to 1997, 
participation was limited to institutional representatives, perhaps the principal reason why the 
process delivered so few concrete results.  To incorporate more direct citizen participation, 
sectoral assemblies (production, infrastructure, organization, health and education, and women) 
were convened for the first time in 1998 to coordinate ongoing projects and an Executive 
Committee (expected to meet monthly) was elected in June of that year to supervise the entire 
process.947 
A conflict emerged with the involvement of GTZ-Promude, another INGO that was also 
providing technical assistance to Tecoluca, among other San Vicente municipal governments, to 
improve local planning, citizen participation and accountability.  GTZ and FUNDE disputed the 
optimal objectives and structure of the CDM.  GTZ pushed for a simpler and more practical 
focus on improving the responsiveness of city council directly to geographic districts, and 
resisted the establishment of sectoral assemblies of the CDM process as excessively cumbersome 
and an unproductive use of time.  FUNDE and other proponents of the sectoral structure 
responded that coordination limited to geographic space would artificially narrow the discussion 
to the fixed menu of social infrastructure to which most town meetings have been reduced, and 
                                                 
947 Technical working groups (representatives of specialized institutions) would also be convened as needed. 
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provide no incentive for NGOs to coordinate their work with other institutions.  The situation 
was complicated further by the challenge of reconciling the complex and expansive 
organizational structure that CORDES was promoting in the south with the comparable absence 
of institutional protagonism in other sectors, such as the cluster of communities located on the 
volcano. 
 While the theoretical debate over the most effective and appropriate coordinating space 
proceeded, institutions were free to pursue their preferred model within Tecoluca.  In part due to 
the competition for naming and controlling zones of conflict during the war, competition 
between GTZ, FUNDE, CORDES, the municipal government and other local initiatives 
contributed to the confusion  about the appropriate territorial zoning terminology in the post-war 
period.  The term microregion has been used to describe multiple municipalities as well as 
subsections of a single municipality.  Excessive organization, overlapping jurisdictions, too 
many meetings, and insufficient follow through, left the communities exhausted and reluctant to 
participate.948  Tecoluca’s over attention to the design of participatory mechanisms contributed 
to excessive and duplicative organizational structures with inadequate capacity of assemblies to 
execute.  
 Still, this competition did not degenerate into conflict or derail the process.  Despite a 
shift in political leadership from a renovador to an ortodoxo mayor in 2000, several factors have 
facilitated the continuity of Tecoluca’s CDM process and set it apart from other coordination 
spaces.  Tecoluca’s municipal coordination efforts have undoubtedly improved local governance 
and strengthened the capacity of the municipal council.  Evidence of this is the retention of 
support for the process itself as well as funding for the concrete and ambitious projections for 
local development that have been consulted widely and are in sync with municipal town 
meetings.  Projects that emerged in the CDM process include an pre-investment fund for 
investment feasibility studies, a restaurant and hotel services training program, an ecological 
park, and the placement of the regional branch office of the state justice ministry.  This capacity 
to coordinate efficiently has also been a factor in the effective lifesaving and reconstruction 
response to natural disasters that has also been widely recognized.  The movement to demand 
                                                 
948 UNDP (2003) cites the National Development Commission and other regarding the lack of coordination or 
rationalization about territorial planning.   
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flood prevention infrastructure in the Lower Lempa region and collaboration with the IDB can be 
traced to the CDM. 
 Participation in the CDM has fluctuated, but has nevertheless included community 
leaders, INGO and NGO directors, and government representatives at the local level.   The 
debates are vibrant and clearly demonstrate a capacity and confidence to criticize and receive 
criticism about perceived institutional deficiencies.  For example, CORDES and SES were 
challenged by communities in the north to account for why resources appeared to be 
concentrated in the south.  In turn, these NGOs and others were forced to explain and justify 
their projected work in the municipality, but challenged other institutions to reciprocate as well.  
Whether the responses were satisfactory or not, the CDM permitted unprecedented 
accountability and transparency that grounded perceptions of institutional performance and 
substantiated planning processes.  No local authority was considered “endiosado.”  The CDM in 
Tecoluca represents one of the few local coordination mechanisms where women have held 50% 
of the governing board positions and despite fluctuating participation it continues to exist a 
decade after it began (Rodriguez 2005: 99).   
 Despite a constructive climate where peasant leaders openly criticized endless analysis 
and insistence on results by NGO representatives, the coordination debate did not get lost, in the 
words of one participant, “in looking to place blame on local institutional weaknesses by 
forgetting to make demands of those who have a greater duty for local development.  There are 
problems that NGOs can’t solve and the utopia of a better future is one without NGOs because 
sufficient capacity for self-governance has been achieved.” 949  The CDM was not expected by 
participants to meet the basic needs of the municipal population, but to better manage the 
additional power won through decentralization to force the state to meet its obligations.   
 As a result, discussion centered on the correct balance in the allocation of energy and 
resources between local analysis, initiatives or fundraising and political advocacy.  Poverty and 
unemployment were clearly defined as the municipality’s core challenges and structural as well 
as the local obstacles were identified as targets for community action.  This assignment of 
economic development responsibilities to local government is rare, given the narrow counter-
insurgent expectations still dominant for most mayors.  However, the CDM process reinforced 
                                                 
949 Intervention by Emilio Espín, regional director CORDES, CDM Meeting, March 1998, Tecoluca. 
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the view that full responsibility for local economic development was not placed exclusively with 
local actors, but reserved a significant amount of attention to demanding that the state fulfill its 
responsibility to rural communities.    
 Finally, the proposed action strategies ranged from conventional actions (fundraising, 
lobbying, capacity building, strategic alliances, consultation) to contentious advocacy 
(mobilization strategies to oppose contamination of organic crops by air fumigation of cotton and 
sugar, protest marches to publicize demands for infrastructure and road repair equipment, 
advocacy capacity building investments).  Local community and NGO representatives argued 
that confrontational actions were both necessary and legitimate to ensure that Tecoluca’s needs 
are heard.  INGO representatives typically voiced caution about the risk of alienating potential 
allies (or donors).   Despite these tensions and unresolved challenges to local coordination, even 
critical observers of the CDM process praise it as one of the most advanced municipal 
consultative processes in Central America.950 
 
 
b.  Microregion Jiboa Valley 951   
 
The Jiboa Valley microregion was one of the first efforts to resolve the non-viability of local 
municipal governance in small towns (UNDP 2003: 211, Map 7.3).  The process is complex 
from both a technical and political standpoint and reflects the profound obstacles to decentralized 
decision making that exist in settings of high inequality.  Conceptually, the microregion would 
preserve the autonomy of each of the four municipal governments, but establish agreements to 
coordinate in the areas where individual municipal administration was clearly ineffective.  Jiboa 
Valley municipalities came together at the urging of GTZ, motivated by the potential benefits of 
coordination in terms of job creation in tourism, horticulture, infrastructure, and communal 
organization as well as savings from cost sharing in the more efficient provision of services 
(water, sanitation, solid waste).  Job creation rested largely upon the diversification of agriculture 
                                                 
950 Interview, Dr. Oscar Mena, GTZ Local Development Director, Dec. 1998 
951 This section is based on participant observation in five Microregion Meetings between May 1998 and April 1999, 
plus interviews with mayors, NGOs and GTZ-Promude staff.  Little relevant documentation was available.   
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to alternative industries such as cut flowers, craft production and promotion of the region’s 
tourism potential.  The top attraction is the infiernillo (“hot springs”) perched high up on the 
volcano and offering spectacular views of the valley and surrounding landscape.  In both cases, 
the goal definition was heavily influenced by the visible success of Alfredo Cristiani, whose 
frequent commute by helicopter to his own chalet was a constant reminder (or illusion) that 
economic development was within reach. 
 Beginning in 1997, the micro-region planning process was led by GTZ-Promude, and 
included participants from the municipal councils of each of the four municipalities, various 
members of the Fundacion Guadalupe, ISDEM and FISDL.  The micro-region diagnosis process 
identified unemployment and lack of basic services as the principal problems.   As in the CDM 
of Tecoluca, early participation was limited to institutional representatives, excluding ADESCO 
leaders, other NGOs or gremios.  The debate about how to consult with the communities on a 
shared development plan, as in Tecoluca, raised many questions about the appropriate 
organizational structure.  FundaGuadalupe and GTZ-Promude favored a mechanism that 
represented the microregion with a cross-section of ADESCO leaders, council members and 
other institutional representatives.   Most mayors and council representatives expressed anxiety 
about additional responsibilities or accountability beyond their respective cabildo abiertos.   
Among the representatives of the municipal governments, community participation was 
treated as an imposed cost on the flexibility of decision making rather than a legitimating 
mechanism or even a source of higher quality decisions.  At one point in this debate a San 
Cayetano councilperson cited the municipal code to argue that cabildos only require designated 
community leaders to be convened four times per year, not the entire community.  Consequently, 
the micro-region should not hold them to a higher standard.  Another mayor added that even 
these standards are interpreted by most mayors as an imposition that is taken seriously only 
because the Comptroller General can withhold transfers unless the requirement is fulfilled.  
“What would happen,” asked one mayor, “if we convened the people and they decided that they 
didn’t agree with the priorities of the microregion?”  The discussion hastily backed away from 
this precipice.  Not surprisingly, INGO and NGO expectations that mayors would recruit local 
leaders to participate in microregion planning meetings were unmet.   
 FundaGuadalupe was the principal NGO and a driving force in the coordination process, 
conveying strategic information about funding opportunities as well as extensive contacts and 
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leverage with potential institutional allies for the microregion.  However, the Foundation’s 
perception of local needs as “small, simple and requiring little effort to fulfill,” forced them to 
moderate their ambitious vision for the transformation of the Jiboa Valley.952  This paternalist 
view of local political culture, accurate or not, further restricted participation in the planning 
process.  
 In the few instances that communities were informed about microregion planning efforts, 
little demand for increased participation was forthcoming.  Throughout the Jiboa Valley, there 
persists a perception among many that organizing is a necessary evil that is likely to bring as 
many problems as benefits.   
This local reputation for individualism became notorious following the 1995 crash of a 
Guatemalan AVIATECA airliner into the volcano after it drifted off-course attempting to land 
during an evening storm killing all aboard.  The crash site was located near the cantón of San 
Emigdio, just a short distance to the west of Alfredo Cristiani’s home.  Authorities were delayed 
in arriving to the crash site until the following morning, but by then the remains of the crash had 
been thoroughly looted by the surrounding communities.  The plane’s flight recorder box, among 
other valuables scavenged among the wreckage, had been stolen and held for a ransom from the 
airline company.953  In addition to the persistent poverty that led to the desperate pillaging of a 
crash site, this incident also underscored the predatory individualism that prevails in the absence 
of any authentic social organization.  
 The reluctance to open the decision making space to a broader cross-section of the Jiboa 
Valley residents, despite the insistence of the GTZ facilitator, replicated the top-down 
preferences of Jiboa Valley leaders.  No representatives of producer organizations, community 
gremios, or women from the communities were active participants in the micro-region design 
process.  Commitments by mayors to integrate the microregion planning process into cabildo 
abierto meetings were routinely ignored. 
                                                 
952 Interview, FundaGuadalupe official, 1998. 
953 AVIATECA (now TACA and one of the principal representatives of the modernizing faction within ARENA) 
desperately searched for the black box to reinforce its legal protection from insurance claims for indemnification of 
the victim’s families by attributing the crash to pilot error.  Based on local accounts, after some confusion the black 
box was purchased from a local farmer although the company has never publicly acknowledged finding it.    
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 Past competition between the four municipal governments was another obstacle to 
microregion coordination.   Recent efforts to coordinate local service provision have resulted in 
deepening divisions and distrust among Jiboa Valley communities, rather than bringing them 
closer together.  One example involves water, perhaps the single most serious unmet basic need 
in the Jiboa Valley.  The lack of water on the northern slope of the Chinchontepec volcano was 
one of the factors that prevented the FMLN from achieving a sustained presence there.  
Guadalupe’s central plaza once consisted of a large catchment basin for gravity fed water 
captured at higher points on the volcano.  When water stopped flowing, the basin was converted 
to a garden and trees were planted.  During 1999, tremors throughout the Jiboa Valley were 
altering the area water table again and many community wells were going dry.  The 2001 
earthquake would further damage the region’s scarce access to water.  
 In 1996, GTZ decided to fund a potable water system initiative that had begun with 
CONARA/SRN funding several years earlier.  A well was sunk in San Emigdio near the border 
with Verapáz and in the first stage of service treated water would be pumped to four 
communities in Guadalupe and the adjacent community of San Pedro Aguas Calientes in 
Verapáz.  A process of local planning between communities in both municipalities that GTZ 
described as innovative and participatory invited prospective beneficiaries to democratically set 
the price for water and prepare for the self-administration of the system.954   
 A series of technical errors in the project design and political errors in how the project 
was promoted eventually inflated the cost of water access, the water service itself, and quickly 
accumulated a significant debt.  The well was located near an active garbage dump requiring 
greater than anticipated treatment costs.   Newly privatized electricity prices increased 
significantly in 1998, also inducing unanticipated additional costs.  One member of the water 
committee from Aguas Calientes complained that proposed water tariffs for a home connection 
were as high as $55 per month – over a third of reported household income.955   Rather than 
aggressively explore avenues for subsidizing energy costs or a sliding scale for water fees to 
achieve the expected coverage, the Guadalupe municipal government decided to take over the 
                                                 
954 GTZ-Promude (1998).  The water administration committee was to include three representatives from the 
municipal government of Guadalupe and six community representatives.   
955 Water fees for a gravity system in the Bajo Lempa, Tecoluca were between $3 and $8 per month, and for a pump 
system proposed in San Ildefonso, between $17 and $20. 
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project and reversed course by excluding San Pedro Aguas Calientes as well as any future 
expansion to communities in Verapáz.956  GTZ was forced to intervene to recover materials for 
the water system stored in Aguas Calientes that the community was defending to demand the 
access to water that Guadalupe’s mayor had promised.  The $250,000 water project effectively 
drove a wedge between communities in Guadalupe and Verapáz.  
 The two ARENA mayors (Guadalupe and San Cayetano Istepeque) frequently ignored 
the collective agreement to joint micro-region goals when certain decisions did not coincide with 
the municipalities’ immediate interest.  Perhaps the most divisive illustration of this dual agenda 
involved road construction.  For several years the micro-region had lobbied the central 
government strenuously to allocate funding for paving the principal access, extending as well 
through neighboring communities as an alternative scenic highway linking to San Salvador.   
Four letters were introduced into the legislative assembly and another to the President between 
1996 and 1998 requesting the $8 million road project, which contemplated improved access, 
environmental and development investments.  These efforts did not succeed.  GTZ proposals to 
publish the most recent letter or a press release in the newspaper and more aggressive lobbying 
of departmental legislators were rejected due to perceived risk of causing political problems with 
the ARENA controlled Assembly president.957 
 Having failed to acquire the funding for this collective project, just prior to the 1999 
elections, the mayors of Guadalupe and San Cayetano pursued individual road paving projects 
with local funds.  Both paved a short segment of the road that entered each municipality.  
Guadalupe’s mayor held a public meeting to announce his project with local transport business 
representatives and invite private sector contributions toward the $20,000 resurfacing project.958  
Max Menjivar, owner of one local transport company, and UNEX, the coffee processing 
company owned by Cristiani, each pledged the suggested minimum - $25.   
                                                 
956 Interviews with Alicia Campos, San Pedro Aguas Calientes and Juan Cerritos, Mayor, Guadalupe painted 
different sides to the story.  Campos claims that Cerritos and GTZ mislead their community by offering to include 
them if the project could access a supply of water pipe stored there from a previous uncompleted water project.  She 
argues that proposed fees were initially much lower and an additional quota of $2,300 was requested when the 
project experienced cost overruns.  When Aguas Calientes refused the higher fees, water service was suspended.  
Cerritos denies that promises were made or that the costs were excessive. 
957 Microregion meeting, June 20, 1998.   
958 Based on estimates provided at the July 6, 1998 meeting with local transport companies in Guadalupe.  Some 50 
local businesses were asked to finance the project’s fuel costs, which amounted to $2,260 or 2,201 gallons of diesel.   
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Perhaps the most pressing and practical need of all four municipalities was dealing with 
solid waste.  Not one of the four mayors had the funds or tax base to finance universal solid 
waste removal and disposal.  A clear advantage offered by microregion coordination was the 
designation of a single depository shared by all four towns.  One modest achievement of the 
microregion coordination process was the agreement that 5% of FODES transfers would be used 
for a feasibility study for the solid waste problem.  However, the design and implementation of 
the project has encountered repeated delays.   
Land speculation proved to be a veto factor in any real progress on the location of 
microregion landfill.  None of the four municipalities could manage to identify and purchase a 
property.  Whenever a landowner was approached to negotiate the property, the price 
escalated.959  So too with the property on which the infiernillo is located, which is owned by 
Rosaelia Iglesias – a member of one of the few families that have long dominated coffee 
production on the volcano.  A proposal by GTZ and FMLN deputy, Marta Valladares, advised 
the Guadalupe municipal government to exercise a constitutional right to issue a local decree 
declaring the land an ecological reserve eligible for expropriation.  San Cayetano mayor Arcenio 
Hernandez explained why the proposal was effectively rejected, “Unfortunately, although the 
measure may be applicable, we do not want to meddle in polemics.” 960  Mayors found 
themselves unable or unwilling to exercise eminent domain.  By 2005, the shared landfill or hot 
springs tourist center for the microregion Jiboa had yet to be built.   
The Microregion meetings were very little about process issues, and almost exclusively 
about projects.  There was no open discussion, much less, critique of the structural obstacles to 
proposed development visions for the region, be they intransigent local landowners refusing to 
sell land for public works or the inequality and political influence that restrained strategies that 
pressured the government.  Criticism was offered in private, but public discussion masked the 
underlying distrust.  Guarded distrust of others’ motives was instrumental in preventing more 
substantive coordinated action  
                                                 
959 One prospect in the canton of San Jose Carbonera, Guadalupe asked for $2,400 for 0.7 hectare of relatively low 
quality land.   MR mtg, June 20,1998 
960 Microregion meeting, July 18, 1998, Verapáz. 
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 Despite the leadership of a visionary NGO and stronger ties than Tecoluca to state 
institutions, effective coordination failed on almost every project that mattered to more than one 
municipality in the Jiboa Valley.  After a frustrating three years of relatively fruitless discussion 
and evasive political maneuvering, FundaGuadalupe withdrew from the process.  Efforts to 
secure minimal commitments on micro-regional cooperation were undermined by free rider 
strategies and party loyalties that blocked any visible progress.  Few beyond the local elites that 
were invited to participate in the design of the micro-region knew or had realized any benefit 
from it.  While the concrete benefits were likely to be years off, there was no indication that any 
were in the pipeline.  In the end, the prior consensus of individualism prevailed as action plans 
were ignored and planning meetings retraced  
 The CDM process in Tecoluca and Microregion process in the Jiboa Valley each point to 
the formidable challenges of inter-institutional coordination.  However, the differences between 
these processes could not underscore more clearly the competing empowerment strategies at 
play.   
 The range of participants in the Tecoluca’s CDM process, both horizontally and 
vertically, was much more diverse than in the Jiboa Valley microregion.  Both processes started 
with institutional representatives, but after several years, Tecoluca’s process opened up to direct 
community level participation.  Jiboa Valley, by contrast, has resisted expanding participation in 
the central decision making activities and has consequently weakened potential linkages with 
communities or allied institutions.961 
 In Tecoluca, many more NGOs were present and part of the problem of poor 
coordination.  A significant number of NGOs were therefore more responsive to calls for greater 
local coordination and have participated consistently in the CDM.  At the same time, NGO 
influence has been increasingly balanced by sectoral committees of community representatives.  
In the Jiboa Valley, few NGOs were available at the outset, and even fewer were invited to 
engage the process (FUSAI, FundaGuadalupe, SACDEL), eventually pulled back after achieving 
little.   
 In Tecoluca, a wider cross-section of INGOs participated actively in the CDM process, 
often serving as the voice of caution in reaction to aggressive advocacy proposals from local 
                                                 
961 Jiboa Valley mayors did collect signatures for legislative lobbying in favor the paving of the main access road, 
although petition signing is considered one of the least empowering political actions. 
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actors.  In contrast, GTZ-Promude was the only INGO in the Jiboa Valley microregion, but 
served as the catalyst for nearly all of the organizing cues to expand participation and constantly 
had to push for greater advocacy and leadership by the participant mayors.   The only other 
prominent NGO in the Jiboa Valley (Habitat) did not coordinate its efforts with the microregion.  
To some extent in both cases, but more so in the Jiboa Valley, the sustainability of the 
coordination processes was dependent upon INGO support. 
 Both coordination processes served to place an unprecedented amount of local 
development information into the public domain.  However, the starting points were very 
different.  In Tecoluca, participating institutions came prepared to be held accountable for their 
work and the process itself was documented with meeting minutes and operational plans that 
were consulted to varying extents.  Among the Jiboa Valley participants, information was shared 
between mayors but often not transferred to any broader constituency for greater accountability.  
Thus, options for deepened compromise foundered without any external citizen oversight to 
validate crucial decisions.  The anonymity of coordination failure was ensured by the lack of 
meeting records.   
 Both municipal cases faced a similar set of challenges posed by government policies that 
were generally inhospitable to small producers and rural businesses.  Yet, the menu of advocacy 
strategies that each considered and chose steered in two different directions.  In Tecoluca, 
conflict was understood as a normal characteristic in the web of alliances and adversarial 
relations that the municipality negotiated to meet defined goals.  Confrontational tactics were 
clearly viewed as legitimate and complementary to the full panoply of conventional advocacy 
strategies.  The menu of advocacy tactics was considerably shorter in the Jiboa Valley.  
Repeatedly, INGO proposals to push harder for government or private sector compliance with 
cautiously stated requests were blocked easily by ARENA mayors.  Conflict with party elites 
beholden to local landowners was avoided, and consequently the requests for support were not 
taken seriously.   
 These opposing views on the role of conflict in advocacy may simply be artifacts of the 
current correlation of political force.  Would FMLN mayors and NGOs engage an FMLN 
executive in the same way?  To the extent that citizens themselves are in control of the 
accountability mechanisms, as most indications seem to suggest in Tecoluca, not even an FMLN 
president would likely enjoy immunity. 
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D.  PARTICIPATION, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LOCAL 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
 
1.  Local Resource Mobilization Comparison 
 
There is little reliable and comparable information about local development finance.  The relative 
administrative inexperience of most municipal governments, a culture of non-transparency that 
still prevails in most rural towns and the budget complications associated with recent reforms to 
the state transfer law (FODES) are all implicated in this problem.  In this section, I offer some 
comparisons of the resource mobilization strategies and achievements by each municipal case, 
estimating from the available information.962  One of the single most confusing factors during 
1998 was the dramatic increase in state transfers and the complicated division of this transfer 
between FISDL and ISDEM.  Many municipal governments experienced significant delays in 
receiving 1998 allocations, which therefore were reflected in 1999 financial statements.   
 Table 9.6 compares available data on municipal budgets for the case study municipalities 
for 1998, with some additional data for 2002 to 2004.  The reported municipal budget 
(investment plan) for 1998 includes only local revenue, transfers and other income, but does not 
reflect actual expenditures.  Thus, municipal income line items (Local tax and fees, FODES 
transfer) do not add up to the projected budget.  In Tecoluca alone was I able to obtain budget 
information for more than one year, suggesting somewhat greater reliability of the budget 
figures.  Per capita budget estimates suggest that there is little difference between the three cases.  
 The underestimation of Tecoluca’s population (use of 1992 census figure) lowered its 
proportionate share of FODES transfers by comparison the other cases.  Tecoluca received $18 
per capita in 1998, compared $31.5 per capita in the Jiboa Valley.   Tax collection, on the other 
                                                 
962 A specific request to COMURES in 2000 for the most recent municipal budget and expenditure data for the 17 
participating municipalities produced information for just five.  Recent evaluations of decentralization reforms have 
confirmed that the lack of any single reliable database for municipal finance.  Here I rely on partial data provided by 
mayors in cabildo abiertos, municipal publications funded by GTZ-Promude, FISDL, ISDEM, DevTech Systems, 
Local Development Network database on municipal statistics, and interviews.   Problems associated with the uneven 
reliance on standard budgeting rules reveals many inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the data collected from different 
sources and best estimates were used when conflicting figures were given. 
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hand, is four times higher in Tecoluca than the other cases, and FISDL projects approved during 
1998 were slightly higher.  Non Financial Public Sector investment (health, education, public 
infrastructure, agriculture, energy, etc.) is estimated by calculating a slightly lower than 
population share of department level flows (based on the assumption that the city of San Vicente 
receives the highest share proportionate to its population).  Tecoluca received $52 per capita in 
public investment compared to $35 in the Jiboa Valley and $44 per capita in San Ildefonso.963  If 
there is no overlap between NFPS funds and municipal budget funds, total public investment of 
the three case study municipalities totals between $84 and $101 per capita – providing some 
indication of the minimal state commitments to rural development. 
 INGO cooperation and remittances act as a de facto social safety net where public 
investment is deficient.  Estimates based on FISDL data from 2002 suggest that San Ildefonso is 
the most dependent on remittance flows, $68 per capita, over two and half times the per capita 
amount received by families in Tecoluca.  The concentration of INGOs and NGOs in Tecoluca 
channel an estimated $1.5 million into the municipality.  This amount far exceeds all other 
municipalities and surpasses the municipal budget.  The total budget for CORDES San Vicente 
alone was $750,000 in 1998 (not including the spike in assistance in response to Hurricane 
Mitch).  Comparatively, San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley receive much less in INGO funding.  
The annual budgets for FundaGuadalupe or Habitat for Humanity and the combined annual 
resources that PCI, ASDI, ITAMA, FUSAI, and CNC invested in San Ildefonso do not exceed 
$100,000.   If both sources of external non-governmental cooperation are combined, they equal 
$85 per capita in Tecoluca, $77 in San Ildefonso and $50 in the Jiboa Valley, and represent 
between 60 and 85% of total public investment.  
                                                 
963 Between NFPS date may include some overlap with FODES & FIS data. 
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Table 9.6  Comparison of Case Study Municipal Resource Mobilization Achievements 
 
 Tecoluca San Ildefonso Jiboa Valley 
Pop. 1998 26,000 11,000 23,000 
Pop. 2002 31,000 12,900 24,700 
       
1998 
Amt US$ 
$Per 
cap 
% 
Tot Amt US$ 
$Per 
cap 
% 
Tot 
Amt US$ $Per 
cap 
% 
Tot 
Budget 1,278,727 49 26 528,121 48 28 1,132,452 49 36.5 
   Local tax & fees 223,087 8.6  15,800 1.4  44,973 2.0  
   FODES transfer 468,070 18 10 290,232 26.3 15.5 727,607 31.5 23.5 
FIS Total 265,410 10  42,263 3.8  148,957 6.5  
    FIS Projects 241,475   41,177   141,561   
    FIS Loc Ctrpart 23,935   1,087   7,396   
Non. Fin. Pub. 
Sect.  Inv. 1998. 1,350,000 52 28 482,000 44 26 797,000 35 26 
Remittances 98 700,000 27 14.5 750,000 68 40 1,000,000 43.5 32.5 
INGO Projects 1,500,000 58 31 100,000 9 5.3 150,000 6.5 5 
Total 1998964  186 100  169 100  134 100 
          
2002-2005 Amt US$ $Per 
cap 
% 
gdp 
Amt US$ $Per 
cap 
% 
gdp 
Amt US$ $Per 
cap 
% 
gdp 
Municipal GDP  $23,000,000 885  $10,000,000 775  $20,00,000 869  
Ave. Budget 1,487,158 48 6.5 n.d.   n.d.   
Local tax & fees 185,809 6.0 0.8 n.d.   n.d.   
    FODES  620,066 20 2.7 347,668 27 3.5 983,427 43 4.9 
Remittances 2002 1,163,782 37.5 5 1,241,368 96 12.4 1,660,329 72 8.3 
NonFinPubSect 
Inv.  93-01 Ave. 850,000 27 3.7 300,000 27.6 3.0 730,000 32 3.6 
Sources: Municipal GDP estimated from UNDP (2003) Departmental GDP estimates; 2002-2005 data from 
RDL (2005).  Tecoluca local tax data is from personal communication with Tecoluca municipal government.  
1998 data is from Promude-GTZ and Dev Tech, provided by Gallagher.  FISDL provided project data 
estimates and department level remittance estimates.  Remittance amounts are estimated from EHPM 
household surveys reported by FISDL (2002).   Municipal level non-financial public sector investment levels 
are estimated from San Vicente department averages, given by UNDP (2003).  INGO Project flows are 
estimated from institutional interviews. 
 
  
With the 1998 FODES increase, most municipalities are now heavily dependent on 
transfers.  Some have criticized the reform for its lack of incentives to raise local revenue.  A 
                                                 
964 Total is the sum of budget, public investment, remittances and INGO projects.  It is assumed that FISDL, FODES 
and local taxes are encompassed in the local budget, and that there is no overlap between these local revenue sources 
and NFPS.   
  622
USAID study measured the tax effort or capacity, defined as the expected level of tax collection 
given a specific municipality’s population, poverty level, urbanization.965  Using reported 
municipal taxes and fees data provided by ISDEM for 229 of the country’s 262 municipalities, 
the study tested various models for estimates of the expected tax collection and compares them 
with actual tax collection.966  In general, Gallagher finds that towns that are larger, with higher 
levels of urbanization, and less poverty tend to collect more taxes.   
 
Table 9.7  Local tax collection improvements 
 
 
 Tecoluca San Ildefonso Jiboa Valley 
1997 Tax per capita $ 1.3 1.6 1.7 
1998 Tax per capita $ 7.8 1.7 2.0 
Tax effort min estimate 335% 63% 56% 
Tax effort max estimate 528% 101% 71% 
Tax effort min rank 2 69 133.25 
Tax effort max rank 5 122 136.5 
    
2002 Tax per capita $  mry 6.0 n.d. n.d. 
Source: Gallagher 2001, data are unadjusted for actual population estimates. 
  
 
The results summarized in Table 9.7 show that Tecoluca, which according to Gallagher, 
collected $223,087 in 1998 taxes and fees, was ranked in the top five performing municipalities 
in the nation, generating over five times the tax yield expected.  This estimate was inflated by 
25% due to undercounting Tecoluca’s actual population.  However, the correction would still 
place Tecoluca in the top tax performer category.  Between 1997 and 1998, reported tax 
collection increased by almost $190,000 (over 500%).  The ratio of FODES transfers to 
                                                 
965 Gallagher (2001)  The reader should know that conflicting estimates of municipal revenue (e.g. the ISDEM data 
used by Gallagher and the GTZ-Promude data for SV municipalities) raise questions about the precision of the 
claims made by any study. 
966 The four models explain between 40 and 70% of the variance in per capita municipal tax and fees collection. 
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municipal revenue in 1998 was 2:1.  Data for 2002-2004 suggest that this level of taxation has 
leveled off, as FODES transfers have increased.  The transfer to municipal revenue ratio for this 
period rose to 3.3:1. 
 This impressive tax performance dispels claims of predatory interests or inexperience 
leveled at FMLN mayors during electoral campaigns.  What it shows, by contrast, is that in 
Tecoluca this fiscal aspect of local governance has improved considerably.  Combined with three 
successive re-elections, each by wide margins, the higher tax burden has not translated into lower 
popularity.  In contrast, fiscal responsibility is one of the expectations that most Tecolucans hold 
for local government  
As Gallagher has argued, a fairly simple property tax would double local tax revenue in 
places like Tecoluca, one municipality considered in the 2000 study.  Even after the exemption 
of most small farms, expected property tax collection would generate at least $210,500 (based on 
acreage), slightly below the actual tax collection.  The minimum tax on the average 2.5 hectare 
farm would be $20.  If the property tax was based on value (a more equitable but 
administratively costly option), revenues in Tecoluca would be considerably higher.967  Clearly, 
the benefits of a property tax to even small and medium municipalities are evident.968   Tecoluca 
is one of a small number of municipalities that has recently achieved an accord with the National 
Registry (CNR) to acquire an updated property registry for the locality as the basis for a future 
property tax assessment (Diario de Hoy Dec. 2, 2005). 
 In terms of tax effort, San Ildefonso collected only $15,800 in taxes in 1998, between 
63% and 101% more than expected given the socio-demographic parameters of the 
municipality.969  This tax effort ranked San Ildefonso near the median for the municipalities 
studied, but no where close to a sustainable revenue source for development.  Small increases in 
tax collection (5%) were noted between 1996-1998, however the ratio of FODES to municipal 
revenue (17:1) underscores the dependence on transfers. 
                                                 
967 DevTech compares land tax collection rates and totals for various Salvadoran municipalities.  For a 1% tax on the 
value of 256,120,000 square meters of land in Tecoluca, the estimated value of tax collection based on value would 
be $87 million.  For San Salvador, the amount collected was estimated at close $1 billion.   
968 Gallagher (2000).   Proposed tax rates range from 0.002 colones per square meter ($0.0002) for rural land to 1.0 
colon per square meter in urban San Salvador ($0.11) 
969 This ranked San Ildefonso between 69 and 122 out of 200 municipalities in the sample.   
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 For the four municipalities that constitute the Jiboa Valley microregion, the total taxes 
collected in 1998 were $45,000, which was between 56% and 71% higher than expected 
according to the Gallagher study.  Of the four municipalities, the coffee producing town of 
Guadalupe was ranked close to the bottom of all municipalities, collecting less than 25% of 
expected revenue.  By comparison with the other case studies, the slightly wealthier Jiboa Valley 
collects much less tax revenue than Tecoluca, and slightly less than San Ildefonso.  The Jiboa 
Valley also receives $727,000 in FODES transfers.  The ratio of transfers to municipal taxes is 
16:1, similar to San Ildefonso.   
 Despite the noted data problems, Gallagher concludes that the main cause of the 
unexplained variance in the tax effort models that were tested can be attributed to differences in 
fiscal effort.970  In other words, state transfers have not only failed to diminish tax collection in 
but have increased it most in Tecoluca.  In short, higher transfers may be associated with lower 
expected tax efforts, but of the three cases this disincentive appears most true for Jiboa Valley 
and San Ildefonso.  When comparing the three fiscal experiences, the likelihood of tax evasion 
(one aspect of political capture) is highest in the counter-insurgent municipalities.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when those asked whether they would be willing to pay more local taxes for 
services to improve, half of all Tecoluca residents responded affirmatively, compared to 41% in 
Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso.971 
 In addition to the lowest relative dependence on state transfers, the sustained flow of 
INGO investments in Tecoluca also contributes to greater diversification of local economic 
development resource base.  FODES transfers represented 10% of total local resources, 
compared to 23.5% in the Jiboa Valley.  INGO transfers, by contrast, represent 31% of total 
resources in Tecoluca, compared to only 5% in the other two cases.  Remittances make up the 
largest single component of local development resources in San Ildefonso (40%) and Jiboa 
Valley (32.5%).  While remittances undoubtedly improve coping strategies for the rural poor, 
research has shown that low percentages of family to family remittances have been invested in 
productive investments (World Bank 2005e).  A small but increasing number of experiences 
                                                 
970 The data problems noted were measurement error, variation in local tax structure, and temporary factors, such as 
climatic events.   
971 Source is the 1998 paracentral regional survey. 
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have attracted collective remittance investments in municipal infrastructure projects.  However, 
the atomized nature of remittance networks and the profound needs of recipient families have 
proven surprisingly durable to concerted efforts to steer this flow of investment toward public 
goods.  
 Tecoluca and San Ildefonso municipal delegations have visited with hometown 
association representatives to explore joint investments, but each faces slightly different 
obstacles to effective capture and channeling of remittances toward the priorities of their 
respective municipal investment plan.  For Tecoluca, the relatively low percentage of families 
that receive remittances reflects two factors that lower the probability of establishing strong 
hometown association (HTA) investment linkages.  The first factor is that many if not most 
families that have settled in Tecoluca were active insurgents, remained in the country to fight, 
and did not send their children or other family members to the U.S.  These families are not as 
likely to migrate now.  The Tecolucans that did migrate tend to be families of former landowners 
or urban property owners that were hostile to the FMLN and are likely to be indifferent or hostile 
to public goods investments now.     
 San Ildefonso counts a much higher percentage of its current labor force in the U.S. (as 
high as 20%), but faces different problems in converting this resource into local development.  
The first challenge is a relatively low level of trust in the municipal government and the absence 
of a coordinated strategic development plan to attract investors.  Poor relations between the 
mayor and large parts of the municipality could make coordination with some hometown 
associations more difficult. 
 The second challenge is simply the inherent sensitivity related to government 
involvement in a highly personal transaction.  One a recent effort by FIDA to recruit Salvadoran 
hometown association leaders to participate as co-financing partners of government local 
development projects, most were uninterested in any collaboration in which the government 
would have any control over their money.972  To date, the formal government program sponsored 
by FISDL to capture remittances reports only one such alliance in the three municipal case 
studies, involving a $60,000 school in the community of El Socorro, Tecoluca that was co-
                                                 
972 Based on observations as a participant on a 2002 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
sponsored delegation of twenty Salvadoran HTA leaders to El Salvador to recruit remittance investors as a local 
counterpart funding for IFAD financed local development projects.   
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financed by the Hometown Association El Piche, in Los Angeles.973   It is highly likely that there 
exist other informal projects, but both research and empirical evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of remittance flows continue to finance consumption.  While the effect is clearly a 
lowering of poverty and the support for local service markets, remittances have also financed 
imports, driven up the exchange rate (before dollarization) and lowered youth commitments to 
local development as an alternative to migration.  In rural communities where the labor force 
pyramid has been carved away by the loss of nearly all working age men, the prospects of rural 
development are diminished.  The rather unimpressive track record demonstrated by other 
programs that have targeted remittances as a potential source for local public investment (IFAD, 
IDB-MIF) suggests the very real limitations for even weaker municipal governments in 
managing a more effective use of remittances as a local development tool.974     
 Are INGO investment flows superior to remittances as a local investment resource.   
INGO investments are likely to be less enduring than remittances for the current beneficiary 
communities.  However, a much higher percentage of INGO funding tends to finance actual 
public investment than remittances.  Moreover, in the case of Tecoluca, as INGO resources 
migrate to other more demanding destinations, they have leveraged alternative resource flows 
could ultimately be more sustainable.  In Tecoluca, the examples of pre-investment funds, 
relatively successful production initiatives that are now eligible for credit, and new grant and 
loan proposals for development – all constitute products of INGO and NGO subsidization of the 
development process.  While both remittances and INGO investments will continue to be 
significant local development resources, the net development benefits tend to favor INGO 
cooperation over remittances. Unless improvements are achieved in capturing remittances for 
public investment and limiting the loss of human and social capital that comes as an expense of 
replacement migration, the local resource diversification seems most promising in Tecoluca 
where it is moving beyond transfers and remittances. 
 
                                                 
973 FISDL Unidos por la Solidaridad, report as of Sep. 22, 2004. 
974 See IDB Multilateral Investment Fund for research on investment and track record of municipal governments in 
channeling these flows.  http://www.iadb.org/fomin. 
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2.  The Cabildo Abierto 
 
 
 
In this section I compare participation in the cabildo abierto - a central municipal budget 
planning process that is common to local governance and a fundamental mechanism of 
transparency and accountability in local development finance in El Salvador.  Participation in 
these periodic convocations of the public to discuss, ratify and control municipal income and 
spending priorities depends to some extent on the active participation of the public.  Participation 
in the cabildo is needed to legitimate local rule.975  However, the function of the cabildo varies 
considerably with respect to historically rooted expectations and performance standards for local 
governance.   
In settings of high inequality, the likelihood of political capture is both a reality and a 
disincentive for the powerless to participate.  Traditionally privileged interests view the cabildo 
both as a means to steer scarce public development resources in their favor as well as to stave off 
any redistributive effort that might challenge the actual basis of their power.   Elites therefore 
have an incentive to participate, if only indirectly through surrogate agents.  The challenge of 
collective action in this decentralized decision making process is to promote the optimal level of 
participation to balance costs with the principal benefit of avoiding political capture by local 
elites. 
Participation in cabildos is similar in each of the three municipal cases – about one in five 
survey respondents reported participating in a cabildo abierto or municipal session within the 
past six months.  People were then asked the extent to which they perceived these meetings to be 
representative of all sectors of the community (much, some, little).  The results in Figure 9.5 
show that just over a third (38%) of the respondents in Tecoluca reported that there was much 
representation in the cabildos, which while low was considerably higher that San Ildefonso 
(23%) or Jiboa Valley (19.2%).  Finally, people were asked whether the municipal government 
responds to community needs always, most of the time, some of the time or none of the time.  In 
Tecoluca, 44% responded that the mayor and council respond always or most of the time, 
compared two 21% in the Jiboa Valley and 11% in San Ildefonso.   
                                                 
975 Both because holding cabildos are a requirement to receive state transfers and because local governments believe, 
albeit to varying degrees, that public input is necessary to improve local governance. 
  628
 
  
 
 p
43.9
21.5
11.4
19.2
2321.3 22.6 22.7
37.6
0
10
20
30
40
50
Tecoluca Jiboa Valley San Idefonso
% say council is responsive % say cabildos are representative
% cabildo participation
 
Figure 9.5  Cabildo Participation, Representation, & Council Responsiveness 
 
 
This survey evidence suggests that participation in town meetings is not necessarily 
reflective of the representativity of those meetings nor the performance of the town council in 
responding to local needs.   The municipal government in Tecoluca is evaluated more favorably 
in both indicators.   
Participant observation of five cabildo abiertos (all but Nuevo Tepetitán), various council 
meetings and cabildo pre-meetings, and interviews with all six mayors, various council members 
and interest group representatives serve as the basis for comparing the quality of cabildo 
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participation in the three municipal case studies.976  The comparison will focus on several 
factors: scope of participation, transparency, and the range of policy issues considered. 
Four of the five observed cabildos were held in June and July of the fiscal year, and 
Tecoluca held a cabildo abierto one month after Hurricane Mitch had flooded a third of its 
territory.  While municipalities are obligated to hold four cabildos annually, few actually meet 
this standard.  The observed cabildos were most likely one of two cabildos in 1998, due to the 
FODES reform and Hurricane Mitch.  However, the observed meetings were only the second 
“new” cabildo type town meeting, which experimented with more participatory methods.  Most 
municipal officials view both the old and new cabildo abiertos as an imposed requirement rather 
than a planning tool that is desired or necessary.  Few mayors view them as more than an 
informational exercise and prefer to limit the scope for citizen participation to the minimum 
acceptable level. 
 
a.  Jiboa Valley   
 
In the Jiboa Valley, four independent cabildos were held in parallel.  The three observed 
cabildo’s in the Jiboa Valley (Verapáz, San Cayetano and Guadalupe) were all convened by 
multiple term mayors.   In the case of Juan Cerritos, the meeting featured the participation of the 
departmental ARENA governor, Blanca Avalos de Angulo, who in addition to making a heavy 
handed political pitch for party’s Presidential candidate, recognized Cerritos’ personal 
achievement as a four term mayor of Guadalupe.   As important to the cabildo itself were any 
preceding meetings to prepare the cabildo.  Each of the three municipalities had participated in a 
local strategic planning process facilitated by the NGO, FUSAI, as part of the CDA capacity 
building program.  However, officials from all three towns complained about FUSAI’s lack of 
follow through on the Action Plans and acknowledged that the NGO had effectively disappeared.  
SACDEL, another civic training NGO, had recently begun working in the region, although their 
                                                 
976 The respective cabildo abiertos that were observed include Guadalupe (June 26, 1998); Verapáz (June 28, 1998); 
San Cayetano Istepeque (July 25, 1998); San Ildefonso (July 26, 1998) and Tecoluca (Dec. 26, 1998).  The temporal 
difference between the Tecoluca cabildo with the others may have been a factor in the range of issues discussed, 
since the investment planning becomes more prominent at the end of a year. 
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presence was too recent to assess.  GTZ-Promude was the principal provider of technical 
assistance to the councils.  Participation in cabildo preparatory meetings were limited to bilateral 
meetings between GTZ-Promude, the mayor and certain council members. These meetings were 
viewed as technical and no apparent consultation or participation of NGOs or gremios was 
invited.   
 Although agreements noted above obligated the mayors to integrate the microregion 
planning process and recruit the participation of local leaders, the microregion and cabildo 
processes were essentially delinked.  Juan Cerritos of Guadalupe was the only mayor to present 
the microregion planning process at all.  However, the description of the collective initiative 
appeared intentionally superficial to embellish the mayor’s own achievements.  Recognizing that 
various members of the town had interest in prior microregion efforts to secure the access road 
paving project, a progress update was pessimistic about chances for approval before 2000.  
Instead, the funding for paving 2.5 kilometers of road connecting Verapáz to Guadalupe was 
announced as the crown jewel of the 1999 Investment Plan, and an optimal short-term alternative 
to the micro-region project.  In San Cayetano (and Verapáz), the microregion was not mentioned, 
but significant attention was devoted to funding allocated to paving 500 meters of main access 
road. 
 The Jiboa Valley cabildos closely followed the new cabildo script, with some slight 
variation.  In Verapáz and San Cayetano, but not Guadalupe, a detailed explanation of the 
FODES transfer increase was provided.  In Guadalupe and Verapáz, but not San Cayetano, 
monthly income and expenses were reported.  In every case, a brief description of projects in 
execution or in the pipeline was provided and space for working groups to prioritize a single 
project for their cantón or community was facilitated by the mayor or council members. The 
routine opened only a modicum of additional space for meaningful community participation.  
Group discussion among community representatives consists of choosing from a pre-determined 
list of social infrastructure projects.   
 The community representatives of San Jose la Carbonera in Guadalupe prioritized a 
walkway crossing a ravine that separated the community from the school.  Children and elderly 
crossing the ravine during the rainy season have drowned and the project had been requested in 
earlier cabildos.  Without doubting the need for this project, one is surprised by the suggestion 
that a walkway is only expectation from the municipal government for a community of 
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extremely poor subsistence farmers that also lacks clean drinking water and electricity.  
Similarly, in the community of La Entrevista of San Cayetano, which had been battling with the 
mayor and Cristiani’s beneficio Acahuapa over environmental concerns, the community 
representative prioritized a $2,000 Community center.  Low expectations or self-censorship 
underscore how unchanged agrarian relations have shaped the local institutions. 
 No concerns were voiced regarding any of the financial information provided or the 
information omitted.   Guadalupe reported one project in execution and an investment plan that 
featured ten projects for a total of $350,000.  While ambitious, the investment plan exceeded the 
1998 budget by 55%, of which 70% was state transfers.  Where monthly income and expenses 
figures were provided, the cumulative deficit over four months in Verapáz was $5,000 and in 
Guadalupe, $9,000.  Yet, no explanation or clarification was requested nor given.   There was no 
discussion of agricultural production issues, long-term development strategies, public policy, or 
the cabildo rules themselves. 
 Municipal officials in all three cabildos expressed some level of frustration with low 
turnout.  Some attributed it to communications difficulties or misunderstandings, but the 
overarching reaction was a paternalist condescension that the poor are unable to seize the few 
opportunities provided to them.  In turn, the councils saw little rationale for offering greater 
incentives.  The mayors’ view of participation ranged from indifference to resentment.  Orlando 
Paredes of Verapáz reflected,  
 
Now people don’t want to participate.  Most of the birth certificates were lost when the municipal offices 
were burned in 1980.  Under a Presidential decree (205) people could recover their birth certificate if they 
presented a baptismal document.  Although two ISDEM representatives were here for two years, people 
did not take the opportunity.  People don’t approach the mayor until they need something desperately, not 
before.  Here, things don’t work. 977 
 
 
b. San Ildefonso  
 
Past cabildo and participatory municipal planning history in San Ildefonso was limited to a single 
notebook summarizing the results of a December 1997 cabildo (the most recent one) and a 1996 
                                                 
977 Interview with Orlando Paredes, Verapáz, July 8, 1998 
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Action Plan, which was a result of participatory planning exercise conducted by FUSAI under 
the previous mayor.  Both indicated a prioritization of road repairs, heath care, water, 
delinquency, organizational deficiencies and lack of credit or technical assistance.  The 1996 
Action Plan consulted widely in the municipality for the first time in the post-war period and 
deposited the responsibility for follow through in the prioritized areas to a Community Support 
Committee.978  Representation on this committee was to include representative of communities, 
NGOs, the municipal government, DIDECO and FUSAI.  
 As promising as this nascent coordination structure seemed in 1996, there remained no 
evidence of its existence by 1998.  The minutes of a December 1997 cabildo constituted a 
summary of projects recently finished, in execution, prioritized and proposed by twelve of the 57 
communities represented.  This list of projects focused entirely on social infrastructure and six 
proposals were for town center improvements.    
 In March, 1998 two council representatives and the sindico resigned to protest the alleged 
misuse of municipal funds by the mayor.  The situation was aggravated by the fact that no one 
had been paid for months.  Costanza’s first year as mayor of San Ildefonso was plagued with 
personal and public scandals.  In one instance, the mayor attempted to build a private house on 
property belonging the local clinic, beginning only several months after her term began.  When 
confronted by critics, the construction was halted.979   
 As with most municipal events organized in San Ildefonso, the ceremonial drama of the 
cabildo abierto rivaled meaningful dialogue as the principal goal.  The July meeting in San 
Ildefonso began three hours late with the national anthem as the mayor, ARENA Congressman 
Amado Aguilúz, stood before 40 participants at the table of honor.980  Costanza saluted rigidly in 
                                                 
978 FUSAI (July 24, 1996) San Ildefonso Municipal Action Plan.  The report indicates the participation of 76 people, 
including representatives from all six cantons, the town center, the Catholic church, four state agencies and two 
NGOs.  The follow-up committee had nine members, including the mayor, two NGOs, the church, two community 
organizations, and three community representatives. 
979 Other instances included a bitter public dispute with an ex-husband who was also local justice of the peace and 
local ARENA official, the impoundment of the town’s single solid water collection vehicle for improper 
registration, and charges of armed assault.  The municipal finances were subject to almost a constant audit by the 
Court of Accounts since 1998, motivated both by poor bookkeeping and political attacks from COENA.  In January 
2001, the municipal offices of San Ildefonso were visited by a delegation of three lawyers and 18 police to conduct a 
surprise inspection of municipal finances and “falsedad ideological” or illegal party identification.  Vertice, Diario 
de Hoy, March 17, 2002. 
980 While most meetings begin late in El Salvador, the three hour delay exceeded all other cabildos. 
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the trademark gesticulation of patriotism.  There seemed to be no fixed agenda.  A sorghum for 
beans seed exchange program administered by CENTA was the first order of business and 
instantly fixed the attention of the mostly male farmer audience to the program registration 
official.981  The municipal secretary then exhorted the participants to renew their identification 
documents, which would be subject to fines otherwise. 
 The mayor then took stock of the community representatives in attendance and scolded 
several communities for not sending representatives.  One councilperson openly referred to the 
FMLN community, Los Almendros, as “cowards” for not attending.  The mayor then appealed 
for urban residents to pay their taxes, citing the soaring municipal electricity costs.  She 
announced the recent legislative approval of the 6% increase in transfers without mentioning the 
municipal allocations or conditions, and suggested that the paving of the main municipal access 
road would soon follow.  The recent Plan de Nación consultation by the National Development 
Commission was ridiculed as a plot to disenfranchise small municipalities (CND 1998).  A list of 
projects recently executed was then read aloud, with notable overlap with projects associated 
with from earlier cabildos.  It was announced that FISDL project funding was delayed without 
explanation and that no plans had been established yet for FISDL funds allocated for 1998.  This 
jumbled and incomplete presentation of the town’s fiscal affairs undoubtedly left participants 
more confused than informed. 
 Each community representative was then invited to share their project proposal.  The 
council members exercised no facilitation as a list of social infrastructure projects were read 
aloud without elaboration or group discussion, except to note prior requests of the same project.  
The list clearly exceeded the municipal budget, but there was no indication of how the stated 
needs would be prioritized.  Twenty communities were represented in the written requests, both 
highland and lowland villages.   
 The discussion then returned to the seed exchange.  Lolo Melendez, councilman and 
CNC representative announced that he would be representing the agricultural needs of the 
municipality in a future meeting to discuss the inauguration of a commodities market.  When 
suggestions were elicited, the reaction from several producers was to criticize the government 
                                                 
981 The 1997 drought caused steep losses to the sorghum harvest in San Ildefonso despite access to hybrid improved 
seeds.  The exchange was intended to bolster local bean supply and lower imports.  San Ildefonso produces very 
little beans. 
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seeds as defective and to express the need for greater technical assistance for area producers.  
The response by the councilmen was to encourage producers to visit the Lempa Acahuapa 
Ministry of Agriculture office themselves to solicit technical assistance.   
 The cabildo ended without summary or closure, simply dissolving into friendly personal 
conversations.  No information in writing was presented nor distributed to the participants.  The 
financial report was clearly incomplete and unorganized, a somewhat daring display of 
incompetence given the alleged corruption swirling around the current mayor.  However, the low 
turnout and absence of most opposition leaders ensured the any criticism would be limited to 
those few in attendance.  The agenda was controlled by the mayor, who spoke for most of the 
time offering almost no space for participation.  Moreover, the vertical distance between the 
honorary participants and the audience was reinforced by every aspect of the event’s design.  
 Despite the spectacle of local governance in San Ildefonso that has done very little to 
diminish the levels of extreme poverty in the town, the mayor has been re-elected three times 
after switching parties to the PCN.   
 
c.  Tecoluca   
 
In Tecoluca, planning meetings prior to the cabildo were more systematic and substantive.  The 
municipal council and allied NGOs held CDM sectoral assemblies in each of the six subsectors.  
The goal of these assemblies was to prepare elected sectoral representatives to facilitate the 
formulation, proposal and negotiation of prioritized projects to be funded by the 1999 budget.  
Collective decisions would be made by participants at the cabildo.   
In meetings in the months leading up to the December cabildo abierto, community and 
NGO leaders were convened in CDM sectoral assemblies and directly by the municipal council 
to discuss how to guide the prioritization of scarce local funds.  Community and organizational 
leaders struggled to transparently weigh their own sector’s needs with their neighbors.  Should 
projects be prioritized to help consolidate the more advanced processes expand and potentially 
employ more people, or provide initial support to the weakest sectors get started?  Should the 
coastal communities recently battered by Hurricane Mitch be privileged even though they have 
historically attracted the lion’s share of local investment?  In one of the pre-meetings, the mayor 
recognized that Santa Cruz Porillo – a town that has historically opposed the FMLN, was the 
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sector least supported in the preceding year and that geographic prioritization should balance this 
deficit.  These and various other questions of equity emerged as community leaders debated the 
appropriate criteria for project prioritization. 
 The disagreement over CDM orientation between GTZ-Promude, the municipal council 
and other NGOs also influenced discussion about the extent of citizen participation that was 
necessary to prepare for the cabildo.  GTZ-Promude advised in favor of setting pragmatic limits 
on the scope of citizen involvement that would narrow the focus of the resource targets to the 6% 
FODES transfers.  The priority for GTZ-Promude was to avoid missing the deadline for 
submitting the 1999 budget, a goal that would be at risk if citizens were given too much 
participatory space to change the rules.  
 In opposition to the advice of the GTZ, it was decided that the discussion would not be 
confined to only carving up the 6% FODES transfer.   The cabildo would also include the 
council’s plans to seek additional funding from the central government and international donors.  
The risky decision to include external fundraising goals was intended to both encourage 
responsible choices in the allocation of guaranteed resources (perhaps to lengthen time horizons), 
but also to encourage participants to think at a larger scale and to motivate participation in future 
advocacy actions to meet these targets.      
 At the Tecoluca cabildo, among the materials that were printed by the council and 
distributed to the 150 participants, was a small list of project prioritization criteria that had been 
formulated over the past month in discussions among institutional and community 
representatives.982  The unranked project selection criteria were:  
 
1.  Sectors and communities that have least benefited to date. 
2.  Projects that benefit more than one community (or largest percentage of the municipal 
population) 
3.  Projects in communities that are disposed to offer their support and that want to be 
involved in the entire process and execution of the project. 
4.  Projects that facilitate the generation of employment and production 
5.  Projects in communities that are organized. 
                                                 
982 The single page pamphlet that summarized the participatory budgeting rules was titled, Participatory and Public 
Prioritization and Planning of Project Funds (Dec.12, 1998).  Other relevant public documents were made available 
by the municipal government, including recent census data, GTZ-Promude promotional material, project registries, 
and various diagnostic materials.   
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6.  Special consideration should be made for coastal communities recently harmed by 
flooding. 
 
 
The handout opened with the following Council Message, “The members of the 
municipal council of Tecoluca represented by Nicolás Antonio García Alfáro, in this way want 
to state to all of the communities of our municipality our gratitude for the confidence that has 
been generated between us and for the immense support that you have offered during the current 
administration.” In contrast to the public scolding that cabildo participants received in San 
Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley, Tecoluca’s municipal government sought to establish a context in 
which citizen participation was fully invited and thus respected.  However, this empowerment 
strategy left considerable bargaining power in the hands of those invited to participate. 
The Tecoluca cabildo involved a description of projects recently completed, in execution, 
and approved in the pipeline (totaling $1.3 million).  The 1998 FODES quota for Tecoluca was 
explained, including the fact that it was allocated on the basis of a population underestimate of 
almost 50%.  The mayor then emphasized to the participants that the administrative capacity of 
the municipal government exceeds the FODES amount and listed other proposed projects that 
were being pursued in addition to small scale infrastructure.  These included feasibility studies 
for an Ecological Park, a composting project, a gender training workshop for public employees, a 
central restaurant, a microenterprise study to accompany a planned regional judicial center, 
daycare centers in three rural villages, a new cattle auction yard, road construction equipment, a 
new central market, and an urban sanitation program.  The final external project was a master 
proposal for an irrigation and flood protection infrastructure in the Lempa valley that would be 
directed to the IDB, JBIC and the World Bank.   
Not only did the focus of these additional projects address non-traditional demands to 
local government, such as employment, environment, gender and organizational issues, but they 
also targeted an unusually diverse field of donors (INGOs, Bilateral and Multilateral 
cooperation). 
After a reprise of the methodology that resulted in the selection criteria, most of the time 
was devoted to prioritizing five projects in each of the seven geographic sectors – all of which 
were represented.  The proposed list was then presented to the plenary.  García exhorted the 
participants to reflect on these inputs, “if we want to work for democracy and participation, we 
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have to take it all the way.  In the working groups, it’s fine to analyze your situation 
independently, but take into account the given criteria.”   
A brief period for questions and answers focused on details of the larger projects being 
pursued, followed by an hour of group discussion by sector facilitated in each group by the 
council representative.  Each sectoral representative then presented a list of priority projects, all 
of which varied between three and six projects that largely consisted of social infrastructure.  If 
the FODES allocation of $435,000 was divided evenly between the seven geographic sectors, 
each would receive about $50,000.  The average project list totaled $82,000.  Sectors Santa Cruz 
Porillo topped the seven sectors with a list of six priority projects for over $120,000, including 
one environmental project.  The Lower Lempa sector proposed the second highest level of 
funding.  The urban sector of San Nicolás, by contrast, requested three projects for $26,000.  The 
ranking of Santa Cruz and the Lower Lempa geographic sectors as the top two favored sectors 
suggests that the prioritization criteria had some influence on the group discussions.  At least two 
of the 24 proposed projects identified non-traditional funding sources.   
The process was far from perfect.  Inadequate information about the state of municipal 
finances was presented.  No clear instructions were given about how to apply the budgeting 
criteria nor how the proposals would ultimately be prioritized by the council.  Although non-
traditional funding sources were announced, participants were not clear about the scope of 
available funding for their needs assessment.  Nevertheless, all but one sectoral proposal 
exceeded their respective FODES quota.   
Still, by most accounts, the Tecoluca cabildo surpassed the other cases by introducing 
structural development issues, attempting participatory budgeting practices and expanding the 
scope of possible development resources for the consideration of citizen oversight.   
Table 9.8 summarizes the key similarities and distinctions between the cabildo abiertos held in 
the three municipal cases.   
 The scope of participation varied considerably.  In Tecoluca alone, considerable attention 
was devoted to mechanisms for participatory budgeting methods prior to the cabildo, which 
produced the highest and most representative turnout.  The representation and turnout was lowest 
in the Jiboa Valley.  San Ildefonso used the enticement of the government seed exchange to 
invite participation and there was moderate representation of the six cantónes and interest 
groups, although nothing remotely approaching the 1996 strategic planning session.   
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 Tecoluca followed a combined Community-Contract collective action strategy of sectoral 
assemblies and collective discussions of equity to appeal to local solidarity traditions and ensure 
the level and quality of participation that is expected of local institutions.   Jiboa Valley mayors 
followed a low level Market collective action strategy providing few incentives to participate but 
resigned to low expectations and uninterested in negotiating to improve representation.  San 
Ildefonso exhibited many features of the Hierarchy collective action strategy that structured the 
event to reinforce the flagging credibility of the mayor and the vertical distance between citizen 
and official.   
 The comparison suggests that despite the new rules, cabildos still tend to be more 
informative and than consultative.  However, even in the area of transparent information 
provision, none of the cabildos performed exceptionally well, with inconsistent methods and  
content in the presentation of administrative and financial information.  None provided printed 
financial material.  Explanations of the FODES reform and its implications for development 
resources were not explained in San Ildefonso and Guadalupe.  Little feedback was elicited to 
validate or question any of the financial summaries.  Of the three cases, the integration of the 
CDM mechanism, despite its deficiencies, was the only instance of concerted effort to strengthen 
the accountability of municipal finances to community representatives.  Although the mayor’s 
complained about their respective administrative non-viability, Jiboa Valley micro-region 
coordination commitments were delinked as solution in the cabildo discussions.  The 
microregion or any other coordination space was generally absent from the cabildo process in the 
other cases.   By 2000, Tecoluca was one of only a handful of municipalities in El Salvador that 
had formed a Comptrollers Committee that prepared and presented an accounting for that year’s 
municipal administration (RDL 2003: 177). 
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Table 9.8  Summary of Cabildo Abierto Collective Action Strategies 
 
 
 Jiboa Valley San Ildefonso Tecoluca 
1.  Scope of 
participation (in 
setting priorities) 
MARKET CA 
STRATEGY 
HIERARCHY CA 
STRATEGY 
COMMUNITY CA 
STRATEGY 
 - Low turnout 
- Low Representation 
- No participatory budget 
rules 
 
- Low turnout 
+ Medium Representation 
-  No participatory budget 
rules 
 
+ High turnout 
+ High representation 
+ Participatory budget 
rules 
 
2.  Transparency & 
Accountability 
LOW-MODERATE  LOW MODERATE-HIGH 
 + Project pipeline 
presented 
+ Quarterly finances (2/3) 
+ FODES partially 
explained 
- No prior documentation 
- Microregion delinked 
from cabildo participation 
- No budget or project 
information presented in 
writing 
- FODES not explained 
- Minimal prior 
documentation 
- No link to prior Local 
Development Committee 
or municipal coordination 
mechanism 
+ Projects pipeline 
presented 
- No Quarterly finance 
information provided 
+ FODES explained 
+ Prior documentation 
available 
+ CDM process integrated 
3.  Range of policy 
issues and investment 
options 
LOCAL 
 
LOCAL LOCAL & 
NATIONAL-
STRUCTURAL 
 + Social Infrastructure 
 
+ Social Infrastructure 
+ Agricultural production 
 
 
+ Social Infrastructure 
+ Agricultural production 
+ Employment 
+ Environment 
+ Gender 
+ Flood reconstruction 
plans  
+ Long term development 
plans  
 
 
 
INGO and NGO funding exists in parallel to the municipal budget in all three municipal 
cases, yet Tecoluca was the only cabildo that attempted to integrate these “off-budget” resources 
into the discussion about the municipal investment plan.  While only a nascent step in a process 
of mutual accountability and coordination that has continued to mature, this decision to expand 
the scope of available development resources is another distinguishing aspect of early 
participatory budgeting.  A far wider range of policy issues was also present in the Tecoluca 
cabildo than in the other cases, applying the development principle that the parochial mold of 
  640
limiting decisions to pre-determined projects and funding limits can be broken.  San Ildefonso 
devoted some time in the cabildo to production issues.  However, when the discussion agenda 
shifted to the participant’s exploration of solutions to the profound challenges facing local 
farmers, the discussion was ended.  In the Jiboa Valley, the mayors hewed close to the script that 
fulfilled the minimal obligations under a top-down conception of decentralization. 
 The most promising instances of NGO-municipal coordination within increasingly 
accountable participatory budgeting processes have emerged in Tecoluca.  The participatory 
budgeting process revealed the character of local governance in Tecoluca.  The process for 
setting spending prioritization criteria was relatively transparent and balanced. This effort to 
integrate local economic development processes was one reason why NGOs staff participated in 
Tecoluca cabildos. However, eloquent and often more easily heard demands of NGOs were held 
in check by principles of equity.  Project selection criteria were agreed upon, but the council also 
made certain that the discussion only reinforced the perception that municipal resources were 
insufficient to meet local demands.  Thus, the parochial and disempowering exercise of a more 
perfect division of an inadequate budget has been transcended.  Consequently, Tecolucans have 
evaluated the performance of their local government more positively than the two counter-
insurgent cases. 
 
 
 
 
E.  AGENCY AND POLITICAL CAPTURE 
 
There are differing views about the optimal level of participation in local economic development 
and governance processes, which I have argued is contingent on accumulated political 
experiences and expectations in respective insurgent and counter-insurgent towns.  The noted 
differences in FMLN and ARENA cabildo abiertos are not unlike those described in the inter-
institutional coordination spaces and the experience of municipal coordination in the San Vicente 
CDA.  Insurgent and counter-insurgent experiences have shaped the emergence of local 
development institutions by holding them to different performance standards.   
Hierarchical, paternalist organizational structures in ARENA and PCN communities have 
effectively restored or preserved the pre-war civic association model where elites ply the fearful 
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poor with patronage and charity but set clear limits against politicized between-group ties or 
vertical negotiations with the state.  Bottom-up, principled organizing by insurgent FMLN 
communities is dismantling the pre-war edifice of social and economic inequality through 
thoughtful and determined creation of participatory mechanisms.  The comparative evidence of 
competing empowerment strategies provides some clues as to how the collective action problems 
are resolved.   
A Market collective action strategy targets the costs and benefits (perceived and real) of 
individual participation.  A Contract strategy focuses on negotiations designed to alter the 
constraint or benefit structure for participation.  Both the Market and Contract collective action 
strategies emphasize influence over the rationality of spontaneous individual participation.  A 
Hierarchy strategy depends on selective benefits and sanctions as incentives for participation of a 
targeted population.  A Community strategy might draw from and strengthen existing norms of 
reciprocity and past experiences of collective action that encourage participation to ensure 
representation.  Both the Hierarchy and Community strategies for collective action are 
contingent on highly planned coercion or the prompt of endogenous norms that requires less 
planning. 
The variation in success in promoting participation, accountability and transparency 
through cabildo abiertos is but one of many instances of how the challenge of collective action 
impinges on the effectiveness of decentralized development in settings of high inequality.  On 
one hand, the advent of democracy has forced many patrons that were previously shielded by 
military force to compete for votes and investment.  Dominant elites have had to diversify their 
collective action strategies to ensure the type of participation that does not threaten their 
authority.  Political capture involves stacking the deck in these participatory spaces to steer them 
into safe harbors.  On the other hand, local decision making that requires some level of 
institutional coordination is prone to political capture through the reverse threat of exit by vested 
local elites to avoid accountability.  The effective management of scarce joint resources such as 
municipal budgets, a water supply, forests, or an irrigation district is dependent upon the 
compliance with a mutually agreed set of rules for sustainable and/or equitable resource use.  
While powerful elites have often absorbed the costs of coordination to prevent free riding by the 
poor, they also just as frequently enjoy exit options that make these rules non-binding in the 
absence of effective monitoring and enforcement capacity by non-elites.  As such, the challenge 
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of collective action to ensure the sustainable and fair use of common pool resources may involve 
the restriction of elite exit options.  How the respective actors choose to act to resolve these 
collective action problems can also be understood within the proposed agency framework. 
Figure 9.6 illustrates the multiple collective action strategies that have been employed 
simultaneously by both insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization networks, but highlights 
that there were discernibly differing starting points and trajectories.  For example, both insurgent 
and counter-insurgent movements in El Salvador relied to differing degrees on a Hierarchy CA 
strategy to mobilize support and reduce resistance during the civil war.  However, the starting 
point for hard-line counter-insurgents was a very similar repertoire of Hierarchy CA strategies.  
For insurgents, their starting point before the war came from a Community strategy preference 
that then gravitated to a balance between Contract and Hierarchy strategies during the war 
(culminating in the agreement between the five rebel factions to create the FMLN).  However, 
reliance on sustained Hierarchy strategies by the FMLN during the war was neither as exclusive 
nor as intense as the government and military.    
In the post-war period, hard-line counter-insurgents were forced to diversify their 
collective action strategies as a consequence of the dismantling of much of the repressive state 
apparatus and an increase in political competition.  The FMLN has also employed a shifting 
balance between all four collective action strategies, contrary to the more dire predictions about 
the insurgent pathological tendencies toward greed, opportunism, corruption and coercion. If we 
were to believe the arguments of Salvadoran elite and it’s U.S. benefactors, before, during and 
after the civil war, FMLN rule would be intolerant, authoritarian, secretive, unrestrained in the 
violation of property rights and human rights – almost the polar opposite view than what has 
occurred in Tecoluca. The predominant strategies of FMLN governance at the local level have 
been, in fact, more pragmatic – striving to perfect local governance through Contract and 
Community CA strategies, despite the noted tension and interconnectedness between them.   
Comparing empowerment strategies for cabildo participation underscores the different 
preferences and capacities for collective action.  A Market strategy for cabildo participation used 
most frequently was the promotion of increased state transfers or special projects to raise the 
perceived probability of benefiting.  San Ildefonso also included a government seed exchange as 
part of the cabildo agenda as an incentive for farmer participation.  A second Market strategy 
used with varying effectiveness involved efforts to foster perceptions of efficient administration 
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to increase the perception that participation will translate into expected outcomes.  Tecoluca 
extended this into a risk taking transparency strategy, or taking unprecedented steps to signal 
greater budget transparency through pre-meeting information dissemination.  In the Jiboa Valley 
and San Ildefonso, mayors engaged in agenda setting to restrict entry by unilaterally delinking 
potentially more effective development mechanisms (the Jiboa micro-region and several 
proposed coordination mechanisms in San Ildefonso) from the cabildo process.     
Coercion as the principal Hierarchy collective action strategy was most evident in San 
Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley.  Mayors and council members publicly reprimanded and 
demeaned absent community leaders and scolded those present for not fulfilling their duties.   In 
both cases, COENA intervened in local affairs by picking and sanctioning local candidates, 
blocking coordination with FMLN within CDA and the Jiboa Microregion, as well as providing 
selective incentives to undermine coordinated local projects.   
 In Tecoluca, Hierarchy strategies are reflected by the fact that INGO and NGO budgets 
remain largely delinked from the cabildo discussion of municipal finance despite the tremendous 
influence of this source of local investment.  The perceived lack of NGO accountability in 
Tecoluca may partly explain the lower performance evaluations.  INGOs may also be exercising 
Hierarchy collective action strategies when they intervene directly in discussions about local 
advocacy.  INGOs in Tecoluca have cautioned against more radical options for collective 
advocacy, while GTZ-Promude and FundaGuadalupe in the Jiboa Valley have had to push 
Microregion Jiboa mayors to explore participation, advocacy and coordination options that they 
would not likely have chosen voluntarily  
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Figure 9.6  Counter-Insurgent & Insurgent Collective Action Strategies 
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 Contract strategies include the prior negotiation of development priorities in Tecoluca 
through sectoral assemblies to improve information access and clarify priorities before the 
cabildo.   CDM meetings also involved negotiations over representation in the rule making 
process, particularly among historically excluded sectors. The pre-cabildo representation 
processes were generally absent in the two other case studies.  Steps toward reducing the off-
budget status of NGO finance in the Tecoluca cabildo and the inclusion of non-FODES funding 
sources and projects into the field of consideration for participants also constitute two significant 
Contract strategies with other institutions toward greater integration of all local investments into 
a single accountability mechanism. 
Debates over participatory budgeting criteria in Tecoluca suggest a Community collective 
action strategy of appealing to local norms of equity and fairness that was exclusive to the 
insurgent case.  The fear of organizing in the Jiboa Valley results in selective invitation of 
participants and agenda setting.  This empowerment by invitation process parallels the promotion 
of informal, bottom-up independent local organizing to better defend the competing conceptions 
of a local mandate in Tecoluca (particularly illustrated by protests against local polluters and the 
lobbying between orthodox and revisionist factions within the FMLN).  The same tensions that 
ultimately led to significant post-war rights based struggles and were crucial in generating 
municipal primaries in Tecoluca resulted in quashed protest activity and the defection of local 
elites from ARENA to the PCN with few implications in local support.   
As suggested at the outset, when Market strategies were the principal approach to cabildo 
participation, the results were disappointing.  Tecoluca’s performance in empowerment 
achievement at the institutional level has relied more than San Ildefonso or the Jiboa Valley on 
Contract and Community strategies.  Formal organization is a Contract collective action strategy 
explicitly designed to improve resource mobilization and distribution.  In Tecoluca more than 
any other case, the rise of Salvadoran NGOs and the consequent decline of gremios illustrates the 
Contract strategy at work.  However, by itself this Contract strategy of NGO formation is not 
panacea.  Planning and organization in the rise of increasingly bureaucratic NGOs tends to come 
at the expense of ideology or radical norms of more informal gremios and grassroots CA 
strategies.  This noted tension exists between Contract strategies and Community strategies 
within insurgent municipalities.   
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Similarly, Hierarchy strategies that rely on coercion or selective benefits/sanctions can 
only temporarily solve collective action problems, before voluntarism is overwhelmed by 
opportunism.  Hierarchy can also destroy Community strategies. Taylor (1982) has argued that  
selective incentives foreclose Community strategies by undermining altruism, reciprocity and 
voluntarism.   Exclusive reliance on selective incentives or disincentives can have a similarly 
corrosive effect on the ability to legitimate bargaining positions contemplated in a Contract 
strategy.  We see these effects in the ARENA Hierarchy collective action strategy in tax policy.  
ARENA and PCN legislators have blocking the most progressive tax reforms and have been 
silent on enforcing compliance with existing tax laws.  ARENA and PCN mayors have for the 
most part acquiesced to this policy imposition by blocking an endorsement for property tax 
reform by COMURES and essentially refusing to exercise eminent domain to advance strategic 
public development initiatives.  Particularly for those mayors, such as Juan Cerritos and now 
Julia Costanza that lost party backing, these choices may in hindsight seem less aligned with 
their interests.   
Along these same lines, COENA’s sabotage of bipartisan Iniciativa Vicentina, non-
partisan endorsement of the CDA political agenda and any locally coordinated initiatives that 
would provide dividends to the FMLN, have come at a significant cost to local economic 
development in counter-insurgent communities.  The negative impact of Hierarchy collective 
action strategies on local resource mobilization has forced the Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso to 
fall back on Market strategies that largely revolve around remittances.  Remittance transfers are 
inherently an individual exit option strategy with ambiguous social net effects in terms of capital 
acquisition and reproduction.  This remittance effect is most prevalent in San Ildefonso.   In the 
Jiboa Valley Microregion, the limitations set by COENA interventions on the optimal economic 
option of a coordinated campaign to win a paved access road have disintegrated into the pursuit 
of individual road projects.  
 Tecoluca’s superior tax collection performance suggests that the local government has 
negotiated either a negative tit-for-tat agreement to sanction and reward tax compliance or has 
improved commitments to self-government to broker a tradeoff between compliance and 
effective service delivery.  At the same time, Tecoluca is one of the few municipalities 
aggressively coordinating with other municipalities to pursue a property tax.  Finally, the 
variation in how local coordinating mechanisms were achieved and have contributed to the 
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respective volume and productivity of INGO investment differentiates the dependence on 
Contract collective action strategies in Tecoluca.   
By contrast, the incapacity to negotiate a more diversified funding base without 
compromising local autonomy characterizes a lower reliance on contract strategies in the Jiboa 
Valley and San Ildefonso.  Ineffective capacity to negotiate public goods investments with 
remittances and failed negotiation between cooperative members with ISTA over land security 
are additional examples of the roadblocks to contract strategies that are more prevalent in the 
counter-insurgent cases. 
This does not mean the Tecoluca has eschewed Market resource mobilization strategies 
of increasing and improving local services.  Tecoluca’s achievement of the highest level of 
public support for tax increases is indicative of this strategy.  It merely suggests rather that 
Market strategies are balanced by Community strategies socializing the equity benefits of tax 
reform and compliance.  The credibility of the local government to do so is strengthened by 
strong public signals of commitment to these principles.  Three examples in Tecoluca include the 
mayor’s decision to voluntarily exercise term limits, the higher relative participation of women 
in the municipal council and the CDM, and significant investments in advocacy capacity 
building to enhance citizen’s collective pursuit of common objectives regardless of the 
institutional target.  In contrast, perceptions associated with the Nonualco Coffee Cooperative in 
the Jiboa Valley and the Lempa Acahuapa Irrigation district bordering San Ildefonso reflect a 
much higher tolerance for unaccountability and clientelism as the cost of doing business in areas 
of higher inequality.  The failure of PRODAP to enable subsistence producers to escape rigged 
regional commodity markets and the capacity of ARENA to block an IDB loan for sustainable 
development in the Bajo Lempa of Tecoluca demonstrate the susceptibility to even the best 
designed development initiatives to political capture.  The fact that local institutional elites in 
Tecoluca have not been able to capture local decision making processes is a validation of the 
checks and balances that result from lower inequality.  
Lichbach (1998: 271) argues that Market and Hierarchy strategies are mostly likely to 
generate or perpetuate inequality.  The lower FMLN reliance on these strategies is associated 
with diminished inequality in zones of insurgent influence.  Conversely, inequality has persisted 
in areas of counter-insurgent influence, as in the Jiboa Valley, a zone of military or government 
influence during the war.  Here the preferred war mobilization collective action strategies that 
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vary between Hierarchy and Market have been adapted again to reinforce post-war inequality.  
Demonstrated by the quantitative and qualitative evidence in this chapter, both tendencies have 
left their mark on post-war development processes.  
 Finally, the competing empowerment strategies may be distinguished by the range of 
advocacy options available to insurgent and counter-insurgent communities.  Insurgents from 
Tecoluca have engaged in collective and at times contentious actions to fend off political capture 
in the post-war period.  Examples include participation in conflictive and at times, violent 
protests to reduce the agrarian debt, to fight contamination by a local sugar mill, to have the 
government fulfill the Peace Accords, and to find permanent solutions to the vulnerability of the 
lower Lempa valley, among others.    
War-wounded ex-combatants of the Salvadoran armed forces and ex-civil patrollers have 
also engaged in important and contentious protests in the post-war period demanding 
indemnification promised them in the Peace Accords.   These protest actions by communities 
aligned with the right suggest three possible explanations regarding the linkage between political 
experiences and empowerment strategies.  1) Counter-insurgent political experiences have also 
contributed to the capacity for contentious collective action.  Perhaps the experience as an ex-
combatant per say is a distinguishing resource for effective, collective action. 2) GOES 
communities have learned protest methods from the FMLN and appropriated into their tactical 
repertoire.  3)  Such political experiences are irrelevant to post-war local politics.    
The key distinction between the insurgent and counter-insurgent contentious advocacy 
illustrations is the duration of the former.  The civil patrollers or armed forces never congealed as 
an independent political movement, but have been subject to the arbitrary representation of elite 
policymakers.  Insurgent advocacy strategies have continued to accumulate and reproduce 
political capital as well as modulate effectively between conventional and contentious modes. 
 What Tecoluca has learned about advocacy is summarized in the views of Emilio Espín, 
the regional director of CORDES: 
 
Single actors cannot do it alone, but need to persuade larger allies (INGOS, bilateral and multilateral 
donors) to back their position.  These organizations are not monolithic, creativity is required to find allies 
within them.  Pragmatic relationship building and leverage are essential and the conventional bureaucratic 
options must be exhausted before politically divisive tactics become viewed as legitimate.  Unnecessary 
provocation of the reactionary right is a frequent flaw in the strategic defeats experienced by leftist 
organizations.  The most that a new revolutionary government can do is deepen credibility, make 
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marginal gains, but not structural ones.  There are no development models and many have suffered from 
the rigidities that past leftists have tried to impose. 
 
Achieving USAID’s commitment to fund the road to La Pita illustrates this strategy.    
International allies were mobilized (SHARE, CISPES, Sister City organizations) and the 
coordinated lobbying of USAID to fund the road was not only successful in and of itself, but also 
served as the first step in turning USAID into an ally. 
These advocacy illustrations suggest the wide range of tactics that are available to 
organizations and individuals in Tecoluca.  Collective action can be engaging the Inter American 
Development Bank to design a loan for resolving longstanding flood vulnerability in the Bajo 
Lempa, or occupying the San Marcos Lempa bridge in coordinated national protest against trade 
liberalization policies.  Both collective action strategies can not simply be reduced to 
accommodative or contentious, but are both.  The problems that make collective action difficult 
are not resolved by Hierarchy strategies, but solutions tend to emerge from strong Community 
norms.   
What stands out among ARENA mayors in the Jiboa Valley is the lack of autonomy 
among local officials to participate in local advocacy initiatives.  The notion of political 
advocacy is tightly restricted by party hierarchy (COENA), preventing bottom-up initiatives 
from galvanizing participation.  While allied donors (GTZ) recognize ARENA intransigence to 
decentralization, most are reluctant to sponsor contentious advocacy measures, preferring to 
counsel accommodating engagement despite the apparent inefficacy of these efforts.  
Consequently, most incipient protest mobilizations (water project dissent in San Pedro Aguas 
Calientes and La Entrevista beneficio contamination) have been as ineffective as the 
conventional lobbying for an improved road or hot springs-tourism complex. 
 In San Ildefonso, the absence of strong ties to either the insurgent or counter-insurgent 
mobilization network has resulted in passive participation in contentious and conventional 
advocacy initiatives driven by both.  The Fonchano community representatives have remained on 
the sidelines of the advocacy campaigns associated with the San Vicente Productivo ratification 
by the CDD, the Lempa Acahuapa water user association dispute, agrarian debt and 
indemnification for the civil patrollers. 
 Advocacy capacity may represent the most profound distinction between the case studies.   
Although most local institution officials share the same concerns about the challenges to 
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decentralized development, the expectations held for them by their respective populations are 
different and deeply rooted in past political experiences. 
 Table 9.9 summarizes the Institutional Level Empowerment Achievements for the three 
case study municipalities.  Of the fourteen indicators, nine are drawn from the 1998 regional 
survey data, three from reported municipal development finance data, and the final three 
measuring institutional accountability, transparency and coordination are derived from 
participant observation in local development and governance processes.  Local institutional 
performance in Tecoluca is rated highest in ten of the fourteen indicators, compared to two in the 
Jiboa Valley and two indicators for which the differences in the means are not statistically 
significant.   
 Perhaps one of the more surprising outcomes involves the absence of a statistically 
significant difference among NGO assessments.  The performance of NGOs in Tecoluca appear 
to rated as less satisfactory than both Jiboa Valley or San Ildefonso.  This is surprising because 
NGOs and INGOs have been a significant factor in the level of coordination and resource 
mobilization achieved in Tecoluca.  The fact that these same NGOs and INGOs do not receive as 
favorable an evaluation from the beneficiary population adds weight to the arguments outlined in 
chapter seven regarding the ambiguous development impact of NGOs in El Salvador.   
 The national government agency performance is given the highest scores by the Jiboa 
Valley residents, although the difference in means for the entire index is not statistically 
significant.  Despite the evidence of government or party responsibility for political interference, 
low participation, and poor coordination, a higher proportion of residents in municipalities 
historically tied to the government view their primary benefactor.  Still, government agencies 
receive by far the lowest performance scores. 
 In sum, the institutional empowerment indicators summarized in Table 9.9 outline the 
sharp differences in local institutional performance, both perceived and concrete. 
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Table 9.9  Indicators and Data Sources for Institutional Level Empowerment/Disempowerment Achievements 
 
 
Meso/Inter-Institutional Level Data Source Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig 
1. Local Government Performance  Index of three performance assessment questions (below)  [0-10] 4.7 4.8 5.2 4.1 .000 
Performance Local Govt Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with LG  P3.10 59.1 43.3 83.6 50  
Performance Local Govt Percent reporting that municipal services are good or excellent  P3.11 37.1 37.3 51.9 28.5  
Representation Local Govt Percent that say mayor is somewhat or very interested in local participation to resolve 
community problems, P3.12 
45.1 43 62.9 32.1  
2. Performance Local Govt Percent that report willingness to pay more local taxes in order to improve local 
services P3.15 
40.8 41.2 49.3 41.3  
3. Representation Local Govt Percent that say LG responds to local needs always or most of the time P3.16 23.3 21.5 44 11.5  
4. Representation Local Govt (n=367) Percent that say all sectors are represented in the cabildo abiertos most of the time P3.6 23.5 19.2 37.6 23.0  
5. National Govt. Performance Index of three performance assessment questions (below)  [0-10]  4.0 3.5 3.6 NS 
Performance National Govt Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with agency of 
National Government  P4.6 
54.9 51.6 46.4 33.3  
Performance National Govt Percent reporting that municipal services are good or excellent  P4.7 20.9 17.6 18 16.4  
Representation National Govt Percent that say government is somewhat or very interested in local participation to 
resolve community problems, P4.8 
28.9 25.3 21.5 21  
6. Representation National Govt Percent that principal beneficiaries of government programs are the poor or everyone 
p4.9 (rather than the rich or government functionaries 
21.1 21 17.1 16.1  
7. NGO Performance Index Index of three performance assessment questions (below)   [0-10]  7.5 6.9 7.4 NS 
Performance NGO Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with NGO  P5.7 83.9 100 73.6 82.6  
Performance NGO Percent reporting that NGO services are good or excellent  P5.8 76.6 90 64.4 76.1  
Representation NGO Percent that say NGO is somewhat or very interested in local participation to resolve 
community problems, P5.9 
87.8 85.7 84.3 95.5  
8. Representation NGO Percent that say principal beneficiaries of NGO assistance are the poor or everyone 
P5.10 
89.3 93.1 81.3 91.7  
9. Resource Mobilization 1 Local tax effort (Minimum percent exceeded expected tax collection performance 
based on Gallagher model (2000). 
Na 56% 335
% 
63% 
 
10. Resource Mobilization 2 Local tax per capital Na 2.0 7.8 1.7  
11. Resource Mobilization 3 Diversity of Municipal Finance (% of total development resources represented by state 
transfers 
Na 23.5 10 15.5  
12. Accountability Qualitative (Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, Moderate-High, High) based on 
participatory observation of municipal meetings 
 L-M M-H L  
13. Transparency Qualitative- Access to Available documentation  L M L  
14. Coordination Qualitative: based on participatory observation in inter-municipal, inter-institutional 
and town level meetings. 
 M H L  
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F. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This chapter has intended to demonstrate is that decentralization, defined as the devolution of 
resources and authority to local actors and increased participation in local politics, tends to 
reinforce already existing distributions of power when democratic institutions are weak and local 
inequality is high.  Under such conditions, decentralization works (empowerment is achieved) 
when local actors acquire capital resources and use them effectively to overcome collective 
action problems and contest prevailing inequality.  Effective use of resources to contest 
prevailing inequality requires the capacity for both contentious and conventional collective 
action.  Moreover, decentralization disempowers local actors to the extent that on their own they 
are unable to overcome collective action problems to seriously contest prevailing inequality 
through conventional or contentious means. 
To test this argument for empowerment at the institutional level, I compare local 
performance in the three municipal cases focusing on three key areas of local governance: inter-
municipal cooperation, inter-institutional coordination within municipal cases, and participation, 
transparency and accountability in local resource mobilization.  I find that decentralization has 
worked most effectively where the post-war expectations for development have guided local 
institutions according to a challenging, bottom-up empowerment through conflict strategy.  
Local institutions have performed poorly under decentralization when post-war expectations tend 
to prefer a stabilizing, top-down empowerment by invitation strategy.  These competing notions 
of empowerment have in turn have deeply marked the institutionalization of local authority in 
NGOs, municipal governments and their articulation with social safety net programs.  Tecoluca, 
the municipal case representing insurgent political experiences, demonstrates the collective 
capacity to confront and transform local inequality as a pre-requisite for sustainable local 
economic development.  Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso, the municipal cases of hard-line and 
moderate counter-insurgent political experiences, demonstrate imposed or individualist 
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approaches to local development that are more acquiescent to high inequality and suggest 
continuity with pre-war agrarian relations.  
The summary of trends in public finance reveals that centralization has expanded new 
local opportunities for resource mobilization, but has failed to compensate for significant and 
persistent biases against public investment in local economic development in rural areas.  Local 
actors have little choice but to coordinate on various levels to find solutions to this resource 
mobilization challenge.  However, the analysis of the local politics of inter-municipal 
coordination in San Vicente nevertheless points to the inherent pitfalls of decentralization.  
Efforts to strengthen municipal government through departmental coordination mechanisms have 
been susceptible to political capture in a setting of high inequality.  Hierarchy strategies by 
ARENA party elites have effectively blocked FMLN efforts to coordinate and advance a 
progressive political agenda in the San Vicente mayors’ council.   
This inherent vulnerability to decentralization is visible at the inter-institutional level 
within each municipal case.  Variation in density, ideological diversity and transnational reach of 
the respective institutional fields suggest the different challenges that actors in each of the three 
cases must surmount to achieve institutional coordination.  Comparison of the Tecoluca 
municipal development council, the Jiboa Valley microregion and the failure to achieve any 
coordinating mechanism in San Ildefonso illustrates how past political experiences have shaped 
each coordination effort.  Although in no case was coordination especially effective, the CDM in 
Tecoluca included a wider diversity of participants, encompassed a more profound discussion of 
the structural obstacles to local development, and a consideration of a more ambitious menu of 
advocacy strategies.  The Jiboa Valley microregion has achieved little when confronted by the 
parochial self-interests of the competing mayors or the limitations imposed by ARENA party 
elites.  A higher premium placed on the collective interest in Tecoluca explains why the CDM in 
Tecoluca has been sustained while coordination in the other cases have been unable to overcome 
political capture.  
A comparison of the cabildo abierto across the municipal cases further reveals how 
competing empowerment strategies have aligned the performance of this participatory 
mechanism to insurgent and counter-insurgent expectations for local institutions.  In Tecoluca, a 
higher and more intense level of citizen participation, moderately greater transparency regarding 
local financial information and concrete strides toward participatory budget making have 
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resulted in a more diverse, stable and increasing resource mobilization achievement than either 
of the other two municipal governments.  The sum of the evidence underscores fundamental 
differences in the insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies.  The performance of 
local institutions in Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso suggest that the legacy of counter-insurgent 
political experiences is the persistence of Hierarchy or Market collective action strategies – 
neither of which has proven particularly effective in confronting the threat of political capture.   
Tecoluca, by contrast, has demonstrated the capacity for Contract and Community collective 
action strategies that are more associated with participatory and accountable local governance, 
and the institutional coordination so necessary for overcoming the challenges to local 
development in El Salvador. 
Lichbach warns us that “appeals to participatory democracy within dissident groups 
typically fail.” (1998: 269).  The dissident leaders themselves are well positioned for the political 
capture of the organizations or movement resources and goals.  The evidence marshaled here 
shows the opposite to be true, both in terms of the insurgent case of Tecoluca as in the converse 
expectation that greater participatory democracy is more likely in the counter-insurgent cases of 
San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley. 
Perhaps the evidence of institutional level empowerment summarized in this chapter only 
points to idiosyncrasy of Tecoluca?  If so, the performance of local institutions would be 
interesting but the lessons would be of limited general utility.  The charismatic leadership 
qualities of Nicolás García as the first two term FMLN mayor might also be responsible for the 
described outcomes.  It would be incorrect to suggest that García’s leadership skills were not in 
part responsible for Tecoluca’s success, but the analysis has demonstrated that he is not alone in 
shouldering the adoptive responsibilities of meeting the revolutionary expectations for economic 
development and local governance.  The durability of Tecoluca’s governance model suggests 
that local institutions and mobilization network have required the decentralization of local 
authority to old and new leaders, just as the insurgent experience has always done.  Tecoluca 
institutions perform better because the once concentrated power held by a handful of landowners 
has been redistributed along with their assets to many citizens that now use those assets to 
exercise relevant control over local decision making.  
 Similarly, the durability of choices and expectations that explain the preferred leadership 
of Juan Cerritos as an ARENA/PCN mayor in the Jiboa Valley, or the splintered and weak 
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loyalties that have endorsed Maria Julia Costanza and Orlando Arevalo in San Ildefonso, also 
demonstrate that the continuity of pre-war inequality and disempowerment are also deeply 
rooted.   
Of course, none of the three municipalities is monolithic.  Each reflects the deep political 
polarization that characterizes El Salvador today.  Perhaps the level of inclusivity of Tecoluca’s 
local economic development experience is its crowning achievement.   However, the true test of 
the generalizability of Tecoluca’s achievements would be to compare the empowerment qualities 
beyond the municipality.  In the next chapter, I test the uniqueness of Tecoluca’s successful 
insurgent empowerment strategy by comparing the effect of its core distinctive attribute – its 
insurgent political experience, on the individual level empowerment indicators across the entire 
paracentral survey sample.  
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X. CHAPTER TEN:  EMPOWERED INSURGENTS: THE IMPACT OF PAST POLITICAL 
EXPERIENCES 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
El Salvador, like much of Latin America, has decentralized government on the premise that local 
actors are empowered to act collectively to hold local institutions more accountable than remote, 
centralized state agencies.  However, improved governance through decentralization depends 
upon the distribution of power that exists ex ante at the local level.   When democracy is 
unconsolidated and inequality is high, decentralization may only reinforce inequality and 
increase the probability for political capture of public goods provision.  El Salvador represents a 
crucial case for testing this hypothesis.  The country’s twelve-year civil war was caused in large 
part by the unequal distribution of land.   
Throughout the war, the Salvadoran countryside was governed by two parallel states, two 
political-economic systems, and two competing conceptions of citizen empowerment.  In zones 
under the control of the FMLN, insurgents challenged local inequality by decentralizing power 
from the bottom-up.  By contrast, counter-insurgent decentralization strategies stabilized 
inequality from the top-down in zones under the control of the Salvadoran government.  These 
competing political experiences have had an important contextual impact on the varied 
effectiveness of post-war local development programs.   
Building upon the accumulated evidence of societal and meso-institutional empowerment 
presented in the preceding chapters, I continue to sort out the empirical evidence of post-war 
decentralized development to illustrate my definition of empowerment, focusing on individual 
level indicators of the three core dimensions – Resources, Agency and Achievements.  
Resources are human, social, economic, and political capital - the pre-conditions for authentic 
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development choices and the control levers of sustained capital acquisition.  As illustrated in 
Chapter nine, collective action (agency) is necessary to convert into achievements – defined by 
Sen as valued ways of being and doing that a person has managed to accomplish.  Through 
agency, resources are converted into achievements that we might associate with a dignified life – 
the fulfillment of basic needs, voice and participation in social and political action, local problem 
solving skills and adequate resource mobilization. Efficacious participation represents a key 
indication of empowerment and will serve as the primary dependent variable for individual level 
analysis in this chapter. 
Are the empowering effects of insurgent political experience found in Tecoluca unique or 
can we make broader claims about past insurgent and counter-insurgent experiences?  In order to 
further isolate the effect of political experience during the war on post-war empowerment 
outcomes, the unit of analysis will shift in this chapter from the case study municipal population 
to a recategorization of political experience, ranging from hard-line insurgent to hard-line 
counterinsurgent.  Based on survey data from the 1998 paracentral region survey, I compare 
objective attributes and behaviors of local insurgent or counter-insurgent political experience to 
establish an index for comparing participation across all communities in the survey. 
Decentralized individual or collective action strategies (contentious or accommodative 
participation) are expected to differ with respect to the past political experiences.   
This view of local politics is informed by classic explanations of participation that have 
focused on individual socio-economic and social-psychological factors.983  Efficacious 
participation refers here to the capability to take part in the social and political life of one’s 
community.  In terms of indicators, I will focus both on actions (voting, organizational 
affiliation, activism in local development committees and the workplace, attempts and outcomes 
of contacting public officials, and the collective solving of day to day local problems) as well as 
the mediating attitudes that give these actions meaning (individual and collective efficacy, trust, 
aspirations, and optimism).  I also explore the link between conventional and unconventional 
participatory modes of action (protest marches, property and land occupations, violence to 
property, riots, collective insurgency).  
                                                 
983 A sample of the most influential work on conventional participation is extensive Almond and Verba (1965), 
Verba and Nie (1972) Milbrath (1965) Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady (1995).  
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By introducing political experience as an independent contextual variable that captures 
historically and structurally rooted variation in conflictive roles, I hope to correct for an 
underspecification of these factors in explanations of political and social participation.  Political 
participation models also have not adequately explored the link between conventional modes and 
unconventional modes.984  Indeed, a central proposition of the empowerment by invitation logic 
in El Salvador holds that conventional and unconventional modes of participation are mutually 
exclusive.  The empowerment through conflict path calls for a repertoire of collective action that 
allows citizens to be active protesters as well as active voters. 
 Finally, the field of political activity in El Salvador does not permit the unreflective 
transportation of concepts and constructs that are prominent in U.S. political science.  In poor, 
rural societies, citizens writing letters to express an opinion or making campaign contributions 
donation are equally rare.  However, people do express their opinions verbally in meetings and 
through other informal activities.  Voluntary contributions may come in the form of joining an 
electoral caravan, handing out leaflets, preparing refreshments for an event.  Given limited 
resources, informal activities such as making demands on local authorities, attendance and 
participation at municipal meetings, or pitching in to solve a local problem take on greater 
political significance.  Moreover, while the act of voting in national elections may be the easiest 
political activity to measure, it may not be the most empowering activity.  In many rural 
communities, involvement (including voting) in local development committees, the workplace, 
visits to offices of public agencies, and the individual or collective solving of day to day local 
problems are equally, if not more relevant expressions of empowerment at the most basic level.  
While decentralized development prioritizes these activities as the wellsprings of more efficient 
and effective governance, an exclusively local optic would also be flawed.  A focus on local 
activism should not lose sight of the inherent and necessary relationship between local activism 
and the role of a responsive national government in generating sustainable development 
initiatives. 
If decentralization tends to strengthen the distribution of power that exists ex ante at the 
local level, we should find efficacious participation to be the highest where power asymmetries 
                                                 
984 Studies of unconventional political participation have devoted greater attention to the linkage between 
conventional and unconventional modes, including Gamson (1968, 1975), Gurr (1970, 1993) Seligson (1980), 
Muller & Seligson (1987) 
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have been historically leveled.  In counter-insurgent contexts of high inequality, stabilizing, top-
down decentralization tends to empower local elites almost exclusively, just as it fragments local 
interests and exacerbates local capacity for collective action.  As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, under these conditions the chances of political capture are high.  A result of the top-
down approach, levels of participation in local development will tend to be low, individualized, 
avoiding sustained contentious action, and lacking a sense of efficacy.    
In contexts of relative greater equity, challenging, bottom-up decentralization under 
conditions of improving local equity tends to empower a wider cross-section of people and 
further reduces the obstacles to collective action.   Decentralized participation from the bottom-
up will be more participatory, combine both conventional and contentious modes of action, 
involve more collective effort, and generate a greater sense of efficacy among the participants.   
The chapter will be organized as follows: I first provide an outline of the two competing 
approaches to decentralization in El Salvador, which informs the survey design and selection of 
the case study municipalities.  In section two, I explain the construction of my contextual 
variable - political experience.  I then review the survey evidence comparisons of individual 
level empowerment indicators between municipal cases and cohorts clustered by political 
experience across the entire paracentral region.  Section three uses OLS and logistical 
regressions to illustrate the durability of political experience in explaining both conventional and 
contentious participation.  In the final section, I discuss the implications for the dissertation 
hypotheses. 
In this chapter, I measure empowerment at the individual level by the intensity and form 
of participation in post-war decentralized development projects (formal and informal community 
activism and contentious protest).  Comparisons of the levels of participation between 
representative insurgent and counter-insurgent communities in one of El Salvador’s ex-
conflictive regions based on the results of an original 1998 survey clearly illustrate the impact of 
competing decentralization strategies.  I find that 1) decentralization reforms are associated with 
the highest levels of efficacious participation where local land inequality and associated power 
relations have been leveled – in insurgent FMLN communities.  2) Political experiences of 
bottom-up, contentious decentralization linked with the social and economic contexts of FMLN 
zones of influence prove to be a durable predictor of efficacious participation across the entire 
region.   
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B.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The primary independent variable of this study is a contextual effect derived from wartime 
conflictive experiences.  Many Salvadoran communities that today live side by side in the 
paracentral region had very different experiences of political socialization during the war.  These 
political experiences may be located in terms of their commitments to the FMLN or the ARENA 
led government of El Salvador.  In this section, I measure insurgent and counter-insurgent 
political experiences as scale variables composed of the sum of a five factor weighted objective 
and subjective community level indicators that reflect the context of past political choices.   
From a methodological standpoint, the construction of a political experience index 
variable and other scale variables are preferable to single question indicators because they reduce 
the chances of systematic measurement errors.  To assure that each scale item is measuring the 
same conceptual dimension, varimax rotated component factor analysis is used to test the 
reliability of this scale variable as single factor indicators.  Cronbach’s Alpha statistic, which 
determines the level of compatibility of the different scale components as a single aggregated 
index, is reported for each scale variable.  The maximum value of Alpha is 1, but values over 
0.70 are considered to have adequate reliability as a single indicator (Knoke and Bohrnstedt 1994: 
268). 
Scale variables constructed of multiple survey questions also face the problem of missing 
values.  To avoid losing entire cases when 1 or 2 questions of a scale of four or more questions 
are computed, a method to allow for the mean values to be imputed for the missing responses is 
used.  This is done only when two or fewer responses are missing, otherwise the case is dropped 
from the estimate of the unit mean.  When Alpha statistics for scale variables are high, this 
procedure for imputing values for missing cases is considered valid.  
I turn now to the construction of the political experience context variable.  In Table 10.1, 
I list the five variables that were used to distinguish between insurgent and counter-insurgent 
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political experience, as well as the means for each indicator and the grand mean score for each of 
69 surveyed communities (several smaller communities are grouped together from the original 
list of 98).  The five indicators include community location on conflict map, total land 
transferred to FMLN PTT beneficiaries, percent of reported vote for FMLN in the 1997 
municipal elections, the ratio of FMLN ex-combatants to total survey responses, and the number 
of FMLN NGOs reported to be active in the community.  For all indicators, high values are 
consistent with an FMLN insurgent political context.   
The political experience index represents a contextual property rather than an exclusively 
individual property, although several individual level attributes are central to its construction.  
The variable connotes a specific political experience that has been described in prior chapters 
under the labels of insurgent or counter-insurgent to individuals now living within a community 
that shares certain fundamental attributes that we might associate with one or the other.  The 
attribution of prior political experiences to post hoc features rests on several basic assumptions 
that deserve some justification.   
The effectiveness of post-war decentralization depends upon a facilitative context for 
both conventional and contentious collective actions that challenge rather than stabilize local 
inequality. This facilitative context is informed by the past political experiences.  Whether 
insurgent or counter-insurgent, these political experiences represent what some analysts have 
defined as, “the complex product of an individual’s own characteristics in combination with the 
characteristics and predispositions of other surrounding individuals.” (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and 
Sprague 1993: 366)   The attitudes or behaviors of any single individual will be constrained or 
reinforced by the surrounding contextual history of support given to the FMLN, to the Armed 
Forces or government, or efforts to avoid collaborating with either side.  This composite of 
attitudes and accumulated behavioral experiences represent a degree of continuity or rupture with 
pre-war social structures and their associated belief system that has shaped post-war local 
institutions.985   
This notion of political experience is inherently collective and portable.  In other words, 
the composite of similar or different individual experiences over the past three decades that I 
                                                 
985 On the measurement and analysis of context variables, see Huckfeldt (1986), Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987), 
Cook, Jelen and Wilcox (1993), Huckfeldt, Sprague and Plutzer (1993), Banaszak and Plutzer (1993), Gibson and 
Gouws (2001). 
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want to measure is rooted in relationships between individuals, rather than the individual 
attributes by themselves.  That shared history of political experience can be transported from one 
geographic location to another, say from a refugee camp in Honduras to a repatriated community 
in the Lower Lempa valley or from among a scattered displaced population through individual 
reoccupation strategies to communities of origin.  While geography is one item that helps 
identify political experience (for reasons that I explain below), it is not wholly determinative.  
More important are the shared beliefs about fairness, equality, or rights and the histories of 
wartime participation that some, but not all, hold and associate with each other.    
There are several conceptual drawbacks to this method, which must be recognized.  First, 
the survey did not ask the respondents to directly report or elaborate on their history or degree of 
participation in insurgent or counter-insurgent activities.  This type of question was considered 
too sensitive for survey research in an ex-conflictive zone where the politics surrounding the war 
remain unsettled.  Instead, it was decided that indirect indicators, derived from both survey and 
non-self reported data, would provide a preferable and adequate construct. The most direct 
measure was a specific question that asked people to identify their status as an FMLN ex-
combatant, Armed Forces non-combatant, PTT beneficiary or FMLN base, and civil defense.  
Nearly a quarter of the sample responded affirmatively to this question (214 of 912).  A critical 
mass presence of any of these participant types is one of the central features of a community’s 
political experience. 
Another concern is whether this conception provides sufficient analytical space for the 
choice of political neutrality.986  Indeed, my analysis in prior chapters underscores the fact that 
only a small minority of the Salvadoran population actually participated as combatants or active 
collaborators in the conflict.  Most of the populations located in highly conflictive zones, such as 
the one in this study, were only passive collaborators with one or both sides.  That is to say that 
the provision or not of food and water or information about the enemy was motivated by the 
threat of sanction rather than the promise of some benefit or moral belief.  While the category of 
political expansion zone is imprecise, it is intended to encompass individuals and communities 
that were caught in the middle and uncommitted to either side, without specifying the degree of 
collaboration or active non-participation.  Nearly all territory in the paracentral zone was 
                                                 
986 I am grateful to Elizabeth Wood and William Barnes for pointing out this concern. 
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contested, which meant that explicit non-participatory neutrality was virtually impossible.  The 
absence of space for neutrality in the paracentral region was one of the factors for the massive 
depopulation of the zone.  While emigration might reflect the only true choice associated with 
neutrality in the region for obvious reasons, it was not possible to survey those people who had 
emigrated.987 
Population shifts lead to the second concern related to the other challenge posed by the 
massive displacement and recent repopulation.  It might questioned whether any person that now 
lives in a community necessarily experienced the features of an insurgent or government oriented 
political culture for any significant period of time.  In other words, where people live now may 
not tell us where or how they might have lived before or during the war if they were displaced.988  
There are several reasons why this problem is minimized.  Nearly two thirds of the surveyed 
respondents stayed in their current community during the war, and the other third were either 
combatants (7.3%), were displaced to nearby communities (12.7%) or beyond (14.5%).   Only 
20% of the communities surveyed involved a transformation of the original population or the 
establishment of entirely new communities, and the vast majority of these were located in zones 
historically controlled by the FMLN.989  This means that 80% of the communities were 
represented by a majority original population, with varying degrees of resettlement.  Within the 
new FMLN communities, the coordination of land occupations and refugee resettlement by the 
military leadership of the insurgency ensured that most residents shared the political experiences 
associated with the insurgency.  It is therefore safe to assume that the people interviewed in 1998 
would accurately reflect the political experiences that were largely representative of these 
communities, original or new.   
Table 10.1 provides a statistical breakdown of the diversity of political experiences 
between and within municipalities.  For each of the 69 community clusters, the means for each of 
                                                 
987 The percent of families receiving remittances now might offer a rough indication of where migration was highest, 
e.g. in San Ildefonso.   
988 Close to a third of the Salvadoran population was displaced during the war.  FMLN control zones, in particular, 
involve massive resettlements.  The post-war composition of communities sometimes differ considerably from pre-
war compositions.  With this in mind, these geographical boundaries offer a reasonable accurate locator of political 
experiences. 
989 A variable for community change has a moderately positive and significant correlation with FMLN control and 
expansion with respect to political experience. 
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the five subcomponents, the raw total score and the political experience code are listed.  The 
estimated political experience raw scores range from a low of 0 for Cantón San Benito of 
Guadalupe municipality to 12.2 of a maximum 12.4 in the Cantón La Sabana of Tecoluca 
municipality (which also served as one of the FMLN demobilization points).  Within several 
municipalities, there are scores of insurgent and counter-insurgent communities that are 
differentiated by a range of 8-11 points.  By contrast, Jiboa Valley reflects very little variation – 
with almost all of the communities as government controlled zone.  This variation in political 
experiences underscores how the war has polarized local politics in El Salvador.  I turn now to 
the specific variables that comprise the political experience scale. 
 Two of the five indicators of the political experience score are derived from secondary 
sources, the other three are derived from the 1998 survey responses.  The Conflict Zone Map 
Code is the first indicator of a community’s past political experience. For each community, 
which constitutes one or several cantónes of a municipality (typically a population of between 
500-5000 people) I assign the communities a score on a scale of 1 to 4 based upon their location 
on maps of conflictive zones that distinguish between FMLN and GOES controlled territory and 
zones of expansion during the war.  Figure 5.1 (map of insurgent and counter-insurgent control 
and contested zones in the paracentral region) provides one illuminating example of these 
boundaries for El Salvador that identifies three types of conflictive zones in 1989.  A map code 
score of 4 is associated with an FMLN control zone, which signifies established presence of 
FMLN combatants, their social support infrastructure, and a political-military system of 
authority.  Figure 5.1 suggests three large contiguous zones of FMLN control, located in the 
paracentral region, with a fourth to the southeast.  A map code of 3 indicates new zones of 
FMLN operations, or expansion zones where base level recruitment of combatants and 
collaborators was ongoing late in the war.  Zones of contested influence signify relative areas of 
GOES military and political expansion subject to frequent attacks by the FMLN.  White areas on 
the map indicate least disputed zones of GOES control, where the military’s authority is 
relatively unchallenged.  
For the paracentral zone, I have cross-checked and refined Figure 2.2 (originally 
published in Montgomery 1995) by drawing on historical testimony and document analysis to  
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more precisely locate communities according to geo-political boundaries.990  FMLN control 
signifies established presence of FMLN combatants, their social support infrastructure, and a 
political-military system of authority.  FMLN control zones in the paracentral region are located 
in northern San Vicente, the Chinchontepec volcano region, the Lempa valley-foothill region that 
covers parts of Usulután and San Vicente, the Eastern Pacific Coast area of Jucuarán, and the 
coffee highlands between Santiago de Maria, Usulután and Chinameca, San Miguel.  New areas 
of FMLN operations signify expansion zones where base level recruitment of combatants and 
collaborators was ongoing late in the war.  Contested or disputed areas signify relative zones of 
GOES military and political expansion despite frequent attacks by the FMLN.  White areas on 
the map indicate least disputed zones of GOES control, where the military’s authority is 
relatively unchallenged.  However, Figure 2.2 is incorrect in designating large parts of Tecoluca 
(in the lower central (Bajo Lempa) region of San Vicente) as GOES control zone.   
The conflict map code variable is grounded in the objective reality of the war.  However, 
a map only refers to controlled or disputed territory and reveals less about the political 
composition of these community populations.  A second objective variable is the total area of 
land transferred to FMLN beneficiaries of the Land Transfer Program of the Peace Accords in 
each community.  The transferred amounts per community are converted to a scale of 0 to 5.  
Each number signifies a range of land transferred (0-99 ha., 100-299 ha., 300-499 ha., 500-999 
ha., 1000 ha. and higher). Recall that over 40% of the agricultural workforce benefited from PTT 
in Tecoluca, compared to only 8% and 0% of farmers in San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley, 
respectively.   
The first subjective indicator is vote preference in the 1997 local elections.  Vote 
preferences are derived from the percentage of surveyed respondents in each community who 
voted for either the FMLN, ARENA or a third party.  A low score of 1 signifies that 50% or 
more of those reported their preference, voted for ARENA.  A high score of 5 signifies that the 
50% or more of those reporting their preference, voted for the FMLN.  The intermediate scores 
                                                 
990 These boundaries were based on careful historical reconstruction of the events and biographies of the war and 
post-war periods as well as interviews with ex-combatants and civilians who reside in or fought in those 
communities, as well as analysis of the literature chronicling the events of the conflict in the paracentral zone.  
Published sources for identification of FMLN control and expansion zones include Benitez-Manaut (1989), 
Montgomery (1995), Lungo (1998), PRISMA (1996), and Murray (1995). Other maps referenced here include 
Benitez (1989:191), UNDP (1993:4, 50-52), Ventura (1983), Pearce (1986:viii), Medina Nuñez  (1990: 96), 
Americas Watch (1991), SALPRESS (1985), Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador (1986), and CISPES (1989). 
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of 2 and 3 signify 25-50% for either party and 3 signifies a vote distribution that gives no party 
more than 25% of the reported votes.   
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Table 10.1  Definition and Measurement of Political Experience: Community Level Context (Community Means) 
 
Municipality Canton
No. 
Persons 
Surveyed
Conflict Zone 
Map Code       
(1-4)
PTT Land 
transferred to 
FMLN        (0-10)
Vote % for 
FMLN 1997 
Election      
(1-5)
FMLN ex-
combatant
s per capita 
(0-1)
FMLN NGOs 
active in 
canton       
(0-2)
Canton Political 
Experience Raw 
Score (0-12.4)
Political 
Experience 
Survey Code
1=Govt Control   
2=Govt. Expan   
3=FMLN Expan     
4=FMLN Control 
0=0 ha.             
1=1-99 ha.      
2=100-299 ha. 
3=300-499 ha. 
4=500-999 ha.      
5=>1000 ha.
1 >= 50% Arena   
3 - even split        
5 >=50% Fmln
FMLN ex-
combatants 
as % of 
canton 
population
0 = 0 NGOs      
1= (1-2 NGOs) 
2=(>2NGOs)
 0 (Min) = Counter-
Insurgent        
12.44 (Max) = 
Insurgent
1: (0-3.11)      
2: (3.11-6.22)   
3: (6.22-9.33)  
4: (9.33-12.44)
Guadelupe San Benito 6 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
San Emigdio 16 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Guadelupe Casco 17 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Guadelupe Total 39 1.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.55 1.00
Verapaz San Pedro Agua Calientes 9 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.11 0.00 1.75 1.00
Molineros - San Antonio Jiboa 15 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
Verapaz Casco 16 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
Verapaz Total 40 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.04 0.00 1.68 1.00
Tepetitan Concepcion Canas - La Virgen 15 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.46 1.00
Tepetitan Casco - Antig Tepetitan 23 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
Tepetitan Total 38 1.50 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 1.00
San Cayetano Candelaria Abajo y Arriba 14 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.46 1.00
Cerro Grande 8 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.27 1.00
San Cayetano Casco 16 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
San Cayetano Total 38 1.67 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.19 1.00
Tecoluca Las Anonas - La Sabana 12 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.75 2.00 12.22 4.00
Los Naranjos - Sta Marta 14 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.64 2.00 12.12 4.00
Pacun 13 4.00 2.00 3.00 0.15 2.00 7.57 3.00
Taura-San Carlos 6 4.00 3.00 5.00 1.00 2.00 10.82 4.00
San Nicolas 14 3.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 5.77 2.00
San Pedro + El Vaquerano 9 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 2.00 4.99 2.00
Nueva Amanacer 8 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 4.13 2.00
La Florida-El Socorro 11 3.00 4.00 5.00 0.73 2.00 10.57 4.00
Guajoyo-Gran Sasso 12 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.83 2.00 10.66 4.00
Santa Monica - Angulo 11 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.73 2.00 11.38 4.00
Llano Grande-El Arco 16 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.06 0.00 3.33 2.00
Tecoluca Casco 19 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.05 2.00 4.23 2.00
Nuevo Tehuacan 10 4.00 1.00 4.00 0.20 1.00 6.77 3.00
Tecoluca Total 155 3.54 2.23 4.00 0.40 1.62 8.11 3.00
San Ildefonso Maradiaga-Divisadero-Palmeras 17 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
Cumiste-Lajas 15 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 4.14 2.00
Guachipilin-Sihuatepeque 14 3.00 1.00 4.00 0.29 1.00 6.03 2.00
San Francisco de la Cruz 10 3.00 0.00 5.00 0.60 2.00 7.19 3.00
Las Canoas-El Limon-Los Almendro 16 3.00 3.00 4.00 0.81 2.00 9.01 3.00
San Pablo Canales 8 3.00 2.00 3.00 0.13 2.00 6.74 3.00
Quebracho 9 1.00 0.00 4.00 0.22 0.00 2.68 2.00
El Jicaro-Guarumas 8 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.00
San Ildefonso Casco 22 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.05 0.00 0.87 1.00
San Ildefonso Total 119 1.89 0.89 3.33 0.23 0.67 4.16 2.00
Apastepeque Las Minas 8 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.46 1.00
El Zaite-San Jose Almendros 15 3.00 2.00 3.00 0.13 1.00 5.88 2.00
Apastepeque Casco 9 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.00
Apastepeque Total 32 2.00 0.67 3.00 0.04 0.33 3.33 2.00
San Sebastian La Labor-Aguacayo 12 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.27 1.00
El Paraiso 8 3.00 0.00 4.00 0.13 2.00 5.93 2.00
San Sebastian Casco 10 2.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 1.00 4.97 2.00
San Sebastian Total 30 2.33 0.00 3.67 0.04 0.67 3.89 2.00
San Vicente Achichilco-San Antonio Caminos 15 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 3.32 2.00
Chucuyo-La Galera 14 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.21 0.00 1.83 1.00
Col. Jiboa-San Diego 12 3.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.10 2.00
Flores suburban 16 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 1.00
San Vicente Casco 28 1.00 0.00 4.00 0.04 1.00 3.37 2.00
San Vicente Total 85 1.80 0.00 3.00 0.05 0.40 2.69 1.00  
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Table 10.1 continued 
 
Municipality Canton
No. 
Persons 
Surveyed
Conflict Zone 
Map Code       
(1-4)
PTT Land 
transferred to 
FMLN        (0-10)
Vote % for 
FMLN 1997 
Election      
(1-5)
FMLN ex-
combatants 
per capita  
(0-1)
FMLN NGOs 
active in 
canton       
(0-2)
Canton Political 
Experience Raw 
Score (0-12.4)
Political 
Experience 
Survey Code
San Pedro NonuSan Ramon 9 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
La Comunidad 10 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.10 0.00 0.92 1.00
San Pedro Nonualco 12 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
San Pedro Nonualco Total 31 1.00 0.00 2.33 0.03 0.00 1.13 1.00
Santiago NonuaSanta Teresa-Chancuyo 12 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
El Sauce-Hoja de Sal 13 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
Santiago Nonualco Casco 12 1.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 1.00
El Chile 8 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Santiago Nonualco Total 45 1.50 0.00 2.75 0.00 0.00 1.85 1.00
Zacatecoluca Santa Lucia 10 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.27 2.00
Tablas-Hatos delos Reyes- Lomita 20 3.00 2.00 4.00 0.25 2.00 7.68 3.00
Zacate suburbano 13 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 4.13 2.00
Zacatecoluca casco 36 2.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.00 4.15 2.00
Zacatecoluca Total 79 2.50 0.25 3.50 0.06 1.00 4.40 2.00
Jiquilisco Romero-La Limonera-El Sisiguayo 18 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.94 2.00 11.58 4.00
California 12 3.00 5.00 4.00 0.42 1.00 9.42 4.00
Jiquilisco Casco 16 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 1.00 3.32 2.00
Jiquilisco Total 46 3.00 3.00 4.00 0.45 1.33 8.11 3.00
Berlin Zapotes-San Lorenzo 15 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 4.17 2.00
Talpetates 13 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.85 2.00 10.67 4.00
Berlin Casco 16 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Berlin Total 44 2.67 1.33 2.67 0.28 1.33 5.22 2.00
Nueva Granada Gualcho 9 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.78 1.00 11.39 4.00
Nueva Carrizal 9 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.27 2.00
Nueva Granada 12 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 1.64 1.00
Nueva Granada Total 30 3.00 1.67 3.33 0.26 0.33 5.43 2.00
Jucuapa Las Marias 12 4.00 4.00 5.00 0.92 2.00 11.56 4.00
Loma de la Cruz 8 2.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.46 1.00
Jucuapa Casco 12 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Jucuapa Total 32 2.33 1.33 3.33 0.31 0.67 4.95 2.00
Ozatlan El Delirio 11 3.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.00 3.31 2.00
Ozatlan Casco - Jocote 18 1.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.00
Ozatlan Total 29 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.50 1.25 1.00
Total 912 2.23 0.00 3.20 0.18 0.70 3.58 2.00
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The designation as an insurgent, counter-insurgent, or disputed zone and the inference of 
an associated insurgent local political culture coincides in part with the political ideology of the 
party in power locally.  In terms of the municipal level results of the most recent elections, the 
FMLN has governed in Tecoluca for three terms as of 1998.   
Two additional indicators measure the presence of FMLN ex-combatants among the local 
population and the presence of FMLN NGOs or gremios such as CORDES, ASDI, FUNDESA, 
FUNPROCOOP, FEDECOOPADES, PROCOMES, CRIPDES, FUNDASPAD, SES, ORC, etc. 
working actively in the community.  Scores for NGO density range from 0, 1, or 2 if 2 or more 
NGOs are noted.  Scores for per capital concentration of FMLN ex-combatants refer to the 
percentage of surveyed respondents that identified themselves as a demobilized ex-combatant or 
a member of the FMLN base.  Scores range from 0 – 1, with a minimum of 0 and an observed 
maximum of 0.91 for cantón Las Marias, near Jucuapa, 0.85 for Talpetates in Berlín, 0.83 for 
cantón Guajoyo in Tecoluca and 0.81 for cantón cluster Los Almendros-El Limón - Las Canoas-  
in San Ildefonso.  Higher scores for both indicators suggest local political experiences are most 
likely associated with the FMLN during the war.   
Consistency among the five variables 
was evaluated using factor analysis, which 
produced a single factor and estimated relative 
loadings for each individual indicator (see 
Table 10.2).  An Alpha score of 0.89 suggests 
the proposed scale variable is reliable.  A 
political experience score for each of the 69 
communities in the survey is calculated by summing the five mean factor scores for each 
community –each weighted by the respective factor loading.  I then subtract the value of the 
minimum score (1.24) to center the range of scores between a lower bound of 0 and an upper 
bound of 12.44.  A high score is associated with insurgent political experiences in zones of 
FMLN control and expansion (community location in a geographic zone influenced by the 
FMLN, a high-density FMLN ex-combatants or PTT land, a vote preference for FMLN).  A low 
score indicates counter-insurgent political experiences in zones of GOES control or expansion.   
To make comparisons within municipalities, the political experience scores are recoded.  
The distribution of scores is divided into quartiles (1: 0-3.11) GOES control zone, (2: 3.11-6.22) 
Table 10.2  Political Experience Context – 
Factor Analysis Component Matrix 
 Component1 
Map Code .810 
1997 FMLN Vote .825 
FMLN ex-combat. .921 
FMLN NGOs .860 
FMLN PTT .816 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
.
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GOES expansion zone, (3:6.22-9.33) FMLN expansion zone, (4:9.33-12.44) FMLN control 
zone.  The distribution of political experiences within the case study municipalities is shown in 
Table 10.3, which shows the distribution of political experience.  The Jiboa Valley is skewed 
almost entirely as a GOES control zone (95%) with only 5% identified as GOES expansion 
communities where control was contested.   Tecoluca is divided between FMLN control (43%), 
FMLN expansion (15%) and GOES expansion (43%).  Here no communities qualified as 
government controlled. Political experience in San Ildefonso slightly favors GOES 
control/expansion (60%) and the other highland communities are identified as an insurgent 
expansion zone (40%).  For the entire survey, FMLN control and expansion represent only 
26.8% of the respondents, which is consistent with various accounts of the territorial and popular 
support achieved during the conflict. 
Control refers to a population that was most actively collaborating with either the FMLN 
or GOES/FAES.  Expansion refers populations that engaged protagonist forces mostly through 
passive collaboration, but may have sought political neutrality to the extent possible.  Every 
square inch of the paracentral region was contested politically and militarily throughout the civil 
war.  Neutrality may have been the choice of those who emigrated or died in refusal to fight, but 
will be indicated here by the expansion zone designation.991  
It might be argued that the context variable is an acceptable measure of past insurgent 
experiences, but does not adequately represent all past political experiences.  The five variables 
are not perfectly defined as a range in which the maximum value represents a proxy associated 
with the FMLN and the minimum value represents a proxy associated with hard-line government 
controlled counter-insurgent communities.  However, I will argue that there is some basis for 
making the claim that these variables will suffice.  PTT land can be located in both insurgent and 
counter-insurgent communities, but tends to be most concentrated in FMLN communities.  This 
is particularly true for cases such as Tecoluca where a significant quota of PTT land was 
assigned to ex-combatants of the Armed Forces, but very few actually occupy the land and live 
in the communities.  There is a negative and statistically significant correlation of -0.37 between 
                                                 
991 Expansion zones are admittedly too ambiguous to isolate what are ultimately a variety of modest to zero political 
commitments to either of the principal protagonists. 
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the per capita ex-combatant/base member ratio for the FMLN and the Armed Forces/civil 
patrols.  That is to say that where ex-combatants or FMLN base veterans are living, ex-
combatants and civil patrol veterans that served in the counter-insurgency tend to be absent.  The 
opposite also tends to be true.  Where NGOs aligned with the FMLN are found, right wing 
NGOs tend to be absent.  Finally, the map code assigned to each community based on various 
sources regarding claims to have held the territory politically also distinguish clearly between 
insurgent and counter-insurgent poles at each end of the spectrum.  So, there is some basis to the 
claim that this political experience variable does account for the full range of counter-insurgent 
to insurgent experiences along a continuum, although admittedly imperfect. 
 
Table 10.3  Distribution of Political Wartime Experience within Municipal Cases 
 
 
 Jiboa 
Valley 
Tecoluca San 
Ildefonso 
Secondary 
Municipalities 
Total 
FMLN control 0 66 
42.6% 
0 64 
13.3% 
130 
14.3% 
FMLN expansion zone 0 23 
14.8% 
48 
40.3% 
43 
8.9% 
114 
12.5% 
GOES expansion zone 8 
5.2% 
66 
42.6% 
15 
12.6% 
183 
37.9% 
272 
29.8% 
GOES control 147 
94.8% 
0 
 
56 
47.1% 
193 
40.0% 
396 
43.4% 
Total 155 
100% 
155 
100% 
119 
100% 
483 
100% 
912 
100% 
 
 
 Some examples might illustrate how these attributes stack up.  In Tecoluca, despite the 
prevailing and dominant influence of the FMLN, the communities of San Nicolás, Santa Cruz, 
and the urban town center, were largely controlled by the military during the war due to their 
strategic importance bordering highways and proximity of government agencies.  FAES 
garrisons were repeatedly attacked but were never overrun, and civilians were organized into 
civil defense patrols.  Residing in these communities are people who fled other more contested 
areas and tended to be sympathetic to the government and hostile to the FMLN.  Near the 
highways, but farther from the protection of the garrisons were communities that resisted FMLN 
requests for collaboration and had family members serving in the military.   These communities 
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were recipients of refugees from neighboring conflict areas, defended cooperatives established 
under the government agrarian reform, and frequently include demobilized FAES soldiers.  In 
Tecoluca, these characteristics which tilt toward government authority and sympathy describe 
the communities of Llano Grande, San Pedro and Vaquerano as GOES expansion zones.   
 The FMLN control zones in Tecoluca were located in the most remote areas - the 
southeastern slopes of the Chinchontepec volcano, the coastal lowlands bordering the Lempa 
River, and the eastern foothills.  In these zones, National Guard posts and FAES garrisons were 
entirely eliminated by the FMLN by 1984.  Many communities were relatively mobile for much 
of the war, as combatants, militia engaged in direct logistical support for the FPL forces in the 
zone.  Some communities were established in exile, as with refugee camps that were allied with 
the FPL.  El Pacún and Nueva Tehuacán represent two FMLN expansion zone communities 
because they include a mix of people who actively or passively collaborated with the FMLN, the 
latter group including resettled refugees from internal refugee camps in San Vicente, 
demobilized FAES combatants, or original beneficiaries of the “Land to the Tiller” phase of the 
government land reform.  Santa Marta is an example of an FMLN control zone community that 
is composed of families originally from outside Tecoluca, but formed a new community in a 
refugee camp established in Sandinista governed Nicaraguan, before repatriating to the coastal 
village where they now live.   
 The communities in the Jiboa Valley suffered less political upheaval and fall largely into 
GOES expansion or control zones.  San Ildefonso can be sectioned into four areas, western 
highland, eastern lowlands, communities bordering the Pan-American Highway, and the town 
center.  Only the first area, which served as an eastern frontier for the concentrations of FMLN 
combatants in the controlled zones to the West, includes four FMLN expansion zone 
communities.  Los Almendros, now composed of demobilized combatants and the civilian base 
of the FMLN, is the only control zone community.   
In the section that follows, I make two types of comparisons to examine the effect of 
contextual political experience.  I first compare case study municipalities, some of which contain 
both insurgent and counter-insurgent communities.  Next I compare between communities 
regrouped according to their respective political experience score, which I refer to as insurgent or 
counter-insurgent control or expansion zones.   
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C. QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF INSURGENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENT 
EMPOWERMENT STRATEGIES 
 
 
Summarizing evidence drawn primarily from the 1998 regional survey, I turn now to a 
comparison of the case study municipalities and political experiences in each aspect of the 
proposed empowerment framework.  To what extent can we measure the impact that the 
processes described in previous chapters have had in terms of the acquisition of capital resources 
and the conversion of these resources into individual level achievements of meeting basic needs, 
social and political action; local problem solving and advocacy and resource mobilization?  I 
examine resource acquisition, mediating attitudes and achievements. 
 
1.  Resources 
 
Capital stocks are simultaneously inputs and outputs of the empowerment process.   
Empowerment begins with an initial stock of capital, but generally sustains or increases capital 
stocks as a consequence in addition to producing other achievements.  We are faced with a 
temporal sequence problem involving the identification of a starting point in the recursive 
process that leads from resources to achievements.  There are also conditions of trade-off, where 
an increase in one form of capital may necessarily diminish the stock of another form.  An 
increase in economic capital from having a successful occupation may come at the expense of 
time available to participate in the life of one’s community.  Conversely, distance from 
population center or markets may reduce exit options but increase communal ties.    
Any cross-sectional analysis of an empowerment process is unable to accurately 
distinguish between beginning capital resources or achievement capital resources.  Data 
limitations make it impossible to say with certainty whether people are empowered as the 
outcome of a process, or whether already empowered people determined the outcome of that 
process. The short time period of observation for most of the rural development interventions in 
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this study prohibits any clear solution to this methodological problem, except to attempt careful 
inferences when available data on resource and achievement indicators permit. 
 A second issue involves the assignment of attitudinal and behavioral variables as 
resources, intervening factors or achievements.  Social ties and collective efficacy, both 
measured by attitudinal responses to survey questions, are considered to be social and political 
capital resources, respectively, because they measure the potential availability of two types of 
communal solidarity typically conducive to local participation.  Both indicators could arguably 
be included as mediating attitudes or possibly even achievements, but address actions that could 
potentially happen but may not have yet.  So too with several attitudinal achievement indicators 
(political efficacy, satisfaction with local decision making, and perceptions of gender influence), 
which could arguably be included as intervening attitudes rather than achievements.  They are 
included as achievements because these attitudinal indicators are associated with actions that are 
likely to have already occurred.  While debatable, the assignment is of little consequence to an 
analysis that does not attempt to model the temporal order of the proposed empowerment 
process.   
Table I.4 in Appendix I lists twenty indicators of capital resources.  Economic capital is 
measured in by reported income, land, land that is farmed, Gini index of land distribution, land 
owned under collective title, remittances, household occupation to family size ratio (dependency 
index) and indices of household and agricultural asset ownership.  Of these indicators, land 
inequality is the most significant.  As noted in chapter eight, the impact of insurgent and counter-
insurgent political experiences in the redistribution of land is the foundation for leveling 
inequality in all other aspects of empowerment resources.  Tecoluca has a much lower level of 
land inequality that San Ildefonso or the Jiboa Valley.  The Jiboa Valley reported a higher 
economic capital stock with income, remittance flows, household and farm assets.  Tecoluca has 
slight advantages in livestock and labor dependency ratios.  Collective land ownership reported 
by over a third of producers in Tecoluca is a vestige of the proindiviso status under which many 
PTT properties were transferred, but is considered a potential advantage for producers. 
Farm size is the single economic indicator favoring San Ildefonso, albeit misleading 
given the low land quality.  Although economic capital stocks favor the Jiboa Valley, the 
absolute levels are low and indicative of the high rates of extreme poverty in the region.   
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 This pattern generally holds for human capital.  The mean education level is highest in 
the Jiboa Valley, both in terms of average adult achievement and the maximum achieved 
education level within the household – the latter being an indication of possible a positive 
demonstration effect.  However, in terms of ability to name local or national political 
representatives – considered a proxy for tacit civic knowledge – San Ildefonso is the most 
informed and Jiboa Valley is the least. 
 Table I.4 also compares the economic and human capital endowments of the paracentral 
region survey communities regrouped according to their respective political experiences.  In 
some contrast to municipal averages, the differences in human and economic capital with respect 
to cohorts of insurgent and counter-insurgent communities are defined more sharply.  FMLN 
control and expansion communities report lower overall incomes, a lower number of household 
assets and have lower levels of education.  FMLN control communities report a lower receipt of 
remittances and a smaller farm size, although the differences are not statistically significant.  On 
the other hand, FMLN communities report a lower level of land inequality, a lower dependency 
index, and higher percentage of collective land ownership and higher access to farm assets 
(although the latter indicator is not significant).  The lower economic capital levels in FMLN 
communities are in part due to a higher dependence on farm related occupations, the newer, 
more socially reconfigured communities, and lower parent’s SES.  Together, these indicators 
strongly suggest that the lower socio-economic status of FMLN communities should predict a 
lower level of participation and be associated with weaker dispositions toward being able to 
effectively participate.   
 Social capital is measured in the context of daily concrete social situations as well as the 
physical attributes of each community.  Survey respondents were first asked to what extent they 
could count on their neighbors to help in various situations. The index of social ties is based on 
the sum of responses to four questions which asked, “How willing do you think your neighbors 
would be to help you in the following ways: watching your children once, watching your 
children for a week if you needed to leave the community, tending your work if you fell sick, 
helping you repair the house or bring in a harvest, and lending you money?” Respondents 
answered on a 1-4 scale of very willing, somewhat willing, somewhat unwilling, and not willing 
at all.  The average scores were summed, and converted to a [0-10] scale, where a higher score 
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indicates stronger social ties.992  San Ildefonso reports the strongest social ties and Jiboa Valley 
the weakest.   
 Associational density measures the reported participation in any one of six local 
organizations (religious, school parents, ADESCO, cooperative, union and other).993  The index 
reflects the cumulative total of organizations identified in a particular community averaged 
across each municipal case.  Tecoluca and San Ildefonso report 2.6-2.7 organizations per 
community, compared to only 2.1 in the Jiboa Valley.  Finally, the distances to the closest paved 
road or market are considered proxies for exit options from the community.  Proximity to 
transport routes or population centers tends to diminish reliance on social ties to the community.  
On average, communities in the Jiboa Valley are located closer to both exit options, and San 
Ildefonso is two to four times farther away.  Based on these four indicators, social capital tends 
to favor San Ildefonso and would appear to be least in the Jiboa Valley.  
 Political capital is measured in two ways.  First, civic engagement measures the ability to 
contact authorities to make a request or demand and as such represents political access.  The 
survey asked, “Have you made a request for assistance for the cooperation of the 
mayor/municipal council, an NGO, some agency of the national government?”  Typical 
municipal or NGO requests ranged from individual transactions (document certification, 
personal reference or credit) to public requests (specific project proposal or to attend to some 
community problem).  Government requests also included indemnification under programs of the 
Peace Accords in areas of FMLN influence. 
Table I.1 shows the highest level of access is in San Ildefonso for local government and 
Tecoluca for national government officials or NGOs – this latter indicator is over two times that 
reported in the Jiboa Valley reflecting the disproportionate absence of NGOs there.  When 
control for political experience is introduced, FMLN control or expansion zones report the 
highest level of contacts with authorities at all levels, and the difference with other political 
zones is statistically significant.  Of the three types of contacts (municipal, national, and NGO), 
the higher frequency of contacts within FMLN zones is most pronounced for contacting NGOs.  
The differences are statistically significant (ρ <0.001).  FMLN communities tend to contact 
                                                 
992 The Alpha statistic measuring the reliability of the scale variable is 0.89.   
993 Participation in women’s organizations is treated separately below as a political action achievement 
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government agencies more frequently than GOES communities (ρ < 0.01).  However, the 
strength of the relationship for case study differences in contacting mayors or council members is 
not statistically significant.  We might argue that differences in contacting NGOs between 
political zones may be a function of the density of organizational presence in each zone.  The gap 
between men and women in FMLN zones of influence remains and is slightly higher than the 
gap in GOES zones.  Yet FMLN women report a higher frequency of contacts with authorities, 
than men in all other zones.   
In general, the intensity of civic engagement is low, with an average of less than one 
contact of the three institutions per respondent.  However, communication with public officials is 
limited by the lack of telephones and a functioning mail service, as well as the disincentive of 
losing a day’s labor to make the trip to the office of the respective public agency.  However, even 
this level of access to public officials for the 1998 paracentral sample stand out when compared 
to Salvadoran surveys from other years.  Figure 10.1 compares civic engagement levels for the 
paracentral region for the 1991 San Salvador survey, a 1995, 1998 and 1999 national sample, the 
paracentral survey reflects a surprisingly more active civil society, for both men and women, 
than rural cohorts represented in recent national samples.    
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Figure 10.1  Political Capital – Access to Local and National Officials (Paracentral Survey 
compared to other National Samples 
 
 
 Collective efficacy is measured by three questions that represent the perceived 
availability of principled solidarity as a resource for solving political challenges that the 
community might face.  The survey asked two questions regarding the extent to which a person 
believes that they could count on the support of their neighbors and whether they themselves 
would opt for joining a local protest to resolve political problems in the community.  The first 
question asks, “If the community confronted a serious problem (such as the excessive cost of 
electricity or contamination of the community by a nearby business), to what extent your 
neighbors could be counted on to resolve it?  The second one asks, “If the government 
announced a project that would harm the community and some of your neighbors tried to 
organize a protest against the project, would you be (very much in favor, somewhat in favor, 
somewhat against, very much against) participating in this activity?  Reported responses indicate 
the percent of those surveyed who would be “very much in favor” of participating in a protest to 
solve a local problem.   A third question asks about opposition with a statement proposing that 
economic progress would be acceptable even at the expense of short-term inequality - “Some 
people say that for things to improve economically, some may gain more than others in the short 
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term.” Respondents were then asked to indicate strong, or partial agreement or disagreement 
with the proposition.  
 For all three questions, Tecoluca and FMLN control zone communities in general 
demonstrate significantly higher levels of collective efficacy.  Three out of four Tecolucans 
would join a protest organized locally, although generalized protest dispositions are high in 
general - even in the Jiboa Valley.  Insurgents appear to enjoy more pronounced communal 
norms that would facilitate Community collective action strategies for political action.  Jiboa 
Valley and counter-insurgent zone respondents in general report a lower confidence in collective 
problem solving or inclination to engage in protest against a harmful government project.   
Equity demands constitute a radical orientation given the overwhelming free market 
ideology now prevalent in El Salvador.  Equality is considered to have been a principle that was 
both endorsed and practiced as a revolutionary goal among supporters of the FMLN, and is 
consistent with the lower land inequality Gini coefficient for FMLN communities.  We might 
have expected Tecoluca and FMLN zones to demonstrate a stronger disagreement with the 
proposed statement than the results indicate.  Yet, strong support for equitable development is 
lower than 50% in all case study communities, suggesting that individualist strategies prevail.  
Tecoluca ranks highest in its endorsement of equity, and San Ildefonso ranks lowest.   
For the first time, regrouping communities in terms of their political experience does not 
result in an increase in challenge oriented attitudes for FMLN control zone residents.  Support 
for equitable development falls from 44.5% in Tecoluca to only 37.9% in FMLN control zones 
and only 12.4% in FMLN expansion zone communities.  Only slightly more than a third of 
FMLN control zone residents assert that development and equity should be linked.  Men are 
more supportive of equitable development than women in FMLN zones, while women are more 
interested than men in equality in GOES zones. 
This result suggests an even further weakening of support for equity as a principle of 
development in general, regardless of political experiences.  The post-war period has relaxed 
these commitments, particularly in San Ildefonso and insurgent expansion zones, as collective 
commitments have withered and individualist strategies have returned.  
 The distribution of capital stock summarized in Table I.1 reveals a mixed picture.  
Among the three case studies, the distribution is relatively even.  The Jiboa Valley holds a slight 
advantage in terms of human and economic capital, while Tecoluca and San Ildefonso hold a 
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similar advantage in political and social capital.  This same pattern holds when respondents are 
reorganized according to political experience.  Government controlled counter-insurgent 
communities hold advantages in economic and human capital, while insurgent FMLN controlled 
communities have an edge in terms of social and political capital.  The expansion communities 
approximate the capital stock of their respective peer communities in control zones. 
 
 
2.  Mediating Attitudes 994  
 
Empowerment achievements at both the individual level or aggregated at the level of the 
community are mediated by certain attitudinal underpinnings.  These include of self-confidence, 
trust, life satisfaction, economic optimism, aspirations for development achievement, political 
efficacy, the level of radical preferences for social change, religious fatalism, and confidence in 
political institutions.  Table I.2 summarizes how these attitudes vary between insurgent and 
counter-insurgent municipalities.  I define mediating attitudes as follows: 
Interpersonal Trust:   The interpersonal trust index is well-known variable often used as 
a surrogate for social capital (Inglehart 1990; Wrightsman 1991; Putnam 1993; Rose, et al 
(1997).  It is based on the sum of responses to three classic questions (are people here generally 
trustworthy; do most people look out for themselves or try to help their neighbors; do you think 
most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance).  The overall mean score to the 
three questions was converted to a [0-10] scale, where a higher value indicates greater inter-
personal trust.995  All of the case study municipalities registered levels of trust below the survey 
mean of 5.7, with no statistical difference between them.  Difference in trust between insurgent 
and counter-insurgent communities is also non-significant.   
                                                 
994 Again, scale variables are constructed where appropriate for attitudinal variables.  Varimax rotated component 
factor analysis revealed distinct and theoretically consistent dimensions for the variables system support, tolerance, 
inter-personal trust, political efficacy, and life satisfaction.  The additional dimensions were suggested from 
individual efficacy questions. 
995 Reliability for the index is 0.70 (Alpha score). 
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Figure 10.2 Inter-Personal Trust in El Salvador, 1991-1999 
 
Perhaps a more important question is whether this reported level of trust is high or low.  
Figure 10.2 presents comparisons to recent national surveys in El Salvador, and trust in the 
paracentral region in 1998 exceeds all other estimates.996 LatinoBarómeter studies have 
underscored the low levels of inter-personal trust throughout Latin America as one explanation 
for the collapse in democratic indicators, and thus an obstacle to many aspects of 
                                                 
996 This gap in trust, an attribute that is slow to change, may at first raise suspicions about the comparability of the 
data.  It is worth noting that the difference is due in part to the higher rural percentage of households in the 1998 
paracentral sample where trust tends to be higher.  The 1991 sample is largely an urban sample. 
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development.997  For Putnam (1993) as well, traditions of civic activity and well-performing 
democratic institutions should be associated with high levels of trust, the glue of social capital. 
However, tests of the trust-democracy causal claims for the developing world conducted by 
Inglehart (1988, 1990) have yielded little empirical validation (Muller and Seligson, 1994).  
Efforts to test for the effect of trust on democratic development have neither produced any 
conclusive confirmation of Putnam’s claims (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000).   
Given the trauma and transformation of family and community caused by the war, there 
are reasons to expect lower levels of trust in both insurgent and counter-insurgent communities.  
We could plausibly argue that dramatic changes in an individual’s social structure may produce 
both positive and negative psycho-social effects.   The rupture of a solidary peasant culture, 
coupled with the lost trust of friends and family may represent a net loss to surviving community 
members if pre-war social networks reinforced an inclusive social contract.  The experiences of 
violence and betrayal on both sides have also undoubtedly eroded trust.  Fogaroli and Stowell 
(1997) have argued that the recomposition of post-war communities in Tecoluca exhibit these 
concerns.  Survey evidence indicated that FMLN influence is associated with greater 
recomposition.  However, it may be just as likely that pre-war networks reinforced patterns of 
high inequality, the reconstruction of which may not be in the positive interest of the majority.   
Life Satisfaction: Reported satisfaction with occupation, family income, house and 
health care are combined to provide an indication of life satisfaction.998  The mean scores, 
converted to a [0-10] scale, are averaged across municipalities and communities according to 
their political experience.  Differences are not significant. 
Optimism (Economic Expectations): People were asked whether they believed that the 
economic conditions for themselves and their family would be better, worse or the same in the 
coming year.  Despite lower apparent starting points in most economic aspects, the higher levels 
                                                 
997 For Latin America as a whole, only 20% reported trust in their neighbor.  Those countries with highest reported 
levels of trust were Mexico (43%), Nicaragua (35%), Colombia (32%) Uruguay (31%) and Costa Rica and El 
Salvador (30%).  El Diario de Hoy, April 5, 1998, p. 7.  We cannot easily explain the association between trust and 
system support variables like confidence in institutions, when two very different political systems like El Salvador 
and Costa Rica report equally low inter-personal trust.    
998 A bias in the definition of life satisfaction toward certain income, job, house and health care may not represent 
universal values. 
  683
of optimism were found in Tecoluca and insurgent controlled communities.  The lowest level of 
economic optimism was found in the Jiboa Valley and counter-insurgent areas. 
Impact of the war: I include two key subjective indicators that reflect a community’s 
collective evaluation of the war’s impact.  The Salvadoran civil war was extremely violent, 
disruptive and brought extreme hardship to the lives of millions of families.  The war also 
introduced modest political reforms, redistributed some wealth to the poor and middle classes, 
and ended the impunity of the security forces.  Given this mixed legacy, there can be no 
universally acceptable evaluation of the war’s impact.  Supporters of the government tend to 
delegitimize the FMLN rationale for taking up arms and therefore are more likely to evaluate the 
civil war in negative terms.  Conversely, positive evaluations of the war will most likely be 
associated with FMLN supporters.  However, it is also likely that the majority of respondents 
may see little change at all.  Moreover, many others remain fearful of making public judgments 
about the war.   
Two open-ended questions were asked in the survey to measure the respondents’ 
qualitative evaluation of the global costs and benefits of the civil war and an evaluation of the 
specific changes in community life as a consequence of the war.  The first open-ended question 
asked respondents how they perceived life in their community to be different (better/worse) that 
it had been before the war.  Answers were coded on a five point scale, with 0 signifying a 
response consistent with “much worse than before” and a score of 5 signifying a score consistent 
with “much better than before”.   
The second open-ended question asked respondents to name what, if anything, the war 
achieved.  Answers were coded on a five-point scale ranging from 0 for answers characterizing 
only costs to a 5 for those answers strongly emphasizing the benefits.  A middle score of 3 was 
assigned to those who identified peace as the only achievement.  I expect FMLN supporters and 
combatants to emphasize benefits, while ARENA and GOES supporters to emphasize costs.  The 
answers were coded with low scores signifying negative evaluations and high score signifying 
positive evaluations.   
Development Aspirations: People were asked to answer an open ended question, “What 
improvements in your life would you like to achieve in the future?  The answers were coded on a 
scale of 1-5, based on the reported level of ambition (preserve subsistence, general economic 
progress, or specific economic targets) and the extent to which the goals would benefit an 
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individual, the family or the community more broadly.  High ranked answers identified 
collective goals (public goods) that extended beyond basic needs to the acquisition of various 
capital resources noted in Table I.1.  The highest development aspirations are reported in 
Tecoluca and FMLN communities in general.  Lower aspirations are found in the Jiboa Valley 
and in government controlled zones in general. 
Religious Fatalism – Passivity in the face of structural obstacles to development is one 
consequence of the conservative hierarchical Catholic Church that prevailed in El Salvador 
before Vatican II, and persists in many parts of post-war society.   To measure the extent of 
religious fatalism, people were asked to report their level of agreement or disagreement with the 
following proposition, “Some say that if we are closer to God, the problems of this country will 
get resolved by themselves.”  The mean level of opposition (scale 1-4) is 2.2 for the survey 
sample, which suggests some agreement with the suggestion that individual spiritual devotion 
alone will resolve pressing national problems.  Tecoluca is alone among the three municipal case 
studies in moderate opposition to this perspective. An indication of the lasting impression of the 
conservative church in places like the Jiboa Valley is the relatively high level of support for the 
fatalist view in government control zones.999   
Political Efficacy – Efficacy is probably the attitudinal concept most closely associated 
with empowerment.  I am interested here in internal efficacy, or what Converse defined as, “an 
individual’s sense of his [sic] own fundamental capacities and experience in operating in the 
political domain” (1972:334). Numerous studies have illustrated how internal political efficacy is 
positively correlated with conventional political participation (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954; 
Finifter 1970).  Gamson (1968) has argued, and considerable research has confirmed, that low 
confidence in the institutions of the political system (system support) and high efficacy are the 
psychological tinder of political protest.1000  Indeed, Muller (1977) argues that in the absence of 
personal efficacy indicators, system support does not predict much about political behavior.  
                                                 
999 Differences between men (mean of 3.0) and women (2.7) in Tecoluca are significant, as well as in FMLN control 
zones (2.85 vs. 2.5).  The strongest indication of religious fatalism is found among women in government expansion 
zone communities (1.95). 
1000 For studies of the efficacy-system support correlate of participatory modes, see Paige (1971), Balch (1974), 
Seligson (1980) and Bandura (1995) 
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Still, either as a positive concept (self-governing) or a negative one (powerlessness), there is little 
agreement over the optimal construct to measure efficacy. 
 Efficacy must therefore be treated as a multi-dimensional concept, with separate and 
unique components.  Muller has suggested three dimensions: “1) a general belief that 
government is responsive to citizen influence; 2) skills necessary for effective political behavior; 
and 3) a psychological disposition or feeling of confidence in one’s personal ability to influence 
salient government decisions” (Muller, 1970:793).  As a central explanatory factor to my 
argument, I explore the measurement of efficacy using three similarly structured conceptual 
indicators. A second debate between participatory democracy advocates like Pateman (1970) 
who argue that participation fosters a sense of efficacy, and adversarial democracy proponents 
like Verba who reverse the temporal order, will be addressed more directly in the next section. 
Subjective Competence:   A person’s sense of self-confidence is the perception of being 
able to influence political processes and outcomes.  Respondents were asked, “Would you say 
that persons such as yourself have much, some influence or no influence over the decisions that 
are made by groups in this community?  This question taps a generalized sense of confidence, 
least precise in terms of a specific context, but consistent with a bedrock attitudinal indicator 
used widely since Almond and Verba’s classic 1963 study (Almond and Verba, 1963).  Greater 
perceived influence in local group decisions represents a traditional indicator of internal efficacy.  
Original responses ranging from 1-3 were converted to a 0-10 scale.  Insurgent responses in 
Tecoluca and FMLN control communities were well above the survey mean of 3.95 and highest 
in general.  Jiboa Valley and counter-insurgent attitudes suggested the lowest levels of subjective 
confidence.   
The gap between Tecoluca and Jiboa Valley communities is substantial and statistically 
significant (ρ<.001 for political efficacy, and ρ <.01 for subjective competence).  There is no 
overall statistically significant difference between men’s and women’s political efficacy or 
subjective competence, although women report higher levels of political efficacy than men in the 
Jiboa Valley and in the GOES expansion zone.1001   
Political Efficacy-does voting matter?: In the survey, four common questions asked 
people to value the importance of their vote by evaluating reasons that other people give for not 
                                                 
1001 However, we must remember that women living in FMLN expansion zones reported the highest level of 
abstention (54%).   
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voting. The stronger the rejection of any of the four rationales for abstention suggests a higher 
level of political efficacy.  Political efficacy fits Muller’s psychological disposition of confidence 
dimension of efficacy.  The scores were summed and converted to a scale of [0-10] (a = 0.76).  
The survey mean for political efficacy is 5.4 and the mean for women is 5.2.  The results offer 
additional indications that empowerment is influenced by past political experience with 
insurgents placing a higher premium on the value of their vote.   
Institutional Trust:1002 General trust in political institutions approximates Muller’s third 
measure of efficacy, but has also been defined as a form of political or social capital.1003  Low 
institutional trust signals a danger zone within a democratizing political culture.  High trust in 
government institutions has been argued to factor heavily in the stability of a political system and 
therefore a pre-requisite for economic development (Lipset 1961, 1994, Easton 1975, Miller 
1974, Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982, and Seligson and Booth 1993).  However, we know 
little about the relationship between institutional trust and political participation or the other 
dimensions of empowerment. Critics of the government may be more motivated to participate 
than satisfied citizens, yet might also face greater obstacles to participating such as voting rights 
restrictions, agenda setting at local meetings or coercion.  We should therefore expect that low 
confidence in government can mobilize participation, but unconventional modes may only be 
possible as a condition of other attitudes, such as efficacy.1004   
Institutional trust was defined as the reported confidence (none, a little, some, much) 
vested in eight key institutions (parties, police, central government, local government, the armed 
forces, electoral magistrate, legislative assembly and the human rights ombudsman.  The sum of 
the means of the responses to each question converted the total to a scale ranging from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 10.1005  Confidence in the principal institutions of El Salvador is 
low in absolute terms (high trust is defined at or above a summed score of 5.0). The entire survey 
                                                 
1002 Seligson has referred to this measure as system support, although the survey questions used to measure the 
concept have changed in more recent analyses.  Comparisons are made here to the original variable definition, 
however to avoid confusion, I refer to the concept as institutional trust. 
1003 See Rossing, Feldman and Assaf (1999) for reference to diffuse trust in government as a social capital resource.   
1004 Trusting and critical citizens alike may or may not participate depending in part on individual attributes that 
contribute to apathy or conformity.  I deal with Gamson’s efficacy-cynicism thesis below. 
1005 Cronbach Alpha score of .83 suggests adequate scale reliability. 
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produced a mean of 4.5.  This regional level of confidence in national institutions is significantly 
lower than that found by Seligson in recent national surveys.  For 1991, the mean for institutional 
trust was estimated at 5.0.  For 1995, the mean had risen to 5.3, and by 1999 to 5.4.1006  San 
Ildefonso reported the highest support for government (4.8) and Jiboa Valley the lowest (4.0).  
Controlling for political experience, distrust of most state institutions is greatest among 
communities in zones previously controlled by the FMLN (3.9), which may not be surprising due 
to the historic exclusion of the FMLN from the political system.  System support is slightly 
higher and about even in all other surveyed communities (4.6-4.7).   
A lack of faith in the primary political institutions may not seem surprising among FMLN 
communities, given the institutionalized persecution of leftist insurgents and their supporters 
during almost two decades of war and their current position as an opposition party and lesser 
relative influence at the national level.   On the other hand, we would expect institutional trust to 
be relatively higher in communities associated with the government and allegedly immune to the 
influence of the revolutionary ideology.  However, the institutions of the current political system 
are also distrusted by the hard-line right in the Jiboa Valley for contemporaneous rationales - i.e. 
“selling out” to the FMLN by restricting the property and civil rights of the landed elite with the 
signing of the Peace Accords.    
 Seligson and Booth argue that former dissidents tend to be less confident in political 
institutions as a function of their political exclusion.  In their comparative study of Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, the authors conclude that institutional trust (which the authors label system 
support) taps strategically manipulated attitudes, that underpin a political culture that is 
“contingent, utilitarian, and malleable” (1993:790).  If the authors are correct, then such political 
attitudes will be poor independent predictors of participation.    
Preferences for Social Change:   A related question was designed by Inglehart to 
measure the extent of political moderation associated with democratic consolidation.  It asked 
respondents to what extent they supported radical change by revolutionary means, gradual 
improvements though reforms, or valiant defense against revolutionary movements, as the 
preferable description of how society should be changed.  The results represent the percent of 
                                                 
1006 My scale construction differs slightly with those of Seligon and Córdova (1995: 43-55).  I take the mean of 
values of at least four of eight system support questions.  I take the mean instead of summing the raw scores in order 
to avoid eliminating up to one third of the cases per year due to missing values.  I also set the cutoff points toward 
the lowest segment, thus slightly biasing low system support.   
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respondents that chose “radical revolutionary means”.   Support for radical revolutionary means 
for social change, which according to Inglehart, constitutes a regression from democracy, still 
finds support among 24% of Tecolucans, but almost no support in the other two municipal case 
studies and less than 7% of all respondents).  Nearly one in five residents of the Jiboa Valley 
reports a reactionary position that social change should defend against revolution. 
Support for revolutionary change is almost exclusively an attitude of FMLN control zone 
communities, barely registering even in the communities in FMLN expansion areas.  Gender 
differences in support for revolutionary change show that FMLN men are more radical than 
women.  Inglehart argues that democratizing societies should demonstrate a consensus around 
gradual reforms as the optimal strategy for social change, but Tecoluca confounds this argument 
with its combination of highly democratic and highly conflictive attitudes.  
 The attitudes that are most closely associated with empowerment reveal significant 
differences between the municipal case studies, which tend to become clearer when communities 
are compared on the basis of their political experience.  Of the eleven attitudinal indicators, the 
evidence suggests that Tecoluca manifests higher levels of confidence, political and personal 
efficacy, optimism and development aspirations, combined with lower satisfaction with actual 
economic circumstances, higher distrust of government institutions, a premium placed on the 
achievements of the war and a stronger preference for radical social change.  In the Jiboa Valley, 
we find almost the polar opposite views - the lowest aspirations, efficacy, and optimism, but also 
the lowest confidence in government.  Preferences of social change tend to be much more 
conservative, even reactionary, and coincide with higher levels of spiritual fatalism.  In San 
Ildefonso, we find contrasting attitudes.  The highest levels of system support, fatalism, 
economic pessimism and conservative preferences for social change contrast with relatively high 
political efficacy and development aspirations.   
When we control for political experience, FMLN control zones stand out even more.  The 
communities most associated with insurgent political experiences report more empowered 
attitudes in eight of nine indicators (in which differences are statistically significant).  
Conversely, those communities most associated with hard-line counter-insurgent political 
experiences suggest the least empowered attitudes.   
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3. Achievements 
 
Empowerment reproduces capital resources by converting them into achievements.  Four broad 
dimensions of empowerment achievements include fulfillment of basic needs, social or political 
action, resource mobilization and local problem solving-advocacy skills.  Access to minimum 
health, clean water, shelter and electricity are all considered basic for survival.  I add to these 
social and political actions, which combine actual voice in social or political decisions, the 
evidence of participation in community life and local politics, and the level of actual voting or 
protest participation within the municipality.  Local problem solving and advocacy skills will 
compare the attitudes of capacity with reported preferences and actual attempts to solve 
identified local problems, with attention to the level of coordination, contentious versus 
accommodative orientations, and the encompassing or hierarchy features of an advocacy 
coalition (horizontal and vertical ties). Finally, resource mobilization at the household level will 
include income improvements, productivity and diversification (particularly for agriculture 
producers) land use, land security and access to credit.   
The indicators for empowerment achievements reflect survey averages as specified for 
1998.  The sample for specific questions varies, sometimes limiting the question to the 
subsample of landowners or renters (n=435), women (n= 444) or those engaging local officials.  
Many of these indicators have changed since 1998.  However, the trends that these indicators 
suggest should provide a reasonable prediction regarding the current achievements (2005), 
especially considering the devastating impact of recent floods and earthquakes. 
 
a.  Meeting Basic Needs:  
 
The first dimension of empowerment achievements involves meeting basic needs.  Table 10.6 
lists the results for nine indicators of this type achievement.   
 
Access to Basic Services: In terms of access to water, electricity, housing and health care, 
Jiboa Valley and Tecoluca are closely paired in three of the four services.  The Jiboa Valley has 
a higher percentage of people with access to electricity, roughly twice the number reported in 
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San Ildefonso or Tecoluca.  We find one of the widest observed gaps between insurgent and 
counter-insurgent communities in terms of access to electricity, with a three to fourfold 
difference.   
Tecoluca, which benefits from a level surface area, has achieved the highest level of 
private access to water, which refers to the percent of households reporting a private well or 
piped in source.1007  San Ildefonso exhibits the most severe deficit, although these conditions 
most likely prevailed before the war.  San Fonchanos comment ironically that they lack 
sufficient drinking water and struggle without electricity in most homes, despite the fact that 
municipal lands were donated toward the construction of the hydroelectric dam with a 50 square 
kilometer reservoir.  Both FMLN and government controlled communities enjoy significantly 
higher access to water than expansion zone communities. 
Three types of houses are found in rural communities: concrete block, adobe brick and 
bahareque style houses (a combination of plant fiber and mud).  The latter is typically associated 
with extreme poverty.  Despite widespread preferences for adobe brick for its heat resistance 
qualities, adobe dwelling have proven least resistant to recurrent flooding and seismic 
activity.1008  Thus, only first type of house is considered permanent.  Yet only just over a third of 
the houses surveyed were constructed from concrete block and 15% were living in bahareque 
houses.  Despite the massive loss of infrastructure due to the war in Tecoluca, the municipality 
has achieved the highest level of permanent housing.  This is most likely due to the 2,000 new 
concrete block houses built since 1992 in projects associated with the Peace Accords.  In San 
Ildefonso, only 10% occupied permanent housing and over a third of those surveyed were living 
bahareque style houses.  A similar housing advantage is held by FMLN control zone 
communities. 
                                                 
1007 The percentages in Table I.3 do not reflect access to potable drinking water nor do they address the irregularity 
of service.   Water from wells often disappears in the dry months and wells are frequently ruined by floods, but have 
the distinct advantage of providing relatively cost-free water.  Piped systems are slightly more reliable in the dry 
months, although outages are frequent and these systems carry the added burden of a monthly charge.  Water quality 
is poor, often non-potable in both cases.  Wells and piped systems are comparable, thus grouped as a single 
category. 
1008 While adobe block houses possess certain thermal and cost advantages, the clay-straw construction material has 
proven inadequate for long term needs, collapse under flooding or tremors (both relatively frequent in the zone), and 
contribute to respiratory problems by producing higher internal airborne particulate densities.  Despite local 
preferences and the low cost of adobe, I do not consider such housing permanent. 
  691
 Access to health care is measured by the percentage of respondents that reported that they 
were very satisfied with the most recent medical assistance.  Only two in four reported access to 
fully satisfactory health care, with no clear trend among municipal cases or otherwise.  The Jiboa 
Valley reported a lower proportion of beneficiaries of recent local development projects, 
although at least 60% have reported benefiting from at least one.   Project activity is highest in 
Tecoluca and San Ildefonso, perhaps a reflection of higher levels of reconstruction among ex-
combatant communities.1009 
Four of the five indicators of basic needs achievements reveal significant advances by 
FMLN communities, particularly Tecoluca.  This suggests that gap reflected by economic and 
human capital may be closing.   
 
b.  Social and Political Action   
 
The second dimension of empowerment achievements involves social and political action.  Table 
I.3 lists the results for thirteen indicators of this type achievement.   
 
Voice in Local Decision Making: Social or political action is measured here first by the 
perceived range of participation in community decision-making that involves local institutional 
leaders (mayors, councilpersons, agricultural extensionists, loan officers, public works designers, 
local businesspeople) and community members.  Each respondent was asked in an open-ended 
question format, to describe the decision making process in their respective communities.  The 
question was worded, “who makes the most important decisions in the community?”  Answers 
were coded on a scale from 1–7.  The seven-point scale was converted to a 0-10 point range, for 
which the survey mean was 5.8, and the mean for women was 5.7. Low scores indicated no 
knowledge of the process or a response indicating that decisions were made exclusively by un-
elected, or unaccountable leaders.  Intermediate scores indicated that decisions were made with 
formal, albeit limited representation of the community at large.  High scores indicated a 
                                                 
1009 Self-reporting as a beneficiary of a project is also a subjective ascription as projects were underway in nearly 
every community surveyed and it depended on the evaluation of the respondent as to whether they felt they would 
eventually realize a benefit or had participated in some way.   
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perception that most of the community participated directly in local decisions, in active 
coordination with local authorities.  The question measures a respondent’s political knowledge 
(who makes decisions and how). 
Tecoluca reported the most decentralized local decision making with a mean of 6.9, while 
the Jiboa Valley reported the least decentralized participation in local decisions with a mean of 
5.0.  San Ildefonso reported a mean of 6.1.  Decentralization is highest in FMLN control zones, 
while government control zones represent the other extreme with a mean score of 5.2.  The gap 
between insurgent and counter-insurgent communities is nearly 2.5 points.  These gaps strongly 
underscore the relative dispersion of power in the former and concentration in the latter.  
The results suggest a variation in local decision making power exercised by non-elites 
that is consistent with the competing empowerment strategies.   What varied in the answers was 
the extent to which decisions were taken by individuals (e.g. the mayor only) to expanding 
representation (the mayor, town council and some non-elected local authorities) to 
approximations of direct participation of affected people (“we all participate in the most 
important decisions”).  The answers varied from a low of “no one, everyone for themselves” to a 
maximum level of participation (“everyone, with some independence of the municipal 
government”).   
One could argue that a person might be satisfied with a non-participatory decision 
making process.  Is a low score evidence of powerlessness?  The survey posed a follow-up 
question (also open-ended) that asked the same respondent to evaluate the process just described.  
The question was worded, “Are you satisfied with this decision making process, explain why?”  
Government control communities (and the Jiboa Valley) report the lowest satisfaction with how 
decisions are made, but FMLN communities (and Tecoluca) report only slightly higher 
satisfaction.  A higher response to the lead question (indicating more decentralized participatory 
decision making) is moderately and positively correlation (r = 0.32, sig. < .001) with positive 
evaluations of the process described.  This result suggests that more participation is generally 
desirable, but there is also considerable satisfaction with non-participatory processes as well as 
dissatisfaction despite the relatively greater levels of local involvement.   
 
Effective demand making: Access to local officials represents political capital, but 
converting access into results is a different matter.  As noted in the previous chapter, the 
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fulfillment of requests made to local and national authorities varied significantly between 
institutions and slightly between municipalities.  Over 80% of those who made requests also 
reported getting what they requested from NGOs, with little variation between municipal or 
political categories.  This compares to only 40% of requests to municipal governments and 60% 
of requests to national government agencies.  Jiboa Valley requests to mayors of councilpersons 
were met 53% of the time, compared to only 28% in San Ildefonso and 47% in Tecoluca.  
Tecoluca requests to government agencies were met over 60% of the time, compared to 50% in 
the Jiboa Valley and 43% in San Ildefonso.  Counter-insurgent communities report greater 
effectiveness in achieving requests at the municipal and national government levels, while 
insurgent communities have had more effectiveness with NGOs.   
 
 
i. Modes of Efficacious Participation   
 
The survey measured several modes of conventional participation and one indicator of 
unconventional participation (protest).  Where possible, questions that were designed to measure 
the same underlying concept are clustered together in additive scales.1010   
 
Formal Group Activism  Local development groups which are commonly found in rural 
El Salvador include church groups, parent-teachers associations, community development 
groups, cooperatives, and other organizations - a catch-all category that includes some women’s 
organizations, environmental clubs, cultural and sports groups, political organizations, veterans 
associations, alcoholics anonymous, etc.  The formal group activism index variable sums the 
intensity of participation scores (frequently, sometimes, almost never and never) for these five 
types of local groups. (alpha = 0.32).  Unions were omitted from the scale due to very low 
                                                 
1010 A varimax rotated component factor analysis tested the reliability of all but the single question indicators for 
participation (voting, local government activism, and protest activism).  Factor analysis revealed two distinct 
dimensions consistent with the theorized construction of informal group activism and project participation. 
However, two distinct dimensions of formal group activism were revealed where one was suspected.  The frequency 
of religious and parent-teachers organization meeting participation is weakly inter-related with other forms of local 
organizational participation.  A division of the five items may be justified on the logic that the former two items 
(participation in a cooperative or other workplace or community organizations) are associated with traditional civic 
participation, while the latter items are more associated with workplace – economic development participation. The 
combined scale for formal group activism is preserved for descriptive cross-sectional comparison, but is split 
according to suggested dimensions to analyze its specific components in the regression analysis that follows. 
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participation rates in rural areas.  The scale, like those that follow, was converted to range from a 
low of 0 to a high of 10.  The overall survey mean for formal group activism is 3.7, and for 
women, 3.6.   
Informal Communal Activism The second participation index variable sums the scores 
of three questions about participation in local problem solving.  Respondents were asked if they 
had worked to try to resolve some community problem, if they had provided voluntary labor in 
its resolution, and if they had tried to organize some new group to resolve a local problem.  Yes 
or no responses were summed and converted to a 0-10 scale (alpha = 0.78).  The overall survey 
mean for informal communal activism is 3.6, and the informal group activism mean for women 
is 2.8.    
Project participation index:  The third index variable, project participation, sums the 
binomial score (1 - participated, 0 - did not participate) for eight distinct dimensions of a 
development project for which that person identified themselves as a beneficiary (alpha= 0.80). 
The project phases included, 1)  project design or pre-evaluation, 2) select project supervisor or 
contractor, 3) in the direction of the implementing institution,  4) provided labor,  5) donated 
materials, 6) reviewed the budget, 7) evaluated the project, 8) some other project related activity. 
The scale was converted to range [0-10].  The overall survey mean for project participation is 
3.1, and the project participation mean for women is 2.9. 
The means for formal group activism, informal communal activism and project 
participation, for both the municipal case studies and between political zones, are shown in 
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 (see also Table I.3).  
Tecoluca reports the highest level of participation for all three indicators.  Jiboa Valley 
communities appear to be consistently and dramatically less active. Insurgent Tecoluca 
demonstrates higher levels of participation on average than government influenced communities.  
These differences are statistically significant (ρ < .001) for formal group activism and (ρ < .05) 
for informal group activism and for project participation  
Controlling for political experience within the entire survey (Figure 10.4), produces a 
pattern of consistent and declining levels of participation with movement from insurgent to 
counter-insurgent communities.  FMLN control zones report the highest levels of participation 
for all three indicators.  FMLN and GOES expansion zones report similar participation levels.  
Differences between zones are significant with least chance of statistical error for formal group 
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activism (p<.001).  GOES zones again rank as the least active for each mode of participation.  If 
participation is important as a cause or effect in the process of empowerment, FMLN influence 
tends to be associated with higher participation at the local level.  It is worth remembering that 
no Jiboa respondents are classified as living in communities previously under the political 
experience of FMLN influence, while 40% of San Ildefonso respondents are classified as FMLN 
control or expansion zone communities.  The higher than average level of participation in San 
Ildefonso may be due to the FMLN communities within the municipality. 
 The gender gap between men and women’s levels of participation is highest for informal 
group activism (as high as 50% for San Ildefonso).  For project participation, the gender gap 
narrowed, even reversed in several cases (San Ildefonso and FMLN expansion zone 
communities).  However, FMLN women’s participation levels, while lower than their male 
peers, are still higher than men’s participation in GOES zones.  Although this inequality in terms 
of participation has been preserved within FMLN communities, FMLN women are more active 
at the local level than both men and women living in zones outside of FMLN influence.1011   
 Overall levels of participation may appear low in general.  For formal group activism, 
having reported participating frequently in one group would have logged a score of 2, 
participating frequently in two groups produces a score of 4.  Frequent participation in more than 
two groups becomes difficult for employed adults, so the mean of 3.7 for formal group activism 
for the entire sample, seems a reasonable expected level of activity.  For the informal mode of 
activism, having answered yes to only one of the three questions would have registered a score 
of 3.33, which is just below the total survey mean of 3.6.  The means for formal group activism 
and informal group activism suggest a relatively active civil society, particularly in FMLN 
communities. 
 
                                                 
1011 Jennings (1998) for persistent gender disparity in participation in similar transitions from hierarchical rural 
settings. 
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Figure 10.3  Modes of Conventional Participation (by Case Study Municipality) 
 
 
  697
 
San Ildelfonso Tecoluca Jiboa Valley
 
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
M
ea
n
3.13.3
2.5
3.9
4.7
3.4 3.8
4.0
3.1
Case Study Municipalities                              Error bars: 95% CI
pp3pp2pp1
 
Figure 10.4  Modes of Conventional Participation (by Political Experiences cohort) 
 
 
Women’s organizations: The presence of women’s organizations merits specific 
attention given the association of gender with patterns of disempowerment.  Women were asked 
how frequently they participated in a local women’s group and the indicator reflects the percent 
of respondents that reported frequent or some participation.  Close to one in four women in 
Tecoluca were active in local women’s groups, representing literacy circles, economic projects, 
maternal health or community organizing initiatives.  By comparison, only 5-6% of women in 
the other municipal cases were active.  The pattern is even more sharply skewed when compared 
FMLN and non-FMLN communities.  Nearly 40% of all women in FMLN control zones 
participate in organizations that attend to women’s issues, compared to a much lower level 
elsewhere. 
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Gender Influence:  Women were asked, “Compared to before the war, would you say 
that women in the community have more influence in the community, less influence, or the same 
influence as before?”  Over half of all respondents reported that women have more influence 
now, suggesting significant advances in the gender balance of power at the local level.  
Consistent with the higher level of activity in women’s groups, women in Tecoluca and FMLN 
control communities report considerably more pronounced perceptions of their own influence 
compared to other areas.  
Cabildo participation, Voting and Protest Participation:  Respondents were asked 
whether they had attended a cabildo abierto within the last six months, whether they had voted or 
not and for which political party in the 1997 local and legislative elections.  Each respondent was 
also asked whether they had participated in a public protest related to some community problem.  
Participants were then asked to describe the problem that motivated the protest, the objective and 
the location of the protest.   
 Overall, 20% have attended cabildo abiertos, with no statistically significant differences 
between municipalities of political experiences.  Cabildo attendance is almost the same in each 
municipality, with one in five reporting attendance at such a meeting in the past six months. 
Cabildo attendance is highest within FMLN control zone communities, and lowest among 
government expansion zone communities.  The most closely associated respondents with the 
insurgent experience of the FMLN are not only high intensity protesters, but also participate in 
local municipal politics through conventional channels with the same intensity.  Why does 
cabildo attendance drop in FMLN expansion zones?  These FMLN communities more often 
represent a political minority, located within hostile, exclusionary ARENA governed 
municipalities.1012  Therefore, this mixed evidence of higher local municipal activism in FMLN 
zones may indicate that local government activism may depend not only on the types of 
communities but their respective capacity to coordinate with the local party in power.  Women’s 
overall cabildo participation is almost half that of men (11.9% vs. 20.4%), and the relative 
                                                 
1012 In 1998 ARENA governed in almost two-thirds of El Salvador’s municipalities.  FMLN municipal governments 
also exclude ARENA supporters, however there are substantive differences between the representative styles of both 
parties. 
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gender gap is highest in Tecoluca and FMLN zones in general.   In FMLN expansion zones, men 
attend cabildos four times as frequently as women. 
In Tecoluca, two of every five respondents reported having recently participated in public 
protest, compared to 15% in San Ildefonso, and less than 5% in the Jiboa Valley.  When the 
controls for political experience are introduced, the pattern shifts even more sharply toward the 
association of the FMLN experience with protest activity.  Almost two thirds report experience 
in activities that range from marches, to land, street and office takeovers.  Protests involving 
FMLN supporters have tended to be oriented toward national issues (agrarian debt forgiveness, 
indemnification under the Peace Accords and land redistribution) as well as local grievances 
(environmental contamination by local industry, and lack of flood prevention infrastructure).  
GOES zone protests, on the other hand, focused almost exclusively on local services (water and 
electricity prices and service quality) as well as infrastructure demands.   FMLN protests tend to 
take place in the capital city of San Salvador, while GOES zone protests were more likely to 
occur in the municipal or department capital.  Finally, explanations of the motivation and goals 
of the protest elicited a variety of responses that were coded for their grasp of the problem.  
FMLN respondents demonstrated a more informed political understanding of their participation. 
More recent survey data put the level of political participation in the paracentral region 
and in FMLN communities into broader comparative perspective.  Figures 10.5 and 10.6 
compare the 1998 survey average with other Latin American reported levels of protest and 
cabildo abierto participation in 2004.  El Salvador as nation ranks last with only 6% 
participation, while Bolivia and Colombia, two countries in turmoil, reach or surpass the average 
level of protest activity found in the paracentral region.  The comparison underscores a very high 
level of contentious mobilization in Tecoluca and insurgent communities compared to 
neighboring countries. 
 If this were all, we might assume that the paracentral region was also politically unstable. 
Yet the confounding evidence illustrated in Figure 10.6 shows that contentious and conventional 
political action go hand in hand within the paracentral region, and particularly among insurgent 
communities.  The regional average level of cabildo participation in 1998 exceeds all other 
estimated country participation rates, as well as a declining rate in El Salvador as a whole.  The 
higher rate is likely due to the higher rural proportion of paracentral respondents. Seligson 
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(2000) has shown that small rural towns rely on cabildo type meetings as an outlet for political 
engagement at a much higher rate than urban areas, which are reflected in the national averages.  
As communities associated with the political opposition, higher levels of protest by 
Tecolucans and FMLN zone respondents may not seem surprising.  Higher socio-economic 
status among Jiboa Valley and GOES respondents presumes higher influence the national level 
and suggests they may protest less because they are more satisfied.  Lower FMLN influence at 
the national level may explain higher level of nationally focused protest activity.  However, the 
survey data presented above clearly refute this assumption.  Recall that over 44% of Jiboa Valley 
residents and 67% of counter-insurgent community respondents reported a willingness to join a 
protest against a harmful government sponsored project.  This professed interest in contentious 
collective action is not matched by actions or perhaps local organizing capacity in these 
communities – suggesting a gap between empowerment resources and agency to convert this 
capital into empowerment achievements.  
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Figure 10.5  Protest Participation in Latin America (Paracentral Region Mean compared to other 
LAC country means) 
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Figure 10.6  Cabildo Participation in Latin America (Paracentral Region Mean compared to other 
LAC country means) 
  702
This agency is an essential complement to decentralized development in highly unequal settings 
such as rural El Salvador.  What seems more remarkable is that the converse assumption - that 
protesting communities forgo conventional avenues of political expression, is also refuted by this 
evidence. 
Voting data also illustrate interesting differences. El Salvador has now conducted six 
successive peacetime elections.  Greater competition is a new feature of these elections and the 
FMLN has made impressive advances, especially at the local level.   However, high abstention 
rates remain a dominant and poorly understood aspect of Salvadoran political culture (Barnes, 
1998; Córdova, et al, 1998; Córdova, 2001).  Figure 10.7 and Figure 10.8 shows the stated voting 
preferences in the case study municipalities and the political experience clusters for local 
elections in 1997.1013  Voting abstention was reported at 31% for the entire survey, ranging from 
a low of 28% in San Ildefonso to a high of 37% in the Jiboa Valley.  Actual abstention rates for 
the 1997 elections were much higher at 62%.1014  What explains the over-reporting of voting?  
One clue is the high percentage of respondents who claimed to have voted, but declined to 
identify the party, which also ranged from a low of 31% in San Ildefonso to a high of 39% in the 
Jiboa Valley.  Excluding abstention and the guarded “my vote is secret” responses, only 1 in 4 
respondents from the Jiboa Valley reported voting for a specific party - with ARENA polling 
slightly above the FMLN.  In Tecoluca, 33% openly reported voting for the FMLN and only 
2.6% reported voting for ARENA, while 32.3% of Tecolucans declined to specify the party.  
Respondents in San Ildefonso reported the highest open support for ARENA, but this support 
was divided in a three-way contest between the FMLN and the Christian Democrats. 
 Typically voting is over-reported in surveys in response to the social desirability of 
recognition for having performed a civic duty (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995:51).  In El 
Salvador, a political culture of fear may also restrict openly stating party preference.  We can 
                                                 
1013 At the time of the survey, there had only been one prior Presidential and Legislative election in which the FMLN 
had participated as a legal political party (1994).  The voting results were largely the same.   
1014 Only Guatemala and Colombia have greater abstention rates than El Salvador.  La Prensa Grafica, March 14, 
1999, p 7c.  The magnitude of this problem is tied to low trust in political parties, problems in getting registered, and 
the absence of decentralized voting stations.  The implications go much deeper as elections are the principal 
institution upon which consensus politics rests its legitimacy in El Salvador.  Estimates of actual abstention among 
registered voters in the 1999 elections for the case studies are 65% in San Ildefonso, and 58% in Tecoluca.  No 
estimates of registered voters in Jiboa Valley were available.  However, equal caution should be used to interpret 
high voting rates with a well performing democracy. 
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speculate on how to redistribute the “fearful” responses between abstention and specific parties.  
ARENA and FMLN consistently poll lower than their respective, actual 1997 party vote.  
Adjusting the reported party votes to percentages of only the reported votes (party preference 
plus “vote is secret” responses) produces the following gaps in reported vs. actual party voting 
preferences, ARENA: (16.5% vs. 39% in the Jiboa Valley, 3.8% vs. 26% in Tecoluca, and 
18.5% vs. 52% in San Ildefonso) and FMLN: (13.4% vs. 24% in the Jiboa Valley, 48% vs. 64% 
in Tecoluca, 24% vs. 22% in San Ildefonso).  ARENA supporters appear less inclined to reveal 
party preference than FMLN supporters, with the unusual social desirability or vote fraud 
outcome in San Ildefonso of more people claiming to vote for the FMLN than seems possible 
given actual results. 
When we compare reported voting preferences across communities regrouped according 
to political experience, the pattern becomes clearer.  Both abstention and “vote is secret” 
response rates are lowest for FMLN control zones, and declared FMLN preferences are 
dominant.  Reported abstention is highest in FMLN expansion zones, while reluctance to state 
party preference is highest in government control and expansion zones.  Twice the number of 
government control zone respondents do not feel free to report party preference or admit to 
abstention in government control zones than in FMLN control zones, combined with a very low 
reported level of support for ARENA in the zones where their mayors govern locally.   The 
results indicate that the fear of talking openly about politics is highest where government 
influence has been less contested by the FMLN.  
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Figure 10.7  Conventional Participation – Voting Preferences in Case Study Municipalities in 
1997 Municipal Elections 
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Figure 10.8  Conventional Participation – Voting Preferences by Political Experience in 1997 
Municipal Elections 
 
  
 By looking at gender differences in the vote, we may unpack the abstention and fearful 
responses one step further.   Women reported higher overall abstention (39.1%), and the gap 
between men and women’s abstention rates is highest in Tecoluca (a 16 point gap).1015  
Responses suggest that nearly 50% of the women from Tecoluca and the Jiboa Valley did not 
vote, while that figure drops to 37.5% for San Ildefonso.  Women’s abstention in FMLN 
expansion zones rose to 53%.  Conversely, women in FMLN zones, including Tecoluca, reported 
voting less frequently for the FMLN.  Clearly, the FMLN demonstrate the greatest difficulty in 
recruiting the vote of potential women supporters.  On the other hand, the percent of women who 
                                                 
1015 Analysis of the 1999 national survey of El Salvador estimated that the gender gap among voters in the 1997 
elections favored men be 13 percentage points (64% of men reported voting vs. 51% of women). 
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declined to reveal their party preference was lower than for all men, and lowest in FMLN zones.  
Women are less fearful than men in nearly every category.  Surprisingly, men in the government 
control and expansion zones report the highest reluctance to reveal party preference -- two times 
as high as FMLN women.  The relatively high rate (50%) of women in FMLN control zone 
women that have participated in a protest action contrasts with the gender gap within the 
reported FMLN vote and raises some questions about the general empowerment of women in 
FMLN zones, suggesting different thresholds or premiums placed on these modes of 
participation. 
 A review of the evidence on political and social action suggests the strong support for the 
thesis that the achievements of Tecoluca’s empowerment through conflict strategy are not 
idiosyncratic, but rather also reflect achievements in other paracentral communities historically 
associated with insurgent political experiences.  Of the thirteen indicators, in nine Tecoluca 
reports the achievements that surpass San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley.  Equally important, in 
over half of the indicators, the counter-insurgent case of empowerment by invitation in the Jiboa 
Valley reports the lowest level of achievement.  When reorganized by political experience, the 
trend is crystal clear.  Men and women in communities most closely associated with the FMLN 
are significantly more involved in the social and political life (for 11 of the 13 indicators), 
demonstrating the most versatile capacity for collective action in both conventional and 
unconventional opportunities for participation.  
 
c.  Local Problem Solving and Advocacy Skills   
 
Following work by Mathiason and Powell (1972) and Seligson (1980b), the third dimension of 
empowerment achievement was designed to measure problem-solving and advocacy skills.  The 
primary indicator consists of an opened-ended set of questions that first asks a respondent to 
name the most important local problem, then to explain the history of that problem, if they could 
do something to help solve that problem, and finally, to describe what that they would do to 
solve the problem.  By having the respondent name the local problem, this set of questions 
corrects for the possible over-definition of the situation for which many surveys predetermine a 
closed list of possible responses.  At the same time, by emphasizing the reporting of skills that 
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might be employed or available to the individual to solve the problem, it allows the respondent to 
choose from the full range of conventional or contentious tactics. 
 In addition to constructing a Guttman scale from the four questions, I focus on coding the 
content of the last question – the proposed solution to the identified problem.   The Guttman 
scale was constructed by scoring a point for a problem definition, 1-3 points for the level of 
analysis and specificity on the problem origin, and another point if the problem was perceived to 
be solvable.  Finally I coded the answers to the last question according to a cardinal scale of 0-5, 
ranked by the extent that their respective solutions reflected an increasing reliance on collective 
and contentious action.  Lower scores reflected more conformity with the status quo.  A score of 
0 was assigned to respondents who answered negatively to the prior (entry) question of whether 
they could help solve the problem.  A score of 1 was given to conformist responses (i.e. 
“whatever is the will of God” or “there is only so much a poor person can do”). A score of 2 was 
assigned to proposed solutions that were individualist and depended on the assistance of 
authority (i.e., “I could make a request that the police/mayor/government (i.e. someone other 
than me) should solve the problem”).   A score of 3 was assigned to responses that proposed an 
individual contribution to a larger process (i.e. attend a town meeting, offer voluntary labor).  A 
score of 4 was assigned to responses that focused on strengthening communal organization to 
address local authorities about the problem through conventional tactics.  A score of 5 was coded 
when an answer made reference to both community organization and the potential use of 
pressure or protest tactics.  The entire problem solving scale ranged from [0-9]. 
 A second measure, collective advocacy, reflects the percentage of respondents that 
answer the final question with solutions that involve collective and possibly contentious 
strategies (scores of 4 or 5).   The inference that contentious tactics are available or may be 
necessary demonstrates a level of self-confidence and a confidence in the reliability of one’s 
neighbors.  Together, these measures not only tap relevant problem solving efficacy and skills, 
but also serve as an indicator of challenging participation and orientation.1016  Contentious, 
confident and collective problem solving skills should be a strong predictor of both conventional 
and unconventional modes of participation.   The results indicate that Tecoluca appears the most 
                                                 
1016 Low positive zero order correlations between the two attitudinal efficacy indicators and problem solving skills 
suggest that they are related, but are measuring different sub-components of efficacy.  Correlations were 0.12 
(political efficacy and subjective competence), 0.17 (political efficacy and problem solving skills), 0.15 (competence 
and skills). 
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politically competent in terms of both skills, a sense of confidence, and the capacity for 
collective action.  The indicators for the Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso portray a lower level of 
problem solving skills with significantly lower reliance on organized communal strategies in 
particular.  Political experience and municipal case study differences for both indicators are 
statistically significant (ρ < 0.001).   
 The mean for problem solving skills understates the disposition to use contentious tactics 
to solve local problems.  Overall, 25% of all those surveyed, responded by proposing some form 
of communal organization, and only 7% proposed contentious, collective tactics.  However, 
reported solutions to community problems in Tecoluca would be more than twice as likely to 
involve organized pressure as those solutions in San Ildefonso or Jiboa Valley. 
 Awareness of local problems and confidence in solving them are highest in FMLN 
control zones, slightly higher than FMLN expansion communities.  FMLN communities 
demonstrate much lower levels of collective advocacy, suggesting important sub-cultural 
differences between the two.  San Ildefonso reports the most conformist problem solving 
proposals, somewhat inconsistent with other similarities shared with Tecoluca.   
Resorting to organized pressure to solve local problems reflects a capacity for conflictive 
tactics that is much more available to communities in FMLN control zones than anywhere else.  
One in five FMLN control zone residents mentioned contentious protest tactics as a potential 
means for solving local problems, compared to 5% in government controlled zones.  Within 
expansion zones, government influence is associated with a higher proclivity for collective 
protest compared to FMLN expansion influence (both below 5%).  This finding may reflect 
indemnification movements by FAES ex-combatants, ex-civil patrollers, or small farmers 
demanding debt relief that have participated in recent protest activities - many of which have 
been organized by FMLN leaders.  While it is difficult to confirm, it seems worth speculating 
that strategic learning may be occurring as dissident, conservative communities adopt FMLN 
techniques of contentious collective action. 
 Gender differences are small, with women reporting slightly lower levels of problem 
solving skills (although the gap is particularly wide in Tecoluca, San Ildefonso, and FMLN zones 
in general). The gender gap in FMLN zones is magnified through the optic of choosing 
collective, contentious solutions to problems. Although the relative problem solving skills gap is 
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highest within FMLN communities, FMLN women still demonstrate less conformist problem 
solving skills that many men and women in counter-insurgent communities. 
 
 
d.  Agricultural Resource Mobilization   
 
The final dimension of empowerment achievements emphasizes individual level resource 
mobilization, particularly for small farmers.  The seven indicators summarized in Table I.3 
reflect short-term changes in the use of economic and other capital resources to convert assets 
such as land and training into improvements in rural livelihoods.  While some of the listed 
indicators suggest changes over a period of a single year, they nevertheless provide some 
evidence regarding various mechanisms or proxies for capital reproduction.  Since most of the 
indicators refer to the subsample of agricultural producers (n=467), statistically significant 
differences between much smaller groups (between 30 and 100), will be much more difficult to 
achieve. 
The first two indicators asked producers if they experienced increases in their agricultural 
income or production compared to the prior year.  Only two of every five producers in the entire 
survey reported an increase in production between 1997 and 1998. The highest mean agricultural 
production gains are found in the Jiboa Valley, where over 60% of producers reported increases 
over 1997.  By contrast, agricultural production declined on most farms in San Ildefonso and 
fewer than a third of reported production increases.  In Tecoluca, nearly half reported gains, but 
over a third reported losses.  These results likely reflect a drought and strong coffee prices in 
1997, which had a disproportionately negative effect outside of the Jiboa Valley.   These 
differences vanish when comparison is made between insurgent and counter-insurgent producers.  
Although the production performance is weakest in FMLN expansion zones, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the four categories. 
All groupings of producers reported monthly average earnings from agriculture below 
$130 – near poverty levels.  Unlike production, there were no statistically significant differences 
in agricultural income suggesting that any production gains were offset by deep income losses by 
subsistence producers. 
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Diversification and intensification of production are widely considered to offer the only 
possibilities for sustainable livelihood improvements in micro-parcel farming.  Producers were 
asked to identify the range of crops cultivated.  The answers were ranked on a crop 
diversification index scaling from 1 for basic grains only to 6 for mix of basic grains, fruits or 
vegetables, and export crops such as coffee, sugar cane or non-traditional crops (cashews, etc.).  
Cattle ranchers were not included.  Alternatives to basic grains are most likely to be found 
among Jiboa producers and least likely among San Fonchanos an indication of both land quality 
and the concentration of best land and productive resources among fewer producers.   Similarly, 
San Ildefonso producers are much more likely to consume the food they produce, indicating a 
combination of disincentives to sell, such as storage and transport costs.  Higher subsistence 
production is another indicator of low diversification, which was estimated at 2.77 for the Jiboa 
Valley, 2.22 for Tecoluca, and 1.11 for San Ildefonso.   
Access to technical assistance, alternative production techniques (like organic 
agriculture) and irrigation can also improve production through intensified land use on small 
farms.  Reported access to these three aspects of farm technology were summed into a single 
index to measure agricultural intensification strategies.  The results indicate that although 
technological resources seem to be relatively unavailable to most producers in general, producers 
in Tecoluca and FMLN control communities reported a relatively higher level of access.  The 
differences are significant at a p-value of .001.   
Slightly more than a third of all producers report access to technical assistance, a 
reflection of the collapse of state extension programs (CENTA was identified by only 10% of 
producers).  One in two producers in Tecoluca and FMLN control communities, report some 
type of technical assistance (with nearly half identifying NGOs as the source).  The considerable 
absence of technical assistance for producers in San Ildefonso and all other clusters of producers 
in expansion and government control zones suggest a concentration of NGO attention among 
FMLN farmers, excluding many others.   Actual experimentation with organic farming 
techniques are found among a quarter of all producers, with slightly more in FMLN control 
communities.  Knowledge of organic techniques without the capacity to experiment is much 
higher (over 50%), again with a slight tendency favoring producers in FMLN communities.   For 
irrigation, the flatness and proximity to the Lempa River is an advantage, but has also been a 
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curse to occupants of the coastal valley.  Floods have destroyed crops, homes and livelihoods for 
thousands living in the lower Lempa valley four times in the last seven years.  
 Relatively equal land distribution represents the foundation of Tecoluca’s local 
development strategy, but has this increased access to land translated into the ability to produce 
or security in maintaining this asset.  Landowning producers were asked how much of their land 
was titled and how much of their farmland was actually in production.  The results suggest that 
while owned farm sizes may be smaller in the Jiboa Valley (2.2 ha.), nearly all of it is in 
production (96%).  Landowners farms are larger on average in Tecoluca and San Ildefonso, but 
size is inversely proportional to the percent actually farmed.   In San Ildefonso, only 39% of 
farms averaging 3.9 hectares are cultivated, the equivalent of 1.5 hectares.  In Tecoluca, the 
equivalent farm in production is only 1.4 hectares.  Clearly, access to land is not sufficient to 
convert this asset into a mechanism for resource mobilization.   
 This pattern in the relative distribution of net equivalent farms in production is apparent 
when comparing producers in FMLN and government zones of influence, although the gap is 
smaller.  Between 72% and 74% of counter-insurgent producers farmland is under production – 
producing an equivalent farm size of 1.8 ha. for expansion and control zone communities, 
respectively.  FMLN producers report on 34% to 65% of land in production – the equivalent 
farm size of 1.2 and 1.4 ha. for expansion and control zones communities.  
 Similarly, over 94% of all landowners in the Jiboa Valley reported having title to 50% or 
more of their land, compared to only 67.5% in San Ildefonso and 54% in Tecoluca.  Nine in ten 
producers in counter-insurgent communities enjoy significant land security compared to only six 
in ten among insurgent communities.  The parcelization of proindiviso PTT properties beginning 
in 1997 may be most responsible for this gap in land security between insurgent and counter-
insurgent landowners, but nevertheless represents a significant factor in local development. 
 Access to credit is a final indicator of individual level resource mobilization.  Credit 
typically requires a guarantee, which is facilitated by having a title to land.  Production is also a 
criteria for acquiring credit, although credit is necessary to increase, diversify and intensify 
production.  Overall, 28% of all survey respondents reported access to credit, with the highest 
levels in Tecoluca, FMLN control communities and government expansion communities, 
although the differences are not statistically significant.  For farmers only (a subset of all 
reported borrowers), the percentages increase, suggesting the greater reliance of agriculture on 
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credit than other occupations.  Over 40% of farmers in Tecoluca reported access to credit, a 
difference that is statistically significant and over three times the national average for rural areas.  
Between 24% to 32% of producers grouped according to political experience report access to 
credit, with a similar trend but differences are not statistically significant.   
 Resource mobilization achievements reveal a landscape that remains largely unfavorable 
to small farmers in general, but suggests that FMLN producers are closing the gap with 
producers in counter-insurgent areas.  In agricultural production, farm income and access to 
credit, there is little difference between FMLN and government ties.  Producers in areas of 
government influence tend to have title to cultivate more of the land they own.  Producers in 
FMLN areas of influence are more diversified and enjoy an advantage in access to agricultural 
technology.  In four of the seven indicators, Jiboa Valley producers report the highest level of 
achievement – the highest percentage for any of the four dimensions of empowerment 
achievements.   
 The bivariate comparisons of participation above offer strong evidence toward 
confirmation of my initial assumption – that legacies of political experience have left their mark 
on local political culture.  The evidence on empowerment achievement provides persuasive 
support for the thesis that political experience has shaped individual level outcomes.  Of the 27 
indicators, Tecoluca scores highest on 17 of them, the Jiboa Valley on 6, and San Ildefonso on 1 
(differences on three indicators were not statistically significant).  When respondents are 
regrouped by virtue of the underlying political experience of their respective communities, those 
associated most closely with FMLN insurgent experiences score highest on 20 of the 27.  Those 
communities most associated with hard-line counter-insurgent political experiences score the 
highest on only 3, with expansion zone communities achieving high scores on two indicators 
each (FMLN control and expansion communities tied for high score on one indicator, and for 
two others differences were not statistically significant). 
 Where empowerment through conflict strategies have prevailed, we find a more 
pronounced attitudinal disposition toward empowerment as well as the economic, social and 
political achievements that come as a result.  Where empowerment by invitation strategies have 
shaped local development processes, we find much lower levels of empowerment achievement, 
resting upon a more fragile attitudinal foundation.  The results suggest that the impact of war on 
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post-war attitudes and behaviors that are associated with empowerment go beyond Tecoluca or 
the Jiboa Valley and extend throughout the regional sample of similar communities.   
 However, the lack of continuity from core to peripheral areas of FMLN influence raise 
the question of just how extensive insurgent political experience actually is.  San Ildefonso and 
communities associated with weaker ties to the FMLN in expansion zones exhibit a much lower 
level of empowerment than Tecoluca or communities in FMLN areas of control.  For over half of 
the reported attitudinal and achievement indicators, respondents from San Ildefonso or FMLN 
expansion zones are more similar to respondents in government expansion than to the core 
insurgent communities.   
 Despite claims that an insurgent victory would be the end for any hope for democracy in 
El Salvador, these results underscore the achievements of the insurgent empowerment through 
conflict thesis.  Combined, they suggest a strong association between insurgent political 
experiences, superior collective problem solving skills, improved provision for basic needs and 
resource mobilization, and high levels of participation in protest activities but also in some of the 
most conventional institutions.   Together these achievements suggest empowered individuals.  
The results offer equally compelling evidence of weak democratic attitudes and achievements in 
the Jiboa Valley, the municipal case most impermeable to insurgent political experience. The 
strongest democratic and development indicators are found where empowerment is expected the 
least, among the revolutionary communities of Tecoluca and the FMLN. 
 However, we cannot say with certainty whether it was the insurgent or counter-insurgent 
political experience that explains the performance of an individual or community in post-war 
achievements?  Could it not have also been other individual attributes, such as education or 
socio-economic advantages, or organizational ties that also explain these results.  To answer this 
question, we must weigh the relative importance of the different possible factors to judge 
whether political experience holds up.    
 In this section I compare different forms of participation as the principal measure of 
empowerment achievement in decentralized local economic development.  I then test the 
strength of political experiences in explaining participation across the entire survey by regressing 
both modes of participation on the contextual variable - political experience, while controlling 
for other factors. 
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D.  REGRESSION RESULTS: POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND EFFICACIOUS 
PARTICIPATION 
 
 
1. Dependent Variable:  Participation 
 
  
In order to test the direct, independent effect of political experience on empowerment, I regress 
both conventional and protest modes of participation (formal group activism and protest 
participation) on all relevant variables as independent controls.1017   
Human and economic capital variables are introduced as independent variables in order 
to control for the effect of socio-economic status on participation.  I define human capital as 
education level (number of years completed, 0-21) and age (years, 18-90).  The second variable 
is a surrogate for informal education, since formal education has only recently become available 
to most younger Salvadorans and would bias the lower education levels of the older generation.  
Age reflects accumulated general experience.  Economic capital is measured by reported family 
monthly income (which ranges from categorical values of less than $80, $80-132, $132-230, 
$230-344, $344-459, and greater than $459 per month).  Agrarian incomes are highly dependent 
on secure access to land, therefore a dummy variable for land ownership was also included as a 
second economic capital variable.1018  Spatial factors may restrict or facilitate participation.  
Remoteness (distance) as potential exit restraint is a measure of social capital and defined as the 
distance in kilometers between a respondent’s home and the urban town center, where many 
                                                 
1017 Other modes of participation (informal group activism, project participation, voting, and contacting local 
officials) were also regressed on this set of variables.   The effect of political participation was positive and 
significant for some (voting, participation in women’s groups, parent associations, contacting local officials), but 
lost significance as other variables were introduced for (informal group activism, project participation). 
1018 The predictive strength of all SES indicators is limited due to the truncated socio-economic range of the rural 
sample.  The narrowed difference between high and low values for income and education in rural areas increases the 
standard error of these variables, and thus negatively biases their predictive strength.  Parent’s SES and both indices 
of household and agricultural assets were introduced as alternatives to income and land, but none demonstrated 
stronger predictive power for any mode of participation.  
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civic meetings (cabildos abiertos) are held.  However, most meetings are held within the 
communities themselves.  Travel costs are an obvious disincentive to participate in cabildos in 
the same way that remoteness reduces the exit options that could potentially weaken community 
ties.1019 
Political experience is modeled as a continuous variable with the scores shown above in 
Table 10.1 assigned to every respondent living in that community.  Protest participation will be 
used as an independent predictor of conventional modes of participation, and as a dependent 
variable. As a dichotomous variable, protest will be measured as an independent dummy variable 
for ordinary least square analysis of formal group activism.  Of the five items initially included 
in the scale variable – formal group activism, factor analysis revealed that two items, 
participation in religious and parent-teachers organizations, have insufficient covariance with the 
other three items (participation in local development organizations, cooperatives, and “other” 
local groups).  The two poorly fitting items were dropped from the formal group activism, and 
the variable was reduced to a three-item scale.1020  
Equation 1 in Table 10.4 regresses the truncated formal group activism on political 
experience, controlling for SES factors of income, land ownership, age, and gender.  Education 
was not significant as a predictor of frequent local group participation and was dropped.  Formal 
group activism (frequency of participation in local groups dealing with local development issues) 
is highest among younger men who own land.  Participation is also higher the more remote the 
respondent lives from the municipal center.  Income is also positive and significant predictor of 
formal group activism.  Yet even, after controlling for these human and economic capital factors, 
the political experience associated with insurgent communities is a positive significant predictor 
of this mode of conventional participation.  The robust effect of insurgent political experiences 
on activism in community groups reinforces the suspicion toward any simplistic view of 
conventional and unconventional modes of participation.   
Equation 2 adds two social capital variables (social ties and distance from municipal 
center) and a political capital variable (institutional access).  The social ties variable is highly 
significant, suggesting that specific habits of reciprocity among neighbors underwrite local 
                                                 
1019 Distance between residence and town center ranged from 0 to 34 kilometers.  An alternative urbanization 
variable that proved less useful was size of municipality to which respondent belonged. 
1020 When the full five item scale is regressed on the same combination of independent variables, the results are 
largely the same. 
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activism.  Political capital in terms of institutional access is also highly significant suggesting a 
positive effect on participation.  The spatial variable – distance between the community and the 
town center, is not significant.  The variance explained increases substantially by just over 40% 
in equation 2, and the context variable of political experience remains a strong predictor of local 
participation in terms of its coefficient and its level of significance.   
In equation 3, I add two efficacy variables.  Political efficacy and subjective competence 
are both significant predictors of formal group activism.1021  However political efficacy is only 
significant the ρ<.05 level, suggesting the efficacy related to voting may not carry the same 
weight as other confidence measures.  The addition of efficacy variables reduces the magnitude 
of the effect that insurgent past experiences have on current participation, but not its significance. 
This trend suggests an indirect (mediating) effect of political experience through efficacious 
attitudes. The explained variance of formal group activism improves again (by over 10%), 
underscoring the importance of efficacy for promoting local activism.   
In equation 4, I add two achievement variables associated with FMLN challenging and bottom-
up empowerment through conflict strategies.  Decentralized decision making and local problem 
solving skills are both significant predictors of participation in local groups.  Decentralized 
decision making is a measure of the collective or horizontal nature of community involvement in 
the most important local decisions.  Local problem solving skills represent a similar measure of a 
community’s capacity to identify, diagnose and propose solutions to local problems through 
collective, at times, contentious methods.  This set of advocacy skills is associated with well 
organized communities and the variable represents the community mean for surveyed capacity to 
achieve these components of local problem solving.  
 
                                                 
1021 Other measures of mediating attitudes of empowerment were tested.  Inter-personal trust, life satisfaction, 
system support, and religious non-fatalism were not significant.  Optimism, development aspirations and preferences 
for social change were significant but added little additional explanatory power to the model. 
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Table 10.4  OLS Regression Results: Impact of Conflictive Political Experiences 
on Conventional Participation 
 
Independent Variables Formal Group Activism 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Gender 
(1= female) 
 
-1.1*** 
(.166) 
-.954*** 
(.153) 
-.896*** 
(.148) 
-.86*** 
(.147) 
-.822*** 
(.147) 
Age 
 
 
-.016** 
(.005) 
-.015** 
(.005) 
-.016** 
(.005) 
-.012* 
(.005) 
-.012* 
(.005) 
Income 
 
 
.180 ** 
(.061) 
.158** 
(.057) 
.125* 
(.055) 
.136** 
(.054) 
.144** 
(.054) 
Landowner (dummy) 
 
1.34*** 
(.189) 
 
.965*** 
(.181) 
.758*** 
(.176) 
.693*** 
(.175) 
.661*** 
(.174) 
Political Experience 
 
.588*** 
(.084) 
.419*** 
(.097) 
.368*** 
(.095) 
.331*** 
(.094) 
.25** 
(.098) 
     
Social Capital: Social Ties 
 
 
 .091*** 
(.024) 
.057* 
(.024) 
.050* 
(.024) 
.047* 
(.024) 
Social Capital: Distance from 
nearest market 
 
 .01 
(.01) 
.011 
(.01) 
.005 
(.01) 
.005 
(.01) 
Political Capital: Institutional 
Access  
 
 .266*** 
(.026) 
.220*** 
(.026) 
.211*** 
(.026) 
.193*** 
(.026) 
Subjective Competence 
 
  .153*** 
(.022) 
.131*** 
(.023) 
.128*** 
(.023) 
 
Political Efficacy 
 
 
  .060* 
(.03) 
.044 
(.03) 
.043 
(.03) 
Decentralized 
Local Decision Making 
 
   .093** 
(.027) 
.093** 
(.027) 
Local Problem Solving Skills 
 
   .075* 
(.03) 
.079* 
(.03) 
 
Protest Participation     .636** 
(.224) 
      
Constant 4.3*** 
(.40) 
2.8*** 
(.47) 
2.11*** 
(.49) 
1.16* 
(.53) 
.882* 
(.53) 
R-squared .270 .383 .428 .443 .450 
Adj. R sq .265 .376 .420 .434 .439 
N 724 724 724 724 724 
*** = ρ<.001; ** = ρ <.01;  or better; * = ρ <.05; Standard errors in (  ). 
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Both achievement indicators are significant predictors of formal group participation, 
although they add only a small increment of explained variance.  The low, positive correlations 
between social ties and political efficacy with decentralized local decision and contentious 
efficacy skills explains in part the loss of significance and decline in the magnitude of the 
coefficients for the former variables.   
The final equation (5) introduces another achievement indicator – protest participation.   
The significant protest dummy variable suggests again that contentious and conventional modes 
of participation are not mutually exclusive.  FMLN protesters are also presumably active in a 
wide variety of conventional local groups.  Despite the addition of these three final variables 
clearly associated with FMLN communities in equations 4 & 5, the political experience context 
variable remains significant at the (p<.01) level, although it’s magnitude is trimmed somewhat.  
Together with gender, income, landownership, political capital, subjective self-confidence and 
decentralized local decision making, the persisting significance of the past collective insurgent 
experiences underscores the impact of context on formal group activism, both directly and 
indirectly through attitudes such as efficacy.  Overall, this set of variables explains 45% of the 
variance in formal group activism, suggesting a relatively meaningful model.   
To ensure that the standard errors for the coefficients of these variables that we found in 
Table 10.4 are robust for the respective cohorts of political experience for which I am attempting 
to control with the political experience variable, I will run the final two regression equations for 
each cohort independently.  These regressions are summarized in Table 10.5, effectively 
controlling for political experience by separating the sample into three subsamples based on the 
political experience code.  I have aggregated FMLN control and expansion samples (n = 244), to 
approximate the size of the Government expansion zone subsample (n=272) and Government 
control zone subsample (n=396).1022   
In equations 1, 3 and 5 shown in Table 10.5, I am regressing formal group participation 
on the most significant independent variables.  In equations 2, 4 and 6, I am adding protest 
participation.  The results largely validate the importance of past insurgent experience as a strong 
predictor of formal group participation, but also reveal several important qualifications of this 
argument.   
                                                 
1022 As in the first regression model, some cases are lost due to missing values.  Replacing missing values with 
community means does not alter the results shown here. 
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Equations 1 & 2, representing the FMLN cohort, have the highest explained variance 
among the respective subsamples, but still remain 10% lower than the final equation 5 (Table 
10.4) for the full sample.  This is due in part to a smaller sample size.  In all four models, 
political capital and subjective confidence are positive and highly significant predictors of formal 
group activism.  Also, women are relatively unlikely to participate in comparison to men 
regardless of past political experience, although the magnitude of the effect is greater in 
government expansion and control communities.   
Socioeconomic variables are positive and significant predictors of participation only in 
non-insurgent communities.  This divergence between the subsamples represents an important 
correction to the significant effects we see in the full sample model.  Without disaggregation of 
the sample, we could argue that the positive effect of land ownership (and income) on 
participation means that owning land represents an indication of status or wealth that translates 
into either the economic security or time to engage in politics.   Land ownership could also be a 
positive incentive to participate as a safeguard measure - to maintain control over one’s assets.  
Both rationales could explain the higher than average levels of participation in Tecoluca as a 
result of massive land redistribution.  However, the non-significance of these factors (and 
negative sign for income) in FMLN communities (composing large parts of Tecoluca) suggest 
otherwise.  The partial effect of land and income on participation is most evident within counter-
insurgent communities, raising another possible explanation.  We might infer that the 
significance in the full sample of the effect of income and land on participation is attributed to 
the persistence of higher inequality within insurgent communities in counter-insurgent 
communities.  Social class is linked to participation only where inequality persists.   By contrast, 
we may also say that the leveling of inequality in insurgent communities has not reduced 
participation.  Redistribution of assets has merely reoriented the political opportunity structure 
for participation such that other factors become the driving force behind it. 
Several additional distinctions between the insurgent and counter-insurgent participation 
models are worth noting.  Social capital, in terms of perceived trust in the assistance of neighbors 
to help solve local problems and distance from the nearest town center, has a positive, significant 
effect on participation only in government control zone communities.   By contrast, decentralized  
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Table 10.5   OLS Regression Results: Impact of Conflictive Political Experiences 
on Conventional Participation by Cluster 
 
Independent Variables FMLN Control & 
Expansion Zones 
Government 
Expansion Zone 
Government Control 
Zone 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender 
(1= female) 
 
-1.4*** 
(.362) 
-1.35*** 
(.364) 
-.792** 
(.264) 
-.734*** 
(.265) 
-569** 
(.181) 
-565** 
(.182) 
Age 
 
 
-.018 
(.012) 
-.019 
(.012) 
-.021* 
(.01) 
-.02 
(.01) 
-.005 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.006) 
Income 
 
 
-.064 
(.179) 
-.018 
(.182) 
.324** 
(.096) 
.322** 
(.096) 
.071 
(.066) 
.07 
(.066) 
Landowner (dummy) 
 
0.481 
(.40) 
 
.425 
(.402) 
.682* 
(.324) 
.736* 
(.324) 
.726** 
(.23) 
.712** 
(.23) 
Social Capital: Social Ties 
 
.04 
(.056) 
 
.026 
(.057) 
.058 
(.044) 
.06 
(.044) 
.069* 
(.031) 
.068* 
(.031) 
Social Capital: Distance from 
nearest market 
 
-.002 
(.018) 
-.003 
(.018) 
-.02 
(.029) 
-.02 
(.028) 
.035* 
(.017) 
.036* 
(.017) 
Political Capital: Institutional 
Access 
 
.193*** 
(.049) 
.178** 
(.051) 
.262*** 
(.052) 
.246*** 
(.053) 
.171*** 
(.037) 
.165*** 
(.038) 
Subjective Competence 
 
.185** 
(.056) 
 
.179** 
(.056) 
.136** 
(.041) 
.125** 
(.041) 
.106*** 
(.029) 
.106*** 
(.029) 
Political Efficacy 
 
 
.067 
(.075) 
 
.070 
(.075) 
.029 
(.051) 
.03 
(.051) 
.037 
(.039) 
.036 
(.039) 
Decentralized 
Local Decision Making 
 
.237** 
(.077) 
.224** 
(.078) 
-.08 
(.048) 
.085 
(.048) 
.062 
(.032) 
.061 
(.032) 
Local Problem Solving Skills 
 
.131 
(.073) 
 
.119 
(.074) 
-.012 
(.054) 
-.015 
(.053) 
.098* 
(.038) 
.098* 
(.038) 
Protest Participation  .475 
(.382) 
 .896 
(.516) 
.309 
(.386) 
.309 
(.386) 
       
Constant .212 
(1.05) 
.254 
(1.05) 
.622 
(.76) 
.529 
(.755) 
-.03 
(414) 
-.048 
(414) 
R-squared .427 .432 .389 .398 .373 .375 
Adj. R sq .393 .395 .356 .362 .375 .350 
N 197 197 212 212 313 313 
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local decision making is a considerably stronger predictor of insurgent participation (although 
the coefficient is nearly significant at the ρ < .05 level for government controlled zones.  I 
distinguished between social ties as a generalized empowerment resource and decentralization 
local decision making as an empowerment achievement because the latter is more specific and 
derives from open ended questions related to the survey respondent’s own choices of phrasing to 
describe who holds power locally.  The first indicator describes hypothetical situations where 
social capital might be available, while the second describes actual decision making processes 
that have occurred.  For these reasons, the relative weight of empowerment achievements on 
other achievements may be greater than for empowerment resources.  
By this same standard, it is somewhat surprising local problem solving skills are 
significant predictors only for government control zone communities (although the coefficient 
for insurgent communities is positive and nearly significant at the (ρ < .05) level.  This result 
suggests that local problem solving skills, including the professed capacity to pursue contentious 
tactics in the resolution of community problems is more relevant to formal group activism than 
among insurgent communities.  By contrast, we know that actual reported protest participation in 
counter-insurgent communities is very low (5-8%) and tells us little about conventional 
participation in counter-insurgent controlled places (perhaps not surprising).  More surprising is 
that protest participation also loses significance as a positive predictor in FMLN communities.  
We would have expected the effect of protest experiences to have increased within the FMLN 
subsample, but it did not.  The effect is in fact stronger (although still not significant) in 
government expansion zones).   While positive, the hypothesis that both contentious and 
conventional modes of participation go hand in hand for empowered communities is weakened 
when explaining formal group activism. 
Logistic regression is used to evaluate the impact of political experience on protesting as 
a dependent variable. Of the full sample, 149 people or 16.5% reported participating in a protest 
activity in the past 12 months.  Table 10.6 shows the logistic regression results for three 
equations predicting the impact of these same independent variables on protest activity.  After 
controls for socio-economic status factors in Equation 1, FMLN contextual association with 
protest activism is unequivocal.  The political experience variable remains highly significant and 
only declines slightly in magnitude, but still demonstrates a stronger effect than any other 
predictor in the three equations.  In terms of the odds ratio, we can say that living in a 
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community with a past association with the FMLN makes one 3.2 times as likely to participate in 
protests.  In other words, an insurgent context increases the probability of protest by 26%.1023   In 
explaining contentious tactics, political experiences associated with the FMLN matter.   
 Gender (males), education, poverty (and at least initially, land ownership) are also 
significant predictors of protest participation, consistent with the direction suggested by the 
previous OLS equations.  For income, an increase of one level in reported income make a person 
24% less likely to participate in a protest.  Women are again less likely than men to engage in 
protest actions and education is a positive predictor of such participation.   
Social capital (social ties), political capital, formal group activism and subjective 
confidence all also increase the likelihood of protest, again only slightly diminishing the strong 
effect of insurgent political experiences.  All but subjective confidence remain positive and 
significant predictors of protest in the final equation (3), although land ownership loses 
significance.  The McFadden pseudo r-square value compares the likelihood of the null model 
with the maximum likelihood estimation.  With all independent variables, Equation 3 explains 
35% improvement in predictive efficiency from the null model.1024   
Equation 3 also underscores the hypothesized symbiosis between conventional 
participation and protest activism.  Both informal local activism and civic engagement variables 
are highly significant and positive predictors of protest.  There is little reason to view contentious 
and conventional action as mutually exclusive.  Educated, politically and socially connected 
although less affluent men fit the profile of the most likely protestor given the significance of 
these three variables in all three equations.  Surprisingly, other efficacy variables have little or no 
significant impact on protest activity (and are not shown). 
  
                                                 
1023 The percent probability change was calculated by taking the 27% mean of FMLN insurgents in the overall 
sample as the prior probability level, dividing it by the probability of being non-insurgent (= .37), taking the LOG of 
this Odds Ratio of the prior probability level (= -.994), adding the coefficient for the political experience variable    
(-.994+1.16= .116), taking the anti-log of the new Odds Ratio (= 1.12), dividing by 1 plus the new Odds Ratio (= 
.716), and subtracting the prior probability (.528-.27= .26).   
1024 In other words, it explains a 30% reduction in deviance around the original error line. 
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Table 10.6  Logistic Regression: Impact of Conflictive Political Experiences on Protest Participation 
 
 
 1 2 3 
Independent Variables B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
                
Gender 
 
-.753 .250 -9.18 .003 2.12 -.767 .268 -8.18 .004 2.15 -.501 .287 -3.04 .081 1.65 
Age 
 
.008 .009 .81 .369 .992 .013 .01 1.89 .169 .987 .017 .01 2.91 2.91 .729 
Education 
 
.129 .034 14.1 .000 .879 .134 .038 12.4 .000 .874 .133 .04 11.0 .001 .876 
Income 
 
-.242 .109 -4.92 .027 1.27 -.303 .12 6.4 .011 1.35 -.308 .121 6.5 .011 1.36 
Land Owner dummy 
 
.604 .257 5.53 .019 .547 .47 .284 2.75 .097 .625 .315 .299 1.12 .291 .729 
Social Capital: Distance  
 
.012 .014 .797 .372 .988 .014 .015 .895 .344 .986 .01 .016 .378 .539 .99 
Political Experience 1.16 .15 59.3 .000 3.2 1.19 .16 54.6 .000 3.3 1.14 .167 46.7 .000 3.13 
                
Social Capital: Social 
Ties 
     .099 .042 5.63 .018 .91 .084 .044 3.7 .054 .92 
Subjective Confidence 
 
     .108 .037 8.38 .004 .89 .033 .041 .66 .42 .97 
Political Capital: Access 
to officials 
          .182 .043 17.6 .000 .834 
Formal Group Activism 
 
          .156 .057 7.42 .006 .855 
Constant .945 .71 -1.78 .183  .094 .769 .015 .903  -.912 .817 -1.25 .264  
Chi-Square 213     233     268     
McFadden Rsq .295     .347     .398     
Naglekerke Rsq .394     .451     .507     
N 792     754     754     
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 When I regress protest participation on the disaggregated subsamples, we see a similar 
pattern to that evidenced in Table 10.5.  The overall chi-square value drops significantly, 
particularly for the government expansion and control subsamples.  Gender is no longer a 
significant predictor of protest participation in any of three subsamples, although the sign 
remains negative.  There remains several notable differences between insurgent and counter-
insurgent protest participation.  The insurgent model is the best of three equations for explaining 
protest and the one for which most of the variables are significant.  An increase in income 
significantly lowers the probability of protest participation in FMLN communities, although land 
ownership increases this same probability.   Social capital appears to have greater impact on the 
probability of insurgent protest, than on conventional participation.  Efficacy (subjective 
confidence) is a significant predictor of protest only in government expansion communities.  
Political capital is a positive predictor of the probability of protest in government controlled 
communities.  The positive sign for formal group activism (nearly significant at ρ < .06) further 
supports the claim that protest and conventional activism are mutually reinforcing.
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Table 10.7  Logistic Regression: Impact of Conflictive Political Experiences on Protest Participation by Cluster 
Independent Variables B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
B S.E. Z Sig. Exp 
(b) 
Gender 
 
-.333 .361 .852 .356 1.35 -.995 .658 2.28 .131 2.7 -.226 .548 .171 .679 1.25 
Income 
 
-.623 .201 9.6 .002 1.86 .035 .194 .033 .856 .965 .08 .178 .197 .657 .924 
Land Owner dummy 
 
.769 .406 3.6 .06 .463 -1.2 .78 2.4 .122 3.33 .461 .593 .60 .437 .631 
                
Social Capital: Social 
Ties 
.167 .057 8.5 .003 .846 -.026 .102 .063 .801 1.03 .026 .085 .094 .759 .974 
Subjective Confidence 
 
.067 .054 1.51 .219 .935 .188 .096 3.8 .05 .829 -.04 .084 .215 .643 1.04 
Political Capital: Access 
to officials 
.157 .052 9.01 .003 .855 .166 .108 2.37 .124 .847 .275 .098 7.89 .005 .76 
Formal Group Activism 
 
.130 .069 3.53 .059 .878 .198 .141 1.98 .16 .622 .101 .15 .455 .50 .904 
Constant 1.48 .582 6.5 .011  3.97 .982 16.3 .000  4.11 .706 33.9 .000  
Chi-Square 65     26     17     
McFadden Rsq .228     .222     .117     
Naglekerke Rsq .360     .266     .140     
N 207     237     345     
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E.  DISCUSSION: WHAT MAKES DECENTRALIZATION WORK? 
 
Compared to communities that were loyal to the government during the war, insurgent 
communities associated with the FMLN are more active in local groups, they vote more, they 
contact officials more frequently, they participate in a wider range of project activities, and they 
are generally more involved in local problem solving decisions and actions. These results, I have 
argued, are in part a consequence of the FMLN’s bottom-up, challenging approach to 
decentralization in places where they have governed over the past 15 years.  This shift has not 
occurred within communities associated with the top-down, stabilizing approach to 
decentralization.  In these communities, whose political experiences can often be traced to top-
down counter-insurgent programs by the government, we find an almost complete abandonment 
of unconventional political orientations and practices.  Indeed, the evidence presented in this 
chapter shows that contextual experiences linked to FMLN influence have empowered 
individuals to negotiate conventional access to political institutions, but also reveal a 
complementary capacity for contentious, collective action if or when conventional processes fail.  
The traces of government counter-insurgent governance reveal much lower levels of 
participation, lower sense of efficacy and weak social ties.  It is under these conditions that 
decentralization most likely strengthens the hand of local elites and leads to political capture of 
public goods.  It is hard to underestimate the importance of lower land inequality in FMLN 
control zones as a necessary element of effective decentralization – a trend that runs counter to 
the reconcentration of land in other zones and nationally.  How can we explain the empowerment 
of communities associated with past political experiences of insurgency?   
 Controlling for the contextual effect of political experience sharpens, not diminishes, the 
differences in efficacious participation between FMLN and GOES communities.  Within both 
FMLN and ARENA municipalities, the survey results suggest a strong association between 
FMLN influence during the war and the adoption of democratic attitudes and behaviors during 
the post-war period.  Undoubtedly, the emergence of democratic culture in El Salvador has been 
mediated by repression and violence.    However, examining the types of responses by civil 
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society to repression indicate the emergence of important sub-national differences.  Some 
Salvadoran communities (in zones controlled by the FMLN) effectively resisted repression.  
Effective resistance endowed those participants with a sense of efficacy that is dramatically 
higher than non-FMLN zones.  Not all FMLN communities effectively resisted the Salvadoran 
security forces (or FMLN repression, although to a much lesser extent).  Passive collaboration in 
FMLN expansion zones is associated with lower levels of efficacy common to zones of counter-
insurgent government influence.  
The results of the OLS and Logistic regressions illustrate that political experience is a 
robust and significant predictor of both formal group activism and protest participation.  The 
evidence here seems to contradict the claim made by some that repression tends only to destroy 
levels of social and political capital.  Experiences of highly uncivic, violent and empowered 
resistance to repression is shown to be associated with stronger democratic attitudes and 
behaviors, at the same time retaining, redefining and adapting motivations and tactics that 
challenge the post-war democratic political opportunity structure.  In the most clear cut area of 
empowerment achievement, communities associated with FMLN control have in fact gained 
political capital as a consequence of their insurgent experiences and continue to reproduce this 
capital in the post-war period.1025   
This conflict - empowerment association is advanced with several caveats: 
 
1.  Levels of participation are generally low.  Indicators of formal group activism point to a level 
of participation in all communities that seems surprisingly low given the widely declared 
commitments to institutionalizing participation in the local development documentation that was 
consulted.  Why is participation so low, and why are FMLN communities more active than 
others?  One reason may be the Salvadorans living in areas traditionally closed to FMLN 
influence are more fearful to engage local politics.  A surrogate for fear (a respondent’s choosing 
not to declare who whom they voted, “one’s vote is secret”) is associated with lower levels of 
participation.  For many the trauma of the war has left an impression that any form of community 
activity is suspicious.  A landless farmer who resides in a community that was previously a 
government expansion zone vividly recalled an experience that had occurred 18 years earlier in 
                                                 
1025 If associating or participating in local groups is considering social capital, then FMLN communities have gained 
in this resource area as well. 
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his cantón, “We heard that FINATA (land reform agency) was distributing the land of a patron 
in the neighboring community. Some men from our village got together and went to ask this 
patron for land. A few days later, several of the men were found dead, maybe killed by this same 
patron.  People here are still afraid to ask for things, there is even fear of voting.  Anyway para 
uno de pobre  (for the poor like us) things don’t change, you die with the cuma  in hand.”1026 
 Despite higher reported levels of self-confidence, FMLN communities were not immune 
to the climate of uncertainty and fear that prevailed in the early post-war period.  Former 
combatant and current mayor of Tecoluca, Carlos Cortes, explains how fear was one of the many 
political challenges facing insurgent post-war rule: 
 
 
Tecoluca has been through a lot to legitimate itself - overcoming institutionalized fear, armed 
destabilization, the disadvantageous political climate and the practical challenges of conducting an 
alternative development experiment in an economically destroyed zone.   We were called “communists” 
and “terrorists” and offered no assistance when systematic attacks were directed at us in 1994 and 1995.  
There were moments of real frustration, when we wanted to settle things with violence.  After disarming, 
we felt we had one hand tied behind our backs.  Everyone was nervous all the time, getting off of a bus or 
eating at a restaurant.  Even now, after twelve years in the war, and five years as a council representative, 
it feels like the revolution never arrives, that we are just navigating in open waters. (Carlos Cortés, Nov. 17, 
1998)  
 
 
 A GTZ-Promude study of San Vicente assessing the program’s experience in 
participatory methodology and municipal strengthening concluded that the nature of collective 
action strategies in response to fear, uncertainty, and the many other challenges of post-war 
decentralized development had much to do with prior experiences “community level 
participation in organizational structures is limited, although this has much to do with the type of 
leadership that exists, and is a response to prior processes and experiences.  One of the factors 
                                                 
1026 Interview, anonymous, Santiago Nonualco, October, 1998.  Editorials by The Jesuit University (UCA) weekly 
publication, Proceso, have articulated this view that a majority of civil society feels unrepresented in the current 
political system, but remains stigmatized by fear of retaliation to act (see for example July 23, 1997 edition).  The 
best treatment of voter abstention offers some evidence on this score (Barnes and Cruz, 1998; Barnes, 1998).  Voter 
abstention among Salvadorans old enough to vote have risen steadily: 34%  in 1984, 54.9% in 1989, dropping 
slightly to 47% in 1994, then rising again to 61.9% in 1997, 61.4% in 1999 and 63% in 2000.  High and growing 
levels of voter abstention in El Salvador (see discussion and Figure 1b below) reinforce a skepticism of the 
Salvadoran political class, and underscore civil society’s fear of assuming its required role in the democratic 
transition.  I do not know how widely among the professional elite this view is shared.  Despite recent electoral 
gains by the FMLN, interviews with numerous NGO leaders suggest that widespread, mutual distrust continues to 
divide the party leadership and the country’s professional class. 
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that is worth recognizing is their identification of organizations, during the war, as 
representatives of movements in opposition to the government, for which there now persists in 
many people a fear of community organization, in order to avoid not being identified as 
before.”1027   
 The same report also found that political experience during the war and its reinforcement 
through shared commitments to equity, fairness, and social justice that shape community life, are 
critical in how this cycle is apparently broken: 
 
There was evidence in Tecoluca and San Esteban Catarina (the only two FMLN governed municipalities 
at the time of this 1995 study), of a greater identification among the people toward their communal 
organizations, moreover, these same organizations are represented through elected leaders in other 
organizations at the cantón level… Experiences of violence during the war depleted trust in most 
authority, and may have reinforced peasant traditionalism, individualism, and fatalism.  However this 
pattern is weakest among FMLN communities, perhaps because the violence was mediated by an 
organizational structure that transformed violence into an empowering experience (1995: 75, italics 
added). 
 
 
 Many ex-combatants echoed the recollection offered by one farmer in Tecoluca. “During 
the war the people here were taught how to participate, and they learned many things that before 
being organized, they didn’t know ... In the communities where the people didn’t organize, 
participation is motivated more by ‘if I have a need’ and not whether the group has a need.  In 
other (these) communities no, they see the thing globally.” (in Fogaroli and Stowell, 1997:198).  
Participation was learned under the political induction of revolutionary leadership.  It is therefore 
no surprise to find more activist communities led by demobilized FMLN leaders. 
 However, the dissolution of the intense organizing conditions of the war is just as likely 
to explain the barriers to participation faced by a demobilized civil society suggested in the 
overall low levels of activism illustrated above.  Ex-combatants have described a decompression 
that occurred in the post-war period from accumulated deprivation and unfulfilled expectations.  
Withdrawal, excess, demoralization, corruption, and dependence on donated goods and services 
are responses to the severe and exhausting sacrifices made during a decade of war.  Families 
separated and grieving for lost or absent family members fall into a post-traumatic despair that 
                                                 
1027 Promude/GTZ (1996: 75-76).  It might be considered that the so-called GTZ-Promude experts in participatory 
methodologies share part of the blame for prevailing low participation in some municipalities. 
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contributes to alcoholism and social violence.  Capable military leaders sometimes prove to be 
poor community leaders.  It is all the more remarkable that Tecoluca and FMLN communities 
have escaped, in a relative sense, the total collapse of their organizational structure. 
 
2. Durable gender gaps weaken the generally positive contextual effect of FMLN influence on 
participation: Much of the discussion of empowerment directs attention to the relative 
improvement of women as the most vulnerable social actor.  Not surprisingly then, gender 
proves to be one of the most important predictors of participation.  Throughout the war, the 
FMLN raised the banner of equity in gender roles.  To a large degree, FMLN combatants 
symbolized a revolutionary leap in feminist goals as women served in highly visible leadership 
roles and female combatants made up one of the highest percentages of any military in Latin 
American history (Mason 1992; Luciak 1998, 1999; Kampwirth 1998; González and Kampwirth 
2001).  The FMLN has pressed a pro-feminist legislative agenda, and instituted internal rules 
allotting women candidates 30% of all electoral candidacies.  At the same time, post-war 
biographies and surveys have stripped down some of the more romantic notions of gender 
equality within the FMLN. Gross violations of women’s rights within their ranks have also been 
revealed.  The gender focus has also declined within the FMLN legislative agenda, crowded out 
by other political fights.   
Given this mixed record on gender issues, it may not be surprising that the survey results 
show that a gender gap between the participation and attitudes of men and women in FMLN 
communities has been preserved in spite of revolutionary commitments to gender and other 
forms of equality.1028  However, the absolute gap that separates FMLN women from women in 
other communities implies that a revolutionary experience has had a relatively empowering 
effect on women in general.  That is to say that women have acquired greater social and political 
capital within FMLN zones of influence than women in other zones.  Most striking is the 
absolute gap between women in FMLN control zone communities hold over men in GOES zone 
communities in terms of participation levels, civic engagement and efficacy.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
1028 One example of the pendulum movement of women’s issues within FMLN organizations is the female quota of 
30% of all candidates, achieved in 1997.  Despite the existence of this statute, when left to the discretion of the 
departmental and municipal conventions, only 17% of the candidates nominated locally for the March 2000 
elections were women.  Several FMLN campaign directors suggested that the larger ideological struggle within the 
party had suppressed other debates, including gender equity questions.    
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50% abstention rates in reported voting in FMLN expansion zones and the persistent gap 
between men and women’s participation both signal that women remain second-class citizens in 
many aspects of local development. 
 
 
 
 
F.  CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that political experience matters for explaining political culture and its link to 
decentralized development in post-war El Salvador.  Embedded within the Salvadoran process of 
post-war reconstruction, divergent political experiences have shaped different local political sub-
cultures, which are linked to stabilizing or challenging empowerment strategies - the outcomes of 
which can be compared and evaluated.  The survey evidence presented here clearly supports the 
assumption and hypotheses stated at the outset: 1) there exist substantive differences in political 
culture between insurgent and counter-insurgent case study municipalities and political 
populations of influence,  2) contrary to the prevailing political diagnoses that continue to 
delegitimize contentious politics as undermining democracy, the strongest democratic attributes 
are found within the most contentious insurgent culture, 3)  experiences of insurgent political 
socialization linked to support for the FMLN represent a durable predictor of empowered 
participation in local development. 
 Survey respondents were asked to what extent they supported radical change by 
revolutionary means, gradual improvements though reforms, or valiant defense against 
revolutionary movements, as the preferable description of how society should be changed.  A full 
six years after the fighting had ceased, one in four Tecolucans and people living in FMLN zones 
of control state a preference for radical, even violent means of social change.  Does this finding 
present threat to the fragile democratic process underway in El Salvador as Inglehart (1997) has 
suggested.  I argue that, in fact, it demonstrates the strength of civil society to defend itself 
against predatory forces, and a critical insurance policy should conventional democratic practices 
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fail in settings with weak mechanisms of formal political competition.  In considering this choice 
between radical and gradual social change, one elderly Tecolucan veteran of the war, who had 
lost 3 brothers and 3 sons in the war, opted for radical change through revolutionary means, but 
carefully explained his choice. “A democratic country should constantly revolutionize, but not 
only through war, nor words, but with concertación (consensus building).” 1029  The complexity 
of political culture in Tecoluca, and areas in the paracentral region of El Salvador that have 
developed under the influence of the FMLN, could not be better articulated.  Democracy is not 
the absence of conflict, but rather struggle for the conditions under which consensus truly 
becomes possible. 
 Revolution has left an imprint on the formation of local political culture and oppositional 
structure.  These findings underscore the differential impact of two very different approaches to 
decentralization.  Post-war decentralized development in El Salvador has favored a consensus-
oriented, stabilizing, empowerment by invitation approach.  Yet, a consensus empowerment 
explanation cannot account for the variation in attitudes and behaviors I have described.  A 
contentious and disruptive empowerment through conflict approach of rural communities in 
FMLN and non-FMLN areas of El Salvador presents a more complex and satisfactory 
explanation of local development than the prevalent notion of conflictive politics as deviant and 
socially alienated.  Contentious politics in the paracentral zone of El Salvador have produced the 
strongest evidence of efficacious participation, where according to conventional theory about 
political culture and participation theory, we might least expect it.  These findings suggest that 
the dominant consensus approach to decentralized development may over-emphasize the non-
conflictive resources of “social capital” and “civic culture.”  Far from a force for social decay, 
the revolutionary contribution of Tecoluca and the FMLN insurgent influence more generally in 
the paracentral region of El Salvador has been to democratize political culture, suggesting an 
important revision to how we traditionally understand the conditions under which decentralized 
development works. 
   
                                                 
1029 Interview, Santa Monica, Tecoluca, Aug. 25, 1998. 
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XI. CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS -  TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF 
EMPOWERMENT 
 
 
 
 
One may conclude that the wellsprings of human freedom lie not only where Marx saw them, in the 
aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom 
the wave of progress is about to roll.  (Barrington Moore 1966)  
 
 
 
This dissertation is about decentralization and agrarian politics in post-war El Salvador (1992-
1998).  Decentralization of government has been prescribed widely in Latin America over the 
past two decades, justified on the premise that it encourages more accountable governance by 
empowering local actors.  However, under conditions of high inequality and weak democracy, 
decentralization tends to reinforce already existing distributions of power and is frequently 
captured instead by powerful elites as a top-down strategy for preserving their interests.  Given 
this ambiguous mandate, a performance standard for empowered local actors is required.   
Following a line of inquiry established by Amartya Sen, I propose a novel 
conceptualization of empowerment as my dependent variable that is multidimensional and is 
examined at three levels of analysis (individual, meso-organizational, macro-societal). I 
hypothesize that under conditions of high inequality and weak institutions, decentralization 
works (i.e. empowerment is achieved) when local actors acquire capital resources and through 
collective action they contest inequality to convert those resources into sustainable livelihood 
improvements and more favorable power relations.  Effective decentralization can therefore be 
contentious and may disempower local actors when collective action problems are 
insurmountable.   
El Salvador has decentralized government in the post-war period on the premise that it 
necessarily encourages more accountable governance by empowering local actors.  Achieving 
empowerment or converting resources into achievements under conditions of high inequality and 
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weak democracy depends upon collective action.  Decentralized development in settings often 
relegates these collective action problems to unplanned, individualist strategies or reliance on the 
coercion or benevolence of a hegemonic actor.  An alternative approach surmounts collective 
action problems through negotiated agreements or strategies that are motivated by community 
norms of fairness and reciprocity.  I apply this template of collective action options (referred to 
here as Market, Hierarchy, Contract and Community strategies) to the various challenges posed 
by decentralization in post-war El Salvador.  This analysis is guided by the hypothesis of 
Lichbach that Market and Hierarchy collective action strategies are most likely to preserve 
inequality while Contract and Community collective action strategies are more likely to 
challenge inequality. The capacity for local collective action to confront entrenched inequality 
represents the central dilemma for making decentralization work in El Salvador. 
In El Salvador, two competing empowerment strategies may be distinguished.  
Empowerment by invitation is a top-down, elite brokered process of political negotiation, 
premised upon a positive sum distribution of the benefits and a prior acceptance of the rules of 
the game.  Empowerment through conflict, on the other hand, implies a bottom-up, zero-sum 
contestation of political benefits, as well as very rules and privileges that assure elites a cut of 
any subsequent benefit distribution.   The FMLN employed an empowerment through conflict 
approach, emphasizing an inherent conflict of interest between elite and non-elite groups over a 
zero-sum distribution of power resources.  With counter-insurgent aims, the Government of El 
Salvador pursued an empowerment by invitation approach, based on an imposed consensus over 
the acceptable rules of political expression that sought to preserve unequal property rights and 
political privileges of the elite (Karl 1986).   
Explaining why individuals, communities or organizations opted for either empowerment 
strategy turns our attention to political opportunity and to history, in other words, the specific 
shifts in structural configurations of elites or institutional rules and the network mobilization 
capacity of political entrepreneurs.  Tracing these more or less durable elements of political 
opportunity helped delineate the conditions under which insurgent and counter-insurgent action 
choices were made.  These political experiences have opened or closed space for Salvadoran 
peasants to choose revolution, counter-insurgent resistance or neutrality in during civil war in El 
Salvador.   
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To assess the performance of these competing empowerment strategies, I conduct a most 
similar case study comparison of three conflictive municipalities in the paracentral region of El 
Salvador that differ in one fundamental factor: their respective insurgent, hard-line counter-
insurgent and moderate counter-insurgent political histories.  Using survey analysis and process 
tracing, the evidence shows that where decentralization reinforced a process of diminishing 
inequality (Tecoluca) local actors were empowered to collect more local taxes, provide better 
services, attain more far reaching institutional coordination, and achieve efficacious 
participation.  The persistence of high inequality in both counter-insurgent cases weakened 
mechanisms for participation, accountability and transparency that in turn made decentralization 
highly susceptible to bureaucratic resistance, corruption and the prioritization of elite interests – 
in other words, political capture.   
 
  
 
A.  DECENTRALIZATION – THE QUIET REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE 
 
Decentralization in El Salvador was part of a broader reaction throughout Latin America to the 
political opportunity triggered by the collapse of the Latin American developmentalist state in 
the early 1980s.  This crisis set in motion a combination of political, social and economic 
realignments.  The revival of municipal government and emergence of social safety net programs 
and NGOs can be viewed as the product of strategic negotiation between stability oriented elite 
reformers from above and challenge oriented contentious social movements from below. 
The Latin American state found itself wracked by an unprecedented loss of legitimacy, 
hemmed in by increasing democratization, dismantled by conditionality of neoliberalism, and 
confronted by the strident demands for equity and participation by transnational social 
movements.  Latin American elites had little choice but to decentralize state functions as a way 
of preserving their teetering economic and political systems.  Given these cross-cutting 
constraints, ruling elites often pushed down decentralization reforms from above to placate and 
stabilize a peripheral (rural) electoral coalition as realignment and power redistribution occurred 
within the urban coalition.   
  736
Decentralization has emerged from a remarkable convergence of interests between the 
ascending neoliberal faction and the descending traditional, largely agrarian faction of Latin 
American political leaders.  Handpicked local actors have been invited to help implement 
decentralization programs that range in form from counter-insurgent civic action programs to 
anti-poverty complements of structural adjustment.  This “reactionary alliance” introduced social 
safety nets, revived local government and co-opted many NGOs with the principal objective of 
resisting contentious and potentially more transformative challenges from below.   
Decentralization was also embraced by social movements as a political means for 
expediting the demise of corrupt, authoritarian governments.  In the case of El Salvador, 
decentralization became a de facto governance and mobilization strategy with in insurgent 
controlled zones.  The dramatic rise of NGOs was clearly associated with social movement 
opposition to authoritarian rule in Latin America that helped open political space for 
decentralization.  However, the effectiveness of NGOs in directly challenging top-down 
decentralization is much less clear due to their frequent acceptance of the established rules for 
political participation.   
 This dramatic local turn in development policy, what the World Bank has called a quiet 
revolution, has also occurred despite significant gaps between the theory and expected 
performance of local institutions.  Effective decentralization assumes that local actors will find it 
easier to act collectively to hold local institutions more accountable than remote, poorly 
informed, centralized, often times corrupt agencies.   Significant responsibilities are shifted from 
the state to local governments, non-governmental organizations, civic associations -- to civil 
society itself, which is assumed to hold a comparative information and accountability advantage 
in tailoring local services to client needs, deepening participation, and advocating for citizen 
interests.  The inefficiencies and inequities attributed to centralization are best countered by 
forcing decentralized state institutions and levels of government to compete for citizen votes and 
taxes.   Decentralization finds support among neoliberal reformers as a politically more palatable 
means for privatization or structural adjustment and among post-structuralists in the promotion 
of a cultural politics of local self-determination.  Decentralization has also been promoted in 
some cases to diffuse social and political tensions, using autonomy in the midst of ethnic or 
separatist conflict as a way of preserving power. 
  737
In effect, all theoretical approaches to decentralization seek to empower citizens to hold 
the state and themselves more accountable for their own development. The metaphor of a 
virtuous circle is used to describe how the state and local networks of civil society organizations 
and local government become locked in a two-way dynamic of pressures for accountability that 
results in improved government.  
Local development actors have rushed in to fill the void left by a state weakened from 
structural adjustment reform.  Several conditions for successful decentralization have been noted.  
Decentralization is expected to work where local governments are of adequate size, have 
acquired administrative skills and autonomy over local revenue generation, and rest upon a well-
defined division of labor that provides the capacity to coordinate both horizontally (across 
NGOs, local governments) and vertically (upward with the line ministries of the state and 
downward with communities).  Coordination in the management and delivery of local public 
goods essential for rural development--roads, technical assistance services, power, 
telecommunications, irrigation, education, public health, sanitation, and security, are identified as 
some of the principal collective action challenges to effective decentralization.  In the provision 
of decentralized local public goods, collective action is necessary in the mobilization of money, 
labor and material resources, the design of rules governing resource use, the monitoring of rule 
compliance, and the enforcement of sanctions against rule breakers – all of which must be 
coordinated between jurisdictions of government. 
These expectations for decentralization are often frustrated in the prevailing context of inequality 
and bureaucratic self-interest that decentralization was also intended to protect.  Decentralization tends 
to strengthen the distribution of power that exists ex ante at the local level.  In counter-insurgent 
contexts of high inequality, stabilizing, top-down decentralization tends to empower local elites 
almost exclusively, just as it fragments local interests and exacerbates local capacity for 
collective action.  Under these conditions the chances of political capture are high.  A result of 
the top-down approach to decentralization, levels of participation in local development tend to be 
low, individualized, avoiding sustained contentious action, and lacking a sense of efficacy.    
In contexts of relative greater equity, challenging, bottom-up decentralization under 
conditions of improving local equity tends to empower a wider cross-section of people and 
further reduces the obstacles to collective action.   Empowered participation tends to be the 
highest where power asymmetries have been historically leveled.  Decentralized participation 
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from the bottom-up will be more participatory, combine both conventional and contentious 
modes of action, involve more collective effort, and generate a greater sense of efficacy among 
the participants. 
Absent the necessary safeguards against political capture, the emergence of NGOs, social 
safety nets and local government may effectively stabilize political support for neoliberal 
reforms and in turn, an equally exclusive and disempowering political and economic system.   
Given decentralization’s ambiguous mandate, this dissertation questions whether the trend 
toward greater localism and a smaller state is in the interest of El Salvador’s rural poor.  These 
political and economic realignments associated with decentralization have increased the political 
space for local actors, but have they empowered them?  How might we evaluate the pro-poor 
claims of decentralization – specifically in terms of empowerment?   
 
 
B.  INSURGENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENT POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
These questions are answered in part by examining the history of how local institutional 
endowments have taken shape.  Local institutional performance today has a great deal to do with 
choices people made in the recent past.  In tracing the conflictive and consensual origins of the 
local institutions from the pre-war period in El Salvador, three factors of the political opportunity 
structure (agrarian structure, elite access and repression) explain the competing empowerment 
strategies deployed by the FMLN and the military-government and how people in the case study 
communities responded to them.  Prior to the war, agrarian inequality was deepened by the 
modernization and export orientation of agriculture a process that  marginalized a peasant labor 
force that for years had been subsisting as colonos in stable relations with area landowners.  
Growing economic anxiety and intransigence among the landed elite blocked all meaningful 
political and economic reform initiatives.  These shifts eroded long-standing peasant-landlord 
relations.    
Two main catalysts help explain how the rural poor reacted.  Increased access to dissident 
political and religious elites and experiences of gross acts of violence altered the pre-war 
political opportunity structure for collective action. The progressive Catholic Church, Christian 
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Democrat politicians and revolutionary organizations all provided elite leadership for channeling 
rural and urban grievances toward conflictive mobilization tactics.  The reactionary Catholic 
church and paramilitary organizations stifled rural unrest or steered it toward defense of elite 
interests. 
The types of local collective mobilization or individual actions chosen to survive pre-war 
violence begin to distinguish two competing empowerment strategies.  Framed by definitive 
local turning points, choices made in the run up to civil war set otherwise similar neighboring 
communities on one of three possible paths – revolution, reform or reactionary counter-insurgent 
defense of the status quo.  In Tecoluca, a five year period of building Christian base communities 
and a parallel effort to recruit and train insurgent cadre preceded the first shock of massive 
repression. The massacre at La Cayetana strengthened the movement to challenge agrarian 
relations.  In the Jiboa Valley, where the impact of the popular church was less and reactionary 
political forces found a strong following, an episode of massive repression was capable of 
annihilating any base of resistance to the prevailing coffee oligarchy.  In San Ildefonso, a 
combination of weak religious influence and insurgent violence toward a widely supported 
cooperative movement closed off potential participation in actively challenging local inequality, 
but also mitigated a deeper commitment to counter-insurgency.  Instead, in San Ildefonso we 
find an allegiance to the personalities and accommodative policies of the Christian Democrats, 
and in particular, the promise of agrarian reform.   
In the run-up to war, the onset of political democratization as well as the rather slow, 
methodical process of discovery that had been possible within Christian base communities and 
rural peasant unions, were strangled early by military repression, which then escalated to a full-
blown and bloody contest over national power and property rights.  The civil war brought both 
change and continuity.  Some communities had leadership and capacity forged over a decade of 
training and collective action, others were swept into the chaos with little preparation or 
understanding at all.    
Over the course of the civil war, competing insurgent and counter-insurgent strategies 
experimented with new institutions and governance rules at the local level to win peasant 
sympathies.  Decentralized mobilization strategies were necessitated by the sheer scope, duration 
and intensity of the conflict.  Within zones of military control, the authoritarian character of 
government rule was unabashedly top-down, ruthless, and opposed to any civic participation that 
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served no counter-insurgent function.   The conscription of soldiers and coerced service of civil 
patrols, the revival of municipal government and state managed agrarian reform cooperatives the 
three fundamental pillars of the government counter-insurgency strategy to incorporate local 
populations as a buffer against FMLN recruitment. 
My research suggests that the motivations for participation in the insurgency had less to 
do with greed or other material incentives than to principled beliefs and the perceived threats of 
repression.  In fact, few the grievance-based, rationalist or structural explanations for peasant 
rebellion by themselves can not account for the patterns of insurgent participation found in the 
paracentral region.  Civilians were also recruited by the FMLN as a buffer between them and the 
military, but those rebels interviewed expressed considerably greater voluntarism than the among 
Armed Forces recruits.   Repression, by itself, does not tell us enough about the actions in 
collaboration or full participation as a combatant with the FMLN.  The evidence associated with 
those that did participate on both sides, suggest that multiple factors, some structural and others 
attitudinal, combine to explain how the insurgents were able to continue recruiting new 
combatants and collaborators over nearly two decades. 
If only within zones of FMLN control, the insurgency brought with it a transforming 
process that rendered the pre-war authority structure and the associated agrarian land structure on 
which it rested, null and void,.  Command was also vertical but notably different in the self-
imposed limits set on this power.  FMLN authority derived from an underlying respect for 
human dignity, the delegation of governing authority to local populations and the goal of equity 
in property redistribution.  The asymmetric nature of the conflict forced insurgent commanders 
to delegate responsibilities and decision making power to the thousands of community 
organizers, and the masses of peasants, women, elderly, children that supported them.   
While many of these new leaders transitioned from pre-war roles as catechists, students, 
and peasant union leaders, their experiences during the war required new skills and often the 
ascription of multiple identities.  Insurgent populations invented new local institutions (militia, 
popular local governments, independent cooperatives, repopulation movements, and eventually 
NGOs) to survive and resist the government efforts to re-establish pre-war agrarian relations.  As 
such, the collective experiences in FMLN controlled zones involved significant increases in the 
confidence of opposition communities. This analysis breaks with some research on the 
Salvadoran conflict by asserting that greater voluntarism and local autonomy existed within 
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FMLN zones of control and distinguished the FMLN empowerment strategy.  At the same time, 
insurgent culture was punctuated by deep fissures of distrust and suspicion that were a legacy of 
clandestine organizing, betrayal and the suffering of gross acts of violence directed from both 
sides. 
In effect, decentralization occurred in both insurgent and counter-insurgent controlled 
and contested zones as de facto governance strategies where the war had destroyed prevailing 
structures of rule.  Municipal government was revived and NGOs were invented as political 
necessities in a climate of violence and struggle for the sympathies of the Salvadoran population.  
Decentralized rule was essential because the heightened stakes of winning or sustaining the 
allegiance of rural “hearts and minds” led intentionally or unintentionally to the authentic or 
apparent empowerment of local populations to set their own terms for participation.  
Both types of local institutions, to differing degrees, have evolved from instruments for 
decentralization and political capture by both parties to the conflict.  Before the war, most NGOs 
eschewed politics and most small town mayors discharged a narrow political mandate set by 
local landowning elites in the ruling party.  Preserving the stability of agrarian inequality was the 
paramount goal.  During the war, local institutions were endowed with unprecedented 
responsibilities and authority.  Tempered by this conflict, competing visions and capacities for 
local development and democracy were both forged in the furnace of civil war. 
During the “high intensity conflict” period of the war (1980-1984), the FMLN eliminated 
traditional local government within liberated territory and experimented with alternative 
institutions, such as the Poderes Populares Locales, while the civilian-military regime targeted a 
moderate cooperative sector in its attempt to stabilize rural unrest through an ambitious agrarian 
reform.  In the “low-intensity conflict” stage of the war (1984-1989), the electoral success of the 
Christian Democrats combined with an expansion of government air power to force the FMLN to 
break up its battalions into smaller, more coordinated but independent mobile units.  The 
insurgent focus turned to political organizing and refugee land repopulations.  The government 
civic pacification programs focused on restoring the authority of rural mayors. The proliferation 
of NGOs and the revival of local government represented insurgent and counter-insurgent 
preparations for peace and set the stage for a new chapter of political struggle around 
decentralized development in the post-war period.  
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C.  THE POST-WAR POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR DECENTRALIZATION 
 
When the political war ended in 1992, the experiences that distinguished those individuals and 
communities that chose revolution, reform or reactionary counter-insurgent defense of the status 
quo were so profoundly rooted that they would shape the expectations and behaviors of a 
generation of Salvadorans that came of age in this period.  In short, a twelve year civil war 
brought into sharp relief a Salvadoran countryside governed by two parallel states, two political-
economic systems, and in turn, two competing conceptions of citizen empowerment.  Distinct 
political experiences involving war-time decentralization were deeply marked the post-war 
institutionalization of local authority in NGOs, municipal governments and their articulation with 
social safety net programs.  Thus, the assigned roles, interests and performance of these local 
actors in decentralized post-war reconstruction vary according to their respective underlying 
aggregate political experiences and their associated empowerment strategies.  As the dominant 
forces in national politics, the FMLN and ARENA incorporated these new local actors into their 
mobilization networks as a way of adapting wartime empowerment strategies to the shifts in the 
post-war political opportunity structure.   
Three important macro-level linkages are evident between the post-war shifts in the 
political opportunity structure, the emergence of decentralization as a policy initiative and the 
respective insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies.  First, decentralization 
began to gain national traction as a policy option in El Salvador only after the FMLN became 
more competitive as a political opponent to ARENA and made rapid electoral gains, particularly 
at the municipal and legislative level. However, ARENA also viewed decentralization as a way 
of redistributing power within its ruling coalition.  Second, decentralization transferred power to 
local institutions embedded within a rural economy in rapid decline, falling far short of the 
expectations for the economic performance of local institutions.  Third, post-war inequality of 
land and income have remained very high nationally, suggesting that the capacity for collective 
action remains important for post-war decentralized rural development.   
The political and economic implications of the Peace Accords triggered a profound 
recomposition within the principal insurgent and counter-insurgent political movements and the 
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diversification of their respective mobilization strategies.  By trading political concessions to the 
FMLN in return for control over the economy, the Peace Accords enabled ARENA to achieve its 
primary goal of social and political stability and insulate an economic agenda that emphasized 
massive state privatization and trade liberalization.  However, the political cost was an unsettling 
transition within the ruling coalition that favored those elites that had diversified their interests 
beyond agriculture, and punished those elites most dependent upon agrarian rents.  The latter 
extracted political concessions to cushion their economic decline and resisted the distributive 
goals of peace process from within the key posts of post-war government.  The restoration of 
civil authority over the military also meant that enforcing the priorities of the party would require 
a set of collective action strategies less dependent on coercion.  ARENA used decentralization to 
enrich the modernizers in its party while placating dissenting elites.  Little new space was opened 
for local actors.  
The FMLN ceded control of the economy in exchange for political reforms and an 
economic reinsertion package for ex-combatants.  Electoral gains, increasingly weighted by 
urban turnout, secured new legislative and municipal power and consolidated the FMLN’s place 
as the principal opposition party. The FMLN has improved the accountability of key political 
institutions and ensured the monitoring and compliance of the most contentious aspects of the 
Peace Accords. However, recurrent internal divisions have limited the FMLN’s political success 
as well as the party’s ability to improve the quality of life of much of the insurgent rural base.  
Lacking the same normative incentives and institutional allies to rally collective action in its base 
as during the war, the FMLN has also ceded greater autonomy to new local actors (NGOs, 
municipal and community authorities) in order to shore up its own mobilization network.  
Decentralization and local economic development have provided the means for reinventing the 
principled incentives for collective action during the war and for channeling significant resources 
to local actors as a platform to mount contentious challenges at the national level.   
Both insurgent and counter-insurgent empowerment strategies promoted decentralization 
in response to a transition between new and old elites.  However, the ongoing recomposition of 
insurgent and counter-insurgent mobilization networks has played out differently. For ARENA, 
the fundamental shift was horizontal, between one faction of the Salvadoran oligarchy to 
another.  Decentralization responded to the modernizing elite’s top priority of safeguarding 
economic reforms, but also to a steady effort to expand the party’s base and to consolidate its 
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control over large parts of the countryside.  However, the mere promise of devolution of power 
to municipal authority plus the selective distribution of benefits to the hard-line agrarian elite 
were sufficient to maintain broad party loyalty and preserve the capacity to mobilize it rural base 
during elections.  Control over the spoils of public office has enabled ARENA to manage the 
realignment of ruling coalition elites with relatively lower political costs. 
For the FMLN, the fundamental shift has been vertical, with more new leaders ascending 
or entering politics from municipal office, the NGO field or grassroots gremios.  Local actors 
have opened the space for themselves in a process that has been both expansive and 
unpredictable – rupturing in some localities the exclusionary pattern of development.  Without 
the capacity to redistribute state patronage, this impulse from below sparked the FMLN’s 
promotion of decentralization as a central element in its electoral strategy.  Decentralization was 
being pulled down from below by the FMLN, which had to rely much more on the actual 
improvement of self-governance at the municipal level.  The acquisition of political credibility in 
local governance by FMLN mayors, councils and NGOs opened unprecedented space within 
Salvadoran society and within the party itself for the inclusion of a new class of elites and 
interests. 
ARENA’s political control of the Presidency has nevertheless ensured that post-war 
decentralized development in El Salvador has generally favored a top-down, stabilizing, 
empowerment by invitation approach.  Beginning with the National Reconstruction Plan, 
policy making decision processes related to issues that had been at the core of the civil war were 
effectively sealed off from the domain of citizen participation.  With a mix of coercion and 
clientelism, ARENA invited citizens to participate only in those matters considered politically 
safe and therefore often irrelevant.  In this empowerment by invitation approach to 
decentralization, elites have legitimized conventional and non-violent forms of political 
expression and actively discredited contentious forms of challenge to their historic political and 
economic privilege. 
Counter-insurgent decentralization was designed to restore a modicum of electoral 
democracy at the national level, recapture local political authority and undermine the legitimacy 
of the FMLN through top-down reconstruction programs.  Political competition within the 
ARENA-controlled ruling coalition gave rise to multiple state agencies charged with local 
development responsibilities.  Most of the critical decisions, from the creation of these 
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institutions to their budget allocations, were taken at the top with almost no participation by the 
affected population. Among the various government agencies charged with attending local 
needs, there has been a tendency to pursue individual strategies with local target populations 
rather than coordinate more broadly.  Competition for development resources rather than 
coalition building as a means for strengthening local populations, became the norm.  
The FMLN organized local forces to demand both fiscal and administrative 
decentralization from below.  The local institutions aligned with the FMLN have attempted to 
combine the capacity for protest with effective and propositive local governance as a platform 
for acquiring the political capital necessary to derail ARENA’s neoliberal reforms and win the 
Presidency.  Lacking any control over state agencies, the NGOs, municipal governments and 
community organizations aligned with the FMLN have acted with considerable autonomy, if not 
incentives, to innovate in the implementation of local reconstruction plans, pursue independent 
funding and channel local demands upward.   
The FMLN adapted an empowerment through conflict approach to the post-war 
opportunity of decentralization by employing a diversity of collective action strategies.  In 
contrast to the more dire predictions that FMLN rule would be intolerant, authoritarian, secretive,  
or unrestrained in the violation of property rights and human rights, the predominant strategies of 
FMLN governance at the local level have been, in fact, quite pragmatic.  FMLN councils have 
sought to perfect local governance through the promotion of unprecedented participatory and 
accountability mechanisms, advancing an agenda for far reaching political reform, and building 
community capacity for social oversight based on equity principles.   Empowerment through 
conflict strategies have also placed a premium on institutional coordination, although recurrent 
factional divisions have been the principal obstacle to even greater electoral success. 
 
 
D.  NGOS: A MIXED LEGACY 
 
Within the suggested range of competing empowerment strategies, municipal governments and 
NGOs have also evolved on different tracks.  Communities in zones of wartime FMLN control 
supported NGOs and reserved hostility for many mayors.  This pattern of institutional 
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preferences was reversed in zones of government control.  NGOs allied with the FMLN have 
tended to prioritize contentious collective actions to demand among other fulfillments of the 
Peace Accords, expropriative redistribution of assets.  Controlled until recently by ARENA or 
PCN mayors, municipalities have tended to emphasize conventional modes of participation and 
gradual improvements in public services.  Since 1994, the ideological tension between NGOs 
and municipal government has diminished.  FMLN mayors now govern over half of the 
population at the local level and must learn the art of coordinating with adversaries, including 
many NGOs.  ARENA’s initial distrust and unwillingness to deal directly with most NGOs or 
community organizations has switched to prioritizing and rewarding alliances with those that are 
willing to accept the established rules of the game.  Still, coordination between government, 
mayors and NGOs became one of the central challenges to post-war decentralized development.   
My analysis of the evolution of Salvadoran civil society over the past five decades 
questions whether the proliferation of NGOs has increased non-elite bargaining capacity.  On 
one hand, the most recent cycle of organizational growth defies the logic of pluralist democratic 
theorists that posit the slow, non-conflictive accretion of social capital through the face to face 
encounters within small associations.  In El Salvador, a large segment of the population 
organized itself as a strategy to confront a repressive state and suffered tremendous repression as 
a result.  A solid foundation of social and political capital was generated in the increasingly 
violent experiences of mass collective action in which civil society organizations and local 
government were often at odds.  The break with the traditional paternalist NGO presence that 
prevailed prior to the war has undoubtedly contributed to local development. 
On the other hand, NGOs were never intended to assume broader development 
responsibilities.  The value added of effective NGOs is in making modest, partial contributions to 
local development that demonstrate how development might be solved, and to empower local 
actors to act collectively to achieve these solutions.  Instead, many NGOs have tended to assign 
themselves the full responsibility of solving local needs.  In so doing, NGOs have often failed to 
coordinate widely enough and have diverted local energy away from addressing structural 
obstacles such as inequality and political capture, or to look beyond the local environment for the 
required investments of the private sector and the state.  Despite contributing to social and 
economic development, NGOs have at times provided an inferior substitute for effective 
government services and have undermined the political capacity of gremios better suited to 
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advocate for those services. As some evidence here and numerous analysts have observed, large 
numbers of NGOs ought to indicate a most viable civil society. Yet, the NGO sector in El 
Salvador is fragmented, highly politicized at the margins, and in many respects given their 
numbers, surprisingly unable to advance a progressive social agenda.   
 
 
E. MEASURING EMPOWERMENT: AGRARIAN INEQUALITY, INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE, & PARTICIPATION 
 
An assessment of post-war agricultural development strategies in the municipal case studies 
provides the first direct link between post-war land inequality, decentralization and 
empowerment.  These largely agricultural communities share a very low accumulated level of 
economic or human capital, although important differences are evident.  First and foremost, 
although land inequality remains a fact of life in El Salvador, some communities are no longer 
paralyzed by this formidable obstacle to development.  In Tecoluca, the predatory hold of the 
landed elite was broken, creating space for a variety of locally driven, often contentious and 
collective development initiatives.  In turn, NGOs, local gremios and community organizations 
have been assigned unprecedented authority and elicit higher levels of local collaboration toward 
fulfilling the elevated expectations for post-war development.   
In contrast, land inequality remains high in the Jiboa Valley, and to a slightly lesser 
extent, San Ildefonso.  In the Jiboa Valley, a remarkable stability in patron-client relations 
underscores the individualist, acquiescent and nostalgic attitudes that continue to enable top-
down initiatives to favor the prerogatives of a small group of larger owners.  An empowerment 
through invitation strategy to rural development opens very little space for local actors or new 
alliances to compete with, much less confront the modernizing elites within ARENA that control 
the allocation of patronage and discipline dissent.  In San Ildefonso, the ambivalent collaboration 
with both sides during the war has resulted in a partial land reform, but is weakened by the 
absence of a strong identity or political ally able to fend off the encroachment on local power of 
provincial elites. 
The dividends of both empowerment strategies in terms of economic capital have been 
small.  International loan conditionality has been instrumental in shifting agrarian reform away 
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from asset expropriation and redistribution, and toward the promotion and enforcement of 
market principles and individual property rights.  As the state has withdrawn from agriculture, 
state sponsored social investment programs, municipal governments and internationally funded 
NGOs have tried to fill the gap.  For the most part, none of the first generation of post-war 
agricultural development initiatives have succeeded in achieving sustainable livelihoods for the 
majority of the beneficiary populations.  Most share the same defects and were never more than 
social compensation programs in an economic climate highly inhospitable to small scale 
agriculture.   
Far from being monolithic, each case study illustrates different correlations of power and 
internal tensions between landed and modernizing elites, individual peasant farmers, organized 
farmer groups, NGOs, state agencies, and international financial institutions.  Where there is 
relative continuity in land inequality and relations between the various social classes, 
empowerment by invitation strategies circumscribe the options for local producers and 
decentralization of rural development resources are more prone to political capture.   Counter-
insurgent empowerment strategies have also depended to a greater extent on the top-down 
benevolence of the state and the disciplinary capacity of hierarchical institutions such as COENA 
to manage an orderly retreat from economic dependence on agriculture.  In these settings (Jiboa 
Valley), communities rely mostly on hierarchy and market collective action strategies that 
emphasize individual competition and tend to reward elites through the political capture of 
resources freed by agricultural policy reforms.   
Where the power of elites, both the landowning and modernizing types, has been 
restricted by land redistribution, empowerment through conflict strategies have shifted 
agricultural development responsibilities to new local institutions and leaders.  Insurgent 
empowerment strategies in Tecoluca have relied increasingly on contract or community 
collective action strategies.  These strategies combine negotiated institutional solutions for 
exploring alternative post-war agricultural development alliances with solidarity based, 
frequently contentious and mobilized defense of hard won rights and assets.  As a result, 
effective vigilance against political capture is greater.   
Where political experiences were less clearly defined and agrarian inequality left partially 
intact (San Ildefonso), competition between top-down and bottom-up contract collective action 
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strategies have neutralized each other and consequently resulted in the weakest economic 
performance. 
Perhaps the more important distinction beyond the failure to create much economic 
capital has been the accumulation of political capital in demonstrating a long term alternative for 
local economic development that rests on widespread credibility and an organizational capacity 
to defend it against political capture.  The risks of political capture remain.  Political influence in 
the design, approval and implementation of internationally financed investments in the 
strengthening of rural producers negatively affected the major agricultural initiatives in all three 
municipal case studies (Cooperative Nonualco and PRODAP in the Jiboa Valley, Lempa 
Acahuapa in San Ildefonso, and the Bajo Lempa loan in Tecoluca).  Resistance to these instances 
of political meddling in the provision of public goods depended on transparent, accountable and 
equitable structures of local governance.  In Tecoluca alone, where land inequality has been most 
clearly reversed, were these attributes visible.  Even in Tecoluca these qualities were insufficient. 
Post-war trends in local development finance suggest that decentralization has expanded 
new local opportunities for resource mobilization, but has failed to compensate for persistent 
biases in public investment against rural economic development.  Local actors have little choice 
but to coordinate on various levels to find solutions to this resource mobilization challenge.  
Again, a comparison of institutional level empowerment, defined as the performance of local 
institutions in three key areas of governance: cooperation between mayors, inter-institutional 
coordination within municipalities, and participation, transparency and accountability in local 
resource mobilization, reveals striking differences in insurgent and counter-insurgent 
municipalities. 
In each area, FMLN mayors and local institutions in Tecoluca outperform the two 
counter-insurgent cases in nearly every institutional empowerment indicator.  Efforts by FMLN 
mayors to lead municipal coordination around a progressive political agenda in the San Vicente 
mayors’ council have been repeatedly blocked by ARENA party elites.  At the inter-institutional 
level within each municipal case, Tecoluca’s municipal development council has included a 
wider diversity of participants, explored a more profound discussion of the structural obstacles to 
local development, and considered of a more ambitious menu of advocacy strategies than similar 
efforts in the Jiboa Valley and San Ildefonso.  Finally, Tecoluca’s cabildo abierto process 
demonstrates a higher and more intense level of citizen participation, modestly greater 
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transparency and concrete strides toward the establishment of participatory budget accountability 
mechanisms.  Together, these institutional innovations in Tecoluca have resulted in a more 
diverse, stable and increasing development finance base than either of the other two municipal 
governments.   
The sum of the evidence underscores fundamental differences in the insurgent and 
counter-insurgent empowerment strategies.  The performance of local institutions in Jiboa Valley 
and San Ildefonso suggest that the legacy of counter-insurgent political experiences is the 
persistence of hierarchy or market collective action strategies – neither of which has proven 
particularly effective in confronting the threat of political capture.   Tecoluca, by contrast, has 
demonstrated the capacity for contract and community collective action strategies that are more 
associated with participatory and accountable local governance, and the institutional 
coordination so necessary for overcoming the challenges to local development in El Salvador. 
For the majority of indicators the measure individual level empowerment attitudes and 
achievements, Tecoluca also surpasses San Ildefonso and the Jiboa Valley.  Tecolucans are 
significantly more involved in the social and political life of their communities and the nation, 
demonstrating the most versatile capacity for collective action in both conventional and 
unconventional opportunities for participation.   
However, the true test of the generalizability of Tecoluca’s achievements is to compare 
the empowerment qualities at an individual level across a broader cross-section of El Salvador.  I 
test the uniqueness of Tecoluca’s successful insurgent empowerment strategy by comparing the 
effect of its core distinctive attribute – its insurgent political experience, on the individual level 
empowerment indicators across the entire paracentral survey sample. Empowerment is measured 
at the individual level by efficacious participation in post-war decentralized development (formal 
community activism and contentious protest).  Comparisons of the levels of participation 
between representative insurgent and counter-insurgent communities in one of El Salvador’s ex-
conflictive regions based on the survey results clearly illustrate the impact of competing 
empowerment strategies.  I find that 1) decentralization reforms are associated with the highest 
levels of efficacious participation and individual level empowerment achievements in general 
where local land inequality and associated power relations have been leveled – in insurgent 
FMLN communities, and 2) political experiences of bottom-up, contentious decentralization 
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linked with the social and economic contexts of FMLN zones of influence prove to be a durable 
predictor of efficacious participation across the entire region.   
What makes decentralization work?  For twelve years, the U.S. spent $4.5 billion in aid 
and considerable political capital fighting the communist inspired insurgency Frente para la 
Liberación Nacional Farabundo Martí in El Salvador.  The conventional justification behind this 
counter-insurgent commitment was the belief that a communist takeover in El Salvador would be 
bad for democracy (totalitarian rule), bad for political stability (ungovernability triggered by 
unleashed demand outstripping institutional capacity) and bad for economic development (rigid 
preference for a command economy over market reforms).  A true test of this thesis is only 
possible under conditions of an FMLN Presidency.  However, at the local level the evidence 
presented here provides compelling support for the core assumption that insurgent and counter-
insurgent political experiences were substantively different, but refutes the expected outcome.  
What U.S. development and other bilateral aid representatives now concede and what FMLN 
political gains at the local level seem to confirm, is the puzzling evidence that FMLN postwar 
rule at the local level in Tecoluca and other insurgent municipalities has been pragmatic, 
inclusive and accountable - the very opposite effect than that predicted by their detractors.   
In Tecoluca, insurgent collective action has broken the straitjacket of land inequality.  In 
so doing, all other reinforcing processes of inequality (resource allocation, participation, 
accountability) have also been loosened.  As a result, the likelihood of political capture has been 
dramatically lowered. Decentralization reinforced a process of diminishing inequality in 
Tecoluca that empowered local actors to acquire capital resources and use them effectively to 
overcome collective action problems and contest prevailing inequality.   Tecoluca collects more 
local taxes, uses these and other resources more effectively to provide better services, and 
encourages more far reaching coordination to ensure the highest possible efficiency among local 
institutions.  Compliance with these negotiated local development strategies is greatly enhanced 
by Tecoluca’s capacity for contentious collective action.  
The intervening authority of local elites combined with the stigma associated with 
grassroots organizing in government controlled zones, such as the Jiboa Valley, explains the 
persistence of high inequality.  Consequently, the absence of mechanisms for participation, 
accountability and transparency make decentralization highly susceptible to bureaucratic 
resistance, corruption and the prioritization of elite interests – in other words, political capture.  
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By disabling local capacity to overcome collective action problems and contest prevailing 
inequality through either conventional or contentious means, decentralization may have even 
disempowered local actors in the Jiboa Valley and to a lesser extent in San Ildefonso.   
 
 
F.  CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION: 
 
1.  New ways to measure empowerment: The lack of attention to empowerment in the 
political science literature is due in part to the concept’s multi-disciplinary nature.  Elements that 
I have defined as empowerment (participation, efficacy, trust, etc.) constitute vibrant research 
programs within political science and the other social sciences.  On the contrary, the widespread 
use of empowerment resources, attitudes or achievements in development literature often lacks 
an accepted frame of meaning or method of evaluation.  Empowerment is one of the three pillars 
of World Bank’s approach to poverty reduction, yet there is no consensus on what it is or how it 
can be measured.  This dissertation reflects the novel efforts underway to substantiate and 
integrate our approach to measuring the empowerment impact of development policies or 
projects. 
The analysis also moves beyond what empowerment is not.  For example, empowerment 
is commonly associated with the aphorism, ‘Give a man a fish and he eats for one night. Teach 
him how to fish and he eats for life.’   The inherent appeal of this adage is that building self-
sufficiency appears to be a win-win proposition.  The benefactor is pleased to see a limit on 
poverty assistance, and through the transfer of technical skills or resources the recipient is 
presumably enabled to participate in their own self-development.  Post-war decentralization 
policies that target rural ex-conflictive populations in El Salvador have largely operated 
according to this conventional wisdom in El Salvador.  By transferring resources, training and 
even responsibility from the state or international agencies to local actors, the rural poor were 
expected to be more able to help themselves.   
This dissertation has shown how such an approach has unfortunately failed under 
conditions of high inequality.  First, the conventional approach assumes that the transfer of 
technology is sufficient and avoids the creation of political and social capital resources.  
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Secondly, the transfer of empowerment resources to the local level does not ensure that these 
resources will lead to the expected outcomes.  Teaching someone to fish does not insure that they 
will receive a fair price for their catch or that the revenue will not be expropriated through 
onerous taxation or theft.  Nor does it guarantee their secure access to sustainably replenished 
fishing waters.  In settings of high inequality and weak democratic institutions, resources 
transferred to the poor are highly susceptible to political capture and decentralization can have 
the perverse effect of disempowering the local beneficiary.  Collective, perhaps contentious 
collective action is required to guarantee the conversion of these empowerment resources into 
achievements.  The value added of the alternative approach to empowerment advanced here is to 
account for both empowering and disempowering potential outcomes through a more balanced 
range of indicators that do not disqualify political capital and political achievements nor exclude 
contentious forms of agency. 
Attention to structural and contextual factors such as inequality in measuring 
empowerment moves us beyond an exclusive focus at the household or community level.  
Empowerment must be measured and compared simultaneously at different levels: individual, 
institutional and societal, with some process tracing between these levels.   
This approach to empowerment also emphasizes the significance of inequality, 
particularly asset inequality, as a national or local contextual constraint on policy performance as 
an area that deserves considerably more research attention.  The effects of inequality explored in 
this study suggest that future research on the topic strive to analyze the deeper causal effects this 
attribute of Latin America’s political economy on the region’s disappointing policy performance 
than the habitual compilation of descriptive statistics. 
The capacity for local collective action to confront entrenched inequality represents the 
central challenge for making decentralization work in El Salvador.  Decentralized development 
tends to settle for either unplanned, individualist collective action strategies or seeks out an 
institutional patron to push down the reform from above.  This alternative approach provides for 
a more diverse and expansive set of potential solutions to collective action problems that 
includes a variety of negotiation strategies, the formation of new formal and informal 
organizations, self-government, strategies of  community norms of fairness and reciprocity – all 
of which are oriented by bottom-up demand for decentralization.   
  754
This empowerment framework also departs from conventional development policy 
assumptions that tend to treat all rural communities as essentially the same.  Overlooking or 
intentionally ignoring the variation in political experiences among communities that at first 
glance appear similar, reduces the likelihood of policy success.  Determination of which of the 
four categories of collective action strategy may be most likely in any given community depends 
on an analysis of the political opportunity structure over time.  Reconstruction of municipal case 
study histories tracing processes of agrarian inequality, access to elites and state repression was 
necessary to assess the probability of certain empowerment strategies in the present.   
This analysis of the wartime experiences contrasts sharply with the counter-insurgent 
perspective of revolutionary political culture that was espoused by the government and its 
principal benefactor, the United States, during and after the war.  The historical narrative 
presented here complicates the exclusively negative view of conflict as an empowerment strategy 
by insurgents.  By employing some of the right’s preferred indicators for democracy and 
development, this dissertation provides a wealth of evidence that challenges many of the dire 
predictions of insurgent rule.  Conflictive empowerment strategies that emphasize zero-sum 
resource distribution and contentious advocacy strategies are found to be legitimate and effective 
in explaining post-war empowerment, complicating a singular focus on win-win strategies.  
Application of Lichbach’s stylized rational choice framework of solutions to the rebel’s dilemma 
to empowerment expands the range of agency options beyond positive sum scenarios.   
As a pilot effort to explore a rather novel methodology, there remain many unanswered 
questions regarding the appropriate empowerment measure.  These include a clearer conceptual 
distinction between resources, attitudes or achievements; a logical causal sequence between these 
factors, and the recognition that achievements do not fulfill Sen’s preferred notion of 
capabilities.  Further efforts to test these and alternative definitions of empowerment over time 
will undoubtedly shed further light on these gray areas. Other policies that rely on similar 
elements of empowerment, or what makes decentralization work (participation, accountability, 
resource mobilization, efficacy, etc.) are equally suitable domains for seeking a better 
understanding of why collective action matters, how it is achieved, and how inequality sets limits 
or facilitates finding these solutions.   
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2.  Measuring Agrarian Inequality: A second methodological innovation is the use of nationwide 
household surveys that can be disaggregated at sub-national levels to provide data on income, 
asset distribution and other relevant indicators.  While many countries, such as El Salvador, have 
not updated their agrarian census, research on the extent and impact of land inequality can be 
advanced by utilizing household survey data that have become widely available throughout Latin 
America.  To suggest that land inequality no longer matters simply because of data unavailability 
effectively biases research results.  This research demonstrates an effective solution to this 
methodological problem.  Seligson (1995) illustrates the utility of these household data sets in 
filling empirical gaps left by infrequent agricultural or population censuses.   My analysis of El 
Salvador national household survey data permits an important update and extension of what we 
know about the current agrarian structure in El Salvador.  Harmonization of household survey 
instruments and improved survey techniques to include large landowners would provide a critical 
source of data and facilitate long overdue cross-national comparison of land inequality in Latin 
America that employs current and disaggregated inequality estimates. 
 
3.  Regional analysis of national conflicts: El Salvador is not one case of peasant insurgency, but 
a number of different regional cases.  This analysis of Salvadoran civil war in the paracentral 
region over several decades adds a chapter to the growing comparative regional and temporal 
treatment of this conflict and is consistent with a more disaggregated and local approach to 
studying civil war (Lauria-Santiago and Binford (2004).  In another sense, the comparison strives 
to compare insurgency and counter-insurgency simultaneously, which I hope has strengthened 
rather than weakened the analysis. The surprising contrasts in the political experiences of 
neighboring Salvadoran communities of the same geographical region provides texture to the 
claims of polarization that are used to describe the country, but are rarely explored in depth.   
 The analysis of the Salvadoran civil war also departs somewhat from the view held by 
some that the nature of experiences of FMLN combatants were overwhelmingly authoritarian 
and non-democratic.  While this was undoubtedly true in particular instances, the relatively little 
evidence that we have about the diversity of self-governing experiences under FMLN rule in 
conflictive zones tells a slightly different story.  The insurgent collective action strategy during 
the war was much more dependent upon the voluntarism of its supporters and combatants than 
the coercion to which such collaboration is often attributed. The post-war experience of FMLN 
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rule, which has tended to be surprisingly innovative and democratic at the local level while 
regressing at times toward a central command mode of decision making at the national level, 
cannot be explained without recognition of accumulated capacity for democratic self-rule during 
the war.  
 
4. Local context effects: Comparison of statistical averages at the national level or the observed 
actions of individuals at the micro-level takes us only so far establishing meaningful 
explanations of revolution, democracy, or inequality.  The contextual effect of shared 
experiences or attributes of an intermediate unit of analysis, be it a community or an 
organizational network, offers independent explanatory power that is not reducible to the 
attributes of any individual and is obscured by a higher statistical aggregations.  The variation in 
the contextual effect of political experiences found between otherwise similar rural communities, 
despite noted shortcomings in its definition, is significant for understanding post-war 
empowerment at several levels.  Control for local contextual explanatory factors has broad 
applications to empowerment research and other development puzzles of comparative research.    
 
 Combined, the evidence and analysis presented here strongly suggests that the impact of 
civil war on Salvadoran political culture in one region, while not uniform, has generated 
empowerment where conventional wisdom has suggested we might least expect it.  It is very 
much a story that shows the potency of revolutionary action in achieving local empowerment by 
transforming property relations and yet also turns out to be tragically inadequate. Only by 
fighting, these three contrasting regional cases suggest, could the Salvadorans gain much, and 
they did gain much.  Despite these considerable advances, it still wasn’t enough.  Even extensive 
agrarian change and the accumulation of impressive political capital in places like Tecoluca, 
which approximated the kind of redistribution that most revolutionaries imagined they were 
fighting for, has proven inadequate to ensure sustainable rural livelihoods for much of the rural 
population.   
In the future, we might return to the lower Lempa valley and find a burgeoning cottage 
export industry that Putnam traced in Northern Italy.  For now, Tecoluca teaches us once again 
that the winners in class struggle that are at the forefront of advancing human freedom and 
democracy, are also often on the losing end in the struggle against economic marginalization.  
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The largely peasant fighters in the Salvadoran insurgency have altered the political culture and 
many are satisfied that access to land and local power will offer a better life for their children, if 
only in places like Tecoluca.  However, most of the country’s impoverished agricultural labor 
force is watching the tide of history roll over them as trade liberalization will likely bring an 
unceremonious end to many subsistence livelihoods.  The winners of this story, as Barrington 
Moore predicted four decades ago, are the modernizing agrarian elites that have appropriated the 
crown jewels of economic opportunity that were opened by the transition to democracy.  This 
sobering reality, more than any single indicator that I have measured, perhaps best underscores 
the limits set by high inequality to empowerment in post-war El Salvador. 
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APPENDIX A.  Empowerment Indicators, Measures and Data Sources 
 
 
Table A.1  Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
 
 
RESOURCES Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, n=912 unless noted otherwise) 
Economic Capital  
1. Income Reported monthly income range, P1.37 
2. Land (n=435) Reported land owned or rented, ha. (P1.11, P1.17) 
3. Land inequality Gini index of land inequality among producers w access to land 
4. Collective land ownership % of landowners holding some or all land in collective title 
5. Livestock (n=132) Reported cattle owned of 467 ag. Producers  
6. Remittances (Exit option) Reported receipt of remittances (range) in last year (P1.40) 
7. Dependency Index Total household occupations per family member  
8. Household Asset Index 
9. (n=912) 
Index of 5 household assets: tv,vcr,fridge,phone,auto (Sum P1.45-P1.49).  
Weighted Scale 0-10 
10. Farm HH Asset 
Index (n=436) 
Index of 6 farm assets:tractor,plow,silo,cart,ox team, grain mill (Sum P1.50-
P1.55) Wtd Scale 0-10 
Human Capital  
1. Education level Reported years of education achieved 
2. Education example Maximum level of educational achievement within household 
3. Civic Knowledge  Knowledge of mayor, council rep, & legislator (Sum P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, P4.1, 
P5.1)  Scale 0-10 
Social Capital  
1. Social Ties (SOCTIE) Reported trust in neighbors to help resolve household challenges/problems 
(Mean P10.1-P10.5) Scale 0-10 
2. Association Density Ave. number of organizational memberships (Sum P6.11-P6.17) Scale 0-7 
3. Exit options Distance to nearest paved road (km) 
4. Exit options Distance to nearest market (km) 
Political Capital  
1. Access to Local Govt Reported contact of mayor or town council P3.6 
2. Access to Natl Govt Reported contact of government official P4.2 
3. Access to NGO Reported contact of NGO P5.3 
4. Collective Efficacy1 Level of confidence that neighbors could be counted on to solve a serious 
problem that confronted the community (excessive energy price increases, 
contamination by local business) (Percent saying much 
5. Collective Efficacy2- Willingness to participate in a protest against a government announced project 
that would harm the community (Percent saying very willing) 
6. Collective Efficacy3-
Development with Equity    
Level of agreement with proposition that short-term inequality is necessary if 
economic conditions are to improve (Percent opposed) 
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Table A.2  Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Mediating Attitudes 
 
 
MEDIATING  
ATTITUDES 
Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, n=912 unless noted otherwise) 
1. Inter-Personal Trust Reported trust based on 3 question scale, (Mean P9.1, P9.2, P9.3) 
Scale 0-10 
2. Life Satisfaction Reported index of satisfaction (job, income, house, health care) 
(Mean p1.55, p1.56, p1.57, p1.59) Scale 0-10 
3. Optimism Economic Expectations (P1.41) Scale 0-3 
4. Development Aspirations What life improvements are achievable in future (P18.2) Scale 0-
10 
5. Subjective Self-Confidence Reported confidence that one can make a difference (P6.3) Scale 
0-10 
6. Political Efficacy Reported efficacy of voting participation (Mean P12.1-P12.4) 
Scale 0-10 
7. System Support Index of reported confidence in 10 institutions (Mean P14.1-
P14.11) Scale 0-10 
8. Preferences for social 
change 
Percent reporting preference for radical or revolutionary social 
change (over gradual reforms and defense against revolutionary 
movements). 
9. Religious non-fatalism Mean opposition to the proposition that national problems can be 
resolved by only becoming closer to God, P16.4 
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Table A.3  Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Achievements 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS Data Source 
Individual-Community Level  
Meeting Basic Needs  
1. Access to water Reported access (P1.42) 
2. Access to electricity Reported access (P1.43) 
3. Access to adequate housing Reported access (P1.44) 
4. Access to health care Reported very satisfied (P1.58) 
5. Project beneficiary % reporting having benefited from or participated in a community 
project (P8.1) 
Social & Political Action  
1. Voice in community decisions  Who makes local decisions (Scale 0-10) Max is most participatory  
(LOCDEC) 
2. Satisfaction w local decision making Assessment of community decision making (P6.2)  Scale 0-6, Max 
strongest approval 
3. Local Demand Effectiveness 
(n=243) 
Percent that reported requests to municipal government were met 
4. Government  Demand Effectiveness 
(n=209) 
Percent that reported requests to municipal government were met 
5. NGO Demand Effectiveness 
(n=149) 
Percent that reported requests to municipal government were met 
6. Efficacious participation 1 Formal organizational participation Index, PP1:relig, school, 
ADESCOs, union, coop, other (Mean P6.11-P6.16)  Scale 0-10   
7. Efficacious participation 2 Informal community participation index, PP2 (Mean P6.4 – P6.6) 
Scale 0-10) 
8. Efficacious participation 3 Project participation index, PP3:labor, materials, design, choose 
contractor, control budget, evaluate, direct, other (Mean P8.4-P8.11) 
Scale 0-10) 
9. Women’s organizational 
participation 
Percent of women who report some or frequent participation in a local 
women’s organization, P6.18 
10. Women’s influence Percent of women who report that women have more influence now 
than before the war 
11. Participation in cabildo abierto Percent that reported participation in cabildo abierto or municipal 
assembly in past six months  
12. Protesting Percent that reported participation in recent protest activity 
13. Voting/abstention Percent that reported voting in most recent election 
Local Problem Solving & Advocacy  
1. Problem solving skills Analysis of top local problem (P7.1-P7.4)  Likert Scale of Problem 
Identification, analysis, and Solution (0-9) 
2. Collective Advocacy Percent reporting communal, collective problem solving methods 
(P7.4) 
Ag Resource Mobilization  
1. Improve local outcomes (N=467) Reported increase in agricultural production over prior year 
2. Improve local outcomes (N=467) Reported improvement in agricultural income 
3. Agriculture diversification (N=467) Reported level of diversification (P1.18) 
4. Agriculture intensification (N=467)) Index of reported access to four agricultural technology indicators 
(Sum P1.22a, P1.23a, P1.18a, P1.25a) Wtd Scale 0-10. 
5. Land cultivated % of land cultivated 
6. Land security % of landowners with title to 50% or more of land 
7. Access to credit (n=279) Reported loan in the past year (P1.29) 
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 Table A.4  Indicators and Data Sources for Institutional Level Empowerment/Disempowerment 
Achievements 
 
 
Meso/Inter-Institutional Level Data Source 
1. Local Government Performance  Index of three performance assessment questions (below)  
[0-10] 
2. Performance Local Govt Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with 
LG  P3.10 
3. Performance Local Govt Percent reporting that municipal services are good or excellent  P3.11 
4. Representation Local Govt Percent that say mayor is somewhat or very interested in local participation 
to resolve community problems, P3.12 
5. Performance Local Govt Percent that report willingness to pay more local taxes in order to improve 
local services P3.15 
6. Representation Local Govt Percent that say LG responds to local needs always or most of the time 
P3.16 
7. Representation Local Govt (n=367) Percent that say all sectors are represented in the cabildo abiertos most of 
the time P3.6 
8. National Govt. Performance Index of three performance assessment questions (below)  
[0-10] 
9. Performance National Govt Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with 
agency of National Government  P4.6 
10. Performance National Govt Percent reporting that municipal services are good or excellent  P4.7 
11. Representation National Govt Percent that say government is somewhat or very interested in local 
participation to resolve community problems, P4.8 
12. Representation National Govt Percent that principal beneficiaries of government programs are the poor or 
everyone p4.9 (rather than the rich or government functionaries 
13. NGO Performance Index Index of three performance assessment questions (below)  
[0-10] 
14. Performance NGO Percent reporting that they were treated well or very well in dealing with 
NGO  P5.7 
15. Performance NGO Percent reporting that NGO services are good or excellent  P5.8 
16. Representation NGO Percent that say NGO is somewhat or very interested in local participation 
to resolve community problems, P5.9 
17. Representation NGO Percent that say principal beneficiaries of NGO assistance are the poor or 
everyone P5.10 
18. Resource Mobilization 1 Local tax effort (Minimum percent exceeded expected tax collection 
performance based on Gallagher model (2000). 
19. Resource Mobilization 2 Local tax per capital 
20. Resource Mobilization 3 Diversity of Municipal Finance (% of total development resources 
represented by state transfers 
21. Accountability Qualitative (Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, Moderate-High, High) based 
on participatory observation of municipal meetings 
22. Transparency Qualitative- Access to Available documentation 
23. Coordination Qualitative: based on participatory observation in inter-municipal, inter-
institutional and town level meetings. 
 
  762
 
 
 
APPENDIX B.  Paracentral Sample Design Methodology & Survey Descriptives 
 
 
Table B.1  Sample Design 
 
1.  Oversample Design: 429 surveys 
        
Municipality:  Population Pop. Percent Surveys 
   (est. 1998) Oversample (% Oversample) 
Tecoluca  26,000  52%  155 (36%) 
San Ildefonso  11,000  22%  119 (28%) 
Valle de Jiboa  23,000  46%  155 (36%) 
OVERSAMPLE  60,000  100%  429 
TOTAL  
 
2.  Secondary Sample Design: (482 encuestas) 
The Population STRATA A: San Salvador Metropolitan Area (SSMA) and Municipalities > 80,000 people were 
excluded from the survey.  
     National  Paracentral   Total 
     Population      Population               Surveys  
 
STRATA B: 40-80,000  (ALL NC)  
 EXC    149,747 (18.8%)  62,697       0 
 NC    644,928      103,126   166  (18%) 
 SUBTOTAL   794,675 (25%)           165,823 (34.4%)       166  (18%)  
 
STRATA C: 20-40,000  
 EXC    295,734 (9.3%)     91,619 (19%)    134  (14.7%)  
 NC    523,459 (16.5%)  0                  0 
 SUBTOTAL   819,193 (25.7%)       91,619 (19%)         134 (32%) 
 
STRATA D: 0-20,000 
 EXC    725,435 (22.8%)     181,406 (46.5%)      506  (55.6%) 
 NC    842,137 (26.5%)  42,762    (37.7%)   106  (37.7%) 
 SUBTOTAL   1,561,572 (49.3%)     224,406 (50%)         612  (67.1%)        
TOTAL SAMPLE    3,181,440 (100.0%) 481,610  (100%)       912 
 
The sampling methodology is a stratified survey design with clustered oversamples.  Two of the Jiboa Valley 
municipalities (San Cayetano and Nuevo Tepetitán were not defined as Ex-conflictive municipalities by the National 
Reconstruction Program.  I am grouping them with Verapáz and Guadalupe (which were designated as ex-
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conflictive municipalities). Sample design excluded the largest 4 municipalities in the country and the other 10 that 
comprise the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (STRATA A), using the remaining 251 municipalities as a guide 
for determining the number of interviews selected per municipality so the survey sample is consistent with national 
population distribution according to most recent 1992 census.  The remaining national population at the municipal 
level is clustered into three strata, as noted above.  In STRATA B, 25% of the national population, and 34% of the 
regional population lives in municipalities containing between 40-80,000 people.  This is proportional to 25% (or 
228) of my 912 interviews conducted in municipalities of this size.  However, in order to include enough farmers as 
a sub-sample in the non-case study municipalities, I decided to limit the urban part of the survey to only two 
municipalities of this size (San Vicente and Zacatecoluca) conducting 83 interviews in each.  In STRATA C & D, I 
also selected secondary municipalities so that they reflect the national distribution within ex-conflictive/non-
conflictive communities.  For the paracentral region, the non-conflictive municipalities represent 25% of the total 
regional population.  The total number of surveys drawn from non-conflictive municipalities was 272, which 
represents 30 % of the total.  For both the oversample and secondary sample components, respondents were selected 
by choosing cantónes (communities within a municipality) at random, but controlling for the urban/rural, gender and 
age distribution of the respondents through quota criteria. 
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Table B.2  Paracentral Municipalities Surveyed 
 
Paracentral Region 
Survey Sample Design 
Pop. 
1992 
EXC/ 
NC 
Local 
Party 
Surveys 
STRATA B 40-80000     
San Vicente 45,824 NC ARENA 83 
Zacatecoluca 57,032 NC FMLN 83 
STRATA B Subtotal 102,856   166 
STRATA C 20-40,000     
Jiquilisco 37,334 EXC FMLN 46 
Berlin 21,947 EXC PCN 44 
Santiago Nonualco 32,338 EXC ARENA 44 
STRATA C Subtotal 91,619    
STRATA D 0-20,000     
Tecoluca, S.V. 14,865 EXC FMLN 155 
Apastepeque, S.V. 16,832 EXC FMLN 32 
San Sebastian, S.V. 12,662 EXC FMLN 30 
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San Ildefonso, S.V. 7,904 EXC ARENA 119 
Guadalupe, S.V. 5,103 EXC ARENA 39 
Verapaz, S.V. 5,699 EXC PDC 40 
Nva. Tepetitán, S.V. 3,566 NC FMLN 38 
San Cayetano, S.V. 4,473 NC ARENA 38 
Jucuapa, Usu. 14,887 EXC ARENA 31 
Nueva Grenada, Usu. 7,289 EXC ARENA 30 
Ozatlan, Usu. 10,972 NC ARENA 30 
San Pedro Nonualco, La 
Paz 
9,923 EXC ARENA 30 
STRATA D Subtotal 114,175    
Total Sample Population 308,650   912 
Total Paracentral 
Population 
481,610    
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Table B.3  Political Experiences By Case Study Municipality 
 
 Jiboa 
Valley 
Tecoluca San 
Ildefonso 
Secondary 
Municipalities 
Total 
FMLN control 0 66 
42.6% 
0 64 
13.3% 
130 
14.3% 
FMLN expansion zone 0 23 
14.8% 
48 
40.3% 
43 
8.9% 
114 
12.5% 
GOES expansion zone 8 
5.2% 
66 
42.6% 
15 
12.6% 
183 
37.9% 
272 
29.8% 
GOES control 147 
94.8% 
0 
 
56 
47.1% 
193 
40.0% 
396 
43.4% 
Total 155 
100% 
155 
100% 
119 
100% 
483 
100% 
912 
100% 
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Table B.4  Comparison of Survey Descriptives1030 
 
  1998 1991 1995 1999 Actual El 
Salvador 
1992 
Census 
Actual 
Rural El 
Salvador 
Sample (all cases 
betw 18-95 yrs  
Descriptives Regional Urban San 
Salvador 
National National   
Strata M.S.S. 0 100 34.9 25.1 27 0 
 > 80,000 0 0 4.5 5.5 11 0 
 40-79,999 18% 0 15.1 20.6 15.5 25 
 20-39,999 31.8% 0 14.6 14.0 16 25 
 <20,000 50.2% 0 30.8 34.9 31 50 
  912 910 1409 2914 5,118,599 3,181,440 
Sex Male 51.2 44.5 44.7 48.2 48..6 49.9 
 Female 48.4 55.5 55.3 51.5 51.4 50.1 
Age 18-20 4.6 21.1 10.5 12.4 11.9 12.7 
 21-30 22.7 40.1 29.7 28.5 31.1 30.1 
 31-40 23.5 18.5 22.1 23.0 20.4 20 
 41-50 19.8 10.2 16.3 13.7 14.2 14.6 
 51-95 29.4 10.1 21.4 22.4 22.3 22.6 
Education None 21.3 0 19.1 12.9   
 Primary 50.9 18.3 42.9 29.5   
 Secondary 23.1 52.2 28.3 39.2   
 University 4.7 29.5 9.7 18.4   
Religion Catholic 82.6 71 67.8 57.5   
 Protestant 11.4 10.8 17.7 24.2   
 Other 6.0 18.3 14.4 18.3   
Urban/Rural  33/67      
Income (%)  <  $80 30.5  37.2 32.3   
 80-130 30  22.6 27.7   
 130-230 21.1  23.4 14.8   
 230-450 15.0  14.3 13.6   
 > $450 3.4  2.5 12.5   
Access to Land % surveyed 47.8  5.4 7.7   
Farm  Occup % surveyed 39  9.7 8.9 21(>18 yrs) 47(>18 yrs) 
Ex-Conflictive Surveyed 70 0 38 24   
Zone vs.  Actual 53 25 25 25 25 50 
Ex-combatants % surveyed 7.2 N/A N/A 5.8 4.5 7.0 
Political Left (1-4)  10.5 14.1 18.7   
Orientation Middle (5-7)  71.5 67.4 53.5   
 Right (8-10)  18 18.4 27.7   
FMLN Vote 1997   % surveyed 17.4   13.0   
1999 President % surveyed 14.8  6.0 11.1   
                                                 
1030 Source: DIGESTYC (1997, 1992) Ex-combatant proportions of overall proportions are based on U.N. estimates 
of demobilized combatant populations, plus former combatants, plus active but not formerly demobilized FMLN 
combatants.  Totals of 25,000 FMLN, and 100,000 FAES were then divided by the total and rural over-17 year old 
population from 1992. The Peace Accords officially identified 115 municipalities as ex-conflictive zones targeted 
for reconstruction, equal to a population of 1,271,599, or 25% of total 1992 population, and 50% of rural population. 
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Abstention % surveyed 30.8  35.1 52.9   
Vote is Secret % surveyed 37.9  17.3 8.2   
FMLN governed % surveyed 25 0  57   
municipalities % actual 42 0 1.8 54   
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Survey Codes for the open ended questions: 
1.26 Why have you not diversified your agricultural production? 
1.  Tradition, lack of security regarding change  
2.  Lack of land, renting now and not worth it to invest 
3.  Lack of resources (inputs)  
4.  Lack of irrigation, the land is not apt for irrigation. 
5.  Lack of land security, access to land but without title 
6.  Lack of technical assistance 
7.  Other 
8.  NS/NR (Don’t know or No Response) 
9.  NA (Not applicable) 
 
2.7 Where did your family go to work on the harvests befote the war? 
1.  Coffee fincas on the volcano 
2.  Sugar cane farms 
3.  Cotton farms 
4.  Other 
8.  NS/NR  
 
2.12 Describe changes in your life or the lives of your family between now and before the 
war?  Were things better, worse or the same?  Please describe. 
1.  Life was better before:  things were less expensive, there was less deliquency/crime related 
violence.   
2.  It is the same as before: we are poor now just as before.   
3.  Ambivalent: better and worse, there are more services although there is also more 
crime/violence, less work, and things are more expensive now.   
4.  Life is better now: there is some work, more services, and we live better.   
5.  Life is much better now: we have access to education, work, more opportunities and 
freedoms.  
 
3.7/4.3/5.4 What did you ask for in your meeting with the mayor or municipal council/ 
government official/NGO? (Individual vs. Collective Ask) 
1.  A simple tramite (procedure/transaction) 
2.  Personal credit, job reference or recommendation (letter), or personal favorite 
3.  Infrastructure or basic service project for my community. 
4.  Attention to some community problem. 
5.  Recognition of a community group/organization. 
6.  Indemnfication, benefits related to the Peace Accords for a group 
7.  Other 
8.  NS/NR 
 
3.9/4.5/5.6  Why did you not receive what you asked for? 
1.  We the poor (“uno de pobre”) are typically did not taken into account. 
2.  The proyect was never completed, it just ended. 
3.  There were not sufficient funds. 
4.  Poor administration or corruption related to the relevant funds. 
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5.  Lack of local organizational capacity, interest or will en the government agency or NGO 
6.  Lack of organization en the community or individual. 
7.  The process is underway but unfinished. 
8. NS/NR 
 
5.1 Name of the NGO that you works in your community? 
1.  Habitat for Humanity 
2.  None 
3.  OEF 
4.  CORDES 
5.  FUNDE 
6.  ASDI 
7.  FUSAI 
8.  NS/NR 
9.  NA 
10.  CRIPDES 
11.  PROCOMES 
12.  FUNDASAL 
13.  SES 
14.  APROCSAL 
15.  FEDECOOPADES 
16.  CREA 
17.  FUNDACION SHARE 
18.  ALFALIT 
19.  FUNPROCOOP 
20.  PHILADELPHIA SISTER CITY 
21.  FUNDACAMPO 
22.  FUNDESA 
23.  ITAMA 
24.  HIBASA/PCI 
25.  FUNDAGUADALUPE 
26.  CNC/ACOPAI 
27.  ORC 
28.  SACDEL 
29.  CARITAS 
30.  INFSAFORP 
31.  FUNDASPAD 
32.  ASSOC. ECOLOGICO CHINCHON. 
33.  ACT 
34.  FUNDANONUALCO 
35.  TECHNOSERVE 
36.  IGLESIA LUTERANA 
37.  MSM/MCM 
38.  CODECOSTA 
39.  PROVIDA 
40.  COMUS 
41.  IGLESIA BAUTISTA (IBBE) 
42.  LAS DIGNAS 
43.  CARE 
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6.1 Who makes the most important decisions in this community? 
1.   No one, there is no that makes decisions, everyone for themselves. 
2. The mayor (by him or herself). 
3. The mayor and the council, and/or some individual, unelected authorities. 
4. ADESCOs (community organizations) or community board members with the mayor. 
5. Everyone, all of the community 
6. ADESCOS/board members without the mayor. 
7. All of the community, without the mayor. 
8. Don’t know 
9. No response. 
 
6.2 Are you in agreement with this situation? 
1. Strongly disapprove, with informed explanation 
2. Somewhat disapprove, less informed explanation 
3. Approve, but resigned, not informed 
4. Somewhat approve, but with some concerns 
5. Strongly approve, highly informed 
6. NS/NR 
 
6.8  What was the problem that was the topic of the protest? 
 
 
 
6.9  What was the objective of the protest? 
 
6.10  Where was the protest held? 
1.  in the community 
2.  in the municipal center 
3.  in the departmental capital 
4.  in San Salvador 
5.  Other (at the factory, the mill, the beneficio) 
8.  NS/NR 
9.  NA 
 
7.1  What is the most serious local problem? 
1.  Land, ownership or the lack of it (security) 
2.  Unemployment, lack of permanent work 
3.  Misadministration of public funds 
4.  Criminal violence/delincuency 
5.  Lack of organization 
6.  Basic infrastructure (housing, schools, roads) 
7.  Services (water, light, health) 
8.  Economic conditions, poverty 
9.  Loss of values 
10.  Environment 
  787
11.  Credit, agrarian debt 
12.  Human rights violations 
13.  Indemnification/compliance with the Peace Accords 
88.  NS/NR 
 
7.2  How did this problem emerge? 
1.  Limited response (the war, the government or mayor did not do something, or it has always 
been that way) 
2.  Intermediate response (slightly more detail) 
3.  Formulated response (highly detailed and analytical) 
8.  NS/NR 
 
7.4  What would you do to help solve this problem? 
1.  Conformist: nothing, only God knows, what can one person do? 
2.  Dependent: Government/mayor/police should do their duty 
3.  Offer individual support: provide my labor, or donation of material, participate in the cabildo 
abierto 
4.  Communal organization: We would support the mayor/council/NGO with collective 
contributions of labor, material, or funds 
5.  Collective organization that goes beyond cabildo abiertos: collective contributions of labor, 
material, or funds – and if necessary, political pressure or protest. 
8.  NS/NR 
 
8.15  What was there not greater participation in the project? 
1.  We did not know anything about it, they did not ask us 
2.  Conflict with work commitments or no remuneration was offered 
3.  The people don’t want the project, participation was not worth it 
4.  The proyect was poorly administered. 
5.  We have representatives that participate for the community 
6.  I did not like the promoter 
7.  Other 
8.  NS/NR 
 
8.16  What benefits have you received from the project? 
1.  None, few 
2.  Only individual material benefits: salary, water access, a house, a road 
3.  We contributed to social change. 
4.  In addition to below (3), we received specific training and learned things 
5.  and we learned to organize 
6.  and we built solidarity 
8.  NS/NR 
 
17.5  Where is your PTT land located? 
1.  Close to the community 
2.  Within the community 
3.  In another community, but the same department 
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4.  In another department 
 
 
17.5  In what did you invest your PTT credit? 
1.  housing 
2.  agriculture 
3.  transport 
4.  a store 
5.  carpentry shop 
6.  other business 
7.  personal/health 
8.  NS/NR 
9.  NA 
 
17.10  Who/what is responsible for your not having received benefits for your war service? 
1.  government 
2.  FMLN/FAES commanders 
3.  1 & 2 
4.  International donors/NGOS 
5.  Myself, ourselves, lack of interest or will 
6.  No one 
7.  NS/NR 
8.  NA 
 
17.11  What were your reasons for joining the FMLN, militia, FAES, civil patrols? 
1.   Repression 
2.   Voluntary choice, based on my principles 
3.   Voluntary choice, with recruitment incentives or repression disincentives 
4.   Obligation, conscription, forced recruitment 
5.  Family ties 
6.  Economic reasons, other 
8.  NS/NR 
9.  NA 
 
17.13  What have you achieved personally through your experience as a combatant? 
1.  Only negative results, wounds, loss. 
2.  Nothing 
3.  Discipline, experience 
4.  Specific material benefits 
5.  Pride in having struggled/served/defended the homeland/my people or the revolution 
6.  Other 
8.  NS/NR 
9.  NA 
 
18.1  What are the achievements/results of the war? 
1.  Only negatives, losses 
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2.  There are none: only the combatants or commanders enriched themselves 
3.  Peace, the Peace Accords 
4.  Some changes for the better: (elimination of the death squads, former security forces, some 
economic opportunity, access to land, improvements in the judicial system, respect for human 
rights, political freedoms) 
5.  Many changes for the better (see 4 above) 
8.  NS/NR 
 
18.2  What improvements would you like to achieve? 
1.  NS/NR  Don’t know 
2.  Conformist: Only God knows, nothing, maintain the current state, subsistence 
3.  Improvements for myself and my family: to achieve something more, to live better 
economically, without informed details 
4.  Collective, community or nation-wide improvements: without details, for all to live better, 
that the community has better services, land, etc. 
5.  Collective improvements with specific goals: To achieve much more that basic services or 
individual economic gains – structural opportunities for empowerment. 
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List of Institutions Interviewed 
ACSUR Acsur las Segovias 
ADC Asociación Democratica Campesina 
AIFLD American Institute for Free Labor Development 
AL Legislative Assembly 
ALFALIT  Alfabetización y Literatura en El Salvador 
ANTA Asociación Nacional de Trabajadores Agropecuarias 
ARENA  Nationalist Republican Alliance of El Salvador (Alianza  
Republicana Nacionalista de El Salvador) 
ASDEC  Asociación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo Comunal 
ASDI  Asociación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo Integral 
ASMUR  Asociación de Mujeres Rurales 
ASSOC. CAFE Asociación Cafetalero 
ATI Appropriate Technologies International 
AYUDA EN ACCION Action Aid Spain 
BCIE  Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económica 
BM  World Bank  
BOLL Heinrich Böll Foundation 
CACH Comité Ambiental de Chalatenango 
CAMAGRO Agricultural Chamber of Comerse 
CARE  Cooperativa Americana de Remesas al Exterior (ONG) 
CARITAS 
CBL Coordinadora del Bajo Lempa 
CDA  Departmental Mayors’ Council (Consejo Departamental de  
Alcaldes)  
CDHES Centro de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador 
CDM  Comité de Desarrollo Municipal 
CE  Comisión Europea 
CENTA  Centro Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria y Forestal 
CHRISTIAN AID 
CIPHES Interinstitutional Coordination of Human Promotion of El Salvador 
CLUSA  Liga Cooperativas de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica 
CNC National Peasant Confederation 
CND  National Development Commission 
CODECOSTA Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de la Costa 
COMURES  Corporación de Municipalidades de la República de El Salvador 
COMUS Comunidades Unidas de Usulután 
CONFRAS Confederation of Federations of Agrarian Reform in El Salvador 
CORDES  Asociación para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Comunal de El   
   Salvador 
COSUDE  Agencia Suiza para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación 
CREA Creative Associates International 
CRECER  Proyecto Crecimiento Económico Equitativo Rural 
CRIPDES  Salvadoran Committee for Displaced Persons 
CRS Catholic Relief Services 
DIAKONIA Diakonia Sweden 
DIDECO  Dirección de Desarrollo Comunal (Ministerio del Interior) 
DIGESTYC  National Directorate for Statistical and Resources Development;  
Policy and Census Human Resources Development Fund 
DIGNAS   Mujeres por La Dignidad y La Vida (Las Dignas) 
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ENTREPUEBLOS 
EZE    Evangeliches Zentrarstelle fur Entwicklungstillfe (Germany) 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
FEDARES  Federación de Asociaciones de Regantes de El Salvador 
FEDECACES  Federación de Asociaciones Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito de El 
Salvador 
FEDECOOPADES Federation of Cooperative Associations for Agricultural Production in El 
Salvador 
FIDA  Fondo Internacional de Desarrollo Agrícola 
FISDL  Social Investment Fund for Local Development 
FLACSO  Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales 
FMLN  The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo  
Martí para la Liberación Nacional) 
FLM    Lutheran World Federation 
FOMMI  Programa de Fomento a la Microempresa 
FUNDACAMPO Fundación Campo 
FUNDAMUNI  Fundación de Apoyo a Municipios de El Salvador 
FUNDAGUADALUPE Fundación Guadalupe 
FUNDAJIQUILISCO Fundación Jiquilisco 
FUNDAJUCUAPA Fundación Jucuapa 
FUNDANONUALCO Fundación Nonualco 
FUNDAUNGO  Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo 
FUNDE  Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo 
FUNDECIT-ITAMA Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y Tecnología 
FUNDESA  Fundación para el Desarrollo 
FUNPROCOOP  Fundación Promotora de Cooperativas 
FUNSALPRODESE Fundación Salvadoreña para la Promoción Social y el Desarrollo 
Económico 
FUSADES  Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social 
FUSAI  Fundación Salvadoreña de Apoyo Integral 
GTZ  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Sociedad para la 
Cooperación Técnica – Alemania) 
HABITAT Habitat for Humanity International 
HIVOS Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries 
(Denmark) 
IAF Inter-American Foundation 
IBIS Education for Development (Denmark) 
IDB InterAmerican Development Bank 
IICA  Instituto Interamericano de Cooperación para la Agricultura 
IIZ Institut für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Institute for International 
Cooperation – Austria) 
IMF Internacional Monetary Fund 
INTERMON Oxfam Spain 
ISDEM  Instituto de Desarrollo Municipal 
ISTA Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria 
JICA Japanese Internacional Cooperation Agency 
LEMPA ACAHUAPA Lempa Acahuapa Irrigation District 
MAG  Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería 
MAM Movimento de Mujeres Melida Anaya Montes 
MARN  Ministerio del Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
MINEC  Ministerio de Economía 
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MINHA  Ministerio de Hacienda 
MS MS - Danish Association for International Co-operation 
MSM  Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres 
Municipality of Tecoluca 
Municipality of San Ildefonso 
Municipality of San Cayetano Istepeque 
Municipality of Nuevo Tepetitán 
Municipality of Verapáz 
Municipality of Guadalupe 
NOVIB Oxfam Netherlands 
OXFAM U.S.  
OXFAM QUEBEC 
OXFAM GREAT BRITIAN 
PCI Project Concern International 
PTM Paz y Tercer Mundo (Spain INGO) 
PNC Policía Nacional Cívil 
PRISMA  Programa Salvadoreño de Investigación sobre Desarrollo y Medio 
Ambiente 
PROCAFE  Fundación Salvadoreña para Investigaciones del Café 
PROCOMES Asociación de Proyectos Comunales de El Salvador 
PRODAP    Proyecto de Desarrollo Agrícola para Pequeños Productores de la  
Región Paracentral (FIDA-GOES) 
PROMUDE  Programa de Asesoramiento en el Fomento Municipal y la 
Descentralización (GTZ) 
REDES Fundación Salvadoreña para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo 
RTI  Research Triangle Institute 
SACDEL  Sistema de Asesoría y Capacitación para el Desarrollo Local 
SES Sistema Economic Social 
SHARE The SHARE Foundation 
STC Save the Children U.S. 
SIDA  Swedish International Development Agency (ASDI) 
TECHNOSERVE 
UCA  Universidad Centroamericana ‘José Simeón Cañas’ 
UCRAPROBEX  Union de Cooperativeas de la Reforma Agraria Productoras,  
Beneficiadoras y Exportadoras de R.L de C.V 
UE  Unión Europea 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF  Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
VISION MUNDIAL World Vision El Salvador  
WOLA Washington Office on Latin America (Central America) 
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APPENDIX D: 1998 EHPM Survey Methodology to Derive Land Inequality Estimates 
 
 
 
As has already been shown in some detail by Seligson (1995), describing the agrarian structure 
of El Salvador is not an easy task because of the absence of recent agricultural census data.  The 
most recent agricultural census dates from 1971, and therefore is woefully inadequate to assess 
the current state of land inequality.  Seligson developed a methodology of using the very large 
sample data obtained from the Multipurpose Household Survey in El Salvador (henceforth, 
EHPM), and constructed the agrarian tenure and occupation distribution for 1991.  Here I modify 
that method to analyze the 1998 EHPM, which surveyed 12,352 households, gathering 
information on some 56,768 individuals.1031  The EHPM contains what are called “expansion 
factors” which, when applied to the data set allow us to estimate the actual population figures.  
Thus, throughout this study, whenever data are reported from that study, I use the expanded 
figures.    
The 1998 data set for the first time provides information about the distribution of land 
and income at the departmental level.  The 1998 sample was constructed so that each of El 
Salvador’s departments formed a self-representative stratum within the national sample, a feature 
that was not present in 1991, when the sample was subdivided into regions. I can therefore 
compare the agrarian inequality, landlessness and other variables of interest between 
departments.  At the national level I can compare the 1998 EHPM survey with 1991 data, and 
with agricultural census data from 1950, 1961 and 1971 government agrarian census data (Table 
D.1).  In this section, I summarize the changes to the Salvadoran agrarian structure over this time 
                                                 
1031 I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Phil Sidel, formerly of the University of Pittsburgh, 
Information Services Department, in the reconstruction of the EHPM dataset and application of Gini command 
syntax. 
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period at the national level, and the impact of land reform interventions intended to rectify 
extreme levels of agrarian inequality.1032 
 The first task is to determine the size of the agricultural population.  Replicating 
Seligson’s (1995) methodology, I estimate the 1998 economically active adult population (EAP) 
in agriculture 16 years of age and older as 472,332 people.1033  In addition, the 1998 survey 
found a total of 30,314 unemployed agricultural workers, which, when added to the employed 
population, sums to a total 1998 agricultural sector labor force of 502,646 persons (or 20.6% of 
EAP).  
 The second task is to examine the income data.  Table D.2 shows the distribution and 
average incomes of the adult (16 years of age and older) economically active employed 
population by industrial sector.1034  Not surprisingly, Salvadorans in the agricultural sector, on 
average, earn the lowest of all incomes among occupational categories.   Near-poverty and below 
poverty incomes suggest one reason for the decline of employment in the agricultural sector; it is 
simply not an attractive occupation.1035   
                                                 
1032 The 1991-92 EHPM survey excluded 40 conflictive municipalities.  The most affected departments were 
Chalatenango (13 municipalities excluded), Morazán (13 missed) and La Unión (5), San Miguel (5), Usulután and 
Cuscatlán (2 each) and Cabañas (1).  Results from the 1992 census showed that the 40 towns combined counted a 
total population of 196,188, almost 40% less than 1971 census data figures.  The survey undercount also missed as 
many as 20,000 farms located in conflictive zones. The population decline is, no doubt, the result of conflict-induced 
displacement and a secular urbanization trend.  The importance of both factors is discussed in more detail below.  
Extra caution should be taken with respect to the validity of comparisons using 1991 departmental income and land 
related data from the departments of Morazán, La Union and Chalatenango, where the excluded populations and 
farm properties represent 46%, 21% and 14% of 1992 total department populations, respectively. 
1033 See Diskin (1996) and reply by Seligson (1996) for the justification of this age threshold.  This calculation 
removes 6,975 auxiliary and administrative occupations, a procedure identical to that employed in the calculations 
performed on the 1991 data set. 
1034 Several industrial classifications were combined to produce the five categories in Table D.2.  Agriculture 
includes fishing.  Services include utilities, construction, transport and communication, communal and domestic 
services.  Trade includes commerce, hotel and restaurants, and finance.  Industry includes manufacturing and mines.  
The category “other” includes public administration, defense, education and various minor sectors.   
1035 Poverty was estimated as the number of households that reported income levels below the monetary value of the 
defined by the official expanded food basket of essential items.  For 1997, the rural and urban expanded food 
baskets were reported to cost 1,947 colones and 2,498 colones, respectively.  These values were adjusted by the 
1.5% inflation rate in 1997-1998.  Rural households reporting less than 1,976 colones per month ($227), and urban 
families reporting incomes less than 2,535 colones per month ($291), were considered to be living in relative 
poverty.  A full discussion of poverty estimates is given in McElhinny and Seligson (2000). 
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Table D.1  Economically Active National and Agricultural Populations in El Salvador, 1950-1998 
 
. 
National  2A-5   
Totals 
1950 Census 1961 Census 1971 Census 1991-1992 
EHPM  
1998 EHPM 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Economically Active 
National Population 
(EANP) 
653,409 100 807,092 100 1,166,479 100 1,781,582 100 2,403,194 100 
EANP older than 15 588,068 90.0 727,736 90.2 1,043,334 89.4 1,633,993 91.7 2,234,970 93.0 
EAP older than 15 active 
in agriculture 
363,890 55.7 416,728 51.6 542,879 46.5 581,661 32.6 502,646 20.9 
Sources: El Salvador Ministerio de Economía, 1950, 1965, 1967, 1975, 1977; Authors’ calculations from the EHPM of 
1991-92 and 1998 
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Furthermore, post-war macroeconomic stability has not translated into major foreign direct 
investment for El Salvador.1036   As a consequence, there has been negligible growth in the 
industrial sector, and thus little ability to absorb the outflow of agricultural sector workers.  The 
reported mean individual income in industry is lower than in services or trade, another indication 
of stagnation in this sector.1037  Employment in both services and industry have changed little in 
the 1990s, suggesting that most people leaving agriculture or entering the workforce remain 
unemployed or find work in the commercial sector (micro-enterprise, informal sector jobs).  The 
category “other” includes government sector jobs (public administration, defense and education) 
which surprisingly, given the efforts to shrink the state, have not declined in relative terms.   
 With the exception of agriculture, all other employment sectors report mean incomes 
above the urban minimum wage, which was raised to 1,255 colones per month in 1998 ($144, 
$1=8.7 colones).1038  The gap between the minimum wage and reported incomes may be due to 
the weight of higher salaries or other sources of income such as remittances, estimated at about 
700 colones per household per month in 1998.1039  In sum, Tables D.1 & D.2 underscore the 
decline of agriculture as the primary source of employment, the movement toward service and 
informal sector jobs, and the vast disparity in mean income between agricultural and non-
agricultural occupations. 
                                                 
1036 In 1998, CEPAL estimates that El Salvador received only 5% of all foreign direct investment to Central 
America, the lowest of the five countries.  Costa Rica received two thirds of all regional FDI in 1998, largely as a 
result of the large investment by INTEL in a microchip factory constructed there (CEPAL, 1999). 
1037 The maquila sector has expanded to 200 factories by 2000, employing roughly 70,000 Salvadorans and 
generating $945 million per year in export revenue.  Even with the expected creation of 10-20,000 additional jobs 
from inclusion of El Salvador to free trade agreements with Mexico and the U.S., surplus labor supply still vastly 
exceeds demand.  Moreover, the specific investment focus in maquilas has come at the expense of other industrial 
segments, as the reported increase in factory closings caused by the most recent economic slowdown indicates.  
Diario de Hoy, December 6, 2000.  The plants are also mostly urban and tend to hire only young women. 
1038 With the decision to “dollarize” the economy in January 2001, U.S. dollars are now freely exchangeable in El 
Salvador. 
1039 One of the weaknesses of the DIGESTYC-EHPM is the under-reporting of remittances as a percent of family or 
individual income.  In 1998, the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador reported that the country received a total of 
$1.34 billion in remittances, up from $790 million in 1991 (La Prensa Gráfica, Jan. 23, 1999).  These figures 
translate into $221 for 1998 ($1,000) per family per year and $158 per capita per year in 1991.  However, the 
DIGESTYC-EHPM estimates that average remittances for 1998 were $52 per capita per year, and $236 per family 
per year. 
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Table D.2   Employed Economically Active Salvadoran Population, Sixteen Years of Age and 
Older 
 
2A-6    
 
1991 
  
 
1998 
 1998 
Mean 
Individual 
.Monthly  
Income 
1998 
Mean 
Individual 
Monthly 
Wage 
Field of Activity Number (%) Number (%) (colones) (colones) 
Agriculture 544,099 33 496,334 23.5 615 209 
Services 336,344 21 431,774 20.4 2,108 1,098 
Trade 291,665 18 613,438 29.0 2,064 1,064 
Industry 290,883 18 401,093 19.0 1,959 931 
Other 171,002 10 173,076 8.2 3,474 3,062 
Total 1,633,993 100 2,115,715 100.0 1,800 1,072 
Source: Authors’ calculations from raw data of the El Salvador, Encuesta de Hogares de 
Propósitos Múltiples (DIGESTYC-EHPM), 1991-1992 and 1998. 
 
 
Estimating the Landless and Land-poor Population 
 In order to calculate the magnitude of landlessness and land-poor in 1998, Table D.3 
distinguishes between the landed and landless occupations within the agrarian labor force.  
Coding contradictions in the 1998 EHPM forced some deviation from Seligson’s methodology 
for calculating landlessness and land-poor.  Of the landed sub-categories of farmers who employ 
laborers, cooperative members and small farmers, some respondents were reported working no 
land.  Conversely, in the sub-categories of permanent and temporary wage workers, as well as 
unpaid family laborers and even the unemployed, some respondents reported working land over 
1 manzana (0.7 ha, and the specific cutoff point between land-poor and small farmer adopted by 
Seligson). Seligson (1995) found that for the 1991 EHPM dataset, 9.9% of agricultural laborers 
were simultaneously landholders who farmed as a second occupation, but most of whom owned 
1 manzana or less. 
 In some cases the size of the farm and the income derived exclusively from farm related 
activities justified re-categorization of the primary agricultural occupation.  Of the 22,640 
respondents coded as farmers who employ laborers and 2,417 cooperative members, 1,384 and 
706, respectively, did not report working any land and were reclassified as land-poor farmers.  
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Some 170,349 persons were coded as “cuenta propia,” (independent farmer) but divided between 
those “con lugar” (with property), 33,882 and those “sin lugar” (without property), 136,147.  Of 
the first group, 2,720 reported no land and another 7,496 reported plots smaller than 1 mz. and 
both were classified as land-poor.  A third group of 23,666 reported plots of one mz. or greater 
and were classified as small farmers.  Among the second sub-category of independent farmers 
“sin lugar,” the same criterion produced 14,615 landless temporary wage workers, 43,918 land-
poor farmers and 77,934 small farmers.  Of the 69,437 permanent wage workers, 15,092 reported 
landholdings.  However most were less than one mz., and for the 4,820 who had over one mz. 
the mean farm income was less than their mean wage income.  Thus, no permanent wage 
workers were moved.  For 133,074 temporary wage workers, 32,288 reported landholdings.  Of 
these 11,921 had more than one mz. and their mean farm income was greater than their mean 
wage income and therefore were reclassified as landed farmers.  Another 19,367 reported plots 
less than one mz., but their mean farm income was still greater than their mean wage income, 
and they were reclassified as land-poor farmers.  Among unpaid family laborers, 245 reported 
working land greater than or equal to one mz., and having an income from farm activities greater 
than all other sources of income, and were thus reclassified as small farmers.  Of the 30,314 
unemployed population, 5,492 reported previously working land.  Comparisons of farm size re-
assigned 2,949 to landed farmer status, 5,023 to land-poor, 21,222 to landless wage laborer, 821 
to permanent wage laborer and 299 to unpaid family laborer in Table D.1 (above). 
Data for 1991 and 1998 are my calculations from the respective DIGESTYC-EHPM 
surveys, with the inclusion of all reported properties.1040    
Of principal interest is the extent to which land reforms have or have not improved the 
equality of landholding distribution between 1971 and 1998 (unadjusted total).  One would think 
that this would be an easy task, but as I explain below, serious problems in underreporting of large 
farms complicates the issue considerably. Table D.3 based on census and survey data, shows that 
                                                 
1040 Only the 1998 survey asked respondents to report the actual farm size in manzanas.  The 1991 survey asked 
respondents to choose from a predetermined range of farm sizes.  The top range was 50 manzanas and greater.  Both 
surveys included questions on land use by crop.  Total area per crop was reported, which permitted a cross-check of 
the 1998 farm size and a determination of actual 1991 farm size.  A conservative estimate of the total area of the first 
crop (out of a maximum of four crops) was used as the actual farm size in the 1991 survey, and in the 1998 survey if 
the value was larger than the reported farm size.  Double cropping, and planting more than one crop in the same 
farm during the same cycle prohibited adding all crops as an estimate of farm size.  Investigation of the potential 
under-estimation of farm size by not adding all crops proved to be minimal. 
                                                                                              799
the total number of farms has increased steadily since 1950, to 296,728 in 1998.  However, the 
1991 and 1998 surveys reflect an under-reporting of as much as 75% of total farmland.  Prior 
work on this subject by Edelman and Seligson (1994) in Costa Rica has shown that, using the land 
registry as a supplementary source of data reveals widespread and systematic underreporting of 
land held in large farms in censuses and surveys.  Those who hold such farms are very likely to 
register them in the land registry to legalize their claims, but some landowners try to avoid making 
such ownership widely known by not reporting the farms (or their full extension) in censuses.  In 
El Salvador, where land conflicts have been so violent and expropriation so common, I suspect 
that the incentive to try to hide land ownership for even modest-sized holdings to be very great, 
especially after the initial outburst of state-led land reforms. Inspection of the distribution of 
farms, total farmland, and average farm size strongly suggests that farmers of the largest properties 
failed to report or vastly understated actual holdings.1041  The number of farms above 100 hectares 
(well within the constitutional limit of 245 hectares) appears to drop dramatically from 1,941 
farms in 1971 to 173 in 1998, and average farm size drops from 289 ha to 138 ha.  For the next 
lowest strata, the farms between 50-100 ha. also appear to have declined precipitously from 2,230 
in 1971 to 837 in 1998.  
In order to estimate land inequality in 1998, I must correct the DIGESTYC-EHPM data for 
the missing large farms and farm area.  To do so, I determine the number of large and medium 
farms that remain after the most recent land reforms compared to the number of farms as reported 
by the 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM.  The area of the missing farms must then be estimated in order to 
restore the missing farm area in those upper strata. Therefore, the first step involves accounting for 
the farms redistributed through land reform programs since 1980.  Fortunately, I was were able to 
obtain access to that data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1041 Between 1950 and 1961, the number of farms in all strata increased, with the exception of the middle range 
farms of 5-50 hectares.  Anticipation of impending redistributive reforms spurred a wave of parcelizations between 
1966-1976 (especially in the departments of Usulután, La Paz, San Miguel and Ahuachapán).  Thus between 1961 
and 1971, the number of the largest farms decreased by 207 (a 10% drop), while the farms between 5 and 100 ha. 
increased as a consequence of the subdivision of larger farms.  I estimate that half of the subdivided farm area was 
transferred into the medium farm strata, and the other half was transferred into the small farm strata or was removed 
from production altogether.  
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Correcting the Distribution Data: Estimated Impact of the Salvadoran Land Reforms 
In order to adjust the 1998 land tenure survey data presented above for the undercounting 
of large farms, I make recourse of the extensive information on larger farms reported in the 
context of the land reforms undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s.  As a whole, Salvadoran land 
reforms delivered only about half of what had been promised.  As much as 60% of all farmland 
was potentially redistributable, benefiting as many as 248,500 landless and tenant farmers, or 
44.5% of the economically active adult population in agriculture in 1980.  However, only 
118,787 peasants (21.2% of adult 1980 EAP in agriculture) gained access to land totaling about 
30% of all farmland (400,000 hectares).  The departments of Sonsonate, La Libertad, 
Ahuachapán, La Paz, San Vicente and Usulután experienced the greatest transformation, with 
between 23-30% of total area redistributed.  In these departments I would expect the greatest 
decline in land inequality. I show below that this is largely the case, with the exceptions of La 
Paz and San Vicente, the other departments register the greatest improvements in estimated land 
inequality between 1961-1998. 
 The PTT redistributed 245 farms greater than 245 hectares and another 7,663 between 25 
and 100 hectares (MAG-OCTA 1997).  With these large farms converted into minifundias of 3 to 
5 ha., I would expect the mean farm size in the highest segment (100 or more ha.) to have 
declined since 1988.  Unfortunately, I can not make direct comparisons between the 
McReynolds, et al. data and the 1971 census data or the 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM survey data, 
because the reported ranges of farms are inconsistent and I did not have access to the raw data 
from the 1988 study.  However, the sample design data reported by McReynolds, et al. (1989) 
offer a method of estimating the missing farms in the 1998 dataset.  The McReynolds survey 
estimate of large and medium size farms in 1988 offers a satisfactory intermediate estimate 
between 1971 and 1998.  Based on information provided by the Instituto Geográfica Nacional, 
the McReynolds team designed their sample based on the estimated number of farms and 
average farm size for three strata of small, medium and large farms.  Table D.4 presents this 
stratification for 1988, along with similarly reconfigured data for 1971 and 1998. 
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Table D.3  Agrarian Farm Size Structure, 1950-1998 (uncorrected for large farms, 1991 and 1998) 
 
1950 Agrarian Census Total 0 -1 ha 1-5 ha  5-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100ha >100 ha 
 No. of Farms 174,204 70,416 70,057 14064 15,524 2107 2026 
 % Total No. farms 100 40.4 40.2 8.1 8.9 1.2 1.2 
 Total Area (ha) 1,530,323 35,204 154,986 99,441 328,811 147,640 764,231 
 % of total area 100 2.3 10.1 6.5 21.5 9.6 50.0 
 Ave. farm area 8.8 0.49 2.21 7.1 21.2 70.1 377.2 
         
1961 Agrarian Census Total 0 -1 ha 1-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
 No. of Farms 226,896 107,054 86,244 14001 15,235 2,214 2,148 
 % Total No. farms 100 47.2 38.0 6.2 6.7 1.0 1.0 
 Total Area (ha) 1,581,428 61,365 186,013 98,791 480,758 154,704 754,500 
 % of total area 100 3.9 11.8 6.3 30.4 9.8 47.7 
 Ave. farm area 6.97 0.57 2.2 7.1 31.6 69.9 351.3 
         
1971 Agrarian Census Total 0 -1 ha 1-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
 No. of Farms 270,868 132,464 102,477 15,598 16,150 2238 1941 
 % Total No. farms 100 48.9 37.8 5.8 6.0 0.8 0.7 
 Total Area (ha) 1,451,895 70,287 213,023 110,472 342,430 154,164 561,518 
 % of total area 100 4.8 14.7 7.6 23.6 10.6 38.7 
 Ave. farm area 5.4 0.53 2.1 7.1 21.2 68.9 289.3 
         
1987 McReynolds Survey Total  0-3.5 ha 3.5-14 ha 14-35 ha 35-70 ha >70 ha 
 No. of Farms 286,183  222,883 43,304 12,550 4,589 2,857 
 % Total No. farms 100  77.9 15.1 4.4 1.6 1.0 
 Total Area (ha) 1,334,758  201,503 275,097 262,094 217,378 378,676 
 % of total area 100  15.1 20.6 19.6 16.3 28.4 
 Ave. farm area 4.7  0.9 6.4 20.9 47.4 132.5 
         
1991 DIGESTYC-EHPM 
Survey 
Total 0 -1 ha 1-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
 No. of Farms 251,656 172,181 74,941 2103 2112 113 206 
 % Total No. farms 100 68.4 29.8 0.8 0.8 0.0005 0.001 
 Total Area (ha) 350,030 103,940 116,502 13,822 42,331 7,910 65,524 
 % of total area 100 29.7 33.3 3.9 12.1 2.3 18.7 
 Ave. farm area 1.4 0.60 1.55 6.6 20 70 318.1 
         
1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM  
Survey 
Total 0 -1 ha 1-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha >100 ha 
 No. of Farms 296,728 198,699 87,424 6080 3566 837 173 
 % Total No. farms 100 66.9 29.5 2.1 1.2 0.3 0.01 
 Total Area (ha) 469,004 109,848 158,850 42,200 74,208 59,856 23,972 
 % of total area 100 23.4 33.9 9.0 15.8 12.8 5.1 
 Ave. farm area 1.6 0.55 1.82 6.9 21.1 71.4 138.2 
Sources: DIGESTYC 1954, 1967, 1977; McReynolds, Johnston, Gore, and Francis (1989); Ministerio de Economía, 
DIGESTYC-EHPM 1991 and 1998 
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 Of the 2,199 farms greater than 100 hectares, I subtract the 310 Phase I cooperatives and 
245 large farms redistributed through the PTT, leaving a new sub-total of 1,594 large farms that 
presumably exist in 1998 not taking into account subdivision independent of the PTT.1042   
Subtracting 766 medium size farms transferred in the PTT from the 1988 estimate of 8,390, I 
estimate a sub-total of 7,663 medium farms. Comparing these estimates to the 1998 DIGESTYC-
EHPM estimates, I find a deficit (the under-reporting) of 5,973 medium size farms and 1,424 
large farms.   
 
                                                 
1042 It is worth noting that the original PERA stratification on which the McReynolds is based, lists at least 342 
properties, excluding 310 cooperatives, in excess of legal limit of 245 ha. established in 1983.  However, estimates 
of the number of cooperatives in El Salvador go as high as 350, perhaps accounted for some of the other large 
properties.   
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 Table D.4  Estimating Change in Farm Distribution, 1971-1998 
 
1971 Census Total 0 - 20 ha. 20-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 270,868 259,703 9224 1941 
% Total No. farms 100 95.9 3.4 0.8 
Total Area (ha) 1,451,895 520,756 369,620 561,519 
% of total area 100 35.9 25.5 38.7 
Ave. farm area 5.4 2.0 40 289 
     
1988 Survey Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 269,832 a 259,243 a 8390 2199 
% Total No. farms 100 96.1 3.1 0.8 
Total Area (ha) 1,542,343 510,239 390,100 642,004 
% of total area 100 33.0 25.0 42.0 
Ave. farm area 5.7 2.24 46.5 291.9 
     
1998 Survey Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 296,728 294,865 1690 173 
% Total No. farms 100 99.4 0.5 0.01 
Total Area (ha) 561,393 442,230 94,883 24,280 
% of total area 100 78.7 16.9 4.3 
Ave. farm area 1.9 1.5 56.1 140.3 
     
1998 Adj. Survey  Total 0 - 25 ha. 25-100 ha. >100  ha. 
No. of Farms 306,396 296,544 8347 1505 
% Total No. farms 100 96.8 2.8 0.5 
Total Area (ha) b 1,334,000 610,256  415,229  308,515  
% of total area  100 45.7 31.1 23.1 
Ave. farm area 4.4 2.1 49.7 205 
     
Sources: DIGESTYC (1974), McReynolds, et al. (1989), DIGESTYC-EHPM 1998 
a. Includes 40,233 farms less than 2 mz. (1.41 ha.) that were excluded from the original study.  An average farm 
size of 0.5 ha. is estimated to add 20,117 ha. total farm area.  Estimates of small farms were adjusted to account 
for anomalies in departmental distribution in order to calculate department level Gini coefficients.  See 
Appendix D.5. 
b. Total farm area for medium and large farm strata is the sum of the reported farm area in the 1998 DIGESTYC-
EHPM and the additional farm area derived in Appendix Tables D.6 and D.7.  Subtracting the large and 
medium farm area from total area of 1,334,000 produces the total farm area for small farms. 
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 Comparing 1971 Census data with the 1988 survey data, we see a consistency in the 
percent total farm area found in each stratum, as well as the average farm size.  This lends 
credence to the 1988 distribution.  As such, I may also accept a moderately adjusted percentage 
of stratified total farm area as 38% in large farms, 24% in medium size farms, and 38% in small 
farms.  
 Recall that the 642,004 ha. of large farm strata in 1988 includes 237,586 ha. of 
cooperative farm area. If cooperative area is excluded, the net area in large farms drops to 26%, 
and the average farm size for the remaining farms is 220 ha. that is used as an average large farm 
size for correction estimates in Table D.4.  I use an estimate of 50 ha. for the average farm size 
of medium strata farms in Table D.4.  If the cooperative sector is added to the small farm strata, 
the total area increases to 48.6%. 
 By examining the distribution of reported versus estimated farms per department in the 
medium and large strata (Tables D.6 and D.7), I can replace the missing farms and farm area 
according to a simple calculation.1043  The adjusted land distribution estimates for the entire 1998 
survey are shown as the last set of farm distribution estimates in Table D.4.  The adjusted total 
number of farms is the sum of farms estimated by the DIGESTYC-EHPM and the farms added, 
for a total of 8,347 for the medium strata and 1,505 for large farms.1044  Total added farm area in 
each stratum is estimated by multiplying the number of added farms by their respective farm size 
                                                 
1043 The deficit in large farms are calculated for each department by subtracting the estimated number of farms in the 
DIGESTYC-EHPM (raw count multiplied by expansion factors) from the number of farms predicted by the 
McReynolds estimates of farms in each department after subtracting farms known to have been distributed through 
the PTT.  An adjustment is then made to account for the independent subdivision of large farms since 1991.  An 
attrition rate of 10% was set as a best guess estimate of the net subdivision of non-reform sector, large farms.  Ten 
percent of the predicted farms are removed and transferred to the medium strata in equivalent size farms.  Each 
department is given several weight factors in the 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM, often distinguishing between urban and 
rural areas. A department’s deficit in farms for each stratum is divided by the lowest weight factor to generate the 
number of medium and large farms to be added.  If the remainder is less than a full farm, the last farm size is pro-
rated by this amount.  Medium farms must be greater than or equal to 25 ha., but less than or equal to 100 ha.  Large 
farms must be greater than or equal to 100 ha.  For example, DIGESTYC-EHPM data for the department of 
Cuscatlán reported no large farms, but our estimates suggest that 33 large farms exist (Table A5, column 3).  When 
reduced for attrition, 30 large farms are predicted (column 5).  We then add one farm to the raw data file, which is 
weighted by a given factor of 67 (column 6).  Since the weight factor of 67 is 123% greater than the predicted 
number of large farms, we reduce the value of the farm area of 220 by 123% to 100 ha. (column 7).  Thus, when the 
DIGESTYC-EHPM is weighted, Cuscatlán now shows a frequency of 67 farms averaging 100 ha.  This procedure 
was used to replace the missing large- (220 ha.) and medium-size (50 ha.) farms, and the respective farm area for 
each department.   
1044 The value for large farms is slightly lower than the estimated farm deficit of 1,594 because given the 
departmental weight factors, adjustments were made in average farm area. 
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(Tables D.6 and D.7, columns 8), generating 321,612 ha. to be added to the medium strata and 
293,118 ha. to be added to the large strata.  When 1998 DIGESTYC-EHPM estimated farm area 
is added, a total of 415,229 ha. is obtained for medium- size farms.   For large farms, summing 
the area for the 173 farms originally estimated by the DIGESTYC-EHPM (23,972 ha), and 
275,756 ha. in farm area to be added, I obtain a total of 299,728 ha.  Subtracting the area of 
medium and large farms from total farm area, gives an estimate of the farm area in small farms at 
643,679 ha. (48% of total farm area).1045 
 It is possible that more farms were broken up within both the large and medium strata 
than I conservatively assumed with only a 10% attrition rate (about 32,000 ha.), above and 
beyond the farmland that was subdivided through the PTT process.  Further research is required 
to determine whether a higher rate is justified.   
 Only a new agrarian census coupled with land registry data for the nation as a whole can 
provide the true distribution of farms and farm area in El Salvador after three decades of land 
reform.  As already noted, no census has been conducted since 1971.1046  Given the serious 
under-estimation of large and medium farms diagnosed in the 1998 household survey, the 
adjusted 1998 figures in Table D.4 are probably the best available estimate of current land 
distribution in El Salvador, from which indicators of agrarian inequality may be derived.  Land 
distribution is only one, but arguably the most contentiously debated, element of the agrarian 
structure.  Therefore, considerable care was taken in deriving Table D.4 in order to generate 
valid land inequality measures for the data analysis section of the paper below.  However, I am 
less interested in the validity of the absolute measures of land inequality than in the variation 
between departments, which should not be affected by the correction methodology.  
 
 
                                                 
1045 We include an estimated 230,000 ha. constituted by the cooperative sector in small farms, even though most are 
still held in various forms of collective or mixed collective and individual tenure. 
1046 The World Bank has financed a $70 million overhaul of the land registry and cadastral institutions, as well as a 
complete registration of all 1.8 million urban and rural properties.  The project was scheduled to be complete by 
2010.  
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 Table D.5  Department Gini Coefficients of Land Inequality, various years. 
2A-9   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 1961 
Gini 
1971 
Gini 
1998 
Gini 
1980AgReform 
Area %Totarea 
Change 
61-71 
Change 
61-98 
Col.6/ 
Col. 1 
Ahuachapán .852 .835 .748 19.8 .02 .104 .122 
Santa Ana .859 .832 .782 12.3 .027 -.078 .09 
Sonsonate .849 .878 .848 29.4 -.029 .001 .001 
Chalatenango .794 .780 .783 5.0 .014 .034 .043 
La Libertad .885 .867 .835 28.7 .018 .05 .056 
San Salvador .809 .811 .851 18.5 -.002 -.042 -.052 
Cuscatlán .721 .735 .835 6.9 -.014 -.114 -.158 
La Paz .778 .845 .818 24.7 -.067 -.04 -.051 
Cabañas .701 .678 .779 2.0 .023 -.078 -.113 
San Vicente .803 .809 .829 17.5 -.006 -.026 -.032 
Usulután .832 .815 .795 15.9 .017 .037 .044 
San Miguel .797 .794 .818 12.6 .003 -.021 -.026 
Morazán .673 .721 .815 2.4 -.048 -.142 -.211 
La Union .757 .751 .831 10.8 .006 -.074 -.097 
Total 0.83 0.81 .81 15 .02 .02 .024 
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Table D.6  Correction Statistics Large farms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1998 
DIGESTYC
-EHPM 
1971 
Census 
1998 
Pred. 
10% 
Reduction 
Deficit 
(5-3) 
1998 
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
Correction 
Add farms 
Estimated 100+ 
Strata 
Dept 100+ 
farms 
100+ 
farms 
100+ 
farm
s 
 100+ Wt. 
factor 
a) No. 
(5/6) 
b) Area   
(ha) 
220 * 
(5/6) 
Total 
Add 
Farms 
(7a*6
) 
Total 
Added 
Area 
(8a*7b) 
1. AH 56 119 133 120 64 56 1 251 56 14,056 
2. SA 0 260 138 124 124 106 1 257 106 27,242 
3. SO 70 179 139 125 125 70 2 220,173 140 27,510 
4. CH 0 158 66 59 59 69 1 188 69 12,972 
5. LL 0 225 195 176 176 51 4 220, 220, 
220, 100 
204 38,760 
6. SS 0 67 70 63 63 37 2 220, 155 74 13,875 
7. CU 0 37 33 30 30 67 1 100 67 6,700 
8. LP 0 129 86 77 77 70 1 242 70 16,940 
9. CA 0 45 52 47 47 32 2 220,103 64 10,336 
10. SV 47 133 120 108 61 47 1 285 47 13,395 
11.US 0 174 139 125 125 56 2 220, 271 56 27,496 
12.SM 0 201 213 192 192 183 1 231 183 42,273 
13.LU 0 85 63 57 57 31 2 220,185 62 12,555 
14.M
O 
0 127 147 132 132 74 2 220,172 74 29,000 
Total 173 1941 1594 1435 1332  24  1272 293,11
8 
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Table D.7  Correction Statistics for Medium size farms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6               7 8 
 1998  
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
1971 
Census 
1998 
Predict. 
Adj. for 
large 
farm  
Deficit 
(4+3-
1) 
 Correction 
Add Farms 
Estimated 0-25 ha 
Strata 
Dept 25-100 ha 
farm 
20-100 
ha 
farm 
25-100 
ha farm 
attrition 25- 
100 
Wt. 
fac 
a) 
Raw 
No. 
farms 
(6/5) 
b) Farm  
     sizes 
(7a*50) 
a) Total 
Add 
farms 
    
(7a*6) 
b) Total 
Add 
Area (ha) 
(8a*7b) 
1. AH 112 494 522 57 467 56 6 
1 
50 
67 
392 20,552 
2. SA 246 1039 678 62 494 106 4 1 
50 
33 
530 24,698 
3. SO  223 491 62 483 70 6 
1 
50 
45 
490 24,150 
4. CH 97 495 451 31 482 69 5 
1 
50 
29 
414 19,251 
5. LL 69 243 359 84 443 51 6 
1 
50 
67 
357 18,717 
6. SS 277 287 352 31 383 37 2 
1 
50 
43 
111 5,291 
7. CU  453 200 13 213 67 2 
1 
50 
59 
201 10,653 
8. LP 70 376 350 40 390 70 4 
1 
50 
29 
350 16,030 
9. CA 212 438 448 22 470 32 8 
 
50 
 
256 12,800 
10. SV  568 563 53 616 47 12 
1 
50 
55 
611 30,785 
11.US 135 1055 606 62 668 56 9 
1 
50 
26 
560 26,656 
12.SM 183 908 967 92 1059 183 4 
1 
50 
39 
915 38,056 
13.MO 186 1294 587 26 613 31 13 
1 
50 
39 
434 21,359 
14.LU 103 9224 1089 66 1155 74 13 
1 
50 
61 
1036 52,614 
Total 1,690  8,429  7936  83  6,657 321,612 
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Table D.8  Gini Calculation Correction Statistics to 1988 McReynolds Data for small farms 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 1971 
Census 
1988 
Predict 
1991 
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
1991 Adj. 
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
1998  
DIGESTYC-
EHPM 
Corrected 1988  
0-25 Strata 
Additional 1988 
Cooperative 
Farms 
Dept 0-25 ha 
farms 
0-25 ha  
farms 
0-25 ha 
farms 
0-25 ha 
farms 
0-25 ha 
farms 
a) 
Farms 
Area 
(6a*1.9) 
a) Area 
(ha) 
Farms 
(7a*6.8)
1. AH 18,558 16,011 26,101 26,101 30,880 23,941 45,488 14,807 2,188
2. SA 23,139 20,543 19,115 19,115 32,764 26,203 49,786 19,349 2,845
3. SO 17,476 15,320 17,894 17,894 16,930 17,500 33,250 29,667 4,363
4. CH 20,061 7,932 17,718 20,000 18,470 18,180 34,542 7,484 1,100
5. LL 19,482 22,454 28,676 28,676 24,534 28,000 53,200 39,278 5,776
6. SS 13,627 23,844 11,106 11,106 16,627 15,000 28,500 13,566 1,995
7. CU 17,626 24,728 7750 8,000 81,52 8,000 15,200 3,443 506
8. LP 14,533 22,488 21,050 21,050 16,262 18,945 35,995 26,172 3,849
9. CA 15,178 9,903 20,110 20,110 15,348 18,009 34,217 729 107
10. SV 12,510 14,361 14,341 14,341 12,995 12,907 24,523 17,123 2,518
11.US 18,527 23,740 16,102 16,800 22,814 18,500 35,150 28,168 4,142
12.SM 27,844 13,331 16,226 16,226 37,184 30,500 57,950 20,327 2,989
13.MO 18,317 25,006 8,622 12,600 17,584 18,000 34,200 1,298 191
14.LU 23,514 19,769 16,046 19,400 26,000 25,000 47,500 16,175 2,379
Total 259,603 259,432 219,212 251,419 296,544 278,685 531,500 237,586 34,939
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 Table D.9  Estimation of Patterned Inequality for El Salvador, 1998 
Farm Size Ave. 
Farm 
Size 
(X) 
Observed 
Number 
of Farms 
Observed 
% of 
Total 
Farms 
Natural Log 
of Observed 
% of  Total 
farms 
LNPRCTOT
(Exponential) 
Predicted  
% of Total 
Farms 
(Log-
Exp) 
Predicted 
% of 
Total 
Farms 
Lower       
0-.99 .49 183,589 .68 .39 .46 .81
1-1.99 1.49 56,664 .21 1.57 .26 .11
2-2.99 2.49 22,043 .08 2.51 .15 .04
3-3.99 3.49 5,274 .02 3.94 .08 .02
4-4.99 4.49 3,443 .01 4.37 .05 .015
Total 
Lower 
 271,013 1.00  
Upper   
5-9.99 7.49 6,079 .34 1.08 .21 .38
10-24.99 17.49 2,663 .15 1.90 .207 .24
25-49.99 37.99 4,220 .24 1.44 .19 .15
50-99.99a 74.99 3,264 .18 1.70 .17 .10
100-199.99 149.99 463 .03 3.65 .13 .07
200-299.99 249.99 1,145 .06 2.75 .09 .05
Total 
Upper 
 17,834 1.0  
  288,847  
Exponential   P<.001,  Chi Sq. = 17.81;  Log-exponential P < .003,  Chi Sq. = 
Source: Table 9, Corrected DIGESTYC-EHPM 1998 farm distribution. 
a. The observed number of farms in the 50-99 strata is higher than would be expected due to the correction process, which 
replaced medium size farms with 50 hectare farms.  Actually, a 50 hectare designation simplifies a medium size farm 
distribution of those below and above 50 hectares.  In order to reduce the concentration of farms within the 50-99 ha 
strata, half of the observed farms were replaced in the 25-50 ha strata. 
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Table D.10  Estimation of Patterned Inequality for Chalatenango, 1998 
2A-14 
Farm Size Ave. 
Farm 
Size 
(x) 
Observed 
Number  
of Farms 
Observed 
% of 
Total 
Farms 
Natural 
Log of 
Observed 
% of  Total 
farms 
PRELNCH
(Exponential) 
Predicted  
% of Total 
Farms 
(Log-Exp) 
Predicted 
% of Total 
Farms 
Lower       
0-.99 .49 11,490 .75 .29 .49 .84
1-1.99 1.49 3,546 .23 1.47 .26 .10
2-2.99 2.49 1,565 .10 2.29 .135 .04
3-3.99 3.49 166 .01 4.53 .07 .02
4-4.99 4.49 194 .01 4.37 .036 .01
Total 
Lower 
 15,396 1.00  
Upper   
5-9.99 7.49 720 .47 .76 .26 .43
10-24.99 17.49 304 .20 1.62 .25 .26
25-49.99 37.99 269 .18 1.74 .21 .17
50-199.99a 124.99 173 .11 2.18 .16 .08
200-299.99 249.99 69 .04 3.10 .09 .06
Total 
Upper 
 1,535 1.00  
Exponential p < .001, Chi Sq. = 20.36;  Log –exponential p< .46, Chi Sq. = 2.57 
a. The 50-99 and 100-199 strata were combined because Chalatenango reported no farms in the latter strata. 
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Table E.1  Political Decentralization in Latin America 
 
 
Year of 
post- 
Auth. 
Natl 
Election 
Direct or 
Popular  
Election 
of Mayor 
Election/ 
Apptmt of 
Deptl. or 
Province Exec 4 
Mayoral 
Term  
of  
Office 
Re-
elect 
Mayor 
Formal  
Override 
Authority 
SSN Total 
Finance 
$ mn. 
Externl 
Share 
(%) 
Brazil 1985 Elected (1985) Elected (1982) 5 No No various state level SSNs   
Chile 1990 Indirect 
(1992) 
Appointed 
(1993) 
4 Yes No FOSIS 
(1991-95) 
316 11 
Colombia 1958 Direct 
(1988) 
Elected 
(1992) 
3 No No Red Solidaridad 
(1995-96) 
1255 20 
Bolivia 1985 Direct 
(1987) 
Elected 
(2005) 
5 No No FSE (86-89) 
FIS (91-95) 
195.3 
219.5 
87 
90 
El Salvador 
 
1984/ 
1994 
Direct 
(1985) 
Appointed 3 Yes Yes FIS/FISDL 
(1990-95 
212.6 91 
Guatemala 
 
1985 Elected 
(1985) 
Appointed 2 c Yes Yes FONAPAZ 91-96 
FIS (1992-95) 
67.5 
122.6 
12 
89 
Costa Rica 
 
1948 Indirect 
(1970) 
Appointed 4 Yes Yes    
Honduras 
 
1982 Elected 
(1981) 
Appointed 4 Yes No FHIS 
(1990-95) 
213 81 
Venezuela 1961 Elected 
(1989) 
Elected 
(1989) 
3 Yes No FONVIS 
(1992-96) 
140 60 
Mexico 1917/ 
1988 
Elected 
(1982) 
Elected 3 No No PRONOSAL 
SEDESAL 
9,000  
Argentina 1983 Direct 
(1983) 
Elected 
(1983) 
4 Yes No    
Ecuador 1978 Direct b 
(1978) 
Appointed  
(1978) 
4 No Yes FISE 
(1991-95) 
109.1 95 
Nicaragua 1984/ 
1990 
Indirect 
(1990) 
Appointed 6  Yes FISE 
(1991-96) 
250.6 91 
Panama 1991 Direct 
(1994) 
Appointed 5 Yes Yes FES 
(1991-95) 
102.7 80 
Paraguay 1991 Direct 
(1991) 
Elected 
(1994) 
  Yes PROPAIS 
(1996) 
31 90 
Peru 1980 Direct 
(1981) 
None 3 Yes No FONCODES 
(1991-96) 
890 58 
Uruguay  None Elected 
(1984) 
  NA PRIS/FAS 90.5 76 
Dom. Rep. 1966 Elected 
1966 
    PROComunidad 
(1995-96) 
44.3 93 
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Sources: 
1.  Peterson (1997) for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Bolivia 
a.  Legislation for direct elections has been proposed 
b.  For large cities only (greater than 100,000 population and provincial capitals).  All other mayors are elected indirectly.  Bolivia is divided 
into four sub-national levels: departmental, provincial, sub-provincial, and cantónes.  Municipal governments are located in urban areas 
only.  Departmental prefects were until the 2005 elections, selected by the president, and they in turn appoint the sub-prefects. 
c.  Guatemala City has a four year term. 
d.  Costa Rica municipal executive consists of a city manager appointed by city council.  City manager may be removed by a two-thirds 
majority of councilors. 
e.  Ecuadorian provinces are governed by both an elected executive (prefecto) and a governor appointed by the central government. 
f.  Chile has three levels of sub-national government: regional, provincial, and municipal.  The candidate for municipal council who receives at 
least 35% of the vote is elected mayor.  If no candidate receives 35% of the vote, the mayor is chosen by a vote of elected members of the 
municipal council.  The president has the power to appoint the Intendente at the regional level.  Members of the Regional Council are 
elected by the councils of municipalities located within the region.  These regional councilors can exercise an effective veto over the 
Intendente. 
g.  Peruvian regional governments consisting of elected officials were established in 1989 but were suspended by the government of Alberto 
Fujimori in 1992. 
h. Uruguayan sub-national level government performs both departmental and municipal functions. 
i.  Brazilian mayors of state capitals were elected for the first time 1985, since the military coup in 1964. 
j.  Although municipal elections in Mexico were part of the 1917 constitution, victories by opposition parties at the municipal level began in 
1982, and at the state level in 1989.  Mexico City mayor was appointed until 1997. 
k.  Open list voting replaced closed, blocked party list in Venezuela in 1989 
l.  Regional or provincial level governments are appointed and are assigned resources and responsibilities by the ruling party leader or president 
in Chile, Guatemala, and Bolivia. 
2.  Willis, Garmen and Haggard (1999) National government has authority to revoke automatically the mandate of an elected mayor of override laws 
passed at the municipal level. 
3.  Burki, Perry, Dillinger (1998)  
4.  Nickson (1995) 
5.  Goodman, Morley, Siri and Zuckerman (1997) 
  
Table E.2  Fiscal Decentralization in Latin America (no data where cells are blank) 
Country Decentralization  
Measure 
Level 
of  
Govt 
 
Share  of 
Total 
Govt. 
Rev. 
Collected 
1980-90 
Share of 
Total 
Govt. 
Revenue 
Collected 
MRY 
Share of 
Total 
Govt 
Expend 
1980-90 
Share of  
Total Govt 
Expend 
MRY 
Local  
Revenue 
Base 
Vertl. 
Imbal- 
ance 
LG 
Debt 
Autonomy 
Latin 
America 
     14.6  52  
Argentina  CG 
SG 
LG 
79.3 
13.7 
7.0 
80.0 
15.4 
4.6 
63.5 
31.0 
5.4 (‘83) 
51.9 
39.5 
8.6(49.3) 
 56 3.0 
Brazil State and Municipal 
Share 
of Public Sector Expend. 
CG 
SG 
LG 
59.8 
36.9 
3.8 
47.1 
49.4 
3.6 
50.2 
36.2 
13.6  
36.5 
40.7 
22.8 
41 -tax 
44-CT 
15 other 
33 2.9 
Mexico  CG 
SG 
LG 
90.7 (‘82) 
8.3 
1.0 
82.7  
(‘92) 
13.4 
3.9 
90.2 
8.8 
1.0 (‘82) 
87.8 
9.5 
2.8(25.4) 
CT,PT, 
BLT 
61 1.8 
Venezuela  CG 
SG 
LG 
95.8 (‘80) 
0.1 
4.0 
96.9 (‘89) 
0.1 
3.1 
76.0 
14.9 
7-9.1  
77.7 
15.7  
6.5(19.6) 
CT,PT,VT 
18 tax, 
64 CT 
18 other 
83 1.0 
Chile Regional and Municipal 
Share of Public Sector 
Expenditure 
CG 
SG 
LG 
0.7   (‘80) 19.5  
(‘92) 
 
 
11 (‘91) 
 
 
14-15 
PT, health, 
educ grants 
61 0 
Colombia Departmental and 
Municipal Share of 
Centrally Collected 
Revenue 
CG 
SG 
LG 
82.2 
12.2 
5.6 
81.6 
11.1 
7.3 
38.3   
(‘91) 
5.2 1   
(‘97) 
72.8 
16.7 
10.5 (‘80) 
67.0 
15.7 
17.3-243 
S/L-39 
CT,PT, gas 
tax, 
indust+ 
commerc 
tax 
38 2.0 
Bolivia Municipal Share of 
Centrally Collected 
CG 
SG 
   
 
 
S/L26.7 
CT,VT,PT 43 0.5 
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Revenue LG 10  (‘93) 20  (‘95) 
El Salvador 
 
 CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
3  (90) 
 
 
6  
CT 90 1.5 
Guatemala 
 
 CG 
SG 
LG 
   
8/143 
(‘87) 
 
S/L10.3 
11 (93) 
CT, 
VAT1%, 
local tax 
67 1.0 
Costa Rica 
 
 CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
43  (‘89) 
 
S/L 2.3 
10 (‘91)6 
  0.5 
Honduras 
 
 CG 
SG 
LG 
   
5 law 
1.5 real 
 
S/L12.3 
8 (‘94) 
 49 1.0 
Ecuador  CG 
SG 
LG 
    
S/L-7.5 
5 (‘92) 
CT, PT, 
VT, BLT 
58 2.0 
Nicaragua  CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
13 (‘89) 
 
S/L-5.2 
  - 
Panama  CG 
SG 
LG 
    
S/L-3.2 
23 
  0.5 
Paraguay  CG 
SG 
LG 
    
S/L-6.2 
23 
 23 1.0 
Peru  CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
8 (‘87) 
 
S/L10.5 
CT, PT, 
15 tax 
15 CT 
28 other 
5 1.5 
Uruguay  CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
4 (‘86) 
 
S/L 14.2 
 17 1.0 
Dom. Rep.  CG 
SG 
LG 
   
 
4 (‘86) 
 
S/L 2.9 
  1.0 
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CT-Central Government Transfer, PT - Property tax, VT - Vehicle tax, BLT - Business License Tax, Other - non-tax revenue,  
Sources: 
1.  Peterson (1997) for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Bolivia 
2.  Willis, Garmen and Haggard (1999) for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela 
3.  Stein (1997) in Kiichiro Fukasaku and Ricardo Hausmann (1998) Democracy, Decentralization and Deficits in Latin America. Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
4.  Andrew Nickson (1995) Local Government in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
5.  Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1998) 
6.  Rivera (1999)
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Table E.3  NGOs in Latin America 
 
    Democracy   Rating 
 NGOs Pop. NGOs/ 
mn. pop. 
1972 1980 1988 94-95 97-98 
El Salvador 700 5.5 127.3 2/3 6/4 3/3 3.0 2/3 
Guatemala 700 10 70 2/3 5/6 3/3 4.5 2/3 
Honduras 95 5.3 18    3.0  
Bolivia 530 7.1 75 5/4 7/5 2/3 3.0 1/3 
Nicaragua 300 4.1 73    4.0  
Costa Rica 320 3.3 97 1/1 1/1 1/1 1.5 1/2 
Chile 700 13.8 51 1/2 6/5 5/4 2.0 3/3 
Mexico 608 90 7    4.0  
Argentina 850 33.8 25    2.5  
Haiti 146 7 21    5.0  
S.Africa 10,000 39.7 252    1.5  
Mozambique 27 15.1 1.8    3.5  
Bangladesh 1200 115.2 10    3.5  
Philippines 6000 64.8 93    3.0  
Egypt 13,239 56.4 235    6.0  
Tunisia 5186 8.7 596    5.5  
         
Source: Fisher (1998: 162-164)
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APPENDIX F. Civilian & Military Deaths in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979-1991 
 
Table F.1  Estimated Civilian & Military Deaths in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979-1991 
 
1972-77ave.977-79 ave 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total (1979-199
1. Civilian Deaths 580 14,343 16,357 12,547 5,826 3318 2,287 1,821 1,415 1,891 3,713 1,323 1,035 Max 66,456
13,138 13,353 5,962 5,569 2,860 1,832 1,091 301 500 Min 38,259
11,903 6,116 5,339 1,543 261 432
335
2. Combat Deaths
Salv. Armed Forces (FAES) 132 3,477 801 1579 2400 1,296 859 742 832 788 1,356 1,000 878 Max 16,140
1,200 1,693 750 749 459 500 455 600 Min 11,556
953 1,298 426 470 457
FAES Casualties (incl. paramil) 17,000
FMLN source 900 5,859 5,133 3,587 9,164 4,962 6,084 6,151 6,079 7,230 2,000
Govt Source 2,100 4,000 3,560 2,456 2,109 3,285
Ave 1+2 900 2,500 3,617 3,794 6,362 3,709 4,097 4,121 4,682 4,844 5,400 2,000 1,756 Ave. 47,781
Monthly ave. 11 73 75 208 301 316 530 309 341 343 390 404 450 167 146 3,982
FMLN 100 658 1500 750 2,000 783 1,123 900 1,004 1,111 1,902 832 500 Max 13,163
500 774 334 1,034 900 826 1,853 Min 9,790
8 809 1,773
FMLN Casualties (Govt source) 687 2,200 1,500 4,000 1,120 2,246 1,772 1,674 2,201 3,490 1,664 1,000 23,554
FMLN Source 1,490
37 342 57 183 125 333 93 187 148 140 183 291 139 83 164
3. Disappearances 979 927 1,177 526 196 185 39 213 253 293 164 157 5,109
Total Estimated Cum. Death Toll 42,000 73,000
4. Yearly totals (1+2+3)
Maximum Annual Estimate 812 19,457 19,585 16,053 10,752 5,593 4,454 3,502 3,464 4,043 7,264 3,319 2,570 Max 100,868
Minimum Annual Estimate 812 17,017 8,344 8,466 8,167 4,140 1,980 2,489 2,907 1,795 2,955 3,319 2,570 Min 64,961
5. Cumulative Totals
Maximum Cum. Estimate 812 20,269 39,854 55,907 66,659 72,252 76,706 80,208 83,672 87,715 94,979 98,298 100,868 83,000
Minimum Cum. Estimate 812 17,829 26,173 34,639 42,806 46,946 48,926 51,415 54,322 56,117 59,072 62,391 64,961
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Table F.2  San Vicente ISTA Agrarian Reform Properties transferred in the March 1980 
Phase I reform (see Figure 5.2) 
Map No. Property Name Area (Has.) 
1 Parras Lempa 1,144.3 
2 El Marquezado 434.7 
3 El Chorro 367.2 
4 Sta. Teresa, Sta. Amalia y Las Moras 693.4 
5 Sihuatepeque, San Pablo Cañales 712.4 
6 Las Queseras 703.3 
7 Guajoyo 601.1 
8 La Joya 954.5 
9 Achichilco 409.8 
10 Santa Marta 211.3 
11 El Coyol 217.5 
12 Barrio Nuevo 522.4 
13 San Luis las Posadas 216.8 
14 San Nicolás 150.8 
15 Miramar 411.5 
16 San Luís Alto 133.8 
17 San Juan Buenavista 253.4 
18 Santa Monica – Los Lotes 34.2 
19 San Antonio Caminos 55.9 
20 Los Angeles 159.4 
21 Nuevo Oriente 209.7 
22 La Cañada Arenera 142.1 
23 San Jeronimo 40.0 
24 La Primavera 85.3 
25 Gran Sasso 257.6 
26 Guachipilín 482.3 
27 Los Almendros 472.0 
28 San Ramon Grifal 179.2 
29 Las Puertecitas 409.8 
30 El Izcatal 339.3 
31 Los Lotes 45 34.9 
 San Vicente Department Pre-1980 ISTA Farms Area (ha.) 
A  Tehuacan & Teocali 500.6 
B No data  
C La Rinconera 113.1 
D Las Pampas & Santa Monica 1183.4 
E San Nicolas Lempa 479.8 
F Las Anonas 142.3 
G El Porvenir II 403.5 
H San Bartolo 389.3 
I El Naranjo I & II & Puerto Nuevo 542.1 
J Santa Marta, Las Puertecitas 1,174.4 
Map in Figure 5.2 was reproduced from a photograph of a map in the office of the ISTA 
Director.  Table F.2 data was provided by ISTA for Phase I properties in February 2000.  The 
two sources are not completely consistent. 
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APPENDIX G.  Summary of Municipal and Legislative Election Results, 1994-2003 
 
 
Table G.1  Municipal Governments Won by Party, El Salvador (1994-2003) 
 
 
Party 1994 % 1997 % 2000 % 2003 % 
ARENA 206 78.6 160 61.1 127 48.5 111 42.4 
FMLN 15 6.1 54* 20.6 79** 30.2 74** 28.2 
PCN 9 3.4 18 6.9 33 12.6 53 20.2 
PDC 30 11.5 15 5.7 16 6.1 18*** 6.9 
CD/CDU 0 0 0 0 4 1.5 4 1.5 
Other 2 0.7 15 5.7 3 1.1 2 0.7 
Total 262 100 262 100 262 100 262 100 
* Includes 6 muncipalities won in coalition; ** includes 12 municipalities won in coalition; *** includes 4 
municipalities won in coalition.  Other can include: MNR, MAC, MU, MSN, PD, PL, PLD, PRSC, PUNTO, 
MAS, PAN, PPL, USC, FC, PSD, PPR, and MR.  Based on data provided by the Supreme Electoral Council 
(TSE) 
 
 
Table G.2  Legislative Deputies Won by Party, El Salvador (1994-2003) 
 
 
 
Party 1994 % 1997 % 2000 % 2003 % 
ARENA 39 46.4 28 33.3 29 34.5 27 32.1 
FMLN 21 25.0 27 32.1 31 37.0 31 37.0 
PCN 4 4.8 11 13.1 14 16.7 16 19.0 
PDC 18 21.4 7 8.3 5 6.0 4 4.8 
CD/CDU 1 1.2 2 2.4 3 3.6 5 6.0 
Other 1 1.2 9 10.7 2 2.4 1 1.2 
Total 84 100 84 100 84 100 84 100 
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 Table G.3  Summary of National Assembly Election Results, El Salvador (1994-2003) 
 
 
Municipal Vote by Party (1994-2003) 
Party 1994 % 1997 % 2000 % 2003 % 
ARENA 598,391 44.5 410,537 36.8 438,859 36.0 491,452 35.0 
FMLN 273,498 20.3 365,176 32.7 338,950 27.8 471,042 33.6 
FMLN incl. 
coalition 
    424,111 34.8   
PCN 107,110 8.0 102,961 9.2 123,950 10.2 210,056 15.0 
PDC 261,130 19.4 101,945 9.1 95,509 7.8 104,494 7.5 
CDU 48,763 3.6 26,986 2.4 54,291** 3.4 37,629 2.7 
Other n.a. n.a. 108,363 9.7 81,276* 7.7 88,253 6.3 
Total 1,345,454 100 1,115,878 100 1,217,996 100 1,402,926 100 
* does not include FMLN, CDU, USC coalition votes ** includes USC coalition in San Salvador 
 
 
Table G.4  Summary of National Assembly Election Results, El Salvador (1994-2003) 
 
Legislative Vote by Party (1994-2003) 
Party 1994 % 1997 % 2000 % 2003* % 
ARENA 605,775 45.0 396,301 335.3 436,169 36.0 446,279 31.9 
FMLN 287,811 21.4 369,709 33.0 426,289 35.2 475,130 34.0 
PCN 83,520 6.2 97,362 8.7 106,802 8.8 181,167 12.9 
PDC 240,451 17.9 93,645 8.4 87,074 7.2 101,854 7.3 
CD/CDU 59,843 4.5 39,145 3.5 65,070 5.4 89,090 6.4 
Others 67,877 5.0 123,441 11.0 88,865 7.3 105,206 7.5 
Total 1,345,277 100 1,119,603 100 1,210,269 100 1,398,726 100 
Preliminary, from ECA (2003) Vol. 653-654, pg. 182.  
 
 
Table G.5  Swing in Municipal Vote, El Salvador (1994-2003)  
 
 Change in Municipal  Vote 
 1994-1997 1997-2000 2000-2003 
ARENA -187,854 -31.4 28,322 6.9 52,593 12.0
FMLN 91,678 33.5 -26,226 -7.2 132,092 38.9
FMLN incl. 
coalition 
  -58,935 -16.1 46,931 11.1
PCN -4,149 -3.9 20,984 20.4 86,106 69.4
PDC -159,185 -60.9 -6,436 -6.3 8,985 9.4
CD/CDU -21,777 -44.7 14,563 54.9 -16,662* -30.7
Others   6,977 8.6
Total -281,287 -20.9 31,207 2.8 184,900 15.2
* does not reflect added vote from coalition with FMLN (est. 2,000 addl votes) 
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Table G.6  Swing in National Assembly Vote, El Salvador (1994-2003) 
 
 
 Change in Legislative Vote 
 1994-1997 1997-2000 2000-2003 
Party Change % 1997 % 2000 % 
ARENA -209,474 -34.6 39,868 10.1 10,110 2.3
FMLN 81,898 28.5 56,580 15.3 48,841 11.5
PCN 13,842 16.6 9,440 9.7 74,365 69.6
PDC -146,806 -61.1 -6,571 -7.0 14,780 17.0
CD/CDU -20,698 -34.6 25,925 66.2 24,020 36.9
Others 55,564 81.9 -34,576 -28.0 16,341 18.4
Total -225,674 -16.8 90,666 8.1 188,457 18.4
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APPENDIX H.  Case Study Municipality Institutional Maps
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Figure H.1  TECOLUCA INSTITUTIONAL MAP 
 
Multilateral Donors: World Bank, IDB, BCIE, IFAD, EU, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO
Bilateral Donors: USAID, IAF, Germany GTZ, Spain, Japan, Canada, Holland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Italy, UK, Austria, Switzerland 
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Multilateral Donors: IDB, BCIE, IFAD, EU, UNDP, UNICEF, FAO 
Bilateral Donors:USAID, Germany GTZ, Spain, Japan, Canada, Sweden
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Multilateral Donors: IDB, BCIE, UNICEF, IFAD, EU  
Bilateral Donors: Germany, Canada, Belgium
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Figure H. 3 SAN ILDEFONSO INSTITUTIONAL MAP 
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Table I.1  Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Resources   
 
( JV-Jiboa Valley, T-Tecoluca, SF- San Ildefonso, FC – FMLN Control Communities, FE – FMLN Expansion Communities, GE-Government 
Expansion Communities, GC –Government Control Communities, Sig. = statistical significance for ANOVA two tailed test, NS = ρ > 0.10) 
RESOURCES Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, n=912 unless noted 
otherwise) 
Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig FC FE GE GC Sig. 
Economic Capital            
1. Income Reported monthly income range, P1.37 $171 $148 $115 $133 .000 $133 $123 $166 $170 .000 
2. Land (n=435) Reported land owned or rented, ha. (P1.11, P1.17) 2.7 1.9 2.1 3.3 NS 2.1 3.6 2.5 2.5 NS 
3. Land inequality Gini index of land inequality among producers w 
access to land 
0.52 0.57 0.20 0.47  0.20 0.33 0.55 0.67  
4. Collective land ownership % of landowners holding some or all land in collective 
title 
21.4 7.3 34.7 11.1 .000 27.2 22.8 24.6 11.6 .000 
5. Livestock (n=132) Reported cattle owned of 467 ag. Producers  5.4 3.1 5.8 5.3 NS 4.8 6.2 5.1 5.2 NS 
6. Remittances (Exit option) Reported receipt of remittances (range) in last year 
(P1.40) 
19.7% 16.1 14.8 15.1 .05 11.5 15.8 25.7 19.4 .05 
7. Dependency Index Total household occupations per family member  .379 .34 .36 .31 .000 .356 .342 .413 .373 .005 
8. Household Asset Index 
9. (n=912) 
Index of 5 household assets: tv,vcr,fridge,phone,auto 
(Sum P1.45-P1.49).  Weighted Scale 0-10 
1.1 1.2 0.5 0.55 .000 0.38 0.38 1.3 1.4  
10. Farm HH Asset Index 
(n=436) 
Index of 6 farm assets:tractor,plow,silo,cart,ox team, 
grain mill (Sum P1.50-P1.55) Wtd Scale 0-10 
0.72 1.17 1.02 0.70 .000 0.59 0.59 0.39 0.43 .000 
Human Capital            
1. Education level Reported years of education achieved 4.95 5.2 3.55 3.75 .000 3.3 3.8 4.8 5.9 .000 
2. Education example Maximum level of educational achievement within 
household 
8.2 9.2 6.6 6.4 .000 6.3 5.8 8.8 9.2 .000 
3. Civic Knowledge 
(CIVINFO) 
Knowledge of mayor, council rep, & legislator (Sum 
P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, P4.1, P5.1)  Scale 0-10 
5.5 4.8 5.7 6.5 .000 6.4 6.2 5.1 5.3 .000 
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Table I.1 Continued
RESOURCES Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, n=912 unless noted 
otherwise) 
Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig FC FE GE GC Sig. 
Social Capital            
1. Social Ties  Reported trust in neighbors to help resolve household 
challenges/problems (Mean P10.1-P10.5) Scale 0-10 
3.9 3.0 3.8 4.3 .006 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.8 NS 
2. Association Density Ave. number of organizational memberships (Sum 
P6.11-P6.17) Scale 0-7 
2.5 2.1 2.7 2.6 .000 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.3 .000 
3. Exit options Distance to nearest paved road (km) 5.3 6.6 4.7 10.5 .000 9.3 9.5 1.8 5.1 .000 
4. Exit options Distance to nearest market (km) 16 9.4 19.0 39.5 .000 25.4 25.0 9.3 15.1 .000 
 
Political Capital 
           
1. Access to Local Govt Reported contact of mayor or town council P3.6 26.4 25.2 21.9 38.7 .000 28.5 31.6 21.7 27.5 .01 
2. Access to Natl Govt Reported contact of government official P4.2 22.9 19.3 24.8 19.0 NS 30 25.5 20.5 21.4 .05 
3. Access to NGO Reported contact of NGO P5.3 46.7 22.6 51.5 38.0 .000 55.6 50.0 34.7 43.4 .000 
4. Collective Efficacy1 Level of confidence that neighbors could be counted 
on to solve a serious problem that confronted the 
community (excessive energy price increases, 
contamination by local business) (Percent saying much 
46.7 27.5 44.5 42.6 .000 54.0 45.9 52.9 40.3 .002 
5. Collective Efficacy2- Willingness to participate in a protest against a 
government announced project that would harm the 
community (Percent saying very willing) 
69.5 44.7 74.8 68.2 .000 80.5 72.9 73.5 62.0 .002 
6. Collective Efficacy3- 
Development with Equity    
Level of agreement with proposition that short-term 
inequality is necessary if economic conditions are to 
improve (Pct opposed) 
22.4 31.2 44.6 19.8 .000 37.9 12.4 23.0 19.7 .004 
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 Table I.2   Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Mediating Attitudes 
 
 
MEDIATING  
ATTITUDES 
Individual-Community Level Data Sources 
(1998 Paracentral Survey, n=912 unless noted 
otherwise) 
Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig FC FE GE GC Sig. 
1. Inter-Personal Trust Reported trust based on 3 question scale, (Mean P9.1, 
P9.2, P9.3) Scale 0-10 
5.7 5.3 5.2 5.4 NS 5.9 5.4 6.0  5.5 NS 
2. Life Satisfaction Reported index of satisfaction (job, income, house, 
health care) (Mean p1.55, p1.56, p1.57, p1.59) Scale 
0-10 
5.7 5.3 5.2 5.4 NS 5.9 5.4 5.9 5.5 NS 
3. Optimism Economic Expectations (P1.41) Scale 0-3 2.1 2.06 2.32 2.08 .003 2.24 2.14 2.06 2.0 .005 
4. Impact of the war 1 Life is better or worse now than before the war  (0 – 
worse; 5 – better) 
3.0 2.33 3.97 4.63 .000 5.68 3.92 2.56 2.13 .000 
5. Impact of the war 2 What, if anything, did the war achieve (0- only costs; 
5 – specific, broad benefits) 
2.7 2.35 3.2 3.0 .000 3.8 3.0 2.7 2.2 .000 
6. Development Aspirations What life improvements are achievable in future 
(P18.2) Scale 0-10 
6.5 6.4 7.0 6.6 .005 7.3 6.7 6.4 6.4 .000 
7. Subjective Self-Confidence Reported confidence that one can make a difference 
(P6.3) Scale 0-10 
3.95 3.91 4.83 3.8 .01 5.0 4.3 3.9 3.5 .000 
8. Political Efficacy Reported efficacy of voting participation (Mean 
P12.1-P12.4) Scale 0-10 
5.4 5.0 6.2 5.8 .000 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.0 .000 
9. System Support Index of reported confidence in 10 institutions (Mean 
P14.1-P14.11) Scale 0-10 
4.5 4.0 4.2 4.8 .005 3.9 4.6 4.8 4.6 .003 
10. Preferences for social 
change 
Percent reporting preference for radical or 
revolutionary social change (over gradual reforms 
and defense against revolutionary movements). 
6.8 4.3 23.8 3.9 .000 26.1 5.0 3.7 3.1 .000 
11. Religious non-fatalism Mean opposition to the proposition that national 
problems can be resolved by only becoming closer to 
God, P16.4 
2.2 2.1 2.85 2.1 .000 2.7 2.15 2.3 2.04 .000 
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Table I.3  Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Achievements 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS Data Source Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig. FC FE GE GC Sig. 
Individual-Community Level            
Meeting Basic Needs            
1. Access to water Reported access (P1.42) 68.4 66.5 80 55.5 .000 74.6 43.9 67.6 74.0 .003 
2. Access to electricity Reported access (P1.43) 62.5 85.2 40 38.7 .000 19.2 22.8 70.6 82.6 .000 
3. Access to adequate housing Reported access (P1.44) 34.1 32.3 42.6 10.1 .000 43.1 20.2 40.8 30.6 NS 
4. Access to health care Reported very satisfied (P1.58) 40.4 35.1 40.7 37.9 NS 32.3 38.1 45.1 40.5 NS 
5. Project beneficiary % reporting having benefited from or 
participated in a community project (P8.1) 
68 62 81 80 .000 81 77 63 65 .000 
Social & Political Action            
1. Voice in community decisions  Who makes local decisions (Scale 0-10) Max is 
most participatory  (LOCDEC) 
5.8 5.0 6.9 6.1 .000 7.6 6.9 5.6 5.2 .000 
2. Satisfaction w local decision making Assessment of community decision making 
(P6.2)  Scale 0-6, Max strongest approval 
2.8 2.6 2.9 2.8 .053 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.7 .000 
3. Local Demand Effectiveness (n=243) Percent that reported requests to municipal 
government were met 
40.3 52.6 47.1 28.3 NS 35.1 19.4 50.9 43.9 .018 
4. Government  Demand Effectiveness 
(n=209) 
Percent that reported requests to municipal 
government were met 
62.2 50 63.4 42.9 NS 64.3 57.1 62.5 62.7 NS 
5. NGO Demand Effectiveness (n=149) Percent that reported requests to municipal 
government were met 
83.9 85.7 84 84.2 NS 91.7 86.2 70.4 78.8 NS 
6. Efficacious participation 1 Formal organizational participation Index, 
PP1:relig, school, adesco, union, coop, other 
(Mean P6.11-P6.16)  Scale 0-10   
3.7 3.1 4.0 3.8 .000 4.6 4.3 3.7 3.3 .000 
7. Efficacious participation 2 Informal community participation index, PP2 
(Mean P6.4 – P6.6) Scale 0-10) 
3.6 3.4 4.7 3.9 .000 5.3 4.0 3.3 3.1 .000 
8. Efficacious participation 3 Project participation index, PP3:labor, materials, 
design, choose contractor, control budget, 
evaluate, direct, other (Mean P8.4-P8.11) Scale 
0-10) 
3.1 2.5 3.3 3.1 .087 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.7 .000 
9. Women’s organizational participation Percent of women who report some or frequent 
participation in a local women’s organization, 
P6.18 
9.7 6.4 23.7 5.4 .001 37.1 7.4 3.5 5.8 .000 
10. Women’s influence Percent of women who report that women have 
more influence now than before the war 
61 58.4 71.6 50. .000 79.7 58.1 65.1 58.4 .000 
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Table I.3  Indicators and Data Sources for Empowerment/Disempowerment Achievements (Continued) 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS Data Source Survey 
Mean 
JV T SF Sig. FC FE GE GC Sig. 
11. Participation in cabildo abierto Percent that reported participation in cabildo 
abierto or municipal assembly in past six 
months  
20.4 22.6 21.3 22.7 NS 28.5 20.2 14.7 21.7 .01 
12. Protesting Percent that reported participation in recent 
protest activity 
16.3 4.5 41.9 15.1 .000 60.8 24.6 7.4 5.6 .000 
13. Voting/abstention Percent that reported voting in most recent 
election 
65.0 45.2 66.5 68.9 .000 74.6 60.5 68.4 60.9 .014 
Local Problem Solving & Advocacy            
1. Problem solving skills Analysis of top local problem (P7.1-P7.4)  
Likert Scale of Problem Identification, 
analysis, and Solution (0-9) 
4.65 4.7 5.4 4.7 .001 5.5 4.9 4.5 4.4 .000 
2. Collective Advocacy Percent reporting communal, collective 
problem solving methods (P7.4) 
31.6 32.6 46.1 27.7 .000 52.0 26.3 29.1 28.0 .000 
Ag Resource Mobilization            
1. Improve local outcomes (N=467) Reported increase in agricultural production 
over prior year 
39.5 60 46.3 33.8 NS 42.5 32.9 37.8 45.6 NS 
2. Improve local outcomes (N=467) Reported improvement in agricultural income 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 NS 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 NS 
3. Agriculture diversification (N=467) Reported level of diversification (P1.18) 1.7 2.8 2.2 1.1 .000 2.5 1.2 1.4 2.3 .000 
4. Agriculture intensification (N=467)) Index of reported access to four agricultural 
technology indicators (Sum P1.22a, P1.23a, 
P1.18a, P1.25a) Wtd Scale 0-10. 
3.3 4.14 4.3 2.0 .000 4.9 3.5 3.2 3.6 .000 
5. Land cultivated % of land cultivated 62 96 65 39 .01 65 34 72 74 NS 
6. Land security % of landowners with title to 50% or more of 
land 
75.5 94.4 54.3 67.5 .000 60.6 53.8 88.0 95.8 .000 
7. Access to credit (n=279) Reported loan in the past year (P1.29) 28 22.6 27.7 20.2 .03 32.3 25.4 32.4 24 .06 
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